The document provides background information on aircraft navigation and flight planning. It discusses the differences between visual flight rules (VFR) and instrument flight rules (IFR), as well as basic navigation techniques for VFR pilots such as pilotage and planning routes using aeronautical charts. It also mentions the importance of accounting for wind in flight planning to avoid being blown off course.

1. The year 1985 was particularly costly in human terms
for commercial air carriers. Six major incidents during those 12 months cost over
1300 people their lives.
One of the most horiffic of these incidents was the loss of a British Airtours
Boeing 737-200 at Manchester International Airport. The Greek Islands enjoyed a
significant increase in tourist traffic during the 1980s, and British Airtours, a
subsidiary of British Airways, carried many hundreds of thousands of these
tourists from Britain. In the early morning of August 22, 1985, a full compliment
of 130 passengers boarded the aircraft at Manchester, bound for the Greek island
of Corfu.
While the passengers stowed overhead luggage, the cabin crew prepared for a
busy flight. On the flight deck, pre-flight checks passed routinely, and
the aircraftproceeded to the holding area just off runway 24. Cleared for take-off,
the Captain released the brakes and the aircraft began to accelerate smoothly
along the runway. As the aircraftapproached V1, the flight crew heard a loud
thump. Believing that a tire had burst they immediately aborted the take-off run,
and informed the control tower of their predicament.
However, what the flight crew had heard was the port engine partially
disintegrating. Parts of the engine casing ruptured the fuel tank next to the
engine, and as the aircraft began its emergency deceleration, aviation fuel gushed
over the red hot exhaust and ignited.
This fire was not immediately indicated on the flight deck, where the crew was
still under theillusion that a tire had burst. The flight crew then used the power of
the engine reversers to arrest the progress of the airliner, which served literally to

2. fan the flames. When the aircraft finally turned off the runway and ground to a
halt, the blaze was already intense. Aviation fuel spilled out of the wing tank and
formed a flaming lake on the concrete. To further hamper the evacuation, the
prevailling wind then fanned the flames towards the aircraft, burning into the
passenger cabin within half a minute.
By: Chris Kilroy
Conditions were perfect for a routine scheduled
flight by PSA (Pacific Southwest Airlines) Boeing
727-200 N533PS on the morning of September 25,
1978.
Flight 182 was flying the daily morning service of
California's largest feeder airline from Sacramento
toSan Diego, via Los Angeles. While it was on the
ground at Los Angeles, on and off loading
passengers, a single-engine Cessna 172, N7711G,
took off at 08.15am from Montgomery Field, a
municipal airport seven miles northeast of San Diego's main airport, Lindbergh Field.
At the controls of the Cessna was David Lee Boswell, who was taking instrument flying
lessonsfrom his instructor, Martin Kazy. Montgomery Field was not fitted with an ILS
(Instrument Landing System), so Boswell flew the seven miles to Lindbergh, and began
practice approaches, simulating landings from west to east. San Diego's airport was fitted
with the latest ATC equipment, as well as a computer-controlled conflict alert warning
system.
Boswell has completed two practice ILS circuits and was leaving the vicinity of Lindbergh
Field when the PSA 727 arrived in the area.
Lindbergh Tower told Boswell to fly north-east and to stay below 3,500ft. He complied
initially, and then, without informing the ATC controllers, he changed course, bringing his
Cessna on to the same path as the oncoming jet.
PSA 182 had the Cessna clearly in view at 09.00. In the course of the next minute, the
experienced crew of the 727 lost sight of the Cessna as it continued its climb. Assuming that
they had overtaken it, they continued with their planned approach and descent.
An amateur photographer photographed N533PS just
before impacting the ground (File Photo).

3. Meanwhile, the conflict alert warning system began
to flash on the screens in the San Diego ATC
facility. Such alerts were a common occurance in the
busy Lindbergh control zone, so the tones were
simply ignored. As the Boeing crew had already
indicated that they had the Cessna in sight, the
controllers took no further action, other than to
notify the Cessna's crew once more of the jet's
presence behind them. There was no
acknowledgement and just three quarters of a minute
later, the two aircraft collided.
The 727 was carrying more than six tons of fuel, much of it in the wing tanks. The explosion
and subsequent fire-ball that followed the collision "felt like 200 degrees" according to one of
the witnessses on the ground. Another said she saw her "apples and oranges bake on the
trees."
Investigators determined that the 727 struck the ground in a high speed nose down attitude,
while banked 50° to the right.
From the moment of impact with the Cessna, it took just 17 seconds to transform Flight 182
from a fully functional airliner in to a mass of burning wreckage spread out over four city
blocks. The crash destroyed 22 houses and numerous cars in North Park, and killed 7
residents, as well as the 144 people on board the flight. The tower pilots onboard the Cessna
were also killed.
Investigative Findings
1. The primary cause of the disaster was that the crew of PSA flight 182 lost sight
of the Cessna and did not tell San Diego ATC that they had done so.
2. The controllers failed to appreciate that PSA 182 had lost sight of the Cessna, or
even that there was some confusion as to its position. This should have been
obvious from the radio transmissions recieved from the 727.
3. The possible presence of a third, unidentified and unauthorized aircraft may have
confused the crew of PSA 182 as to the position of the Cessna.
4. ATC procedures were confused and poorly coordinated, allowing the controllers
to authorise visual separation procedures when a radar service was available.This
would have been safer, giving lateral and vertical separation between both aircraft.
5. The controller failed to advise Flight 182 as to the direction of the movement of
the Cessna.
6. The pilot of the Cessna didn't maintain his assigned heading of 070 or inform
ATC that he was diverting from his course. Had he maintained his position the
accident would never of happened.
7. San Diego Approach Control had failed to react to the conflict alert warning (both
visual and aural). No warning was passed to either pilot.
8. San Diego Approach Control did not restrict Flight 182 to a minimum height of
4,000ft while it was within the Mongomery Field traffic area. Had it done so, the
collision would not have occured
The wreckage of PSA Flight 182. (File Photo)

4. 18
1 | 2
Date: 19 August 1980
Airline: Saudi Arabian AL
Flight No.: 163
Aircraft: L1011-100
Location: Riyadh, S. Arabia
Fatalities: 301:
By: Chris Kilroy
Choose Photo:
1 | 2
Date: 13 January 1982
Airline: Air Florida
Flight No.: 90
Aircraft: B737-222
Location: Washington, DC
Fatalities: 74:79+5
Photographer: Unknown
The aircraft crashed into the Potomac River on takeoff from Washington National Airport in snowy conditions after the pilots forgot to
activate their engine anti-ice systems, which led to erroneous engine indications and a lack of sufficient power to climb. The aircraft
impacted the 14th Street Bridge, killing 5 motorists

5. January 13, 1982 brought one of the worst blizzards in
history to Washington, D.C. Businesses closed early,
schools closed their doors, and even Congress
recessed early. Washington's National Airport had
been closed all morning, but re-opened by 12:00 pm.
Sitting at gate B12 was Boeing 737-222B, in
command of the aircraft, were Capt. Larry Wheaton
and First Officer Roger Pettit, both relatively young
pilots enjoying their new jobs at Air Florida. The
flight was scheduled to depart at 2:15, but both men
knew that time would come and go.
Just before 1:40 pm, the airport was closed so that crews could plow the field's one
instrument runway, 18/36. It was scheduled to re-open at 2:30. Despite the delay,
Air Florida elected to begin the boarding process, and all passengers were on board
by 2:30. Meanwhile, Capt. Wheaton had ordered de-icing to begin. The tower told
him to expect a further delay, and he requested that de-icing be halted. 'Palm 90'
was number 11 for departure when the airport reopened.
At 3:00, Wheaton instructed de-icing to continue, and the job was done by 3:10.
Ground personnel reported only a "light dusting" of snow on the wings. At 3:23
pm, 'Palm 90' was cleared to push from the gate and the towing equipment was
attached. Due to the deep accumulations of snow, however, the TUG was
unsuccesful in its attempts to push the aircraft, and contrary to company policy,
Wheaton elected to use the reverse thrust to back the airplane out of the gate. The
reversers were engaged for a minute and a half, but only succeeded in sucking
large amounts of storm debris into the engines. Finally, cooler heads prevailed, and
a TUG with chains attached was called in. The aircraft was successfully pushed
back.
'Palm 90' then proceeded to taxi into position behind a New York Air DC-9, the
last of sixteen aircraft in line for takeoff. With a light snow still falling, Wheaton
decided to use the hot exhaust from the preceeding DC-9's engines to melt the
snow off the wings, which in the end only had the effect of pushing it to the
trailing portion of the wing to refreeze. The aircraft's anti-ice system was unable to
de-ice this portion of the wing, not that it made any difference.
While running through the takeoff checklist, the following conversation took place:
CAM-2: Air conditioning and pressurization?
CAM-1: Set.
CAM-2: Engine anti-ice?
(File Photo)

6. CAM-1: Off.
When the Cockpit Voice Recorder tape was played back after recovery, there was
much disagreement about Capt. Wheaton's response to "anti-ice." Many of the
investigators could not accept the fact that, despite the freezing 20 degree
temperatures and 25+ inches of snow on the ground, Wheaton said "off." The tapes
were taken to the FBI Labs in Washington for analasys, and it was concluded that
the word was, in fact, "off." Apparently, despite the weather, the crew had
forgotten to activate the anti-ice systems.
At 3:59 pm, 'Palm 90' was cleared for takeoff with the remark "no delay on
departure, if you will, traffic's two and a half out for the runway," added a few
seconds later by ATC. Pettit advanced the throttles, and quickly responded "real
cold, real cold," implying that the engines reached the takeoff EPR of 2.04 before
the throttles had been fully advanced. Throughout the entire takeoff roll, the First
Officer tried to inform the Captain that something wasn't right, but it was in vain.
Wheaton was sure everything was in order:
15:59:51 CAM-1 It's spooled. Real cold, real cold.
15:59:58 CAM-2 God, look at that thing. That don't seem right, does it? Uh, that's
not right.
16:00:09 CAM-1 Yes it is, there's eighty.
16:00:10 CAM-2 Naw, I don't think that's right. Ah, maybe it is.
16:00:21 CAM-1 Hundred and twenty.
16:00:23 CAM-2 I don't know.
16:00:31 CAM-1 Vee-one. Easy, vee-two.
At rotation speed, the aircraft pitched up
sharply, causing Wheaton to reply "easy." It
was a known fact that ice buildup on the wings
of a 737 can cause a tendancy to pitch up.
Pettit's correction of the nose-up attitude,
however, failed to resolve the problem and the
stickshaker immediately began to sound.
Wheaton called "Forward, forward, easy. We
only want 500," refering to the altitude at
which the airplane had to be to make the 40
degree turn to the left around the Washington Monument and the restricted
(File Photo)

7. airspace over the Capitol.
"Come on. Forward, forward. Just barely climb," exclaimed Wheaton as the
aircraft continued to stall. Moments later the aircraft was no longer climbing, but
falling back to earth.
"Stalling, we're falling."
"Larry, we're going down Larry."
"I know it."
These are the last words spoken from the
cockpit of 'Palm 90.' The aircraft came
down directly on top of the 14th Street Bridge, which spans the Potomac River and
is a major route from the Virginia suburbs into the city. Four automobiles were
crushed, resulting in five deaths on the ground. The aircraft then impacted the icy
water and quickly sank to the bottom. In the hours after the crash, only four
passengers and a Flight Attendant would be pulled alive from the icy water.
The investigation of the crash concluded that the combination of the crew's use of
thrust reverse on the ground, and their failure to active the engine anti-ice system,
caused the crash. By failing to activate the engine anti-ice, the large amouts of
snow and ice that were sucked into the engines during reverse thrust use was
allowed to remain there, unchallenged. The ice buildup on the compressor inlet
pressure probe, the probe which measures engine power, can cause false readings,
as was the case here. The indications in the cockpit showed an Engine Pressure
Ratio of 2.04, while the power plants were in reality only producing 1.70 EPR, or
about 70% of available power. The combination of the ice covered wings and low
power caused an immediate stall on takeoff that resulted in 74 lives lost.
Introduction
In the very early days of powered flight, pilots were content
simply to get airborne and fly short distances. It was
not long, however, before they began to fly further and
had a need to find their way safely and efficiently to their
desired destination, thus leading to the development of air
navigation. This was initially based on nautical navigation,
hence the term aeronautical. Navigating a course in the
air is fundamentally different from navigating on land or at
sea, as one cannot simply stop in order to decide the best
course to follow. An airplane can also only carry a limited
amount of fuel and failure to reach its destination (or another
safe landing area) before this fuel runs out might well have
fatal consequences (for more on this see Unit 10).
VFR / IFR
Nowadays all flights operate under VFR (Visual Flight
Rules) or IFR (Instrument Flight Rules). A VFR pilot
is qualified and authorized to fly only in good weather
conditions and is responsible for maintaining separation
from other aircraft and obstructions on the basis of what
he / she can see. An IFR pilot is permitted to fly in all
weather conditions, when visibility may be low, and
relies on flight instruments and navigational aids
to follow a safe course. Most IFR flights take place in
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8. controlled airspace where air traffic control services issue
instructions to pilots to ensure the safe and efficient flow of
traffic. When you board a commercial flight, it is probably
flying under IFR, but if a friend or relative offers to take you
up in an airplane around your local area on a sunny day,
then this is most likely flying under VFR.
Basic navigation (VFR navigation)
In the early days of flight, navigational aids did not exist
and the basic technique followed was pilotage. Flights
were at low altitude and the pilot simply looked out the
window and navigated with reference to known landmarks.
In some cases, it was just a question of following a road,
river or railway to the desired destination. While a VFR
pilot today will still use this technique, there is an obvious
danger of getting lost, particularly if bad weather sets
in suddenly. VFR pilots are nowadays advised to plan
their flight carefully before taking off using the detailed
aeronautical charts they have at their disposal. They
plan their route, taking into account natural obstacles and
Unit 2: LOST
Su bject background:
NAVIGATION AND FLIGHT PLANNING
airspace which may be restricted or controlled (they will
either need prior authorization to enter or it may not be
open to them at all). They then mark this route on their
charts.
For all aircraft, and light aircraft in particular, wind is an
important factor in flight planning. A pilot who tries to fly
along a planned route risks being blown off course unless
a suitable heading is chosen based upon meteorological
forecasts of wind strength and direction. The chosen
heading will probably need to be altered in flight in
response to changes in the strength or direction of the
wind. Note that the word track is also used to refer to
the actual route taken by the pilot when, as frequently
happens, the flight plan changes.
A heading is expressed in degrees with magnetic north
as a reference. It should not be confused with the term
bearing, also expressed in degrees, where an alternative
reference is explicitly stated (e.g. a particular beacon).
For example a pilot may be heading due west (a heading
of 270°) having just passed directly over a beacon, in
which case the pilot has a bearing of 180°in relation to this
beacon.
A technique known as dead reckoning serves as a
check that all is going to plan. The pilot selects some
easily recognizable landmarks along the planned route
and calculates how long it will take to reach these points
taking into account both the planned airspeed and wind.
These points are known as checkpoints, and when the
planned time has elapsed the pilot expects to identify the
landmarks on the ground. When this happens he / she
has made a fix and can confidently proceed with the next
stage along the planned route.
The magnetic compass is the basic navigational aid that a
VFR pilot will use.
Despite all their training and the existing regulations, VFR
pilots do get lost from time to time, fly into airspace that
they shouldn’t normally be flying in, or find themselves in
IMC (Instrument Meteorological Conditions), such as
flying through cloud, for which they are not necessarily
equipped or trained. The consequences are potentially
very serious and it often falls to the highly skilled air traffic
controllers or perhaps to other more experienced pilots
who are flying in the vicinity to do what they can to help.

9. A good illustration of an air traffic controller aiding such a
pilot is to be found in Section 3.
lost
19
IFR navigation
The first and most obvious difference in navigation
procedures for IFR is that pilots need to be qualified and
licensed to fly IFR.
IFR pilots usually fly in controlled airspace. They have at
their disposal special charts which indicate recommended
IFR routes between navigational beacons (radio
stations on the ground which emit signals). If they are
travelling in remote areas where there are no navigational
beacons, then they have to determine a suitable route by
themselves. Distances between beacons, the bearings to
be taken and the lowest safe altitude (LSALT) are clearly
marked for the recommended IFR routes.
If an IFR pilot is flying through controlled airspace, he / she
needs to file a flight plan with air traffic control services.
In the case of commercial airlines that repeatedly fly the
same route, they would normally file a repetitive flight plan
that is valid for a certain period.
Navigational aids
ADF (Automatic Direction Finding): ADF is a fairly old
system of radio navigation, but it is still in use today. A
Non-Directional Beacon (NDB) emits a radio signal
and the pilot’s cockpit display will show the direction of
the beacon from the aircraft. This, combined with dead
reckoning, is the system Jay Prochnow was using for
his flight across the Pacific ocean which appears in the
reading in Section 1.
VOR (Very High Frequency Omni-directional Range):
This is a more developed system and is currently the
primary air navigation system in countries where sufficient
infrastructure is in place. A VOR station can determine and
transmit to the pilot the exact direction that will take the
pilot over the point where the VOR station is. Many VOR
stations also have distance measuring equipment (DME)
which informs the pilot of his / her distance from the VOR
station.
GPS (Global Positioning System): Many cars are now
fitted with a GPS system so that you can drive without
consulting a map. Pilots are also now making use of
GPS satellite navigation. Originally very expensive, GPS
equipment is now cheaper to buy and so even if a light
aircraft is not fitted with a GPS cockpit system, many pilots
will use a hand-held device. Had Jay Prochnow been flying
today with such a system available, he would not have
come so close to disaster.
One of the benefits of GPS is the greater degree of
precision that it affords to both pilots and controllers. A
pilot’s position can now be identified within a few metres.
For this reason, required minimum levels of separation
between airplanes are less nowadays than in the past.
One of the criticisms of GPS is that it was developed and
is owned by the US military. It has been freely available
for civilian use for several years, but the worry that one
day this might change has led the Europeans to develop
their own new satellite navigation system, Galileo, which is
expected to be operational in a few years’ time.
Air traffic control
IFR pilots can obviously not follow their desired course
blindly while disregarding other traffic. When flying through
controlled airspace a pilot will often ask for or receive
vectors (instructions as to which heading to take, or we
can say that the controller vectors the pilot) from an

10. air traffic controller who is responsible for ensuring and
maintaining safe separation between aircraft.
f o r f u n
When things go wrong …
Student Pilot: I’m lost; I’m over a lake and heading toward the big E.
Controller: Make several 90°turns so I can identify you on radar … OK then.
That lake is the Atlantic Ocean. Suggest you turn to the big W immediately ...
The pilot is VFR, and the request on the part of the controller that he / she
make 90°turns is a commonly used technique in such cases for quick and
sure radar identification. ‘The big E’ and ‘the big W’ refer to the large letters
displayed on the compass – East and West.
lost
20
Unit 2
lost1 The picture and the question should arouse students’ curiosity. Flying a light aircraft like
this with one engine over long stretches of water is not recommended. You might receive
some strong reactions, particularly if you are teaching airline pilots (or trainee airline
pilots) whose training emphasizes the importance of avoiding any kind of risk. Air traffic
controllers (or trainees) are likely to react in a similar way. It is likely that the students will
be intrigued by the situation and motivated to talk about the risks involved.
(Suggested answers)
The aircraft can’t carry much fuel, which limits how far it can fly at once.
The aircraft doesn’t have sophisticated navigational aids.
There are few landmarks for navigation.
The aircraft only has one engine.
There are few places to land in an emergency.
2 Note that the word incident has a high frequency in aviation English. It refers to any
situation in which one or more things went wrong but which did not actually result in an
accident. Safety and prevention of accidents relies primarily on the systematic study of
incidents and the drawing of appropriate conclusions and recommendations.
a endurance
b fix
c calculate
d incident
e track
f task
3 This text should be clear and the aviation vocabulary is straightforward or has been
defined in Activity 2. HF signals stands for high frequency signals. You might need to
respond to vocabulary questions of a general nature.
(from top to bottom)
Oakland
Hawaii
Pago Pago
Onu-I-Lau
Norfolk Island
4 1 Cessna 188
2 22 hours
3 15 hours
4 110 knots
5 0300
6 1,500 nm
Section one - Across the Pacific
This section introduces the true story of a pilot, Jay Prochnow, who is lost
while crossing the Pacific Ocean on a solo flight in a single-engine plane. The
section teaches the key vocabulary of air navigation and the language function
of explaining abbreviations. It also sets the scene for Section 2 in which Jay
Prochnow is rescued through the efforts of a commercial airline pilot who picks
up his distress call.
lost

11. 21
5 Students read the text a second time in order to make sure they have understood. They might wish
to discuss the situation or you could prompt a discussion with some supplementary questions, e.g.
What will happen if he runs out of daylight? (Navigation becomes impossible and he probably has
to ditch in the ocean with little chance of survival.) How serious is the problem? (Extremely serious
as he’s running out of daylight.)
1 An aircraft sales company in Oakland
2 Charts, a compass and an ADF
3 To give maximum daylight hours.
4 There were no navigational aids.
5 When he couldn’t see Norfolk Island.
6 If you wish to vary the activity, ask students to close their books and work in pairs or small groups
to brainstorm the advice they would give to pilots like Prochnow.
(Suggested answers)
Carry a GPS device.
Be patient and wait for the best meteorological conditions (completely clear skies, a following
wind).
Contact other pilots who have flown a similar route for advice.
Bring some strong coffee or something else to help keep you awake at all time.
Functional English – Explaining abbreviations
1 Students could complete the activity in groups A and B to ensure they have the correct answers
before beginning the information exchange activity.
NDB = non-directional beacon, ADF = automatic direction finder, VFR = visual flight rules
2 Encourage students to help their partner with hints (e.g. giving the first word when there’s more
than one). To feed back on this activity ask students to explain the abbreviations that you don’t
know (or are not sure of). This could be an authentic and useful exchange of information.
DTG distance to go
FAF final approach fix
FDR flight data recorder
OAT outside air temperature
RVR runway visual range
TAS true air speed
TBS to be specified
TOGA take off, go around
ZFW zero fuel weight
ILS instrument landing system
lost
22
Section two -
Finding flight N45AC
This section deals with the rescue of Jay Prochnow. Students listen to the
initial contact he made with Auckland air traffic control and the subsequent
assistance he received from Captain Vette. The listening activity outlines the
considerable aid he received and forms an interesting and challenging listening
comprehension activity. Later in the section students practise giving and
receiving coordinates as well as the pronunciation of regular past tense endings.
1 This is a warm-up activity prior to listening. The aim is for the students to discuss the
possible order of events and review some of the key parts of the pilot-controller dialogue.
2 07, 08, 09 Mayday. Mayday. Mayday. is the standard phrase for declaring an
emergency. Note that pilots may sometimes contact a controller with a problem but not
actually need to or wish to declare an emergency (when in doubt, a controller will ask
Are you declaring an emergency?). Once an emergency has been declared, all possible
assistance will be provided to a pilot, whether from air traffic control services or other
pilots who pick up the emergency call.
1 d 2 e 3 a 4 b 5 c
Unit 2
lost
P = Prochnow, C = controller,
V = Vette
P MAYDAY. MAYDAY. MAYDAY. Auckland Control. N45AC.
I’m lost. I’m a Cessna 188 AgWagon.
C N45AC. Auckland centre roger mayday.
V TE103 contacting N45AC.
P N45AC. Copy.
V N45AC. We are a DC-10 en route from Fiji to New Zealand.
We received news of your situation. We are offering
assistance. Can you tell me what happened?
P TE103. Thanks. Departed Pago Pago at three this morning

12. with around 22 hours endurance. I wanted to have enough
light to see my fixes. But the ADF stopped working
correctly and now unable to calculate my position. N45AC.
V N45AC. We are going to try to establish VHF
communication with you.
07 Listening script
V Turn towards the sun and report your heading.
P Wilco. My heading is 274º.
V N45AC. We are facing the sun. Our heading is 270. The
difference is 4º, so you are south of our position. Now hold
out your hand. How many fingers do you have between the
horizon and the sun?
P About two and a half fingers.
V N45AC. We have four fingers, so you are south-west of our
position. Fly heading 315.
P Heading 315.
V N45AC. Maintain your position, so we can establish your
position using the radio signal. We’ll maintain our heading
until we lose contact. Then we will turn left to re-establish
contact, and then try to box you in this way. We’ll contact
you again very soon. N45AC. It’s getting dark. What
time is your sunset?
P The sun is setting now, and it 0752 zulu.
08 Listening script
V N45AC. Sunset on Norfolk Island is 0730 zulu. That means
you are 5.6º east and 30º south of Norfolk Island.
Maintain your heading.
P TE103. I can see a light. I think it’s an oil rig.
V N45AC. Your coordinates are 31°south 170°21’ east. You
are 150 miles from Norfolk Island.
09 Listening script
23
3 07, 08, 09 Even allowing for the fact that pilots will
always help each other out, the assistance provided
by Captain Vette was quite remarkable. He agreed
straightaway to incur a significant diversion of his
passenger flight in order to search for Prochnow. He also
had little information to go on, making the search very
difficult. The navigational techniques he used to determine
Prochnow’s approximate position were highly innovative
and effective. Note the word transponder in Question 4.
This is the onboard device which allows aircraft to be
identified on a controller’s radar. Even if Jay Prochnow’s
aircraft was equipped with a transponder it would not
have been any use in the remote area he was flying in as
radar coverage was not provided. Had there been radar
coverage in the area, an air traffic controller would have
been able to give him his precise position and help him to
navigate safely to his destination.
1 b 2 b 3 b 4 b 5 a
Vocabulary – Co-ordinates
1 08, 09 Note that according to standard ICAO
phraseology, the following numbers have special
pronunciations in aviation English: 3 tree 5 fife 9 niner.
Numbers are of critical importance and the aim is that
there is no ambiguity in this area. Five and nine could be
confused. The th sound is difficult for many nationalities
to pronounce and hence tree instead of three. That said,
many pilots and controllers (native English speaking or
foreign) do not incorporate these variations when they
communicate on the frequency.
1 274°
2 5.6°east
3 30°south
4 31°south 170°21’ east
5 150 miles
2 10 Students repeat the numbers.
3 Exact positions on the globe are stated longitudinally and
laterally with the Earth’s surface divided into 360°around
each axis. Each degree is divided into 60 minutes and for
further precision a number of seconds can also be stated.

13. In this pair-work information exchange activity, it is
important that students communicate numerical data
accurately. Monitor students’ rhythm and offer them advice
on improving it as necessary.
Pronunciation – Regular past tense endings
1 11 Correct pronunciation of the ed past tense ending
is difficult for many nationalities and it is important in
preventing a possibly serious miscomprehension. Make
sure all students can hear and reproduce the three basic
sounds before moving to the next activity.
lost
north
south
east
west
south-east
north-west
south-west
north-east
274°
56°east
30°south
170°21’ east
14°32’ 40. 25” north
10 Listening script
We received news of your situation.
The ADF stopped working correctly.
I wanted to have enough light to see my fixes.
11 Listening script
2 12 You could do this activity with the whole class.
Encourage students to say each verb. You could model
one or two verbs if they can’t agree, but students should
be able to complete the table without help. Then play the
recording to check.
1 d followed arrived tried
2 t established approached tasked
3 Id contacted departed calculated
1 d followed arrived tried
2 t established approached tasked
3 Id contacted departed calculated
12 Listening script
3 After successful choral repetition, you might elicit some
other regular verbs and ask students which group they
belong to.
4 In this activity students practise reproducing the correct
past tense endings in context.
24
Section three - Lost
This section deals with a situation where a pilot who is qualified to fly only VFR
ends up lost in IMC (Instrument Meteorological Conditions). This is a frequent and
dangerous occurrence, especially with inexperienced pilots or student pilots flying
solo. Often it is the air traffic controller who rescues the pilot by guiding him / her
to safety. As well as providing further relevant listening comprehension practice
for the students, the section focuses on the vocabulary needed to describe
landmarks and also on the functional language of confirming and disconfirming.
1 Before beginning this activity, review
vocabulary for geographical features. Have
students keep their books closed and ask them
the following question: What geographical
features can help a pilot navigate visually?
Write their suggestions on the board, supplying
the vocabulary yourself when necessary.
Then students work in pairs or small groups to
complete Activity 1. Be ready to explain any
words they are not sure of.
1 built-up area
2 lake
3 high ground
4 mast

14. 5 reservoir
6 valley
7 woods
8 fields
9 highway
10 power lines
11 coast
2 13 To provide students with vocabulary
revision before completing the table, ask them
to close their books and elicit answers to the
following question:
What is the most important information
a disorientated pilot needs to give ATC?
(Altitude – the pilot could be dangerously low
depending on the terrain – and endurance
should be high on their lists. Note that
controllers are required to ask how many
passengers are on board.)
1 15
2 south-east
3 Beech Baron
4 3,000
5 110
6 780
7 8
8 1, 30 minutes
3 14 For less confident classes, play the
recording once and ask the students to just
listen. Then play the recording again pausing
at regular intervals to give them time to answer.
trees, fields, road, valley, river, reservoir,
communications mast, high ground
lost
Unit 2
P = pilot, C = controller
P MAYDAY. MAYDAY. MAYDAY. TJB.
C TJB. Pass your message.
P MAYDAY. MAYDAY. MAYDAY. We’re lost.
C TJB. Say last known position.
P Last known position was 15 miles south-east of CELRA VOR. TJB.
C TJB. Roger, last known position 15 miles south-east of CELRA VOR.
Remain straight and level.
P I’m straight and level right now. We’re in total IMC. I can’t see the ground.
C TJB. Squawk 7700 on your transponder sir.
P Squawking 7700. TJB.
C TJB. I don’t have you on my screen. Can you confirm your aircraft type,
altitude and speed?
P We’re in a Beech Baron. Altitude 3,000. Speed 110. TJB.
C TJB. Please state fuel on board and persons on board.
P I have 780 lb of fuel, and eight persons on board. Endurance is
approximately one hour and 30 minutes … I can see the ground now.
I can see trees, and I can make out … high ground on each side of
the aircraft …
13 Listening script
C TJB. Can you fly into VFR?
P Affirm … I can see high ground to the north. I’m flying up a valley, with
woods to the north, and fields below me. There is a road below me.
C TJB. Confirm that you can see a road.
P Affirm. I can see a road.
C TJB. What side of the valley is the road on?
P The highway is to my right, on the south side of the valley.
C TJB. Can you make out a river?
P Affirm. There is a river.
C TJB. Is the river on the north side of the road?
P Affirm. The river is … no … the road is crossing the river. The river is now
on the south side of the road.
C TJB. Can you clarify that the road crossed the river and is now on the
south side of the road?
P Negative. The road is now on the north side of the river. The road is now
turning south-east. There’s a reservoir below me now.
C TJB. Can you see a communications mast at 12 o’clock, at about 4 miles?
P Affirm. There is a communications mast at 12 o’clock.

15. C TJB. Turn hard left and make a 180º turn, heading 265. Expedite.
P Making a 180º left turn, heading 265. TJB. I’m coming out of the
valley and I can see a built-up area and a lake at one o’clock. TJB.
C TJB. There is an airport with a tower 5 miles north-west. Say intentions.
P I’d like to land. Can you give me vectors?
14 Listening script
25
Functional English – Confirming and disconfirming
1 14 You could review the sentences with the students before listening to the dialogue and get them
to predict the answers. After completing the activity, you could review question formation with students.
1 Can 2 Confirm 3 Can 4 Is 5 Can you clarify 6 Can you see
2 14
1 4 2 4 3 4 4 then, 8 5 8 6 4
3 14 As well as an effort on the part of the controller to speak more slowly and clearly (as in this
example), rephrasing or a reformulation can also help when the pilot is having difficulty understanding
(or vice versa). Most controllers and pilots who are speaking English as a foreign language do this
automatically. Controllers and pilots who are native English speakers, on the other hand, are sometimes
criticized for their lack of sensitivity when checking, confirming and clarifying instructions. You could
discuss with your students some of their experiences and difficulties in this area.
(2) is slower and clearer. Requests to confirm information must be spoken slowly and clearly.
Speaking
This is a free practice activity. Explain to students that they will reuse the language they have studied in
this section and that they should confirm, check and clarify the information given by Students A and B.
When they have done the activity once, you might like to change pairs and change roles and do it again.
You can add an extra challenge this time by telling the pilots to deliberately read back wrongly one of the
controller’s instructions.
lost
4 14 Get students to listen again and draw the pilot’s path on the map. In large classes, students
could work in groups, then exchange their maps with other groups to check their answers.
26
Section four - Language development
Functional English – Simple past
1 1 made
2 happened
3 reported
4 departed
5 flew
6 did not reach
7 landed
8 believed
9 was
10 were not
2 1 Why did you make
2 When did you notice
3 Did you decide
4 Why did you land
5 How did the fire start
6 How many passengers did you have
3 1 took place / happened
2 avoided
3 detected
4 steered
5 was
6 was
7 crossed
8 took place / happened
9 issued
10 blamed
11 didn’t tell
lost
Unit 2
Confirming and disconfirming
1 Say last 4 what you 7 Negative
2 that correct 5 can see 8 give further
3 Affirmative 6 Confirm that
Vocabulary
1 1 d 4 i 7 e

16. 2 b 5 h 8 c
3 g 6 a 9 f
2 1 Maintain 4 lose 7 box
2 establish 5 turn 8 contact
3 maintain 6 re-establish 9 getting
3 type of land urban area harbour
high terrain farmland cemetery
marshland features lighthouse
desert bridge ridge
plain footpath
This is a role-play activity where the students work in pairs. First Student A is a TV journalist
interviewing Jay Prochnow and Student B is Jay Prochnow. Then Student A is Captain Vette
and Student B is a TV journalist.
Before students start, review what happened to Jay Prochnow and how Captain Vette rescued
him (Sections 1 and 2). Students will then need ten minutes preparation time to do the activity
and to think of two additional questions. With more confident classes, you can explain that they
are not obliged to follow the script.
If you have access to recording equipment, you could video the students’ interviews. You
should seek your students agreement if you plan to do this.
Photocopiable activity
Key
Questions for Student A
1 Why were you flying for such a long distance across the ocean?
2 What special preparations did you make for this flight?
3 When did you realize you were lost?
Questions for Student B
1 Why did you ask Jay Prochnow to fly towards the sun?
2 How did you establish his exact position?
3 What advice did you give him?
27
Unit 2
Photocopiable
activity
Role card for Student A
First you will play the role of a journalist. You are going to conduct an interview with Jay
Prochnow.
Look at the words below and put them in the correct order to make questions. Then write two
more
questions. After you finish the interview you will play the role of Captain Vette and answer your
partner’s questions. When you and your partner are both ready, conduct the two interviews. You
may choose to ask additional questions depending on the responses you receive.
1 a / across / distance / flying / for / long / ocean / such / the / were / why / you
?
2 did / flight / for / make / preparations / special / this / what / you
?
3 did / lost / you / realize / were / when / you
?
Additional questions:
?
?
Aviation English Te acher’s Book
© Macmillan Publishers Limited 2008
Role card for Student B
First you will play the role of Jay Prochnow and answer your partner’s questions. After you
finish the interview you are going to play the role of a journalist. You are going to conduct
an interview with Captain Vette. Look at the words below and put them in the correct
order to make questions. Then try to write two more questions of your own. When you and
your partner are both ready, conduct the two interviews. You may choose to ask some
additional questions depending on the responses you receive.
1 ask / did / Jay Prochnow / to / fly / sun / the / towards / why / you
?
2 did / establish / exact / his / how / position / you

17. ?
3 advice / did / give / him / what / you
?
Additional questions:
?
? By: Darryl Morrell
For the flight crew of Captain Harold Green and
his First Officer, Patricia Eidson, Sunday March 3rd
began just like any other day. They were on a second
day of a busy schedule flying Boeing 737s on a
number of domestic flights throughout the western
United States. The evening before, they checked into
ahotel in Denver, ready to take over the flight from
another crew early the next morning. On the morning
of the 3rd they wererostered to take over from another
crew, Boeing 737-200, N999UA. The aircraft was
operating as flight 585 from Peoria, Illinois,
to Colorado Springs, via Moline and Denver. The
aircraft departed Peoria on schedule at 5am. The flight to Moline and on to Denver
was completely uneventful and it touched down ahead of schedule in Denver. The
previous crew handed the aircraft over to Green and Edison, reporting no problems
on the trip to Denver. The aircraft was checked by the dispatch engineer and apart
from the avionics door latch being out of its stowed position, he reported no
problems with the aircraft and the crew were told that it was fully servicable to
carry on the next sector of the flight.
The weather center reported good conditions for the next leg, with visibility at 100
miles and the temperature at 49° F. On board the aircraft there were 20 passengers,
with 3 flight attendants to look after them.
The aircraft took of as normal with the Captain flying and the First
Officer handling the communications. The flight to Colorado Springs was expected
to take about 20 minutes. The departure controller vectored them on to a heading
of 140° ready to intercept the designated airway, V81, to Colorado Springs. Three
minutes later the crew were cleared to maintain 11,000ft. The aircraft called
Approach control reporting their present altitude and that it had copied
"Information Lima" from the ATIS transmission. This information current for the
last 40 minutes was reporting "...wind 310 at 13 knots, gusting to 35, low level
wind shear warnings are in affect, occasional severe turbulence reported by
numerous aircraft between FL180 and 380. Local aviation wind warning in effect
calling for winds out of the northwest, gusts to 40kt and above."
Approach instructed 585 to proceed to the VOR, then leave it on a heading of 165°
in preparation for being vectored to Runway 35 for a visual approach. The
The wreckage of United Airlines 585. (File
Photo)

18. controller reported current winds as 320 at 13kt, gusting to 23kt.
Several minutes later ATC cleared the 737 to descend to 10,000 feet and 3 minutes
later requested they descend to 8,500 feet. When the aircraft reported "airport in
sight" they wereinstructed to maintain 8,500 feet until on base leg, then they
were cleared for a visual approach to runway 35, and to contact the Tower on
119.9Mhz. On final the Captain was flying the aircraft, the first officer was
handling communications, the runway was in sight, the aircraft was configured,
and the checklist was complete. The aircraft was turning from its 45° intercept to
the extended runway centerline, and the first officer called "we're at 1,000 feet."
Dozens of witnesses in the community directly under the extended centerline
watched as the airplane levelled off momentarily on the runway heading, 3.5 miles
from the threshold. Then, it rolled to the right, pitched down until reaching a nearly
vertical attitude, and compacted itself into a 39-foot wide, 15-foot deep crater in an
area known as Widefield Park. All onboard were killed.
The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) tape for the last
12 seconds of the flight indicated the crew was
completely surprised by the upset and attempted
corrective measures. Two seconds after calling "1,000
feet," the first officer exclaimed, "Oh, God." The
captain called, "15 flaps," an indication that he was
initiating a go-around. The first officer responded
"15." The following five seconds contained only
exclamations as the crew tried to regain control.
For the last 20 seconds, the Flight Data Recorder
(FDR) showed the rate of heading change consistent
with a 20-degree (right) bank angle and a turn for alignment with the runway.
Sixteen seconds prior to the crash, the thrust was increased to about 6,000 pounds
per engine (from 3,000 pounds). As the thrust was increasing, the first officer made
the "1,000 feet" call.
Within the next four seconds (about nine seconds prior to the crash), the heading
rate increased to about five degrees per second to the right, nearly twice the rate of
a standard turn. The first officersaid, "Oh, God," - the altitude decreased rapidly;
the indicated airspeed increased to over 200 knots; and the normal acceleration
increased to over 4g.
"The two most likely events that could have resulted in a sudden uncontrollable
lateral upset," said the Safety Board, "are a malfunction of the airplane's lateral or
directional control system or an encounter with an unusually severe atmospheric
disturbance. Although anomalies were identified in the airplane's rudder control
system, none would have produced a rudder movement that could not have been
An aerial view of the United 585 crash site.
(File Photo)

19. easily countered by the airplane's lateral controls. The most likely atmospheric
disturbance to produce an uncontrollable rolling moment was a rotor (a horizontal
axis vortex) produced by a combination of high winds aloft and the mountainous
terrain. Conditions were conducive to the formation of a rotor, and some witness
observations support the existence of a rotor at or near the time and place of the
accident. However, too little is known about the characteristics of such rotors to
conclude decisively whether they were a factor in this accident."
During the course of the investigation, NTSB personnel interviewed several
sailplane pilots who spend their spare time chasing thermals along Colorado's
Front Range. These aviators probably know as much (if not more than) the region's
professional meteorologists about the wind flows around the peaks and through the
passes.
The sailplane pilots seemed to agree that rotors are a fairly common occurrence
and that they sometimes touch the ground on the lee of the mountains. They often
are present along with mountain waves and lenticular clouds.
One of the Safety Board's recommendations stemming from this investigation is
that the FAA develop a meteorological aircraft hazard program to include airports
in or near mountainous terrain. This program would be based on research
conducted at Colorado Springs to observe, document and analyze potential
meteorological aircraft hazards with a focus on the approach and departure paths.
HISTORY OF THE AICRAFT INVOLVED:
The 737-200, built in Renton in 1982, started out as part of Frontier Airline's fleet.
Four years later, Frontier sold the plane to United and it was assigned tail number
N999UA.
On a Feb. 25, 1991, flight, N999UA's rudder deflected inexplicably to the right.
The problem went away when the pilots switched off the yaw damper, a device
that automatically commands small rudder adjustments during flight. Mechanics
replaced a part called the yaw-damper coupler and returned the plane to service.
Two days later, a different flight crew reported N999UA's rudder again moving to
the right. The new coupler evidently had made no difference. This time mechanics
replaced a valve in the yaw damper and returned the plane to service.
Four days later, on the blustery morning of March 3, 1991, Captain Harold Green
and First Officer Patricia Eidson were bringing N999UA down for a routine
landing in Colorado Springs. At 1,000 feet, the jet suddenly flipped to the right and
dived straight down, smashing into a city park and killing all 25 on board.

20. The pilot of a Cessna flying near the airport called the tower with a bird's-eye
account: "We just saw the plane . . . uh just suddenly a complete downward dive."
From the control tower, air-traffic
controller Kevin Ford reported from
another perspective: "It looked like a dropped pencil going straight down."
It didn't take long for errant rudder movement to surface as a possible cause of the
crash. Witness reports and readings from the plane's flight-data recorder confirmed
that the 737 had traced a classic aerobatic maneuver, known as a "split-S," into the
ground.
A split-S results from radically altering the symmetry of flight. Such a quick or
severe change would be consistent with the right engine or right wing falling off,
but that had not happened. The pilots could have moved the rudder to the extreme
right, but to do so within 1,000 feet of the ground would be suicidal. The other
possibility was that the rudder had moved on its own.
Investigators with the National Transportation Safety Board were unfamiliar with
the make up of the plane's rudder-control system when they arrived in Colorado
Springs to comb through N999UA's wreckage.
ACCIDENT SUMMARY:
Discovery of the PCU (power control unit) recovered from the wreckage showed
wiring to the solenoid was loose and the circuit intermitent, this could have been
the cause of the uncommanded rudder yaws in previous flights. Also the weather
conditions in mountain ranges were looked at.
A test flight the next day in the area reported severe windshear in the vicinity.
The NTSB, in early-2001, cited a rudder system malfunction, leading to a loss of
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21. rudder command by the crew, as the primary probable cause of this accident.
By: Chris Kilroy
It was just after 6:00pm on the evening of February 2, 1991 and USAir
flight 1493 was preparing to land atLos Angeles International
Airport in California. Six crew members and 83 passengers were
aboard the 737 during its three hour flight from Columbus, Ohio. On
the ground, Skywest's flight 5569 was preparingfor takeoff. The
Metroliner carrying 10 passengers and two crew was bound for
Palmdale, California, flyingone of the many rush hour commuter
flights out of theLos Angeles area. USAir 1493 was cleared for the ILS
24L approach as Skywest 5569 was taxing away from the gate towards
runway 24L. Due to traffic, Skywest 5569 was cleared to taxi to 24L and enter at the intersection of taxiway 45,
some 2,200ft from the runway threshold.
As the Skywest Metro awaited its takeoff clearance, USAir 1493 touched down near the threshold of runway
24L and shortly thereafter slammed into 5569. Both aircraft skidded down the runway, the Metro crushed
beneath the 737's fuselage. The wreckage came to rest on the far side of the taxiway against an empty building.
All 12 in the Skywest aircraft were killed as were 21 people in the USAir 737, including the Captain.
Clearly both aircraft believed they had sole use of the runway at the time of the crash. In order to determine the
the origin of the confusion, a careful analysis of radio transcripts and ATC procedures at Los
Angeles International was begun. After receiving clearance from Clearance Delivery, the flight strips go
directly to the local controller(LC), bypassing the ground controller(GC). While this lessened the GC's
workload by not having to mark the flight strips, it actually increased the LC's workload by denying them
information regarding the aircraft's position on the field. Aircraft were allowed to request intersection
departures directly from the GCs. Because Skywest 5569 was taxing from the south side of the airport, it had
been in contact with both GC1 and GC2 on its way to runway 24L and had been cleared to hold short at taxiway
45 before contacting LC2.
In its initial call to LC2, it reported "at [taxiway] 45 we'd like to go from here if we can." After the accident,
LC2 reported that she had not heard the "at [taxiway] 45" part of the transmission. Because the flight strips
bypassed the GCs, there was no indication for LC2 as to the aircraft's position. LC2 then cleared 5569 to taxi up
to and hold short of runway 24L which was acknowledged. During this time, another flight, Wings West 5006,
had just landed and was attempting to clear the runway. The crew had inadvertently changed frequencies and
was out ofcontact with LC2. Skywest 5569 was cleared into position and hold on runway 24L.
The wreckage of USAir Flight 1493. (File Photo)

22. Communications with Wings West 5006 was re-established just after this instruction and several seconds were
spent with uneccesary transmissions regarding the loss of communication. Southwest 725 was
also preparing for takeoff at the time and LC2 also cleared it to taxi up to and hold short of runway 24L. Just
after this, USAir 1493 called for landing clearance "on the left side, two four left." LC2 confirmed that
Southwest 725 was holding short and then cleared 1493 to land. Shortly thereafter, Wings West 5072 called
ready for departure. There was no flight strip in front of LC2 for 5072, so she and several others began a search
for it.
It was found still at the Clearance Delivery station, believed to still be waiting for initial contact. Just after the
strip was found, LC2 saw 1493 touchdown and cleared 725 to taxi into position and hold. Just seconds after this
transmission, 1493 collided with 5569 still sitting in position and holding at the intersection of taxiway 45 and
runway 24L.
The First Officer of 1493 reported that the touchdown was normal. As the nose was being lowered, he reported
that the landing lights began to reflect on 5569's propellers and its rear position light became visible. Maximum
braking was applied, but there was insufficient space and time to avoid the collision. He did not report hearing
that another aircraft had been placed into position on runway 24L even though 1493 had come on to
LC2's frequency prior to the instructions.
LC2 was clearly distracted by several events in the few short
minutes prior to the accident. Allowing 5569 to make an
intersection departure was acceptable and she cleared the flight into position prior to giving 1493 landing
clearance. The initial confusion with 5006 caused her to lose awareness of 5569's position. The futher confusion
regarding the flight strip of 5072 caused her again to avert her attention from the situation on the active
runways. She later said she had believed 5072 taxied in front of the tower to runway 24L was actually 5569 and
formed a mental picture that all was correct.
The NTSB cited many factors as contributing to the cause of the accident. Primary was Air Traffic Control
procedures at Los Angeles International Airport. The FAA later required LAX to revise its flight strip handling
to relieve the local controllers (LCs) from carrying the full responsibility of flight strip marking and handling
and allowing better awareness during high workloads. LC2 was also cited for becoming distracted and allowing
a breakdown in awareness during the incident period. The NTSB also cited lighting placement on the Metro,
showing that its light blended with and were not conspicuous against the runway environment background
during low light periods. Although both flight crews were operating within their ATC clearances, they were
both still responsible for "see and avoid" operations since conditions were VFR.
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By: Chris Kilroy

23. Spain's Canary Islands are situated 250 nautical
miles off the Moroccan coast of North Africa.
They have, for many years, been a popular
tourist attraction for people wanting the best of
weather any time of the year. Ancient Greek
and Roman seafarers knew them as the
"Fortunates Isles." Tenerife these days is
served mainly by the airport in the south of the
island, known as Reina Sofia, but years ago the
Island was served by the airport up in the north
of the island, known as Los Rodeos. Los
Rodeos is still used today, but mainly only for
domestic flights around the islands, or for
cargo flights. The events leading up to this accident started on the Island of Las
Palmas, which is also part of the Canary Islands.
Sunday March 27, 1977 should have been no different than any other spring day at
Las Palmas Airport, with the usual flights operating from all over Europe and the
Atlantic. But at 1:15 that afternoon, the passenger terminal was thrown in to chaos
and panic after a small bomb planted by a terrorist exploded in a florist's shop in
the terminal concourse. The authorities were warned of this fifteen minutes prior,
so although the bomb caused much damage to the building, no one was killed. 8
people, however, were injured, one seriously.
Telephoning the Spanish airport administration afterwards, a spokesman for a
militant Canary Islands independence group, speaking from Algeria in north
Africa, claimed responsibility for the explosion and hinted that a second bomb was
planted somewhere in the airport. On hearing this, the local police had no option
but to close the airport and not to take any further chances, pending a thorough
search for the second device. All international incoming flights were then diverted
to Tenerife's Los Rodeos Airport, which was less than one hour of flying time
away.
KLM Boeing 747-206B PH-BUF Rijn (Rhine River)
A map showing the location of the Canary Islands, off
Africa's west coast.

24. Among the
flights to be
diverted was
a charter trip
flown by
KLM's
Boeing 747,
PH-BUF.
Operated by
KLM as
Flight
KL4805 on
behalf of the Holland International Travel Group, it had departed Amsterdam's
Schiphol Airport that morning at 9:31 a.m. local time, carrying 234 passengers
escaping the harsh cold winters of Northern Europe for the sunny climates of the
Canary Islands. They included 3 babies and 48 children. Most were Dutch, but
there were also two Australians, four Germans, and two Americans on the flight.
In command of 4805 was Captain Jacob Veldhuyzen van Zanten, KLM's chief
training Captain for Boeing 747s. Van Zanten had been flying since 1947, and had
been a pilot with KLM since 1951, when as a 24 year old, he commenced duty as a
first officer on the company DC-3s. He now had nearly 12,000 hours experience,
with more than 1500 hours on the Boeing 747. Most of his time, however, was
spent in simulators training other pilots.
After its four-hour trip from Amsterdam, across Belguim, France and Spain, PH-
BUF touched down at Los Rodeos Airport at 1340 hrs GMT (1:10 p.m .local time).
The fabled Canary Islands failed to live up to its reputation for fine weather, as
those on board the KLM 747 were greeted with the sight of low cloud sand light
rain, and light fog looming over the airport in the distance.
The apron area, together with a section of the taxiway, was already occupied by
diverted aircraft, so on landing, the controller directed the 747 to vacate the runway
via the last intersecting taxiway and to park their aircraft on the holding area next
to a Norwegian Boeing 737. Shortly afterwards a DanAir 727 and a Sata DC-8
landed and were both directed to park in the same area.
Pan American Boeing 747-121 N736PA (Clipper Victor)
At 1:45 pm local time (a little more than a half hour after the arrival of PH-BUF)
the Pan American 747 landed and taxied to the same holding area, parking directly
behind the KLM 747. N736PA, flight number PA 736 had orginated in Los
Angeles, where 364 passengers, most of them of retirement age, had boarded
"Clipper Victor" for the first stage of a charter flight to Gran Canaria. Here they
The wreckage of KLM Boeing 747 PH-BUF. (File Photo)

25. would join the Royal Cruise Line's ship "Golden Odyssey" for a twelve day
Mediterannean Highlights cruise. Departing LAX late the previous afternoon ,they
had flown direct to Kennedy Airport in New York. The aircraft was refuelled, 14
additional passengers boarded, and there was a change of crew. After 90 minutes
on the ground, the aircraft took off for Las Palmas. On approaching the Canaries
six hours later the crew were informed of the temporary closure of the airport and
diverted to Tenerife's Los Rodeos airport.
This was unwelcome news to the crew, who had already been on duty for eight
hours. The diversion would just add more hours to the trip, and there were also the
passengers to consider - most of them had aleady been on the aircraft for 13 hours
as it was. Many were tired and the majority of them were no longer young ,so it
was taking a greater toll on them. The Pan Am Captain, Victor Grubbs, a 57 year
old, 21,000 hour pilot sensed from the Spanish air traffic controller's instructions
that Las Palmas was expecting to reopen before long and, knowing that his aircraft
had more than adequate fuel reserves, asked to possibly be put in a holding pattern
until it did open. His requests were denied and therefore N736PA had to land and
join the rest of the waiting aircraft on the ground at Los Rodeos.
By the time the two aircraft were ready to depart the weather had deteriorated
somewhat to the fact that there was a good deal of thick fog descending on to the
airport.
At first the KLM passengers were not allowed to leave the aircraft, but after about
twenty minutes they were all transported to the terminal building by bus. On
alighting from the bus, they received cards identifying them as passengers in transit
on Flight KL4805. Later, all the passengers boarded KLM 4805 except the
H.I.N.T. Company guide, who remained in Tenerife. The Pan Am passengers
stayed on their aircraft the whole time it was on the ground, only the doors being
opened for them to get some fresh air and to take some photographs of what
scenery they could see from the aircraft.
When Las Palmas Airport was opened to traffic once more, the PA1736 crew
prepared to proceed to Las Palmas, which was the flight's planned destination.
When they attempted to taxi on the taxiway leading to runway 12, where they had
been parked with four other aircraft on account of the congestion caused by the
number of flights diverted to Tenerife, they discovered that it was blocked by
KLM Boeing 747, Flight 4805, which was located between PA 1736 and the
entrance to the active runway. The First Officer and the Flight Engineer left the
aircraft and measured the clearance left by the KLM aircraft, reaching the
conclusion that it was insufficient to allow PA1736 to pass by, obliging them to
wait until the former had started to taxi.

26. KLM 4805 called the tower at 16:56 requesting
permission to taxi. It was authorized to do so
and at 16:58 requested to backtrack on runway
12 for takeoff on runway 30. The tower
controller first cleared the KLM flight to taxi to
the holding point for runway 30 by taxiing
down the main runway and leaving it by the
(third) taxiway to its left. KLM 4805
acknowledged receipt of this message from the tower, stating that it was at that
moment taxiing on the runway, which it would leave by the first taxiway in order
to proceed to the approach end of runway 30. The tower controller immediately
issued an amended clearance, instructing it to continue to taxi to the end of the
runway, where it should proceed to backtrack. The KLM flight confirmed that it
had received the message, that it would backtrack, and that it was taxiing down the
main runway. The tower signalled its approval, whereupon KLM 4805
immediately asked the tower again if what they had asked it to do was to turn left
on taxiway one. The tower replied in the negative and repeated that it should
continue on to the end of the runway and then backtrack.
Finally, at 16:59, KLM 4805 replied, "O.K., sir." At 17:02, the PA aircraft called
the tower to request confirmation that it should taxi down the runway. The tower
controller confirmed this, also adding that they should leave the runway by the
third taxiway to their left. At 17:03:00, in reply to the tower controller's query to
KLM 4805 as to how many runway exits they had passed, the latter confirmed that
at that moment they were passing by taxiway C-4. The tower controller told KLM
4805, "O.K., at the end of the runway make one eighty and report ready for ATC
clearance."
In response to a query from KLM 4805,
the tower controller advised both aircraft
that the runway centerline lights were out of service. The controller also reiterated
to PA1736 that they were to leave the main runway via the third taxiway to their
left and that they should report leaving the runway.
As the Pan American aircraft approached its turnoff in the thick fog, the First
Officer noticed the landing lights of the KLM aircraft looming through the fog. At
first, they appeared stationary, but as several seconds passed, it became obvious
that they were shaking. First Officer Bragg yelled to the Captain "Get off, get off!"
at which point full power was applied and the Captain turned the aircraft left
towards the grass. Captain van Zanten on the KLM aircraft desperately tried to
rotate and climb out before the Pan Am aircraft, as was evidenced by a 3-foot deep
gash in the runway from the aircraft's tail.
A diagram showing the orientation of runways and
taxiways at Los Rodeos Airport, Tenerife, as well as the
location of the debris field following he accident.Click for
a larger view.
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27. The KLM aircraft collided with the Pan Am airplane just after liftoff, and
proceeded to climb to approximately 100 feet before losing control and crashing.
The Pan Am aircraft immediately burst into flames and broke into several pieces.
There were no eyewitnesses to the collision.
Place of accident:
The accident took place on the runway of Tenerife Airport (Los Rodeos) at latitude
28° 28' 30" N and longitude 16° 19' 50" W. The field elevation is 2,073 feet (632
m).
Injuries and Fatalities to persons aboard KLM4805:
None of the 234 passengers and 14 crew survived the accident.
Damage to KLM Boeing 747 PH-BUF:
The aircraft lifted off briefly before the collision with the Pan Am aircraft, but due
to severe damage caused on impact, fell back to the runway 250 yards after impact.
The aircraft was totally destroyed by fire.
Injuries and Fatalities to persons aboard PA1736:
Of the 16 crew on board, there were 9 fatalities, 7 survivors + 2 company
employees who were sitting in the cockpit jump seats. Of the 317 passengers on
board, 61 survived the accident ,but 9 died of their injuries at a later date.
Damage to Pan Am Boeing 747 N736PA:
The aircraft was written off in the accident due to the severe impact caused by the
KLM aircraft, and the resulting fire. Between 15 and 20 tons of Kerosene was later
recovered from the one remaining wing that survived the fire.
Accident Investigation:
There were many questions regarding the cause of this accident:

28. 1. Why had Captain van Zanten commenced take off with out the ATC clearance
to do so?
2. Why had Captain Grubbs been instructed to vacate the runway at taxi way 3,
which would have taken him back towards the main apron, and not T4 which
would have put him on the holding point for runway 30?
3. Why did the KLM crew not grasp the significance of the Pan Am aircraft's
report that it had not yet cleared the runway, and would report again to the tower
when it did?
The final accident report found that Jacob Van Zanten was solely responsible for
the accident. The fundamental factors in the development of the accident were the
facts that van Zanten:
- Took off without being cleared to do so.
- Did not heed the air traffic controller's instruction to stand by for take off.
- Did not abandon take off when he knew the Pan Am aircraft was still taxiing.
For the passengers who had a view out of the portwindows aboard BOAC Flight 712 to Zurich, enroute to
Sydney, Australia, it must have seemed that their worst nightmares had come true. One and a half minutes after
takeoff on the clear and sunny afternoon of April 9, 1968, the no.2 engine of Boeing 707 G-ARWE broke away
from its mounting pylon and fell, tumbling in flames, over Hounslow, on the fringe of
London's Heathrow Airport. For Captain Charles Taylor and his four companions on the flight deck, the drama
had begun 80 seconds earlier, and confusion had added to the difficulties.
Captain Taylor lifted Flight 712 off of runway 28L at 15.27hrs. Besides his First Officer and engineering
officer, the flight deck also housed an acting first officer and a supervisory captain running a routine check on
Captain Taylor's performance. Twenty seconds into the flight with the undercarriage up and locked and noise
abatement power time approaching, there was a loud bang and the crew felt a shock tremor. The throttle lever
for the no.2 engine kicked back towards the closed position, and the engine's instruments showed it was slowing
down.

29. Engine Failure
The Captain ordered "Engine Failure Drill" and the flight engineer immediately began
to carry out the first actions of the drill, which included fully retarding the throttle
lever. Because the under carriage was fully retracted, the warning horn sounded as he
did so, and the check captain and flight engineer both reached for and pulled
simutaneously the horn cancel switch which was located on the pedestal. At the same
time instinctively, but in error, the first officerpunched the fire bell cancel button in
front of him, and the flight engineer reached for the engine fire shut-off handle but did
not pull it.
The lack of a flight voice recorder made it impossible to establish a second-by-second
timing of events, but at about this time the check captain glanced out of the port
side window and saw the number 2 engine was ablaze. He suggested that Captain
Taylor should turn back to the airport and land. The number 2 engine fire shut-off
handle light came on, and though the alarm did not sound, Captain Taylor ordered
'Engine Fire Drill' as the first officer began to put out a 'Mayday' call.
As the flight engineer switched from 'Engine Failure Drill' to 'Engine Fire Drill,'
carrying out the check list from memory as required by regulations, Captain Taylor was turning the aircraft back
towards Heathrow and the crosswind Runway 05, simultaneously descending from his achieved height of 3,000
feet. Just as the undercarriage was lowered and locked and full flap selected, the number 2 engine fell away.
Fortunately, the undercarriage was unaffected, but the flaps ran out to only 47 degrees, three degrees short of
their maximum. There was no glide slope guidance for Runway 05, but despite the damaged flaps, the need to
decelerate from the achieved speed of 225 kts, and indication that number 1 engine might fail, Captain Taylor
managed an extremely smooth touchdown about 400 yards beyond the threshold.
He immediately brought wheel brakes andreverse thrust on
engines 1 and 4 engines into play to halt the aircraft as soon as
possible, for by now the fire in the port wing root was so hot that the window mountings were melting.
The reverse thrust deflected the flames further in towards the fuselage, and as the captain ordered engine shut-
down and fire drill, there was a sudden explosion.
The port wing fell off at the root, and the blast buried flaming debris over to the starboard side of the aircraft.
The time elapsed between rotation and touchdown had been just three minutes, 32 seconds. While the flight
crew scrambled from the flight deck window to assistpassengers from the chutes on the starboard side,
passengers were already making their way along the starboard wing and down from the rear and forward galley
doors. Two escape chutes were damaged by the fire and burst, but of the 127 people aboard, 123 had escaped
before the arrival of the fire and rescue services, which had been held up in crossing busy runways. Thirty eight
people received treatment for injuries, and five, including a stewardess, were overcome by heat and fumes and
died aboard G-ARWE. An investigation later discovered that the fire in the engine had been caused by the
failure of a low pressure compressor wheel, due to fatigue.
An amateur photographer
photographer 712 as its no.2
engine (encircled) dropped away.
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