The Putinisation of the Russian internet

1. VladiNet and PutinBots
The Putinisation of the Russian Internet
Simon Ross

2. Putinisation and implications
Putinisation is a shift from liberal, democratic values to a more authoritarian control and use of information,
nationally and internationally, to ensure government longevity.
International sanctions imposed after Russia’s annexation of Crimea have accelerated the Kremlin’s need to
use digital communications to mitigate economic uncertainty.
To defeat a perceived Russophobe mentality among western leaders, the Kremlin assists political entities,
primarily far right candidates, that could help end or ease sanctions.
Resultantly, the Kremlin uses manipulative and disruptive strategies to distort the reliability and very narrative
of the news across foreign countries.

3. Russian digital skepticism
The first act of cyber-espionage against the Russians was in 1982 when a virus caused a pipeline explosion
(Barmin, Jones, Moiseeva & Winkelman, 2011).
The Arab Spring revolutions demonstrated the vulnerability of authoritarian governments to the internet
despite obedient mainstream media.
WikiLeaks and the 2013 Edward Snowden revelations on CIA surveillance justifiably concerned the Kremlin.
The Kremlin portrays crackdowns as patriotic to give policies legitimacy (Nocetti, 2015). This opposes
Introna’s (1997) idea that privacy preservation is better for communal good to ensure individualism.

4. The RuNet’s evolution
The RuNet, the Russian Internet, was built with western technology and its first 20 years were “free and open”
(Soldatov, 2017).
The RuNet has experienced 3 distinct chapters (Kolozaridi & Shubenkova, 2016):
- 1994 to 1999: “weakly” and not widely utilised
- 2000 to 2011: a benefit to “public development”
- 2012 to 2014: a social, national and security “threat”
Lessig’s (1998) views of privacy - focusing on the monitored, searchability and protections - reveal Russians
could be more vulnerable to Kremlin tyranny if foreign companies move servers to Russia.

5. Putin’s destabilising of online freedom
The government, since 2012, negates the democratic potential of the RuNet through:
- Self-censorship (Ognyanova, 2010)
- Coercing ISPs to burden surveillance costs to collaborate with security agencies (Soldatov, 2016) using
informal intimidation (Soldatov, 2017)
- Implementing vague legislation that constantly requires Kremlin clarification (Soldatov, 2017)
The ISPs have been much easier to control than their users (Soldatov, 2017) as citizens can restrict access to
content meaning (Marwick & boyd, 2014).

6. Alexei Navalny - Putin’s digital nemesis
41-year-old blogger, lawyer and activist with democratic but populist views, Navalny has coordinated many
anti-corruption protests despite repeated imprisonment and intimidation.
- Capitalises on social media
- Won 27% of vote in 2013 Moscow mayor bid despite ban from mainstream TV
- Coordinated unprecedented 2011 Duma and 2012 Presidential protests
Putin will likely prevent Navalny from competing in the 2018 presidential election and choose a more
preferential opponent.
Chess grandmaster and fierce Putin-critic Garry Kasparov, has also forwarded himself as a possible
candidate.

7. A Russian Facebook and the Kremlin Coup
Founded by Pavel Durov, VKontakte is the most popular social network in Russia. However, the 2011 and 2012
protests were coordinated through Facebook due to its reduced vulnerability to federal monitoring and
interference (White & McAllister, 2014).
Following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, the government requested the censorship of VKontakte
groups linked to Alexei Navalny.
- Durov refused, was fired and went into exile
- Kremlin-loyal oligarchs now own VKontakte (Soldatov & Borogan, 2015)
Digital policy has “unintended consequences” (Villeneuve, 2006) and Russian soldiers uploaded media to
Vkontakte during fighting in eastern Ukraine as the Kremlin denied involvement (Soldatov, 2017).

8. International Putinisation
The Kremlin funds political parties and movements to strengthen Russian influence abroad (Chivvis, 2017)
and uses cyber espionage to help favoured candidates.
- Destabilising Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential bid was a Kremlin “imperative” (Maréchal, 2017)
- Troll factories and bots are employed to aggressively spread propaganda across foreign media outlets
(Aro, 2016)
Cyberbulling tactics, “willful and repeated harm inflicted through the medium of electronic text” (Patchin &
Hinduja, 2006), are an important aspect of silencing national and international opposition.

9. Putinisation effectiveness
Federal agencies can block media produced by reporters or activists but not content spread by thousands
(Soldatov, 2017).
The horizontal nature of the RuNet poses an unprecedented challenge to the Kremlin compared to vertical
communication during the cold war (Soldatov & Borogan, 2015).
Overtly aggressive pro-Kremlin trolling tactics are less effective at influencing foreign opinion than subtle
commentary as that is harder to distinguish (Aro, 2016).
The majority of public opinion now favours censorship (Lipman, 2014) demonstrating Russians have accepted
reduced freedoms to preserve core values (Armstrong & Forde, 2003).

10. Conclusions
Putin’s digital crackdown is a recognition of his own vulnerability to the internet and, primarily, social
media.
The imposition of sanctions has led to a more international digital strategy to advance the Kremlin’s
interests.
The distinction must always be made separating authoritarian governments from the nation state
especially where democracy, the rule of law and accountability are dispensable.
2018 will be a vital year for Russia and the international community. Could there be a President
Navalny? Never rule it out.

11. References
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