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Risk Assessment Visualization Study for Lunar Outpost Landing Zone Surface Preparation

The document presents a risk assessment visualization study related to the preparation of lunar landing zones for future missions, specifically focusing on inadequate surface preparations as a major concern. It outlines various risks associated with the outpost build-up sequence, identifies priority risks, and suggests potential mitigation strategies. The study emphasizes the importance of optimizing landing zones to protect surface assets during missions, detailing operational scenarios and risks involved in the process.

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ASCE EARTH & SPACE 2010 Exploration and Utilization of Extraterrestrial Bodies Symposium 3 Honolulu, Hawaii, March 14-17, 2010 Risk Assessment Visualization Study for Lunar Outpost Landing Zone Surface Preparation Space Enterprise Council Space Transportation Working Group Lunar Surface Systems Risk Study Risk #11 Inadequate Landing Zone Surface Preparation Sam Ximenes, Managing Partner sximenes@explorationarchitecture.com 210-404-2981 www.explorationarchitecture.com 1
Scenario 4.2.1.20 – Emplaced Surface Element Assets at ISC Scenario 4.2.1.20 Premises: Test Flight Lander • Scenario 4.2.1.20 is the reference Outpost build-up sequence for surface preparations. • The Risk 11 premise occurs prior to ISC since first need date for landing pad and regolith protective berm is prior to arrival of the ISC 14 day mission in FY21. Sortie Mission Sortie Lander Chassis Rover Methodology: Abandoned ISC Phase Airlock 1 • Created illustrated sequencing of the Outpost buildup to ISC with pictorials of mission “snapshots” to play out the operational scenario and help visualize the sequence of risks along the way to Small Pressurized Small Pressurized Crew Mobility Chassis how the prepared landing zone gets to its Rover 1 Rover 2 w/ excavation blade ready state in time for the ISC mission. • Identified and ranked risks according to Cargo Lander Risk Matrix Priority Scoring using CxP criteria for risk consequence scoring. • Identified risk mitigation approaches. Assumptions: • Test Flight landing zone is in vicinity of future Outpost operations. • Altair for Mission 4 ISC is Extended Stay Portable Utility Portable Utility Lunar Surface Sortie configuration. Pallet 1 Pallet 2 Manipulator System Sortie Extended Caveats: Stay Lander Abandoned • Form factor of landing pad berm Airlock 2 geometry illustrated in the pictorials of the Outpost buildup sequence scenario is for reference only and is not intended to convey a berm design solution. Chassis A + Robot Assistant Landing/Launch Pad 2
Risk Statement Risk #11 - Inadequate Landing Zone Surface Preparation If the excavator system, CMC w/ blade or other, fails to build the desired regolith protective berm, there is a possibility the emplaced surface assets could be damaged by debris and ejecta from the arrival of the next lander or departure of the ascent module. 21 Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone Surface Preparation Identified. 5 7 16 20 23 25 • 2 Scored Priority Red 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 • 14 Scored Priority Yellow 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 • 5 Scored Priority Green 1 2 3 4 CONSEQU ENCE 5 Risk # Risk Title R11 Risks Priority Distribution Failure to optimize landing zone R11-07 separations to protect surface assets in 6 event of powered descent abort 5 Berm design form factor not optimized R11-15 # of Identified Risks for sufficient protection 4 Lander fuel cells fail to provide surface R11-04 power for off-loading CMC excavator 3 Off-loading collision or damage to R11-06 2 excavator R11-17 Ejecta discharge from top layer of berm 1 Downtime from numerous recharging R11-13 0 events causes scheduling inefficiency 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 CMC not configured for tele-robotic pre- Risk Priority Score R11-19 emplacement of navigation aids at completion of ISC landing pad 3
Top Five Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone Surface Preparation Risk # Risk Description Failure to optimize landing zone separations to protect surface assets in event of powered descent abort Given there is an operational correlation between location of the Mission 3 Cargo Altair landing zone and location R11-07 of the landing pad for Mission 4 ISC, there is a possibility the distance between the two landing zones will not have sufficient separation to avoid subsequent crewed landing plume ejecta debris damage to Cargo Altair cargo elements in event of protective berm failure, or CMC excavator system is not successfully deployed, or fails to construct berm. Berm design form factor not optimized for sufficient protection Given the complexity of interacting forces between the lunar environment, lunar surface features, and the Altair R11-15 propulsion system causing debris and ejecta during landing and launch, there is a possibility of not achieving an optimized geometry (height, shape, mass, deflection angle) for the protective berm's form factor, causing it to be over or under designed for effective protection. Lander fuel cells fail to provide surface power for off-loading CMC excavator R11-04 Given the lander fuel cells are assumed to provide power on the surface to support the offloading of the CMC prior to deploying the PUP solar array, there is a possibility the assumption is erroneous in that the lander fuel cell design has not been sized to accomplish this operation. Off-loading collision or damage to excavator R11-06 Given the Uncrewed Cargo Altair is tele-robotically operated, there is a possibility offloading collision or damage to the CMC excavator system can occur. Ejecta discharge from top layer of berm R11-17 Given the top layer of the regolith protective berm may be relatively uncompacted, there is a possibility the outer skin of the berm will be a source for discharging ejecta. 4
Risk Matrix Priority Score 5 7 16 20 23 25 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 n/a CONSEQU ENCE Figure 1 Mission 1 - Test Flight Uncrewed Test Flight of Altair Lander with Ascent Module • ConOps shown is Ascent Module departure. Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone • Test Flight landing zone is in vicinity of Surface Preparation future Outpost operations. Assumption is lander residual consumables may be Risk # Risk Title needed for excavator system and/or n/a - None identified for Test Flight other future Outpost operations. Scenario 4.2.1.20 5
Risk Matrix Priority Score 5 7 16 20 23 25 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-0 1 CONSEQU ENCE Figure 2 Mission 2 - Lunar Sortie Crew DRM First Human Lunar Return (HLR) • ConOps shown is Altair Sortie configuration in proximity to Test Flight landing zone; crew conducting Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone exploration with Sortie Mission Chassis Surface Preparation (SMC) rover. Risk # Risk Title • Crew performs recon and emplacement of navigation aids for cargo Mission 3 Lack of scientific data to properly R11-01 characterize lunar surface environment landing zone. at selected landing and excavation sites • Crew conducts site survey verification for location of Mission 4 landing pad and regolith protective berm, (three landing pads are planned). Scenario 4.2.1.20 6
Risk Matrix Priority Score 5 7 16 20 23 25 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-0 2 CONSEQU ENCE Figure 3 Mission 2 - Lunar Sortie Crew DRM 7 Day HLR Mission End • ConOps shown is crew departure in Ascent Module. • Airlock and SMC rover abandoned. Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone Surface Preparation • SMC parked behind Test Flight Descent Module to minimize damage from plume Risk # Risk Title ejecta debris. R11-02 Incongruities in site planning data Scenario 4.2.1.20 7
Risk Matrix Priority Score 5 7 16 20 23 25 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-0 3 CONSEQU ENCE 5 7 16 20 23 25 LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-0 4 CONSEQU ENCE 5 7 16 20 23 25 LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-0 5 CONSEQU ENCE 5 7 16 20 23 25 Figure 4 Mission 3 - Uncrewed Cargo Altair DRM LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 3 Initial Mobility Delivery 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 • ConOps shown is Crew Mobility Chassis 1 2 3 4 5 (CMC) with attached excavation blade R11-0 6 CONSEQU ENCE and Chassis Driving Kit (CDC) offloaded Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone using Lunar Surface Manipulator System Surface Preparation (LSMS). Risk # Risk Title • Deployed PUP solar array, (PUP solar array deployed after CMC is offloaded). R11-03 Comm link failure for tele-robotic ops • CMC stationed at lander base, testing Lander fuel cells fail to provide surface R11-04 power for off-loading CMC excavator power recharge station. Final landing orientation precludes • Small Pressurized Rovers (SPR) and R11-05 proper orientation of Solar panel array associated PUP cargo elements are Off-loading collision or damage to assumed crew-supervised EVA offloaded R11-06 excavator when crew arrives in Mission 4. Scenario 4.2.1.20 8
Risk Matrix Priority Score 5 7 16 20 23 25 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-0 7 CONSEQU ENCE 5 7 16 20 23 25 LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-0 8 CONSEQU ENCE 5 7 16 20 23 25 LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-0 9 CONSEQU ENCE Figure 5 Mission 3 - Outpost Remote Operations DRM Mission 3 Ops Landing Pad Excavation Phase Begins • ConOps shown is CMC tele-robotically preparing landing zone for next mission. Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone Surface Preparation Risk # Risk Title Failure to optimize landing zone R11-07 separations to protect surface assets in event of Altair powered descent abort Dust ejecta from excavation or solar R11-08 wind plasma interaction near the lunar surface contaminating solar array Failure to optimize landing zone R11-09 separation to minimize traverse distance to Altair CMC recharge station Scenario 4.2.1.20 9
Risk Matrix Priority Score 5 7 16 20 23 25 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-1 0 CONSEQU ENCE 5 7 16 20 23 25 LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-1 1 CONSEQU ENCE 5 7 16 20 23 25 LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-1 2 CONSEQU ENCE 5 7 16 20 23 25 Figure 6 Mission 3 - Outpost Remote Operations DRM LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 3 Mission 3 Ops Berm Excavation 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 • ConOps shown is CMC tele-robotically 1 2 3 4 5 constructing protective regolith berm R11-1 3 CONSEQU ENCE around landing zone. Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone Surface Preparation Risk # Risk Title Loss of video surveillance from lander R11-10 vantage point compromises situational awareness for tele-operations Human error due to improperly R11-11 designed HCI / GUI for tele-operator R11-12 CMC excavator system reliability Downtime from numerous recharging R11-13 events causes scheduling inefficiency Scenario 4.2.1.20 10
Risk Matrix Priority Score 5 7 16 20 23 25 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-1 4 CONSEQU ENCE Figure 7 Mission 3 - Outpost Remote Operations DRM Mission 3 Ops Berm Excavation (cont.) • ConOps shown is CMC tele-robotically nearing completion of protective regolith berm around landing zone. Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone Surface Preparation Risk # Risk Title Top layer material of regolith source R11-14 field in proximity to landing zone may be depleted before completion of berm Scenario 4.2.1.20 11
Risk Matrix Priority Score 5 7 16 20 23 25 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-1 5 CONSEQU ENCE 5 7 16 20 23 25 LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-1 6 CONSEQU ENCE 5 7 16 20 23 25 LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-1 7 CONSEQU ENCE 5 7 16 20 23 25 Figure 8 Mission 3 - Outpost Remote Operations DRM LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 3 Mission 3 Ops, Landing Pad 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 Excavation Complete 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 • ConOps shown is completed landing pad R11-1 8 CONSEQU ENCE prepared to receive next mission. Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone • CMC parked at lander base power Surface Preparation recharge station. Risk # Risk Title Berm design form factor not optimized R11-15 for sufficient protection Berm over-design causing requirements R11-16 creep for excavator system design R11-17 Ejecta discharge from top layer of berm Unforeseen consequences if blast R11-18 ejecta debris forms a medium reflecting pressure energy off berm design Scenario 4.2.1.20 12
Risk Matrix Priority Score 5 7 16 20 23 25 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-1 9 CONSEQU ENCE Figure 9 Mission 4 - Visiting Lunar Outpost Expedition DRM Initial Surface Capability (ISC) • ConOps shown is successful landing of Altair at landing pad. • Altair is in Lunar Sortie Crew Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone configuration, and relies on Lunar Surface Preparation Surface Systems resources to extend Risk # Risk Title surface stay to 14 days. CMC not configured to pre-emplace • PUP 1 moved to landing pad by SPR 1; R11-19 navigation/beacon aids at completion of LSMS offloads remaining SPR 2/PUP2. landing site (or for construction phase) • Chassis A with Robotic Assistant (RA) is delivered. • CMC initiating excavation of 2nd landing pad. Scenario 4.2.1.20 13
Risk Matrix Priority Score 5 7 16 20 23 25 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-2 0 CONSEQU ENCE Figure 10 Mission 4 - Visiting Lunar Outpost Expedition DRM ISC Operations • ConOps shown is Crew member performing CMC excavator maintenance check, assisted by RA. Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone • SMC Rover is revived and powered after Surface Preparation 1 year dormancy period. Risk # Risk Title • SPRs performing exploration and Provisioning for CMC excavator system science activities. R11-20 spares, maintenance and refurbishment not sufficiently accommodated Scenario 4.2.1.20 14
Risk Matrix Priority Score 5 7 16 20 23 25 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-2 1 CONSEQU ENCE Figure 11 Mission 4 - Visiting Lunar Outpost Expedition 14 Day ISC Mission End • ConOps shown is crew departure in Ascent Module. • 2nd Airlock abandoned. Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone Surface Preparation • Outpost surface assets placed in Safe Mode quiescent state prior to departure. Risk # Risk Title • SMC Rover parked behind protective Ambiguous ConOps for the three R11-21 planned landing pads versus the berm (serves as crew’s transportation to remaining 9 Altair landings to CHPC launch pad from SPR’s parked location). • CMC excavator positioned at new power recharge station, (resumes tele-robotic excavation of 2nd landing pad after Crew departure). Scenario 4.2.1.20 15
Summary of Main Mitigation Themes MAIN MITIGATION THEMES CAPTURED IN RISK DESCRIPTIONS AND MITIGATION APPROACHES WORKSHEETS - Utilize SMD's International Lunar Network (ILN) of surface science stations to characterize environment of Outpost specific landing /launch sites. - Validate data through use of extensive simulation and phenomenological modeling of lunar surface at excavation and construction sites. - Include civil engineering and planetary geology disciplines as core crew expertise for Mission 2 sortie scouting and surveying mission. - Deploy an integrated lunar sensor network to enhance the spatial-orientation capabilities of teleoperators and astronauts on the lunar surface. - Ensure Altair design requirements align with LSS operational scenarios; to extent practical, align schedule of Altair and LSS design reviews. - Design mechanical articulation of solar array orientation in Mission 3 for any positioning contingency of Cargo Altair landing. - Extensive use of discrete modeling and event simulation tools for understanding processes and procedures, and design impacts to: * power generation and supply; * characterizing optimized landing zone separations; * regolith simulation of plume ejecta models; * berm or landing/launch zone design alternatives; * teleoperated excavator system designs. - Utilization abandoned Mission 2 Sortie Mission Chassis (SMC) redeployed as a transportation carrier for: * a self-transporting battery system to shuttle itself to and from the charging station to the excavator while the excavator continues to work; * shuttling crew from parked SPR's or habitation modules to landing/launch site. - Deploy a Lunar Dust Instrument (LDI) mission, i.e., Langmuir Probe to characterize lunar dusty plasma environment on and near the lunar surface. - Design teleoperator control center with human-systems integration principals for workstation design. - Use/develop software tools for modeling and analyzing workstation interfaces, crew station design and overall workflow environment - Incorporate lessons learned from Soviet era Lunokhod teleoperator control station experience. - Ensure CMC tool kit for Mission 3 Altair Cargo manifest includes capability for CMC to reconfigure itself for emplacement of navigation/beacon aids. - Ensure spares provisioning and spares ConOps for CMC excavation activity is sufficiently accommodated. - Develop CMC spares ConOps for Mission 3 telerobotic remote Outpost operations. - Develop complete ConOps for optimized usage of landing/launch zones through CHPC to characterize potential design opportunities or shortfalls. 16
R-11 Risk Descriptions and Mitigation Approaches RISK DESCRIPTION SCORE TOP 5 MITIGATION APPROACHES R11-01 Given lunar environment characterization is required to conduct design Ensure lunar robotic precursor science studies for landing on and moving over the lunar surface, and given that certain 5 7 16 20 23 25 missions (including international missions) LIKELIHOOD scientific data may not be available, there is a possibility of failure to completely 4 6 13 18 22 24 have appropriate instrument suite of sensors characterize the lunar surface at selected landing sites for such environmental 3 4 11 15 19 21 for characterizing Lunar Outpost's specific characteristics as surface geological environment, regolith properties, dust, regolith 2 2 8 10 14 17 locations for habitation, landing and launch electrical and photoelectric properties, optical properties, thermal environment, 1 1 3 5 9 12 sites; LSS coordination with SMD on radiation environment, surface plasma environment, and ejecta environment, which 1 2 3 4 5 International Lunar Network (ILN) for surface may impact safe operations and design solutions for the protective berm construction R11-01 CONSEQUENCE stations science network. d t t d i R11-02 Given HLR SMC rover excursions will explore and perform on-site Validate data through extensive simulations; verification of remote survey data, as well as demarcate selected landing zones and 5 7 16 20 23 25 Crew expertise to include civil engineering LIKELIHOOD excavation sites, there is a possibility that discovery of "real-time" mission data does 4 6 13 18 22 24 and planetary geology disciplines (site not coincide with remotely obtained planning data or does not match pre-mission 3 4 11 15 19 21 surveying as core activity for 7 day scouting simulations, causing significant changes to future site plans, e.g., pre-determined 2 2 8 10 14 17 mission); deploy integrated lunar sensor excavation sites not viable, or vehicle-terrain interactions grossly mis-match 1 1 3 5 9 12 network to enhance the spatial-orientation simulations, causing incongruities in excavator system design, etc. 1 2 3 4 5 capabilities of astronauts on the lunar R11-02 CONSEQUENCE surface. R11-03 Given the Mission 3 Initial Mobility Delivery is tele-robotically operated, there Dependent on Space Communications and is a possibility that a communications link failure will jeopardize the mission, 5 7 16 20 23 25 Navigation Architecture (SCaN) for routing, LIKELIHOOD preventing construction of the landing pad and protective berm. 4 6 13 18 22 24 redundancy, and link protocols. 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-03 CONSEQUENCE R11-04 Given the lander fuel cells are assumed to provide power on the surface to Coordination with Altair Project Office; support the offloading of the CMC prior to deploying the PUP solar array, there is a 5 7 16 20 23 25 ensure Altair design requirements aligned LIKELIHOOD possibility the assumption is erroneous in that the lander fuel cell design has not 4 6 13 18 22 24 with LSS operational scenarios; to extent been sized to accomplish this operation. 3 4 11 15 19 21 practical, align schedule of Altair and LSS 3 2 2 8 10 14 17 design reviews. 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-04 CONSEQUENCE 17
R-11 Risk Descriptions and Mitigation Approaches, cont. RISK DESCRIPTION SCORE TOP 5 MITIGATION APPROACHES R11-05 Given the Uncrewed Cargo Altair will utilize a deployed solar array from one Dependent on Altair navigation and beacon of the PUP cargo elements for providing power resources for Outpost Remote 5 7 16 20 23 25 aids for landing; employ astronaut/pilot LIKELIHOOD Operations, there is a possibility the final landing orientation of the Cargo Altair will 4 6 13 18 22 24 spatial disorientation countermeasures preclude the solar panel articulating arm to maximize the exposure of the solar panel 3 4 11 15 19 21 during landing; design mechanical to the sun. 2 2 8 10 14 17 articulation of solar array for all orientation 1 1 3 5 9 12 contingencies, and model extensively in 1 2 3 4 5 Lunar Surface Operations Simulator for R11-05 CONSEQUENCE design impacts to power generation. R11-06 Given the Uncrewed Cargo Altair is tele-robotically operated, there is a Refer to risk mitigation approaches identified possibility offloading collision or damage to the CMC excavator system can occur. 5 7 16 20 23 25 in Risk 4 "Damage During Unloading LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 Operations" 3 4 11 15 19 21 4 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-06 CONSEQUENCE R11-07 Given there is an operational correlation between location of the Mission 3 Extensive use of simulations and modeling Cargo Altair landing zone and location of the landing pad for Mission 4 ISC, there is a 5 7 16 20 23 25 to characterize optimized landing zone LIKELIHOOD possibility the distance between the two landing zones will not have sufficient 4 6 13 18 22 24 separations; regolith simulation of plume separation to avoid subsequent crewed landing plume ejecta debris damage to 3 4 11 15 19 21 ejecta models; berm or landing/launch zone 1 Cargo Altair cargo elements in event of protective berm failure, or CMC excavator 2 2 8 10 14 17 design alternatives. system is not successfully deployed, or fails to construct berm. 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-07 CONSEQUENCE R11-08 Given there is an operational correlation between location of the Mission 3 Deploy Lunar Dust Instrument (LDI) mission, Cargo Altair landing zone and location of the landing pad for Mission 4 ISC, there is a 5 7 16 20 23 25 i.e., Langmuir Probe at approximately 10 LIKELIHOOD possibility the distance between the two landing zones will not have sufficient 4 6 13 18 22 24 meter height, as part of International Lunar separation to minimize contamination of the Portable Utility Pallet (PUP) solar power 3 4 11 15 19 21 Network (ILN) of surface science stations or array from dust ejecta or dusty plasma electric potential of approximately 6 month 2 2 8 10 14 17 on Altair Test Flight mission to characterize berm construction activity, (interaction of lunar dust and solar wind plasma near the 1 1 3 5 9 12 lunar dusty plasma environment on and near lunar surface at ~ 6 - 10 meters high), thereby jeopardizing surface systems power 1 2 3 4 5 the lunar surface. R11-08 recharge capability. CONSEQUENCE 18
R-11 Risk Descriptions and Mitigation Approaches, cont. RISK DESCRIPTION SCORE TOP 5 MITIGATION APPROACHES R11-09 Given there is an operational correlation between location of the Mission 3 Derive construction and excavation Cargo Altair landing zone and location of the landing pad for Mission 4 ISC, there is a 5 7 16 20 23 25 operations requirements through LIKELIHOOD risk the distance between the two landing zones will not minimize their separation to 4 6 13 18 22 24 development of regolith excavation optimize the CMC excavator system traverse distance between Cargo Altair power 3 4 11 15 19 21 simulation tools; consider redeploying SMC recharge station and landing pad construction site. 2 2 8 10 14 17 left behind from Mission 2 as a carrier for a 1 1 3 5 9 12 self-transporting battery sysem which can 1 2 3 4 5 shuttle itself to and from the charger while R11-09 CONSEQUENCE the excavator continues to work. R11-10 Given the CMC excavator system's reliance on tele-robotic control, assumed Use integrated lunar sensor network to to include High Definition line-of-sight video surveillance from the Cargo Altair landing 5 7 16 20 23 25 enhance spatial-orientation capabilities of LIKELIHOOD zone vantage point, there is a possibility the remote tele-operator may loose 4 6 13 18 22 24 teleoperators; integrate sensor information orientation / situational awareness if the HD camera goes down. 3 4 11 15 19 21 with computational models to provide 2 2 8 10 14 17 teleoperators with self-localization and path- 1 1 3 5 9 12 generation capabilities, e.g., relative 1 2 3 4 5 positioning, generation of return paths in R11-10 CONSEQUENCE reverse directions, path memorization, etc. R11-11 Given the CMC excavator system's reliance on tele-robotic control, there is Design teleoperator control center with a possibility that human error from the tele-robotic operator could occur due to an 5 7 16 20 23 25 human-systems integration principals for LIKELIHOOD improperly designed Human Computer Interface / Graphical User Interface. 4 6 13 18 22 24 workstation design; use/develop s/w tools for 3 4 11 15 19 21 modeling and analyzing workstation 2 2 8 10 14 17 interfaces, crew station design and overall 1 1 3 5 9 12 workflow environment; incorporate lessons 1 2 3 4 5 learned from Soviet Lunokhod teleoperator R11-11 CONSEQUENCE control station experience. R11-12 Given the heavy excavation operations required of the CMC excavator Derive construction and excavation system and reliance on tele-robotic control, there is a possibility that lack of an 5 7 16 20 23 25 operations requirements with development of LIKELIHOOD optimized excavator system design integrated with a specific berm design and 4 6 13 18 22 24 regolith excavation simulation tools for construction methodology may diminish excavator system reliability. 3 4 11 15 19 21 modeling various teleoperated excavator 2 2 8 10 14 17 system designs against various berm 1 1 3 5 9 12 designs, using parameters of driving speed, 1 2 3 4 5 payload ratios, excavation resistance forces, R11-12 CONSEQUENCE power supply, etc. 19
R-11 Risk Descriptions and Mitigation Approaches, cont. RISK DESCRIPTION SCORE TOP 5 MITIGATION APPROACHES R11-13 Given the heavy excavation operations required of a single CMC excavator Derive construction and excavation system in Scenario 4.2.1.20, and that there are likely to be high system consumable 5 7 16 20 23 25 operations requirements through LIKELIHOOD resource constraints, (e.g., power recharge time vs. power storage capacity), there is 4 6 13 18 22 24 development of regolith excavation a possibility that construction scheduling inefficiency will pose a threat to completion 3 4 11 15 19 21 simulation tools; consider redeploying SMC of the berm due to downtime caused by duration and number of recharge events 2 2 8 10 14 17 left behind from Mission 2 as a carrier for a required in a single work period for the CMC excavator system. 1 1 3 5 9 12 self-transporting battery sysem which can 1 2 3 4 5 shuttle itself to and from the charger while R11-13 CONSEQUENCE the excavator continues to work. R11-14 Given the preliminary estimated quantity of regolith required to construct a Characterize excavation site for determining protective berm, (Astrobotics estimate of as much as 1.2 million kg of regolith), there 5 7 16 20 23 25 distribution of regolith source field and derive LIKELIHOOD is a possibility the top layer material source field in proximity to the landing zone may 4 6 13 18 22 24 operational design requirements for CMC be depleted before completion of the berm, requiring additional traversing distance 3 4 11 15 19 21 excavator through simulation of contingency for the excavator system to haul regolith back to the berm site from another source 2 2 8 10 14 17 traverse paths of CMC for "offsite" material field and/or deeper digging into the regolith which will impact CMC excavator system 1 1 3 5 9 12 source fields. power storage/usage requirements and excavation timeline. 1 2 3 4 5 R11-14 CONSEQUENCE R11-15 Given the complexity of interacting forces between the lunar environment, Evaluate other innovative design solutions lunar surface features, and the Altair propulsion system causing debris and ejecta 5 7 16 20 23 25 for form factor other than berm design LIKELIHOOD during landing and launch, there is a possibility of not achieving an optimized 4 6 13 18 22 24 against rigid set of criteria. geometry (height, shape, mass, deflection angle) for the protective berm's form 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 factor, causing it to be over or under designed for effective protection. 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-15 CONSEQUENCE R11-16 Given an over designed berm will place heavier and unnecessary Derive construction and excavation requirements on the excavator system design for moving material and constructing 5 7 16 20 23 25 operations requirements through LIKELIHOOD the berm, there is a possibility interfacing systems such as the power generation, 4 6 13 18 22 24 development of regolith excavation power storage, and recharge station design requirements may be over specified. 3 4 11 15 19 21 simulation tools for modeling various 2 2 8 10 14 17 teleoperated excavator system designs with 1 1 3 5 9 12 parameters of driving speed, payload ratios, 1 2 3 4 5 excavation resistance forces, power supply, R11-16 CONSEQUENCE etc. 20
R-11 Risk Descriptions and Mitigation Approaches, cont. RISK DESCRIPTION SCORE TOP 5 MITIGATION APPROACHES R11-17 Given the top layer of the regolith protective berm may be relatively Evaluate alternative berm construction uncompacted, there is a possibility the outer skin of the berm will be a source for 5 7 16 20 23 25 methods, compaction techniques, LIKELIHOOD discharging ejecta. 4 6 13 18 22 24 geotextiles, etc. 3 4 11 15 19 21 5 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-17 CONSEQUENCE R11-18 Acoustical energy for berm design criteria is believed to be non-existent in Perform phenomenological modeling of the lunar vacuum environment. QUESTION: Can the debris cloud momentarily form 5 7 16 20 23 25 interacting forces. LIKELIHOOD a medium in which the berm design reflects or redirects acoustical and pressure 4 6 13 18 22 24 energy from ignition blast back to the Altair at the launch pad at the beginning of the 3 4 11 15 19 21 flight or while descending along the flight path? 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-18 CONSEQUENCE R11-19 Given the completed launch pad and berm are tele-robotically constructed, Ensure CMC tool kit and Mission 3 Altair and given the CMC is only configured for excavation duty, there is a possibility 5 7 16 20 23 25 Cargo manifest includes capability for CMC LIKELIHOOD emplacement of navigation aids for delineating the berm during construction and for 4 6 13 18 22 24 to reconfigure itself for robotic emplacement landing at the pad will not be possible prior to arrival of the Mission 4 Altair flight. 3 4 11 15 19 21 of navigation aids and beacons for 2 2 8 10 14 17 construction phase and upon completion of 1 1 3 5 9 12 built berm/landing site. 1 2 3 4 5 R11-19 CONSEQUENCE R11-20 Given CMC excavator system may need to excavate as much as 1.2 million Ensure spares provisioning and spares kg of regolith (Astrobotics estimate), there is a possibility spares and provisioning for 5 7 16 20 23 25 ConOps for CMC excavation activity is LIKELIHOOD CMC excavator system maintenance and refurbishment may not be sufficiently 4 6 13 18 22 24 sufficiently accommodated; develop CMC accommodated in Mission 3 or Mission 4 Altair manifests. 3 4 11 15 19 21 spares ConOps for Mission 3 telerobotic 2 2 8 10 14 17 remote Outpost operations, e.g., CMC tool 1 1 3 5 9 12 kit and Mission 3 Altair Cargo manifest 1 2 3 4 5 includes capability for CMC to reconfigure R11-20 CONSEQUENCE itself for spares changeout task. 21
R-11 Risk Descriptions and Mitigation Approaches, cont. RISK DESCRIPTION SCORE TOP 5 MITIGATION APPROACHES R11-21 Given the initial landing/launch pad is completed by ISC, and given Scenario Develop complete ConOps for optimized 4.2.1.20 calls for a total of 3 landing pads, there is a possibility post-ISC site 5 7 16 20 23 25 usage of landing/launch zones through LIKELIHOOD construction for the landing pads #2 and #3 will be incongruous with the ConOps for 4 6 13 18 22 24 CHPC to characterize potential design the remaining 9 Altair landings planned for achieving Continuous Human Presence 3 4 11 15 19 21 opportunities or shortfalls. Capability (CHPC) by FY2025. 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-21 CONSEQUENCE 22

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Risk Assessment Visualization Study for Lunar Outpost Landing Zone Surface Preparation

  • 1.
    ASCE EARTH &SPACE 2010 Exploration and Utilization of Extraterrestrial Bodies Symposium 3 Honolulu, Hawaii, March 14-17, 2010 Risk Assessment Visualization Study for Lunar Outpost Landing Zone Surface Preparation Space Enterprise Council Space Transportation Working Group Lunar Surface Systems Risk Study Risk #11 Inadequate Landing Zone Surface Preparation Sam Ximenes, Managing Partner sximenes@explorationarchitecture.com 210-404-2981 www.explorationarchitecture.com 1
  • 2.
    Scenario 4.2.1.20 –Emplaced Surface Element Assets at ISC Scenario 4.2.1.20 Premises: Test Flight Lander • Scenario 4.2.1.20 is the reference Outpost build-up sequence for surface preparations. • The Risk 11 premise occurs prior to ISC since first need date for landing pad and regolith protective berm is prior to arrival of the ISC 14 day mission in FY21. Sortie Mission Sortie Lander Chassis Rover Methodology: Abandoned ISC Phase Airlock 1 • Created illustrated sequencing of the Outpost buildup to ISC with pictorials of mission “snapshots” to play out the operational scenario and help visualize the sequence of risks along the way to Small Pressurized Small Pressurized Crew Mobility Chassis how the prepared landing zone gets to its Rover 1 Rover 2 w/ excavation blade ready state in time for the ISC mission. • Identified and ranked risks according to Cargo Lander Risk Matrix Priority Scoring using CxP criteria for risk consequence scoring. • Identified risk mitigation approaches. Assumptions: • Test Flight landing zone is in vicinity of future Outpost operations. • Altair for Mission 4 ISC is Extended Stay Portable Utility Portable Utility Lunar Surface Sortie configuration. Pallet 1 Pallet 2 Manipulator System Sortie Extended Caveats: Stay Lander Abandoned • Form factor of landing pad berm Airlock 2 geometry illustrated in the pictorials of the Outpost buildup sequence scenario is for reference only and is not intended to convey a berm design solution. Chassis A + Robot Assistant Landing/Launch Pad 2
  • 3.
    Risk Statement Risk #11 - Inadequate Landing Zone Surface Preparation If the excavator system, CMC w/ blade or other, fails to build the desired regolith protective berm, there is a possibility the emplaced surface assets could be damaged by debris and ejecta from the arrival of the next lander or departure of the ascent module. 21 Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone Surface Preparation Identified. 5 7 16 20 23 25 • 2 Scored Priority Red 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 • 14 Scored Priority Yellow 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 • 5 Scored Priority Green 1 2 3 4 CONSEQU ENCE 5 Risk # Risk Title R11 Risks Priority Distribution Failure to optimize landing zone R11-07 separations to protect surface assets in 6 event of powered descent abort 5 Berm design form factor not optimized R11-15 # of Identified Risks for sufficient protection 4 Lander fuel cells fail to provide surface R11-04 power for off-loading CMC excavator 3 Off-loading collision or damage to R11-06 2 excavator R11-17 Ejecta discharge from top layer of berm 1 Downtime from numerous recharging R11-13 0 events causes scheduling inefficiency 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 CMC not configured for tele-robotic pre- Risk Priority Score R11-19 emplacement of navigation aids at completion of ISC landing pad 3
  • 4.
    Top Five MissionOps Risks to ISC Landing Zone Surface Preparation Risk # Risk Description Failure to optimize landing zone separations to protect surface assets in event of powered descent abort Given there is an operational correlation between location of the Mission 3 Cargo Altair landing zone and location R11-07 of the landing pad for Mission 4 ISC, there is a possibility the distance between the two landing zones will not have sufficient separation to avoid subsequent crewed landing plume ejecta debris damage to Cargo Altair cargo elements in event of protective berm failure, or CMC excavator system is not successfully deployed, or fails to construct berm. Berm design form factor not optimized for sufficient protection Given the complexity of interacting forces between the lunar environment, lunar surface features, and the Altair R11-15 propulsion system causing debris and ejecta during landing and launch, there is a possibility of not achieving an optimized geometry (height, shape, mass, deflection angle) for the protective berm's form factor, causing it to be over or under designed for effective protection. Lander fuel cells fail to provide surface power for off-loading CMC excavator R11-04 Given the lander fuel cells are assumed to provide power on the surface to support the offloading of the CMC prior to deploying the PUP solar array, there is a possibility the assumption is erroneous in that the lander fuel cell design has not been sized to accomplish this operation. Off-loading collision or damage to excavator R11-06 Given the Uncrewed Cargo Altair is tele-robotically operated, there is a possibility offloading collision or damage to the CMC excavator system can occur. Ejecta discharge from top layer of berm R11-17 Given the top layer of the regolith protective berm may be relatively uncompacted, there is a possibility the outer skin of the berm will be a source for discharging ejecta. 4
  • 5.
    Risk Matrix PriorityScore 5 7 16 20 23 25 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 n/a CONSEQU ENCE Figure 1 Mission 1 - Test Flight Uncrewed Test Flight of Altair Lander with Ascent Module • ConOps shown is Ascent Module departure. Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone • Test Flight landing zone is in vicinity of Surface Preparation future Outpost operations. Assumption is lander residual consumables may be Risk # Risk Title needed for excavator system and/or n/a - None identified for Test Flight other future Outpost operations. Scenario 4.2.1.20 5
  • 6.
    Risk Matrix PriorityScore 5 7 16 20 23 25 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-0 1 CONSEQU ENCE Figure 2 Mission 2 - Lunar Sortie Crew DRM First Human Lunar Return (HLR) • ConOps shown is Altair Sortie configuration in proximity to Test Flight landing zone; crew conducting Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone exploration with Sortie Mission Chassis Surface Preparation (SMC) rover. Risk # Risk Title • Crew performs recon and emplacement of navigation aids for cargo Mission 3 Lack of scientific data to properly R11-01 characterize lunar surface environment landing zone. at selected landing and excavation sites • Crew conducts site survey verification for location of Mission 4 landing pad and regolith protective berm, (three landing pads are planned). Scenario 4.2.1.20 6
  • 7.
    Risk Matrix PriorityScore 5 7 16 20 23 25 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-0 2 CONSEQU ENCE Figure 3 Mission 2 - Lunar Sortie Crew DRM 7 Day HLR Mission End • ConOps shown is crew departure in Ascent Module. • Airlock and SMC rover abandoned. Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone Surface Preparation • SMC parked behind Test Flight Descent Module to minimize damage from plume Risk # Risk Title ejecta debris. R11-02 Incongruities in site planning data Scenario 4.2.1.20 7
  • 8.
    Risk Matrix PriorityScore 5 7 16 20 23 25 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-0 3 CONSEQU ENCE 5 7 16 20 23 25 LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-0 4 CONSEQU ENCE 5 7 16 20 23 25 LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-0 5 CONSEQU ENCE 5 7 16 20 23 25 Figure 4 Mission 3 - Uncrewed Cargo Altair DRM LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 3 Initial Mobility Delivery 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 • ConOps shown is Crew Mobility Chassis 1 2 3 4 5 (CMC) with attached excavation blade R11-0 6 CONSEQU ENCE and Chassis Driving Kit (CDC) offloaded Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone using Lunar Surface Manipulator System Surface Preparation (LSMS). Risk # Risk Title • Deployed PUP solar array, (PUP solar array deployed after CMC is offloaded). R11-03 Comm link failure for tele-robotic ops • CMC stationed at lander base, testing Lander fuel cells fail to provide surface R11-04 power for off-loading CMC excavator power recharge station. Final landing orientation precludes • Small Pressurized Rovers (SPR) and R11-05 proper orientation of Solar panel array associated PUP cargo elements are Off-loading collision or damage to assumed crew-supervised EVA offloaded R11-06 excavator when crew arrives in Mission 4. Scenario 4.2.1.20 8
  • 9.
    Risk Matrix PriorityScore 5 7 16 20 23 25 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-0 7 CONSEQU ENCE 5 7 16 20 23 25 LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-0 8 CONSEQU ENCE 5 7 16 20 23 25 LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-0 9 CONSEQU ENCE Figure 5 Mission 3 - Outpost Remote Operations DRM Mission 3 Ops Landing Pad Excavation Phase Begins • ConOps shown is CMC tele-robotically preparing landing zone for next mission. Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone Surface Preparation Risk # Risk Title Failure to optimize landing zone R11-07 separations to protect surface assets in event of Altair powered descent abort Dust ejecta from excavation or solar R11-08 wind plasma interaction near the lunar surface contaminating solar array Failure to optimize landing zone R11-09 separation to minimize traverse distance to Altair CMC recharge station Scenario 4.2.1.20 9
  • 10.
    Risk Matrix PriorityScore 5 7 16 20 23 25 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-1 0 CONSEQU ENCE 5 7 16 20 23 25 LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-1 1 CONSEQU ENCE 5 7 16 20 23 25 LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-1 2 CONSEQU ENCE 5 7 16 20 23 25 Figure 6 Mission 3 - Outpost Remote Operations DRM LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 3 Mission 3 Ops Berm Excavation 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 • ConOps shown is CMC tele-robotically 1 2 3 4 5 constructing protective regolith berm R11-1 3 CONSEQU ENCE around landing zone. Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone Surface Preparation Risk # Risk Title Loss of video surveillance from lander R11-10 vantage point compromises situational awareness for tele-operations Human error due to improperly R11-11 designed HCI / GUI for tele-operator R11-12 CMC excavator system reliability Downtime from numerous recharging R11-13 events causes scheduling inefficiency Scenario 4.2.1.20 10
  • 11.
    Risk Matrix PriorityScore 5 7 16 20 23 25 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-1 4 CONSEQU ENCE Figure 7 Mission 3 - Outpost Remote Operations DRM Mission 3 Ops Berm Excavation (cont.) • ConOps shown is CMC tele-robotically nearing completion of protective regolith berm around landing zone. Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone Surface Preparation Risk # Risk Title Top layer material of regolith source R11-14 field in proximity to landing zone may be depleted before completion of berm Scenario 4.2.1.20 11
  • 12.
    Risk Matrix PriorityScore 5 7 16 20 23 25 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-1 5 CONSEQU ENCE 5 7 16 20 23 25 LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-1 6 CONSEQU ENCE 5 7 16 20 23 25 LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-1 7 CONSEQU ENCE 5 7 16 20 23 25 Figure 8 Mission 3 - Outpost Remote Operations DRM LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 3 Mission 3 Ops, Landing Pad 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 Excavation Complete 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 • ConOps shown is completed landing pad R11-1 8 CONSEQU ENCE prepared to receive next mission. Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone • CMC parked at lander base power Surface Preparation recharge station. Risk # Risk Title Berm design form factor not optimized R11-15 for sufficient protection Berm over-design causing requirements R11-16 creep for excavator system design R11-17 Ejecta discharge from top layer of berm Unforeseen consequences if blast R11-18 ejecta debris forms a medium reflecting pressure energy off berm design Scenario 4.2.1.20 12
  • 13.
    Risk Matrix PriorityScore 5 7 16 20 23 25 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-1 9 CONSEQU ENCE Figure 9 Mission 4 - Visiting Lunar Outpost Expedition DRM Initial Surface Capability (ISC) • ConOps shown is successful landing of Altair at landing pad. • Altair is in Lunar Sortie Crew Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone configuration, and relies on Lunar Surface Preparation Surface Systems resources to extend Risk # Risk Title surface stay to 14 days. CMC not configured to pre-emplace • PUP 1 moved to landing pad by SPR 1; R11-19 navigation/beacon aids at completion of LSMS offloads remaining SPR 2/PUP2. landing site (or for construction phase) • Chassis A with Robotic Assistant (RA) is delivered. • CMC initiating excavation of 2nd landing pad. Scenario 4.2.1.20 13
  • 14.
    Risk Matrix PriorityScore 5 7 16 20 23 25 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-2 0 CONSEQU ENCE Figure 10 Mission 4 - Visiting Lunar Outpost Expedition DRM ISC Operations • ConOps shown is Crew member performing CMC excavator maintenance check, assisted by RA. Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone • SMC Rover is revived and powered after Surface Preparation 1 year dormancy period. Risk # Risk Title • SPRs performing exploration and Provisioning for CMC excavator system science activities. R11-20 spares, maintenance and refurbishment not sufficiently accommodated Scenario 4.2.1.20 14
  • 15.
    Risk Matrix PriorityScore 5 7 16 20 23 25 4 LIKELIHOOD 6 13 18 22 24 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-2 1 CONSEQU ENCE Figure 11 Mission 4 - Visiting Lunar Outpost Expedition 14 Day ISC Mission End • ConOps shown is crew departure in Ascent Module. • 2nd Airlock abandoned. Mission Ops Risks to ISC Landing Zone Surface Preparation • Outpost surface assets placed in Safe Mode quiescent state prior to departure. Risk # Risk Title • SMC Rover parked behind protective Ambiguous ConOps for the three R11-21 planned landing pads versus the berm (serves as crew’s transportation to remaining 9 Altair landings to CHPC launch pad from SPR’s parked location). • CMC excavator positioned at new power recharge station, (resumes tele-robotic excavation of 2nd landing pad after Crew departure). Scenario 4.2.1.20 15
  • 16.
    Summary of MainMitigation Themes MAIN MITIGATION THEMES CAPTURED IN RISK DESCRIPTIONS AND MITIGATION APPROACHES WORKSHEETS - Utilize SMD's International Lunar Network (ILN) of surface science stations to characterize environment of Outpost specific landing /launch sites. - Validate data through use of extensive simulation and phenomenological modeling of lunar surface at excavation and construction sites. - Include civil engineering and planetary geology disciplines as core crew expertise for Mission 2 sortie scouting and surveying mission. - Deploy an integrated lunar sensor network to enhance the spatial-orientation capabilities of teleoperators and astronauts on the lunar surface. - Ensure Altair design requirements align with LSS operational scenarios; to extent practical, align schedule of Altair and LSS design reviews. - Design mechanical articulation of solar array orientation in Mission 3 for any positioning contingency of Cargo Altair landing. - Extensive use of discrete modeling and event simulation tools for understanding processes and procedures, and design impacts to: * power generation and supply; * characterizing optimized landing zone separations; * regolith simulation of plume ejecta models; * berm or landing/launch zone design alternatives; * teleoperated excavator system designs. - Utilization abandoned Mission 2 Sortie Mission Chassis (SMC) redeployed as a transportation carrier for: * a self-transporting battery system to shuttle itself to and from the charging station to the excavator while the excavator continues to work; * shuttling crew from parked SPR's or habitation modules to landing/launch site. - Deploy a Lunar Dust Instrument (LDI) mission, i.e., Langmuir Probe to characterize lunar dusty plasma environment on and near the lunar surface. - Design teleoperator control center with human-systems integration principals for workstation design. - Use/develop software tools for modeling and analyzing workstation interfaces, crew station design and overall workflow environment - Incorporate lessons learned from Soviet era Lunokhod teleoperator control station experience. - Ensure CMC tool kit for Mission 3 Altair Cargo manifest includes capability for CMC to reconfigure itself for emplacement of navigation/beacon aids. - Ensure spares provisioning and spares ConOps for CMC excavation activity is sufficiently accommodated. - Develop CMC spares ConOps for Mission 3 telerobotic remote Outpost operations. - Develop complete ConOps for optimized usage of landing/launch zones through CHPC to characterize potential design opportunities or shortfalls. 16
  • 17.
    R-11 Risk Descriptionsand Mitigation Approaches RISK DESCRIPTION SCORE TOP 5 MITIGATION APPROACHES R11-01 Given lunar environment characterization is required to conduct design Ensure lunar robotic precursor science studies for landing on and moving over the lunar surface, and given that certain 5 7 16 20 23 25 missions (including international missions) LIKELIHOOD scientific data may not be available, there is a possibility of failure to completely 4 6 13 18 22 24 have appropriate instrument suite of sensors characterize the lunar surface at selected landing sites for such environmental 3 4 11 15 19 21 for characterizing Lunar Outpost's specific characteristics as surface geological environment, regolith properties, dust, regolith 2 2 8 10 14 17 locations for habitation, landing and launch electrical and photoelectric properties, optical properties, thermal environment, 1 1 3 5 9 12 sites; LSS coordination with SMD on radiation environment, surface plasma environment, and ejecta environment, which 1 2 3 4 5 International Lunar Network (ILN) for surface may impact safe operations and design solutions for the protective berm construction R11-01 CONSEQUENCE stations science network. d t t d i R11-02 Given HLR SMC rover excursions will explore and perform on-site Validate data through extensive simulations; verification of remote survey data, as well as demarcate selected landing zones and 5 7 16 20 23 25 Crew expertise to include civil engineering LIKELIHOOD excavation sites, there is a possibility that discovery of "real-time" mission data does 4 6 13 18 22 24 and planetary geology disciplines (site not coincide with remotely obtained planning data or does not match pre-mission 3 4 11 15 19 21 surveying as core activity for 7 day scouting simulations, causing significant changes to future site plans, e.g., pre-determined 2 2 8 10 14 17 mission); deploy integrated lunar sensor excavation sites not viable, or vehicle-terrain interactions grossly mis-match 1 1 3 5 9 12 network to enhance the spatial-orientation simulations, causing incongruities in excavator system design, etc. 1 2 3 4 5 capabilities of astronauts on the lunar R11-02 CONSEQUENCE surface. R11-03 Given the Mission 3 Initial Mobility Delivery is tele-robotically operated, there Dependent on Space Communications and is a possibility that a communications link failure will jeopardize the mission, 5 7 16 20 23 25 Navigation Architecture (SCaN) for routing, LIKELIHOOD preventing construction of the landing pad and protective berm. 4 6 13 18 22 24 redundancy, and link protocols. 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-03 CONSEQUENCE R11-04 Given the lander fuel cells are assumed to provide power on the surface to Coordination with Altair Project Office; support the offloading of the CMC prior to deploying the PUP solar array, there is a 5 7 16 20 23 25 ensure Altair design requirements aligned LIKELIHOOD possibility the assumption is erroneous in that the lander fuel cell design has not 4 6 13 18 22 24 with LSS operational scenarios; to extent been sized to accomplish this operation. 3 4 11 15 19 21 practical, align schedule of Altair and LSS 3 2 2 8 10 14 17 design reviews. 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-04 CONSEQUENCE 17
  • 18.
    R-11 Risk Descriptionsand Mitigation Approaches, cont. RISK DESCRIPTION SCORE TOP 5 MITIGATION APPROACHES R11-05 Given the Uncrewed Cargo Altair will utilize a deployed solar array from one Dependent on Altair navigation and beacon of the PUP cargo elements for providing power resources for Outpost Remote 5 7 16 20 23 25 aids for landing; employ astronaut/pilot LIKELIHOOD Operations, there is a possibility the final landing orientation of the Cargo Altair will 4 6 13 18 22 24 spatial disorientation countermeasures preclude the solar panel articulating arm to maximize the exposure of the solar panel 3 4 11 15 19 21 during landing; design mechanical to the sun. 2 2 8 10 14 17 articulation of solar array for all orientation 1 1 3 5 9 12 contingencies, and model extensively in 1 2 3 4 5 Lunar Surface Operations Simulator for R11-05 CONSEQUENCE design impacts to power generation. R11-06 Given the Uncrewed Cargo Altair is tele-robotically operated, there is a Refer to risk mitigation approaches identified possibility offloading collision or damage to the CMC excavator system can occur. 5 7 16 20 23 25 in Risk 4 "Damage During Unloading LIKELIHOOD 4 6 13 18 22 24 Operations" 3 4 11 15 19 21 4 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-06 CONSEQUENCE R11-07 Given there is an operational correlation between location of the Mission 3 Extensive use of simulations and modeling Cargo Altair landing zone and location of the landing pad for Mission 4 ISC, there is a 5 7 16 20 23 25 to characterize optimized landing zone LIKELIHOOD possibility the distance between the two landing zones will not have sufficient 4 6 13 18 22 24 separations; regolith simulation of plume separation to avoid subsequent crewed landing plume ejecta debris damage to 3 4 11 15 19 21 ejecta models; berm or landing/launch zone 1 Cargo Altair cargo elements in event of protective berm failure, or CMC excavator 2 2 8 10 14 17 design alternatives. system is not successfully deployed, or fails to construct berm. 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-07 CONSEQUENCE R11-08 Given there is an operational correlation between location of the Mission 3 Deploy Lunar Dust Instrument (LDI) mission, Cargo Altair landing zone and location of the landing pad for Mission 4 ISC, there is a 5 7 16 20 23 25 i.e., Langmuir Probe at approximately 10 LIKELIHOOD possibility the distance between the two landing zones will not have sufficient 4 6 13 18 22 24 meter height, as part of International Lunar separation to minimize contamination of the Portable Utility Pallet (PUP) solar power 3 4 11 15 19 21 Network (ILN) of surface science stations or array from dust ejecta or dusty plasma electric potential of approximately 6 month 2 2 8 10 14 17 on Altair Test Flight mission to characterize berm construction activity, (interaction of lunar dust and solar wind plasma near the 1 1 3 5 9 12 lunar dusty plasma environment on and near lunar surface at ~ 6 - 10 meters high), thereby jeopardizing surface systems power 1 2 3 4 5 the lunar surface. R11-08 recharge capability. CONSEQUENCE 18
  • 19.
    R-11 Risk Descriptionsand Mitigation Approaches, cont. RISK DESCRIPTION SCORE TOP 5 MITIGATION APPROACHES R11-09 Given there is an operational correlation between location of the Mission 3 Derive construction and excavation Cargo Altair landing zone and location of the landing pad for Mission 4 ISC, there is a 5 7 16 20 23 25 operations requirements through LIKELIHOOD risk the distance between the two landing zones will not minimize their separation to 4 6 13 18 22 24 development of regolith excavation optimize the CMC excavator system traverse distance between Cargo Altair power 3 4 11 15 19 21 simulation tools; consider redeploying SMC recharge station and landing pad construction site. 2 2 8 10 14 17 left behind from Mission 2 as a carrier for a 1 1 3 5 9 12 self-transporting battery sysem which can 1 2 3 4 5 shuttle itself to and from the charger while R11-09 CONSEQUENCE the excavator continues to work. R11-10 Given the CMC excavator system's reliance on tele-robotic control, assumed Use integrated lunar sensor network to to include High Definition line-of-sight video surveillance from the Cargo Altair landing 5 7 16 20 23 25 enhance spatial-orientation capabilities of LIKELIHOOD zone vantage point, there is a possibility the remote tele-operator may loose 4 6 13 18 22 24 teleoperators; integrate sensor information orientation / situational awareness if the HD camera goes down. 3 4 11 15 19 21 with computational models to provide 2 2 8 10 14 17 teleoperators with self-localization and path- 1 1 3 5 9 12 generation capabilities, e.g., relative 1 2 3 4 5 positioning, generation of return paths in R11-10 CONSEQUENCE reverse directions, path memorization, etc. R11-11 Given the CMC excavator system's reliance on tele-robotic control, there is Design teleoperator control center with a possibility that human error from the tele-robotic operator could occur due to an 5 7 16 20 23 25 human-systems integration principals for LIKELIHOOD improperly designed Human Computer Interface / Graphical User Interface. 4 6 13 18 22 24 workstation design; use/develop s/w tools for 3 4 11 15 19 21 modeling and analyzing workstation 2 2 8 10 14 17 interfaces, crew station design and overall 1 1 3 5 9 12 workflow environment; incorporate lessons 1 2 3 4 5 learned from Soviet Lunokhod teleoperator R11-11 CONSEQUENCE control station experience. R11-12 Given the heavy excavation operations required of the CMC excavator Derive construction and excavation system and reliance on tele-robotic control, there is a possibility that lack of an 5 7 16 20 23 25 operations requirements with development of LIKELIHOOD optimized excavator system design integrated with a specific berm design and 4 6 13 18 22 24 regolith excavation simulation tools for construction methodology may diminish excavator system reliability. 3 4 11 15 19 21 modeling various teleoperated excavator 2 2 8 10 14 17 system designs against various berm 1 1 3 5 9 12 designs, using parameters of driving speed, 1 2 3 4 5 payload ratios, excavation resistance forces, R11-12 CONSEQUENCE power supply, etc. 19
  • 20.
    R-11 Risk Descriptionsand Mitigation Approaches, cont. RISK DESCRIPTION SCORE TOP 5 MITIGATION APPROACHES R11-13 Given the heavy excavation operations required of a single CMC excavator Derive construction and excavation system in Scenario 4.2.1.20, and that there are likely to be high system consumable 5 7 16 20 23 25 operations requirements through LIKELIHOOD resource constraints, (e.g., power recharge time vs. power storage capacity), there is 4 6 13 18 22 24 development of regolith excavation a possibility that construction scheduling inefficiency will pose a threat to completion 3 4 11 15 19 21 simulation tools; consider redeploying SMC of the berm due to downtime caused by duration and number of recharge events 2 2 8 10 14 17 left behind from Mission 2 as a carrier for a required in a single work period for the CMC excavator system. 1 1 3 5 9 12 self-transporting battery sysem which can 1 2 3 4 5 shuttle itself to and from the charger while R11-13 CONSEQUENCE the excavator continues to work. R11-14 Given the preliminary estimated quantity of regolith required to construct a Characterize excavation site for determining protective berm, (Astrobotics estimate of as much as 1.2 million kg of regolith), there 5 7 16 20 23 25 distribution of regolith source field and derive LIKELIHOOD is a possibility the top layer material source field in proximity to the landing zone may 4 6 13 18 22 24 operational design requirements for CMC be depleted before completion of the berm, requiring additional traversing distance 3 4 11 15 19 21 excavator through simulation of contingency for the excavator system to haul regolith back to the berm site from another source 2 2 8 10 14 17 traverse paths of CMC for "offsite" material field and/or deeper digging into the regolith which will impact CMC excavator system 1 1 3 5 9 12 source fields. power storage/usage requirements and excavation timeline. 1 2 3 4 5 R11-14 CONSEQUENCE R11-15 Given the complexity of interacting forces between the lunar environment, Evaluate other innovative design solutions lunar surface features, and the Altair propulsion system causing debris and ejecta 5 7 16 20 23 25 for form factor other than berm design LIKELIHOOD during landing and launch, there is a possibility of not achieving an optimized 4 6 13 18 22 24 against rigid set of criteria. geometry (height, shape, mass, deflection angle) for the protective berm's form 3 4 11 15 19 21 2 factor, causing it to be over or under designed for effective protection. 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-15 CONSEQUENCE R11-16 Given an over designed berm will place heavier and unnecessary Derive construction and excavation requirements on the excavator system design for moving material and constructing 5 7 16 20 23 25 operations requirements through LIKELIHOOD the berm, there is a possibility interfacing systems such as the power generation, 4 6 13 18 22 24 development of regolith excavation power storage, and recharge station design requirements may be over specified. 3 4 11 15 19 21 simulation tools for modeling various 2 2 8 10 14 17 teleoperated excavator system designs with 1 1 3 5 9 12 parameters of driving speed, payload ratios, 1 2 3 4 5 excavation resistance forces, power supply, R11-16 CONSEQUENCE etc. 20
  • 21.
    R-11 Risk Descriptionsand Mitigation Approaches, cont. RISK DESCRIPTION SCORE TOP 5 MITIGATION APPROACHES R11-17 Given the top layer of the regolith protective berm may be relatively Evaluate alternative berm construction uncompacted, there is a possibility the outer skin of the berm will be a source for 5 7 16 20 23 25 methods, compaction techniques, LIKELIHOOD discharging ejecta. 4 6 13 18 22 24 geotextiles, etc. 3 4 11 15 19 21 5 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-17 CONSEQUENCE R11-18 Acoustical energy for berm design criteria is believed to be non-existent in Perform phenomenological modeling of the lunar vacuum environment. QUESTION: Can the debris cloud momentarily form 5 7 16 20 23 25 interacting forces. LIKELIHOOD a medium in which the berm design reflects or redirects acoustical and pressure 4 6 13 18 22 24 energy from ignition blast back to the Altair at the launch pad at the beginning of the 3 4 11 15 19 21 flight or while descending along the flight path? 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-18 CONSEQUENCE R11-19 Given the completed launch pad and berm are tele-robotically constructed, Ensure CMC tool kit and Mission 3 Altair and given the CMC is only configured for excavation duty, there is a possibility 5 7 16 20 23 25 Cargo manifest includes capability for CMC LIKELIHOOD emplacement of navigation aids for delineating the berm during construction and for 4 6 13 18 22 24 to reconfigure itself for robotic emplacement landing at the pad will not be possible prior to arrival of the Mission 4 Altair flight. 3 4 11 15 19 21 of navigation aids and beacons for 2 2 8 10 14 17 construction phase and upon completion of 1 1 3 5 9 12 built berm/landing site. 1 2 3 4 5 R11-19 CONSEQUENCE R11-20 Given CMC excavator system may need to excavate as much as 1.2 million Ensure spares provisioning and spares kg of regolith (Astrobotics estimate), there is a possibility spares and provisioning for 5 7 16 20 23 25 ConOps for CMC excavation activity is LIKELIHOOD CMC excavator system maintenance and refurbishment may not be sufficiently 4 6 13 18 22 24 sufficiently accommodated; develop CMC accommodated in Mission 3 or Mission 4 Altair manifests. 3 4 11 15 19 21 spares ConOps for Mission 3 telerobotic 2 2 8 10 14 17 remote Outpost operations, e.g., CMC tool 1 1 3 5 9 12 kit and Mission 3 Altair Cargo manifest 1 2 3 4 5 includes capability for CMC to reconfigure R11-20 CONSEQUENCE itself for spares changeout task. 21
  • 22.
    R-11 Risk Descriptionsand Mitigation Approaches, cont. RISK DESCRIPTION SCORE TOP 5 MITIGATION APPROACHES R11-21 Given the initial landing/launch pad is completed by ISC, and given Scenario Develop complete ConOps for optimized 4.2.1.20 calls for a total of 3 landing pads, there is a possibility post-ISC site 5 7 16 20 23 25 usage of landing/launch zones through LIKELIHOOD construction for the landing pads #2 and #3 will be incongruous with the ConOps for 4 6 13 18 22 24 CHPC to characterize potential design the remaining 9 Altair landings planned for achieving Continuous Human Presence 3 4 11 15 19 21 opportunities or shortfalls. Capability (CHPC) by FY2025. 2 2 8 10 14 17 1 1 3 5 9 12 1 2 3 4 5 R11-21 CONSEQUENCE 22