The document discusses the strategic implications and planning considerations for America's long-range strike (LRS) capabilities in a changing global security environment. It emphasizes the urgency of developing a new family of systems to maintain strategic advantage, highlighting the need for advanced capabilities such as standoff and penetrating platforms, improved electronic warfare, and unmanned systems. The analysis critiques past and current planning frameworks while proposing a shift towards a balanced approach integrating both standoff and penetrating strike capabilities.

1. C E N T E R F O R S T R A T E G I C A N D B U D G E T A R Y A S S E S S M E N T S
Sustaining America’s
Strategic Advantage in Long-Range Strike
Toward the next long-range strike family of systems
14 Sep 2010

2. Overview
• Why this issue matters now
• A framework for thinking about long-range strike (LRS)
– Post-Cold War planning assumptions
– A new framework
• Attributes for future LRS capabilities
• Sustaining America’s advantage: toward the next LRS
family of systems
• Initiatives and implementation
2

3. 20 Years of LRS Studies
little program action
3/2006:
1/1992: 6/1995:
QDR released,
Bush TASC Heavy
10/2004: 2018 goal for
announces Bomber Industrial
3/1999: USAF announces initial new bomber
cut to 20 B-2s Capabilities Study
USAF Bomber new bomber plan capability
5/1995:
Roadmap, no new with interim
DoD Heavy 6/97: 3/2007:
bomber until 2037 bomber (2018) 2/2010:
Bomber Force Scowcroft USAF Bomber
and 2030 bomber QDR “Tiger
Study Independent AoA completed Team”
8/1991: Bomber Force 12/2001: 6-12/2008: Analysis
Soviet 10/1993: Review Nuclear
Union DoD Bottom- 12/97: DoD Bomber and NPR
Posture Requirements
Collapses Up Review National
Review Review
Defense
Panel
1990 2000 2010
6/1992: 1996: 11/2001: 3/2004: 3/2005: 4/2009: Today:
USAF Deep Attack USAF LRS USAF USAF starts SECDEF LRS
Bomber Weapons Aircraft accelerates Bomber AoA cancels Family of
Roadmap 7/1995: Mix Study White Paper IOC to 2025 NGB
CORM Future Systems
3/1998: 2004/5: Study
Bomber Study Welch Long-Range Air Next Gen
Power Panel Report Bomber RFI
Bomber 2010 Total Primary Mission Average
1993 BUR: Up to 184 B-52s, B-1s and B-2s Active Aircraft Age
Variants Inventory Inventory in Years
Today: Entering the 3rd decade of the post-Cold B-2A 20 18 16
War era with the same bomber force (albeit older
B-1B 66 50 23
& somewhat smaller)
B-52H 76 54 48
3

4. What is an LRS “Family of Systems?”
• Standoff and penetrating platforms and munitions for long-range
precision strike, plus supporting capabilities such as airborne
electronic attack (AEA) and ISR
• Example of supporting relationships between systems
– AEA aircraft help suppress enemy air defenses in support of penetrating
aircraft and cruise missiles
– Standoff strike platforms (e.g., Tomahawk-carrying Navy surface vessels
and subs, non-penetrating USAF bombers armed with cruise missiles)
launch attacks against an enemy’s critical air defense nodes to support
penetrating platforms
– Penetrating aircraft (e.g., B-2A Spirits) attrite enemy long-range ISR and
ballistic missiles to reduce attacks against US land bases and carriers
Describing a LRS Family of Systems
• Penetrating ISR/strike aircraft
/ ik i f • Airborne electronic attack
Ai b l i
• Standoff strike aircraft • Air breathing ISR
• PGMs, including cruise missiles and CPGS • C2 network that ties the FoS together
This study primarily focused on the strike elements of a LRS Family of Systems
4

5. Why This Matters Now
• DoD is at a crossroads:
– The operating environment and pending technical & operational obsolescence of current LRS
capabilities drive a need to begin building the next family of systems now
– Continuing to invest in short-range strike at the expense of LRS is leading to an unbalanced force
– The next budget may set DoD’s course toward new LRS systems that will exist for 30-plus years
• CSBA’s study proposes:
1. A new framework for evaluating options for the next family of systems
2. Attributes for future LRS systems, including:
• A new bomber (should it be manned, unmanned or optionally
manned; penetrating or standoff; nuclear or non-nuclear?)
• A UAS to extend the range & persistence of carrier strike
• New standoff attack weapons such as a joint cruise missile and
Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS)
• A penetrating platform for airborne electronic attack (AEA)
3. A phased approach to develop new LRS capabilities over time
Without changes to the Defense Department’s program of record,
the nation may lose its long-range strike strategic advantage
5

6. Where We’ve Been
post-Cold War planning assumptions
Illustrative Distances • During the Cold War, the bomber force was
sized & shaped primarily for nuclear deterrence
– End of Cold War: Advanced Cruise Missile
terminated; B-2 buy capped; SAC
deactivated
• DoD adopted a planning framework in the
early 1990s that assumed military forces
should be sized & shaped for two nearly-
simultaneous conventional theater conflicts
– Planning scenarios were limited in scope;
theaters were relatively small in size
– Few threats to theater bases, carriers
operating off the coast, or to US C4ISR and
logistics networks
– Fighters would deploy and provide mass
needed to support US operations (e.g., to
achieve a “rapid halt”)
– Bombers most valuable early in a conflict
before fighters arrive in theater; most
could then “swing” to a 2nd conflict
This vision of a relatively permissive
operating environment continues to
influence DoD’s investment decisions
6

7. Toward a New Framework for
Thinking About LRS
“Current US warfighting strategy hinges on the deployment of short-range fighters and
ground forces to foreign bases. We need the power to fight effectively from beyond
the theater, and that means shifting much of the burden to long-range air. The Gulf
War gave me a glimpse into the future of warfare. I saw adversaries who attacked
without warning. I saw adversaries armed with WMD and ballistic missiles.”
Gen “Chuck” Horner, 1996
“Pentagon preferences for short-range instead of long-range air power raise a puzzling
contradiction. The long-range bomber fleet is an element of the force structure that
appears ideally suited to the demands of the new security environment.”
Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft, 1997
7

8. Today’s Reality
• While operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq reinforced DoD’s planning assumptions,
our adversaries went to school on us
• In the process, they are well on the way to negating nearly all of DoD’s 1990s assumptions by:
p y
– Restricting or denying US access to forward bases through political
coercion / precise missile and air strikes
– Limiting freedom of maneuver for US Navy surface vessels
– Degrading US C4ISR networks with kinetic and non-kinetic weapons
– Hobbling US power projection by attacking “soft” logistics targets
– Limiting the effectiveness of US precision strikes by:
• Fielding advanced integrated air defense systems (IADS);
• Using strategic depth to move potential targets further inland;
• Hardening and/or deeply burying potential targets; and
• Increasing the mobility of key military systems, such as SAMs and
missile transporter erector launchers (TELs)
Operating environments are becoming increasingly non-permissive in nature
8

9. A New Framework for
Assessing LRS Capabilities
US power-projection forces must be prepared
Planning for a wide range of operations against state and
Scenarios non-state aggressors, including enemies
equipped with A2/AD battle networks and WMD
Potential AORs and the lack of close-in regional
Operating
bases will require systems that are capable of
Ranges operating at much longer ranges
Threats to
Maturation of the PGM regime will require US
Forward forces to operate from increasingly distant bases
Bases
Threats to Emerging A2/AD capabilities (ACSMs, ASBMs,
Surface
smart mines, diesel attack submarines, etc.) will Desired Attributes for
force carriers to initially operate 1,000 nm or Future Long-Range Strike Systems
Vessels more from enemy coastlines
• Increased range and mission endurance to
C4ISR and Networks will be attacked with kinetic and non- persist in target areas
Logistics kinetic weapons; networks unlikely to provide
Networks uninterrupted support to LRS operations
• Advanced stealth to penetrate and survive in
contested environments
Advanced IADS with modern radars and double-
Enemy Air
Defenses
digit SAMs will place aircraft and cruise missiles
lacking advanced stealth at risk
• Independence of action to find, track and
attack targets…reduced reliance on off-board
Targets that are increasingly mobile/relocatable, supporting capabilities
Targets hardened or deeply buried will complicate US
targeting 9

10. Attributes for a LRS Family of Systems
in a Non-Permissive World
“Do we want a stand-off bomber? Do we want an attack bomber? Do we want a
manned bomber or an unmanned bomber? Or do we want variations, where you
could have a platform that could serve both purposes?”
Secretary of Defense Gates, February 2010
Range
Stealth
Manned or Unmanned
Penetrating or Standoff
10

11. Illustrative Range & Persistence for a Bomber
with a 2,500 nm Combat Radius
Assuming air refueling is available prior to
penetration, a bomber with a 2,000-2,500 nm
combat radius could cover all countries 11

12. Illustrative Range & Persistence for a Carrier Aircraft
with a 1,500 nm Combat Radius
Illustrative range and persistence for a
notional stealthy unmanned
ISR/strike aircraft with last refueling
approximately 250 nm from coastline 12

13. Viability of Stealth
• “Stealth” aircraft are not invisible
– Stealth = low radar cross sections, smart mission planning & tactics to avoid the most lethal
threat areas, and threat suppression
• There is a perpetual competition between “hiders” and “finders”
– Some believe that advances in processing power have advantaged the defense by enabling
development of new systems such as low-band search radars and passive detection
networks that use emitters of convenience (e.g., TV, cell phone, radio broadcasts)
• Sustaining the US military’s stealth advantage:
– “Moore’s law” advances in processing power advantage both hiders and finders
– The US is unmatched in its ability to turn new technology into operational capabilities
– Using passive location systems to accurately locate stealth platforms in a “many against
many” real-world fight would be extremely difficult
Potential key attributes for future penetrating LRS systems:
‰ “All-aspect” 360 degree low radar cross section
‰ “Broad-band” low observability characteristics across high and low frequency bands
‰ Sufficient on-board computing power to re-plan flight path to avoid pop-up air defense radars
‰ On-board electronic attack–capable systems (such as AESA radar)
‰ Weapons bay capacity to carry expendable decoys and, potentially, air-to-air missiles
13

14. Manned or Unmanned?
• UAS are particularly useful for “dull, dirty and dangerous” missions
• However, little study has been performed on the advantages & disadvantages of large
unmanned platforms the size of a new bomber
– Would an unmanned bomber be inherently more survivable than a manned variant?
– Would it be less expensive than a manned bomber?
– Would the lack of a cockpit increase a new bomber’s range and payload capacity?
• Survivability:
‒ Given equivalent planforms (shape and size), there should be little difference
between the low observability characteristics of manned & unmanned variants
14

15. Empty Weight Comparison
2,000 nm range aircraft 5,000 nm range aircraft
Man Equip 30%
1 pilot cockpit 2 pilot cockpit
as % of (3,000 lbs) (6,000 lbs)
Empty Weight
Assumptions:
20%
• 2,000 nm or
5,000 nm
unrefueled
range
• 3,000 lbs for a
10%
single pilot 4-6% of empty weight/cost
ejection seat,
life support,
other required
equipment
• 430 knots 1k 2k 4k 6k 10k 15k 20k 40k
Weapons Payload (lbs)
• Many performance advantages of unmanned aircraft over equivalent manned
aircraft tend to wash out as their size/empty weight increase
• 4-6% difference in empty weights translates to unit cost
15

16. Comparing Manned, Unmanned,
Optionally Manned Bomber Variants
Manned Unmanned Optionally Manned
Aircrew at Risk Yes No Mission dependent
Mission Persistence Limited by human factors Limited by machine factors Mission dependent
Stealth Characteristics Negligible difference Negligible difference Negligible difference
4-6% increase compared to 4-6% increase compared to
Empty Weight
unmanned unmanned
Unit Cost Negligible difference Negligible difference Negligible difference
Need for Secure C2,
Desired Required for current UAS Mission dependent
Adequate Bandwidth
Inflight Situational
Immediate and onboard Remote or by rule set Mission dependent
Awareness & Retasking
Weapons Release
Immediate and onboard Remote or by rule set Mission dependent
Consent
Very long sorties increase Very long unmanned sorties
Probability for Loss of
need for on-board systems increase need for on-board
Aircraft Control
redundancy systems redundancy
Not capable of meeting
Nuclear Mission C2 No issues No issues when manned
nuclear C2 requirements
• A future bomber capable of independent operations would have increased mission
flexibility in communications-denied operating environments
• Absent true mission autonomy for unmanned aircraft, an “optionally manned” design may
be a viable choice for the next penetrating bomber
16

17. Standoff or Penetrating?
• Standoff weapons are critical for striking targets in very heavily defended areas and for early strikes against IADS
• Future air campaigns will likely require precision strikes on thousands of targets, including targets that are
increasingly mobile, hardened or deeply buried
– Long flight times for sub-sonic cruise missiles limit their effectiveness against deep inland targets that can
relocate in minutes, especially if off-board terminal guidance is unavailable
– Standoff PGMs with 1,000-2,000 lb conventional warheads have limited effectiveness against very hard/deeply
buried targets
• Moving to an all standoff force would present a one-dimensional challenge to future enemies
– Would increase strain on US ISR
– Would encourage increased investment in measures to counter standoff weapons
Assessed Against 1990s Framework Assessed Against New Framework
(Optimized for Permissive Environments) (Non-Permissive Environments)
9VERY CAPABLE LIMITED CAPABILITY
• B-2s, B-1s, B-52s with direct attack and • 16 B-2s
Fixed Targets standoff PGMs • Cruise missiles
• Fighters and UAVs (with refueling)
• Sea-based standoff strike
9VERY CAPABLE LITTLE CAPABILITY
Moving • B-1s, B-52s with direct attack PGMs
Targets • Strike fighters (with refueling)
• UAVs with off-board cueing
Hardened or 9VERY CAPABLE LIMITED CAPABILITY
• Bombers & fighters with penetrating PGMs • 16 B-2s with direct attack penetrating PGMs
Deeply Buried
• B-2 with future MOP for very
Targets deep/hardened targets
17

18. Comparing Standoff and Penetrating
LRS Capabilities
• Standoff weapons such as cruise missiles are
Total Cost of a New Penetrating Bomber “unmanned aircraft” that expend a vehicle, power
Compared to Using New Cruise Missiles* plant and guidance system to deliver a warhead
on target (and thus are costly)
1400
– e.g., $1.5m for a Block IV TACTOM or $2m
(Procurement + Operations & Support)
1200 for a CALCM compared to a $22,000 JDAM
• Using only standoff PGMs in campaigns that
Total Costs $Million
1000
require strikes against thousands of targets is
likely cost prohibitive
800
– 1st Gulf War: average of 961 aimpoints/day
600
– First 30 days of Iraqi Freedom: total of
400 20,000 aimpoints
Bomber Cost
Cruise Missile Cost • A LRS family of systems with a mix of standoff and
200 penetrating capabilities is a more balanced force
0 – Create multiple problems for adversaries
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 – Cover all target categories
Days of Conflict in 30 Year Period – More affordable mix for air campaigns
*From a RAND assessment – Penetrators can perform multiple missions
The next LRS Family of Systems should have a mix of standoff and penetrating capabilities
18

19. Toward the Next LRS Family of Systems
Next Bomber
Air Leg of the Nuclear Triad
Carrier Strike
Standoff Weapons
Airborne Electronic Attack
19

20. Program of Record Capabilities Assessed
Against the New Planning Framework
Near-Term Future
Penetrating
Strike 16 B-2s
Platforms
Standoff Strike
B-52, B-1, B-2, sea-based
Platforms
Standoff Strike
Weapons EC-130
CALCM/ALCM, TLAM , JASSM-ER
Airborne
Electronic EA-6B, EC-130, EF-18G
, 0,
Attack
= Potential Capability Shortfalls
Projected LRS family of systems capability shortfalls:
• Penetrating strike (Air Force and Navy)
• Standoff strike weapons
• Airborne electronic attack to support long-range systems in contested environments
• Air leg of the nuclear triad
20

21. Today’s Bomber Force
Strengths
• Sufficient range, large payloads
• Able to conduct independent operations using on-board sensors and systems
• Viable standoff weapons carriers for 30-plus years (B-52 = 2044; B-1 = 2047; B-2 = 2058)
• Can penetrate low-threat and medium-threat areas
• Capable of attacking fixed and moving targets in low-threat and medium-threat areas
20
Shortfalls
High-Threat
18 B-2A Areas • With the exception of a small B-2 force,
0 unable to penetrate and persist in high-
threat areas
20
50 B-1B Low- & Medium- – Over time, B-2s are likely to lose their
Threat Areas ability to penetrate
40
• Insufficient strike capacity to support air
60
campaigns with thousands of targets in
54 B-52H Low-Threat high-threat areas
80 Areas Only
• Unable to locate, track, and strike moving
100 targets in high-threat areas
21

22. Potential Characteristics
of a New Penetrating Bomber
• Optionally manned or manned AESA
Weapons
Radar
Bay
• Unrefueled range of at least 4,000 nm
between refuelings (2,000-plus nm
radius) F135-PW-100
Engines (2)
• Broad-band, very low-observable
with improved LO materials and Two
Aircrew
computing power
• Active Electronically Scanned Array –
–
F-35 engines
F-35 mission computer
(AESA) Radar – F-35 cockpit controls and displays
– F-35 communication/navigation systems
• Conventional strike and potential to – F-35 armament control system
– F-35 environmental control system
carry nuclear weapons – B-2 AESA radar
• Payload between 20,000 lb and –
–
B-2 landing gear and weapons bay doors
B-2 secondary power system
40,000 lb – B-2 crew escape Illustrative
– F-15E electrical system Off-The-Shelf
• Affordable unit cost to permit – F-15E fuel system Systems &
– F-15E fire suppression Components
procurement of a sizable fleet – F/A-18E/F hydraulics to Reduce
(e.g., up to 100 aircraft) – B737 derivative landing gear Unit Cost
22

23. Affordability is a Key Issue
(size does matter)
“We must avoid a situation in which the loss of even one aircraft –
by accident or by combat – results in a loss of a significant portion
”
of the fleet, a national disaster akin to the sinking of a capital ship.”
09
—Secretary of Defense Gates, September 2009
• The next bomber fleet should be sized to support future air campaigns
s
• For example, compared to 50 new bombers, a fleet of 100 penetrating bombers would give commanders:
g
– Twice the area coverage to search for mobile targets
– Significantly improved ability to swing to another theater
• Aircraft empty weight and 40,000 lb Payload 20,000 lb Payload
size of the buy translates
directly to unit cost Empty Weight 126,000 lb 100,000 lb
Total EMD $19.7 billion $16.2 billion
– Sheer mass of payload (assume 6 test vehicles)
per bomber is less Total Production
important in the PGM
50 aircraft $24.1 billion $20 billion
era
100 aircraft $36.2 billion $30 billion
• Develop new PGMs to fit a Total EMD + $44 billion for 50 acft $36 billion for 50 acft
new bomber’s weapons Production $56 billion for 100 acft $46 billion for 100 acft
bay, vice sizing the weapons Total Program $840 million for 50 acft $680 million for 50 acft
bay for legacy weapons Average Unit Cost $540 million for 100 acft $440 million for 100 acft
23

24. Sustaining the Air Leg of the Nuclear Triad
• 2010 NPR determined the US should sustain the nuclear triad for decades
• However, without changes to DoD’s program of record, the triad is at peril of
becoming a dyad by default
– ALCMs are aging out, B-2s will eventually lose their ability to penetrate
• DoD should design its next cruise missile to carry both conventional and
nuclear warheads
• Design the next bomber to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons after a
future block upgrade
– New START permits mixed fleet of nuclear/non-nuclear bombers of same
type
– No need to fully equip, test and certify for nuclear weapons until required
• A new bomber that may someday carry nuclear weapons must be designed
accordingly—e.g., hardened against EMP & other nuclear weapons effects,
wired appropriately, etc.
• Designing a new bomber to provide this hedge is worth the marginal cost of
approximately 6-8% of EMD
“The Air Force must have a plan for a land-based strategic deterrent
replacement for sustainment of the air leg of the nuclear deterrent force.“
—General Chilton, Commander, US Strategic Command
24

25. Toward the Future Carrier Air Wing
The US Navy’s Notional Future Carrier Air Wing Manned or Unmanned?
F/A-18E/F
F-35
44 strike fighters
UCLASS
F/A-18E/F replacement
nt
EA-18G
5 electronic attack aircraft
EA-18 replacement
5 airborne early warning aircraft E-2D
19 helicopters MH-60R/S or replacement
ment
2 future carrier onboard
delivery aircraft
Unrefueled Range >2,500 nm
• Precision strike technologies have increased the lethality of the
Navy’s carrier air wings Internal Weapons >4,000 lbs
• However, emerging area denial threats may force carriers to Refueled Endurance >24 hours
standoff at great distances, while emerging air defense threats
pose unacceptable risks to aircraft without advanced LO Sensors / Comms AESA, EO/IR, IRST, MADL,
AEHF
• Need a multi-mission ISR/strike capability with sufficient range and Low Observables Broad-band / all-aspect
LO characteristics to operate in increasingly non-permissive areas
• UCLASS and F/A-18E/F replacement are opportunities to increase CVW ISR/strike range and persistence
“We must also rethink what and how we buy – to shift investments towards systems that provide the ability to
see and strike deep along the full spectrum of conflict. This means, among other things…more resources
devoted to long-range unmanned aircraft and ISR capabilities” Secretary of Defense Gates, May 2010
25

26. Opportunity to Significantly Increase
Range & Persistence of Carrier-Based Strike
• For example, build on the UCAS demonstrator to provide a low-observable
e
multi-mission platform as part of the future LRS family of systems
• Missions could include strike, ISR, airborne electronic attack
Future UCAS is an opportunity to make a bold shift toward enabling
effective strike operations against enemies with A2/AD battle networks 26

27. Airborne Electronic Attack
• Current generation AEA aircraft (EA-6B,
EC-130H, EA-18G) are best suited for DoD’s
1990s planning paradigm
– IDA: “EA-18G is not designed to survive
within defended airspace”
• A new AEA system should have
performance characteristics suitable to
complement next generation LRS
capabilities
• May be possible to leverage other
programs and systems to field a “75%
solution” sooner and at less cost than a
new design
Future?
27

28. Standoff Strike
• Due to their high cost & operational
limitations, long-range standoff weapons are
best used in small numbers against high-value
fixed targets
• Consider a new cruise missile sized to be
launched from a variety of AF & Navy
platforms (e.g., one with 500-600 nm range)
– Would permit DoD to take advantage of
economies of scale
• CPGS weapons would offer commanders
another option for attacking very high value
targets
• Supersonic/hypersonic speeds could help
overcome the target location error challenge
• Such weapons would likely be very expensive–
on the order of tens of millions of dollars per
target
28

29. Sequencing and Initiatives
Sequencing LRS
Investments
LRS Initiatives
The Industrial Base
29

30. Sequencing LRS Investments
Option 1: Option 2: Option 3: Option 4:
Defer a New Bomber Standoff Strike + Penetrating Strike + “One Bite at the Apple”
• Continue to upgrade • Field a new standoff • Field a new penetrating • Field a new penetrating
current bomber force bomber first bomber first aircraft to replace the
• Defer a new bomber • Defer fielding a new • Defer a fielding new entire bomber force
decision until the penetrating bomber standoff bomber until
mid-2020s until the 2040s the 2040s
• New standoff cruise • New standoff cruise • New standoff cruise • New standoff cruise
missile, limited CPGS missile, limited CPGS missile, limited CPGS missile, limited CPGS
• New carrier UCAS • New carrier UCAS • New carrier UCAS • New carrier UCAS
• Develop a smaller AEA • Defer a new AEA • New AEA platform • New AEA platform
platform platform until 2040s
Option 1: Allows time to mature potential new technologies for a future bomber, but significantly extends LRS
shortfalls into the 2030s or 2040s, at which time the entire bomber fleet will need replacing
Option 2: Fails to take advantage of the standoff attack service life of current bomber force ; extends the
penetrating strike capability gap well into the future
Option 3: Addresses the most significant LRS shortfalls first; enables opportunity to take advantage of
economies of scale by using the same aircraft planform for a penetrating bomber and follow-on standoff platform
Option 4: Likely the most expensive of the four options, would “overinvest” in stealth for standoff strike
30

31. Initiatives
Land-Based Penetrating ISR-Strike
‰ Up to 100 optionally manned bombers with all-aspect, broad-band LO,
~20,000 lbs payload, 4,000-5,000 nm unrefueled range (field in mid-2020s)
‰ Design to have the potential to carry nuclear weapons, upgrade over time
Carrier-Based Penetrating ISR-Strike
‰ Develop an air-refuelable UCAS with all-aspect, broad-band LO and
~3,000 nm unrefueled range (field ASAP, beginning with UCLASS)
Airborne Electronic Attack
‰ Develop an unmanned or manned platform to support penetrating LRS
platforms and weapons, leveraging other programs as much as possible
S
Standoff Strike
‰ Defer a new standoff attack platform until penetrating bomber production is
nearly completed
‰ Invest in a joint Navy/Air Force standoff cruise missile that can be launched
from a variety of platforms
‰ Develop a small inventory (100 or fewer) CPGS weapons for limited strikes
against very high-value targets
31

32. The Industrial Base
our LRS strategic advantage begins with the human element
New Military Fixed-Wing Aircraft Designs
• Between 7-13 aircraft under development over last 40 years…today,
there are none
50
• At risk of “hollowing out” the military aircraft industrial base
XP5Y-1 XFY-1 • Loss of skills critical to designing advanced military aircraft
A2D F-8U
XC-120 P6M-1 • Declining experience levels contribute to development issues and
40 F-4D U-2 increase costs
Number of New Designs
F-3H XY-3
X-5
B-60
F-105
X-13 • If the industrial base is allowed to atrophy, it will require a considerable
B-52 C-133 amount of time and resources to regenerate
30 A-3D F-107
X-3 B-58 • Without work, it is doubtful that industry will continue to absorb
S-2F F-106
X-2 F-5D the $80-100m annual cost of sustaining their engineering staffs
F-10F X-14
F2Y-1 C-140 • Further delaying a new bomber will likely increase its development
20 F-100 T-2 time and cost significantly
B-57 F-4
F-102 A-5 A-6 XC-142
R3Y-1 T-39 E-2 F-111 F-14 B-1A
F-104 T-38 SR-71 A-7
10 S-3 YC-15
A-4D AO-1
XV-4A OV-10 YA-9 YC-14 YF-22 X-32
B-66 X-15
X-21 X-22 A-10 XV-15 F-117 T-45 YF-23 X-35
F-11F F-5A F-35 N-UCAS
C-130 X-18 X-19 X-26B F-15 AV-8B F-20 B-2 X-31 X-36 X-45 X-47
C-141 C-5A F-16 F/A-18 X-29 V-22
F-101 T-37
B-70 X-24 YF-17 T-46 Condor
C-17 F-22
Bird of Prey
MQ-1/9 RQ-4, ?
0 BAMS
1950s 1960s 1
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s
32

33. Questions?
“We are probably going to proceed with a
long-range strike initiative coming out of
the Quadrennial Defense Review and
various other reviews going on…we’re
looking at a family of capabilities, both
manned and unmanned.”
Secretary of Defense Gates
December 11, 2009
33

34. Relationship Between Empty Weight,
Number of EMD Aircraft, and Cost
25,000
20,000
EMD Costs (FY 2007 $ Million)
15,000
10,000
5,000
Plot developed using Breguet’s range equation and assumes a notional aircraft lift-to-drag ratio of 18, aircraft velocity of 430 knots
(Mach 0.75) and SFC 0.68 pounds of fuel consumed per pound of thrust produced per hour, (lbs/hr/lbf) yielding representative comparisons 34

35. Relationship Between Empty Weight,
Number of Production Aircraft, and Cost
Average Unit Production Cost (FY 2007 $ Million)
700
Number of Production Aircraft
600
500
400
300
200
Plot developed using Breguet’s range equation and assumes a notional aircraft lift-to-drag ratio of 18, aircraft velocity of 430 knots
(Mach 0.75) and SFC 0.68 pounds of fuel consumed per pound of thrust produced per hour, (lbs/hr/lbf) yielding representative comparisons 35