A paper given by Eric Lubbock, Lord Avebury in Brussels on March 13, 1994 on possible solutions to the Kurdish question

1. t •
TheFuture:DemocraticPoliticalSolutions
for the Kurdish Question'
EricAvebiiry,chairman.ParliamentaryHumanRightsGroup
Brussels,March 13,1994

2. When theSovietUnion disintegrated and the cold warended,there was
much talkofa'new world order', peaceful,stable eind orderly,in which the
United States,asthe only remainingsuperpower,would preside over the
settlementofdisputes,and the existingcollection ofstates,however
illogicalsomeofthem mightappear,would continueindefMtely.
Somehow the vision hasgone disastrously wrong,and theinternational
communitylacks the mechanisms necessary to deal with a completely
differentsetofrisksthan the onesfor which thelast halfcentury
prepared.From theend ofthe Second World War,the bigthreatto the
advancement ofmankind was a nuclear conflict between the US and the
SovietUnion.Now,the problem is one ofan ever-increasing proliferation
ofintra-state warsbetween legalgovernments and armed oppositions.
One authority lists 115separate conflicts or potential conflicts, many of
which have erupted within the lastthree years,although their origins
may lie much further back^.The attempts by theinternationalcommunity
to deal with these internal weirs have not been successful.
Because the United Nationsis an assembly ofstates and notofpeoples,
the inviolability ofsovereignty is considered to bethejustificationfor
armed intervention by theinternationalcommunity.TheUN,or rather
the US and itsfriends,broughtnearly halfa million men to bear on the
^pulsion ofIraqfrom Kuwait.YetSaddam's aggression againstthe
marsh Arabs,theShias ofthesouth and the Kurds ofthe north,though
regrettable,is notconsidered to warrantintervention.Theidea ofa right
ofintervention,as ageneralisation ofResolution688,which hadsome
backingfor awhile,has notprospered.The UKForeign Secretary has
referred disparagingly to the'something-must-be-done brigade'in the
contextofBosnia,and theinstinctofall chancelleries mustbe toshy way
fium alineofthoughtwhich undermines the conceptofsovereignty.So
theysay thattheSecurity Councilalready has adequate powers to
intervene whenitisexpedientto doso,asin the case ofKuwait,and that
any extension oftherightofintervention should be on acase by case
basis.
Whatthis meansin practice is that nocommon setofprinciples willbe
developed for intervention.In the case ofthe former Soviet Union,it will
beleftto Russia tosortthe problems out,asshe tries to doin Azerbayan,
Tach'ikistan or Georgia,forinstance.In Somalia,UN troops havescored
severalown goals.In Liberia,a regionalforce operating under Chapter
VII ofthe Charter was tried,and soonshowed the dangers ofgivingsuch
an operation a blank cheque.In Angola,peace talks meander on endlessly
underthe aegis ofthe troika ofthe US,Russia emd Portugal,withoutany
sign thatthe armedforceson theground will pay any attention when they
do agree.
^Morton H Halperin and David JSchefTer,Self-Determinationin the New World Order;
Carnegie Endowmentfor InternationalPeace,1992.

3. In anothersetofinternalconflicts,theinternationalconununily is
determined notto becomeinvolved atall.Foremostamongtheseis
Kurdistan,wherethestatusofthecombatantsisseeninadifferentlight.
We may nothaveliked DrJonasSavimbi,buthe had his uses duringthe
cold war,and has retainedsome residual prestige.And he does control
more than halfoftheland area ofthestate,so there is no alternative but
to continue negotiating with him.Thisseemstobe the keyfactor;wehave
to come toterms with warlords who controlterritory,in Liberia,
Afghanistan,SriLanka and Somalia.Butwherethe armed opposition Hag
notgotto thestage whereitcanseize and hold towns,they are'terrorists',
asin Peru,Kashmir or Kurdistan.The armed oppositionin these
territories doesindeed use terroristtactics,lendingcredence to the
generally held view that Governments cannotdeal with theoL ElSalvador
w£is a borderline case,where theFMLN,thoughstigmatised as terrorists,
werefinally broughtinto negotiations.,leadingto the Chapultepec
Accords ofJanuary 1992,and finally to the elections which are to be held
on March 20.
In SriLanka,the Governmenthavesaid they willnegotiate with the
LTTE,theso-called TamilTigers,only iftheylay down their arms.As
furtherconditions,theysaid the Tigers mustpresenttheir demandsto a
Parliamentary SelectCommitteein writing,and theirleader must
partin the negotiations.TheTigers havecountered bysending peace
proposals directto the President,and stipulate thatinitialtalks mustbe
held in Jafhia.This makesitvirtuallyimpossible to reach a negotiated
settlement,and the Wijetimge Governmentmustbe presumed to believe
thata militarysettlementofthe conflictis possible.SriT.anka presents
one interesting parallel with Turkey;while the north and eastare
considered astheir homelandsbytheTamil nationalists,there arelarge
numbers ofTamilslivingin the predominantly Sinhalese areas ofthe
south.
In Burma,the military Governmenthavesuggestedseparate bilateral
negotiations with each ofthearmed opposition groups,withoutany
preconditions,and these maylead to peaceinsome areas.
In theformerSovietRepublicofGeorgia,there aretalks between the
Shevardnadze Governmentand theAbkhazians,which arestill
continuing.In Abkhazia,theAbkhazians areina minorify ofonly 18%,
butifand whenitcomes to areferendum,some oftheother minorities
mayjoin forces with them infavour ofachangein their constitutional
status.Interestingly,uptotheearly thirties,Abkhazia and Georgia had
separate andequalstatus undertheSovietconstitution,and itwasonly
after 1932 thatAbkhazia became asubordinate unit.
Whatall theseexamplesshowisthatnegotiation between a Government
and an armed opposition maytake a nmnberofdifferentforms,and it
would be usefulforTurkeyifthe authorities there could be persuaded to

4. studysome ofthe models.None ofthem would necessarily provide a
pattern to be copied withoutalteration,but mostcould offerideasfor
mechanisms which could be adapted to the differentcircumstances ofthe
Kurdish problem in Tm-key.
Allthis presupposesthatTurkey wantsa politicalsolution,anH is not
determined to apply similar techniques againstthe Kurds to those used
againstthe Armeniansin 1915-16.The deploymentoflarge militaiy
forces,including armour,eirtilleiy,helicopter gunships andjetbombers
againstthecivilian population does notencourage one to think thata
peacefulsettlementis one ofthe options under consideration,and the
destruction ofvillages and ejection oftheir inhabitants is reminiscentof
the techniques applied in 1915,as the Kurdish people remind us.When
Mrs Cillerspoke lastOctober abouttheBasqueoption,in the nextbreath
she had to deny the reference,and the assumption wasthatshe had upset
the militaiy.Notonly that,butthe military werein a position to exercise
aveto againsteven the mosttentativereferenceby politicalleadersto
ideas ofdevolution or autonomy.
Even ifthe military had less power,the constitution itselfimposesa
serious obstacle to any negotiations.Article 3,which declares that'the
Turkish State,itsterritoryand nation isan indivisible entity',makes any
discussion ofalternative constitutionalarrangementsillegal.Article 125
imposes the death penalty on persons whodo orsay anything which
underminesthatintegrity,and the MPsOrhan Dogan and Hatip Dicle
have been charged underthatprovision.Thelifting ofimmunityofthese
MPs,together with LeylaZana,AhmetTurk,SirriSakik,MahmutAlinak
and the maverick Hasan Mezarci,was done withoutallowingthem the
seven daysin which to appeal,as provided bylaw,and itappearsthatit
wasState Security CourtChiefProsecutor NusretDemiral,known to be a
hardliner,whoframed the Article 125charges^.
Theselatestevents are,however,only the culmination ofasustained and
continuouscampaign ofintimidation and harassmentagainstthe Kurdish
MPsand their party workers,which has been gathering momentum since
thelastelection.Many DemocracyParty activists havebeen mtu*dered,
dozens arrested and tortured,and hundredsintimidated and threatened.
The threshold oftolerancefor any expression oftheKurdish identityis
very low,even ifit were notforthe legalimpediments.Thereis no
politicalspace within the norms oftheTurkish systemfor adialoguewith
representatives ofthe Kurdish people,because the ideathata distinct
culturaland ethnicgroup might have an agendaofits own is considered
tobeillegitimate,and a betrayaloftheKemalistideology on which the
state was founded.
^Hugh Pope,ArrestedKurdish MPscould beexecuted.TheIndependent,March4,1994.

5. InIraq,theimmediatesituation may appeartobebettertbsinin Turkey,
butaslongasSaddam Hussainremainsin power,notonly aretheKurds
attheend ofa blind alley,buttbeirdependenceon allied air power,and
on the meagreflow ofsuppbes across thefrontier with Turkey,makes
them Ankara's hostages,and createsfnctionbetween Turkish andIraqi
Kurds.ThePUKand KDP can alwaysbeblackmailed intosupporting
Turkey againsttbeir brotherKurds.They have no redress against
Turkish cross-border militaiy operations,which continuein violation of
the UN Charter.Economically they aresqueezed between the UN
sanctions,which theoretically applytothemjustastotherestofIraq,and
Saddam Hussain'sinternalsanctions,which preventgoodsreachingthem
from Baghdad.
TheIranian Kurds areeven worseoff.The mullahsregimein Tehran
demonstrated their utterruthlessnessby Mllingtwosuccessive General
Secretaries ofthe KDPl,DrAbdul-Rahman Qassemlouin Viennain 1989,
and DrSadeghSarafkandiin Berlinin 19923.Thereis no prospect
whatsoeverofthe KurdsinIran gainingany controlovertheir political
affairs imtilthe mullahs are removed.
Democraticpoliticalsolutionsfor theKurdsinIraq andIran thusdepend
on the adventofelected governmentsin Tehran and Baghdad,as a
necessary though perhaps notasufficientcondition.Forthetimebeing,
thoseregimes are psychopathic,and therecanbenoeffective dialogue
with them.
This discussion presupposes thatthe Kurds have to establish their
separate politicalsolutions within each ofthe coxmtriestheyinhabit,
beforetheycould decide on whether to aimforthefurthergoalofa
Kurdish super-state.Itcaimotnecessarily be assumed thatifand when
they did getthe opportunily,the bonds ofculture andsimilarities of
language would outweigh thehistory ofseparate developmentwithin the
fivestates amongstwhich the Kurdish people are now split,anditis to be
noted thatno pan-Kurdish movementexists or has ever existed.
Moreover,toinvoketherightofself-determinationfortheKurdish people
asawhole maybejustified in termsofIhecommonsense mgnTiingofthe
term'people',butitlies welloutsidetherealmsofimmediate practical
politics.The United Nations did putself-determinationatthetopofthe
listofrightsin theInternationalCovenants,butthey alsoemphasised the
principle ofterritorialintegrity.Whenever there hasbeen aconflict
betweenthetwo principles,territorialintegrity hasalways prevailed.
Nordid the UN provide a mechanism by which any particularclaim could
be tested.Itis certain only thattheinhabitants ofterritories which were
^TheTehran Murder Machine;ParliamentaryHuman RightsGroup,London,March
1994.

6. administered assingle units duringthe colonialera are treated as
'peoples',even wherethis meansthat,becauseofthearbitr^way
boundaries were drawn by the imperialists,groups having different
languages,religions and cultures were thrown together.Apartfrom the
dependencies ofEiuopean powers,the UN has never accepted the
demands ofsubject peoples forself-determination,exceptwhere the state
concerned has agreed to it, orit has been successfully asserted by armed
action.The separation ofSingaporefrom Malaysia,and the Czech and
Slovak Republicsfrom Czechoslovakia,are examples ofthe firstkind,
while theseparation ofBangladesh from Pakistan,and ofEritreafrom
Ethiopia,are examples ofthesecond kind.There was no objective test of
the merits ofthe claimsin any ofthese cases;the UN was merely
presented with afaitaccompli and proceeded to rubberstamp itin each
case.
The one qualified exception to this rule is the case ofthe Palestinians.
They were allocated aterritoiy by the UN when British mandated
Palestine was divided up in 1948,and their claim to self-deteimination
wascontinuously upheld,when thereseemed to be no possibility ofit
beingimplemented either by agreementor through superior military
force.There has never been any logic in thisspecial treatment,nor any
attemptto argue why the rights ofPalestiniansshould be upheld while
the rights ofKm:ds have to be denied in thesame region^ but all UN
memberstates follow thesame rule:in the absence ofagreed legalcriteria
for determining whether a particular entity has the rightofself-
determination,state practice itselfbecomes the norm.Thatrelieves the
internationalcommunity ofthe impossible task ofdefendingtheir policies
on self-determination on any basis ofprinciple.
Ifneither the United Nations northeir nationalgovernments provide the
Kurds with a pointd'appuifor their political aspirations,they mustlook
to other institutions,and here,Turkey's membership ofboth the
Conferenceon Security and Co-operation in Em-ope(CSCE)and the
CoimcilofEmope providesincreasing opportunities.Both these
institutions have been focusingon the rights ofminorities,and whilstthey
are cautious £iboutthe institutional structures that may be needed to
protectthose rights,they have opened up the conductofstates to
internationalscrutiny,and they are beginning to consider means of
providing remedies to minorities whose collective rights are violated.
The traditionalformulations ofhuman rights have notincluded provisions
for positive action to maintain the cultmaland linguistic identities of
minorities.They have been silenton the need feltby territorially-based
minorities to control access to theirlands.And they have paid no attention
''EricAvebury,Self-Determination and the New World Order:the Case ofthe Middle
Blast,SOAS,October,1993,p9.

7. to the political meansofachievingthese new rights within states^.
Attempts to remedy these omissions have been made now in Declarations
produced by the UN,the CSCE and the CoimcilofEurope,and the
November 1990 Copenhagen Declaration ofthe CSCE has been called the
mostcomprehensiveinternationalinstrumenton minority rightsin
existence®.In this document,the participatingstates,includingTurkey,
setoutthe rightofpersons belonging to national minorities
freelyto express,preserveand develop theirethnic,cultural,linguisticor
religiousidentityand to maintain anddevelop theirculturein allaspects,
freeofanyattemptsatassimilation againsttheir will.Inparticular,they
have the right
32.1 to usefreely their mothertongue inprivateas wellasinpublic.
32.2to establish and maintain theirown educational,culturaland
religiousinstitutions,organizationsorassociations, which canseek
voluntaryfinancialand othercontributionsas wellaspublic
assistance,in conformity with nationallegislation;
32.3toprofessandpractise theirreligion,includingtheacquisition,
possessionand useofreligious materials,and toconductreligious
educationalactivities in their mothertongue;
32.4to establish and maintain unimpeded contactsamongthemselves
within theircountryas wellascontactsacrossfrontiers with citizensof
otherstates with whom theyshareacommon ethnicornationalorigin,
culturalheritageorreligous beliefs;
32.5to disseminate,have accesstoandexchangeinformationin their
mothertongue;
32.6to establish and maintain organizationsorassociations within their
countryand toparticipatein international non-governmental
organizations.
The participatingStates will
...protectthe ethnic,cultural,linguisticand religiousidentityofnational
minoritieson their territoryandcreateconditionsforthepromotion ofthat
identity. They willtakethe necessary measuresto thateffectafterdue
consultation with organisationsorassociationsofsuch minorities....
They willendeavourto ensure,the Declarationsays,
®IanBrownlie,RightsofPeoplesinInternationalLaw,inTheRightsofPeoples,
Clarendon Press,Oxford,1992
®PetterFWille,Minority QuestionsintheCouncilofEurope,HelsinkiMonitor,Vol5,
1994No 1,International HelsinkiFederationfor HumanRights.

8. thatpersons belongingto nationalminorities.,,,haveadequate
opportunitiesforinstruction oftheir mothertongue orin th^r mother
tongue,as wellas,whereverpossibleand necessary,forits use before
public authorities
In the contextofteachingofhistory and culture in educational
establishments,they willalso takeaccountofthe historyandcultureof
national minorities.
The participatingStates
willrespectthe rightofpersons belongingto nationalminoritiestoeffective
participation inpublicaffairs,includingparticipationin theaffairs
relatingto theprotection andpromotionoftheidentityofsuch minorities.
And finally,in thisincompletesummaiy,they
notethe efforts undertaken toprotectandcreate conditionsfor the
promotion ofthe ethnic,cultural,linguisticand religiousidentityof
certain national minorities byestablishing,asonepossible meansto
achieve these aims,appropriateload orautonomousadministrations
correspondingto thespecific historicaland territorialcircumstancesof
such minoritiesandin accordance with thepoliciesoftheState concerned.'^
4
Theimportantpointto note aboutthis documentisthat,although it
providesfor no concrete sanctions againsttransgressors,itdoes have a
review mechanism.There are periodicreview meetingson the Human
Dimension ofthe CSCE,the mostrecentofwhich was held in Warsaw in
October 1993,and Turkey's policiesontheKurds wereroundlycriticised
there.Perhapsthe organisations which representthe Kurds ofTurkey
have under-utilised tiiis mechanism,whichcould be helpful notonlyin
preservingtheiridentity,butalsoin highlighting theirsufferings before
the internationalcommunity.
The Copenhagen Declaration is ofcoursejustthat,and notal^ally
enforceableinstnunent.Butthe CoimcilofEuropeis now goingfurther.
Attheir ViennaSummitin October 1993the Heads ofStateinstructed the
Conunittee ofMinisters
♦ to draftaframework convention specifyingthe princi^es which
contractingstates committhemselvestorespect,in orderto assure the
protection ofnational minorities.Thisinstrument would also beopen
forsignatiire by non-memberstates.
"^Documentofthe Copenhagen meetingofthe Conferenceon theHumanDimensionofthe
ConferenceonSecurityand Co-operationin Europe,Copenhagen,5to 29June 1990;Cm
1234,London,HMSO,November 1990.

9. ♦ to begin work on draftinga protocolto the European Convention on
Human Rights,guaranteeingthe rights ofpersons belongingto
national minorities.
Thefirstofthese documents wasto be ready by June30,1994,and the
second bytheend of1994.The protocolto theEiuopean Conventionis
potentially ofthegreaterimportance,because itwillbesubjectto the
Convention'sjudicialenforcementprocedures,thusguaranteeingthe
implementation ofthe protocoland auniform understandingof^erights
by allstates parties to it.AssumingthatTiukey accedesto the protocol,
Kurdish organisations would then have accessto the European
Commissionforcomplednts ofviolations oftheirrights as minorities,and
would be ablein the lastresortto appealto theEuropean Court.
Itis notclear whatprovisions would beincluded in theframework
convention,the advantageofwhichliesin thefactthatit willhe open to
signature bystates which are notmembersofthe CouncilofEurope.It
hasbeensu^estedthatitwould demand aseriesofprogrammes,setting
objectivesforstateson the protection ofnational minorities,andleaving
theimplementationinthe handsofnationallegislatures.Supervisingthe
application ofsuch aconvention may be difficult,but weshall have a
betteridea when the draft appearsinjustover three months'time.
Itmay be usefulto refer atfiiis pointto theCSCE'sgrowingrolein the
prevention and resolution ofconflicts.The High Commissionerfor
NationalMinorities(HCNM)deals with problems thathave notyet
reached the threshold ofarmed conflict:the ethnicRussians ofthe Baltic
states;Himgarians and Romain Romania;various minorities in the
formerYugoslav RepublicofMacedonia;the Greek minority inAlbania;
the Hungarian minorityinSlovakia and theSlovakian minorityin
Hungary,and the Roma minoritiesinseveral memberstates^. When
violence has already broken out,theCSCE maybecomeinvolved,but
through ad hoc arrangements ratherthan via anyinstitutional
mechanism.In thecaseofBosnia-Herzegovina,for instance,the Council
ofMinisters mandated continued monitoringofSerbia'scompliance with
CSCE normsand principles attheir Rome meetingatthe beginningof
December1993.They called forthe restoration oftheir missions to
Kosovo,Sancfiak and Vojvodina,to easelocaltensions,and forthe renewal
oftalks on thefuture status ofKosovo®.
TheCSCE areinvolved as participantsin thetalks between Georgia and
Abkhazia,and haveofiered tosupply observersorliaison officers there.In
thecaseofthe Georgian-Ossetian conflict. Ministers have ui^ed apolitical
8CSCE BuUetin,Winter 1994,Vol2No 1,Warsaw,1994.
®CSCE and the New Europe-OurSecurityisIndivisible:Decisionsofthe RomeCouncil
meeting,CSCE,Rome,1993.
8

10. dialogueleading to an internationalconference under CSCE auspices,to
negotiate asolution to the conflict.They decided to widen the
responsibilities ofthe CSCE mission in Georgia toembrace the promotion
ofand respectfor human rights in the whole ofGeorgia.
There is a CSCE mission in Moldova,even though there hasbeen no
fightingthere for a year,and atthe Rome meetingthe Ministers decided
to establish a new mission in Tajikistan,to facilitate dialogue between the
parties to the conflict,and to actively promote respectfor human rights.
Itappearsthatthe conflictin Turkish Kurdistan is the only major armed
confrontation in any CSCE member state which hassofar eluded the
notice ofthe CouncilofMinisters.Once again the Kurds are unfortunate,
in thatthe intensity ofthe struggle is not high enough tojustify a CSCE
mission,butitis wellabove the limitsetby the HCNM.It would be useful
to begin a dialogue with the CSCE to discover whetherthere is any
concern aboutthis gap in their range ofmeasures to deal with conflict
prevention and resolution,or whether they are inhibited from offering
theirservices by their consciousness ofTurkish sensitivities.
TheInternational Committee ofthe Red Cross would also be able to help
by seciuingthe conditions under which democratic processes would again
become a possibility.The withdrawalofthe Democracy Parly from the
local elections on March 27is a tragedyfor the Kurds,and for Turkey
herself,because itshows that with the relentless bombardmentoftowns
and villages,the murders ofcandidates and activists by death squads,and
theincessantharassmentofall those who are tiying to operate inside a
constitutionalframework,there is no longer any room for electoral
politics.IftheICRC were invited to enter the region,they mightbe able to
putthe brake on the violence against civilians perpetrated by the army,
and on a much lesser scale,by the armed opposition.
TheICRC have been trying to persuade Ankara to invitethem in ever
since 1983,butthe Turkish Ambassador to the Human Rights
Commission in Geneva has explained why they are notwelcome:
UnlessICRCfundamentallyand unequivocally revise itsapproach with
respectto guerrilla-terroristrelationship and terrorist warfare,its offer of
services in accordance with article 3common tofour Geneva Conventions
can hardly be accepted^^.
Assmningthatonly Article3applies to this conflict,the armed
oppositionists do not have any specialstatus tmderthe law.Those
arrested for offences ofviolence,whether against the forces ofthe state or
^^Ambassador GundiizAktan,PermanentRepresentative ofTurkey to the United
Nations Office atGeneva,Human RightsApproach and Turkey,unpublished paper,
March 1994.

11. againstcivilians,are notto be treated like prisoners ofwarin
internationalconflicts,and the primaiy purposeofArticle3is to ensure
thatcivilians,and persons no longer actively engaged in the conflict,are
treated humanely.UN GeneralAssembly Resolution 1444,adopted by
unanimous vote on December 19,1969,also expressly recognises the
customary principle ofcivilian immunityfrom attack,and the
complementaiy principle that warring parties have to digtingiiiRh civilians
from combatants at all times.Ifthis principle were observed in Turkish
Kurdistan,democratic processes mightbe resuscitated atleastto the
extentthatpeople could votefor candidates they know would favovu*
changesin the constitutionalstatus ofthe region,even though fliey would
still beinhibitedfrom expressingsuch a policy openly.
HurstHannum writesofsecession as being'the ultimateesepression ofthe
rightofself-determination',theend ofarangeofoptionsgivinga people
varyingdegreesofautonomyi^.Ifastate refusesto discussany ofthose
options,however minimalthe extentofthe devolution ofpower,because of
fear thatitwilllead to the dismembermentofthestate,itcreates the
impulsetowards theextreme.PerhapsifAtatrnk had accepted a
partnership ofequality with the Km-ds,astheyexpected him to do,anH as
they wereencouraged to believe wasintendedfrom the wordingofthe
Turkish NationalPactofJanuary 1920^^,histoiy would have been
different.Whateverthefinaloutcomeofthe Kurdishstruggle maybe,and
whateverthe democratic politicaldestiny ofthe Kurdish people,they will
ultimately need to msdntainfriendly relations witiiTurkeyforreasons of
geography and mutualself-interest.Kurds and Turks,respectingeach
other and each others'institutions,could lead theregion intoanew era-of
stability,freedom and prosperity.
^^HurstHannum,Autonomy,SovereignlyandSelf-Determination,Universityof
Penn^lvaniaPress,1992.
Art2Weacceptthat,in thecaseofthethreeSandjakswhich unitedthemselvesbya
gener<d votetothe mothercountry whenthey werefirstfree,recourseshouldagain he
had,ifnecessary,toafreepopularvote''.J CHurewitz,Diplomacyin the Nearand
MiddleEast,D Van Nostrand CompanyInc,Princeton NJ,1956,p.75.
10