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THE CIA AND JACOBO ARBENZ: HISTORY OF A
DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN
By Roberto Garcia Ferreira*
INTRODUCTION
The covert operation by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to
forcibly oust Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz in June 1954 has been
almost completely documented now, thanks to the near-total declassification
of the operation's records. It is now clear that this event represented a decisive
moment in U.S. relations with Latin America during the Cold War. Not
surprisingly, given the significance of the event (a fact perceived at the time),
a good number of studies have been dedicated to its analysis.
Half a century later, and through the study of new records, the
historiographie debate seems to have arrived at the conclusion that in the U.S.
decision to overthrow Arbenz, the ideological imperatives and policies
demanded by the global bipolar confrontation were more important than any
economic motivation related to the influence of the banana monopoly, the
United Fruit Company, on governing circles in Washington.'
It is interesting that despite the abundant scholarly literature on the
vast CIA operation to overthrow Arbenz via a military coup,^ there are only
scarce and dispersed references by those scholars to the exile of Arbenz. His
exile has been treated as a painftil personal drama. But on the contrary, the CIA
documentation alerts us to how much the agency continued to dedicate itself
covertly to destroying the public image of the president after he was toppled.
Arbenz was considered a political figure of the first order of importance within
the Latin American spectrum, a fact corroborated in the historiographie
literature. For that reason the CIA seems to have taken an immediately vigilant
attitude toward Arbenz.
Based on the declassified documents consulted for this article, not
only is it possible to determine the existence of a rigorous control and
surveillance of each one of the former president's steps; also revealed is the
extent to which the agency focused on targeted operations against the interests
of Arbenz. Sometimes these were efforts to infiuence, and other times to
*Roberto Garcia Ferreira is Professor inthe Deparment of History of the Americas, The
College of Humanities and Educational Science, University of the Republic, Montevideo,
Uruguay. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
Journal of Third World Studies, Vol. XXV, No. 2
© 2008 by Association of Third World Studies, hic.
59

JOURNAL OF THIRD WORLD STUDIES, FALL 2008
orchestrate, some of the trials and tribulations, rumors, speculations,
denunciations, and misinformation published by the media (especially
Guatemalan and Uruguayan print media) about Arbenz, his family, his friends,
and his political future.
It is fitting to point out that this CIA media strategy, the central and
specific topic of this article, was particularly intense between 1954 and 1960.
With the eruption of the Cuban revolution Arbenz's notoriety entered a phase
of some decline. After 1960 CIA records on Arbenz are scarce, and most
probably, the efforts of the CIA were not necessary because by that time the ex-
president was a symbol of defeat.'
In any case, the proposal to investigate more deeply the surveillance
and the attacks inspired by the CIA mainly during the first years of Arbenz's
exile provides us the opportunity to understand a facet heretofore unknown of
the CIA's methods. And no less important: the case reveals how opinion may
be constructed. The Arbenz affair illuminates a strategy that the CIA valued
positively. Indeed, one of its analysts commented, "[T]he language, the
arguments and the techniques of the Arbenz episode" were "used in Cuba in the
beginning of the decade of the 60s, in Brazil in 1964, in the Dominican
Republic in 1965, and in Chile in 1973."" This significant affirmation confirms,
as noted in much literature, that the 1954 "stainless"' triumph went far beyond
the case of Guatemala.'
As of this moment, the new materials permit us to establish three
certain principles. First, one must point out that "the historian, in these years
of Arbenz's life, cannot do otherwise than to simply narrate the facts" since he
"completely disappeared from the history of his country" after his resignation.'
Second, it is necessary to realize that we are beholding an event as painful as
it has been silenced in Guatemalan history.* Third, everything indicates that in
the innumerable judgments about Jacobo Arbenz, one important element still
has not been discussed: how mueh infiuence the propagandistic actions of the
CIA still have in the extreme polarization that surrounds the president and his
work in Guatemala.
JACOBO ARBENZ, «THE PEOPLE'S SOLDIER"
Jacobo Arbenz, son of a Swiss pharmacist of the same name and a
Guatemalan womanfi-omQuetzaltenango, was bom in September 1913. He,
who was to eventually be President of Guatemala, moved to the capital city,
where he entered the Escuela Politécnica, the military academy. He graduated
with excellent grades, which were key for later becoming a professor at the
same institution.
Those were the times of Jorge Ubico, a dictator in power from 1931
to 1944, who could not mask his sympathies for fascism. In 1944, Ubico was
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Roberto Garcia Ferreira/The CIA and Jacobo Arbenz: History of a Disinformation Campaign
forced to resign under pressure from a heterogeneous set of rebel forces.
Arbenz, then a young army officer, was one of the leaders that inspired the
rebellion. With that episode he began his vertiginously rising political career.
Before being elected to the highest position in govemment at the end of 1950,
his three important political roles were: leader of the 1944 October Revolution;
member of the Junta that convened the elections for 1945; and Minister of
Defense, a guarantor of legality, during the democratic presidency of Juan José
Arévalo from 1945 to 1951.
Under Arbenz, the revolutionary program initiated by Arévalo was to
be accelerated. The agrarian reform plan, which Arbetiz himself characterized
as the most beautiful fruit of the revolution, was the main axis for a quite
successful project to structurally change the country. Without idealizing this
project, and taking into account some evident errors in strategy, we should not
forget, as a U.S. specialist points out, that this was the first and only occasion
in Guatemala when "a significant part of the state authority was used to
promote the interests of the nation's masses."'
Unfortunately, this project was aborted by the CIA-orchestrated
invasion of 1954. After several military coup attempts and an intensive national
and intemational campaign bythe Eisenhower administration against President
Arbenz, a small force of exiles and mercenaries invaded from Honduras and
penetrated a few miles into the country. Air raids by planes operated by CIA
pilots created terror and confusion, while U.S. diplomatic pressure for
Arbenz's ousting was applied locally and intemationally. The end of
Guatemala's "democratic spring" was approaching.
ARBENZ'S RESIGNATION: "IT WAS A TRAGEDY"
Betrayed byhis military colleagues, without any intemational support,
and after ten days of the highest tensions, Arbenz resigned and transferred
power to a military comrade he believed to be loyal. He assumed, naively,'"
that his resignation would serve to safeguard the conquests of the revolutionary
period. It was the aftemoon of June 27, 1954, and that act marked the rest of
his life. A very close friend to the Arbenz-Vilanova family during the period
the family lived in Uruguay remembers that for Jacobo, both the invasion and
his resignation were "trapped in his head," and that he "kept on recalling those
events and reproaching himself for them.""
Without ignoring Arbenz's own insecurities, it must be added that the
magnitude ofCIA documentation exclusively regarding the pressure on Arbetiz
allows us to take some distance from simple explanations about his last hotirs
in the presidency (it was insistently repeated again and again, in both friendly
and unfriendly circles, that his resignation had been an act of cowardice). It
rather seems that those who havejudged that, at that stage, there were abundant
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reasons to delegate the position were correct.'^ Much later, Arbenz assessed
those circumstances in the light of the moments he had then lived and
expressed categorically: "it was a tragedy.""
The CIA came to know well both the strengths and weaknesses of the
president. Beyond a 1950 "compliment," when the agency described him as
"brilliant...cultivated,"'" Arbenz's weak points in both his life and personality
were used, once he was out of power, in CIA actions against his image and
prestige as a politician who had implemented a model agrarian reform. A
summary of the Guatemalan historical process noted the ascending career of
that young military officer, first as a revolutionary and then as a defender of
legality as Arévalo's minister.'* Even then it seemed important for the agency
to be knowledgable about Arbenz's health conditions, and it had access to a
clinical report of 1947, when Arbenz visited a specialist to treat his problems
with alcohol.'^ It seems that the president was subjected to intense physical and
psychological attacks that caused notable deterioration in the Guatemalan
during the period before the 1954 invasion."
POLITICAL ASYLUM AT THE EMBASSY OF
MEXICO IN GUATEMALA
The Embassy of Mexico was the first lodging place for Arbenz after
his resignation. The 73 days he spent there were uncomfortable, given the fact
that another 300 persons had also sought asylum. It was in this period that the
CIA started a new phase of operations against him, with three main objectives.
The first was to demonstrate the supposed communist connections of the
deposed regime. The second was to circulate the idea that "those in asylum
should be prosecuted in Guatemala and...they should not be allowed to extend
their misbehavior to other countries in Latin America." And the third objective
was to exploit that situation for propaganda purposes by attempting "to
associate Arbenz's supporters with Moscow."'*
Furthermore, there is proof that a diverse set of other ideas was used
through the media with the purpose of harming Arbenz's public image. CIA
agents confiscated his personal papers, and, once they had been tampered with,
they constituted the basis for elaborating "press releases" to generate adverse
public opinion. Through these measures the CIA made clear that it was
pursuing deeper treatment of some issues: for example, due to Arbenz's
resignation, "to accuse [him] of cowardice" and "lack of courage to lead a
desperate resistance;" to exploit his friendship with the communist Jose Manuel
Fortuny" as "very useful" to "reinforce the story of an intimate relationship
between the two;" and finally, to recall his "unfortunate personal life."^"
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By reviewing the perspectives and content of the Guatemalan media's
coverage of these events, we can trace a striking similarity with the CIA's
planned objectives.
Secretly, the CIA and the State Department promoted the view that
those in asylum should be "prosecuted in Guatemala."^' In an opinion column
Fabian Ymeri coincided with that orientation by stating that "if a delinquent
seeks refuge in a foreign country, the government of the country where the
crime was perpetrated has the right...to request his or her extradition in order
to prosecute him or her," thereby "easily" solving "the asylum problem."^^
Regarding Arbenz's refuge, the propaganda stressed that far from his
expected protagonism, the former president was "taking cover behind the four
walls of the room he had been given, from which he never came out."
Additionally, the propaganda diseminated "jokes" that were circulating "from
person to person" among those in asylum, whose central "protagonist" was
Arbenz. The publicity given to these humorous tales seemed to kill two birds
with one stone: on the one hand, it implicitly assessed the president's
"cowardice," and on the other it made clear his supposed "links" with
communism. The jokes included the following: "an old supporter of Arbenz
has nicknamed him Sandino, sarcastically comparing Arbenz with that
Nicaraguan hero who honored his word by being killed;" and "Someone else
says that the former president will go to the Russian university in Kurken,
where he is going to lecture on how to govern...and defend the goverrmient
against any invasion.""
Once safe conduct guarantees to go abroad were obtained, Arbenz left
Guatemala. The ostentious humiliation to which he was subjected (he was
forced to undress before the cameras at the airport) was not enough to make
him open his lips. Coverage of this event next day were particularly harsh, and
again, they followed the CIA's plan. According to the media, the former
president had left "gloomy" and "with arrogance" while his wife was "more
composed." One journalist said that Arbenz "acted as in a play" and
"disappointed the audience" by refusing "to say a single word." He arrived at
the airport in a "lackluster" car, and as soon as he got inside the terminal
members of the public uttered "gross words" of "indignation." "He was
terrribly pale" and "he could hardly hide his...fear.. .He walked like a robot,"
although in his favor the journalist also said that "in one moment he acted a bit
more human, and with his hand he caressed his little daughter" Leonora.
When Arbenz was forced to take his clothes off, the article indicated
that it "gave the impression that a cold statue was taking off his marble
clothes." The search lasted one hour, and then Arbenz walked to the airplane's
stairway. At that moment one could see that Arbenz "lost his self-control and
officers of the Mexican Embassy had to help him." Finally, the article made the
point that Fortuny's presence was noted, in his condition as "number one
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Communist of Guatemala," "inseparable" friend, and "as always," Arbenz's
traveling companion.^"*
ARBENZ'S DAYS IN MEXICO
A few hours later Arbenz and his companions landed in Mexican soil.
Press articles of that country, reproduced in the Guatemalan newspaper El
Imparcial, were not any more encouraging. Again, Arbenz was presented as
"gloomy," with a "corpse-like paleness," and in the place "only one
woman...attempted atimid clapping, which immediately died within the strange
coldness that pervaded the environment."" Arbenz thanked the Mexican
authorities, and he was surrounded by some important personalities, such as
members of the Cardenas family. However, not even there could he enjoy some
tranquility, because, as an Uruguayan paper reported, his presence posed a
"delicate diplomatic problem" for Mexico.^'
Denunciations and an extradition request arrived from Guatemala.
Because of that, the former president convened a press conference.
Anticommunist organizations, some of them facades behind which the CIA
operated, organized a protest at the hotel door, and Mexican authorities forced
Arbenz to cancel the event. The news that spread after this episode contained
the same tendentious profile: Jacobo "abruptly let down" a hundred
journalists.^'
Partly overcoming the circle of silence, Arbenz gave his views to
Siempre, a weekly magazine. The reaction was immediate. A vehement article
by Antonio Uróz suggested that this Mexican journalist was following a pre-
established script. During the interview Arbenz had said that the Ambassador
of the United States in Guatemala was a "gangster" and that his fall was due to
military treason. According to the CIA, such "comments against the army"
were useftil to be "emphasized in internal propaganda in Guatemala."^*
Coinciding with this, Uróz asked Arbenz, "Why do you now accuse [the
ambassador] of being a gangster? Why did you not have courage enough to say
it at the time? You," Uróz continued, "do not have the character, and even less
the courage. What soldier in our America, with more than 12,000 men,
surrenders the way you did? We, the Indo-Hispanics, are ashamed of you."
After that, Uróz asked Arbenz to "leave Guatemala in peace, because no one
likes you there and if they want you to return.,.it is to apply the Talion law to
you."^'
TOWARDS EUROPE
Without either papers or stability, the Arbenz family left for Europe,
where they had a chance to reach Switzerland and seek passports based on
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Arbenz's heritage. Informed of his plans, the CIA assessed that such a move
could be used in the media from "two angles": first, "that the Mexican
government had expelled him," and second, "that his trip to Europe was a last
attempt to travel behind the Iron Curtain for advice.'"" Maria Vilanova",
Arbenz's wife, remembers that the route "took them through Canada in order
to pick up Arabella," their oldest daughter." After that, thejourney continued,
with a stopover in the Netherlands, before arriving the same day in Paris, where
they stayed a few days and then continued to Switzerland by car.
During that time, the media circulated several rumors. Confirmation
of Arbenz's presence in Switzerland since January 5, as well as his intention
to obtain Swiss citizenship, seemed to the CIA as two potentially interesting
elements. A report written by Frank Wisner, the imaginative chief of the Office
for Policy Coordination," leaves no doubts about when, how and why they
should pay attention to Arbenz. Quick action wasjustified because, in Wisner's
perspective, "it would be a mistake...if we waited with arms crossed while
Arbenz successfully rehabilitates himself in Switzerland and wears the mantle
of martyr and victim of cynical U.S. intrigues." Consequently, Wisner ordered
three lines of aetion. The first addressed how to deal with the problem vis-a-vis
Latin America, where Wisner noted that "with his request for a Swiss passport"
Arbenz demonstrated that "he was not as Guatemalan" as he had always
pretended. The second directive, "to be used in Europe," was "speculative and
tendentious:" "[I] f Arbenz is not attempting to go behind the Iron Curtain" is
because "the plans ordered by Moscow have been revoked." Finally, the third
of Wisner's points was the most extensive and encompassed two tracks. One
proposed "making available a certain number of documents and information
to the Swiss government regarding Arbenz and the reeord of his regime." The
second track was to plant "a few stories in the newspapers" including "verbal
accusations against Arbenz," a mechanism for which Wisner asked, "Do we
have contact with any paper in Switzerland in order to approach it... in a
secure manner?""
Some time later, another CIA report noted that with the purpose of
"discrediting Arbenz" "many operations were carried out," after instructions
were given to CIA stations to speculate that Arbenz was "going the route of a
refugee beyond the Iron Curtain" while, simultaneously, in other media,
"articles, pamphlets and posters were inspired portraying Arbenz as a traitor
who had abandoned his comrades.""
Some examples confirm that what was planned was carried out in
practice. In Guatemala, a column—suspiciously, without a byline—stated:
"Very Guatemalan, people said of Mr. Jacobo, because he was the son of a
pharmacist of Quetzaltenango, and the whiteness of his skin derived from the
climate ofthat city and the fact that he bathed frequently." The column called
Arbenz's conduct "disgraceful," because he had never before remembered his
65

land, Switzerland, and now he was doing it only "to save himself from
extradition.'^
The fact that a photograph of the Arbenz-Vilanova couple appeared
on the front page of one of the Uruguayan newspapers closest to the CIA
station in Montevideo," as well as the fact that the same newspaper published
soon after a colutnn about Switzerland and the "Arbenz case," seems to show
its adherence to CIA orientations. This editorial piece contained especially
harsh words: "If former president Arbetiz can and wants to one day provide the
documents...he will automatically become a citizen" in Switzerland. "So far he
has not presented them [and] this distraction or lax attitude...has surprised and
even upset many Swiss, probably because they perceive that in such attitude
there is indifference or disdain towards a nationality they are justly proud of"
Several lines later, the resemblance with another CIA suggestion seems to be
direct, as the columnist hinted that "Arbetiz had recovered or requested Swiss
citizenship in order to protect himself against a possible extradition request by
the present Government of Guatemala. In fact...no Swiss citizen can be tumed
in to a foreign country...[and] Arbenz, as a Swiss citizen, would enjoy the
protection and all the rights granted by Swiss citizenship. Nobody could
impede him even to be a communist...because that party...is not banned in
Switzerland...[and] he could carry on any intemal or foreign policy he
wanted.""
With the same diligence, a biweekly Mexican publication, Lucha,
showed a cartoon of Arbenz going to Switzerland under the title "the quetzal
[a bird that is a national symbol of Guatemala] is incensed."" Additionally, El
Imparcial, a Guatemalan newspaper, circulated the rumor that Arbenz's alleged
"change of nationality" was received with "profotmd displeasure by other
Guatemalan exiles in Mexico, who certainly will erase Arbenz's name in their
sedition plans...and look for a new caudillo.''^'^ Jacobo gave up his quest to
obtain Swiss citizenship, and the CIA's strategy was exhausted because
Arbetiz's preference to remain a Guatemalan citizen led to the agency's
conclusion that it was no longer "very useful to deal with this issue."^'
France authorized Arbenz to reside there for a year, under the
condition of abstaining from all political activism. The former president
accepted and retumed to Paris with his family. Following the Arbetiz family
was an easy task for French agents, because, far from seeking conspiratorial
objectives, the family wanted to walk around the city. The agents offered
themselves to take them to different places around the French capital.''^
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BEYOND THE IRON CURTAIN
Conditions for the Arbenz family continued to be inconvenient and the
possibility of moving to Czechoslovakia seemed to promise greater stability.
For the CIA, Arbenz had crossed the "curtain" and that move made it possible
to act according to the most profitable path: Arbenz was a communist agent,
and he was seeking "advice" in that country.
In Guatemala, the news immediately spread, and with that the analyses
appeared one after the other. The following headline left no doubts about the
manipulation of the news of the former president's move: "Communist former
President will receive instructions for subversion in Guatemala."^' In New
York, the World Telegram and Sun, an evening paper, proclaimed: "Finally
Arbenz has found asylum in a place that he must love, a land from the Iron
Curtain where they practice the same sort of democratic regime as his.'""
Again, repercussions reached as far as Uruguay, and, once again, they
must be attributed to a CIA operation. According to one CIA doctiment, two
"inspired" articles published in Montevideo showed "that Arbenz's trip to
Prague demolished the arguments of those people who defended him against
accusations of communism.'"" Those "inspired" editorials appeared on two
consecutive days in the pages of El Día and La Mañana. The first, a fervently
anticommunist paper, dedicated its space to crowing thatnowArbenz "will feel
comfortable." The passage of time had transformed the ex-president into a
"former dictator," and the paper informed Uruguayan readers about the causes
for Arbenz's decision to live "for a long period of time" in "vassal" Prague:
"the exemplary" Switzerland "did not please" Arbenz because there its citizens
"practice democratic traditions and take life honestly and seriously.'"" The next
day, the second newspaper denounced Arbenz's actions as displaying "a
revealing attitude aboutthe Guatemalan problem." After reminding readers that
the former president had not demonstrated "fervent patriotism" by requesting
Swiss citizenship, it assessed his presence in Prague as leaving "his defenders
pretty empty-handed, since they had tried so far to explain his fall based on a
unilateral interpretation which was far from sticking to truth.'""
The New York paperZ,a Prensa did the same thing, stating, "It did not
take too long for Mr. Arbenz to confirm what people had long suspected about
him, and which he used to deny." Moreover, this paper added a piece of
information that it considered confirmed: "Arbenz is now being paid...as a
propagandist for the communist cause" and "it is believed that...he works for
the Latin American section of the Cominform.'"'*
The CIA also had links in communist territory, which provided first-
hand information and told the agency that during an interview Arbenz
"revealed that he was preparing a book on the events of 1954.'"" The receptive
Guatemalan media echoed that news, reporting that the former president lived
67

"comfortably" in a "golden exile in Prague." One journalist said that "while
Arbenz's life was inexorably linked to international communism," he was
drafting a book on his experiences that "will probably be translated to all
languages in the communist world, guaranteeing a circulation of hundreds of
thousands of copies."'"
Carlos Manuel Pellecer, a Communist Party leader in Guatemala who
at that time was Arbenz's friend and fellow exile in Czechoslovakia, wrote
notes on Arbenz's time in Prague that greatly differed from the above
mentioned news reports. He gave the opinion that when Arbenz arrived he
looked like "a castaway in search of refuge" and that far from being "an official
guest," "his treatment by the authorities was discourteous and even violent."
Pellecer added that after sour negotiations Arbenz managed to get "a residence
in the countryside, with no communication to the city and with many
inconveniences." Under those circumstances, Arbenz's trip to Mosow was
"rather than a solution, a source of relief."''
According to the CIA documents, the days in the Soviet Union and
China were discreetly handled. "His departure from Prague was a carefully
kept secret" and among other precautions both Jacobo and Maria used
"pseudonyms." The secretiveness made almost impossible any filtration to the
press. In fact, any circulation of intimate details of the family would have
jeopardized the privileged position held by the agent who was the CIA's main
source of information, whose cryptonym was "Inluck.""
After some time, Jacobo and Maria returned to Prague with their
youngest son, and then they went back to Paris. At that time the couple was
temporarily separated. Maria travelled to El Salvador to sell some properties,
and, close to Guatemala, try to obtain her little son's birth certificate. Moving
into action, the CIA managed to influence public knowledge regarding her trip,
reporting that "this information can be used as a facade, leaving hints that her
real intentions were much more sinister.""
The separation from Maria increased Jacobo's depression, and thanks
to "Inluck" the agency continued to receive every detail. Based on "the history
of Inluck regarding Arbenz's personal life," in the chronological biography
produced by the CIA, one reads that "his loneliness in Paris (what he calls "a
life without hopes") leads Arbenz to excessively drink." Moreover, "his
desperation drove him to remain in seclusion in his room for days...food would
be sent to him.. .and he would not talk with anyone, with the windows shut and
the lights off day and night. He stayed hours in a state of total depression,
violent irritation and screams. Physically he was exhausted and looked old. His
temperament became more impulsive and violent. He looked like a man with
no strength, without any desire to live or at least a person who wanted to
peacefully live and not to struggle."'''
In some of his writings, Carlos Manuel Pellecer (in this moment also
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in Paris) offered a version almost identical to the CIA report just cited. "The
señora and the child have departed," leaving Arbenz "alone in Paris," wrote
Pellecer. Of the "energetic and handsome official that we used to admire in the
Escuela Politécnica, there is little trace...The disillusionment was palpable."
"The ex-president passed the main part of his days and nights in his room,
doors and windows closed, lights extinguished, in bed, smoking, thinking in the
absolute darkness of the night. He ate little, went out rarely."" At this point, his
lines differed solely in the first letters of the name of the hotel where Arbenz
was staying.^' The similarity between the CIA reports and the writings of
Pellecer was not a coincidence; everything indicates that "Inluck" was the
cryptonym of the very same Pellecer, who, it is important to remember, figured
in the extensive list of collaborators of the CIA, as revealed later by one of its
agents."
AGAIN IN AMERICA
In a desperate situation, Arbenz sought ways to return to Latin
America. Since it was impossible to go to Mexico, one of his ex-ministers,
living in Uruguay, raised the possibility that this country might receive him.
The firm and traditional hospitality regarding political reftigees gave small
margin to the maneuvers of the CIA, so that a visa for Arbenz seemed assured.
In any case, various documents indicate that the efforts aimed at preventing
Uruguayan govemment permission for Arbenz to live in Uruguay were as
persistent as they were fruitless.
The CIA and the State Department worked together. The operation
planned diplomatic protests both formal and informal aimed to "emphasize the
danger for the hemisphere" constituted by the presence of this "Soviet agent,"
an accusation proven by Arbenz's previous "residence behind the Iron
Curtain."'* The beginning of the visa process from Paris hurried the CIA to put
its plan into practice. According to the CIA, the U.S. ambassador in
Montevideo was instructed to "make representations to the Minister of Foreign
Relations asking that a visa not be guaranteed" for Arbenz. In the same vein,
at the request of the CIA's "staff" in Guatemala, "president Castillo Armas was
requested to mandate his Ambassador in Montevideo to make a proposal to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Uruguay" to deny the visa for Arbenz "based on
his decision to go beyond the Iron Curtain."" Based on confidential reports
promptly sent to Montevideo, the Ambassador of Uruguay in the United States
and his First Counsellor were approached by State Department officials.
Without abandoning diplomatic subtlety, they made "very unfavorable"
references "about ex-president Arbenz," suggesting that ifhe were accepted by
Uruguay "unfavorable" circumstances "would be created" as well as
"difficulties of various types.', "60
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JOURNAL OF THIRD WORLD STUDIES. FALL 2008
In any case, and despite demands to the contrary, the Government of
Uruguay accepted the "request by Mr. Jacobo Arbenz to come to the country,"
providing him "asylum as a political refugee."''
The CIA, once confirming the forthcoming presence of the
Guatemalan citizen in South America, designed a series of"operations against"
him, including the circulation of statements, in various stages and through the
usual channels of information, emphasizing Arbenz's friendship with "the
Communists;" "exposing his political and subversive activities, and showing
therefore that he had violated the norms of asylum;" underlining "Arbenz's
unstable temperament...and his dependence on liquor;" and indicating that "his
daughters still were behind the iron curtain."" A physician working for the
agency was assigned to work on "a study of Arbenz that could be presented as
a work of a psychiatrist having had a series of interviews with him." The plan
was to have this study seem "as if it had come from a Czech desertor" and
the"idea behind it" was to "portray Arbenz as a person unfit for public life.""
Dates, expressions and contents of the Uruguayan anticommunist
press confirm the extent to which those media abided by the CIA's operative
suggestions'"*, which, we must add, was not anything new." Furthermore, the
intensity of the operation corroborates one of the central ideas of this work: he
was notjust any former president. It must be said that regarding this aspect the
agency was right: in local leftist circles the former Guatemalan leader was an
important referent.'* Only this fact could explain a newspaper campaign of this
magnitude, in addition to following him and exerting a covert control of this
sort."
The first news on Arbenz came to the media in Montevideo in April,
when a newspaper reported that the former "Head of the pro-Soviet
Guatemalan Government" had obtained "a visa to travel to our country."'* A
few days later, the same newspaper devoted an exclusive editorial piece to this
point in question: Arbenz was a "flilly-discussed figure" for having been the
"first governmental official outside the iron curtain who accepted to be an
official guest in a Commimist State." For this reason, it was "inadmissible to
imagine that someone might have had the occurrence of inviting him," although
if he eventually came we would have the "ungrateful duty to receive him.""
The following day, another morning paper also produced an editorial
piece saying that the Guatemalan citizen considered "moving" in order to "be
surrounded by the well-known commie elements," and in case of confirmation
"we will have, then, repetitions of case of Guatemala, already overcome, for
the.. .concern of the Interior Minister."™
The CIA's clandestine moves seem to have encompassed all possible
groimds, with no room for improvisation. In this sense, it sent two wires to
Montevideo aimed at organizing a "welcoming committee" with "Uruguayan
anti-Communist journalists" to wait for Arbenz at the airport with a
70

"demonstration" against his presence."
Arbenz arrived in Montevideo on May 13,1957. The day before, the
second largest paper published what it understood to be his main "biographic
features." We can note the tone in the four columns by reading some of its
lines: "Arbenz had many of the traits that distinguish individuals of the Aryan
race," but there was something about him that "gave the impression of coldness
and distance," and for this reason he is "surrottnded by an environment which
is far from bringing him sincere friends and followers." Even worse, the main
feature in his physiognomy was a "permanent mutism" leading to "view him
as a pale wax figure."'^
As foreseen, some twenty joumalists were waiting for Arbetiz at the
airport. As soon as he landed on Umguayan soil, they surrounded him and
presented him with suspicious questions: "Why did you go to
Czechoslovakia?" "Are you a Communist or do you feel like one?" "Was your
Govertiment a Communist one?" "What about your wife and children?"'" He
was taken from the airport to meet with the Head of the Police, who transmitted
to him his obligations as a person in asylum, among them one that was imposed
on him for the very first time ever: "to daily present himself to the police
authorities."'" The local CIA station insisted again and again through the press
that the Guatemalan citizen should be under tight control.'' Howard Hunt'*, the
agency's chief in Montevideo confirms this, as does the official police record
of the Uruguayan Intelligence Service. Eventually this unusual measure was
given some flexibility and Arbenz was told to present himself every eight days.
The campaign reached the parliament as well, where several senators
and congresspersons denounced the fact that public events had been organized
for Arbetiz and that he should have canceled a press conference and a talk at
the National University. They mentioned that the front wall of the house where
he was living had been painted with a hammer and sickle. Moreover, the city
was full with pamphlets, with no signature, accusing him of being a "Russian
agent.""
The assassination of head of state Carlos Castillo Armas in Guatemala
in July provoked a marked increased in the media attacks against the former
president then installed in Rio de la Plata.'* Because of this episode, Arbenz
spoke to the media. It would be the last time that he would publicly speak for
the next three years. His words (in essence, half a page written with a
typewriter that he gave to the avid joumalists who came to his domicile) were
tendentiously presented in the front page pretending to be an exclusive
interview with him, even though Arbetiz was not permitted to hold such
interviews." The local Intelligence Service, alert as always, analyzed the news.
The govemment, however, ultimately did not take any action regarding this
issue.'"
As much as they could, Uruguayan fnends accompanied Jacobo and
71

Maria Arbenz in solidarity and made more placid their asylum. A year after
Jacobo's arrival, former Guatemalan president Arévalo came to Uruguay and
established himself there for some time. The Arbetiz couple originally
welcomed the news,*' but rapidly the relationship became cold because of
significant differences.*^ In Montevideo, Arévalo was not under rigorous
surveillance and he could express himself, as he did through press articles.*^
Arévalo left for Venezuela the following year, when he was hired to teach a
university course.*"
Despite all their constraints, Arbenz's wife wrote that the couple was
grateful for the hospitality they received. She said: "the friends we had were
very kind.. .if we had been given permanent residence, we would have stayed
working in this country."*^
CUBA AND MEXICO: THE FINAL YEARS
For Arbenz, the possibility of emigrating to Cuba after the revolution
there seemed like a propitious opportunity to live in more freedom. He,
therefore, accepted an invitation that a Cuban delegation offered to him during
a visit to Uruguay in mid-1960. Arbenz flew to Havana in July 1960 and he
fotmd the city in elation. He was infected by this euphoria, and at first he
participated in public events and gave some interviews. However, he became
upset at the repetition of the slogan: "Cuba is not Guatemala," because it was
a painful reminder of the 1954 defeat.
Arbenz's proximity to his country radicalized Guatemalan media and
authorities, because they were afraid that, with Cuban support, he might lead
an expedition aimed at taking power. As had occurred since 1954, media
denunciations and attacks in his country became increasingly harsh. Without
doctimentary proof of possible CIA involvement in propaganda campaigns*'
he historian must be very cautious in his or her interpretations. But one cannot
fail to observe that, at this time, there were media attacks with very similar
characteristics to those of the years before 1960.
NewsfromGuatemala reported that a "chalet" belonging to the former
president was "given back to its legitimate owners."*' When Arbenz was
accused of being "one of the most active agents Moscow ctirrently counts on
in South America."** few days after Arbenz arrived in Cuba, journalist
Clemente Marroquin Rojas*' warned in a long article that he was "in Havana
and will wage war on us."'" In next day's issue of the same paper, another
coltimnist made it known that all seemed to "indicate that Jacobo Arbenz has
been pointed by the finger of the Kremlin to get all possible support from the
Government of Cuba to head a revolt in Guatemala, directed from Fidel
Castro's land, aimed at overthrowing the present constitutional regime in the
country in order to take power again.""
72

Roberto Garcia Ferreira/The CIA and Jacobo Arbenz: History of a Disinfonnation Campaign
Some offers were made to Arbenz to be in command of a
revolutionary movement in Guatemala, where the military had assumed a very
repressive role. He was pessimistic, however, about the possibilities of
successfully applying the Cuban guerrilla experience to Guatemala. For this
reason he postponed the decision to participate. In 1965, Arbenz was invited
to the Communist Congress held in Helsinki.'^ Soon after, Arabella, his oldest
daughter, committed suicide, shocking and weakening Arbenz even ftirther.
Guatemalan newspapers echoed the family drama in these terms: the remains
of the "suicidal person" were transported from Bogotá to Mexico City, and
after the funeral, the former president left "his family in Mexico as indeflnite
tourists.""
The following years Arbenz alternated between France and
Switzerland, where, Maria remembers, everything was "very different from the
treatment received before."'"* Living in Mexico continued to be Jacobo's goal
and the positive response from that country revealed that time had passed by
and consequently the pressures had ceased. Once in Mexico a "serious illness"
that "he did not want to take care of" became more acute, and his health
increasingly deteriorated. By the end of 1970, Arbenz was sick. Marroquin
Rojas addressed this issue in his newspapers and did not hesitate to make
questionable claims. He dismissed any merit for Arbenz regarding the October
Revolution that overthrew dictator Ubico's autocratic regime. He said that at
that time Arbenz "returned to the country and, as is well known, joined the
rebellion that Colonel Francisco Javier Arana had initiated." His program of
government was nothing but "simple," while his resignation "disappointed us."
He immediately added: "He has had political ftiends in exile and good money."
Meanwhile, he let Arbenz know that in Guatemala "few persons remember
him," and that if he attempted to return "something very similar to what had
happened to Arévalo could occur to him: Arévalo thought that he was going to
be greeted as a demi-God, but only a few hundred old friends embraced him."'*
Not long after, the end came. It happened in the loneliness of the
bathmb after Arbenz suffered a heart attack. An Uruguayan teacher, who had
known Arbenz well while he lived in Montevideo, summarized with accuracy
Arbenz's final departure: "His name sounds distant, but at one time he played
a fundamental role in Latin American revolutionary politics.""
FINAL COMMENTS
As we have demonstrated, it seems undeniable that the CIA played a
key role in undermining Arbenz's prestige, particularly during his first years
in exile. We should add that it was not the CIA only, given the fact that the
conservative upper class, which would never forgive Arbenz's agrarian reform,
enthusiastically joined the anticommunist campaign.
73

The fiftieth anniversary of the 1944 October Revolution in 1994 was
a good time to begin to discuss those historical events. The following year, in
October 1995, Arbenz's remains were repatriated from El Salvador. His widow
once again accompanied him, and the San Carlos de Guatemala National
University posthumously decorated the former president.
However, decades of terror, violence and fear are not easily forgotten.
In Guatemala, a country of strong contrasts, Arbenz is still a topic of debate.
The ambitious and well-documented Historia Generalde Guatemala faithfully
reñects this fact; there, interpretations of the govemment of Arbenz and its
historical role continue to be completely contradictory."
NOTES
1. A specialized scholar on the issue affirms: "The original revisionist
claim that United Fruit masterminded Arbenz's defeat also appears
untenable." See Stephen Streeter, "Interpreting the 1954 U.S.
Intervention in Guatemala: Realist, Revisionist, and Postrevisionist,
Perspectives," The History Teacher 34 (2000), athttp://www.history
cooperative.org/joumals/ht/34.1/streeter.html. Similar conclusions
appear in Richard Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala. The Foreign
Policy of Intervention (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004,
[1982]) IX; Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan
Revolution and the UnitedStates, 1944-1954 Ç>iew Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1991); Stephen Rabe, "The U.S. Intervention in
Guatemala: The Documentary Record," Diplomatic History 28
(2004): pp. 785-790.
2. Nick Cullather, PBSUCCESS. La operación encubierta de la CIA en
Guatemala, 1952-1954 (Guatemala: Avancso, 2002) p. 102.
3. Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p. 391.
4. Nick Cullather, PBSUCCESS, p. 117.
5. Theodore Draper, "Is the CIA Necessary?" The New York Review of
Books, XLIV, 13 (1997).
6. Richard Immerman, TheCIA, 187-197; Nick Cullather, PASi/CŒ^S,
pp. 116-117; Piero Gleijeses, "Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White
House and the Bay of Pigs," Journal of Latin American Studies 27
(1995) pp. 1-42; Piero Gleijeses, "Mirando hacia atrás: Dwight
Eisenhower y Jacobo Arbenz," Revista de la Universidad de San
Carlos de Guatemala 8 (2005) pp. 18-26.
7. Jesús Garcia Añoveros, Jacobo Arbenz (Madrid: Historia 16, 1987)
pp. 137, 139. So far, this is the only biographical essay dedicated to
the life of Jacobo Arbenz, though, unfortunately, it lacks
74

Roberto Garcia Ferreira/The CIA and Jacobo Arbenz: Histoiy ofa Disinformation Campaign
methodological rigor and depth.
8. Maria Vilanova de Arbenz, "La conspiración del silencio," SigloXXI,
Aug. 31, 1990.
9. Greg Grandin, "Pensar globalmente, actuar ¡ocalmente," in Nick
Cullather, PBSUGGESS, p. VIII.
10. Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, pp. 379-380.
11. The former president often visited them and "he always came with a
bottle of whiskey that he placed on the table." That was the ideal
excuse for his reliving for hours the final moments of the Guatemalan
Revolution, "as someone who would like to go back" in time.
Interview with Martha Valentini, Montevideo, September 2005.
12. Stephen Streeter, "Interpreting."
13. Marta Cehelsky, "Habla Arbenz. Su juicio histórico retrospectivo,"
^/ero, 8 (1968) p. 124.
14. PieroGleijeses, ^/iaWez-ei/Z/ope, p. 142.
15. Source: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 'The Revolutions of 1944
(W/Attachments)," Document Number: 928377, 16 May 1952. The
18 pages attached to this report are "totally censored." (From now on
CIA sources will be quoted in the following manner: Source, Name,
Document number and Date).
16. The agency had access to the clinical report that was prepared on that
occasion, when Jacobo was advised that "it is imperative for your
sense of well-being as well as for your happiness to place yourself in
a balanced life plan." The doctor added as an argument that "you felt
much better when you were here." CIA, "Clinical Report on Arbenz'
mental attittide," 915065, Jan. 25, 1952.
17. About Arbenz's political orientations see CIA, "Personal Political
Orientation of President Arbenz/Posibility of a Left-Wing Coup,"
924149, Set 1952. Re possible attacks against Arbenz before the
invasion, see: "General-Kugown-Specific. Possible Attacks Against
Arbenz," 916073, 30 April 1954; "Hula-600. Possible Attacks
Against Arbenz," 915676, 5 May 1954; "KUGOWN- Cartoons,"
915235, 16 May 1954; "(Est Pub Date): Black and White List,"
915774.
18. CIA, "Proposals of Combined Department of State and CIA for
Action to Exploit Asylee Situation in Guatemala", 934416, 3 August
1954; "Exploitation of Asylee Situation in Guatemala
(W/Attachments)", 934415, 5 August 1954.
19. A personal friend of Arbenz since 1947, Fortuny was the main leader
of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT, the Communist
Guatemala's Workers Party). After visiting many countries, he settled
in Mexico, where he recently died at age 89. See La Hora
75

(Guatemala), March 19, 2005.
20. CIA, "Jacobo Arbenz, ex-President ofGuatemala-Operations Against
(W/Attachments)," 919960, May 15, 1957. Written in 1957, the
doctmient is Arbetiz's "chronological biography" between 1950 and
1957. Each of the "operational standards" to be carried out before
each trip, such as information to the press, circle of fHends, ups and
downs of his married life, and other personal aspects, were studied.
21. CIA, Document Number: 934416.
22. El Imparcial (Guatemala), Aug. 6,1954. Most Guatemalan press was
reviewed in the Archive of Centro de Investigaciones Regionales de
Mesoamérica (CIRMA), in the city of Antigua, Guatemala.
23. £//w/7araa/, Sept. 8, 1954.
24. El Imparcial, Sept. 10, 1954.
25. El Imparcial, Sept. 10,1954.
26. La Mañana (Uruguay), Sept. 11, 1954.
27. El Imparcial, Oct. 21, 1954.
29. This refers to the vengeful and retaliatory practice of "an eye for an
eye, and a tooth for a tooth." "Due to its interest." Uroz's article was
totally reproduced in £//wj/>araa/, Dec. 11, 1954.
31. She was a Salvadorean bom to a wealthy couple from El Salvador.
She was known for her high spirits and strong will, and she met
Jacobo at a party in Guatemala. Soon after they were married and had
three children: Arabella, Leonora and Jacobo Antonio. She is now 91
years old and resides in Costa Rica, where she finally settled in 1978.
32. Maria Vilanova de Arbenz, Mi esposo, el Presidente Arbenz
(Guatemala: Editorial Universitaria, 2000) p. 93.
33. Francis Stonors Saunders, La CIA y la guerrafría cultural (Madrid:
Debate, 2001), pp. 66-67, 140.
34. CIA, "Notes-Guatemala 1954 Coup", 920015, Jan. 6, 1955.
35. CIA, "Mise Re Guatemala 1954 Coup (W/Attachment)", 919991,
Apr. 6, 1955.
36. Laííora,Feb. 23, 1955.
37. A short time earlier, on Jan. 8, a pictitre of the Arbenz-Vilanova
couple at the Paris airport was the issue cover, with a headline stating
that Arbetiz was the "procommunist" president "who had been
overthrown last year," La Mañana, Jan. 8, 1955.
38. La Mañana, Feb. 14, 1955.
39. In the drawing, Arbetiz looks older; he is carrying a suitcase that
suggests he is taking a million quetzals from "Banco Agrario" and a
bag where one can read three inscriptions: "treason to Guatemala,"
76

Roberto Garcia Ferreira/The CIA and Jacobo Arbenz; History of a Disinformation Campaign
"sacrifice for the people," and "communist slave." The scene is
completed by a quetzal that talks to the president while he walks by,
telling him: "I hope you neither get there nor return here!" See El
Imparcial, Jan 5, 1955.
40. El Imparcial, Jan 2, 1955.
42. Maria Vilanova de Arbenz, Mi esposo, 94. No opportunity was
missed in Guatemala to talk about the former president's "relaxation
season" in the French Riviera. El Imparcial, Apr. 14, 1955.
43. "The ones who met the Arbenz family in Prague say "(...) they are
wealthy and Mr. Arbenz frequently gets together with the main
Russian and Czech communists." El Imparcial, Dec. 20, 1955.
44. In the Dec. 2 issue. El Imparcial reproduced the article from that
North American newspaper with the headline: "Arbenz finds a
country for himself (...) behind the Iron Curtain."
46. El Día (Uruguay), Nov. 29, 1955.
47. Z,aMiña«a, Nov. 30, 1955.
48. The article was reproduced in El Imparcial, Jan. 26, 1956.
49. CIA, "Kucage-Operational-Guatemalan Exiles-Jacobo Arbenz
(W/Attachment)", 919983, Dec. 6, 1955.
50. El Imparcial. Feb. 2,1956.
51. Carlos Manuel Pellecer, Arbenz y yo (Guatemala: Artemis, 1997) pp.
262-263, 287-289.
52. The CIA knew the Arbenz's daughters had stayed at a Soviet school
for a period of time, but the group of people who had that information
was so small that the agents suggested caution in handling the news:
even though it "was possible to publish that they were being educated
in a communist country, possibly, the USSR (...) the specific school
or its location should not be mentioned." CIA, Document Number
919960.
53. CIA, Document Number 919960.
54. CIA, Document Number 919960.
55. Carlos Manuel Pellecer, Arbenz, pp. 292-293.
56. The CIA files say the name was "Vermont" while Pellecer argues that
it was "Frimont."
57. In the appendix to his diary, Agee wrote textually: "Pellecer, Carlos
Manuel. CIA infiltration agent in the Guatemalan Communist Party
(PGT) and in the communist movements and their connections in
Mexico City. After working for the CIA for several years, he broke
away from communism. Code name: "LINLUCK." Philip Agee, La
CIA por dentro (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1987) p. 475. To be
77

precise, there is one letter's difference in the name (the first L).
However, it does not invalidate the statement; most likely, that
difference was an error of memory of Agee's.
58. CIA,"Sit-Rep Uruguay's Grant of Asylum to-Expresident Arbenz of
Guatemala", 919961, May 10, 1957.
60. Historical Archive of the Uruguayan Ministry of Foreign Relations,
Source: Legations and Embassies, Section: Embassy of the República
Oriental del Uruguay in Washington, box 52, folder 31, Apr. 26,1957
and May 6, 1957.
61. General Archive of the Nation,ft-omConsejo Nacional de Gobierno,
volume XXXII, Minute 281, Apr. 30, 1957.
63. CIA, Document Number: 919957; Document Number: 919958.
64. Roberto Garcia Ferreira, "'Operaciones en contra': el asilo politico
de Jacobo Arbenz Guzman en Uruguay (1957-60)", Política y
Sociedad 42 (2004) pp. 45-70.
65. Roberto Garcia Ferreira "Uruguay y Guatemala. La CIA en la prensa
de 1954" Revista de la Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala 16
(2006) pp. 22-38.
66. Roberto García Ferreira, "El caso de Guatemala: Arévalo, Arbenz y
la izquierda uruguaya, 1950-1971" Mesoamérica 49 (2007).
67. Archive of National Office of Information and Intelligence,
Montevideo Police, Office of Investigation, Intelligence and Liaison
Service, Folder 280, Subject: Jacobo Arbenz Guzman; Folder 280 A,
Subject: Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. Comentarios de prensa. See
Roberto Garcia Ferreira, "Arbenz, la CIA y el exilio en Uruguay"
Diálogo (FLACSO) No. Extraordinario, Oct. 2006.
68. La Mañana, Apr. 20, 1957.
69. La Mañana, Apr. 25, 1957.
70. El País (Uruguay), Apr. 26, 1957.
72. El País, May 12, 1957. Ex-president Arbenz's biographical
information published that day was taken from a book published in
Mexico by the Guatemalan writer Carlos Samayoa Chinchilla. At the
same time, an issue of this publication was donated to the National
Library in Montevideo in 1957 as a "compliment of the Office of
'Diffusion, Culture and Tourism of the Presidency of the Republic.'"
73. El País, La Mañana and Acción (Uruguay), May 14,1957.
74. In the newspaper original, this is quoted in dark type. Acción, May
14,1957.
75. El Día, May 9, 1957; El País, May 12, 1957 and El Plata, May 7,
78

1957.
76. Howard Hunt, Memorias de un espía. De la CIA al escándalo
Watergate (Barcelona: Noguer, 1975) 137, pp. 140-141.
77. Diary of Parliamentary Reports, June 4 and 12, and Aug. 6, 1957.
78. A column in the socialist weekly journal perfectly summarized the
contents of the anticommunist media of the time: "Arbenz was a risk
to the country's security. Arbenz is in touch with our country's union
agitators. Arbenz is the mastermind behind a communist conspiracy
in Latin America. Arbenz ordered the execution of Castillo Armas,
the dictator. In conclusion, a proper cap for the unleashed repugnant
campaign (...) would be to fix posters revealing that Arbenz was the
real culprit of the total failure of Uruguayan soccer. Although, in
truth, this would be nothing (...) For the moment we can inform that
the LOA has gathered a sufficient number of secret documents to
unmistakingly prove that Arbenz is responsible for the recent solar
explosions." LOA referred to Liga Oriental Anticomunista
(Anticommunist League of the East, one of the CIA's fronts in
Montevideo. El Sol (Uruguay), Aug. 9, 1957
79. La Tribuna Popular (Uruguay), July 28, 1957, "Arbenz speaks for
'La Tribuna Popular.'" Arbenz strongly condemns the crimes
perpetrated by traitors in Guatemala. Exclusive report by DOLORES
CASTILLO."
80. Lieutenant Captain Fontana transcribed these statements in a report
to his superior, informing him that he made them known "in case
these statements might constitute a transgression of the norms
regulating the right to asylum." Archive of National Office of
Information and Intelligence, Montevideo Police, Office of
Investigation, Intelligence and Liaison Service, Folder 280, Subject:
"Jacobo Arbenz, sus declaraciones", Aug. 7, 1957, 1. It is very
possible that the rapid reaction of this official can be explained by his
close relation with the CIA in Montevideo. P.Agee, the former CIA
officer, indicated that among his close collaborators "linked to the
station in Montevideo," lieutenant captain Fontana was key. Philip
Agee, La CIA, 465.
81. When the well-fed Arévalo came to Montevideo, "the Arbenz couple
bought a very large bed" to place "in the living room." Interview with
Martha Valentini, Montevideo, September 2005.
82. The death of Francisco Javier Arana, never well explained by
Arévalo, was an unsurmountable barrier and a sure reason for friction.
While both lived in Montevideo, Jacobo suggested that Arevalo
publicly clarify the way Arana had died. Arevalo refused, arguing that
best thing to do was not to talk about that subject. Piero Gleijeses,
79

JOURNAL OF THIRD WORLD STUDIES. FALL 2008
Shattered, p. 70. It may be recalled that one of the strongest issues the
CIA used in its campaign against Arbenz was precisely the Arana
afffair. The fact that Arbenz was consistently accused by the media,
without a single opportunity to respond, adds another element to
prove Maria's testimony, cited by Gleijeses. José Manuel Fortuny,
who at the time used to clandestinely visit Montevideo, states that the
differences between the two former presidents were originated by
Arbenz's policy regarding the communists. Marco Antonio Flores,
Fortuny: un comunista guatemalteco (Guatemala: Óscar de León,
1994) pp. 268-269.
83. Marcha (Uruguay), May 2 and May 30,1958; Aug. 8,1958.
84. The Uruguayan Intelligence Service gave a different interpretation:
"A few days ago, we obtained confidential information indicating that
the person named AREVALO would go to live in Caracas, in
accordance with a perfectly devised communist plan, in order to
direct the entire Latin American movement, and Arbenz would remain
in Montevideo." Archive of National Office of Information and
Intelligence, Montevideo Police, Office of Investigation, Intelligence
and Liaison Service, Folder 410, "Caracas - Centro de Actividades
Comunistas en América Latina," memo dated March 12, 1959.
85. Maria Vilanova de Arbenz, M/esporo, p. 140.
86. There are few declassified documents on Arbenz's life in Cuba. CIA,
"Castro Regime Plans Arms Aid To Guatemalan Leftist", 132566;
"NSC Briefing, 12 August 1960", 137334; "Cuban Developments",
132785; "Cuban Situation: Economic Agreements With Bloc; Latin
American Youth Congress", 132769.
87. Prensa Libre (Guatemala), Feb. 12, 1960.
88. El Imparcial, March 24, 1960.
89. Journalist and intellectual of the right, with a large literature, mainly
with the daily paper La Hora. Years later he was elected Vice
President of the Republic (1966-1970).
90. Z,a//ora, Aug. 10, 1960.
91. ¿a/fora, Aug. 11, 1960.
92. Maria Vilanova de Arbenz, Mi esposo, p. 118.
93. El Imparcial, Oct. 20, 1965.
96. ¿a/fora,Nov. 2, 1970.
97. A/arcAa,Jan. 29, 1971.
98. See Alfredo Guerra Borges, "Semblanza de la Revolución
Guatemalteca de 1944-1954" and Alcira Goicolea, "Los Diez Años
de Primavera" in Jorge Lujan Muñoz [Dir.], Historia General de
80

Guatemala (Guatemala, Asociación de Amigos del País y Fundación
para la Cultura y el Desarrollo, 1997) Tomo VI, pp. 11-22; 23-40.
81

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