The Constitutional Court has handed down several judgements regarding the right to vote in South Africa. It found that South African citizens living abroad have the right to vote if registered. It also ruled that denying prisoners the right to vote was unconstitutional. Parliament later amended the law to disenfranchise prisoners serving sentences without the option of a fine. The rule of law requires that the state exercises power as authorized by law. South African courts have invoked the rule of law to limit government power and ensure it complies with the constitution. The court also sought to protect the independence of the National Prosecuting Authority by invalidating laws that could compromise its independence or induce favoritism. However, some argue the appointment of the NPA head remains vulnerable

1. Gibson Mateyu
CSL 2602 Assignment 02
Question 1.1
There are two judgements of paramount importance, the Constitutional Court had an considered
whether South Africans living abroad or expats have a right to vote, namely in Richter v Minister of
Home Affairs and Others (09/09) [2009] ZACC 3 (12 February 20091
) and The AParty and Another v
Minister of Home Affairs and Others (06/09) [2009]2
ZACC 4. In March 2009, the Court decided on
numerous applications challenging the constitutional validity of some of the sections of the Electoral
Act and its regulations. The High Court ruled that section 33 of the Electoral Act and some of its
regulations were unconstitutional as a response to an urgent application brought by Willem Richter, a
South African teacher who was a fully registered voter, but lived and worked in the United Kingdom at
the time. The Minister of Home Affairs applied to the Constitutional Court for permission to appeal
against the High Court ruling, and opposed the Richter application and two similar applications.3
The Court also decided on the application of the AParty for an order declaring not only section 33 of
the Act unconstitutional, but also sections 7, 8, 9 and 60. The court stated that these sections violated
the right to vote and the right to equal treatment of South African citizens living abroad. These separate
and different judgments were decided at the same time. The Court decided without opposition that
South African citizens living abroad had the right to vote as long as they are registered voters. The
Court further held that section 33 of the Electoral Act unfairly restricted the right to cast special votes
while abroad to a very narrow class of citizens. 4
This section was therefore declared unconstitutional and invalid. The mere implication of this judgment
for the elections was that all citizens who were at that time registered voters, and who would be out of
the country on the date of the elections, would be allowed to vote in the national, but not provincial,
elections but with a condition that they give notice of their intention to do so, in terms of the Election
Regulations, to the Chief Electoral Officer and identify the embassy, high commission or consulate
where they intend to apply for the special vote. Handing down the first of the two separate judgments,
the Court held that the right to vote had a symbolic and democratic value and that those who were
registered should not be limited by unconstitutional and invalid limitations in the Electoral Act.
Furthermore in support of and protect citizens’ right to vote in election the Court in August v Electoral
Commission5
, the constitutionality of actions by the Electoral Commission, which had denied prisoners
the right to vote, was questioned. The Court found that it was unconstitutional for the Electoral
Commission to deny prisoners the right to vote. The Constitutional Court handed down that the right
to vote by its very nature imposes crucial duties upon the legislature and the executive. The Electoral
Commission Act also imposes an affirmative obligation on the Commission to take reasonable steps to
ensure that eligible voters are registered. By omitting to take any steps, the Commission failed to comply
with its obligation to take reasonable steps to create the opportunity to enable eligible prisoners to
register and vote.6
1
Richter v Minister of Home Affairs and Others (09/09) [2009]
2
AParty and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others (06/09) [2009]
3
De Vos and Freedman W etal (eds) South African Constitutionsl Law in Context (2014) Oxford University Press
4
Constitutional Law (CSL2602) 2019 Study Guide, University of South Africa
5
August v Electoral Commission
6
Constitutional Law (CSL2602) 2019 Study Guide, University of South Africa

2. In effect, the omission would have disenfranchised all prisoners without constitutional or statutory
authority therefore. The Court for that reason ordered the Electoral Commission to make reasonable
provisions to ensure that every person was imprisoned during the periods of registration could register,
and that all registered prisoners could vote on election day. The Constitutional Court clearly stated that
its judgment in August should not be read as deciding that Parliament was unable to subjugate certain
categories of prisoners, but that any such attempt at disenfranchisement was a full limitation of the right
to vote and therefore had to be by law of general application to stand any chance of justification. Due
to these concerns of the court, Parliament amended the Electoral Act by way of the Electoral Laws
Amendment Act 34 of 2003. The amendment effectively disenfranchised prisoners serving sentences
of imprisonment without the option of a fine, as it prevented them from registering as voters and from
voting while in prison. Unsentenced prisoners and those who were incarcerated because they could not
pay imposed fines, could register and vote.7
The Court was of the opinion that , for prisoners, the decision was to distinguish three classes of
prisoners. Awaiting-trial prisoners were not to be excluded from voting. Prisoners sentenced to a fine
with the alternative of imprisonment who were in custody because they had not paid the fine would be
allowed to vote. It was realised, however, that it was reasonable to deny the vote to prisoners serving
sentences of imprisonment without the option of a fine. They had been deprived of liberty by a Court
after a fair trial and had to accept that a consequence of this was that special provisions would not be
made for them to register and vote. Further, there were policy justifications for the singling-out of
convicts in this way; this was that it was important for the government to denounce crime and to
communicate to the public that the rights of citizens (such as the right to vote) are related to fulfilling
their duties and obligations as citizens.8
Question 1.2
The rule of law in this context means that the state authorities are bound by the law, and are not above
it. The rule of law also means that if the law demands a specific thing, it must be complied with. The
doctrine of the rule of law according to Dicey, the rule of law rests on the following three premises,
Firstly the absence of arbitrary power meaning no person is above the law, Secondly no person is
punishable except for a distinct breach of the law established in the ordinary manner before the ordinary
Courts and equality before the law thus every individual is subject to the ordinary law and thirdly the
jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts also a judge-made constitution which is the general principles of
constitutional law are the result of judicial decisions confirming the common law. Therefore this
validates the builders of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, had in mind a much
bigger picture of the rule of law than Dicey’s restrictive understanding of the term “rule of law.
In addition to this, Section 1(c) of the Constitution lists "supremacy of the constitution and the rule of
law" among the founding values of the sovereign, democratic South African state. Moreover, it is well
known that the Constitution as the supreme law of the land, it contains the Bill of Rights which entails
that the reference to the rule of law should be grasped in the with firm grip, that is, as a system of
government in which the law reigns supreme and it would appear that the Constitution aims to establish
7
Constitutional Law (CSL2602) 2019 Study Guide, University of South Africa
8
De Vos and Freedman W etal (eds) South African Constitutionsl Law in Context (2014) Oxford University Press

3. a constitutional state. In South African context, the rule of law simply means that government should
possess authority provided by a law for everything it does, nonmatter procedural or substantive merits
of that law9
.
The courts have invoked the rule of law as a mechanism lensed to limit, to regulate and to give much
precisioned realisation and meaning to how government power is exercised. This means the rule of
law has come as a most powerful, active and practical principle that can be invoked in the peripheries
and in figure tips of our courts to make sure that the exercise of state power adheres and comply with
minimum criteria10
.
In Law Society of South Africa and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
[2018] ZACC 5111
where the court handed down that, all presidential or executive powers must always
be exercised in a way that is consistent with the supreme law of the Republic and its scheme, as well as
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, and the President is never at large to exercise power
that has not been duly assigned. Crucially, public power must always be exercised within constitutional
bounds and in the best interests of all the people.
The doctrine of the rule of law was further applied in the Constitutional Court judgment of
Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the
National Assembly [2016]12
in a case where this Court must declare that the President failed to fulfil
his constitutional obligations, in terms of sections 83, 96, 181 and 182 of the constitution, the court
reiterated that, one of the crucial elements of the constitutional vision is to make a decisive break from
the unchecked abuse of State power that was virtually institutionalised during the apartheid era. To
achieve this goal, the court adopted accountability, the rule of law and the supremacy of the Constitution
as values of the constitutional democracy.
Further As pin pointed above, the rule of law has played a significant role in the development of South
Africa’s new constitutional system which gives the reason why the Constitutional Court has consistently
held that the exercise of all public power that falls outside the field of administrative action must at the
very least comply with the principle of legality. The rule that the principle of legality functions as a
restriction on the exercise of public power may be traced back to the Constitutional Court’s judgment
in Fedsure Life Insurance v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council13
. Apart from its
judgment in Fedsure Life Insurance, for example, the Constitutional Court also applied the minimalist
approach in Minister of Education v Harris and held that the Minister could not impose legally binding
obligations on independent schools unless there was a law authorising him to do so.
Another well informed conception of the rule of law was applied in President of the RSA v Hugo,14
where the Constitutional Court stated and held that, the legislature may not enact a law that applies
retrospectively or that targets a particular individual or group and in Affordable Medicines Trust v
Minister of Health, where the Court handed down that the legislature may not enact a law that is so
9
Constitutional Law (CSL2602) 2019 Study Guide, University of South Africa
10
Constitutional Law (CSL2602) 2019 Study Guide, University of South Africa
11
In Law Society of South Africa and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2018] ZACC 51 para 3
12
Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly [2016] para1
13
Fedsure Life Insurance v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council
14
President of the RSA v Hugo

4. vague and uncertain that those who are bound but it do not know what is expected of them15
. The
decision to apply a substantive version of the rule of law appears to have originated in New National
Party v Government of the RSA, where the Constitutional Court held that it may be outrageous for
legislature to enact a law that is arbitrary and irrational16
and this notion was clearly confirmed most
famously in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers: In re Ex parte Application of the President of the RSA,
where the Court held that the executive may not exercise the powers that have been conferred upon it
in a manner that is irrational17
.From above sentiments it is clear that South African courts has invoked
the rule of law as a mechanism to limit government power and align to the call of the constitution.
Question 1.3
To dig through the independence of the National Prosecuting Authority, In the case of Mxolisi
Nxasana v Corruption Watch NPC and Others18
,The Constitutional Court has handed down that the
mere removal of the national director of public prosecutions (NDPP), Mxolisi Nxasana, by former
President Jacob Zuma, was unlawful and the court declared the act as invalid and replacing Mr Nxasana
by appointing of his successor Mr Shaun Abrahams, was therefore considered invalid by the court.
As its standing, The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) is the body fully responsible for prosecuting
criminal offences in the Republic South Africa. Therefore it is the requirement of the constitution,
section 179(4)19
states that the National legislation must ensure that the prosecuting authority exercises
its functions without fear, favour or prejudice. In its judgment the Court laid out why the NPA must be
independent but other critics states that, as it stands, the Constitution makes no provision for the
involvement of Parliament or even a selection panel of any sort. The President has complete discretion
on who he wants to appoint into this crucial position20
.
In actual fact the National Prosecuting Authority plays a crucial and pivotal role in the administration
of criminal justice in the Republic of South Africa. Therefore, if the NPA comes week and malleable,
corrupt or dysfunctional prosecuting authority, so many criminals those holding positions of influence
in particular will rarely, if ever, answer for their criminal deeds.
It was held that, functionaries within the prosecuting authority may be pressured into pursuing
prosecutions so as to advance the political elites’ political agenda. The Court reviled that the
prosecuting authority has suffered an ongoing instability over the years. Its capacity to fulfil its core
functions is increasingly in doubt. This has been illustrated in a number of ways.
The first is that the authority has been abused by powerful office holders by the president in this
particular case. In addition, it has failed to act in cases where strong evidence has been in the public
domain making its independence questionable. Also, the prosecuting authority has pursued baseless
cases against opponents of people in power and is losing its effectiveness in prosecuting non-political
cases therefore jeopardizing the independence of the NPA, leaving it questionable21
.
15
Medicines Trust v Minister of Health
16
New National Party v Government of the RSA
17
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers: In re Ex parte Application of the President of the RSA
18
Mxolisi Nxasana v Corruption Watch NPC and Others
19
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
20
De Vos and Freedman W etal (eds) South African Constitutionsl Law in Context (2014) Oxford University Press
21
https://www.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn online, Accesed 17 March 2019

5. In the case of Mxolisi Nxasana again, the court also looked critically at aspects of the National
Prosecuting Authority Act (NPA Act) that had the potential to threaten the independence of the NPA.
Specifically, the court scrapped section 12(4) of the NPA Act, in terms of which the President had the
discretion to allow an NDPP to stay on in his position past retirement age. The court further directed
Parliament to effect changes to section 12(6) of the NPA Act, which allowed the President to suspend
an NDPP for an indefinite period with no pay. In doing so, the court sought to remove provisions that
has the potential to induce an NDPP to tailor his/her actions in order to curry favour with the President,
either out of fear of being suspended for an undetermined period with no income or in the hopes of
being allowed to continue on in the position after turning.22
It was suggested that, An effective, accountable National Prosecuting Authority structural independence
and competent personnel with expertise and integrity. Structural independence basically entails the
design of the institution, to barricade those in power from forcing the NPA to act in their own interests
instead of in the interests of justice.23
The rulings from the Court’s judgment seems to have improved the structural independence of the
NPA. Primly it was that the clause allowing the president to extend the term of a NDPP was
unconstitutional. Furthermore, the court also declared Section 12(6) of the act invalid to the extent that
it allows the president to suspend NPA officials indefinitely and without pay. Instead, the Court limited
the period of suspension to six months, and made a decree that the suspended officials be paid during
that period.24
On the other hand it is debatable if the judgment had fully address other weaknesses. Other jurists
alluded that, it left untouched the process of appointing its head. Under the National Prosecutions Act,
the choice of the NDPP remains within the sole discretion of the president. The National Prosecutions
Act does set out certain prerequisites, such as legal qualifications which might be a loop of vulnerability
to NPA’s independence. 25
From the onset court’s judgment protects the independence of NPA leadership by removing some
potential for fear, favour or prejudice in trying to strengthen the NPA independence which seems to be
still in shambles.
22
Glynnis Breytenbach, [online] https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ William saunderson, accessed 25 March 2019
23
https://www.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn online, Accesed 17 March 2019
24
De Vos and Freedman W etal (eds) South African Constitutionsl Law in Context (2014) Oxford University Press
25
De Vos and Freedman W etal (eds) South African Constitutionsl Law in Context (2014) Oxford University Press

6. Question 1.4
Whenever we are exploring the relevance of public opinion in constitutional adjudication, we
need to explore its core which lies between the exercise of the power of judicial review and
direct democracy, whether or not the legislation reflects the wish of the people. Usually the
issue arises particularly in cases that tend to address socially, religiously or culturally sensitive
and divisive issues, such as the criminalization of sodomy or the imposition of the death
penalty26
.
In contrast, public opinion may have some relevance to the enquiry, but the problem then
emerge in itself, it is no substitute for the duty vested in the Courts to interpret the Constitution
and to uphold its provisions without fear or favour. If public opinion were to be decisive, there
would be no need for constitutional adjudication as alluded by the South African Constitutional
Court27
The question now becomes open, how relevant is public opinion when resolving
constitutional disputes.
Initially, the Courts primarily rely on public confidence and support for their legitimacy and
for the enforcement of their decisions. This can at times induce them to succumb to popular
opinion when adjudicating socially sensitive issues.
Still, courts should decide cases based solely on law and facts without fear or favor from any
person or segment of society and even, ideally, free of their own biases. In many cases, Gay
rights and the death penalty are issues that may cause courts and judicial review to collide head-
on with the principles of democracy and majoritarian governance. It is sometimes argued that
failure to consider public opinion makes courts seem out of touch with the society they serve,
but bowing to public opinion will curtail their independence28
.
The concern is that granting the final say over constitutional issues to unelected judicial bodies
deprives the democratic majority and its elected bodies of the right to govern. According to
this concern, the will of the majority ought to prevail in the fashioning of law and policy.29
Looking at a wider view, the Tanzanian Court of Appeal argued that in the absence of clear
constitutional guidance on socially sensitive issues the death penalty in that particular case it
is for society to decide therefore the opinion of this court is validating the relevance of public
opinion in constitutional adjudication.
To balance our discussion lets closely examine public opinion in South Africa drawing our
discussion closer to home. The Interim South African Constitution guaranteed the people the
right to life without any qualifications30
. In State v. Makwanyane the Constitutional Court had
to determine, in the absence of an explicit exception, whether the imposition of the death
26
De Vos and Freedman W etal (eds) South African Constitutionsl Law in Context (2014) Oxford University Press p32
27
De Vos and Freedman W etal (eds) South African Constitutionsl Law in Context (2014) Oxford University Press p32
28
Murray Gleeson, Out of Touch or Out of Reach? (Oct. 2, 2004), http://www.highcourt.gov.au/speeches/cj/cj_02oct04.html (last visited
Mar. 27, 2019).
29
Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem, Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a New South African
Constitution, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
30
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996

7. penalty authorized by the applicable criminal law violated the right to life or the prohibition
against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment as was the public opinion.
To further this point, with regards to the relevance of public opinion in South African context,
in State v. Makwanyane31
, it was submitted that, the duty of the court was to decide in
accordance with the Constitution and the court should not be reduced to the level of society
meme. It would set a very dangerous precedent if every time a Constitutional Court had to
decide on a constitutional provision it had to canvass and seek public opinion so that it decides
in accordance with it32
. That would make the role of the Constitution and the Constitutional
Court useless and meaningless therefore placing public opinion relevance in constitutional
adjudication on a dark corner.
Amongst the justifications propounded in State v. Makwanyane for retaining the death penalty
as opposed by public opinion that a person who commits gruesome murder has to be sentenced
to death, was the fact that the majority of South Africans favored it in certain extreme cases
but Court brushed the issue of public opinion aside and held that it is not what the majority of
South Africans believe a proper sentence for murder should be and whether the Constitution
allows the sentence, the Court did not consider public opinion absolutely irrelevant, but it did
hold that public opinion must not prevail over the duty of courts to adjudicate constitutional
issues.
As seen from the above facts, public opinion may have some relevance to the enquiry, but can
not substitute for the duty vested in the Courts to fully interpret the Constitution and to uphold
its provisions. If public opinion were to be decisive there would be no need for constitutional
adjudication. The protection of rights could then be left to Parliament, which has a mandate
from the public, and is answerable to the public for the way its mandate is exercised, but this
would be a return to parliamentary sovereignty, and a retreat from the new legal order
established by the 1993 Constitution33
.
In State v. Makwanyane, the Court justified its rulings by the need to protect minorities and
others who cannot adequately safeguard their rights and interests through the democratic
process. Some jurists are of the opinion that, the court cannot allow itself to be diverted from
its duty to act as an independent arbiter of the Constitution by making choices on the basis that
they will find favour with the public34
. Furthermore, the Court observed, the issue of the
constitutionality of capital punishment cannot be referred to a referendum, in which a majority
view would prevail over the wishes of any minority. The Court therefore declared that only the
court, and not the people or their representatives, has the authority to say what the Constitution
means, regardless of the issues involved.
On the other hand, the issue of public opinion took a twist turn, it is altogether different with
Ugandan Courts, Public Opinion was accorded a very relevant role, In a constitutional case
Susan Kigula & 416 others v. The Attorney General, when the appellant challenged the death
penalty alleging that it violated the absolute prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment or treatment, the applicants argued that the constitutional requirement, which
commands courts to exercise judicial power in conformity with the law and the aspirations of
31
S v. Makwanyane and Another,supra
32
De Vos and Freedman W etal (eds) South African Constitutionsl Law in Context (2014) Oxford University Press, p33
33
De Vos and Freedman W etal (eds) South African Constitutionsl Law in Context (2014) Oxford University Press
34
Stephen Macedo, Against Majoritarianism: Democratic Values and Institutional Design, (2010), observing that reliance on the
majoritarian rule cannot be fair.

8. the people, does not require courts to succumb to public opinion, particularly in cases where
the Constitution is clear.35
The respondent then relied on a report according to which the majority of Ugandans still sided
the death penalty, and further argued that the Ugandan Constitution only recognized a qualified
right to life as opposed to the unqualified right guaranteed in the South African
Constitution.36
The Ugandan Constitutional Court simply relied on the qualifications
surrounding the right to life in the Constitution to rule that the death penalty was not
unconstitutional. It held that the absolute guarantee against inhuman treatment and punishment
did not necessarily abolish the right of the State to impose the death penalty if the sentence was
reached in a fair trial by a competent court and confirmed by the highest appellate court. Hence
imposition of death penalty constitutes no cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment37
.
But as a matter of fact, in conclusion in my view, from the laid down facts, the Constitutional
Court of South Africa did not say public opinion was completely irrelevant rather, it said that
it may be relevant but not determinative, and Constitutional Court of Uganda also did not say
that public opinion is determinative either. It simply reiterated that public opinion is not
irrelevant and that the views of the people, if they can be accurately ascertained, should be
taken into account validating that public opinion may have some relevance to the enquiry, but
can not substitute for the duty vested in the Courts to fully interpret the Constitution and to
uphold its provisions. If public opinion were to be decisive there would be no need for
constitutional adjudication.
QUESTION 2
A Bill is a proposal for a new law, or a proposal to change an existing law that is presented for
debate before Parliament. The proposed legislation is then discussed in a Green Paper. Public
hearings are held on the matter. A White Paper is prepared and public hearings are held
concerning the proposed legislation.A draft of the Bill as well as an explanatory memorandum
is prepared by the Minister responsible for the issue (in terms of s85(2)(d)). Cabinet then
approves it.Once Cabinet has approved the draft Bill, the state law advisers certify that the law
is constitutional before it is submitted to Parliament.The Cabinet Minister responsible for the
Bill (eg: education) usually first introduces the Bill in the National Assembly (or the National
Council of Provinces). This is the first reading.The Bill is referred to the appropriate portfolio
committee for review and amendment after facilitation of public involvement (s59). This is the
second reading.
If the National Assembly passes the Bill, it is forwarded to the National Council of Provinces
for its assent. If the Bill was approved by the National Council of Provinces, it is forwarded to
the National Assembly for its assent. Once both Houses of Parliament have passed the Bill, it
is presented to the President for signature (s84(2)(a)). However, if the President is not
convinced that the Bill is Constitutional, he may refer it back to the National Assembly for
reconsideration (s85(2(b)). If the bill affects the provinces, it must also be considered by the
NCOP as well. If a reconsidered bill takes the President’s reservations into account he or she
may sign it or refer it to the Constitutional Court. If the court decides the bill is constitutional,
35
Susan Kigula & 416 others v. The Attorney General
36
Susan Kigula & 416 others v. The Attorney General, constitutional petition no 6 of 2003, Constitutional Court of Uganda (2005).

9. the President must sign it.The President signs the law in his capacity as Head of State, not Head
of Executive. Once it has been signed by the President, it becomes an Act of Parliament a law
of the land.
QUESTION 3
(a) to maintain national security
(b) to maintain economic unity
(c) to maintain essential national standards
(d) to establish minimum standards required for the rendering of services
(e) to prevent unreasonable action taken by a province which is prejudicial to the interests of
another province or to the country as a whole.

10. Bibliography
• Constitutional Law (CSL2602) 2019 Study Guide, University of South Africa
• De Vos and Freedman W etal (eds) South African Constitutionsl Law in Context
(2014) Oxford University Press.
• Richter v Minister of Home Affairs and Others (09/09) [2009]
• AParty and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others (06/09) [2009]
• August v Electoral Commission
• Constitutional Law (CSL2602) 2019 Study Guide, University of South Africa
• Law Society of South Africa and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa
and Others [2018]
• Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly; Democratic
Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly [2016]
• Fedsure Life Insurance v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council
• President of the RSA v Hugo
• Medicines Trust v Minister of Health
• New National Party v Government of the RSA
• Pharmaceutical Manufacturers: In re Ex parte Application of the President of the
RSA
• Mxolisi Nxasana v Corruption Watch NPC and Others
• The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
• https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ William saunderson, accessed 25 March 2019
• https://www.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn online, accessed 17 March 2019
• LLM (Pretoria); Doctor of Laws (LLD) Candidate, tutor, and researcher (Centre for
Human Rights, University of Pretoria)
• Murray Gleeson, Out of Touch or Out of Reach? (Oct. 2, 2004),
http://www.highcourt.gov.au/speeches/cj/cj_02oct04.html (last visited Mar. 27,
2019).
• Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem, Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable
Guarantees? Social Rights in a New South African Constitution, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 1,
• Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
• S v. Makwanyane and Another,supra
• Stephen Macedo, Against Majoritarianism: Democratic Values and Institutional
Design, (2010), observing that reliance on the majoritarian rule cannot be fair.
• Susan Kigula & 416 others v. The Attorney General, constitutional petition no 6 of
2003, Constitutional Court of Uganda (2005).
Contact me on gibsmcy7@gmail.com