Secure Pork Supply Plan     September 2012
North American Animal Agriculture       Industry is Unique• The size, structure, efficiency, and  extensive movement inher...
Foreign Animal Disease (FAD)           Outbreak• Stop movement will quickly lead to  overcrowding conditions with serious ...
Phases of FMD Response
FMD Detection in the United States:                    Types of an FMD Outbreak                          Six Types of FMD ...
Common Components of Secure Food      Supply Business Continuity PlansSecure Egg Supply (HPAI); Secure Turkey Supply (HPAI...
Secure Pork Supply Plan       (Funded by USDA APHIS VS)• Develop procedures to  allow the safe  movement of animals  with ...
SPS Partners• SPS Planning Committee  – Federal and State officials  – Representatives of all phases of the    swine indus...
Secure Pork Supply Planning               Committee• First meeting October 11-12, 2011• Working Groups formed:  – Biosecur...
FADs included in SPS plan• Foot and mouth disease  – Swine, cattle, sheep, goats, deer• Classical swine fever• African swi...
Disease Transmission                 (FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD)• Not zoonotic• Direct contact and oral exposure  are the most im...
Vaccine• FMD and CSF  – Vaccine will not be    immediately available, or will    be in short supply• ASF and SVD  – No vac...
BIOSECURITY WORKINGGROUP
The Charge• Define biosecurity performance standards  prior to an outbreak• Participating premises can be rapidly  designa...
Our Approach• NPB biosecurity and pork producer  biosecurity protocols• Combined protocols and revised by  Level (Level On...
Next Steps• Finish editing the recommendations• Send to Planning Committee for  review• Develop illustrations demonstratin...
SURVEILLANCE WORKINGGROUP
The Original Charge:Develop Recommendations for• Comprehensive Integrated Swine Surveillance prior  to a FAD outbreak• Sur...
Approach Considerations• Utilize testing approaches the industry is  using, but also test these samples for  FADs  – Produ...
Next Steps• Draft a straw man protocol to be  reviewed by the Surveillance  Working Group
COMPARTMENTALIZATION/MONITORED PREMISESWORKING GROUP
The ChargeDevelop criteria  – To receive and maintain monitored premises    status during an FAD outbreak  – For swine pro...
Our Approach:       Monitored Premises• Biosecurity and Surveillance are very  important to achieve Monitored  Premises st...
Our Approach:      Compartmentalization• Discussed how to approach  compartmentalization• Start with swine specific diseas...
Progress Update• One production company is willing to  work through the application process  to apply to become a compartm...
DATA MANAGEMENTWORKING GROUP
The Charge• To enable optimal management of data  during an FAD outbreak, recommend  – data to be collected prior to and i...
Our Approach• Reviewed and discussed approaches  of other Secure Food Supply plans• Discussed what types of gaps may  exis...
Next Steps• Analyze survey responses.  – NAHLN Laboratories  – State Veterinarians• Discuss possible approaches on how to ...
Producer Information
RISK ASSESSMENTSWORKING GROUP
The ChargeRecommend and prioritize riskassessments necessary to provideadditional scientific basis for theSecure Pork Supp...
Risk Assessment Priorities• Risk Assessments will be Disease and  commodity (movement) specific• Disease Priority  – FMD, ...
Next Steps• Working group calls as needed• Assure alignment with other SPS  working groups• UMN finalizing funding and pri...
OUTBREAK TOMORROWWORKING GROUP
The Charge• Recommend policies and procedures  for maximizing a secure pork supply  while minimizing FAD spread if an  out...
Our Approach• Updating NPB’s Highly Contagious  Foreign Animal Diseases of Swine  Strategy Document  – provides a basic ov...
Our Approach• Develop a controlled stop movement  document  – Factors to Consider in a Stop Movement    Order for Swine in...
Next Steps• Complete revisions of NPB’s Highly  Contagious Foreign Animal Disease  of Swine Strategy document• Complete th...
COMMUNICATIONSWORKING GROUP
CROSS-SPECIES FMD   COMMUNICATIONS TEAMGoals  – Protect animal health & minimize    disease spread  – Ensure consumer conf...
Cross-Species FMD Team       Desired Outcomes• Serve as the umbrella for all outreach• Speak with one voice• Do not duplic...
FMD Messaging Website
Next StepsDevelop messaging for  – CSF  – ASF  – SVD
Summary• Reviewed the goals, charge and  approach of the SPS and the seven  Working Groups• Discussed the progress and nex...
Any Questions?zaabelp@iastate.edu
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Dr. Pam Zaabel - Secure pork supply: FAD Outbreak Business Continuity

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Secure pork supply: FAD Outbreak Business Continuity - Dr. Pam Zaabel, from the 2012 Allen D. Leman Swine Conference, September 15-18, St. Paul, Minnesota, USA.

More presentations at http://www.swinecast.com/2012-leman-swine-conference-material

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Dr. Pam Zaabel - Secure pork supply: FAD Outbreak Business Continuity

  1. 1. Secure Pork Supply Plan September 2012
  2. 2. North American Animal Agriculture Industry is Unique• The size, structure, efficiency, and extensive movement inherent in the U.S. and North American livestock industries will present unprecedented challenges in the event of a FAD outbreak• Strategies for the response to, and management of, a FAD outbreak will change as the outbreak progresses and will depend upon the magnitude, location and other characteristics of the outbreak.
  3. 3. Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) Outbreak• Stop movement will quickly lead to overcrowding conditions with serious animal welfare and health issues.
  4. 4. Phases of FMD Response
  5. 5. FMD Detection in the United States: Types of an FMD Outbreak Six Types of FMD Outbreaks Type 6: CatastrophicSize of FMD North Outbreak American (in terms ofanimals, pre mises, andjurisdictions affected) Response Shifts from Emphasis on Stamping-Out to Emphasis on Alternate Strategies (duration of FMD response) 5
  6. 6. Common Components of Secure Food Supply Business Continuity PlansSecure Egg Supply (HPAI); Secure Turkey Supply (HPAI); Secure Milk Supply (FMD); Secure Pork Supply (FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD) – Government, industry, academia partnerships – Voluntary pre-outbreak preparedness components – Biosecurity, surveillance, epidemiology questionnaires, movement permits – Risk assessments (completed and in process) – Plans must be based on current capabilities and will evolve with science and new capabilities – Guidelines only: Final decisions made by responsible officials during outbreak – Outreach and training pre and post outbreak
  7. 7. Secure Pork Supply Plan (Funded by USDA APHIS VS)• Develop procedures to allow the safe movement of animals with no evidence of infection in a FAD control zone to a pork processing plant or to other sites to Ramirez accommodate different stages of production.
  8. 8. SPS Partners• SPS Planning Committee – Federal and State officials – Representatives of all phases of the swine industry – NPB, NPPC, AASV – Academia • swine disease experts • swine production experts
  9. 9. Secure Pork Supply Planning Committee• First meeting October 11-12, 2011• Working Groups formed: – Biosecurity – Surveillance – Compartmentalization/Monitored Premises – Data Collection, Management, and Sharing – Risk Assessments – Plan for response to an FAD Outbreak Tomorrow – Communications
  10. 10. FADs included in SPS plan• Foot and mouth disease – Swine, cattle, sheep, goats, deer• Classical swine fever• African swine fever• Swine vesicular disease Foot and Mouth Disease : 7 days post infection PIADC
  11. 11. Disease Transmission (FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD)• Not zoonotic• Direct contact and oral exposure are the most important routes of infection for swine (Pigs are relatively resistant to airborne infection by all 4 FADs)• Indirect contact (fomites) also can play a lessor role for transmission• Pigs exhale large concentrations of FMDV, cattle are susceptible to aerosolized virus
  12. 12. Vaccine• FMD and CSF – Vaccine will not be immediately available, or will be in short supply• ASF and SVD – No vaccine Ramirez• May not be a viable option for initial rapid control of these FADs in a large FAD outbreak
  13. 13. BIOSECURITY WORKINGGROUP
  14. 14. The Charge• Define biosecurity performance standards prior to an outbreak• Participating premises can be rapidly designated as Monitored Premises in the event of an outbreak
  15. 15. Our Approach• NPB biosecurity and pork producer biosecurity protocols• Combined protocols and revised by Level (Level One and Level Two)• Reviewed and edited by Working Group
  16. 16. Next Steps• Finish editing the recommendations• Send to Planning Committee for review• Develop illustrations demonstrating the clean/dirty line concept
  17. 17. SURVEILLANCE WORKINGGROUP
  18. 18. The Original Charge:Develop Recommendations for• Comprehensive Integrated Swine Surveillance prior to a FAD outbreak• Surveillance during a FAD outbreak (may depend on phase and type of outbreak)• Surveillance to establish freedom from disease in a premises, production system, region, or the entire US• Surveillance to be eligible for compartmentalization prior to and during an FAD outbreak
  19. 19. Approach Considerations• Utilize testing approaches the industry is using, but also test these samples for FADs – Producers are more likely to collect and submit samples. – Not a financial burden for producers to collect samples. – What would the incentive be for producers?• Provide samples to diagnostic labs so can conduct testing pre-outbreak
  20. 20. Next Steps• Draft a straw man protocol to be reviewed by the Surveillance Working Group
  21. 21. COMPARTMENTALIZATION/MONITORED PREMISESWORKING GROUP
  22. 22. The ChargeDevelop criteria – To receive and maintain monitored premises status during an FAD outbreak – For swine production systems to be eligible for compartmentalization according to OIE guidelines
  23. 23. Our Approach: Monitored Premises• Biosecurity and Surveillance are very important to achieve Monitored Premises status• Wait for Biosecurity and Surveillance working groups to make recommendations for becoming a Monitored Premises
  24. 24. Our Approach: Compartmentalization• Discussed how to approach compartmentalization• Start with swine specific disease such as CSF• Ask two production companies/ systems to start the process of working toward compartmentalization• Identify road blocks during process
  25. 25. Progress Update• One production company is willing to work through the application process to apply to become a compartment
  26. 26. DATA MANAGEMENTWORKING GROUP
  27. 27. The Charge• To enable optimal management of data during an FAD outbreak, recommend – data to be collected prior to and in the event of an outbreak – responsibilities for data entry and management – priorities and mechanisms for data sharing prior to and during an outbreak• Address issues related to data confidentiality and access
  28. 28. Our Approach• Reviewed and discussed approaches of other Secure Food Supply plans• Discussed what types of gaps may exist in data collection and storage of information• Administer questionnaires to help identify gaps
  29. 29. Next Steps• Analyze survey responses. – NAHLN Laboratories – State Veterinarians• Discuss possible approaches on how to address gaps in the data collection and storage process• Evaluate available data sharing mechanisms and best practices• Produce report for committee with findings on data availability, gaps and sharing
  30. 30. Producer Information
  31. 31. RISK ASSESSMENTSWORKING GROUP
  32. 32. The ChargeRecommend and prioritize riskassessments necessary to provideadditional scientific basis for theSecure Pork Supply plan
  33. 33. Risk Assessment Priorities• Risk Assessments will be Disease and commodity (movement) specific• Disease Priority – FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD• Type of Movement Priority Such as Wean to Finish /Nursery to Finish Genetic replacements in to breeding farm Cull pigs (different types) Finishing to harvest
  34. 34. Next Steps• Working group calls as needed• Assure alignment with other SPS working groups• UMN finalizing funding and priorities of RA funding with USDA for the next year• More detailed discussions when have Analyst assigned and begin RA
  35. 35. OUTBREAK TOMORROWWORKING GROUP
  36. 36. The Charge• Recommend policies and procedures for maximizing a secure pork supply while minimizing FAD spread if an outbreak occurred tomorrow with currently available resources• The plans should vary with the phase and type of outbreak
  37. 37. Our Approach• Updating NPB’s Highly Contagious Foreign Animal Diseases of Swine Strategy Document – provides a basic overview of response activities that would occur if an FAD is suspected and/or confirmed in swine by animal health officials – includes industry goals in support of the FAD response and actions necessary to meet industry-defined goals
  38. 38. Our Approach• Develop a controlled stop movement document – Factors to Consider in a Stop Movement Order for Swine in the U.S. due to a Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak
  39. 39. Next Steps• Complete revisions of NPB’s Highly Contagious Foreign Animal Disease of Swine Strategy document• Complete the Controlled Stop Movement Document• Send both documents to working group for review
  40. 40. COMMUNICATIONSWORKING GROUP
  41. 41. CROSS-SPECIES FMD COMMUNICATIONS TEAMGoals – Protect animal health & minimize disease spread – Ensure consumer confidence in meat & milk safety – Prevent supply disruption to customers
  42. 42. Cross-Species FMD Team Desired Outcomes• Serve as the umbrella for all outreach• Speak with one voice• Do not duplicate efforts/work smart• Eliminate consumer confusion• Do not duplicate efforts/work smart
  43. 43. FMD Messaging Website
  44. 44. Next StepsDevelop messaging for – CSF – ASF – SVD
  45. 45. Summary• Reviewed the goals, charge and approach of the SPS and the seven Working Groups• Discussed the progress and next steps of the Working Groups
  46. 46. Any Questions?zaabelp@iastate.edu

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