Part of the Social Norms and Accountable Governance (SNAG) project by the Africa Programme at Chatham House, which seeks context-specific solutions to address collective action problems like corruption, through an evidence-based understanding of the drivers that sustain these problems. https://www.chathamhouse.org/about/structure/africa-programme/social-norms-and-accountable-governance

1. Towards Collective Action on Corruption in Nigeria:
Vote Selling in Nigerian Elections

2. Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2
“Vote Markets”: Understanding Citizens’ Beliefs and Expectations
• Corruption in the form of the exchange of cash or gifts for votes undermines the integrity of
electoral democracy and obstructs accountable governance. Research on “vote markets” tends to
focus on its various forms and strategies for vote-buying by political actors, but little is known
about the supply-side of this market, i.e. citizens’ beliefs and expectations that could influence
their decision to sell their votes even in the context of a secret ballot.
• Nigeria’s recent general elections in March 2019 and the November state elections in Bayelsa
(south-south) and Kogi (north-central) have been widely criticised for the high number of cases
of vote markets observed by domestic and international election observers.
• Three months before the March general elections, Chatham House survey teams went out across
the country to find out what conditions would motivate people to sell their vote and whether
such a decision would be motivated by what people thought other people in their community do
or believe should be done.

3. Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 3
Vote Selling: Findings
• Across the surveyed states it was found that most Nigerians thought that around half of the
people – roughly 50 percent - in their community sold their vote in the last election and the
poorest respondents made up the highest number of people who think that people should sell
their votes.
• Across Nigeria, vote selling is weakly socially conditioned – if at all. It is mostly driven by
practical reasons such as the need for the money or gift, the avoidance of political violence from
party thugs, or the belief that the offer would be accepted by someone else so rejecting the gift
would not make a difference. People’s awareness that vote-selling is illegal was also very high
across the states. On average, 8 out of 10 respondents know that it is illegal to sell one’s vote.
• This is a classic collective action problem: vote selling is driven by shared practical
considerations or expectations, from which individuals benefit privately, while the aggregated
social costs of their actions are hidden.

4. Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 4
Vote Selling: What People Think
When it comes to selling votes in Nigeria, what others do matters more than what others think.
Most people thought that people should not sell their votes.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Adamawa Benue Enugu Lagos Rivers Sokoto FCT-Abuja
%ofRespondents
Do You Think That People Should Collect Money or a Gift for a Vote?
Yes No Don't Know

5. Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 5
Vote Selling: Why People Think What They Think
• More people thought others should not sell their votes for practical reasons rather than due to a
shared belief of the rightness or wrongness of the behaviour.
• But there was significant variation across states in personal beliefs:
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Adamawa Benue Enugu Lagos Rivers Sokoto FCT-Abuja
%ofRespondents
Why Do You Think That People Should Not Collect Money or a Gift for Their Vote?
Moral Prudential Other

6. Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 6
Vote Selling: Variations Across States
• Adamawa (North East geopolitical zone) was the only state where the majority of respondents
who thought that selling votes is wrong, did so because of moral considerations (77.9%).
• In Enugu State (South East geopolitical zone), most thought that voters should not sell their votes
because of practical concerns – a minority considered it morally impermissible.

7. Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 7
Vote Selling: Why People Think People Should Sell Their Votes
• Those who thought voters should sell their votes did so due to practical (not moral)
considerations.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Adamawa Benue Enugu Lagos Rivers Sokoto FCT-Abuja
%ofRespondents
Why Do You Think That People Should Collect Money or a Gift for Their Vote?
Moral Prudential Other

8. Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 8
Vote Selling: Variations Across States
• While close to 45.8% of respondents in Sokoto thought that people should sell their vote and
41.0% of them thought that it was acceptable to sell one’s vote, respondents were right that
about half of the people in their community hold the belief that a citizen should sell their vote,
and that it is acceptable to do so. This means that although there is relatively low awareness of
the illegality of vote-selling in Sokoto, citizens are well aware of the beliefs and behaviours of
people in their community suggesting local networks within these communities share
information well. Anti-vote-selling campaigns are likely to be most effective if they target these
complex grassroots networks where information on vote-buying offers are openly shared.
• In Benue state only 7.3% of respondents thought that people should sell their vote and only 6.7%
thought that vote-selling was acceptable – both amongst the lowest responses for those
questions. However, Benue also registered the lowest number of respondents who thought
people in their community collected money for their votes and should have done. Of course,
people in Benue may still be systematically over-estimating the extent to which others in their
community have favourable views about selling votes.

9. Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 9
Vote Selling: If People Don’t Follow The Behavior
• This is important because when the shared expectations are for practical rather than for moral
reasons, if an individual in the community does not follow the behaviour they are unlikely to be
sanctioned by their community – whereas they would be if there were shared moral beliefs or
expectations.
(NB – this is different however from potentially being attacked by political party thugs or loyalists.
The voter wouldn’t be sanctioned by the community – i.e. – the behaviour is not sustained by a
social norm. The risk of facing political violence from party thugs would be a practical
consideration.)

10. Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 10
Potential Interventions: Vote Selling
• People have mistaken beliefs about what others believe and do:
Respondents thought that on average 50% of their communities sold their votes in the last election
and that 50% thought that they should sell their votes.
• Information campaigns to expose these mistaken beliefs can be one of a number of interventions
to start to unpick this collective action problem and shift beliefs and behaviour.

11. Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 11
Potential Interventions: Vote Selling
• A potential strategy would be to shift the self-interested practical considerations that lie at the
heart of the collective action problem by exposing the consequences of vote selling on public
service and accountable governance – and therefore to voters’ daily lives.
• But the effectiveness of any intervention depends crucially on the content of the practical
considerations as well as the conditions on the ground. No amount of information exposure will
reduce vote selling if, for example, individuals believe that selling their votes is the only way to
protect themselves from political violence, and that belief is in fact correct (as it often is in
Nigeria). Improving ballot secrecy becomes really important in this instance.

12. Thank you
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs