Workshop 3- Third sector impact in Welsh Government policy making/ Gweithdy 3- Effaith y trydydd sector ar bolisi Llywodraeth Cymru

1. Third Sector Organisations and
Public Policy-making in a
Devolved Wales
PAUL CHANEY, CARDIFF UNIVERSITY

2. Aims
To examine civil society organisations’
views and experience of policy engagement
Third Sector engagement - what are the effects and
implications of one-party-dominance?
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3. Method
Data from series of projects 1999- present, inc. ESRC R000239410,
L219252023, L219252016, ES/L009099/1
 200+ semi-structured interviews with purposive sample of CSOs and
policy actors in Wales
75+ interviews CSOs 2013-15
Secondary sources: inc. ‘grey’ literature of CSOs, NAfW proceedings
etc.
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4. The “i” word
Deconstruct “inclusiveness”? “if you have a political system which leads
to pluralism… open up access to power and influence to all these ‘other
people’ through pluralistic and open politics”.
Ron Davies – interview with Paul Chaney and Ralph Fevre 4th November 1999
Chaney, P. and Fevre, R. (2001) ‘Ron Davies and the cult of “inclusiveness”: devolution and participation in Wales’, Contemporary Wales, vol. 14,
pp. 21–49. Downloadable: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/uwp/cowa/2001/00000014/00000001/art00004
‘the Assembly values volunteering as an important expression of
citizenship and as an essential component of democracy… the goal is
the creation of a civil society which… is inclusive and enables people to
participate in all its economic, social and cultural activities’
(National Assembly for Wales, 2000, Voluntary Sector Scheme, chpt 2, para 2.7)
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5. “learning more about the voluntary sector seems to be at the forefront of
the politician’s minds and they do recognise the third sector and what it can
contribute.”
 “we had AMs from every party, and we had a good reception, they were
interested… they are responsive.”
“definitely, they are far more approachable [AMs], there’s not all this stuffy
language and there’s a real interest, they don’t seem so remote.”
“they [AMs] are far more open, if you approach them they are very willing to
meet you.”
Chaney, P. and Fevre, R. (2001) Inclusive Governance and “Minority” Groups: The
Role of the Third Sector in Wales, Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and
Nonprofit Organizations, Vol. 12, No. 2, 131-156.
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6. Civil Society Expectations (2)
“If we are going to get some kind of democratic process… we are going to
have to look at the costs of democracy.”
“Paper work, paper work, paper work… I don’t think they see eye-to-eye with
a voluntary organization, they don’t realise that one full time worker and four
part time workers um : : : they expect you to be able to move, a mountain if
you like… it’s the paperwork… it is just never ending”
“It’s not going to be easy, as you can imagine, but I know these people are
concerned about the contact they have with organizations they are supposed
to be representing… these are big, big issues.”
Paul Chaney and Ralph Fevre (2001) Inclusive Governance and “Minority” Groups: The Role of the Third Sector in Wales, Voluntas: International
Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, Vol. 12, No. 2, 131-156.
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7. ‘the lack of clarity about where the [constitutional]
boundaries lie are an enduring problem… its making life
pretty difficult for voluntary organisations like us but also our
clients… bottom line can we explain to our clients who is to
blame if they have a problem? Some areas its really obvious
others it’s a real problem: it’s not clear’
(Chief Exec. 3rd sector service provider 15 Oct 2013).
Bingham Powell, G. (1989) Constitutional Design and Citizen Electoral Control, Journal of
Theoretical Politics, 1, 2, 107-130.
Accountability
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8. “yeah, I’d say it is pretty accessible… it wasn’t always, in the early
days y’know – getting info was a bit of a nightmare… looking back I
guess part of that was nobody was really sure of what it could do,
what it was responsible for… I’m a bit of an old cynic so its quite
something for me to say this, but yeah it is transparent, I think
anyway… you’ve got the transcripts [of proceedings] and MP4s
[video] of the committees… all the [policy] papers are there… Its not
[former Secretary of State John] Redwood and the Welsh Office is it!”
(CSO manager, November 7, 2013)
Openness/ transparency:
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9. “for some reason that commitment and enthusiasm [for devolution]
hasn’t translated into a really strong engagement… I was really interested
when I joined the organisation but there are a lot of women that are not
terribly comfortable with that [policy work/ political engagement] and I
actually heard someone say “we are not a feminist organisation” – and I
thought “what?!” How can you say we are not a feminist organisation?”
(Chief exec, Women’s CSO 4 Dec 2013)
“there are lots of women who are involved in policy development, lots
who are brilliant, but it’s still that thing about women not pushing
themselves forward and not wanting to put themselves in the firing line”
(Manager, Women’s CSO 16 Dec 2013)
Politicization of Voluntarism – e.g. David Sciulli (1986) Voluntaristic Action as a Distinct Concept: Theoretical Foundations of Societal
Constitutionalism, Vol. 51, No. 6,.American Sociological Review; Habermas, J. (1984). Theory of communicative action, Vol. 1: Reason and the
rationalization of society (T. McCarthy, Trans.). Boston: Beacon
CSOs’ Response to WG/ NAfW
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10. CSOs’ response (2).
“whether we have – or are “pushing the envelope” as it were is
something we all have to ask ourselves – I don’t think that we
have [done so] as much as we should or could have… it’s got to
come from us” (Project manager CSO, Oct 18, 2013)
“I don’t really get a sense of organisations reacting as perhaps
they should have as if they properly understood devolution” (CSO
manager, 19 Sept 2013)
“I think they really do want a voice in it… they really do – they all
do, we all do” (Women’s CSO organisation, 11 Dec 2013)
Marilyn Taylor, Diane Warburton (2003) Legitimacy and the Role of UK Third Sector Organizations in the Policy Process, Voluntas: International
Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 14, 3, 321-338
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11. Political Opportunity Structures
“I say to our colleagues in London ‘look we can probably get
stuff delivered here, we can get calls delivered here that can
then become drivers for change in England” (CSO interviewee 29 Nov 2013)
“Well, we can reach [NAfW committee] chairs and clerks fairly easily I’d
say for one… yeah, two: they’re approachable I’d also say… there’s a
definite two-way thing. They do want to engage with us… even the most
hard-bitten cynic would acknowledge that… my opposite number
[Westminster] was amazed at how approachable things are. Thing is, its
only when someone puts it like that – that you think ‘yeah’ – ‘cos
otherwise you kind of accept it… take it as a given’. (CSO interviewee 3 Feb,
2014)
McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. and Zald, M. (eds) (1996) Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political
Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, New York: Cambridge University Press.
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12. Demands on Civil Society/ Preparedness?
“we weren’t really used to all the policy side of things. Then ‘bam’! Its
‘can you respond to this’?, ‘can we have your views – y’know what do
our members want to see on this one? [policy consultation]… and its
like hold on! You know we’re not just here to fill-in forms and chat to
[AMs]… it’s a mega-step-up in a way… now everyone wants to hear
from us. That’s a ‘big ask’ for an organisation like ours… its clear …
talking to other NGOs we’re not there yet in engaging the way we’d like
– I know we’re not alone… Its not going to happen overnight is it? Like
Westminster’s been going hundreds of years and they’ve still not got
it right either”! (CSO manager Oct 17, 2013)
Jean Cohen (1994) Civil Society and Political Theory, Massachusetts, MIT Press, p.178 “the overload of demand…”
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13. CSOs’ Autonomy
“this is sensitive, shall we say our colleagues in London don’t really get it… they
don’t really understand there’s a growing legislature here… there’s not the
awareness, I think, or the will to let us try and shape the agenda here…”
“its still predominantly our HQ that has sign-off on things… now I can challenge
that… sometimes I win, but that’s not the point. It’s a drag to be honest, y’know
having to constantly fight for the authority to decide how we relate to the
Assembly… At the last Exec I was talking to my opposite number from Edinburgh,
she couldn’t believe it… they don’t have this problem…”
“I suppose you’d call it resistance and mixed with a fair bit of ignorance too I
suppose. There is a sort of feeling from colleagues in England that having a couple
of policy officers – though we’ve even lost one of those now – is enough [to
engage with NAfW]… I’m am telling you it is not! I keep banging on about this.
They kind of look “there she goes again” – you’re seen as a troublemaker…”
Wendy Earles and Robyn Lynn (2012) Third Sector Organisations and Organising , Bremen, Europäischer Hochschulverlag
GmbH & Co. KG
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14. NAfW – Scrutiny/ Capacity
 “I do think its untenable… there are more councillors in Cardiff County Council
[than AMs]… it does worry me if I’m honest… we’re [CSOs] stretched and
they’re stretched [opposition/ backbench AMs] … now you can’t tell me that’s a
good place to be…” (CSO project officer, 15 Sept, 2013)
“it was a headache before [primary powers] now it’s a real concern… you’ve got
all this highly technical stuff… different [legislative] stages… [Bill] amendments
and the like… can a handful of AMs cope? No, to be frank… There has been - and
there’s gonna be attrition. It will only increase with more and more law-
making… one proof is framework powers… now that’s wrong in my book… it
allows government to do what it wants later – under the radar” (CSO Manager,
4 Oct, 2013)
E McLeay (2006) Scrutiny and capacity: an evaluation of the parliamentary committees in the New Zealand parliament, Australasian
Parliamentary Review, Vol. 21(1), 158–82; L McAllister, D Stirbu (2007) Developing devolution's scrutiny potential: a comparative
evaluation of the National Assembly for Wales's Subject Committees, Policy & Politics, 35, 2, 289-309
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15. NAfW – Capacity (2)
‘interestingly, because we work very closely with our
colleagues in London, there are real advantages in
Wales… you can have a direct individual relationship
with a whole series of Assembly Members in a way that
it is very difficult to do in Parliament so probably our
lobbying is slightly more informal here in Wales than it
is in Westminster and that’s purely because of scale’
(CSO Director 27 Nov 2013)
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16. Inclusiveness: ‘civil’ or ‘civic’ society engagement?
Sectoral Share of Expert Witnesses to NAfW Subject Committee in each of First Three Assemblies 1999-2011 (N=4,594).
* data compiled by R. Rumbul 16
* data compiled by R. Rumbul

17. Gender Split: Percentage Female Expert Witnesses from CSOs (green) / All committee
attendees (blue) Each of the first three Assemblies 1999-2011 (N=11,861)
* Data compiled by R. Rumbul 17

18. Changing Political Culture
“Politics has become more male, certainly [it] has
become male-dominated… is that just a gentle shift?
Will it move back? We have moved from an Assembly
that was consensual – now we have law-making
powers, a government and opposition – it’s more
oppositional – is that part of the reason why we’ve
had the shift [back towards male-dominated
politics]?” Chief exec CSO, 15 Nov 2013
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19. Third Sector engagement - what are the effects
and implications of one-party-dominance?
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20. Why this is deserving of study? Why does
this matter?
Health of democracy - benefits of third sector engagement in
work of government > trust, accountability and participation
Type of party elected to govt. shapes patterns and processes of
NGOs’ engagement in public policy-making/ service delivery
Absence of turnover presents potential threats to democracy –
or, ‘a danger of the three A’s setting in – arrogance, apathy, and
atrophy (Jackson, 1994, p. 270)
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21. “Pathologies”?
Compares human body and the body politic
uses language of medical pathology to investigate the disorders
and challenges some governments experience in making and
implementing public policy
Hogwood, B. and Peters, B. G. (1985) The Pathology of Public
Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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22. OPD – One Party Dominance
Duverger (1954, p.308-9) alludes to a dominant party as
one whose ‘influence exceeds all others for a generation
or more’
Butler (2009, p.159): “protracted electoral and
ideological dominance of a single party in a
representative democracy. It requires, but suggests more
than, a series of electoral successes. OPD implies
institutions that translate electoral success into political
power”
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23. Research context:
past 150 years, Welsh politics = one party dominance.
period to WW1 one-party domination under the Liberal
Party
Since WW2 Labour Party pre-eminent political force -
always had a majority of Welsh MPs
Constitutional reform: Labour continuously held
government office since National Assembly for Wales
created in 1999.
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24. 24
Table 1. Exploring the Potential Pathologies of One-Party-Dominance on Third Sector Policy Engagement in Liberal Democracies.
Engagement
Factor
Degree Potentially
Problematic Potential Effects on NGO policy engagement
Regular Turnover OPD
Strategic bridging Low High OPD greatly increases power/ influence of incumbents. NGOs have no alternative but to deal with key individuals over successive
electoral cycles
Collective Incentives Low High Collective incentives for NGOs to engage opposition parties in policy-making much diminished owing to perception they are unlikely
to form future govt. The incentive of future policy gains from such actions is lessened/ removed.
Trust Medium High OPD introduces greater uncertainty – whether parliamentarians concerned with issue – or put party interest first
Neo-corporatism/
Resource dependency
Medium High Problematic in both types of system. Exacerbated under OPD as NGOs forced into ever closer relation with party over successive
electoral cycles
Blurred
Party-CS boundaries
Low High NGOs’ criticality of govt. lessened under OPD owing to fear party figures in third sector will report negative comments to ministers
jeopardising state-funding.
NGO Action Repertoires Low High Change of governing party catalyst for shifts in NGO repertoire of contention/ heightened accountability – absent under OPD
Legitimization versus
legitimation
Medium High All governments may use neo-corporatist structures to further legitimation. Heightened under OPD.
Party system
institutionalization
Low High Under OPD there is a significant risk and costs (declining criticality/ lack of openness/ innovation etc.) arising from party system
institutionalization
Cognitive locks/
Ideological turnover
Low High Change of ideology/ strategic policy aims limited under OPD
Informal/ extra-
parliamentary politics’
Medium High NGOs’ critical engagement with government routinely takes place outwith legislative channels through internal party contacts/
networks
Veto Players Low High The smaller pool of actual and potential ministers, their alignment to one ideological position and endurance in the government elite
heighten the significance of veto players under OPD
Party Politicization Low High OPD means conflation of incumbent party with government as institution – thus to criticise government is seen as criticism of the
party

25. Strategic Bridging, Veto Players and
Collective Incentives (1.)
Strategic bridging is a concept allied to Charles Tilly’s work >
individual agency and co-working between policy actors in civil
society and parliamentarians. (Bridging social capital)
Key question: whom to engage?
OPD skews political dynamic
reduces value of alliance building with opposition party members
undermines scrutiny and accountability & accentuates political
power of members of the dominant party
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26. Strategic Bridging, Veto Players and
Collective Incentives (2.)
OPD increases the likelihood and role of veto players
(Tsebelis, 1995)
These may block third sector claims
Collective Interest Model (Finkel et al, 1998)
Research findings show how OPD is potential pathology
because …. It undermines the collective incentives –
because of the concentration of power in the hands of the
dominant party/ veto players.
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27. Interviewees’ Comments:
We try to be strategic about it… [but] If you don’t get on
with [the minister] like, if she’s not interested in what
you’re campaigning on, it’s like a road block, a show-
stopper… (Participant 42).
“really there is only one show in town, [the] Labour
[Party].We’re massively stretched resource-wise, there’s
only two of us here… you have to ask yourself ‘can it
[engaging opposition parties] be justified?’ ‘Where’s
the pay-off’? That’s the challenge we face…”
(Participant 23).
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28. Neo-Corporatism
Managerialist approach to government engagement with
exogenous policy interests e.g. government-sponsored policy
networks (Mansbridge, 1999)
Inherent dangers: civil society derives its legitimacy from
ability to act independently… more formal/ regulated civil
society–state relations may subvert this (De Jager, 2005)
Increased power of political patronage of dominant party
Core potential pathology alluded to by interviewees was co-
option and loss of independence and freedom to criticise
government
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29. Neo-Corporatism
“we don’t want to alienate [ministers] but also we
don’t want to be in the pocket of the minister and it’s
that balance which is difficult” (Participant 71).
“we are afraid to say ‘the emperor has no clothes’ …
we are afraid to show when failure is happening… there
are conflicts of interest…” (Participant 32).
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30. Blurred Dominant Party - Civil Society
Boundaries; and ‘informal’ politics (1)
Existing studies often point to political parties and civil society as largely
discrete entities.
Some critics highlight blurred boundaries (Mair, 2000; Kitschelt and
Wilkinson, 2007).
Recent research OPD in South Africa resonates with the present case study
(Cf. Friedman, 2003).
Civil society organisations’ criticism of the dominant party limited > citizens’
loyalty to the party as well as a shared sense of identity (Bénit-Gbaffou,
2012)
Interviewees spoke of ‘toning-down’ or avoiding criticism of government >
fear that some third sector managers - who were also dominant Party figures,
may pass on comments to ministers > jeopardise their government funding/
access to decision-makers
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31. Blurred Dominant Party - Civil Society
Boundaries; and ‘informal’ politics (2)
“you do have to stop yourself. … I thought hold-on [uses own
name] watch yourself! ‘cos I know a couple of policy people
there are strong Party [people]” (Participant 36).
‘an awful lot is done via personal relationships – and that’s
how stuff gets done. It’s not right, it’s not proper, it means
that the better your relationships the more influence that
you have, I don’t agree with it but it’s a paternalistic, party
system where, if you have those networks, you will get policy
through and that’s how things happen… it’s a network thing.
I don’t agree with it but I will use it when I have to
(Participant 68).
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32. NGO Action Repertoires
Interviewees referred to way OPD shaped NGOs’
repertoire of contention (Tilly 1995);
in other words, varied means by which they advance
their policy demands on those in power.
A notable finding > interviewees’ claim of deliberate
element of tactical coordination and a differentiation of
modes of engagement between organisations across
policy sectors in an attempt to address potential OPD
pathologies.
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33. NGO Action Repertoires (2).
“I see the environmental movement as being on a bit of
a continuum, [named organisation] are going to be able
to do some of the ‘far out there – really critical stuff’,
others like [named NGO] keep mainly to new media
stuff, whereas we [named organisation] are more
mainstream – and we are going to be more “in the
tent”’ (Participant 47).
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34. Legitimacy versus Legitimation
Political legitimacy aims for a public basis of justification
and appeals to free public reason (Rawls, 2003, p. 171) .
Legitimation involves communicative actions aimed at
managing the public’s perception that government actions
are effective in promoting their desired ends, whether that
is in fact true’ (Moore, 2001, p.712).
Interviewees revealed issues and tensions between
legitimization and legitimation that are compounded by
one-party-dominance.
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35. Legitimacy versus Legitimation (2)
“they dine out on us and whenever they [ministers] are asked
questions in plenary [sessions of the National Assembly]
about what are they doing to engage the [third] sector in
policy they say we’re funding organisations like us”
(Participant 28).
“on the surface at least, it looks like there’s engagement.
When you chip away at it, it’s artificial… it’s basically
democratic cover if you like” (Participant 57).
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36. Cognitive locks
“Cognitive locks” from literature of historical institutionalism
(Pierson and Skocpol, 2002).
‘intellectual path dependency in policymaking’ (Forestiere and
Allen, 2011, p.381) .
Once established, they become a guiding set of ideas or
‘ideological mantra to be repeated and applied no matter… [what]
the actual conditions of a situation’ (Blyth, 2002, p.229).
A pathology under OPD > change or reversal of government
policies as a result of exogenous pressure – what Hirschman (1970,
p. 30) calls ‘voice’ – is limited or absent.
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37. Cognitive locks (2).
“I don’t think there’s enough space in civil/ civic society in
Wales about what kinds of policies we want, what types of
things do we want to achieve, the existing voices come from
the Left-of-centre, they come from a socialist campaigning
background… that imposes challenges in terms of tone, and
positioning our messages, you can’t be seen as being
market-driven by tooth and claw, you’ve got to try and
package your message in a particular way” (Participant 68).
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38. Implications/ significance?
12 potential pathologies related to third sector-state
nexus emerge from accounts of NGO policy actors
OPD systems have considerable implications for third
sector interest representation, co-working, criticality
and ‘voice’
For the body politic pathologies collectively self-
sustaining > over time, may diminish 3 sector
engagement / further strengthen the dominant party.
Empirical support for theorising that absence of
governing party turnover may threaten democratic
‘health’ of the polity
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39. Impact? Oes gennym ddylanwad?
Human Transplantation (Wales) Act 2013
 2007 Kidney Wales Foundation petitioned NAfW to increase no. organ donors in Wales.
 NAfW Petitions Committee referred matter NAfW Health, Wellbeing and LG Committee,
requesting that they consider the issue of presumed consent
2008, Kidney Wales Foundation “Opt for Life Cymru” alliance (People Like us Cymru, the Welsh
Kidney Patients Association, the British Heart Foundation, the British Lung Foundation, Diabetes
Cymru, Cystic Fibrosis and the British Medical Association)
 Campaign to change law in Wales to 'soft opt-out' system of organ donation
 Committee report, Inquiry into Presumed Consent for Organ Donation (C. July 2008)
 Minister (Hart) rejected committee's main recommendation against change (“it did not reflect the
weight of public opinion”)
 http://gov.wales/docs/dhss/consultation/121203responsesen.pdf
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40. Impact? Oes gennym ddylanwad?
Nationwide public debates, Oct. 2008 – Jan. 2009 - gauge public opinion
 WG public consultation ‘Options for Changes’ (May 2009) concluded public
opinion favoured soft opt-out system.
 LCO process superseded (post-referendum) White Paper & Bill introduced to
NAfW
 Bill given royal assent 10 September 2013, becoming the Human
Transplantation (Wales) Act 2013
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41. 41

42. Gender Pay Gap
 2007 Equalities Manifesto demand “Closing the gender
pay
- gap across the public and private sector in Wales”
The Equality Act (2010) – Statutory Duties (Wales)
Regulation 7. duties on authorities - must be
arrangements identifying & collecting information about
any difference between pay of any person (or persons)
who has (or share) one or more of the protected
characteristics and those who do not and the causes of
such differences
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43.  1st July, 2008 Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg submitted NAfW public petition #P-03-157
Coleg Ffederal Cymraeg
'We call upon the Assembly Government to keep its 'One Wales’ agreement promise of
establishing a Welsh-language Federal College. A Federal College must include the following
elements: Statutory status and an independent constitution; An independent charter and
terms of reference that includes responsibility for all Welsh-language higher education in
Wales…’ etc.
“The political context of the petition was that the Welsh-language movement was
disappointed that the pledge to have a Welsh-language daily newspaper had not been
delivered by the Government. In that climate, we were concerned that some of the other
'One Wales’ promises regarding the language would also be broken, or that the
Government would say that it had delivered a pledge when it had simply moved the
goalposts” (Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg –evidence to Petitions Committee, 6 November
2008).
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44. 44

45. New Publications
◦ Chaney, P. (2015) Exploring the Pathologies of One-Party-
Dominance on Third Sector Public Policy Engagement in Liberal
Democracies: Evidence from Meso-Government in the UK,
◦ VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit
Organizations.
◦ Impact Factor 1.238, Social Issues, 20/39; SCImago Journal Rank
Geography, Planning and Development 84/468.
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46. New Publications
◦ Chaney, P. (2015) ‘Getting Involved: Public Policy-Making and
Political Life in Wales’ Chapter 9 in ‘A Tolerant Nation? Revisiting
Ethnic Diversity in a Devolved Wales’Charlotte Williams, Neil Evans, Paul O’Leary
(eds) University of Wales Press. Paperback: 320 pages, (March 15, 2015). ISBN-10: 1783161884.
ISBN-13: 978-1783161881 http://www.amazon.com/Tolerant-Nation-Revisiting-Diversity-
Devolved/dp/1783161884
◦ Chaney, P. (2016) ‘Women and Policy-Making: Devolution, Civil
Society and Political Representation’, Chapter 11 in Mannay, D.
(ed) Our Changing Land: Revisiting Gender, Class and Identity in
Contemporary Wales, Cardiff, University of Wales Press
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