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The CCleaner
infection
A smart way to infect million of users
CCleaner
What is this?
2
Developed by Piriform, CCleaner, aka
Crap Cleaner, is a utility program to
clean potentially unwanted files. The
application is popularly known for
cleaning the temporary internet files
generated by browsers such as
Internet Explorer, Microsoft Edge,
Chrome. It also claim to cleans
malicious programs.
For a period of time, the legitimate
signed version of CCleaner 5.33 being
distributed by Avast also contained a
multi-stage malware payload that
rode on top of the installation of
CCleaner.
In a few words…
◎ Infected CCleaner 5.33 installer
◎ Certification Company SIGNED infected version
◎ Malware was simply installed with the program
3
 Certificate
Version was signed using a
valid certificate that was
issued to Piriform Ltd by
Symantec and is valid
through 10/10/2018
 Process Compromised
External (Internal?) attacker
compromised a portion of their
development or build environment
and leveraged that access to insert
malware into the CCleaner build that
was released and hosted by the
organization
Certificate for Malware?
The infection
lifecicle
A brief introduction on the pattern
of the infection
4
The Malware structure
5
Malware Installation and
Operation
•Binary calls the code
CC_InfectionBase
• Binary creates an
executable heap using
HeapCreate
•PE loader is then called
and begins its operation:
•Erases the memory
regions that previously
contained the PE loader
and the DLL file
•Frees the previously
allocated memory
•Destroys the heap
•Continues on with normal
CCleaner operations.
CBkrdr.dll
•DLL file (CBkdr.dll) was
modified in an attempt to
evade detection and had
the IMAGE_DOS
_HEADER zeroed out
•Calls
CCBkdr_GetShellcode
FromC2AndCall. Sets up
a ROP chain used to
deallocate the memory
and exit the thread.
Command and Control
•Sends information to C&C
servers
•Payload structure:
•HTTPS POST request to
216[.]126[.]225[.]148
•Transmit command to
infected PC
Malware bug?
Talos identified a software bug present in the malicious code related to the C&C
function. The sample analyzed reads a DGA computed IP address located in the
following registry location, but currently does nothing with it:
HKLMSOFTWAREPiriformAgomo:NID
It is unknown what the purpose of this IP address is at this time, as the malware does
not appear to make use of it during subsequent operation
Malware
Operation
Flow
6
In this flowchart is explained
the working flow of the
malware. It is also important
to points out that the C2 (the
C&C operation) generates
random DNS name to avoid
DNS block
ALMOST ONE MONTH INFECTION
Piriform has officially confirmed the
security incident with CCleaner
5.33.6162 and CCleaner Cloud
1.07.3191. It started on August 15
and has been stopped on
September 12. The company also
updated the app to fix the flaw and
the defected version has been
pulled from the server.
The Attack Resoults
WHAT HAVE BEEN EXPLOITED?
Sensitive information such as MAC
addresses of adapters and network,
the software of Windows, installer
software information were leaked
and sent to the attackers. The
affected PCs could have been
remotely controlled by the hacker
and they could have also installed
additional binaries. The company is
also suggesting the affected users to
update the app to the latest version
to avoid any risk.
7
The impact WORLDWIDE
8
The impact of this attack could be severe given the extremely high number of systems possibly
affected. CCleaner claims to have over 2 billion downloads worldwide as of November 2016 and is
reportedly adding new users at a rate of 5 million a week.
If even a small fraction of those systems were compromised an attacker could use them for any
number of malicious purposes.
2,000,000,000
CCleaner downloads worldwide as of November 2016
9
Potentially, the impact of this kind of
infection is ENORMOUS!
“
Supply chain attacks are a very
effective way to distribute
malicious software. This is because
of the trust relationship between a
manufacturer or supplier and a
customer. - Thalos
10
A philosophical problem, more than just an attack
TRUST EXPLOIT
This is a prime example of the
extent that attackers are willing
to go through in their attempt to
distribute malware to
organizations and individuals
around the world. By exploiting
the trust relationship between
software vendors and the users
of their software, attackers can
benefit from users' inherent trust
in the files and web servers used
to distribute updates.
PATCHING
Usually, in the mind of security
aware people patching is one of
the main response to attacks and
vulnerabilities but these
software supply-chain attacks
break all the models. They pass
antivirus and basic security
checks and, in those cases,
patching is the attack vector.
11
Thanks!
If you have any questions
please contact me at:
@Leonardo Antichi
antichi.leonardo@gmail.com
12
😉
References:
◎http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-
distributes-malware.html
◎https://www.windowslatest.com/2017/09/18/ccleaner-
windows-distributing-malware-pcs/
◎https://www.which.co.uk/news/2017/09/ccleaner-
malware-hack-what-it-is-and-what-you-need-to-do/
◎https://www.wired.com/story/ccleaner-malware-
supply-chain-software-security/
13

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The CCleaner Infection

  • 1. The CCleaner infection A smart way to infect million of users
  • 2. CCleaner What is this? 2 Developed by Piriform, CCleaner, aka Crap Cleaner, is a utility program to clean potentially unwanted files. The application is popularly known for cleaning the temporary internet files generated by browsers such as Internet Explorer, Microsoft Edge, Chrome. It also claim to cleans malicious programs. For a period of time, the legitimate signed version of CCleaner 5.33 being distributed by Avast also contained a multi-stage malware payload that rode on top of the installation of CCleaner.
  • 3. In a few words… ◎ Infected CCleaner 5.33 installer ◎ Certification Company SIGNED infected version ◎ Malware was simply installed with the program 3  Certificate Version was signed using a valid certificate that was issued to Piriform Ltd by Symantec and is valid through 10/10/2018  Process Compromised External (Internal?) attacker compromised a portion of their development or build environment and leveraged that access to insert malware into the CCleaner build that was released and hosted by the organization Certificate for Malware?
  • 4. The infection lifecicle A brief introduction on the pattern of the infection 4
  • 5. The Malware structure 5 Malware Installation and Operation •Binary calls the code CC_InfectionBase • Binary creates an executable heap using HeapCreate •PE loader is then called and begins its operation: •Erases the memory regions that previously contained the PE loader and the DLL file •Frees the previously allocated memory •Destroys the heap •Continues on with normal CCleaner operations. CBkrdr.dll •DLL file (CBkdr.dll) was modified in an attempt to evade detection and had the IMAGE_DOS _HEADER zeroed out •Calls CCBkdr_GetShellcode FromC2AndCall. Sets up a ROP chain used to deallocate the memory and exit the thread. Command and Control •Sends information to C&C servers •Payload structure: •HTTPS POST request to 216[.]126[.]225[.]148 •Transmit command to infected PC Malware bug? Talos identified a software bug present in the malicious code related to the C&C function. The sample analyzed reads a DGA computed IP address located in the following registry location, but currently does nothing with it: HKLMSOFTWAREPiriformAgomo:NID It is unknown what the purpose of this IP address is at this time, as the malware does not appear to make use of it during subsequent operation
  • 6. Malware Operation Flow 6 In this flowchart is explained the working flow of the malware. It is also important to points out that the C2 (the C&C operation) generates random DNS name to avoid DNS block
  • 7. ALMOST ONE MONTH INFECTION Piriform has officially confirmed the security incident with CCleaner 5.33.6162 and CCleaner Cloud 1.07.3191. It started on August 15 and has been stopped on September 12. The company also updated the app to fix the flaw and the defected version has been pulled from the server. The Attack Resoults WHAT HAVE BEEN EXPLOITED? Sensitive information such as MAC addresses of adapters and network, the software of Windows, installer software information were leaked and sent to the attackers. The affected PCs could have been remotely controlled by the hacker and they could have also installed additional binaries. The company is also suggesting the affected users to update the app to the latest version to avoid any risk. 7
  • 8. The impact WORLDWIDE 8 The impact of this attack could be severe given the extremely high number of systems possibly affected. CCleaner claims to have over 2 billion downloads worldwide as of November 2016 and is reportedly adding new users at a rate of 5 million a week. If even a small fraction of those systems were compromised an attacker could use them for any number of malicious purposes.
  • 9. 2,000,000,000 CCleaner downloads worldwide as of November 2016 9 Potentially, the impact of this kind of infection is ENORMOUS!
  • 10. “ Supply chain attacks are a very effective way to distribute malicious software. This is because of the trust relationship between a manufacturer or supplier and a customer. - Thalos 10
  • 11. A philosophical problem, more than just an attack TRUST EXPLOIT This is a prime example of the extent that attackers are willing to go through in their attempt to distribute malware to organizations and individuals around the world. By exploiting the trust relationship between software vendors and the users of their software, attackers can benefit from users' inherent trust in the files and web servers used to distribute updates. PATCHING Usually, in the mind of security aware people patching is one of the main response to attacks and vulnerabilities but these software supply-chain attacks break all the models. They pass antivirus and basic security checks and, in those cases, patching is the attack vector. 11
  • 12. Thanks! If you have any questions please contact me at: @Leonardo Antichi antichi.leonardo@gmail.com 12 😉