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VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

THE ART AND SCIENCE
OF
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS
(ISC)2 New York Metro

March 4, 2014

VIRTUE SECURITY
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

What we can’t always teach

•
•
•
•

Component discovery
Identifying data of value
Subverting arithmetic
Reversing algorithms

March 4, 2014

VIRTUE SECURITY
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

Principles of an Application Vulnerability
Assessments

• Understanding business purpose
• Parameters are out control variables
• Understand who an attacker may be and
develop appropriate threats.

March 4, 2014

VIRTUE SECURITY
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

Component Discovery
Request parameters

Components

Session
Token

Request

Timestamp

Page_num

User_ID

March 4, 2014

VIRTUE SECURITY
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

Control Characters are Your Friend
0x00

NUL

0x01

SOH

0x02

STX

0x03

ETX

0x04

EOT

0x05

ENQ

0x08

BS

…

• Control characters are
often poorly handled
by compiled
applications.
• Can be useful to
identify or tamper with
legacy systems.

…

March 4, 2014

VIRTUE SECURITY
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

Component Discovery
Request parameters

Components

URL:
http://example.com/%00

Request
Timestamp

Page_num

March 4, 2014

User_ID

VIRTUE SECURITY
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

What is Useful to an Attacker?

• The obvious: usernames, passwords,
session tokens, etc..
• The less obvious: order numbers,
timestamps,
• Anything that can be used to negatively
impact business integrity.

March 4, 2014

VIRTUE SECURITY
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

Joe’s Banana Stand

• Vendor A notices an Ajax request used to
confirm orders:
order_confirmed.jsp?ordernumber=7567401102182014
Responds TRUE / False

March 4, 2014

VIRTUE SECURITY
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

Joe’s Banana Stand

• Vendor A learns the following:
– 7567 (unknown)
– 4011 (banana PLU code)
– 02182014 (date)

March 4, 2014

VIRTUE SECURITY
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

APPLICATION ARITHMETIC

• Negative Values
account_value += transfer_value;

account_value = 1000 + 100;
account_value = 1000 + -100;

March 4, 2014

// account_value = 1100
// account_value = 900

VIRTUE SECURITY
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

Integer overflows / wraparounds
32 bits:
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
+1

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Signed range: −2,147,483,648 to +2,147,483,647
Unsigned range: 0 to 4,294,967,295

March 4, 2014

VIRTUE SECURITY
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

Decimal Values

System A
• 1000 + 0.001
• 1000 + 0.001
• 1000 + 0.001
• 1000 + 0.001
• 1000 + 0.001
• 1000 + 0.001
• 1000 + 0.001
• 1000 + 0.001
• 1000 + 0.001
• 1000 + 0.001 = 1000.00

March 4, 2014

System B
• 1000 + 0.001
• 1000 + 0.001
• 1000 + 0.001
• 1000 + 0.001
• 1000 + 0.001
• 1000 + 0.001
• 1000 + 0.001
• 1000 + 0.001
• 1000 + 0.001
• 1000 + 0.001 = 1000.01

VIRTUE SECURITY
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

Not All Numbers Are the Same

• Integers may be defined differently.
– Limited capacity
– Signed / unsigned
– Varying support of decimals

• Applications may also handle numbers differently
–
–
–
–

Order quantities with fractions
Transactions with fractions of cents
Negative values
Divide by zero

March 4, 2014

VIRTUE SECURITY
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

Creating Better Payloads

• Input field:

johndoe@example.com
Johndoe

@

example.com

• Attack strings:
– johndoe’%20or%201=1--@example.com
– johndoe@’%20or%201=1--example.com
– johndoe@example.com’%20or%201=1--

March 4, 2014

VIRTUE SECURITY
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

Attacking Tokenizing Algorithms
•

Example parameter:
account_number=6578364,6578376,6587653

•

May have the following attacks:
account_number=6578364,6578376[SQLi],6587653
account_number=6578364,65783760000000,6587653
account_number=6578364,%00,6587653
account_number=6578364,-1,6587653
account_number=6578364,6578376,71111111
account_number=6578364,6578376,6587653,71111111

March 4, 2014

VIRTUE SECURITY
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

Denial of Service / Amplification

•

Amplification is the ratio at which work is performed on the server
vs the work required to make the request:

•
•
•
•
•
•

www.example.com/cart/display.jsp?category=5&pageNum=4
Response time: 51ms
www.example.com/cart/display.jsp?category=5&pageNum=40
Response time: 614ms
www.example.com/cart/display.jsp?category=5&pageNum=10000
Response time: 43120ms

March 4, 2014

VIRTUE SECURITY
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

What about tools?

• Scanners should never be relied upon
• Tools should be user driven
• Tools should be used to make custom
attacks more efficient

March 4, 2014

VIRTUE SECURITY
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

How can we make things better?

• Give users as little control as possible
• Maintain state on the server side wherever
possible:
http://www.example.com/viewaccount?id=67546737
http://www.example.com/viewaccount

March 4, 2014

VIRTUE SECURITY
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

Never Forget

• This is more than a job!
• People really depend on you
• Maintain a balance of structure and
creativity

March 4, 2014

VIRTUE SECURITY

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Art and Science of Vulnerability Assessments

  • 1. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS THE ART AND SCIENCE OF VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS (ISC)2 New York Metro March 4, 2014 VIRTUE SECURITY
  • 2. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS What we can’t always teach • • • • Component discovery Identifying data of value Subverting arithmetic Reversing algorithms March 4, 2014 VIRTUE SECURITY
  • 3. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS Principles of an Application Vulnerability Assessments • Understanding business purpose • Parameters are out control variables • Understand who an attacker may be and develop appropriate threats. March 4, 2014 VIRTUE SECURITY
  • 4. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS Component Discovery Request parameters Components Session Token Request Timestamp Page_num User_ID March 4, 2014 VIRTUE SECURITY
  • 5. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS Control Characters are Your Friend 0x00 NUL 0x01 SOH 0x02 STX 0x03 ETX 0x04 EOT 0x05 ENQ 0x08 BS … • Control characters are often poorly handled by compiled applications. • Can be useful to identify or tamper with legacy systems. … March 4, 2014 VIRTUE SECURITY
  • 6. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS Component Discovery Request parameters Components URL: http://example.com/%00 Request Timestamp Page_num March 4, 2014 User_ID VIRTUE SECURITY
  • 7. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS What is Useful to an Attacker? • The obvious: usernames, passwords, session tokens, etc.. • The less obvious: order numbers, timestamps, • Anything that can be used to negatively impact business integrity. March 4, 2014 VIRTUE SECURITY
  • 8. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS Joe’s Banana Stand • Vendor A notices an Ajax request used to confirm orders: order_confirmed.jsp?ordernumber=7567401102182014 Responds TRUE / False March 4, 2014 VIRTUE SECURITY
  • 9. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS Joe’s Banana Stand • Vendor A learns the following: – 7567 (unknown) – 4011 (banana PLU code) – 02182014 (date) March 4, 2014 VIRTUE SECURITY
  • 10. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS APPLICATION ARITHMETIC • Negative Values account_value += transfer_value; account_value = 1000 + 100; account_value = 1000 + -100; March 4, 2014 // account_value = 1100 // account_value = 900 VIRTUE SECURITY
  • 11. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS Integer overflows / wraparounds 32 bits: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 +1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Signed range: −2,147,483,648 to +2,147,483,647 Unsigned range: 0 to 4,294,967,295 March 4, 2014 VIRTUE SECURITY
  • 12. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS Decimal Values System A • 1000 + 0.001 • 1000 + 0.001 • 1000 + 0.001 • 1000 + 0.001 • 1000 + 0.001 • 1000 + 0.001 • 1000 + 0.001 • 1000 + 0.001 • 1000 + 0.001 • 1000 + 0.001 = 1000.00 March 4, 2014 System B • 1000 + 0.001 • 1000 + 0.001 • 1000 + 0.001 • 1000 + 0.001 • 1000 + 0.001 • 1000 + 0.001 • 1000 + 0.001 • 1000 + 0.001 • 1000 + 0.001 • 1000 + 0.001 = 1000.01 VIRTUE SECURITY
  • 13. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS Not All Numbers Are the Same • Integers may be defined differently. – Limited capacity – Signed / unsigned – Varying support of decimals • Applications may also handle numbers differently – – – – Order quantities with fractions Transactions with fractions of cents Negative values Divide by zero March 4, 2014 VIRTUE SECURITY
  • 14. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS Creating Better Payloads • Input field: johndoe@example.com Johndoe @ example.com • Attack strings: – johndoe’%20or%201=1--@example.com – johndoe@’%20or%201=1--example.com – johndoe@example.com’%20or%201=1-- March 4, 2014 VIRTUE SECURITY
  • 15. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS Attacking Tokenizing Algorithms • Example parameter: account_number=6578364,6578376,6587653 • May have the following attacks: account_number=6578364,6578376[SQLi],6587653 account_number=6578364,65783760000000,6587653 account_number=6578364,%00,6587653 account_number=6578364,-1,6587653 account_number=6578364,6578376,71111111 account_number=6578364,6578376,6587653,71111111 March 4, 2014 VIRTUE SECURITY
  • 16. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS Denial of Service / Amplification • Amplification is the ratio at which work is performed on the server vs the work required to make the request: • • • • • • www.example.com/cart/display.jsp?category=5&pageNum=4 Response time: 51ms www.example.com/cart/display.jsp?category=5&pageNum=40 Response time: 614ms www.example.com/cart/display.jsp?category=5&pageNum=10000 Response time: 43120ms March 4, 2014 VIRTUE SECURITY
  • 17. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS What about tools? • Scanners should never be relied upon • Tools should be user driven • Tools should be used to make custom attacks more efficient March 4, 2014 VIRTUE SECURITY
  • 18. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS How can we make things better? • Give users as little control as possible • Maintain state on the server side wherever possible: http://www.example.com/viewaccount?id=67546737 http://www.example.com/viewaccount March 4, 2014 VIRTUE SECURITY
  • 19. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS Never Forget • This is more than a job! • People really depend on you • Maintain a balance of structure and creativity March 4, 2014 VIRTUE SECURITY