1. Alan Smith
Director – WANO Peer Review Programmes
IAEA Safety Culture Harmonization Meeting, Vienna
Oct 23-25, 2017
Update on Nuclear Safety Culture
in WANO Peer Reviews
2. The term “Safety Culture” came into common use after the accident
at Chernobyl.
Davis Besse event (2002) showed that nuclear safety needed to be
“the overriding priority”, but no clear standard for what that meant
In 2004, INPO developed 8 Principles for Excellence in Nuclear
Safety Culture.
In 2006, WANO develops Principles for NSC Excellence. WANO
develops their own version shortly thereafter.
In 2011, INPO, WANO, and US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
agree on 10 Nuclear Safety Culture Traits. WANO PL 2013-1
becomes the standard for reviewing nuclear operators.
In 2015, joint IAEA-WANO efforts begin to identify common safety
culture themes, applicable to a broader range of nuclear
stakeholders, using terms that are easier to apply (language)
Nuclear Safety Culture Timeline
3. 3
Individual commitment to safety
1 - Personal accountability (PA)
2 - Questioning Attitude (QA)
3 - Effective Safety Communication (CO)
Management Commitment to Safety
4 - Leadership accountability (LA)
5 - Decision making (DM)
6 - Respectful working environment (WE)
Organizational systems
7 - Continuous learning (CL)
8 - Problem identification and resolution (PI)
9 - Environment for raising concerns (RC)
10 - Work processes (WP)
Traits of a healthy nuclear safety culture
Ten Traits Broken into Three Aspects
4. Nuclear Safety Culture (SC.1)
Performance Objective : The organisation’s core values and behaviours reflect a collective commitment
by all nuclear professionals to make nuclear safety the overriding priority.
Criteria
1. All individuals take personal responsibility for safety.
2. Individuals avoid complacency and continuously challenge existing conditions, assumptions,
anomalies and activities in order to identify discrepancies that might result in error or inappropriate
action.
3. Communications maintain a focus on safety.
4. Leaders demonstrate a commitment to safety in their decisions and behaviours.
5. Decisions that support or affect nuclear safety are systematic, rigorous and thorough.
6. Trust and respect permeate the organisation, creating a respectful work environment.
7. Opportunities to continuously learn are valued, sought out and implemented.
8. Issues potentially impacting safety are promptly identified, fully evaluated and promptly addressed
and corrected, commensurate with significance.
9. A safety-conscious work environment is maintained in which personnel feel free to raise safety
concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, harassment or discrimination.
10. The process of planning and controlling work activities is implemented so that safety is maintained.
What Does WANO Review?
5. Depending on the nature and significance of the issues
identified, the issues should be documented as part of an Area
for Improvement (AFI) in the body of the report using one of the
three following methods, listed in order of significance:
1. A standalone AFI should be written in the SC.1 Nuclear Safety
Culture performance objective if:
the issue is broad-based, there has been an actual or potential impact on
nuclear safety, and the issue is considered significant
weaknesses in one or more of the nuclear safety culture traits is affecting,
or has the potential to affect, performance in more than one aspect of
station operation.
How Do We Review It?
6. 2. In some cases, it may be more effective if the nuclear safety
culture issue is written in a performance objective other than the
SC.1 area.
This would be the case if it is considered that the issue may be more effectively
communicated because it is narrowly focused in a single functional area or there is
a common gap that can best be addressed in a cross-functional or foundations
area.
Caution must be used to ensure the nuclear safety culture message is not
diminished by adding it in with other causes and contributors.
Other specific performance objectives exist to document weaknesses in radiological
safety, chemical safety, industrial safety, etc.
3. A safety culture vulnerability statement, such as a reference
to a specific trait or traits, may be added to the fundamental
overall problem (FOP) statement of an AFI if the problem is
limited in scope to a single group or topic and the consequences
are not considered significant.
“How-To” Guidance (continued)
7. Recent Results
NUMBERS PA QA CO LA DM WE CL PI RC WP
TC 15 1 12 0 1 1 0 4 10 0 2
PC 12 6 4 1 5 2 0 1 7 0 4
MC 6 0 5 1 0 0 0 2 5 0 3
AC 13 4 3 0 3 4 0 2 5 0 1
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Nuclear Safety Culture Gaps Identified in AFIs
Industrial, chemical, environmental, radiological safety are all important. And now security is creeping into the “safety culture” dialog because, after all, if security is breeched, couldn’t a safety challenge result?
NUCLEAR SAFETY CULTURE is the extra bit that demands that all of these be present, all the time, because of the simple reason that we are operating a nuclear power plant, and that the consequences of a lapse in any of the above, have greater consequences than anywhere else.
The state of NUCLEAR SAFETY and protecting the core takes priority over the state of any other types of safety at a nuclear power plant. That may not be the same in nuclear medicine, where the top priority is the life of the patient.
Analysis of the results – It is important to note that these results are only from AFIs, and do not reflect other items such as surveys, interviews, self-assessments, etc.
Problem Identification and Resolution (PI) and Trait 2: Question Attitude (QA):
Trait 8 (PI): Issues potentially impacting safety are promptly identified, fully evaluated and promptly addressed and corrected, commensurate with their significance.
Trait 2 (QA): Individuals avoid complacency and continuously challenge existing conditions, assumptions, anomalies and activities to identify discrepancies that might result in errors or inappropriate actions.
Trait QA and PI are the two most commonly identified weak traits. At least part of this may be due to the broad scope of those two specific traits and how they apply to events. For example, in most events, problems may have been avoided or minimized if the individuals had demonstrated a stronger questioning attitude and asked a few more questions before proceeding. Similarly, most events could have been avoided or minimized if previous operating experience had been applied better. Collecting examples of these two traits is therefore very easy!
Personal Accountability (PA) is the third weakest traits in 2015.
The example of these weakest traits in the report is given as follows:
‘In contrast, two essential traits of a healthy safety culture, on the one hand, questioning attitude, and on the other hand, identification and resolution of problems are weak and are contributors to some of the most significant areas for improvement, namely LF.1-1 and CM.3-1, that show how these weaknesses are resulting into a reduction of the safety margins.’
Work Processes (WP)
Trait 10 (WP): The process of planning and controlling work activities is implemented so that nuclear safety is maintained.
The attributes of this trait are about work management, design margins, documentation and procedure adherence.
Respectful Work Environment (WE) and Environment for Raising Concerns (RC) have not been called as weaknesses
Trait 6 (WE): Trust and respect permeate the organisation, creating a respectful work environment.
Trait 9 (RC): A safety- conscious work environment (SCWE) is maintained where personnel feel free to raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, harassment or discrimination.
While it is quite easy to find examples of QA and PI shortfalls at almost every NPP, finding examples of WE and RC with the current peer review approach is much more difficult. They are much more subjective and opinion-based. Most stations are quick to offer some examples of good performance in these areas, but weaknesses are more subtle, and difficult even for the NPP to uncover themselves. So just because we are not specifically highlighting WE and RC weaknesses in AFIs, I am not prepared to say they do not exist. It is more our inability to factually document them. Methods to better identify and communicate weaknesses in these areas is underway.