The document discusses space security and the role of the European Union. It notes that space is becoming increasingly important for meeting the needs of a growing global population. However, space also faces security challenges like space debris, weapons, and other threats. The document examines these issues and how the EU is attempting to enhance space security through initiatives like the EU Code of Conduct and developing a European Space Situational Awareness system.

1. Space Security and European Union -
Leader, Decision Maker or Enabler?
A Frost & Sullivan White Paper by Aman Pannu

2. TABLE OF
CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................ ............... 2
SPACE SECURITY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE FOR A GLOBAL INDUSTRY 3
Space Security and its Role .......................................................... 3
Industry Challenges ...................................................................... 4
Space Security .............................................................................. 5
Europe .......................................................................................... 5
SPACE SECURITY: THREAT DOMAINS AND THE WORLD ................... 6
Space Weapons (Terrestrial and Space Based) ............................. 6
Space Situation Awareness (SSA) and Orbital Debris .................. 7
Space Traffic Management ............................................................. 8
Spectrum Management and Issues ................................................ 8
Space Terrorism ............................................................................. 9
Global Space Security Trends ........................................................ 9
EUROPEAN UNION: PAVING THE ROAD TO SUSTAINABLE SPACE .... 12
EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (EU CoC)........... 13
European SSA System ................................................................... 15
CONCLUDING REMARKS ....................................................................... 17
ABOUT FROST & SULLIVAN .................................................................. 18
2 Frost & Sullivan

3. SPACE SECURITY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE FOR A GLOBAL INDUSTRY
Space Security and its Role
Thought leaders around the globe are voraciously debating the impact of a 9 billion plus
population on planet Earth by 2050. The complexity of meeting the needs of a large and
diverse population is driving the search for innovative technologies and applications.
“...The complexity of
Space is emerging as the lead innovator, by facilitating new technology and applications
meeting the needs of
to confront evolving issues and opportunities. Almost a third of the countries (there
a large and diverse
are 195 listed countries as of 2011) have a satellite (at the very least) orbiting the
population is driving
Earth, even more so, most of the countries use space based applications.
the search for
innovative
Figure 1: Satellite Manufacturing (World) Forecast 2011-2020
technologies and
applications. Space is
emerging as the lead
140
innovator, by
120 facilitating new
technology and
100 applications to
confront evolving
80 issues and
opportunities....”
60
40
20
0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
900 Conservative 990 Medium 1189 High
Source: Frost & Sullivan, 2011
Having weathered the economic crisis more strongly than most industries,
Frost & Sullivan research suggests the space industry is forecasted to close the decade
with approximately 10-15 percent more satellites (900 plus) launched in comparison to
the last decade. Government (Civil and Military) projects will continue to drive demand
(68 percent), however commercial satellites is forecasted to increase its share by more
than 5 percent (2011-2020) over the last decade.
Military as well as Commercial and Civil end-users rely on Space as a critical element
of global information infrastructure supporting frontline operations for them. The role
of space is no longer limited to ground connectivity, both in air and maritime domains.
Space ensures seamless connectivity in the most challenging conditions, such as that
seen in the Haiti disaster, and most recently in Japan.
Frost & Sullivan 3

4. Figure 2: Global Space Industry Trends 2010
Desire to advance regional space capabilities is an opportunity for established Space
participants, wherein they can work in partnership to gain market share while
enhancing technical capabilitis for individual nations.
For satellite manufacturers the current economic downturn induced a
plausible slowdown and this is an opportunity to invest the time and expertise
in developing new technologies for attaining higher efficiencies through
advanced capabilities and streamlined production activities.
Real-time communications on the move will be the main driver for
communications (and earth observation including reconnaissance) satellites.
Some of the applications driving demand for next-generation high
throughout satellites, are: DTG, SNG, IPTV, VSAT services and other tailor-
made broadcasting packages.
The increasing demand for higher bandwidth communication and the finite orbital
slots have triggered the satellite operators to stipulate satellites that are more
powerful, and more flexible than ever before. There is an evident opportunity in
the development of high throughput satellites.
Source: Frost & Sullivan, 2011
The early interpretation of Space’s operating environment as harsh and inaccessible (for
maintenance or repair), led to the industry researching and developing new
technologies and custom designed, ruggedised products to operate efficiently. This
inadvertently led to a stream of spin-off benefits for terrestrial applications. In recent
years, there is a growing shift towards the use of off-the-shelf components and systems,
which is creating new opportunities for market participants. As such, Space has become
an integral part of our lives, in many ways an inconspicuous part, from daily applications
of communications, navigation, and internet; to complex roles such as military
operations, disaster management, monitoring and control; to unique and spin-off
applications in robotics, agriculture, and healthcare.
Industry Challenges
European Space’s global presence is based on a network of applications and products,
both in outer space and terrestrial, delivered by a diverse set of participants. As much
as this omni-presence being a ‘unique’ nature of the Space industry, it is also a challenge.
The continuous connectivity based on Space assets is made possible by a set of policies,
code of conducts and agreements, although not sufficient enough, defining the best
practices for Space operations including access to space, orbit allocation and
positioning, spectrum management, orbital debris management, Research and
Development (R&D), Space security and so on. One such challenge for Space is the
industry’s inconsistent ‘growth lifecycle’ at a global level, with countries/regions like US,
Russia and Europe at an advanced stage of the ‘industry lifecycle’ compared to the Rest
of World (ROW). The outlook of the Space industry in the medium to long-term, is that
of growth according to Frost & Sullivan. This along with the aspirations of multiple ‘new’
participants to become a space fairing nation, driven by the political will and economic
intent, makes the Space environment a complex domain to operate in and secure. In this
context, industry experts continue to express that the (Outer) Space must be
defended, or to start with, not declared as ‘theatre of action’, there is an imperative
need for regulations and policies preventing nations from arming space.
Frost & Sullivan 4

5. The risk of ‘arming’ space is not only a military threat, it also poses a considerable risk
to the commercial infrastructure, a challenge that must be addressed now. Although
Space Security and Situational Awareness is becoming a prominent feature of most, if
not all space policies now, it is very evident that the current guidelines and rules
regulating this area are somewhat patchy.
Space Security “...Frost & Sullivan
research suggests that
it is likely the current
Space Security is the secure and sustainable access to, and use of, space and freedom
competing guidelines
from Space-based threats 1 . Space Security is attaining a critical momentum to outline a
will emerge as a
set of best practices for the industry. However, this is still largely influenced by regional
standardised global
market / political dynamics. Frost & Sullivan’s research suggests that it is likely the
guideline, but this will
current competing guidelines will emerge as a standardised global guideline, but this will
probably only happen
probably only happen when the industry starts loosing a satellite a year and when the
when the industry
stakeholders realise the risk as real time to their assets, a step too late in forestalling
starts loosing a
an unsafe space environment. In this paper, Frost & Sullivan presents an overview of the
satellite a year...”
Space Security issues, challenges and opportunities in context with the European Union
(EU) Space policy and initiatives. Both military and commercial Space assets face a range
of threats (which is further compounded by the growing dual-use of satellites), including
accidental collisions, anti-satellite missiles, lasers, electronic jamming and hacking. This
is very aptly summarised in the statement by Gerard Brachet, the Chair, UN Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (2008), “Ensuring long term secured access and
use of outer space is not a defence issue only. It requires an active dialogue between
the civilian and military communities to address how space can be kept safe and secure.
Both express the same concern: security of their space assets. And they share the same
environment around our planet 2 ”.
Europe
Europe, with its unique ‘collaborative’ model (inter-governmental and inter-industry)
for both EU and also for the European Space Agency (ESA), is well positioned to
facilitate the global norm for Space standards and policies. However, this is a road with
many obstacles. In 2008, European Parliament highlighted the need for space assets to
ensure that the political and diplomatic activities of the EU may be based on
independent, reliable, and complete information in support of its policies for conflict
prevention, crisis management operations, and global security. This applies especially to
the monitoring of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of
transportation and verification of international treaties, the transnational smuggling of
small arms, the protection of critical infrastructure and of the EU’s borders, and civil
protection in the event of natural and man-made disasters and crises. In contrast to the
evolutionary path of Space for United States of America (US) and Russia, which was
dominantly military in nature, Europe’s space programme has evolved around scientific
scope. Although in recent times Europe is focusing progressively on building a dual-use
and cooperative model encompassing both military and commercial activities. For this
paper Frost & Sullivan has analysed issues and developments across main Space Security
domains such as Space Weapons, Space Terrorism, Space Situational Awareness and
Orbital Debris, and Space Traffic Management.
1 UNIDIR/2006/17 Building the Architecture for Sustainable Space Security 2006
2 Seeking Common Security in Space, J.M. Logsdon, Director- Space Policy Institute, Elliot School of International Affairs, The
George Washington University, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/space_security_logsdon.pdf
5
Frost & Sullivan

6. SPACE SECURITY: THREAT DOMAINS AND THE WORLD
‘Houston we have a Problem’, or is it ‘World we have a Problem’? starting in 2007 with
China annihilating one of its defunct satellites by using a ground-based missile anti-
satellite (ASAT) weapon, and (in response) the US ASAT mission in 2008, the Space
industry experienced the very real threat of securing the Space assets, both from an act
of destruction (passive or aggressive), and the aftermath in the form of orbital debris. “Frost & Sullivan
However, as early as the 1980’s the US successfully tested a direct-ascent interceptor believes that the ideal
against a satellite in low earth orbit in the 1980s. The interceptor was launched by a vulnerability
missile carried on an F-15 aircraft. Since then the technical capability (and as such the management system
strike capability) of such systems has evolved formidably. The threat of total destruction should entail both an
is not the only issue that concerns the security of space. There are technologies that internal and external
can cause temporary impairment of Space assets in the short term, or even over a component.”
prolonged time period. Preventing a satellite from accomplishing its mission
temporarily, reversibly, or non-destructively is commonly called denial, while permanent
disabling is called destruction. Then there is the very real risk of orbital collisions and
the more imminent threat of orbital debris. Taking such threats into consideration and
the growing reliance of Space applications and its end-users on commercial as well as
military space assets, demands that the Space community clearly define the
expectations and boundaries from each participant / stakeholder. This becomes even
more critical when we consider the complex and diverse nature of next generation
threats such as electronic interference, space weapons, laser attacks, high-powered
microwave attacks, Attacks on Ground Stations, Laser Attacks on Satellites: Heating and
Structural Damage, Kinetic Energy Attacks- Ground and Space based, Electromagnetic
Pulse from a High-Altitude Nuclear Explosion and more. As mentioned in the
introduction, Frost & Sullivan categorises these threats across the following Space
Security domains:
Space Weapons (Terrestrial and Space Based)
The deployment and potential use of weapons / arms on or from space assets is seen
as a dangerous avenue and needs to be on the priority list of regulations in order to
avoid it from becoming the next war frontier. Although it is important to note that at
present there is no such imminent arms race, yet. Some experts even share the outlook
that it might be more realistic to address surrounding space threats, such as the recent
ASAT activity, from a policy perspective before defining the framework for
weaponisation of space. Successful agreements and code of conduct in areas with
somewhat lesser direct threat to national security should potentially pave the way for
achieving common objectives in this field. Some notable (and concerning) incidents of
using Space Weapons include:
• January 2007 - China destroyed one of its defunct weather satellites orbiting at
about 900km. This created around 2700 new pieces of tracked debris and NASA
estimates more than 150,000 pieces of debris larger than 1cm were created.
• February 2008 - US destroyed one of its satellites in the Low Earth Orbit
(LEO), few lasting pieces of debris were created as the satellite was in a lower
orbit, from which most debris rapidly re-entered the atmosphere.
Frost & Sullivan 6

7. The perplexing element of the Chinese test is that, in contrast to the US policy,
historically China (with Russia) has been proponent in banning the use of arms in space.
Although there is no imminent risk of a Space ‘Arms’ race, industry stakeholders are
exploring guidelines for enforcing a ban or defining a code of conduct (to begin with)
to rein in such an Arms race.
Space Situation Awareness (SSA) and Orbital Debris
Lieutenant General WL Shelton (US) defines SSA as “the understanding of the space
medium to include tracking all manmade objects in space, discerning the intent of
others who operate in space, knowing the status of our own forces in real-time, and
understanding the natural environment and its effect upon space operations — simply
stated, SSA is the foundation for all space operations 3 ” . Currently the US commands
the most comprehensive SSA system, although in line with the strategic objectives set
out in the European Space Policy of 2007 a corresponding preparatory programme for
the European SSA System has been active since the end of 2008. The SSA encompasses
the domains of objects orbiting the Earth (including space debris), space weather and
near-Earth objects, determining the various threats to space assets such as the growing
number of debris, space weather, meteorites, intentional attacks, orbital collisions and
more. It is this vast scope of activities that fall under SSA that make it a prerequisite
for ensuring a safe, secure and sovereign conduct of space operations. The foundations
for an effective SSA system are based on total visibility of the space assets, which can
be achieved through an extensive database of the orbital location, motion data, function
and state of space assets.
Even though Space debris is mapped under the SSA programme, this is considered a
specific threat / space security issue because of the growing risk it poses to the space
assets in outer Space. According to the Space Secure Foundation (data based on the
United States military's Space Surveillance Network) there are approximately 21,000
man-made objects in Earth orbit. Frost & Sullivan research indicates that currently
collisions are the smallest contributor to fragments of debris. However, as the number
of debris objects increases, collisions become more likely, thus creating yet more
debris. As the satellites are clustered in a few useful orbits and objects remain in those
orbits for many years, the risk of collision is higher than might be expected. In this
context industry experts estimate a collision to occur every 5 years on average (leading
to approximately 8-9 collisions over this period). The main orbital debris collisions
recorded over the last two decades are:
• December 23, 1991: Russia's Cosmos 1934 satellite collided with a piece of
debris from Cosmos 926 at an altitude of 980 kilometres. Two pieces of debris
from Cosmos 1934 were catalogued after that incident.
• July 24, 1996: France's Cerise spacecraft was hit at an altitude of 685
kilometres by a piece of Ariane rocket debris left from an explosion 10 years
earlier. Part of a large boom on Cerise was severed, but the satellite later
resumed operations.
3 Statement of Lieutenant General WL Shelton , commander Joint functional Component Command for Space before the Sub
Committee on Strategic Forces Senate Armed Services Committee on Space Posture, 2008-
S http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/olc/docs/testShelton080304.pdf
Frost & Sullivan 7

8. • January 17, 2005: A spent stage from the US Thor-Burner 2A rocket launched in
1974 collided at 885 kilometres with a piece of a Chinese rocket stage that had
exploded in March 2000. Four pieces of debris were catalogued.
• February 10, 2009: The first collision between two satellites occurred 800km
above Northern Siberia. One was an active US communications satellite, while
the other was a defunct Russian satellite. The event created around 1400
“...having an
catalogued debris objects.
advanced Space
situational Awareness
The non-binding nature of the international agreements on space debris may limit the
system is of little use
increase, but it will continue to grow nonetheless . The International Telecommunication
if this means
Union (ITU) provides the guidelines for orbit allocation / traffic, these guidelines
watching debris build
(including space debris mitigation and satellite’s end-of-life cycles) are mostly aligned to
up to the point where
Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO). However, Space debris is probably the most
your own satellites
addressed of the issues on hand, even though there is much to refine and formalise,
become unusable...”
such as a concrete and clear set of rules for GEO as well as LEO. Since 1993, the Inter-
Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) has been developing guidelines
for space debris mitigation, eventually endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2008
(followed by an endorsement by UN Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space
(COPUOS) in 2007). The main thing to comprehend here is that having an advanced
Space Situational Awareness system is of little use if this means watching debris build
up to the point where your own satellites become unusable. Keeping this in context
Europe continues to play an active role in facilitating the formulation of well articulated
guidelines addressing the issues of space debris in all orbits. However, it is the lessons
learnt from the success of such cooperative measures that Europe can leverage to
further define its SSA programme and guidelines.
Space Traffic Management
The growing number of actors within the space domain requires well defined
regulations for registering and capturing data such as launch of satellites, orbital
locations, intended purpose, relevant technologies, re-entry operations, and in-orbit
operations. As noted in the previous section, the guidelines for these activities are not
comprehensive enough and do not traverse the depth of the issues surrounding space
operations. As an example of the gaps in the current regulations consider the
registration of a satellite. The limitation of the fact that only one state of registry can
exist for any satellite, makes it difficult (if not impossible) to account for all
stakeholders in a satellite programme with multiple actors, in practice leading to a
number of unregistered operational satellites. This lack of accountability is a potential
risk / threat to the security of space. Taking this into consideration, Frost & Sullivan
notes that effective (and cooperative) regulations would facilitate a better environment
for all space participants, by limiting any potential deliberate and / or unintended
exploitation.
Spectrum Management and Issues
Another domain of concern for space participants is the orbital congestion in terms of
orbital slot, spectrum management and RF interference. Whilst this is not a direct
threat to space assets, and does not command a military response to mitigate, this has
the potential of creating potentially volatile rifts between established space participants
and the emerging / aspiring participants. Frost & Sullivan 8

9. The ability to efficiently manage orbital slots and spectrum will require systematic
cataloguing based on transparency and mandated disclosures. It is the need of having
such ‘rules of the road’ that are acceptable to all participants which will enable the
resolving of any potential conflicts in the future.
Space Terrorism
“..There is an arising
Space terrorism is an evolving discussion, but nonetheless considered a real albeit awareness for
latent threat to space. Considering that both military and commercial actors rely formulating a space
heavily on Space based applications, the potential of a non-state actor causing policy for protecting
diminutive (if not destructive) damage to space assets and its services could have both military and
serious consequences on critical applications and its end-users. There is an arising commercial space
awareness for formulating a space policy for protecting both military and commercial assets..”
space assets, and ground infrastructure against terrorist attacks. Some of the known
space terrorist attacks are 5 :
• First, the mobile satellite communication signal provided by Thuraya Satellite
Telecommunications from three widely separated locations inside Libya was
jammed.
• Secondly, Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) hijacked the
Intelsat Ltd. Intelsat-12 satellite in geosynchronous orbit to beam their
propaganda across the Indian subcontinent. While Intelsat continuously tried to
interrupt LTTE’s pirating, LTTE was able to continue its satellite piracy for 2
years.
• Thirdly, two similar events happened in China, where China’s Falun Gong
spiritual movement in June 2002 overrode the broadcast signals of nine China
Central Television stations and 10 provincial stations and replaced the
programming with their content and in 2004 disrupted AsiaSat signals for four
hours.
To effectively combat the threat of Space terrorism the global Space community needs
to devise a counter-terrorism policy for Space. However, this will need to be based on
a tripod approach, addressing and covering political intent, civil law, and where required
military action. Europe can leverage its cooperative model (and hands-on involvement
in NATO) to facilitate the formulation of such a policy.
Global Space Security Trends
Agreements and guidelines in Space have historically proven to be intricate and
complex, and continue to be so. This is the case because such agreements not only
require a political coherence but also technical relevance. This is more often the reason
why most Space agreements are not water tight, and have a high degree of ambiguity
attached to them. From the Cold War era of two-party discussions, Space has grown
into a multilateral discussion (not so optimistic would propound it even as an
argument). However, the US and Russia continue to influence any such developments.
5 The Need to Counter Space Terrorism, ESPI Perspective 17, January 2009
Frost & Sullivan 9

10. In the later years Europe carved a niche position for itself, especially after the end of
the Cold War era. Recently, China, India, and other emerging / aspiring space fairing
nations have actively voiced or participated in gathering momentum to discuss
framework options to address the issues such as the threat to space security discussed
in the previous pages. However, for now the growth in the number of space fairing
nations has put the historical space powers such as the US and Russia on a back foot,
leading them to adopt defensive space postures. Furthermore, today’s space
environment demands an operationally responsive framework to meet the ever
changing and unpredictable nature of threats, such as asymmetric warfare, terrorism,
cyber warfare and more. The war frontier is no longer limited to Land, Air, and Sea.
Space is widely noted as the fourth frontier of conflicts, both military and commercial “...today’s space
stakeholder driven. environment demands
an operationally
Until recently the US was strongly opposed to negotiations on the control of space responsive framework
weapons (for nearly three decades). However, in the National Security Space Strategy to meet the ever
(2011) the US projects a somewhat open posture towards participating in negotiations changing and
related to continuing and the peaceful use of Space. Even though there is a definitive unpredictable nature
mention of its clear intention of ‘right to defend or dissuade’ against any potential of threats...”
threats, this is considered as a step in the right direction (albeit with little or no regard
to other actors and their right to defend). Many experts believe that the US shift
towards such a stance is considered mainly a result of the pressures / restraints of the
economic crisis and the Chinese anti-satellite test of January 2007.
As Space activities have increasingly become tied to the national power of pre-eminent
States, Frost & Sullivan notes, it is crucial for other countries to understand that the US
needs to retain an option in principle to deploy force if required. After all it is largely
this Space power that enabled the US to affect outcomes according to its preferences,
interests, and if necessary change the behaviour of other actors in order to achieve
desired outcome aimed at protecting its national security (and economic) interests to
date. As a result, core Space programmes such as the SSA are at the crux of US National
Space Policy. Furthermore, the US is currently conducting the much anticipated Space
Posture review, which is delayed, and expected in 2011.
China, on the other hand does not command a very expansive and extensive Space
heritage. Some of the notable landmarks for the Chinese Space programme are the
launch of China’s first satellite in 1970, the launch of China’s first communications
satellite in 1984, and China’s first human spaceflight in 2003. Against the general
perception of the masses, China positions itself as a cooperative member of the Space
club, rather than a Space power. For many years China, with Russia has tabled a
resolution for Prevention of Arms in Outer Space. However, in 2007 with the ASAT test
conducted by China many questions were left unanswered. Although it is worth
considering that the Chinese actions were intended to soften the stand of those
opposing such a resolution, namely the US and Israel. Frost & Sullivan notes that
immaterial of the intention, the 2007 incident risked starting an Arms Race in space, an
output that would serve no good to any of the stakeholders.
Listed below are the main milestones in setting agreements, guidelines or initiatives that
facilitates or are related to formulation of regulations in space since its evolution:
• 1950 RAND report - considered the birth certificate of American Space policy
• 1958 Preliminary U.S. Policy on Outer Space, 5814/in NSSP, NSC Documents
• 1962 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space as stated in UNGA Resolution 1962
(XVIII)
Frost & Sullivan 10

11. • 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)- Treaty banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in
the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water
• 1967 Treaty of Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space
• 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space
• 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty
• 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects
• 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space
• 1977 Environmental Modification Convention - listed Space among the places
where specific military activities were banned
• 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies
• 1982 Reagan National Space Policy was established in NSDD 42 - This National
Space Policy directed the Department of Defence to develop and deploy an
operational ASAT capability, both to deter threats to US and allied space
systems and, within the limits of international law, to deny hostile military
forces the use of space-based support.
• 1982 ITU updated the International Telecommunications Convention (the
Nairobi Convention) prohibiting interference with non-military
communications
• 1986 UN General Assembly adopted a set of Principles on Remote Sensing
• 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
• 2002 Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
• 2002 Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunications
Union and its Radio Regulations
• 2007 European Space Policy (jointly developed by the European commission
and ESA)
• 2007: UN COPUOS Mitigation Guidelines
• 2008: At the Conference on Disarmament, Russia and China formally
presented a draft treaty on “The Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in
Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Space Objects” (PPWT).
However, the then US administration immediately reiterated its opposition to
any new legal restrictions on its access to or use of space. Potential reasons
for opposition from the US / potentially other space fairing nations would
include the unverifiable nature of the ban on arming outer Space, and the
clear not-mention of ASAT weapons, such as the one tested by China in 2007
• 2008 EU Draft ‘Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities’
• 2009 Treaty of Lisbon- making Space a shared competency of the European
Union and its Member States
• Other relevant regulations / agreements include the Principles Relevant to the
Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space as stated in UNGA Resolution
47/68; the Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into
Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries as stated in UNGA
Resolution 51/122; the Recommendations on the Practice of States and
International Organisations in Registering Space Objects as stated in UNGA
Resolution 62/101; the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the United
Nations Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space as stated in UNGA
Resolution 62/217.
Frost & Sullivan 11

12. EUROPEAN UNION: PAVING THE ROAD TO SUSTAINABLE SPACE
Emerging from the challenges of a complex and
unique decision making process of combining
intergovernmental and communitary processes,
the European Space Policy is based on a
foundation of the Cooperative, Collaborative
and Consultative (C3) approach. This approach
has been proven successful (albeit not always)
in a European context where there is a
continuous need for aligning the political intent
and actions of 27 member nations, and for ESA
with 18 space fairing nations.
Europe is challenged by this unique model
where there is a strong role of Member states
in most decision making with an emphasis on
intra-European cooperation, in an environment of relatively low budgets, multiple
institutions and independent national level programmes. In 1975 the merger of two
institutions European Space Research Organisation and European Launch Development
Organisation led to the formation of the ESA. The ESA has established Europe as a
leading stakeholder in the space industry, and is highly acknowledged for the technical
(R&D) capabilities, fair and competitive markets, dual-use policies and a global outlook.
It is important to note that ESA’s role is mainly to do with technical and operational
aspects of space, and has little or no political mandates. However, it works closely with
the political institutions within Europe. Since the inception of the Space Council in
2004, Europe has taken a somewhat bolder stance to space policies and matters such
as Space security. However, Europe’s Space programme is primarily designed to operate
within a non-military realm. Although on one hand this is an attraction for many Space
fairing nations to be on the negotiating table, this has limited Europe’s influence on
enabling security issues at a global level with Space participants such as the US, Russia
and China. This is changing, as past activities, mostly at national level, have gathered pace
and are leveraged under Europe’s C3 approach to include security as a generic scope
for European Space programmes (this is fundamentally different to the US approach
where security is primarily defined from a military aspect). Europe’s security focus in
Space is driven by the objective of developing technical capabilities and competence by
leveraging national level programmes in a system of systems architecture to serve for
the larger benefit of the European states and its allies.
On December 01, 2009 Article 189 of the Lisbon Treaty came into affect making Space
a shared competency of the European Union and its Member States.
“To provide for and promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, cooperation among European
states in space research and technology and their space applications.” - Article 2 of ESA
Convention
Frost & Sullivan 12

13. The success of any such policy rests on the successful implementation of the C3
approach by all concerned stakeholders, such as the EU, ESA and the Member States.
Although it is clearly articulated that actions developed under this new competency of
the EU should not be of a technical nature, but rather of a political nature, whilst
leaving the technical actions within the realm of ESA and associated regional and
national institutions. The success of such structure is already visible in the GMES and
Galileo programs pursued by EU and ESA. This is a landmark step towards defining a
common European Space Policy, and more importantly gives Space a much needed
political impetus.
EU ‘Code of Conduct’ for Outer Space Activities (EU CoC)
In context of the above discussion, Frost & Sullivan notes that the founding principle of
the C3 approach is deeply rooted in the conception of the EU CoC drafted at the end
of 2008. The EU CoC is not a legally binding agreement (unlike the PPWT resolution
tabled by China and Russia), it is based on voluntary participation with the aim of
deploying Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBM) and a consultative
approach to winning the agreement of a diverse group of stakeholders including
(importantly) the third countries. The EU CoC is essentially a bottom up approach to
addressing critical but sensitive issues under Space security. Under the EU CoC a
comprehensive approach to safety and security in outer Space is guided by the
principles of freedom of access to Space for all peaceful purposes, preservation of the
security and integrity of Space objects in orbit, due consideration for the legitimate
defence interests of States 6 . Notably the EU CoC has an explicit mention of the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the United
Nations Charter. However, this is in consideration of other guiding principles such as
the responsibility of States to take all the appropriate measures and cooperate in good
faith to prevent harmful interference in outer space activities, and the responsibility of
States, in the conduct of scientific, commercial and military activities, promotion of
peaceful exploration and use of outer space and take all the adequate measures to
prevent outer Space from becoming an area of conflict.
The EU CoC incorporates cooperation mechanisms aimed at engaging subscribing
nations to share data based on TCBM principles. This includes a timely notification of
outer Space activities, information on outer space activities, and registration of Space
objects. These mechanisms are creating an extensive database of outer space activities
to enable a near total visibility of space objects and any potential threats.
The EU CoC addresses the basic issues surrounding Space security such as orbital
debris (including having measures on space debris control and mitigation), Space
situational awareness (further supported by the cooperation mechanisms), data
cataloguing and analysis, and information sharing on outer Space activities and Space
objects. This bottom up approach coupled with the TCBM is an intelligent approach to
tackle a very hostile threat of Space weapons to Space security. Having (potentially)
garnered support of notable (and most) Space fairing nations, the EU can then leverage
this to influence the historical Space powers such as the US and Russia in articulation
of a code of conduct (to begin with) for issues regarding space weaponisation.
6 PESC 1697, CODU_ 61, Council conclusions and draft Code of Conduct for outer space activities, 2008,
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17175.en08.pdf
Frost & Sullivan 13

14. The success achieved in implementation and acceptance of the CoC could then lead to
a broader Space legislation / treaty that has essential legally binding clauses, especially
for the military component of the Space.
The EU CoC and the Lisbon Treaty have established EU as an emerging Space actor in
Europe with notable political authority that can continue to build on the Space
experience of Europe and its independent states (such as France, Germany, Spain, UK,
Italy and more).
The EU’s Space security efforts are built on a distributed network approach, leveraging
existing European and national capabilities and assets. Such a network is designed to
address issues concerning security of European Space interests. The EU continues to
work on issues of Space terrorism threats, missile defence issues, threat of Space Arms
Race, and development of a fully operational Space situational awareness system.
However, the EU actively combats the challenges of working in a collaborative model,
such as security implications of joint projects, deployment of Space for internal
security, integration of national programmes, institutional set-up in Europe and the
governance / political guidance. Despite these challenges Europe has established itself
quite strongly in the ‘Space hierarchy’. The question to ask and answer is where does
Europe (EU and ESA) want to position itself on this hierarchy- Leader, Decision Maker,
Enabler? To maintain a leading position in the space hierarchy Europe will need to make
both political and budgetary commitments towards the sector. It is important to
acknowledge and plan Europe’s Space positioning today in line with the evolving Space
trends globally to avoid sliding down the global Space Hierarchy, and losing the
opportunity to influence key decisions and directions for the industry at an
international level. This would threaten the very principles that Europe has set out to
achieve in the EU CoC and even the Lisbon Treaty. Speaking on a non-political (non-
budgetary) stand point, Europe is well positioned to play the role of an enabler for now.
The potential successes in this role will eventually create opportunities for Europe to
take a Leadership role in the industry. This is especially true when we consider the
depreciating share of the historical space powers / leaders (US and Russia) in light of
the emerging space fairing nations.
As an ‘enabler’ the consultative approach of the EU CoC plays a vital role. This is visible
from the systematic introduction and promotion of the Draft to various stakeholders.
A first “food for thought” paper was presented in September 2007 to the First
Committee of the UN General Assembly, and a first version of a draft code of conduct
was circulated to the United States, China, and Russia in July 2008. Currently, the EU is
conducting rounds of consultations with third countries in order to maximise the
consensus and possibilities of a wide adoption of the Code by the international
community. Japan, India, and Canada are on the list of target countries to be consulted
by the EU. There is a likelihood of engaging further countries for the consultation
phase, such as from Latin America, Africa and APAC. EU CoC is designed to encourage
all countries to access and operate in space as long as the activities are conducted for
peaceful purposes and do not cause, intentionally or accidentally, harmful damages to
space objects nor create debris. The EU CoC has specific provisions to ensure the code
is adhered to by subscribing nations. This is facilitated by the consultative mechanism,
and is further supported by an investigation mechanism within the code.
Frost & Sullivan 14

15. Although the EU CoC does not explicitly define the issue of Space weaponisation, the
EU CoC strongly disagrees with the developing and testing of ASAT, such as the Chinese
ASAT Test in 2007. Europe has intentionally and intelligently not aligned its policies
within the context of military approach to Space security. Europe continues to lobby
international stakeholders creating opportunities for aligning security interests of
multiple actors in line with the Space and security interests of emerging / aspiring Space
fairing nations. Europe’s approach to Space security largely entails a tri-solution, which
includes identifying and addressing the main issues threatening security of Space,
leveraging the capabilities and strategic intent of main stakeholders, and applying the C3
approach to reach agreements, achieve common objectives and successfully deliver joint
programmes. Europe’s Space security focus is on developing a distributed network to
address issues on hand such as European SSA (including orbital debris) and spectrum
issues, Space terrorism, Space traffic and Space weapons.
European SSA System
Another notable development in Europe with regards to Space security is the 2008
initiation of a preparatory programme for the development of a European SSA system.
This is intended to address core threats to the security of Space assets including
surveillance and tracking, orbital debris, efficient Space weather capabilities, and surveys
of near Earth objects (NEO). There is an allocation of €50 million over three years
(beginning 2008) with a mandate to develop the main elements of this programme,
which include:
• Core element - covering governance, data policy, data security, architecture and
Space surveillance
• Optional Elements - Space weather studies, NEO surveillance, and pilot data
centres
• Enabling Capabilities such as supplementary surveillance radars (scheduled to
be discussed in 2011)
Europe is working towards creating a system of systems architecture for SSA, wherein
it will create a vast network of SSA infrastructure based on existing and developing
national capabilities of Member States and even international stakeholders. At a
European level the main stakeholders involved in development and deployment of the
European SSA system are the ESA, European Commission, the EU Council Secretariat-
General, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European Union Satellite Centre
(EUSC), and Member States.
The programme currently includes four projects that will merge to form Space
Situational Awareness (SSA) architecture 7
• First, it is looking to develop a Space survey and tracking system. This involves
a catalogue registering satellites in Space so as to better manage Space traffic.
7The Continuing story of Europe and space Security- A conference organised by Institut Français des Relations
Internationales (Ifri) and the Secure World Foundation- October 2010, http://swfound.org/media/15091/spacesecurityeuropec-
ifri-al.pdf
Frost & Sullivan 15

16. • Second comes long-term studies of Space weather conditions;
• Third, a programme concerning NEOs that should go into implementation
phase; and
• Finally, a networking and data centre.
Attaining full operational capability (FOC) will give Europe a sound platform to conduct
technical exchanges with the likes of the US, aiming at improving the overall
performance of the system. Moreover, it is estimated that the European SSA system
would reduce the quantifiable estimated loss for European assets due to collision with
debris and space weather (circa €332million on a yearly basis on average, not taking
into account the collateral damage due to loss of services for critical satellite
applications) 8. An advanced fully operational SSA system can then be leveraged to
enhance data sharing amongst international and national stakeholders enabling better
tracking and monitoring of orbital debris, Space objects and any potentially threatening
outer Space activities. The potential success of the European SSA system could then be
applied to the formulation of broader international regulations and framework for areas
such as debris mitigation procedures and spectrum management. Largely due to
Europe’s balanced approach to security (without an intensive focus on military), and its
collaborative rather than legally binding proposals, it is strategically positioned to align
and collaborate with international stakeholders in reaching agreements on collective
rules of the road and responsible behaviours within Space.
However, before contemplating the success of such a system it is important to address
some outstanding issues such as dual nature of end-user requirements for both civil and
military, the rules of the road for data acquisition and sharing, categorisation /
classification of assets as national or shared, and the potential access of the assets for
the European SSA system. Initiatives / Programmes such as the Space Data Acquisition
(SDA), which is mainly collecting data and processing it in order to avoid accidents
and/or determine responsibilities if they take place, are enabling tools of this system.
Frost & Sullivan suggests Europe should approach these issues in a consultative
approach with an aim to define activities and expectations for each stakeholder. While
undergoing the consultations with the European stakeholders it will be important to
consider the impact of emerging rules of the road in relation to its implementation in
the broader international framework in the future.
Space Terrorism, as mentioned earlier in this paper, is a growing threat for Space assets.
Europe should leverage its access and positioning within the Space hierarchy to
increase awareness of this very real danger. Leading by example would be the suggested
route for Europe, wherein it could introduce ‘counter-terrorism’ measures for Space as
a part of the broader European Space Security Strategy.
8 A new space policy for Europe: Independence, competitiveness and citizen’s quality of life, Reference: IP/11/398, April
2011,
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/398&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr
Frost & Sullivan 16

17. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Space security has attained enough critical mass, such that it is an integral part of most
Space discussions and forums. Europe has the benefit of a unique institutional model
based on the C3 approach, which it should leverage for leading the formulation of a
broader international framework proactively, including a well defined UN Space Policy.
However, in the short-term the EU should work closely with additional countries and
the receptive space powers to create an acceptance of the EU CoC. If countries are for
now in full agreement with these initiatives (countries such as Russia and China may be
more interested in pushing through the PPWT) Europe should continue to reach out to
other stakeholders / countries. In light of (in the medium to long term) a broader
acceptance of these rules of the road, and the changing environment of Space security
(considering orbital debris / collision and other basic issues), Europe would have
established a convincing argument for the historical Space powers to buy into a broader
international framework for Space and Space security.
Europe’s ability to implement these policies is largely dependent on the voluntary buy-
in from the stakeholders within EU and in the Rest of the World. Frost & Sullivan
expects the successful implementation / adoption of such policies to Space security will
not only provide a safe and sustainable operating environment for Europe and other
Space participants, but it will further create opportunities for the industry. The
successful implementation of such rules of the road are driven by the advances in R&D
of efficient data collection and analysis, better imaging and surveillance technologies,
spectrum and orbital location optimisation, safer technologies and systems, low cost -
high efficiency solutions, and other technologies and applications. This will generate a
stream of R&D and market opportunity for industry participants. Frost & Sullivan
suggests that while positioning these policies to the decision makers the EU and ESA
put forth the direct and indirect market opportunities, and not just focus on the costs.
Frost & Sullivan 17

18. Oxford
4100 Chancellor Court
Oxford Business Park
Oxford, OX4 2GX, UK
Tel: +44 (0) 1865 398600
Fax: +44 (0) 1865 398601
C O N TAC T
US
London
4, Grosvenor Gardens,
London SWIW ODH,UK
Tel 44(0)20 7730 3438
Fax 44(0)20 7730 3343
Auckland
Bangkok
Silicon Valley
Beijing
331 E. Evelyn Ave.
Bengaluru Suite 100 Mountain View, CA 94041
Bogotá Tel 650.475.4500
Fax 650.475.1570
Buenos Aires
Cape Town San Antonio
7550 West Interstate 10, Suite 400,
Chennai
San Antonio, Texas 78229-5616
Colombo Tel 210.348.1000
Delhi / NCR Fax 210.348.1003
Dhaka
Dubai
enquiries@frost.com
Frankfurt
http://www.frost.com
Hong Kong
Istanbul
Jakarta
Kolkata
Kuala Lumpur
London
Mexico City
Milan
Moscow
ABOUT FROST & SULLIVAN
Mumbai
Manhattan
Frost & Sullivan, the Growth Partnership Company, enables clients to accelerate growth and achieve
Oxford
best-in-class positions in growth, innovation and leadership.The company's Growth Partnership Service
Paris provides the CEO and the CEO's Growth Team with disciplined research and best-practice models to
Rockville Centre drive the generation, evaluation, and implementation of powerful growth strategies.
San Antonio Frost & Sullivan leverages 50 years of experience in partnering with Global 1000 companies, emerging
São Paulo businesses and the investment community from more than 40 offices on six continents. To join our
Seoul
Growth Partnership, please visit http://www.frost.com.
Shanghai
Silicon Valley
For information, please contact:
Singapore
Sophia Antipolis
Frost & Sullivan
Sydney
Sullivan House
Taipei
4 Grosvenor Gardens
Tel Aviv
London SW1W 0DH
Tokyo
UK
Toronto
Warsaw
Telephone: +44 (0) 207 343 8383
Fax: +44 (0) 207 730 3343
18