Securitization Theory has produced a great debate among security scholars. How security issues emerge continues to be a source of disagreement for the two main schools of thought in Securitization: The Copenhagen School and the Paris School. Does an issue become a security threat through speech or through practices? Far from confronting both schools’ logics, I defend that combining them can provide us with valuable information about securitization processes. To prove this, I study the securitization of the environment in the United States, focusing on climate change. First, in the theoretical chapters, I offer a detailed explanation of how the environment is progressively fitting into security studies and securitization theory. Second, in the empirical chapters, I study the securitization of the environment in the US, during the terms of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama. The arguments from the Copenhagen School and the Paris School are illustrated throughout these chapters, constituting the main focus of analysis, speech acts, discursive and non-discursive practices, and audience.

1. The Securitization of the Environment in
the United States of America: Change and
Continuity in the Bush and Obama
Administrations
By: Francisco Ruiz Sánchez
_______________________________________________________________
_______
Presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of
MSc International Relations
Word Count: 12505
University of Glasgow
September 2014

2. 2
_______________________
________
This dissertation would have not been possible without the constant and
sincere support of Kelsey M. Gardner and my family. I also wish to thank my
supervisor, Dr. Georgios Karyotis, for his great guidance in this exciting
research project.
________
_______________________
NOTICE: Citation of this paper and its content is NOT allowed without explicit
permission from its author, Francisco Ruiz Sánchez. Please send any inquires to
franciscoglasgow@gmail.com.

3. 3
Abstract
Securitization Theory has produced a great debate among security scholars.
How security issues emerge continues to be a source of disagreement for the
two main schools of thought in Securitization: The Copenhagen School and
the Paris School. Does an issue become a security threat through speech or
through practices? Far from confronting both schools’ logics, I defend that
combining them can provide us with valuable information about securitization
processes. To prove this, I study the securitization of the environment in the
United States, focusing on climate change. First, in the theoretical chapters, I
offer a detailed explanation of how the environment is progressively fitting
into security studies and securitization theory. Second, in the empirical
chapters, I study the securitization of the environment in the US, during the
terms of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama. The arguments
from the Copenhagen School and the Paris School are illustrated throughout
these chapters, constituting the main focus of analysis, speech acts, discursive
and non-discursive practices, and audience.
Keywords: Security, Securitization Theory, Copenhagen School, Paris
School, US, Climate Change, Bush, Obama, Speech, Practices, Audience.

4. 4
Table of Contents Pages
- Introduction and Overview of Chapters…………………………………...5-8
- 1. Setting out the Context: Background of Environmental Issues………..9-13
- 2. Securitization Theory: How Security Issues Emerge………………14-20
- 3. George W. Bush vs. Barack H. Obama: The Copenhagen School
Contribution………………………………………………………………21-29
- 4. George W. Bush vs. Barack H. Obama: The Paris School
Contribution………………………………………………………………30-37
- 5. Overall Conclusions…………………………………………………38-40
- Notes…………………………………………………………………….41-44
- Bibliography…………………………………………………………….45-47

5. 5
Introduction
“Here's the challenge: We've got to do
more. What we're doing is not enough […]
and we also have to realize, as hundreds of
scientists declared last month, that climate
change is no longer a distant threat, but has
moved firmly into the present"
Barack Obama’s Commencement Speech at
The University of California on June 14th
20141
The concept of securitization is one of the most innovative and debated
terms in Security Studies nowadays. Its origins are associated with the
Copenhagen School of Security Studies, which defines security as “the move
that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the
issue either as a special kind of politics or as above of politics” (Buzan et. al.,
1998: p. 23). The analytical framework of the Copenhagen School relies on
the logic of exception: “existential threats combated through exceptional
measures” (Bourbeau, 2014, p. 2). They defend that securitization processes
are achieved through speech acts, which result in the change of security
practices. On the contrary, the Paris School defends the logic of routine:
“[existential threats are] combated through a collection of routinized and
patterned practices…” In contrast to the Copenhagen School, they support the
idea that securitization processes are completed through practices (Bourbeau,
2014, p. 2).
If President Obama spoke the words I quote above at a hypothetical
Securitization Theorist World Summit, the plurality of comments and
interpretations analysing the President’s speech would be overwhelmingly
diverse. In this imaginary scenario, it is reasonable to think that the founding
fathers of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies Barry Buzan, Ole
Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, would stick with their original version of
Securitization Theory and move a few sentences down, to focus exclusively on
the effect and practices the president’s assertion has provoked (Buzan et al.,

6. 6
1998): “… and that's why, today, I'm announcing a new $1 billion competitive
fund to help communities prepare for the impacts of climate change and build
more resilient infrastructure across the country”. Under the Copenhagen
School’s view of security, the exceptional measures, in this case the allocation
of the US$ 1 billion fund, would be the most relevant object of study for them,
ignoring the context as well as Obama’s motives, and intentions (Wæver,
2002: pp. 26-27; as cited in Floyd: 2010, p. 43). Nevertheless, authors such as
Ulrich Beck, more closely associated with the Paris School, would go further
to evaluate the context and the utter significance of Obama’s words, criticizing
the fact that the president’s interpretation of security is oriented more towards
the management of an exceptional catastrophe (“…the impacts of climate
change…”) rather than towards its prevention (Beck, 2002). Finally, along
with this reflection, Thierry Balzacq, as the main exponent of the Paris School
of Security Studies, would be more interested in the current and/or previous
practices that might have influenced the president’s speech (Balzacq, 2011).
Securitization Theory, as a relatively young theory in Security Studies,
receives attention from many different scholars with very diverse backgrounds
and expertise. The intellectual exchange between those who defend the main
tenets of the Copenhagen School and those who criticize them has enriched
the content and versatility of this theory, making it more accessible and
appealing to the majority of schools of thought in International Relations.
However, the consensus on how an issue is securitized remains unsettled. Is
securitization achieved through discourse, as the Copenhagen School suggests,
or rather, completed by practices, as the Paris School defends? (Bourbeau,
2014). There is a lack of a heuristic framework on which we researchers can
base our work. Especially with environmental issues, empirical research has
not been as common as in other areas of Securitization Theory, such as
immigration or terrorism (Trombetta, 2007: p. 4). In the past two decades,
scholars have focused their efforts on defining and studying the theoretical
framework of Environmental Securitization, instead of verifying rather or not
they are both compatible approaches that can provide us with valuable
knowledge on securitization processes.

7. 7
In this paper I explore the Securitization of the Environment in the US,
focusing especially on Climate Change. The selection of the US as an object
of study is not random, nor is Bush or Obama’s administrations. In the former,
the US, as one of the most industrialized and pollutant countries in the world,
has always been regarded as the key actor for progress or regression in global
environmental policy. How the US deals with climate change has global
implications. In the latter, studying the differences and evaluating the
discourse and practices of both Republican and Democratic administrations
give us valuable empirical content. Therefore, analysing both leaders can
provide us with an idea of the real importance of climate change in the US.
Relying on discourse and practices analysis, I offer a critical review of the
Securitization of the Environment-Climate Change Process in the US during
the Bush and Obama’s presidencies. I test the explanatory power of
Securitization Theory by analysing the (de)securitization process from two
approaches: The Copenhagen School and the Paris School. The importance of
this research resides in proving that both approaches are complementary
insofar as they can be examined together. With this goal in mind, in this paper
I work with both discourse and practices to examine a securitization process
throughout two administrations of different political affiliation. The thesis of
this research is that the Copenhagen School and the Paris School can
contribute to making the study of securitization something dynamic within a
temporal scope, good for explaining and analysing time trends and
continuities, rather than snapshots of securitizing processes.
Overview of Chapters
This dissertation consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 gives a detailed
background on the association of the environment with Security Studies. The
chapter is organized in two straightforward parts. In the first part, I reflect
upon the transformation of Security Studies and the debate on whether the
environment should be treated as a security threat or not. Introducing the link
between National Security and natural resource management, I put especial
emphasis on the evolution of the idea of National Security throughout the last
decades. In the second part, I examine how world leaders are dealing with

8. 8
environmental challenges. Specifically, I focus on the role of International
Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and analyse the current approach with
which IGOs are facing environmentally related issues.
In chapter 2, I develop the main components of Securitization Theory and
expose the academic importance of my research topic. The chapter is divided
in three parts. First, I expose the basis of Securitization Theory according to
the Copenhagen School and the Paris School. The main tenets of the theory
that have been developed by academics of both schools are outlined here.
Second, I expose critiques and contributions made to the Copenhagen School
from the Paris School. Finally, I plunge into the securitization of the
environment. Here I offer a detailed explanation of the ideas of the
Copenhagen School about the securitization of the environment. Then, I
expose the most important critiques made to the Copenhagen School version
of environmental securitization. I end the chapter with an explanation of the
methodology that I follow in my two empirical chapters.
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the empirical analysis of the Securitization of the
Environment in the US, more specifically climate change. In these chapters, I
combine the Copenhagen School and the Paris School approaches to gather
relevant data about the securitization of the environment in the US. In chapter
3, using discourse analysis, I deploy all the data referring to the most relevant
recorded communications material by Bush and Obama related to climate
change discourse. Chapter 4 deals with the framing of the issue and the
practices of the Bush and Obama administrations. Here I offer a review of
discursive and non-discursive practices to evaluate different outcomes of both
presidents’ administrations, giving a general overview on how climate change
has been tackled under both administrations. A brief reflection on the role of
the audience during their mandates is also attached.
Finally, in chapter 5, I offer detailed conclusions of my research. First I
highlight the theoretical and empirical implications of my findings. Next, I
reflect upon the ways further research on Securitization Theory should go to
enrich the discipline.

9. 9
Chapter 1. Setting out the Context: Background of Environmental Issues
Introduction
Among all the topics related with Security Studies, environmental issues
can easily qualify as one of the most conflicting in the field. Right after the
Cold War, with the first claims that related scarcity of natural resources with
conflict, the empirical research in this field began. New circumstances and
contexts started to shape national and international politics, diverting the
attention of world leaders from the rivalries of the Cold War to a more global-
oriented interpretation of security threats (Dalby, 2013: p. 312). This way, a
global strategy to fight global warming, regulate environmental degradation
and distribute natural resources through International Governmental
Organisations was born from the will of global leaders. However, as I state
next, there has been a lack of agreement and consensus on how to respond to
these global challenges for the past three decades.
This chapter introduces the evolution of Environmental Security Studies
and describes how environmental issues have evolved in the global security
agenda since the end of the Cold War. Simultaneously, I reflect on how the
international community has tackled environmental issues and natural resource
management, and the prospects after the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit
of 2009.
Environmental Security: Overview on the Transformation of the Idea of
Security
Environmental degradation, resource scarcity, and population growth have
been traditionally the main areas in which academics and scientists have
classified environmental issues that potentially threaten human life (Peoples &
Vaughan-Williams, 2010: pp. 6-7). One of the first academics to link natural
resources with violent conflict was Thomas F. Homer-Dixon in 1994 (Homer-
Dixon, 1994). In “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict”, Homer-
Dixon discusses the consequences environmental degradation might pose for
human beings, according to scientific data. Additionally, he explains that due
to progressive environmental degradation and population growth, soon all

10. 10
resources of the planet will not be enough to satisfy the necessities of
mankind. War and conflict are outcomes he contemplates as he warns of the
possibility of massive population movements and ethnic conflicts due to
scarcity of non-renewable natural resources. Nevertheless, this vision has not
been free of criticism. As I mention in further paragraphs, Daniel Deudney has
been one of the most critical authors towards Homer-Dixon’s claim.
Climate change is one of the most well-known consequences of
environmental degradation. According to the United Nations-
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (UN-IPCC), global temperature
could rise from 1.5ºC to 4.7ºC by the end of the century, depending on levels
of emissions of CO2 and deforestation3. Nonetheless, scholars argue that
environmental challenges like climate change fit into security logic. On one
hand, Simon Dalby links environmental degradation to threats including
massive migration, centring his analysis on how this can affect national
borders (Dalby, 2013: p.314). On the other hand, Daniel Deudney strongly
criticizes the idea of including environmental issues in the national security
realm: “… environmental issues may affect human well-being, but this is an
insufficient basis for the definition of a threat to national security as such…”
(Deudney, 1999: pp. 193-194; as cited in: Peoples & Vaughan-Williams,
2010: p. 98). On par with Deudney, other authors coming from the realist
tradition of security reject including environmental issues as pressing matter to
security studies, arguing that the state should be the main object of analysis
along with the military threats that might affect its survival (i.e.: Walt, 1991).
In International Relations theory, realism defends that in a competitive and
anarchical world, the main threat for mankind is mankind itself, thus placing
its focus on military threats (Morgenthau, 1954).
As we can see in the current literature, there is a great debate when it
comes to analysing environmental issues. The lack of consensus comes from
narrow vs. more broad conceptions of security.
Natural Resource Management
As I have mentioned, natural resource management is often related to
conflict. From a global perspective, International Governmental Organizations

11. 11
(IGOs) such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the UN and the
World Trade Organisation (WTO) have taken especial care of implementing a
working framework to negotiate and sort eventual disputes between states.
Conflict over resources is something IGOs have taken very seriously, mainly
due to the multiple chaotic scenarios that could happen due to scarcity of
natural resources and inequality in distribution (Homer-Dixon, 1994: p. 6).
Resource management and energy security are common topics on the National
Security Reports of both Bush and Obama’s administrations.
To date, race over resources rather than scarcity or inequality in
distribution are potentially the main source of conflict between countries with
the biggest military capabilities. For instance, the exploitation of natural
resources in the Arctic is becoming a continuous source of conflict between
China, Russia, and the US, as these countries constantly negotiate zones of
influence. On the other hand, Africa’s natural resources are subject to the
ruthless speculation of northern industrialized countries, especially China.
China’s influence on natural resources in Africa has grown fast since the 70s,
to becoming the first international investor to date. Chinese industries, along
with western industries, are responsible for great environmental damage as
well, provoking great waves of migration in the Congo, Sudan and Ethiopia,
due to the industrial impact of their factories on the local population
(Brautigam, 2009: p. 302)
The Environment as a Global Challenge
Not only in the academic area is there a lack of consensus on how to handle
environmental issues, but in international politics too. International
Governmental Organisations (IGOs) are the institutions in which the states
bargain global politics and debate common interests. Under this logic,
consecution of a fully functional environmental regime in which global
strategies are consensual and binding for all actors is the desirable outcome of
IGOs’ framework. Nevertheless, cooperation and consensus are not often
reached in international affairs, and this is why scientific lobbies and other
civil organizations such as International Non-Governmental Organisations

12. 12
(INGOs) also have relevance in the international realm when it comes to
pressuring actors of IGOs.
The failed Copenhagen Climate Change Summit of 2009 is evidence of the
weak cohesion and lack of will from the US and the other most industrialized
states to tackle the problem of climate change and its main cause, greenhouse
gas emissions. The framework for negotiation provided by IGOs such as the
United Nations (UN) demonstrated its exhaustion. Economic interests once
again prevented any hope of reaching an agreement on a global strategy for
the reduction of global emissions of CO2. Until then, the “global deal”
strategy had been the main approach the international community had
followed in order to achieve a common action towards the reduction of
emissions. This global deal strategy was conceived in a top-down way with
universally negotiated binding goals for the states involved (Falkner et. al,
2010: p. 253). The treaties implemented by the international community to
fight against the depletion of the ozone layer are an example of the early
success of this strategy. However, with the weak results from the Kyoto
Protocol of 1997 and the lack of support from the US, the global deal model
showed symptoms of wear, until its total failure in Copenhagen.
With the proven incapacity of the global deal strategy, a new framework
was needed to continue building a solid climate governance agenda. The
“building blocks” approach has been the strategy to follow after Copenhagen.
With a bottom-up strategy, the main aim of this approach is to “…create trust
between nations and build climate governance step by step out of several
regime elements.” (Falkner et. al, 2010: p. 258). A good example of the
success of this approach is the European Union (EU). Especially since the
Lisbon treaty of 2009 strengthened the European Commission’s competences
on environmental policies and natural resource management (such as fishing
quotas and agriculture). The EU is regarded nowadays as a global leader in
environmental policy, having implemented numerous directives on the
reduction of CO2 emissions with binding targets4. In the US, however, the
convulsive political context throughout the past years has isolated the country
from this trend as well as from the global deal strategy.

13. 13
Conclusion
All in all, we can see that natural resource management is something global
institutions and states have taken more seriously than other environmental
issues such as CO2 emissions. The scarce number of atmospheric treaties
implemented by the UN compared to treaties related to natural resource
provides solid evidence of the primary worries of the international
community5. The key, as Simon Dalby suggests, is centred on the “Degrees of
Risk” logic on a time scale basis (Dalby, 2013: pp. 319-320). The potential to
become a source of state to state armed conflict in the near future has more
directly fused natural resource management with security studies than any
other environmental issues, as Homer-Dixon warned.
In terms of climate change, as it can be seen with the current situation on
failed emissions reductions treaties, states have not taken long term threats as
something that require immediate action (Dalby, 2013: p. 319). Disagreements
in the academic field are also representative of this stalemate, as are political
disagreements. The next chapter will deal more in depth with academic
disagreements from the field of securitization studies.

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Chapter 2. Securitization Theory: How Security Issues Emerge
Introduction
Securitization Theory is nowadays one of the most exciting and
intellectually challenging concepts in security studies. The early usage of the
term “Securitization” is first associated with authors Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver
and Jaap de Wilde. They are considered the main representatives of the
Copenhagen School of Security Studies (CopSS). However, today
Securitization Theory is studied and developed around a great variety of
frameworks. The Paris School (PS) constitutes an alternative logic to the fixed
speech acts logic of securitization. Stating that practices can (de)securitize too,
the PS and the CopSS have waged a debate that so far has not been proved
theoretically productive this far. Out of this analytical stalemate, I defend that
discursive (de)securitization (CopSS) and non-discursive (de)securitization
can both contribute to conducting valuable research.
In this chapter I introduce the theoretical framework upon which the
empirical part of the dissertation is based, and I set out the theoretical context
for the securitization of the environment. First, I begin summarizing the core
of Securitization Theory with arguments from the CopSS and the PS. Second,
after introducing the concept of securitization and how both schools propose
that it happens, I review the main critiques from the PS to the CopSS. Third, I
summarize the main ideas of the CopSS on the securitization of the
environment. Fourth, I address critiques and new thought trends that compose
Securitization Theory to date, focusing on the debate on environmental
securitization. Finally, I review the methodology that I apply in chapters three
and four.
The Basis of Securitization Theory: What is it and how does it work?
On one side, according to Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, security is “… the
move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames
the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.” (Buzan et.
al, 1998: p. 23). Under this logic, they envision the difference between
politicization and securitization. For them, politicization refers to an issue that

15. 15
is within the public policy realm, requiring “… government decision and
resource allocations…”, whereas they understand securitization as the process
in which an issue is classified as an “existential threat”, requiring “…
emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of
political procedure” (Buzan et. al, 1998: p. 23). On the other side, the PS,
which concentrates on audience, practices, and context more than on speech,
defines securitization as “…an articulated assemblage of practices whereby
heuristic artefacts are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who
works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications
about the critical vulnerability of a referent object…” (Balzacq, 2011: p. 5).
Generally speaking, the CopSS agrees that a securitization process is
composed of a referent object (that which has to survive), a securitizing actor
or actors (that or those who initiate the securitization move), and a speech act
(made or performed by the actor, who must convince the audience of the
importance of the threat). On one hand, the CopSS defends that, in
securitization, the speech acts are considered performative acts: by stating
something it is automatically interpreted as done. According to John L. Austin,
a performative act makes the statement true just by naming it, bringing the
security issue into existence (Austin, 1962). A securitizing move starts when
the actor or actors start speaking security: “… by labelling [the issue] as
security, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary
means.” (Buzan et. al, 1998: p. 26). In a securitizing move, the possibility of
an issue becoming a security matter does not rely specifically on the nature of
the threat, but rather on the how the securitizing actor presents that threat
(Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010: p. 78). This is labelled under the logic
of exception: tackling existential threats with exceptional methods. Once the
securitizing move starts with a speech act, then the practices become the
primary object of analysis for the CopSS (Bourbeau, 2014). Consequently, for
the PS, speech acts are not the central object of analysis of securitization
theory. According to Balzacq, specific practices, context where the
securitization happens, and audience compose the securitization process
(Balzacq, 2011: pp. 8-18). That is, under logic of routine: the securitization
process is a process that acquires its meaning through governability and

16. 16
patterned practices carried out by governing officials (Bourbeau, 2014: pp. 5-
6).
The Paris School Critiques and Contribution
The most notable critiques made by the PS to the CopSS are focused on
two aspects: centrality of speech acts and marginalisation of the audience. By
affirming that speaking security is a self-referential practice, the audience
steps out of the analytic framework. That is, as Balzacq explains, if through a
speech act something is securitized, the reactions of the audience and the
context in which the securitization process occurs would be not relevant for
the outcome of the process (Balzacq, 2011: p. 20). Far from that logical
approach, the PS defends the centrality of audience and context, placing
especial emphasis on practices. For the PS, securitization is made of discursive
and non-discursive practices: verbal and non-verbal actions. (Balzacq, 2011: p.
22).
The PS affirms that the relationship between actors and audience has often
been neglected. Moreover, the empowering aspect of the audience has been
completely obviated by the CopSS. As Paul Roe states: “…although the
general public can indeed play a valuable role in providing an actor with
‘moral’ support concerning the ‘securityness’ of an issue, more crucial,
however, is the ‘formal’ support provided by parliament concerning the
‘extraordinariness’ of means necessary to deal with it” (Roe, 2008: p. 615).
According to Roe, the empowering audience is important for understanding
any securitizing process.
The Securitization of the Environment according to the Copenhagen
School
In “Security, a new Framework for Analysis” Buzan, Wæver and Wilde
recognise five political sectors in which securitization can happen: military,
political, economic, societal, and environmental (Buzan et. al, 1998). Among
these sectors, the environment appears as one of the most problematic, as
security issues associated with the environment are relatively new. However,
the securitization of the environment has other particularities compared to

17. 17
other sectors, which makes it a very controversial area of study within
securitization theory.
Some key points or characteristics from Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde’s
interpretation of the securitization of the environment must be highlighted.
First, one of the most notable particularities of this kind of securitization is
that it follows two agendas: political agenda and scientific agenda (Buzan et.
al, 1998: p. 71). The scientific agenda is followed mainly outside the
governmental institutions and specially promoted by non-governmental
organisations. The political agenda is governmental. As a consequence, the
securitization or de-securitization of the environment does not depend on a
single agenda, interpreting de-securitization as the unmaking of security
(Trombetta, 2007: p. 9). Second, another important particularity stated by the
authors is that many securitization moves end up in politicization rather than
in securitization (Buzan et. al, 1998: p. 73). Ultimately it is clear that “…
threats and vulnerabilities in the environmental sector are issue specific and
seldom universal.” (Buzan et. al, 1998: p. 85). With the term ‘issue specific’,
the authors attempt to convey that the universe of environmental security
includes various concrete threats: threats to human civilization from
environmental issues not caused by human activity (earthquakes and tsunamis,
i.e.), threats caused by human activity that do seem to pose existential threats
to civilization (climate change and the ozone layer, i.e.), and threats caused by
human activity that do not seem to pose existential threats to civilization
(depletion of some mineral resources like coltan, i.e.) (Buzan et. al, 1998: pp.
79-80).
The CopSS admits that environmental issues can be securitized, but states
that securitizing moves generally end up being politicized at a local level.
Nevertheless, the securitization of the environment is something it do not
particularly support, because the limited local impact of environmental issues
and its scarce relevance to the state’s security. In its logic of security, the basic
concept of enemy-threat prevents the CopSS from having a positive attitude
towards the securitization of the environment (Trombetta, 2007: p. 7).
The Securitization of the Environment Revised: Critiques

18. 18
Since Buzan, Wæver and Wilde’s “Security, a new Framework for
Analysis” was published in 1998, a great number of academics have
contributed to enlarging and broadening Securitization Theory. The CopSS
analytical framework has been put into question.
Today, there is a new fitting of diverse issues into security studies.
Constructivist logics of security have challenged the original conceptions of
the CopSS on security. With these new trends of thought, the state has lost its
central role, giving way to other sociological approaches of security. The
realist logic of enemy-threat the CopSS took as a base for their analytical
framework now competes with other transformative security logics. The
environment is considered by some authors as one of the main transformative
security threats with a direct impact on what we understand as security and the
practices that come with it (Trombetta, 2007; Beck, 2000, 2002; Balzacq,
2011; Floyd, 2010).
Authors such as Trombetta and Beck, agree on the idea that common
threats that affect society have the power to transform the local community
(Trombetta, 2011, p. 138). In other words, Beck, opposing the CopSS ideal
that global security unity cannot be achieved, suggests that “threats create
society and global threats create global society.” (Beck, 2000: p. 38). Under
this perspective, the key to understanding the environment as a security threat
and as a topic subject to be securitized, lays on changing the fixity of the
CopSS security paradigm. That is, overcoming the enemy-threat dyadic
relationship in order to broaden security logic (Trombetta, 2011: p. 138).
Moreover, Beck criticizes the laxity with which the CopSS deals with
issues not perceived as immediate threats. Beck introduces the concept of
prevention in security logic for the first time in “Risk Society: Towards a New
Modernity”, in 1992 (Beck, 1992). Beck’s risk society can be seen as a
refurbishment of the old emergency logic of security. According to Trombetta,
under the logic of risk management, securitization of the environment is
something feasible, as the security practices that it can bring are oriented
towards managing shared threats: people cannot exclude themselves from
environmental risk (Trombetta, 2007: p. 17). Under this

19. 19
pragmatic/sociological approach, the fixity of CopSS’ logic on security limits
the study of security practices associated with topics not related to the outsider
enemy vs. social group prerogative. Trombetta, Beck, and Balzacq from the
PS, support the study of the securitization of the environment from a
sociological and political approach that can outline and deepen the content of
securitization and its practices (Trombetta, 2011: pp. 148-149).
Methodology
The speeches, practices and main political strategies regarding
environmental issues made by US leaders are of great significance: the
securitization or de-securitization of the environment in the US can be a
referent for the rest of the world. Following the theoretical approaches
explained, the main methods used next are discourse analysis and practices
analysis. Combining both research methods permits a more in-depth
understanding of the (de)securitization of the environment-climate change in
the US and the context that lies beneath.
As I have previously introduced, in Securitization Theory, discourse
analysis and practices analysis are the natural way for the CopSS and the PS
respectively to study securitization or de-securitization processes. According
to Bryman, discourse analysis is an approach to the analysis of the language
that can be applied to texts such as speech transcripts and newspaper articles
among others texts (Bryman, 2012: p. 528). Analysing political leaders’
speech acts brings knowledge and clarity to acts that might otherwise remain
misunderstood. In the case of the US, Bush and Obama’s speech acts enlighten
political strategies and present the framework under which these are
developed. Examples are provided in chapter three.
Besides discourse analysis, analysing practices uncovers the symbolic use
of language that is implicit in them (Balzacq, 2011: p. 22). Dividing practices
into discursive and non-discursive, the PS classifies them into argumentative
practices and practices that imply inter-subjective understandings (Balzacq,
2011: p.15). Under my own definition, in chapter 4 I group discursive
practices in those official actions that happen through laws or executive orders

20. 20
with those official and non-official actions that take place through implicit
acts. Examples of this are provided in this chapter.
The US, as the largest economy in the world and the second polluter of
CO2 emissions, makes for an interesting object of study. Reviewing practices
can help us understand the context and the relationship between securitizing
actors and audience. These two methods of analysis combined provide very
relevant information about the securitization of the environment in the US.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have presented the theoretical tools I am going to use in
my empirical chapters. First, I have developed two different approaches of
securitization from the CopSS and the PS. Combining speech acts, context,
and practices is the main focus of my further analysis. Second, the importance
of focusing my analysis on the securitization of the environment has been set
out in this chapter as well. All the criticisms and contributions of the new
generation of security academics to environmental securitization prove the
relevance and appeal of this topic nowadays. Finally, the methodology section
has advanced the structure of the empirical chapter.
Post-CopSS scholars of Securitization Theory are following a
transformative impetus on the security logic that has been used to deal with
environmental issues. As evidence shows in the next chapter, I explain that the
progressive, but inconsistent incorporation of environmental issues into
national security and political strategies has made this transformative impetus
something primordial to the expansion and reinforcement of environmental
securitization’s explanatory power.

21. 21
Chapter 3. George W. Bush vs. Barack H. Obama: The Copenhagen
School Contribution
Introduction
In this chapter I analyse speech acts made by George W. Bush and Barack
H. Obama. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate if, under the CopSS
perspective, a (de)securitization process has taken place. I especially centre
my analysis on addresses to congress and speeches specific to environmental
issues. Among environmental issues, the focus is placed on climate change, as
it is one of the most common terms along with energy security mentioned by
the presidents in regard to global environmental challenges. The context in
which these statements were said is also given.
George W. Bush: 2001-2009
There is little doubt that President Bush’s term was the starting point of a
new era of national security strategy in the US, based on the so-called “war on
terror”. The post-9/11 context centred Bush’s security agenda primarily on
terrorism and foreign affairs.
Under a pure realist perspective, terrorism was considered the main threat
to the US’s national security. On the other hand, during the eight years Bush
governed, the environment was not subject to any association with security. In
the early stages of his administration, this tendency was already notable. In the
State of the Union address of January 2002, the environment was only
mentioned once6. That way, in the National Security Strategy report published
on September 2002 and March 2006, the environment was not mentioned in
any way it could be related to national security, linking it more to economic
sustainability than to any kind of threat7 (Floyd, 2010: pp. 125-126). Terms
such as climate change or global warming were not mentioned in either report.
It would not be until 2007, when Bush succinctly acknowledged the idea of a
man-made climate change issue that these terms were discussed (Floyd, 2010:
p. 157). As far as rhetoric, the official discourse on climate change or any
other environmental issue was balanced towards not acknowledging the
tangibility of the threat.

22. 22
Bush’s First Term: Priorities Made Clear
Due to lack of relevance of environmental issues during Bush’s
administration, the main example of this section will be based on the
President’s speech on global warming on February 14th, 2002, in Silver
Spring, Maryland. This is one of the very few occasions in which Bush makes
a direct reference to global warming or global climate change. It outlines the
main pillars of environmental issues upon which the Bush first administration
were founded.
Analysing Bush’s speech can bring great insight to the ex-president’s
rhetorical strategies8. In the transcript, in the very first paragraphs of his
speech, Bush already makes it clear that his conception of environment is
linked to economic growth: “…we must foster economic growth in ways that
protect our environment…” With this kind of assumption, he places a decisive
emphasis on classifying the environment out of any logic of security. It is
explicit that the environmental protection is a dependent variable for him,
implying that the economic growth is what is really necessary to foster. A few
sentences ahead, Bush introduces the word “global climate change” for the
first time: “… my government has set two priorities…clean our air, and
address the issue of global climate change.” However, far from introducing
global climate change in a context of security, he refers to acting in a serious
and responsible way “… given the scientific uncertainties”. With this, the ex-
president belittles the scientists’ arguments on global climate change,
conditioning what happens and what is going to happen in regard to this issue,
much to his administration’s discretion. In this speech, Bush plays effectively
with the structure sentences, making a straightforward statement on the real
interest of American people: “…economic growth is key to environmental
progress”.
Bush first intends to set up America’s great priority: economic growth.
After making it clear, he refers to the global climate change issue and argues
directly against science: “The science is more complex, the answers are less
certain, and the technology is less developed. So we need a flexible
approach…” Even though he promises a reduction of greenhouse gas

23. 23
emissions of 18% by 2012, no other policy directions are given. With the same
vague rhetoric, Bush states that his budget devotes a record amount of money
to addressing climate change. However, he focuses again on casting doubt on
the mainstream scientific agenda by stating: “…we want to make sure we [take
decisions] on sound science; not what sounds good, but what is real” At the
end of the speech, a securitization move towards the economic factor puts the
Kyoto Protocol under an enemy-threat logic: “The approach taken under the
Kyoto Protocol would have required the US to make deep and immediate cuts
in our economy to meet an arbitrary target”. By criticizing the Kyoto Protocol
Bush conveys his opposition to the global deal approach that, a priori, had
more support in the international realm.
All in all, we can find this kind of rhetoric in all of Bush’s speeches: the
prioritisation of the economy over any kind of global deal or agreement. An
evidence of this is the scarce reference to environmental issues in any National
Security Strategy reports or in any State of the Union speeches.
Bush’s Second Term: Continuity
During Bush’s second term, environmental issues continued to be of scarce
relevance in the ex-president’s speeches. Far from relating the environment to
any security context, no outstanding declarations reflected any kind of
securitizing moves.
Bush first acknowledged the man-made effect of climate change in 2007,
when he addressed the State Department on September 28th: “…the U.N.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concluded both that global
temperatures are rising and that this is caused largely by human activities” 9
Despite the use of this fact, no other data about the effects of climate change is
provided. Using an instructive tone, the ex-president remarks energy security
above all, stating that those who worried about climate change and supporters
of energetic security have common goals: “Energy security and climate
change are two of the great challenges of our time”. Besides the mention of
energetic security, with a very similar strategy to the one used in his 2002
speech, Bush refers to the economy as the main priority in this speech at the
Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change (Today

24. 24
known as the Major Economies Forum MEF) of 200710. Clean alternatives for
fewer emissions are mentioned; such as nuclear energy development, solar
power and advanced clean coal technology. In general, besides the mention of
the man-made effect of climate change, there is no evidence that suggests
securitization of environmental issues, but rather the contrary.
Another remarkable speech by Bush on environmental issues, specifically
climate change, took place on April 16th, 200811. In this speech, Bush opens
stating that “…climate change involves complicated science and generates
vigorous debate”. Again, he refers to environmental protection as a dependent
variable subject to the strengthening of the economy. As in his 2002 speech,
Bush criticizes the Kyoto Protocol by using economic growth as an excuse for
not adopting it: “… [The Kyoto Protocol] would have limited our economic
growth and shifted American jobs to other countries”. Remarkable as well, is
when he justifies this reasoning by mentioning the fact that China and India
are great competitors that cast pressure on the US economy. In a demanding
tone, Bush refers to a number of points on what he considers an unsuccessful
strategy for fighting climatic change in the US and globally. Outstanding as
well is that in all of the speeches he refers to the potential harmful
consequences that taking certain measures would mean for the US economy
and the taxpayers’ pockets; measures from taxation to oil prices, emission
cuts, and abandoning coal and nuclear power.
Altogether, the strategies outlined by Bush on environmental issues during
his first and second term do not differ much from one another. Before climate
change he defends economic growth, warning about the consequences a global
deal of emissions reduction would have for the US. On other issues such as
natural resources, he is oriented towards the defence of coal and nuclear power
for an efficient, energetic security strategy. Considering all this evidence, it is
clear that Bush rejected the need for securitizing the environment, siding with
a narrow realist conception of national security.
Barack H. Obama: 2009-2014
Change was the identifying factor of President Obama’s speech during the
2008 and 2012 presidential elections. This change is tangible not only in

25. 25
domestic and foreign affairs, but in environmental issues as well. The
rhetorical devices Obama has used to refer to the environment have placed
challenges such as climate change on the security agenda of the US.
Under an assertive and instructive tone, Obama has introduced the
environment to the daily security language managed by his administration. In
the State of the Union addresses in particular, climate change has been the
most common term in regard to environmental issues. Among the five State of
the Union speeches the president has given since 2010, climate change has
been mentioned in four of them12. This fact reflects a great difference with
Bush, since he only addressed climate change in 2007 and 2008. In the
National Security Report of 2010 (single report to date in Obama’s two terms),
climate change is mentioned 28 times. In both National Security Reports of
2002 and 2006 during Bush’s mandate, climate change was only mentioned
once.
Obama’s First Term: Change Made Clear
Far from the lack of importance of climate change in the Bush
administration, during Obama’s six years of presidency the references to
climate change have been very common. Thus, I outline in these two sections
the most relevant speeches that address these environmental challenges.
First, I must focus on the State of the Union addresses. In 2009, during the
first joint session of congress, Obama initially mentioned climate change
under logic of security: ““…to protect our security, and save our planet from
the ravages of climate change, we need to ultimately make clean, renewable
energy the profitable kind of energy”. In the State of the Union address of
2010, the president used a more assertive tone when referring to the scientific
certainties about climate change: “…there are those who disagree with the
overwhelming scientific evidence on climate change”. This way, he gives
scientific arguments a notorious role. In contrast with Bush, Obama casts no
doubt on the scientific agenda.
During Obama’s first term, the only National Security Strategy report was
released in 2010. In this report, a very notable change can be seen in

26. 26
comparison with the Bush administration’s two reports in 2002 and 2006. One
of the most outstanding environmental challenges, climate change, is
mentioned for the first time in a security context: “…we must focus American
engagement on strengthening international institutions and galvanizing the
collective action that can serve common interests such as combating violent
extremism; stopping the spread of nuclear weapons… and forging cooperative
solutions to the threat of climate change”. Climate change is labelled here as a
threat for the first time in an official document, comparable to terrorism and
massive destruction weapons. Another example of this: “…danger from
climate change is real, urgent, and severe. The change wrought by a warming
planet will lead to new conflicts over refugees and resources; new suffering
from drought and famine; catastrophic natural disasters; and the degradation
of land across the globe. The United States will therefore confront climate
change based upon clear guidance from the science, and in cooperation with
all nations…” The terms danger, suffering and catastrophic bring
assertiveness and authority to the text, as does the direct relation established
between US action and scientific guidance. Moreover, the list of consequences
derived from climate change gives the reader strong reasons to believe in the
threatening factor of the issue, it also implies that quick measures have to be
taken.
Between 2009 and 2013, the most notable speech given by president
Obama on environmental issues was at the United Nations, on September
200913. The focus was once again placed on climate change. In this speech,
climate change and its consequences are explained again in a threatening and
authoritative tone: “…we risk consigning future generations to an irreversible
catastrophe”. The president strives to make the consequences appear urgent:
“No nation… can escape the impact of climate change…. Rising sea levels
threaten every coastline… powerful storms and floods threaten every
continent. More frequent drought and crop failures breed hunger and
conflict…. On shrinking islands, families are already being forced to flee their
homes as climate refugees. The security and stability of each nation and all
peoples – our prosperity, our health, our safety – are in jeopardy. And the
time we have to reverse this tide is running out” In this statement, Obama

27. 27
presents the universal feature of the problem, explains the dramatic
consequences of climate change, and ultimately discusses the threat that
climate change can pose to people’s safety. He especially highlights the
urgency of the matter: “…after too many years of inaction and denial, there is
finally widespread recognition of the urgency of the challenge before us”. The
recognition of the urgency of the matter, and the atrocious consequences it
could have for the population, places climate change in the realm of the
existential threat Securitization Theory talks about.
Considering the rhetoric president Obama used during his first term, it is
reasonable to state that, compared to the Bush administration, change was real.
He did not only recognize the existence of environmental issues such as
climate change, but labelled them under logic of security. Legitimated by the
dramatic consequences of not fighting climate change, Obama’s rhetoric
analysis shows the unequivocal existence of a securitization move. Following
Beck’s idea of risk, the President centres his speeches on the risk assessment
of climate change and the potential consequences of not acting accordingly.
Obama’s Second Term: Broadening Climate Change Awareness
From 2013 until today, Obama’s speeches on environmental issues have
been frequent. Climate change continues to be his focus of attention.
In the State of the Union Address of 2013, the president expresses the
importance of the effects of climate change and urges to act immediately: “…
for the sake of our children and our future, we must do more to combat
climate change…. the fact is, the 12 hottest years on record have all come in
the last 15. Heat waves, droughts, wildfires, and floods – all are now more
frequent and intense. We can choose to believe that Superstorm Sandy, and the
most severe drought in decades, and the worst wildfires some states have ever
seen were all just a freak coincidence. Or we can choose to believe in the
overwhelming judgment of science – and act before it's too late” As before,
the president refers to catastrophes, direct consequence of climate change, and
calls for action according to scientific arguments. Pursuing climate change
further, Obama throws a warning to congress: “if Congress won't act soon to
protect future generations, I will. I will direct my Cabinet to come up with

28. 28
executive actions we can take… to reduce pollution, prepare our communities
for the consequences of climate change, and speed the transition to more
sustainable sources of energy” This is a very remarkable quote for two
reasons. First, the president implies that the consequences of climate change
are serious enough to act without formal support of congress. Second, the
emphasis on protection becomes evident; the president is willing to undertake
exceptional executive measures to protect the community from an existential
threat. In the State of the Union Address of 2014, the president has again
pointed out the threatening consequences of the matter: “… a changing
climate is already harming western communities struggling with drought, and
coastal cities dealing with floods” Along with this, Obama has stated once
more the tangibility of climate change: “… the debate is settled. Climate
change is a fact”
During 2013 and 2014, Obama’s mentions of climate change out of
congress have been constant as well. Two important speeches can be
highlighted. On June 25th, 2013, the President made some notable remarks on
climate change at Georgetown University14. “…the costs of these events
[Natural disasters caused by climate change] can be measured in lost lives and
lost livelihoods, lost homes, lost businesses, hundreds of billions of dollars in
emergency services and disaster relief. In fact, those who are already feeling
the effects of climate change don’t have time to deny it -- they’re busy dealing
with it” The emphasis here is put on the emergency of the effects of climate
change and the threat they pose for human existence. On June 14th, 2014, at
The University of California, Obama addressed climate change once more
under security terms. In the initial quote of this paper, the president
emphasized that climate change is a challenge firmly rooted in the present,
calling for immediate action. Besides this, Obama firmly defends scientific
arguments and criticizes those who deny them: “… today's Congress, though,
is full of folks who stubbornly and automatically reject the scientific evidence
about climate change. They will tell you it is a hoax, or a fad. One member of
Congress actually says the world is cooling” Using a straightforward and
friendly tone, the president belittles climate change deniers: “The climate
change deniers suggest there's still a debate over the science. There is not”

29. 29
Comparing Obama’s first and second term to Bush’s, a radical change in
rhetoric on environmental issues, specifically climate change, is very
noticeable. The president defines it under terms of security and classifies it as
an immediate threat for the US and the rest of the world. Renewable energies
occupy an outstanding position in most of his speeches, in contrast to the
Bush’s defence of coal and nuclear power. It is clear that Obama has a broader
vision of security that goes beyond Bush’s realist concept of security.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have highlighted the most relevant discourses from Bush
and Obama during their respective terms. It has been shown that whereas Bush
sustained strong denial towards the recognition of environmental issues such
as climate change, Obama has placed it directly into the security agenda of the
US.
Discourse analysis leaves no doubt about the great differences among both
administrations. The frequent references made by Obama regarding the
catastrophic consequences of climate change for the US and world population
suggest a securitization move. On the other hand, the emphasis with which he
classifies these consequences as short term threats strengthens this statement.
In these terms, far from Bush’s ambiguity, scientific evidence has Obama’s
full support, as he strongly criticizes those who cast doubt on the man-made
nature of climate change.
From a perspective based on the CopSS, rhetorically speaking, it is
reasonable to conclude that Bush did not securitize climate change during his
mandate, but he took it out of public discussion until 2007. On the contrary,
Obama has shown a very clear impetus on linking climate change with
security since he took office in 2009. All in all, studying both presidents’
speech acts has sown interesting results regarding the securitization of
environmental issues like climate change. Nonetheless, what practices took
place during their terms? How can we frame them into the securitization
logic? These questions are answered in chapter 4.

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Chapter 4. George W. Bush vs. Barack H. Obama: The Paris School
Contribution
Introduction
I have shown in the last section that both presidents employed very
different rhetoric in regard to environmental security. Nonetheless, according
to the PS, for a securitization or de-securitization process to be tangible,
practices must be challenged and transformed through governability acts and
habits that turn environmental issues like climate change into a security
concern.
This chapter analyses both Bush’s and Obama’s (de)securitizing practices,
and outlines the role that empowering audiences played during their mandates.
Among the practices, I review official executive orders, laws, and strategies.
The economic outcomes are also examined: public expenditure on
environmental protection and the fight against climate change.
George W. Bush: Practices and Policy Outcomes
Initiatives and Policies: Discursive Practices
A priori, as the rhetorical analysis shows, no notable policy outcomes to
protect the environment were expected to come out of Bush’s two terms. In
2002, the president announced the widely controversial Clear Skies Act, which
was supposed to deregulate emissions of power plants basing the emission
cuts on a market-oriented approach15. To promote emissions control without
damaging economic growth, this legislative initiative required cuts on
emissions of nitrogen dioxide, mercury and sulphur dioxide; but not CO2.
Criticised by democrats and ecological lobbies, the Clear Skies Act
deregulated some of the standards on air pollution former legislation required
energy installations to meet, introducing pollution credits as a new way of
taxation for the big polluters.
In 2005, the Energy Policy Act was ratified with a central topic: energy
security. The massive dependence of the US’ economy on oil, and the
outcomes of the war on Iraq forced the Bush administration to focus on energy

31. 31
policy (Floyd, 2010: p. 158). In 2006 tax cuts were offered for the purchase of
fuel-efficient and hybrid vehicles, appliances, and products (Floyd, 2010: pp.
158-159). Further in his second term, Bush signed the Energy Independence
and Security Act (EISA) of 2007, favouring the use of biofuels. Other
practices included: annulling the Endangered Species Act of 1973, gas
drilling, lodging authorisation in protected ecosystems and endorsing
commercial whaling, among others16.
With all the attention focused on the war on terror, legislation on climate
change was not partially addressed until 2007. Not even hurricane Katrina in
2005 sparked further compromise to tackle climate change. Regarding global
environmental policy, Bush’s refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol left the US
lacking in emissions regulation and practically isolated from the global
legislative trend. Nevertheless, global initiatives such as the Asia-Pacific
Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) of 2005 were promoted
by the Bush administration as great agreements for global environmental
protection. Besides commercial incentives, the APP did not implement any
policies regarding climate change. The main focus of Bush’s environmental
policies was placed on energy security. Following the 2007 MEF meeting, the
rhetorical compromise and leadership showed by Bush was not transformed
into any binding agreement on emissions reductions at the UN conference in
Bali that year. The only official compromise to face climate change was stated
in 2008, when Bush announced a mandatory emissions cut to stop US
emissions growth by 2025. The late announcement of this measure left the
setting of any kind of tangible targets to the next administration (Floyd, 2010:
pp. 163-164).
Framing in the Bush Administration: Non-Discursive Practices
Taking into account the rhetorical analysis and the discursive practices of
the Bush administration, it is reasonable to conclude that the environment was
not only not part of the security agenda, but was de-securitized. That is,
compared to the Clinton administration and the global trend, the link between
environment and security was silently removed17 (Floyd, 2010: p. 168).

32. 32
Traditionally, following Ronald Reagan’s administration, the Republican
Party has shown reticence about addressing the environment as a priority for
the political agenda. Far from labelling any environmental issues under
security logic, Republicans see the economy as the main focus of their
policies, usually stating the incompatibility of environmental protection and
economic growth (Dunlap & McCright, 2008: p. 26). During Bush’s
mandates, the militarization of the environment was the dominant strategy for
addressing environmental protection. The Department of Defence and the
Department of State equated the environment to the war on terror, widening
environmental programmes inherited from the Clinton administration towards
addressing goals of the war effort (Floyd, 2010: pp.147-151). For instance, the
increase from 2.4 billion US$ in 2001 to 3.9 billion US$ in 2006 of the
Defence Environmental International Cooperation (DEIC) budget did not
necessarily mean that a bigger effort was put into environmental cooperation.
As Floyd shows, the money was employed on maintaining military
programmes and installations (Floyd, 2010: p. 150).
The political strategy of the Bush administration was characterized by a
series of controversial practices. Deliberately manipulating official reports on
climate change was one of the most well-known. In 2002, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) presented a report to the UN linking climate change
to man-made pollution. Outcast by Bush a few days later, EPA workers stated
that the White House had tried to change some of the scientific data blaming
climate change on industrial activity. After a few requests from the White
House, the EPA deleted the climate change section from the official report
(Floyd, 2010: p. 157). The Bush administration’s aim to censor was
widespread and noticeable in other reports from the EPA, and was especially
focused on belittling the negative consequences of pollution on the health of
citizens18.
Economically speaking, the republican administration implemented some
other controversial practices. As with the DEIC budget, the money spent each
year on fighting climate change was not dedicated to addressing the problem.
Unjustified expenditures on areas that had nothing to do with the environment,
such as the war on drugs, undermined the aim of federal programmes19.

33. 33
Moreover, according to Miriam Pemberton from the Institute for Policy
Studies, in 2007, 1.83 billion US$ were spent on the study of whether or not
climate change was actually a scientific truth20. On the other hand, the EPA’s
total budget for fighting climate change was reduced from 1000.9 million US$
in 2005 to 939 million US$ in 2009; a 7% reduction. The EPA’s total budget
suffered an 8% decrease as well, going from 7724 million US$ in 2003 to
7143 million US$ in 200921.
All things considered, Bush did not only take climate change of the security
agenda using speech acts. As the analysis of discursive and non-discursive
practices in this chapter demonstrates, Bush erased climate change from his
executive agenda by exercising his cabinet’s influence at all levels of
governance.
Barack Obama: Policy Outcomes and Practices
Initiatives and Policies: Discursive Practices
When Barack Obama won the 2008 presidential elections, not only a
rhetorical change was meant to take place on environmental issues, but a
change in the practices of his administration too. Nevertheless, the high hopes
of diverse environmentalist groups were soon lowered due to a variety of
factors. With a slow start on environmental policies during his first two years
in office, since the 2010 midterm elections, any environmental initiative linked
to climate change has been blocked by the republican majority in Congress.
The ferocious opposition of the conservatives added to the strong leverage of
industrial lobbies has slowed down legislative progress on environmental
protection, and especially on climate change. Nevertheless, some policy
outcomes must be highlighted from Obama’s six years of governance.
In 2009, Congress approved the only environmental law that directly
tackles greenhouse gas emissions, the American Clean Energy and Security
Act, with a vote of 219 to 212. This law sought to reduce national greenhouse
gas emissions by 17% (from 2005 levels) by the year 2020 and 80% by the
year 2050 (Selin & Vandeveer, 2013: p. 5). Further initiatives to implement
climate change legislation have been boycotted by the republican majority

34. 34
ever since. Beginning in 2010 the democratic administration has tried to push
federal regulation by the EPA to force congressional action, achieving
different results (Selin & Vandeveer, 2013: p. 6). After the 2009 Copenhagen
summit, without any local or international programme to fight against climate
change, almost all the actions undertaken by Obama in this regard have been
the result of administrative initiatives. A recent example of this is the historic
announcement of EPA’s goal to cut coal pollution by 30% in 203022.
Among the administrative initiatives Obama has used to implement
environmental regulation, Executive Orders (EO) are common. In January
2011, Obama issued EO (13534) “Federal Leadership in Environmental,
Energy, and Economic Performance”, setting sustainability goals for federal
agencies on greenhouse gas emissions (Vig, 2013: p. 8). With EO 13563, the
president spurred federal agencies to review all regulations that were
duplicative or unnecessary, giving preference to Clinton’s environmental
legacy (Vig, 2013: p. 10).
Framing in the Obama Administration: Non-Discursive Practices
With the legislative initiatives doomed to fail in Congress and the scarce
transformative power of the Executive Orders, non-discursive practices from
the Obama administration reflect more accurately the aims of the democratic
administration on climate change.
Especially after the republican seize of Congress in 1994, the gap between
democrats and republicans on environmental issues began to broaden. Without
formal support from Congress to implement environmental policy, Obama has
undertaken some practices following his political strategy. These practices
have been directed mainly towards the official support of scientific evidence
on climate change, which can be seen more clearly in the democratic
administration’s decisions on who to appoint to certain strategic positions.
Obama has appointed environmentalist Carol Browner as Director of the
White House Office of Energy and Climate Change Policy until 2011, chemist
Lisa Jackson as EPA administrator until 2013, Nobel Prize winner physicist
Steven Chu as energy secretary, and specialist on climate change professor
John Holdren as White House science adviser (Vig, 2013: p. 5). The

35. 35
appointment of environmentalist Gina McCarthy in 2013 as the EPA
administrator is another example of the president’s compromise with the
scientific arguments on climate change.
In reference to economical funding, informative initiatives regarding
climate change have been a principal focus of Obama’s administration. In May
2014, the US Global Change Research Program released one of the most
extensive and solid reports proving that climate change was a real threat to all
American citizens and their way of life. Using extensive scientific literature,
the report focuses on the scientific evidence of climate change and its
consequences23. On the other hand, Obama’s two terms have included a very
important boost to the EPA’s budget, rising 33% from 7143 million US$ in
2009 to 10486 million US$ in 2010, and finally 10020 million US$ in 2011.
The EPA’s total budget for fighting climate change increased as well from 939
million US$ in 2009 to 1070 million US$ in 2010, and 1193 US$ in 2011,
constituting a 22% increment compared to 200924. Finally, compared to 2009,
the 2014 (requested) budget for the Federal Climate Change Programs has
increased from 7562 million US$ to 11594 million US$; a 36% rise25.
In contrast to Bush, it seems clear that Obama is attempting a progressive
securitization of climate change. Especially if we focus on the non-discursive
practices, the inclusion of scientific staff in his administration and the dramatic
rise in the EPA’s budget support this assumption. Nevertheless, unlike Bush,
Obama’s discursive practices are not concordant. In the next section I offer an
explanation as to why this might be.
Engaging with the Context: The Empowering Audiences of Bush and
Obama
Following the PS’ contribution, in order to fully understand Bush and
Obama’s mandate, a brief review of the relationship between actors and
audience is necessary. If we examine Roe’s terms of ‘moral’ support and
‘formal’ support, the practices referred to in this chapter find their operative
foundation.

36. 36
Roe defines moral support as the general support of the public towards a
concrete process of securitization (Roe, 2008). During Bush’s mandates, the
progressive de-securitization of climate change was also supported or
permitted by his electorate, as shown by the graphs show.
Source: Dunlap & McCright, 2008: pp. 28-29 (Op. Cit.). Data obtained from Gallup
Organization
Obama’s environmentally friendly rhetoric and non-discursive practices
can be also explained by these two figures. Nowadays, in 2014, the political
cleavage is still widening. According to a poll by the Pew Research Center
from June 2013, 65% of democratic residents of the US see climate change as
‘a major threat’, compared to only 25% of republican residents26.
On the topic of formal support, if we take Roe’s definition and focus on
parliament, the relationship between both presidents and the US parliament
has been unequal. For instance, Bush enjoyed the support of a republican
majority in congress until 2006. The de-securitization of climate change was
based on the tacit support of a friendly parliament during six years of his
mandate. On the contrary, Obama’s relationship with congress has been
nothing but friendly. During his six years of mandate, democrats held congress
from 2008 to 2010 only. Since then, the president’s views have clashed with
republican’s ruthless opposition to any discursive practices coherent with his
rhetorical aim of securitizing climate change. Even while controlling congress
in 2009, Obama’s taxation law for carbon emissions (477 - H.R.2454) passed
by only 3 votes, and was defeated later that year in the senate, held by
democrats as well27.

37. 37
Conclusion
The aim of this chapter has been to expose the main discursive and non-
discursive practices of both Bush and Obama during their terms. First, it
argues that climate change did not only vanish from Bush’s discursive and
non-discursive practices, but was de-securitized; which means that his
administration actively erased climate change from any kind of security
initiative. Second, it shows that whereas Obama’s securitizing discursive
practices were conspicuous by their absence, the analysis of his non-discursive
practices leave no doubt of a securitizing move.
Following the PS perspective, I have also placed the focus of analysis on
the audience. Compared to the CopSS’ discourse analysis, this has a clear
advantage: it enriches the context of the (de)securitization process. Roe’s
model provides us with a tangible explanation of why Bush de-securitized
climate change with no remarkable opposition from his moral and formal
audience. Besides this, the lack of formal support explains why Obama has not
achieved any noticeable advance in climate change legislation both nationally
and internationally. However, the moral support from democratic voters is a
valid explanation of why non-discursive practices are coherent with his
speech.
Ultimately, this chapter has proved how the PS might offer an empirically
valuable perspective on the securitization of climate change in the US. All
things considered, the CopSS and the PS methods have confirmed that
combining both can help us understand securitization theory in action.

38. 38
Chapter 5. Overall Conclusions
It was the purpose of this dissertation to test the explanatory power of
Securitization Theory by analysing the (de)securitization of climate change in
the US from two a priori contradictory approaches: the Copenhagen School
and the Paris School. However, as I have shown, both approaches have proven
to be capable of working together. Analysing the securitization of the
environment in the US through discourse and practices related with climate
change has sparked challenging theoretical and empirical implications.
Theoretical Implications
The first theoretical implication that my analysis contributes to
Securitization Theory is that securitization is something dynamic and flexible.
The Copenhagen School’s belief that securitization processes can only be
studied through the logic of exception lays on narrow assumptions of the
nature of security itself. Without the theoretical contributions of the Paris
School, some relevant questions with great explanatory potential were
neglected. How do practices contribute to a securitization process? What is the
role of the audience in securitization?
As I have analysed in the empirical chapters, a careful study of both Bush
and Obama’s administrations sheds light on logic other than exception. The
Paris School’s routine logic is present in discursive and non-discursive
practices of both administrations. Moreover, the attention paid to the
supportive role of the audience in the US bolsters the explanatory power of
both schools’ logic combined. First, it offers a tangible explanation of why
speech acts are not always followed by discursive practices. The role of moral
and formal audiences can have a determinant influence on the practices made
of securitizing actors, regardless of the also relevant speech acts. Without
combining the strength of both approaches, the theoretical model of
Securitization Theory remains incomplete. Combining the Copenhagen School
and the Paris School’s contributions to Securitization Theory is the natural
way of consolidating the study of securitization in an effective way, one that is
suitable for the study of time periods and with a strong heuristic framework
for security scholars.

39. 39
Empirical Implications
My analysis of Presidents Bush and Obama terms enlightens thirteen years
of US environmental security focused on climate change. The development of
the securitization of climate change in the US contributes decisively to the
validity of the study of securitization processes through the approach I defend.
Analysing speech, practices and the audience’s role has shown the great
partisan differences between the republican and democratic parties.
After the effort made by Bush to dismantle the scientific evidence of
climate change and numerous attempts to separate it from security, Obama is
changing the game. According to his speech, there is no doubt that he has
labelled climate change as a security issue. However, absence of collaboration
from the legislative branch of the US has prevented the incumbent President
from moving forward with any kind of clear discursive practices regarding
climate change. The political cleavage that nowadays divides the republican
and the democratic parties should not be underestimated, for as I affirm, what
the US does in climate change legislation can have global consequences.
Inability to agree on any kind of environmental approach locally has prevented
the US from endorsing any kind of global deal or other strategies (building
blocks, for instance).
The consequences of this political stalemate are still unknown. However,
the amount of different approaches and outcomes we can expect from further
administrations promises varied answers and plural approaches from security
scholars in the future.
Further Research
The analysis of securitization processes combining the Copenhagen School
and the Paris School’s logics has significant potential for future empirical
research in the field. In this dissertation, I have demonstrated that combining
both approaches can enrich the study of securitization processes and promote
theoretical progress of security studies as a whole. Now, further research must
be made to keep fostering Securitization Theory. Once we have sorted out the

40. 40
theoretical puzzle, it is time to keep testing the dynamism of Securitization
Theory with more empirical research in environmental issues and other areas.
Even though this research does not inquire about more in depth analysis of
US politics, further research in this field must also be done. What lies behind
the US parties’ opposition/support of to the securitization of environmental
issues such as climate change deserves attention of securitization scholars.
New, exciting and competitive research in this field should continue in order
to expand and strengthen the study of Securitization Theory.

41. 41
Notes
1: For a full transcription of Mr Obama’s speech go to:
http://www.vox.com/2014/6/15/5812752/read-obama-s-full-speech-ripping-
into-climate-deniers
2: Due to the debate of whether the environment should be treated as a
security threat.
3: According to the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report on Climate Change:
http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/
4: To see a full description of the EU’s Climate Action visit:
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/brief/eu/index_en.htm
5: The approximate ratio of Atmospheric treaties vs. Natural Resources-related
treaties is 1/5. For a full list of UN treaties visit: https://treaties.un.org/
6: George W. Bush, ‘State of the Union’, 29 January 2002:
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov
7: National Security Strategy of the USA. September 2002:
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov
8: For a full transcription of Mr Bush’s speech go to:
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2002/feb/14/usnews.globalwarming
9: For a full transcription of Mr Bush’s speech go to:
http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.28.07.html
10: Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change,
Bush’s Speech: http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/2007/92938.htm
11: For a full transcription of Mr Bush’s speech go to:
http://www.cfr.org/climate-change/president-bushs-speech-greenhouse-gas-
emissions-climate-change-april-2008/p16043#
12: Full transcripts of the State of the Union speeches:

42. 42
- 2009, Joint Session of the Congress
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=85753
- 2010: http://edition.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/01/27/sotu.transcript/
- 2011: http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/State_of_the_Union/state-of-the-union-
2011-full-transcript/story?id=12759395&singlePage=true
- 2012: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/01/24/us/politics/state-of-
the-union-2012-video-transcript.html
- 2013: http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/transcript-president-barack-
obamas-2013-state-union-address/story?id=18480069&singlePage=true
- 2014: http://es.scribd.com/doc/203006716/2014-State-of-the-Union-As-
Prepared-for-Delivery
13: For a full transcription of Mr Obama’s speech go to:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/us/politics/23obama.text.html?pagewant
ed=all&_r=0
14: For a full transcription of Mr Obama’s speech go to:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/remarks-president-
climate-change
15: Clear Skies Act 2002:
http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020214-5.html
16: In: Goldenberg, Suzanne. “The Worst of Times: Bush's Environmental
Legacy examined” The Guardian, January 16th, 2009.
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/jan/16/greenpolitics-georgebush
17: Note that, according to Floyd, during the Clinton administration a
securitization process of the environment took place. The rhetoric and
practices of his two terms suggest so: “…The vast majority of scientists have
concluded unequivocally that if we do not reduce the emission of greenhouse
gases at some point in the next century, we will disrupt our climate and put

43. 43
our children and grandchildren at risk.”(Bill Clinton during the 1998 State of
the Union Address). The creation of the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary
of Defence - Environmental Security (ODUSD-ES) was one of his most
notable achievements regarding the institutionalization of environmental
security (Floyd: 2010, p.117). During Bush’s first term the ODUSD-ES was
dismantled.
18: In: Eliperin, Juliet. “Cheney’s Staff Cut Testimony on Warming" The
Washington Post, Wednesday, July 9th, 2008.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/07/08/AR2008070801442.html
19: Pemberton, Miriam (2008), ‘The Budgets Compared: Military vs. Climate
Security’, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington; as cited in Floyd, Rita
(2010). Security and the Environment: Securitisation Theory and US
Environmental Security Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
20: Ibid.
21: For detailed EPA budgets go to:
http://www.epa.gov/nscep/index.html
22: In: Goldberg, Suzanne. “Obama Unveils Historic Rules to Reduce Coal
Pollution by 30%” The Guardian, Monday, June 2nd, 2014.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/30/dick-pic-janet-looks-at-89-
dicks_n_5635212.html?cps=gravity
23: US Global Change Research Program Report 2014:
http://www.globalchange.gov/
24: See 21 for detailed EPA budgets.
25: For Federal Climate Change Programs’ budget see:
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43227.pdf
26: In: Leonhardt, David. “On Climate, Republicans and Democrats Are From
Different Continents” The New York Times, Wednesday, May 7th, 2014.

44. 44
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/08/upshot/on-climate-republicans-and-
democrats-are-from-different-continents.html
27: Ibid. Also see: http://politics.nytimes.com/congress/votes/111/house/1/477

45. 45
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