1. Syria, the Royal Prerogative and the House of Commons. How the British Constitution
is under direct threat.
Since Tony Blair allowed a vote in the House of Commons in March 2003 on whether or not
to commit to the Invasion of Iraq, a political precedent has been set that has forced the hand
of the Prime Minister to no longer rely on the royal prerogative should he and his cabinet deem
that foreign policy require the use of HM ArmedForces abroad. This paper will set out to argue
that this relatively recent trend is both unconstitutional and a threat to not only the foreign
policy making capabilities of Government, but also national security.
Introduction
1. Not since Lord North was forced to resign after the House of Commons voted for no
more further military action in the American War of Independence in 1782 has a British
Prime Minister failed to achieve a vote on deploying the armed forces abroad
(www.shipofstate.com accessed 22nd
December 2015). That David Cameron felt
compelled to even issue a vote to the House at all over strikes in Syria in August 2013
is indicative of how foreign policy has changed over the last decade. Through the royal
prerogative granted to the Prime Minister to act in the monarch’s name no formal vote
has to be issued to parliament, and thus the act of committing armed force oversees
remains the sole responsibility of the executive.
2. Through the discourse of the invasion of Iraq, through to the air campaign in Libya in
2011 and finally concluding with the votes in the House of Commons regarding strikes
in Syria in both 2013 and 2015, a dangerous narrative has been set that now gives
Parliament an unprecedented authority over the Government when deploying the
armed forces abroad. It will be looked at in much further detail the fact that this new
‘parliamentary prerogative’ (Strong, 2014, 605) is unconstitutional. By compelling the
Prime Minister into policy that would otherwise be disregarded at the highest level, this
has far-reaching implications for British defence and foreign policy. While some argue
that this power Parliament have recently been enjoying is good for British democracy
(Pass, 2013) this paper argues not only that it is detrimental to British democracy, but
that it is also highly damaging to British national security.
3. Two types of evidence and sources will be discussed. First, the historical context of
these events and how it is only a recent occurrence that has allowed Parliament this
action. The events surrounding the vote in 2003 on Iraq and subsequent votes
regarding Libya and Syria will be explored, examining how it was to be that Parliament
was allowed greater power. Second will be the legality issue of the British constitution
regarding both the executive’s and Parliament’s war powers. The House of Lords
Constitution Committee report of 2013 - 2014 into these affairs will be explored to
extract precisely what, if any, legal and formal role Parliament has in both committing
and rejecting to commit an armed forces deployment. Following this conclusions
regarding the legality of Parliament having a vote or not will be drawn and
recommendations made concerning the issue of the unconstitutional nature of this
business.

2. March 2003: Iraq
4. The build-up to war with Iraq had been so long that by early 2003 forty six percent of
the British population had grown deeply suspicious of Tony Blair’s motives and,
through them, a proportion of Parliament also (YouGov poll 2003). To carry the weight
of legitimacy Blair lacked in the invasion plans of Iraq he allowed Parliament, for the
first time since Churchill forced Atlee into issuing a substantive motion regarding the
Korean War, a vote on whether to send armed forces oversees. Up until as late as
January 2003 Blair was willing to maintain using the Westminster model in structuring
his plans, by relying on using the royal prerogative (Blair 2003). After much build up in
the House of Commons by his own backbenchers Blair, confident in not only his own
mission, but also that of the invasion itself within a legal framework, was convinced
he’d win a vote and he did, conferring upon him the need for legitimacy to the British
public. This notion of legitimacy is extremely pertinent to Politians in the contemporary
political arena.
March 2011: Libya
5. Eight years later from the Iraq vote, and this time a new Government and a new Prime
Minister were in charge. When the issue arose of whether to deploy the RAF to Libya
on humanitarian grounds, what happened next was to change the course of
Parliamentary war powers for the foreseeable future. UN approval had made
intervention in Libya legitimate enough for David Cameron to authorise the use of
armed force by using the royal prerogative. This was not to be enough, however, for
the new Prime Minister’s first foray into intervention. Since Blair had set the precedent
for allowing Parliament a vote military intervention, Cameron subsequently felt
compelled to offer one over Libya. Combined with the Security Council endorsement,
this made Cameron appear very open and honest, and was important to keep the
coalition Government together. A further benefit to Cameron was that this all further
distanced himself from his controversial predecessor, Blair (Strong 2014).
August 2013: President Assad
6. The most damaging of the votes regarding Parliamentary war powers to the British
constitution came in August 2013 surrounding whether or not to deploy the armed
forces in retaliation to the widely believed chemical attacks on civilians by Syrian
President Assad in that state’s ongoing civil war. Then Foreign Secretary William
Hague had said that any intervention would be subject to Parliamentary approval (BBC
News Online, 9th
June 2013). It is widely considered this was to help further avoid any
comparison with Blair, and especially any negative media speculation (Strong 2014
615). That the convention had now been well and truly established whereby allowing
Parliament a say on matters of suchgravitas helped embolden it further still and denied
the Government the right to deploy the armed forces in Syria. Without the UN
resolutions Cameron had enjoyed concerning Libya and likewise Blair had for Iraq, the
Prime Minister had to rely on opposition support to convey the needed legitimacy. This

3. highlights the dangerous aspect of partisanship and divides over party lines, especially
with regards to an issue of suchimportance. The House divided, and Cameron lost the
vote by 285 against to 272 for.
December 2015: Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
7. In December 2015 a similar re-run of the 2011 Libya vote occurred. Like the Libya
vote, the Prime Minister had express authorisation to strike ISIL in Syria, under UNSCR
2249. He still, because of the convention set since 2003, felt compelled to take the
matter before the House of Commons and decree a vote, again insisting to respect the
outcome. The vote was passed, but a significant factor which made a big difference
compared with the Libya vote was that Cameron was enjoying a majority Conservative
government, and not a weaker coalition as in 2011.
The Royal Prerogative
8. Now the circumstances surrounding the events of the military being deployed, or not,
since 2003 have been established, these can now be looked at from within a
constitutional framework. The British constitution can best be described as ‘uncodified’
in the sense that no one single piece of legislation can be said to be the sole authority.
Rather, a series of laws and bills passed since Magna Carta in 1215 and the Bill of
Rights 1689 have been collectively referred to as the British constitution. This can
make certain policies problematic when deciding on the legality of said policy. The
royal prerogative is the power by which, through the inherent delegation of the
monarch,the Prime Minister as the countries executive, can act in the monarch’s name
concerning certain matters. One of these is the deployment of the armed forces. A V
Dicey defines the royal prerogative as ‘The residue of discretionary or arbitrary
authority, whichat any given time is legally left in the hands of the Crown’ (Dicey1959).
This would suggest very strongly in favour of the Crown’s powers left unto the Prime
Minister, in this case relating to the matter of deploying the armed forces. Indeed, even
trying to find where in these bills and acts the royal prerogative is mentioned as to
armed force is difficult. The Ministry of Justice report ‘Review of the Executive Royal
Prerogative Powers: Final Report’ (Ministry of Justice 2009 8) acknowledges this but
states that the existence and the extent of the royal prerogative is clear and a matter
of common law. It further states one of the best sources for clarification of the royal
prerogative dates back to ‘A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown’
(Chitty 1820) where it states;
‘It is only by assigning the exclusive power of managing and executing state measures to one
individual that they can be effectively and properly transacted. For these reasons the
constitution had made the King the delegate or representative of the people, with regard to
foreign affairs’.

4. 9. While the House of Lords isn’t a policy or law creating body it is designed to keep a
check of both Parliament and Government (www.parliament.uk accessed at 23rd
December 2015). In 2013 the Second Chamber issued a report on the use of armed
force entitled ‘Constitutional arrangements for the use of armed force report’ (Authority
of the House of Lords 2013). It sets out the legal position of who may authorise
deployment of the armed forces thus, ‘Her majesty’s armed forces are deployed under
the royal prerogative, exercised in practice by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet’.
Parliament’s traditional role
10. Now that the royal prerogative has been explored and the Prime Minister’s power to
deploy the armed forces clarified, the traditional role of Parliament must be explained
and what, if any, power it has over this issue. The House of Lords report of 2013 lays
out Parliament’s role extremely succinctly;
‘Parliament has no legal role in authorising or approving the useof the armed forces oversees’.
11. Sir George Young, then Leader of the House of Commons,said in the run-up to strikes
in Libya in March 2011 that;
‘A convention has developed in the House that before troops are committed,the House should
have an opportunity to debate the matter. We propose to observe that convention exceptwhen
there is an emergency and such action would not be appropriate. As with the Iraq war and
other events, we propose to give the House the opportunity to debate the matter before troops
are committed’. (Hansard 1066)
12. This notion of a ‘convention’ to give parliament a debate and a vote on deploying armed
forces has been used in numerous literature. The Cabinet Manuel printed in 2011
states;
‘In 2011, the government acknowledged that a convention had developed in Parliament that
before troops were committed the House of Commons should have an opportunity to debate
the matter’.
Conclusion
13. It has been shown that there is indeed no legal basis for Parliament to presume a vote
on matters relating to the use of the armed forces abroad, and this power rests
unequivocally with the Prime Minister. It has been shown, through a series of bills and
evidence that for parliament to override the Government when wishing to deploy the
armed forces is nothing short of unconstitutional.

5. Recommendations
14. This report has the following recommendations to make in regards to this concern.
 As James Strong remarks, referring to the vote in 2003 on Iraq ‘no one thought to ask
what the constitutional implications might be’. This is highly poignant, and needs to be
readdressed as a matter of urgency.
 The Westminster model of democracy must be observed, including that of the war
powers of this state resting firmly with the executive and the Cabinet in having the
flexibility to use the royal prerogative when required.
 The role of Parliament should be one of observation and accountability, not in holding
a veto power. The convention has been set to allow Parliament a debate on
deployment issues but by allowing the House of Commons a veto right over the Prime
Ministers’ foreign policy and armed forces deployment policies is highly
unconstitutional.
 Though the make-up of the British constitution is uncodified, by formalising
Parliament’s exact role in this matter would be highly beneficial for future debates.
There are strong proponents that this should be the necessary action taken, including
Jack Straw who, as former Lord Chancellor from 2007 – 2010, put forth a detailed
resolution which would have formalised parliaments role in both ‘debating and voting
on Government decisions to deploy troops overseas’ (House of Lords Report 2013).
 This paper seeks to recommend that the above proposal would henceforth clarify all
conflicting prejudice regarding Parliament’s authority to veto the Prime Minister’s
inherent right to unilaterally deploy the armed forces abroad. A Parliamentary
Resolution detailing the precise power of Parliament relating to this issue has already
been suggested (The Political and Constitutional Affairs Select Committee of the
House of Commons 2014) and the findings of this report concur to the immediate
actionizing of this Resolution.

6. References
Bibliography
Blair. T, 2003, Prime Minister’s Appearance before the House of Commons Liaison
Committee, 21st
January 2003
Chitty. J, 1820, A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown, London, Joseph
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December 2015
Dicey. A. V, 1959, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, London, Macmillan,
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