U.S. Russia relations in the Syrian Conflict

Running head: US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS REGARDING SYRIA
Research Topic – US-Russian relations regarding Syria
Christopher Pauli-Garcia
Florida International University

Running head: US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS REGARDING SYRIA 2
US-Russian relations regarding Syria
The relationship between the US and Russia has been at its most tense since the end of
the Cold War, and it is important not to forget that these two superpowers are essential for
global security (Oliker, 2017). This paper analyses the US-Russian relations in regards to the
Syria’s crisis, with an analysis of Russia’s foreign policy in the region, a brief comparison
between the US and Russia, and their outlooks on the Syria’s crisis. A description of
Russian-Syrian relations, and the Russian intervention in Syria in 2015 is presented, with a
picture of the current US-Russian relations, and an analysis of the situation in Syria by the
US and the international community. Finally, recommendations and possible solutions to the
conflict in Syria are analyzed.
Russia has approximately 75% of the total population of the Eurasian Economic
Union (EEU), around 85% of EEU members’ total GDP, and over 95% of Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO) members’ military expenditures. With the exception of
Tajikistan, which belongs to CSTO but currently is not a member of the EEU, CSTO and
EEU share the same member states, namely Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Kyrgyzstan. More importantly, Russia maintains active bilateral economic, security, and
political relations with both CSTO and EEU member states, as part of Russia’s foreign policy
goal of maintaining close ties with former USSR neighboring states. On December 1991, the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established by Russia, Belarus and Ukraine,
which includes all post-Soviet states except the Baltics (namely, Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania, all of which currently are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization –
NATO, and the European Union – EU) and Georgia (Welt, 2017).
Observers interpret that through its foreign policy in the region Russia is declaring
that the country is entitled to a “traditional sphere of influence” (Welt, 2017), which in
international politics means the claim by a state to predominant control over an area abroad

(Deudney, 2016). US policymakers consider that Russia has been forceful in regards to its
foreign policy toward neighboring states – such as Georgia and Ukraine – and beyond,
especially the intervention in Syria, which gave rise to new Cold War talks (Oliker, 2017).
The US is a decisive member state of major international organizations all over the
world, including NATO, which is a political and military alliance for collective defense,
comprised of 29 independent member countries bordering the North Atlantic Ocean,
including most members of the EU (NATO, n.d.). Compared to the United States, the surface
area of Russia is almost double of that of the US, while the population is almost half of the
US population. The US economy is much stronger than Russia’s, with the US GDP at over 18
trillion, while Russia’s GDP is 1.2 trillion (Country, 2018). The military budget of the US is
seven fold higher than Russia’s, representing 3.8% of the US GDP, while Russia’s military
budget represents 5.3% of the country’s GDP. Manpower of the US is more than double of
Russia’s, the US air forces are almost the triple of Russia’s , the US naval forces are slightly
larger that Russia’s, and Russia surpasses the US only in the number of tanks, and total
artillery (USA, n.d.).
After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the US intensified conflicts in the Middle East, with
Syria being the most recent after the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) in that country. Russia
and the US share a common view that ISIS and other Salafi-jihadist groups are a threat both
to the stability of the region and to the security of the homeland (Oliker, 2017). However,
Russia is increasingly perceiving Trump’s foreign policy as very similar to Obama’s,
especially in regards to Syria, with a growing distrust towards the US. However, American
experts consider the current policy as a work in progress that is unpredictable so it cannot be
compared yet (Oliker & Kortunov, 2017).
Since the 1950’s Russia has had a military involvement in Syria, as a way for the
former Soviet Union to find a counterbalance to US partners in the region. In the early

1970’s, the Soviet and Russian navies used a facility at the Syrian port of Tartus to carry out
their operations in the Mediterranean. Hafez al Asad, former Syrian president between 1971
and 2000, used to host Soviet military and economic advisers, but did not allow Moscow’s
attempts to gain regular access to Syria’s shore facilities (Welt, 2017). It seemed that
President Hafez Asad did not want to put at risk Syria’s relation with the US. In 1999, Syria
and Russia signed a $2 billion military deal for Russia to supply sophisticated arms, which
marked the reopening of strategic collaboration between both countries, and the resurgence of
Russia as a major regional actor (Nizameddin, 2013). Before the sectarian strife in Syria
began, Russian military personnel continued their base in Syria in order to train Syrians, and
to store their military equipment (Welt, 2017).
The Syrian civil war began after Syrians joined the Arab Spring rebellions against
Middle East iron fisted tyrants in 2010-11. Bashar Al-Assad decided to follow the same
strategy as his father, Hafez: to crackdown on any hint of dissent by using force. Bashar Al-
Assad realized that he had to turn the conflict from a political struggle into a military one,
where his chances of success were greater. By displaying force, he would slaughter his way
to victory (Beauchamp, 2018). Since 2011, the conflict in Syria has left over 500,000 people
dead and millions displaced (Sen, 2018).
After the NATO-led 2011 military intervention in Libya against the dictator Qaddafi
the Russian government decided to support President Bashar al-Asad’s regime. Russia started
offering financial, military and diplomatic support to Syria, and on September 2015
intervened in Syria under the allegation of fighting ISIS. Russia’s interest was also to stall the
attempt by outside powers, such as the US and Saudi Arabia, to end Assad’s regime (Trenin,
2017). Russia became an Asad ally, and insisted that the United Nations (UN) efforts should
focus on negotiations between the rebel movements and the Syrian government, rather than

deposition of Assad and establishment of a transitional government as proposed by the
United States and its allies (Welt, 2017).
Actually, there are two reasons for Russia’s military involvement in Syria. The first is
that Syria is Russia’s closest ally in the region, and Russia is trying to prop up the Assad
regime in order to avoid state collapse, even though Russia does not see eye to eye with
Assad in many issues, and opposes the goal of military victory. The second reason is that
Russia is involved in combating international terrorists such as ISIS and Jabhat al- Nusra, the
Al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. By providing military aid to Syria, Russia claims that it is acting
as a broker that will bring peace to the region (Oliker, 2017).
On March 2016, Putin announced that most of Russian forces were withdrawn from
Syria since his goals there were accomplished, and the Syrian army was strong to continue on
its own (Saivetz, 2016). By 2017, both of his main goals were apparently achieved since
ISIS was eradicated from the area and Assad is still in power. As the war in Syria rages on,
the attention has transitioned on building a political settlement in the future. Even if Russia
tries to accomplish this task alone or with its closest allies, Turkey and Iran, it will continue
engaged in making peace in Syria as it is in the Syrian conflict now (Trenin, 2017).
Russia’s actions in Syria starting on September 2015 surprised most US and European
observers. Until then, the Russian military was seen as a declining force with outdated
equipment, technology and philosophy of warfare – much inferior than the US and NATO
militaries. However, over the past four years, Russia shocked observers for its improved
military capabilities, and unexpected ways that they have been used (Welt, 2017).
Russia’s growing influence in the Middle East, especially in Syria, indicates its long-
term relationship with regional governments such as Iran, Iraq, Algeria, Egypt, and Libya.
Russia is demonstrating its military might beyond near neighboring states, thus making
Russia an important diplomatic player in regards to the United States and other countries. In

addition, Russia’s campaign in Syria, besides furthering Russian diplomatic goals, has
allowed Russia to test its military might in Syria as a training ground for future military
expeditions. Russia has been showing off its military prowess in the Syria conflict, such as
the launching of long range cruise missiles by warships in the Caspian Sea, and the
deployment of Russia’s newest aircraft carrier. Russia has also been able to prevent an
adversary from infringing upon its area of land, sea, or air through the use of its advanced
weapon technology (Welt, 2017).
While the war in Syria rages on, and with Russia building a murky relationship with
Turkey and Iran, Russia is aware that the other players that will step up to the plate during
Syria’s lucrative reconstruction should not be overlooked. They include Europe, Japan, and
China. Also, Russia realizes that a reconstruction effort will be expensive, so it will have to
partner up with international donors. Russia’s main asset is its influence in Damascus, where
it continues to play the role of Assad’s Savior. Syria’s bloody sectarian conflict can continue
for years to come, and Russia is there to keep its place in the region. Russia plans to establish
its footprint in Syria by whatever means necessary. Russia signed a lease agreement in 2015
and 2016 with Syria, establishing a permanent naval and air presence in the country. With
this agreement, Russia has secured supply of weapons and equipment, and training long after
the war in Syria is over. This arrangement will further seal Russia’s geopolitical and military
presence in the Middle East. Diplomacy will be as hard to achieve as trying to win the war
(Trenin, 2017).
Communication is important for many daily decisions that the US and Russia make. A
failure to communicate can signal ramifications that can spread worldwide and last for
decades to come. Between 2009 and 2014, the US and Russia used different channels to try to
cooperate on counterterrorism at the bilateral level, including a meeting of the two countries
premier intelligence agencies: CIA, FBI and its Russian equivalent, the SVR. Due to Russia’s

involvement in Ukraine, most of US-Russia cooperation on counterterrorism has been halted,
canceled, or permanently suspended by the US and its NATO allies (Oliker, 2017).
President Donald Trump has sought to make the US and Russia on friendlier terms on
a range of issues. In meetings with Putin held in April and July 2017, President Trump,
alongside former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, agreed on finding ways to improve
communication channels between the two countries. In the same vein, the Trump
administration indicated that the US would follow the major international principles and
commitments, while keeping the sanctions on Russia in place, until Russia changes their
course of action in regards to the actions in Ukraine. After Russia’s intervention in Syria to
support Assad, the US has imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions against Russia, and
led NATO in a new military approach in Central and Eastern Europe to reaffirm alliances and
to dissuade aggression. However, the US has identified areas of compatibility with Russia,
including an agreement to remove chemical weapons from Syria (Welt, 2017)
Despite Russia’s recent assertiveness on the world stage, observers note that Russian
foreign policy guidelines have stayed the same since the dissolution of the USSR in 1991.
One guideline is for Russia to reclaim its role as the leader in the post-Soviet region, and to
try to chip away the influence of its adversaries such as NATO and the EU. The second
guideline is for Russia to become a global player that is able to compete with the US, and
collaborate when necessary (Welt, 2007).
Beyond these principles, there are several debates on related issues. Russia is far from
being crystal clear. It is difficult to predict if tough responses of the international community
can dissuade Russia or lead to escalating conflict; whether the Russian government is truly
dedicated to building a strategic plan or just responding to the actions and circumstances of
others; and if Russia’s actions abroad aim ultimately to strengthen its domestic policy (Welt,
2007). For instance, when Putin claimed that Russia won in Syria and had withdrawn most of

its troops from that country, he left out of the picture the fact that Russia kept its naval base at
Tartus and on the Mediterranean coast, and the airbase at Hmeinin with S-400 missiles. The
announcement was “part of a well-orchestrated public relations campaign targeting both
domestic and international audiences” (Saivetz, 2016). Russia wants to strengthen its position
in the international arena, and continues to send men and arms to Syria secretively in ships, in
what is called the “Syrian express” (Saivetz, 2016).
Senior Western officials and observers are skeptical that Russia can partner with the
West while Putin is in power because he is “challenging the rules-based order that has kept
the continent’s peace” (Monaghan, 2016). Russian political analyst Vladimir Frolov
concludes that Russia is trapped by Assad to continue fighting in Syria, and that Russia
missed the opportunity to leave the scenario on good terms with the international community
in April 2017 when Assad used sarin gas against rebels (Frolov, 2018).
Russia expert Stephen Blank points out that the US has to put its act together in order
not to “encourage Moscow in the delusion that its threats can intimidate the West on issues
for which Moscow is not prepared to fight” (Blank, 2018). Blank states that the US has to
define a strategic action in the Middle East and clear goals in regards to Syria (Blank, 2018).
Atlantic Council Fellow Michael Carpenter goes one step further by saying that “Trump’s
unbridled desire to have a friendly relationship with Putin emboldens Moscow to act
aggressively in the knowledge that there are unlikely to be any serious consequences”
(Carpenter, 2018). Carpenter adds that it is unrealistic to consider that Russia will collaborate
on issues in which the Kremlin’s goal is to weaken Western interests (Carpenter, 2018).
Evelyn Farkas, also an Atlantic Council Fellow, believes that the US has to use a
combination of diplomacy, sanctions and military force to deter aggressors and protect the
Syrian population (Farkas, 2018). Researcher Talal Nizameddin believes that “Putin order
has crossed the point of no return and there are fleeting but visible signs that grave dangers

lurk in the international system in the coming period” (Nizameddin, 2013). The author
highlights that Russian elite has a cynical and devious approach to the crisis in Syria for
providing arms to the country, which is proof of a mentality that is irreconcilable with the
West and reveals Putin’s KGB heritage and personality (Nizameddin, 2013).
The US and Russia cooperation in Syria is mainly focused on de-confliction. In other
words, the goal is to avoid an accidental collision between the militaries of the two countries,
with the set up of de-escalation zones throughout Syria. However, current diplomatic talks
between Russia and the Trump administration are not as intense as with the prior
administration of Obama. Little progress has been made since 2016. The idea of a diplomatic
solution between the US and Russia is just a pipe dream, and Moscow decided to join forces
with the Iranians and the Turks (Trenin, 2017).
Cooperation in Syria between the US and Russia have been seldom found due to the
conflicting interests. Despite growing conflict between the worlds two superpowers, they
were able to remove and destroy Assad’s chemical weapons. Not finding common ground in
the future of Syria is the most significant obstacle in US-Russia relations. In Russia’s eyes,
the US is only interested in overthrowing the Assad regime and establishing regime change in
the region. In order to back their point of view, Russia mentions US military interventions in
countries such as Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Russia argues that if Assad is overthrown by
the US, the result will be a power vacuum, which will be filled by jihadists in the region. The
only way to end the Syrian civil war in Russia’s eyes is to prop up Assad and get the political
process in motion (Oliker, 2017).
In January 2017, a meeting held in Astana, the capital city of Kazakhstan, lead to a
new kind of negotiation. The meeting was coordinated by Russia, with the help of Turkey
and Iran − two countries involved in the proxy war in Syria. The meeting was related to the
Geneva process, which is based on collaboration between the US and Russia, with Staffan de

Mistura − the UN Special Envoy for Syria − and could help further bilateral relations
between Russia and the Trump administration (Oliker, 2017).
The adding of other countries to the mix such as Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and
Turkey, complicates the communication channels between US-Russia in Syria, particularly in
the Middle East and in regards to the Syria conflict. Both Russia and the US have limited
influence over their partners in the region, with each one having a different view of the
Syrian crisis (Oliker, 2017).
The ongoing sectarian conflict in Syria resulted in a variety of policy inscriptions. The
United States meddling in Syria has lead Russia to vehemently oppose US-backed regime
change. The “color revolutions” − a symbolic name for the series of peaceful uprisings in
the former Soviet Union − drove Russia to distrust the United States in the Middle East.
Russia argues that elections is the right way forward in Syria in deciding the fate of the
Assad regime. Russia has intentionally been striking Western-backed forces in order to
support Assad, while the US strongly believes that Assad has to be removed for peace to be
brought to Syria (Oliker, 2017).
The International Syria Support Group (ISSG) is a working group co-chaired by the
US and Russia created in 2015 for mediation in the Syria crisis in order to find diplomatic
solutions to the conflict. A tentative timeline was set for diplomatic negotiations between the
Syrian government and the opposition, with no success. The timeline beginning in January
2016 provided for a political transition in six months and elections within 18 months (ISSG,
2016).
In order for ISSG to achieve its goals for a unified Syria, the Kurdish parties, who are
seeking autonomy, should have representation at the discussions despite objection of both
the Syrian government and the opposition, under the condition that the Kurds cut their
alliances with violent extremist movements (Oliker, 2017).

Syria is where the US and Russian interests mostly diverge and converge at the same
time. While both countries oppose the violent extremist actions of the Syrian civil war, each
country conducts military operations in support to opposite sides. The US fights against ISIS
and the targeting of civilians by Syria and Russia, while Russia target several factions,
including some supported by the US. The opposing views of both countries are exacerbated
by the local situation in Syria, and a direct conflict between the US and Russia is to be
avoided (Oliker, 2017).
Recommendations for the US-Russian collaboration in regards to Syria include
creation of combined plans for the physical reconstruction, development, establishment of
institutions, and strengthening of antiterrorism capacity in Syria. Coordinated policies in
regards to Kurdish parties, prevention of cycles of revenge after the end of the civil war in
Syria through amnesty, and the definition of possible international guarantees are also
important. Progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict and collaboration on Libya, Afghanistan, and
regional security systems need to be part of the equation. Military actions against ISIS
operatives in Syria must be coordinated in order to successfully strike the targets, while
preventing civilian casualties. A bilateral peace agreement through diplomatic negotiations
should provide that all foreign fighters leave Syria at the end of the conflict. As part of the
solution, a working group headed by the US and Russia aimed at reducing domestic
radicalization and the number of foreign fighters in Syria should be in place (Oliker, 2017).
Although the US and Russia agree on negotiating a settlement to the civil war in
Syria, the US insists that Assad must be removed from power, while Russia defends that this
decision should be taken through elections during the transition phase. The US is not against
the entire regime in Syria, but believes that Assad is not to remain in power in order to create
a united Syrian government. Russia, on the other hand, does not want to force Assad to step
down. As both the US and Russia do not want the burden of a never-ending conflict in Syria,

collaboration to support a transitional agreement to stop the fighting and the unification of the
government in Syria is essential. The complexity of the situation in Syria is enormous since
the reform of the army and the security forces is essential for a political transition, but very
intricate (Oliker, 2017).
Recently, Russia considered the possibility of constitutional amendments for elections
in Syria in 2021 or 2022. The issue is determining if this is a genuine alternative or an
attempt by Russia to gain time and strengthen Assad’s position. Moreover, the influence of
Russia on Assad is questionable since the Syrian government has disregarded Russia’s
requests towards finding a diplomatic solution to the war in the past. Iran might be a better
ally for the US in this regard, since it seems to have more leverage over Assad (Sen, 2018).
Ultimately, despite deep divides and escalating tensions between the US and Russia,
there are opportunities for advances in cooperation since they have interests in common.
Both the US and Russia consider ISIS and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham as threats. The
counterterrorism strategies of both countries have common grounds, including threat
assessment. The tension in the diplomatic relation between the US and Russia is in terms of
the opposing views of the militant groups operating in Syria, but transnational terrorism is a
common issue that could lead to cooperation between the US and Russia in order to find
counterterrorism solutions (Oliker, 2017).
Moreover, there are many issues at stake that can help steer Russia towards
collaboration. Interference on the complex conflict in Syria might have negative
repercussions for Russia domestically weakening its relations with global powers, and
become a burden on Russian’s weak economy (Saivetz, 2016).
According to the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), the best
approach to finding a solution in regards to the US-Russian policies in Syria is a coordination
of efforts and continued Track Two engagement between the US and Russia, since the goals

and parameters are clear, but disagreements persist. Track Two Diplomacy is “unofficial,
informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop
strategies, to influence public opinion, organize human and material resources in ways that
might help resolve their conflict”(Montville, 1991). Thus, Track Two Diplomacy between the
US and Russia include expert working groups comprised of specialists and former senior
officials, such as ISSG, which can provide support to working-level engagement in order to
help develop recommendations for senior decision makers (Oliker & Kortunov, 2017).
CSIS believes that Russia and the US can collaborate, despite their different goals and
approaches, as seen in Syria’s intervention, when both countries were able to coordinate and
share information. Nonetheless, CSIS argues that chances of the US and Russia becoming
close partners is not in sight because both countries are attempting to deter and contain each
other, and consider each others’ policies and actions threatening. However,
nongovernamental organizations could set up an annual security forum with participation of
government officials from both countries, such as the forum that the US has with China
(Oliker & Kortunov, 2017).

References
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