RAKHINE STATE CRISIS AND MYANMAR ECONOMY

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Rakhine Crisis and Myanmar Economy
By Khin Maung Nyo (Economics)
I haven’t voiced my opinion on Rakhine crisis as the State authorities and experts have been discussing it quite
extensively; however, now that the topic falls within my area of expertise, I’m going to express my views.
These days, news agencies, especially foreign news outlets, ask this major question:
“Can Rakhine crisis affect Myanmar economy?”
I myself have never thought it could. That’s why I asked them how the two were related. Then, I realized why.
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In fact, this article should have been written in English in the first place. But the fact that I am not well-versed in
diplomatic terms may give rise to misinterpretations; thus, I’ve put it down in Myanmar.
During the television interviews, I’ve tried to express my thoughts in English as much as I could as those interviews are
meant for international audience.
Here is what I’ve gathered. “International communities are concerned about Rakhine crisis. Therefore, foreign
investments could be delayed as there is no political stability in Myanmar. This in turn would slow down Myanmar
economic development”, they said! Well, well, well!
It would be entirely wrong for the investors to base their business decisions on false news.
Foreign investments are obviously needed for the development of Myanmar. To that end, Myanmar is trying to
cooperate with international communities. The international communities should welcome and acknowledge it, shouldn’t
they? Why do they choose to believe fake, fabricated news and turn a blind eye to the benefits of millions of people?
Till now, Myanmar has not received tangible investments from the West. Majority of investments come from her
neighboring Asian countries. Myanmar is still in the process of penning bilateral trade agreements with some European
countries, and American sanctions against her have not been lifted altogether. Therefore, it is hard to say that the
investments, which have not even arrived here, could be slowed down. The list of some top foreign investors in
Myanmar has remained the same for years, without any significant change. Myanmar has issued a new Foreign
Investment Act which guarantees that foreign investors will be treated and protected equally as local investors.
Most of the trading has been with neighboring countries. Myanmar is still far from enjoying GSP opportunities – a
current buzzword.
There has been a great deal of political progress in Myanmar, the most obvious one is the civilian government in office.
International communities should welcome such progress made within a year and a half, rather than comparing it with
the sort of progress that can be achieved after more than a hundred years. A look into the history of Myanmar will
reveal that it has never given into the pressure of any superpower. It has also withstood years of economic sanctions.
While devising economic strategies and investment plans for the development of Rakhine region, there may be those
who are uninterested as well as those who want to invest. Of course, people have different views on risks and
opportunities. We, on our part, need to welcome investments which correspond with our economic policies for the
benefits of our country.
Although it may not directly impact tourism industry as the current crisis is in the region that is not frequented by
foreign tourists, there may be those who have cancelled their trips out of panic, based on false rumors.
This crisis will not affect current investment either, because such investments are situated off-shore and in the south of
Rakhine. It should be noted that this crisis did not begin overnight; it began in 2012. Nevertheless, investment in the
region did not drop – it has increased gradually.
We notice that some ASEAN member countries, neighboring countries and even some far-flung countries can
understand the situation and sympathize with us.
The silver lining is this Rakhine crisis is that the Government, the Parliament and the public have become united more
than before.
“Blood is thicker than water” and this fact is a notion that no one can put a price tag on!
Translated by Soe Than
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10/7/2017 Crisis puts more pressure on Rakhine’s troubled economy | Frontier Myanmar
https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/crisis-puts-more-pressure-on-rakhines-troubled-economy 4/13
Crisis puts more pressure on Rakhine’s troubled economy

Crisis puts more pressure on Rakhine’s troubled economy
Wednesday, September 20, 2017
Mail
Despite ambitious plans for a development project in Maungdaw aimed at boosting trade with Bangladesh,
businesspeople in Rakhine say the state’s economy is in deep trouble and may take years to recover from
the unfolding crisis.
By MRATT KYAW THU | FRONTIER
AS A grim humanitarian crisis continues to put a spotlight on Rakhine State, plans are continuing for an economic development
zone in conflict-hit Maungdaw Township, officials said.
The Rakhine State government has signed a memorandum of understanding to develop the zone with the Naff River Galaxy
Infrastructure Development Group, which was registered as a company on September 5, show records from the Directorate of
Investment and Company Administration.
Speaking more than two weeks after the August 25 attacks by fighters from the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army that triggered the
crisis, U Aung Naing Oo, the director-general of DICA, said he didn’t believe that the conflict would affect investment.
“The current crisis in Rakhine is not really an obstacle for investment,” he told Irrawaddy.
Rakhine State Minister for Finance and Planning U Kyaw Aye Thein said the Maungdaw project would have some features of a
special economic zone but would be administered by the state government rather than the Union government.
Investors will be able to lease land in the zone at low cost and will pay zero tax, he said.
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Kyaw Aye Thein said Naff River Galaxy Infrastructure Development Group was a consortium of “about seven” businesses from
Maungdaw and Yangon, but declined to give names.
The state government had encouraged Maungdaw business leaders to form a consortium after holding informal talks with them
about the plan and they had invited investors from Yangon to partner in the project, he said.
The company’s two directors are U Kyaw Naing Than, who holds a Citizenship Scrutiny Card issued in Maungdaw Township, and U
Kyaw Tint, who holds a CSC issued in Yangon’s Lanmadaw Township. DICA records show that neither man holds any other
directorships.
Kyaw Aye Thein said the planning for the project had begun well before August 25 and expressed confidence it would go ahead,
despite the situation in northern Rakhine.
Most trade between Rakhine and Bangladesh is conducted through Maungdaw or the state capital, Sittwe. Since the crisis began,
the export of products such as rice and ginger through Maungdaw has stopped but trade has continued between Sittwe and
Bangladesh.
“The crisis is only affecting the export of goods from Maungdaw to Bangladesh; the other trading is continuing,” said U Shwe
Maung, chairman of the Sittwe-based Economic Initiative Company, a trading firm.
Shwe Maung, who trades in tea-leaf and rice shipped between Sittwe and Yangon, said he and his associates welcome the plans
for an economic zone in Maungdaw because they believe it will lead to more business with Bangladesh.

A woman walks past a vendor selling vegetables at a market in northern Rakhine State. (Nyan Hlaing Lynn | Frontier)
To do business in Bangladesh, Myanmar traders usually have to go there to arrange contracts. The traders say that the
development of economic zones or trade zones with modern infrastructure and incentives such as zero tax would provide
opportunities for increased trade with Bangladesh.

However, bilateral trade faces challenges.
“There’s not much to trade between the two countries, and the percentage of Myanmar exports to Bangladesh is low, so much
would need to be done to expand trade,” Shwe Maung told Frontier.
Many are hoping that the underdeveloped Rakhine economy will benefit significantly from other projects.
An agreement was signed in 2014 to develop the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone, on Rakhine’s Ramree Island, where China has
funded an oil and gas terminal. Meanwhile, in early August India unveiled plans to back the development of an SEZ near Sittwe.
The fisheries and livestock sector also has rich potential for growth in Rakhine. However, re-development plans for the sector were
disrupted by the violence that followed the attacks by ARSA in October last year.
“We made a five-year growth plan for 2017-2022 but it was ended by the crisis in 2016,” said U Nyunt Wai, the director of the
Rakhine State Fisheries, Livestock and Agriculture Department under the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation.
The department had been working with international partners to develop the livestock and fisheries sectors in Rakhine, but the
partners abandoned the plan and their funding commitments after the October attacks.
“The international partners would have provided K143.75 billion [about US$105 million) over the five years to 2022, but our
government can’t afford such an amount and we had to change our plans,” Nyunt Wai said.
After the international partners abandoned the project, the Rakhine government asked the department to change the plan to a
one-year project, Nyunt Wai said. The department had also cut the project budget to K1.6 billion for one fiscal year, he said.
“But I don’t know if the project documents are on the table, or under the table at the regional government office,” said Nyunt Wai.
Rakhine State Chamber of Commerce chairman U Tin Maung Oo said activity at his businesses, which includes interests in hotels,
pharmaceuticals and construction, had stalled.
“Some say that the current crisis is not affecting business in the state, but we are facing a big problem now,” he told Frontier.

Tags: Rakhine State
economy
conflict
Bangladesh
trade
foreign investment
Tin Maung Oo said he had accrued debts totaling millions of kyat since the attacks in October last year.
He said the Rakhine economy had been in trouble since 2012, when years of communal tensions erupted into violence.
“I think we will have to wait for the state’s economy to develop and I’m afraid it might be a wait of many years,” Tin Maung Oo
said.
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Mratt Kyaw Thu
Mratt is a Senior Reporter at Frontier. He began his career at Unity Weekly Journal in 2010 and focuses on political reporting.
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10/7/2017 Economic focus for Rakhine relief | The Myanmar Times
https://www.mmtimes.com/business/8212-economic-focus-for-rakhine-relief.html 3/13
1. Home
2. » Business
3. » Economic focus for Rakhine relief
Economic focus for Rakhine relief
Fiona Macgregor 22 Sep 2013

Khin May Htway, 36, is a Rakhine Buddhist who lost her home in the conflict. She has moved to a government-built settlement on the edge of
Sittwe, where she sells ornaments. Photo: Fiona MacGregor
When ethnic tensions erupted into bloody riots in Rakhine last year the immediate toll of the destruction to life and property was graphically
evident.
Less instantly obvious was the long-term financial fallout. It has hit not just those who lost breadwinners, businesses and property in the
riots, but also the entire state and Myanmar’s international reputation as a stable place to do business.

As concerns grow about the impact of Rakhine’s troubles on foreign investment, some experts say a focus on the economic costs of
sectarianism can help change attitudes.
It’s an idea that is increasingly making itself felt and can be heard from diverse and influential figures including government ministers,
opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, religious figureheads and business analysts.
When the national government announced earlier this month it was launching the tender process for the Kyaukpyu special economic zone in
the south of Rakhine, ministers downplayed the trouble and sought to assure international investors that they had nothing to fear from local
tensions.
U Maung Maung Thein, deputy finance minister and vice chairman of the Kyaukpyu SEZ bid evaluation committee, said, “The conflict is not
very huge, not a gigantic problem ... They are not insurmountable problems. It can be tackled in due course.”
Rakhine‘s newly appointed minister for planning and economics, U Maung San Shwe, last week assured The Myanmar Times that “we will
provide 100 percent security for investors. We won’t let the conflicts continue anymore.”
Yet Rakhine State government officials do acknowledge the violent clashes between Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims – which left over 200
people dead and 140,000 homeless last year – have had a significant impact on the economy, scaring off foreign investment from the
resource-rich state.
With tensions remaining high on both sides and over 120,000 people, mainly Rohingya, still living in camps for displaced people, long-term
social solutions remain vague at best, and concern over violent flare-ups remain. At present attempts to “prevent conflict” seem more
focussed on tough policing around the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps rather than boosting economic strength.
Rakhine’s finances have been affected by fallout from the violence, said U Mra Aung, former state minister for planning and economics who is
now responsible for development affairs.
“Due to the crisis, investors from foreign countries are not brave enough to come. Because of that finances of Rakhine State are a little bit not
okay,” he said last month.
He said to help address the problems, ministers are considering building a special industrial zone at Ponnakywn township some 60 kilometres
(37 miles) outside of state capital Sittwe in a separate project from Kyaukpyu. The proposed zone could provide up to 100,000 jobs in light
industry.

A feasibility study is currently underway, and according to financial analysts the proposal could help ease ethnic disputes as well as boost
state coffers.
Jeremy Rathjen, vice president of research at Myanmar financial consultants Thura Swiss, said, “It is definitely possible that developing an
economy could relieve tensions. The tensions in Rakhine are not just social and religious tensions, they are economic ones too.”
He said an industrial zone could help change perceptions and the status of the Rohingya in Rakhine because there would be a demand for
labour.
“Many people in Myanmar consider the Rohingya to be illegal immigrants. That is something that remains unclarified because of the
citizenship law, which is a key issue,” he said.
He added that if the Rohingya were to be given some kind of legal status, even if it were just temporary work permits that allowed
employment in factories in the special industrial zone, it could help raise their status.
“If you look at the US, many of the people who are pro-immigration are business leaders because they need workers. If a lot of
entrepreneurs were to start factories in Rakhine then they might well be pro-Rohingya because they could provide labour.”
It is a view which allows for some optimism, but such is the divide between the ethnic Rakhine and Rohingya communities right now that it is
difficult to envisage them working side by side on a production line.
Much of the Rohingya population may have worked in low-level jobs before the troubles, but such roles play a vital part in propping up the
rest of the economy, especially in a port town like Sittwe where manual labour is in high demand.
Most wealthier Rohingya businesspeople have long since fled the area, taking their money with them. Small businesses formerly run by
Rohingya remain closed, their owners often surviving on handouts in the IDP camps next door.
Government attempts to set up official markets in the camps have been met with distrust by residents. “I don’t want to open a business here
because I don’t want to stay here. I want my old shop in Sittwe back,” explained one 31-year-old Rohingya IDP.
Although many former Rohingya business properties in Sittwe have been taken over by Rakhinese, a large number remain empty or ruined
from the riots.

“Even the streets in Sittwe remain unswept because there is no one to do the job. They are struggling to get porters at the port”,
international NGO workers in the area pointed out.
So far the potential contribution the Rohingya people could be making to the state’s economic recovery is not enough to ensure they are
welcomed back to the community.
Thousands of Rakhine Buddhists also lost their homes and businesses in the riots. In the large new settlement created for Rakhine IDPs on
the edge of Sittwe, small enterprises sprang up within days of people moving in last month. There is no lack of entrepreneurial spirit, but
scars from the conflict remain and there is a distinct lack of will to do business with the Rohingya community.
However even political groups who were previously accused of promoting anti-Muslim tensions are recognising the economic need for change.
U Aye Maung, chairman of the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party, said his party plans to make a proposal to the township government
to create a SEZ where Arakanese and Rohingya can do business.
“The local government should protect the livelihood of both the Arakanese and of the Bengalis,” he said, though he went on to reaffirm his
belief that the two communities should mostly live and work separately, at least for the next five or ten years.
Meanwhile influential religious leaders are also starting to put out the message that allowing the conflict to continue leads to economic
suffering for the entire population.
Earlier this month Daw Aung San Suu Kyi met for behind the scenes talks with senior Rakhine Buddhist monks in Yangon.
The NLD leader has faced international criticism for not tackling head-on the human rights abuses of the Rohingya people in Myanmar, while
simultaneously drawing condemnation from many within the country when she has spoken out on the highly sensitive issue.
During the meeting on September 8, she and the most venerable Alodaw Pyei Sayar Daw Kyi discussed the impact of last year’s violence in
Rakhine on the state’s economy, said the venerable Ashin Kumara, who attended the meeting.
He added Sayar Daw Kyi had said peace must be established if the economy in Rakhine was not to suffer and that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
said that if rule of law was established the sector could perform confidently.
Finding a solution to the human tragedy in Rakhine may seem far away, but factions looking at its economic potential offer a possible
solution. However, persuading investors it is a safe place to do business may be more difficult.

“At the moment the risk is so high that foreign investors are not going to touch it, but Rakhine with its border and coastal position could do a
lot to attract investment,” said Mr Rathjen.
According to state ministers potential investors from China and Japan have expressed interest in the SEZ outside Sittwe.
Mr Rathjen said Asian investors tended not to be so adverse to the political repercussion of investing in a controversial region such as
Rakhine.
“The potential to repair Rakhine’s reputation is there. It’s going to take time, but people have short memories and in two or three years’ time
[foreign investors] won’t remember the trouble, as long as there isn’t more of it.”
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10/7/2017 Economic geopolitics of the Rakhine crisis
http://en.prothom-alo.com/opinion/news/161171/Economic-geopolitics-of-the-Rakhine-crisis 1/4
M Sakhawat Hossain | Update: 19:45, Sep 28, 2017
Economic geopolitics of the Rakhine crisis
The total number of Rohingya
presently in Bangladesh, driven out of Myanmar recently and previously, exceeds 900,000. This is a difficult crisis for an over-populated
country like Bangladesh, though it has no hand in the matter. Speaking at the United Nations General Assembly, Prime Minister Sheikh
Hasina appealed to the world conscience and the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) to come forward resolve the matter. Other
than Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia, no other OIC member has put pressure on the Myanmar government. The European Union has
issued strong warnings against ethnic cleansing, but has taken no effective measures to do anything about the issue. The UK has
imposed a degree of pressure. The US has condemned the atrocities and has committed assistance for the Rohingya refugees. India
Opinion
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has sent relief too. But India, China and Russia have sided with Myanmar. Though the UN has taken a stand supporting Bangladesh,
nothing tangible can be done without the cooperation of these big powers.
The support of these countries in favour of Myanmar is shaped by economic and geopolitical interests in the region. These reasons
make Myanmar more important to them than their bilateral relations with Bangladesh. Bangladesh has resolved India’s major
geographical limitations. We have long-standing economic, military and trade ties with China. The present government took great
strides to improve relations with Russia, which include purchase of US$ 1 billion worth of arms and cooperation in the nuclear sector.
Both India and Russia lent their full support during Bangladesh war of liberation. Despite all of this, they have sided with Myanmar. One
must understand the geopolitical and economic stand of these countries in connection with Myanmar to understand their present
position concerning the ethnic cleansing and atrocities in Myanmar.
In context of India’s ‘Act East’ the country has several projects centred in Myanmar. From a geopolitical stand, one of their main
objectives is to counter China’s extended influence in the Bay of Bengal off the shore of the Rakhine state. Their biggest challenge to
China here is the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport Project. The Modi government has released US$ 500 million for the project so far.
The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project is a project that will connect with the Sittwe seaport in Rakhine State, Myanmar by
sea. In Myanmar, it will then link Sittwe seaport to Paletwa via the Kaladan river boat route, and then from Paletwa by road to the India-
China border. It will then go on to the Indian state of Mizoram. Once the Kaladan project is complete, South Bay of Bengal will be used
to transport cargo from Haldia in Kolkata to Sittwe. China has significant presence here.
India has two major geopolitical viewpoints in this regard. Firstly, it has its eyes on China’s One Belt One Rood project. It wants to curb
China’s influence in this region. In the meanwhile, on 17 July for the first time China took unrefined Saudi oil by pipeline up to Kunming.
India’s second objective is to reduce the use of the Siliguri corridor, referred to as the Chicken Neck in geopolitical jargon, and create a
strategic alternative route.
The Chicken Neck of Siliguri Corridor was the only connecting route between India and its northeast states. It is just an 18 mile stretch
between Bangladesh and Nepal and very close to the Chinese border.
It may be recalled that the Akhaura-Tripura road link has been established via Bangladesh’s Bhairab and a railway link is underway.
This linkage will reduce India’s dependence on the Siliguri corridor.
The long-standing bone of contention between India and China is China’s claim to a northern part of Arunachal. China still retains this
claim. Only recently, Indian and Chinese troops confronted each other at Dokhlam, a connecting point at Bhutan. These tensions have
egged India on further for a separate route and the Kaladan project can even be an alternative to the proposed corridor through
Bangladesh.
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On top of this all, India is on the best of terms with Myanmar’s present military and civil leaders. The Myanmar army chief Min Aung
Hlaing paid an eight-day visit to India in 2015. And when the homes of Rohingyas in Rakhine were being burnt down, Myanmar’s naval
chief was visited India and won Indian support. Military cooperation between India and Myanmar has been expanded. India has
proposed selling patrol boats to the Myanmar navy and has also committed selling arms to the military. Delhi’s geostrategic analysts
say that while the whole world is castigating Myanmar for its atrocities, India is siding with it in order to counter China’s influence. India
is rid Rakhine of Rohingyas in its own interests. They regard Rohingyas as a risk factor. Even though the Rohingyas are in such a
distressed state, the Indian government has ordered that 40,000 of them be sent back. The Indian judiciary has halted this move for the
time being, but their fate in India will be decided upon shortly.
China is still ahead of India in its influence over Myanmar. It has established and begun operating a fuel oil terminal in the Rakhine
region. This pipeline is a long-standing plan of China to ensure its geostrategic presence in the Bay of Bengal. A natural gas pipeline
has been laid down parallel to the oil pipeline. A total of 12 billion cubic metres of gas flows through the pipeline annually, of which 20
per cent is used by Myanmar. US$ 2.5 billion has been invested in this pipeline alone. In all, investment of US$ 18 billion has been
planned for the Rakhine state.
There had been a lot of opposition to the Chinese pipeline in the Rakhine state due to land acquisition, environmental harm and
disruption of the fishermen’s livelihood. The Myanmar government dealt with this firmly and removed the Rohingyas to settle them in
two camps in a camp near Sittwe.
Security has been stepped up for the pipeline not just in Rakhine, but cantonments have been established all over the region. In
Rakhine alone there are three regional commands. The 16 Light Infantry Division’s 10 Infantry Battalion is in charge of Operation
Clearance against the Rohingyas. The army chief himself is in overall charge. Laying this pipeline, and particularly setting up the oil
terminal, is a move by China to bypass the Malacca strait.
* M Sakhawat Hossain is former Election Commissioner, columnist and PhD researcher and can be contacted at hhintlbd@yahoo.com.
This piece, originally published in Prothom Alo Bangla print edition, has been rewritten in English by Ayesha Kabir.
Reproduction of any content, news or article published on this website is strictly prohibited. Privacy
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10/7/2017 Myanmar: 3 Fundamental Questions About The Rakhine Crisis
https://www.forbes.com/sites/riskmap/2017/09/07/myanmar-three-fundamental-questions-about-the-rakhine-crisis/#2a8ee7bf12f3 1/6
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SEP 7, 2017 @ 04:48 AM 3,783 
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Myanmar: 3 Fundamental Questions About The Rakhine
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By Jan Kamphuisen
Rohingya refugees from Myanmar's Rakhine state arrive near the Khanchon border crossing near the Bangladeshi town of
Teknaf on September 5, 2017. K M ASAD/AFP/Getty Images
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The UN on 9 September said that nearly 300,000 Rohingya refugees have fled from Myanmar to
Bangladesh. This latest surge of Muslim refugees from predominantly Buddhist Myanmar followed a 25
August attack by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) against several border police stations in the
north of Rakhine state. This in turn prompted the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) to launch a counter-
offensive on the Rohingya population that has since garnered widespread international criticism. UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein on 29 August said this turn of events ‘was predicted
and could have been prevented’. The UN Security Council (UNSC) on 30 August convened to discuss the
renewed violence in Rakhine. Although no formal statement was issued, individual council members called
upon all parties for restraint.
The latest events would appear to be a repeat of the Tatmadaw’s October and November 2016 ‘clearance
operations’ in the northern townships of Rakhine in response to a October 2016 ARSA attack, and begs
three fundamental questions:
Are foreign partners losing faith in State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s ability to successfully lead
Myanmar’s political transition from a highly authoritarian, military-ruled political system towards a
stable democracy;
Why is the ruling National League for Democracy (NLD) so united in its response, tacitly and at
times, overtly supporting, the Tatmadaw’s operations in Rakhine state; and finally,
Are foreign businesses in Myanmar facing growing reputational risks as a result of the government’s
apparent lack of restraint?
The NLD-led government’s immediate response to the crisis is largely co-ordinated by the defence, interior
and border affairs ministries – which, under the country’s 2008 constitution, are all still directly controlled
by the Tatmadaw – and has generally received popular support. Aung San Suu Kyi, a Nobel Peace Prize
laureate, has not been more vocal about the Rakhine crisis because she cannot compensate for this lack of
formal power over the actions of the Tatmadaw by mobilising her own considerable popular support to rein
in the military. Aung San Suu Kyi has implied in past interviews that the de facto expulsion of the
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Rohingyas from Myanmar trumps her own sway with the public as the former is popular with the country’s
non-Muslim majority. While that might be true, a growing number of foreign critics argue that she is guilty
of making no effort to use her influence to even attempt to steer the political debate towards an
understanding that the status and rights of the Rohingyas cannot be disregarded from the broader project
of transitioning the country to a sustainable democracy.
Statements from the NLD leadership counter that the new government is facing ‘formidable challenges’ in
pursuing an inclusive national peace agenda (it has not included the Rohingyas in this agenda, but has
included all the country’s other ethnic minorities with separatist causes), which have been undermined by
international backlash over the ‘unique’ circumstances of the Rakhine conflict. As such, the NLD
government claims it needs the continued support of the international community to overcome these
challenges. It is highly likely to continue receiving this support – although large-scale ‘ethnic cleansing’ is a
probable red line. Criticism of the situation in Rakhine is unlikely to turn into punitive action, simply
because the international community recognises that Aung San Suu Kyi is a vital actor in – and greatest
hope for – the country’s still delicate transition. Most diplomatic efforts on the conflict in Rakhine will
therefore continue to be pragmatic and discreet.
Despite this trade off, the ongoing crisis will only feed concerns by company headquarters, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), pressure groups and government actors over the reputational risks of
investing and operating in Myanmar. The 25 August attack, the army’s response and the resulting
displacement of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya will also continue to receive extensive international
media coverage. In turn, the Myanmar government will continue its hardline approach vis-à-vis the
Rakhine crisis – driven by popular local support – which includes the alleged planting of antipersonnel
landmines along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border, and rejection of a month-long ceasefire offered by ARSA
on 10 September. Any efforts towards addressing the root causes of the conflict in line with the
recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State headed by former UN secretary-general
Kofi Annan – such as citizenship, entrenched discrimination, lack of economic development and the
humanitarian crisis – will not receive much attention or be part of the government’s public communication
strategy.
BETA

Most Yangon-based diplomats and company managers have spent time briefing their regional or global
headquarters about the unfolding events in Rakhine state, and the potential impact on their interests in the
country. Foreigners are not welcome in the affected townships, however there are no signs that the
diplomatic disapproval of the Tatmadaw’s tactics will manifest as broader anti-foreigner sentiment. That is
helped by the current absence of any signs of bi- or multilateral boycotts or sanctions against Myanmar.
Foreign organisations will need to balance reputational risks against the need for continued positive
engagement with the Myanmar government as it remains the country’s best hope to reduce the still
considerable influence of the army and those with entrenched interests that have enjoyed favourable
treatment under previous governments. That does not translate to divestment or a deceleration of
investment plans in the face of this ongoing crisis. Instead, extreme scrutiny of which elements of the
Myanmar state companies are dealing with, and more so for those with direct interests in Rakhine state – of
which there is a growing number – must become a priority. Beyond the conflict zone, the Tatmadaw still
directly and indirectly controls a considerable portion of Myanmar’s economy – a fact that is often
challenging to avoid when looking for local partners. Detailed scrutiny of those partners, of any deal
involving large areas of land, and of the government’s likely direct involvement in a project are essential –
the latter requiring foreign investors to establish a strong government relations function.
BETA

10/7/2017 Rakhine crisis blights Myanmar economic outlook- Nikkei Asian Review
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Rohingya-crisis/Rakhine-crisis-blights-Myanmar-economic-outlook 1/10
Spotlight > Rohingya crisis
September 5, 2017 10:00 am JST
Rakhine crisis blights Myanmar economic
outlook
Looming 'humanitarian catastrophe' dampens international relations,
business sentiment
By GWEN ROBINSON, Chief editor and YUICHI NITTA, Nikkei staff writer
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BANGKOK/YANGON -- In the shiny new shopping malls and trendy
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fear and mayhem gripping the country's western Rakhine state.
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"Bengali" is a term widely used in
Myanmar to refer to the Rohingya minority Muslim community as
interlopers.
The group, which calls itself the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, launched
coordinated attacks on Aug. 25 that killed 12 government security personnel
across some 30 police facilities and an army base in northern Rakhine.
Nearly 80 crudely-armed militants died in the attacks, and the military
claims to have killed nearly 380 "suspected" members in the ensuing days.
A member of Myanmar's security forces escorts media on an organized visit to conflict areas in
northern Rakhine State on Aug. 30. (Photo by Thurein Hla Htway)
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Since then, "clearance operations" by security forces and paramilitaries have
been in full force. The operations have included summary arrests,
interrogations and executions, as well as the burning of hundreds of houses
across at least 17 villages, according to satellite imagery released by Human
Rights Watch. The violence and the torchings -- which the military has
blamed on the Rohingya themselves -- drove more than 76,000 refugees into
neighboring Bangladesh in just over a week.
Beyond the headlines, local media coverage of the Rakhine attacks and the
ferocious military response has been approving, and either hostile or
indifferent toward the plight of the Rohingya in this overwhelmingly
Buddhist country.
In international circles, by contrast, the Rakhine crisis has drawn fresh
condemnation of the government's extreme response and has further eroded
the image of the country's de facto leader, State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi.
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Suu Kyi, a Nobel laureate and former political prisoner, has been criticized by
western media and human rights groups for failing to speak out during
earlier waves of violence against the country's Muslim minority --
particularly after her National League for Democracy swept elections in late
2015.

In response, Suu Kyi appointed former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan in
2016 to lead a commission to investigate the problems of Rakhine State. His
team's recommendations, presented just before the Aug. 25 ARSA attacks in
Rakhine, included 88 proposals including facilitating Rohingya citizenship
applications and freedom of movement. A Western diplomat described most
of the proposals as "untenable" for Suu Kyi to pursue in the current climate,
"even if she wanted to -- and we certainly don't see any inclination right
now."
While her silence on the Rakhine crisis is seen as a political calculation to
keep the mainly Buddhist population on her side, the latest Rohingya
crackdown -- unprecedented in its intensity and scope -- could irreparably
damage her international standing, already tarnished by her government's
crackdown on press freedom.

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Myanmar State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi attends the funeral of Aung Shwe, former chairman
of the National League for Democracy, in Yangon on Aug. 17. © Reuters
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10/7/2017 Rohingya crisis dents Myanmar hopes of Western investment boom
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-investment/rohingya-crisis-dents-myanmar-hopes-of-western-investment-boom-idUSKCN1BX00V 1/11
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YANGON/HONG KONG (Reuters) - When oﬃcials from Myanmar’s commercial capital Yangon toured six
European countries in June, they were hoping to drum up investment in transport, energy and education.
Instead, they were bombarded with questions about the country’s treatment of the Rohingya Muslim
minority, who have long complained of persecution by the Buddhist majority in the oil-rich, ethnically
divided, western state of Rakhine.
FILE PHOTO: Rohingya refugees walk on a muddy path at Thaingkhali makeshift refugee camp in Cox's
Bazar, Bangladesh, September 14, 2017. REUTERS/Danish Siddiqui/File Photo

“In each of every country, that issue was always brought up,” Hlaing Maw Oo, secretary of Yangon City
Development Committee, told Reuters after the 16-day trip.
The situation in Rakhine has worsened dramatically since then, with more than 400,000 Rohingya fleeing to
Bangladesh to escape a military counterinsurgency offensive the United Nations has described as “ethnic
cleansing”.
Western trade and investment in Myanmar is small, but there were hopes that a series of reforms this year
would prise open an economy stunted by international sanctions and decades of mismanagement under
military rule.
With most sanctions now lifted, an expected flood of Western money was seen as a key dividend from the
transition to civilian rule under Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. Regional diplomats saw it balancing China’s
growing influence over its neighbour.
But Suu Kyi has been beset by international criticism for saying little about human rights abuses against the
Rohingya, and lawyers, consultants and lobbyists say the European and U.S. companies that had been circling
are now wary of the reputational risks of investing in the country.
Louis Yeung, managing principal of Yangon-based investment firm Faircap Partners, said one of his business
partners – a listed, U.S.-based food and beverage company - decided to hold off its plan to enter the Myanmar
market for three to five years, citing factors including slower-than-expected reforms and the Rohingya crisis.

“Their conclusion is that it wasn’t the right time for them,” he said. “They want to see more traction from the
government and Rakhine is not helpful.”
ON HOLD
The pressure has been growing in recent months, even on existing investors, with rights group AFD
International calling on foreign firms to stop investing in Myanmar.
A small group of investors in U.S. oil major Chevron (CVX.N) filed an unsuccessful motion at its annual
general meeting urging it to pull out of its production sharing contract with a state-run firm to explore for oil
and gas, while Norwegian telecoms firm Telenor (TEL.OL), which runs a mobile network in Myanmar, issued
a statement calling for human rights protection.
Chevron declined to comment on its investment in Myanmar, while Telenor did not respond to several
requests for comment.
Bernd Lange, chair of the European Parliament Committee on International Trade, said last week his
delegation postponed a visit to Myanmar indefinitely, saying the human rights situation “does not allow a
fruitful discussion on a potential EU-Myanmar investment agreement”.
Khin Aung Tun, vice-chairman of the Myanmar Tourism Federation, told Reuters global firms planning to
hold conferences in Myanmar were now considering other locations.

“People were just starting to see Myanmar as a ‘good news’ story,” said Dane Chamorro, head of South East
Asia at Control Risks, a global risk consultancy.
“Now you can imagine a boardroom in which someone mentions Myanmar and someone else says ‘hold on,
I’ve just seen something on Myanmar on TV: villages burned down, refugees, etc’.”
In an interview published in Nikkei Asia Review on Thursday, Suu Kyi acknowledged it was “natural” for
foreign investors to be concerned, but repeated her view that economic development was the key to solving
poor Rakhine’s long-standing problems.
“So investments would actually help make the situation better,” she said.
IN CHINA‘S ORBIT
Myanmar’s $70 billion economy should be a strong investment proposition for Western ﬁrms. It boasts large
oil and gas reserves and natural resources such as rubies, jade and timber. Wages are low and its youthful
population of more than 50 million is eager for retail and manufacturing jobs.
In April, Myanmar passed a long-awaited investment law, simplifying procedures and granting foreign
investors equal treatment to the locals. A game-changing law allowing foreigners to buy stakes in local ﬁrms is
expected later this year.
“The investment conditions were improving,” said Dustin Daugherty, ASEAN lead for business intelligence at
Dezan Shira & Associates, a consultancy for foreign investors in Asia.

Myanmar’s economy may not suffer much, however, if Western firms shun the country - or even if their
governments were to reimpose some sanctions, although that appears unlikely for now.
Suu Kyi has sought to deepen relations with China at a time when Beijing is keen to push projects that fit with
its “Belt and Road” initiative, which aims to stimulate trade by investment in infrastructure throughout Asia
and beyond.
Myanmar trades with China as much as it does with its next four biggest partners: Singapore, Thailand, Japan
and India. None of that top five participated in previous sanctions.
Trade with the United States is only about $400 million and U.S. investment is just 0.5 percent of the total.
Europe accounts for around a 10th of investment, while China and Hong Kong make up more than a third,
and Singapore and Thailand another third.
Than Aung Kyaw, Deputy Director General of Myanmar’s Directorate of Investment and Company
Administration, told Reuters European investors might have “second thoughts”, but he expected Asian
investors to stay put.
China is already in talks to sell electricity to energy-hungry Myanmar and pushing for preferential access to a
strategic port on the Bay of Bengal. In April, the two countries reached an agreement on an oil pipeline that
pumps oil across Myanmar to southwest China.
“It is going to feed Aung San Suu Kyi straight into the hands of (Chinese President) Xi Jinping,” said John
Blaxland, director at the ANU Southeast Asia Institute and head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre.

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For a graphic on investment in Myanmar click tmsnrt.rs/2xWqBaO
Reporting by Yimou Lee in Yangon and Marius Zaharia in Hong Kong; additional reporting by Shoon Naing and Wa Lone in Yangon;
Writing by Marius Zaharia; Editing by Alex Richardson
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
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10/7/2017 Rohingya: The oil economics and land-grab politics behind Myanmar's refugee crisis — Quartz
https://qz.com/1074906/rohingya-the-oil-economics-and-land-grab-politics-behind-myanmars-refugee-crisis/ 2/12
The oil economics and land-grab politics
behind Myanmar’s Rohingya refugee crisis
Giuseppe Forino, Jason von Meding, and Thomas Johnson September 12, 2017 Quartz India

Ostracised by politics and economics. (Reuters/Damir Sagolj)
Recent weeks have seen an escalation of violence against the Rohingya in Rakhine, the poorest state of
Myanmar. A tide of displaced people is seeking refuge from atrocities—they are eeing both on foot and
by boat to Bangladesh. It is the latest surge of displaced people, and is exacerbated by the recent activity
of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA).
Religious and ethnic differences have been widely considered the leading cause of the persecution. But it
is becoming increasingly hard to believe that there are not other factors at play. Especially given that
Myanmar is home to 135 of cial recognised ethnic groups (the Rohingya were removed from this list in
1982).
In analysing the recent violence, much of the western media has focused on the role of the military and
the gure of the de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Her status as a Nobel Peace Prize laureate has been
widely questioned since the latest evidence of atrocities emerged.
She continues to avoid condemning the systematic violence against the Rohingya. At least the media gaze
has nally shifted somewhat towards their plight.
But there remain issues that are not being explored. It is also critical to look beyond religious and ethnic
differences towards other root causes of persecution, vulnerability, and displacement.
We must consider vested political and economic interests as contributing factors to forced displacement
in Myanmar, not just of the Rohingya people but of other minorities such as the Kachin, the Shan, the

Land grabbing
Karen, the Chin, and the Mon.
Land grabbing and con scation in Myanmar are widespread. It is not a new phenomenon.
Since the 1990s, military juntas have been taking away the land of smallholders across the country,
without any compensation and regardless of ethnicity or religious status.
Land has often been acquired for “development” projects, including military base expansions, natural
resource exploitation and extraction, large agriculture projects, infrastructure, and tourism. For example,
in Kachin state, the military con scated more than 500 acres of villagers’ land to support extensive gold
mining.
Development has forcibly displaced thousands of people—both internally and across borders with
Bangladesh, India, and Thailand—or compelled them to set out by sea to Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Australia.
In 2011, Myanmar instituted economic and political reforms that led it to be dubbed “Asia’s nal frontier”
as it opened up to foreign investment. Shortly afterwards, in 2012, violent attacks escalated against the
Rohingya in Rakhine state and, to a lesser extent, against the Muslim Karen. Meanwhile, the government
of Myanmar established several laws relating to the management and distribution of farmland.

A regional prize
These moves were severely criticised for reinforcing the ability of large corporations to pro t from land
grabs. For instance, agribusiness multinationals such as POSCO Daewoo have eagerly entered the market,
contracted by the government.
Myanmar is positioned between countries that have long eyed its resources, such as China and India.
Since the 1990s, Chinese companies have exploited timber, rivers, and minerals in Shan State in the
north.
This led to violent armed con icts between the military regime and armed groups, including the Kachin
Independence Organization (KIO) and its ethnic allies in the eastern Kachin State and Shan State.
In Rakhine State, Chinese and Indian interests are part of the broader China-India relations. These
interests revolve principally around the construction of infrastructure and pipelines in the region. Such
projects claim to guarantee employment, transit fees, and oil and gas revenues for the whole of Myanmar.
Among numerous development projects, a transnational pipeline built by China National Petroleum
Company (CNPC) connecting Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine, to Kunming, China, began operations in
September 2013. The wider efforts to take Myanmar oil and gas from the Shwe gas eld to Guangzhou,
China, are well documented.

Compounding the vulnerability of minorities
A parallel pipeline is also expected to send Middle East oil from the Kyaukphyu port to China. However,
the neutral Advisory Commission on Rakhine State has urged the Myanmar government to carry out a
comprehensive impact assessment.
In fact, the commission recognises that pipelines put local communities at risk. There is signi cant local
tension related to land seizures, insuf cient compensation for damages, environmental degradation, and
an in ux of foreign workers rather than increased local employment opportunities.
Meanwhile, the Sittwe deep-sea port was nanced and constructed by India as part of the Kaladan Multi-
modal Transit Transport Project. The aim is to connect the northeast Mizoram state in India with the Bay
of Bengal.
Coastal areas of Rakhine State are clearly of strategic importance to both India and China. The
government of Myanmar, therefore, has vested interests in clearing land to prepare for further
development and to boost its already rapid economic growth.
All of this takes place within the wider context of geopolitical maneuvering. The role of Bangladesh in
fuelling ethnic tensions is also hotly contested. In such power struggles, the human cost is terribly high.
In Myanmar, the groups that fall victim to land grabbing have often started in an extremely vulnerable
state and are left even worse off. The treatment of the Rohingya in Rakhine State is the highest pro le

example of broader expulsion that is in icted on minorities.
When a group is marginalised and oppressed it is dif cult to reduce their vulnerability and protect their
rights, including their property. In the case of the Rohingya, their ability to protect their homes was
decimated through the revocation of their Burmese citizenship.
Since the late 1970s, around a million Rohingya have ed Myanmar to escape persecution. Tragically, they
are often marginalised in their host countries.
With no country willing to take responsibility for them, they are either forced or encouraged to
continuously cross borders. The techniques used to encourage this movement have trapped the Rohingya
in a vulnerable state.
The tragedy of the Rohingya is part of a bigger picture which sees the oppression and displacement of
minorities across Myanmar and into neighbouring countries.
The relevance and complexity of religious and ethnic issues in Myanmar are undeniable. But we cannot
ignore the political and economic context and the root causes of displacement that often go undetected.
Giuseppe Forino, PhD candidate in disaster management, University of Newcastle; Jason von Meding, senior
lecturer in disaster risk reduction, University of Newcastle, and Thomas Johnson, PhD candidate in disaster
vulnerability, University of Newcastle.

10/7/2017 Solution to Rohingya crisis is socio-economic and infrastructure development: Indian envoy tells UN | The Indian Express
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/only-long-term-solution-to-rohingya-crisis-is-socio-economic-and-infrastructure-development-indian-envoy-tells-un-4850929/ 1/12
Special Coverage
By: Express Web Desk | New Delhi | Published:September 19, 2017 4:15 pm
Home India Solution to Rohingya crisis is socio-economic and infrastructure development: Indian envoy tells UN
Solution to Rohingya crisis is socio-
economic and infrastructure
development: Indian envoy tells UN
An estimated 410,000 Rohingya Muslims have fled Myanmar's Rakhine state into Bangladesh as their
villages burned and hundreds were killed in the fresh bout of violence since August 25.

RELATED NEWS
Shah Porir Dwip: Rohingya Muslims, who crossed over from Myanmar into Bangladesh, carry an elderly
woman in a basket and walk towards a refugee camp in Shah Porir Dwip, Bangladesh. (Source: AP/PTI)
With the global outrage mounting on
Myanmar over its handling of Rohingya
crisis, India’s permanent representative to
the UN in Geneva, Rajiv K Chander, stated
that only long-term solution to the situation
in Rakhine state was socio-economic and
infrastructure development. The Indian
envoy’s comments came a day after the
Central government told the Supreme Court
that the “illegal” influx of Rohingyas and
their continued stay in India was “seriously
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harming the national security of the
country”.
“India recently agreed with Myanmar to
provide financial and technical assistance to
identify projects to undertake in Rakhine
specifically those agreements to undertake infrastructure and socio-economic
projects,”Chander was quoted as saying by ANI. READ: Illegal Rohingya are a
security threat: Govt tells Supreme Court
The Indian Ambassador also informed the global body that India extended the
humanitarian release to Bangladesh government to support it in meeting refugees’
needs.
An estimated 410,000 Rohingya Muslims have fled Myanmar’s Rakhine state into
Bangladesh as their villages burned and hundreds were killed in the fresh bout of
violence since August 25. As per reports, the violence erupted when Rohingya
militants attacked police posts in Rakhine state. ALSO READ: Defending Myanmar,
Aung San Suu Kyi says majority Rohingya villages calm
With the country facing allegations of ethnic cleansing, Myanmar leader Aung San
Suu said her country does not fear international scrutiny. The Nobel Peace laureate
claimed that “great majority” of Muslims within the conflict zone stayed and that
“more than 50 per cent of their villages were intact.”
Facing a mass influx of Rohingyas from Myanmar, Bangladesh called on the
international community to intervene and put pressure on Myanmar to address the
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table

DEVELOPMENT IN TIMES OF
TRANSITION: THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC
STATUS OF RAKHINE STATE, MYANMAR
WORKING PAPER
Shagun Gupta, Programme Analyst
Livelihoods and Food Security Trust (LIFT) Fund

1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................................................3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................4
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES ....................................................................................................................................4
METHODOLOGY....................................................................................................................................................5
RAKHINE FACT SHEET ........................................................................................................................................6
SECTION ONE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF RAKHINE...............................................................................................8
1.1 Pre-Colonial Period (327 AD - 1826 AD) ......................................................................................8
1.2 British Colonialism (1826 AD - 1948 AD)......................................................................................8
1.3 Political Turmoil Post-Independence (1948 AD- Present) ............................................................9
SECTION TWO: DEMOGRAPHICS..................................................................................................................... 10
2.1 Population ...................................................................................................................................10
2.2 Sex ..............................................................................................................................................10
2.3 Age Group...................................................................................................................................10
2.4 Urban/Rural.................................................................................................................................10
2.5 Internally Displaced Persons ......................................................................................................11
2.6 Ethnicity and Religion..................................................................................................................11
SECTION THREE: THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT................................................................................................. 12
3.1 Poverty ........................................................................................................................................12
3.2 Income Sources ..........................................................................................................................12
3.3 Livelihood Zones .........................................................................................................................13
3.4 Average Land Area Owned by Agricultural Households.............................................................13
3.5 Landless Rate in Agriculture .......................................................................................................13
3.6 Agricultural Land Usage..............................................................................................................14
3.7 Estimated Net Incomes from 1 Ac of Paddy ...............................................................................14
3.8 Unemployment Rate ...................................................................................................................14
3.9 Labour Force Participation Rate .................................................................................................14
3.10 Migration ...................................................................................................................................15
3.11 Emerging Industries ..................................................................................................................15
3.12 Special Economic Zone in Kyaukpyu........................................................................................15
SECTION FOUR: THE SOCIAL CONTEXT ......................................................................................................... 17
4.1 Food Security and Nutrition.........................................................................................................17
4.1.1 Food Insecurity.....................................................................................................................17
4.1.2 Causes of Food Insecurity ...................................................................................................17
4.1.3 Malnutrition in IDP Camps ...................................................................................................18
4.1.4 Nutrition and Food Security..................................................................................................18
4.2 Child Well-being..........................................................................................................................18
4.2.1 Child Mortality ......................................................................................................................19

2
4.2.2 Malnutrition...........................................................................................................................19
4.2.3 Underweight .........................................................................................................................19
4.2.4 Stunting ................................................................................................................................19
4.2.5 Wasting ................................................................................................................................19
4.2.6 Exclusively Breastfed...........................................................................................................20
4.2.7 Immunization........................................................................................................................20
4.2.8 HIV-Testing for Infants .........................................................................................................20
4.2.9 ART for PMTCT ...................................................................................................................20
4.3 Maternal Well-being ....................................................................................................................20
4.3.1 Ante-Natal Care ...................................................................................................................20
4.3.2 Births in Health Facility.........................................................................................................21
4.3.3 HIV-Testing for Pregnant Women........................................................................................21
4.4 Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH).....................................................................................21
4.4.1 Population with Access to Improved Water .........................................................................21
4.4.2 Population with Access to Improved Sanitation...................................................................22
4.5 Education ....................................................................................................................................22
4.5.1 Availability ............................................................................................................................22
4.5.2 Access..................................................................................................................................23
4.5.3 Quality ..................................................................................................................................23
4.6 Housing Conditions.....................................................................................................................24
4.6.1 Access to Electricity .............................................................................................................24
4.6.2 Main Sources of Energy for Cooking ...................................................................................24
4.6.3 Main Sources of Energy for Lighting....................................................................................24
4.6.4 Main Sources of Drinking Water ..........................................................................................24
4.6.5 Main Sources of Water for Non-Drinking Use......................................................................25
4.6.6 Types of Toilet......................................................................................................................25
SECTION FIVE: CONFLICT................................................................................................................................. 26
5.1 A Brief History .............................................................................................................................26
5.1.1 Post-1948.............................................................................................................................27
5.1.2 The Na Ta La Scheme.........................................................................................................27
5.2 Outbreak of Riots in 2012 ...........................................................................................................28
5.3 Internal Displacement .................................................................................................................29
5.4 Violence in 2014..........................................................................................................................29
5.5 Chronology of Conflict in 2012 and 2014....................................................................................30
MAP OF RAKHINE STATE BY DISTRICTS AND TOWNSHIPS......................................................................... 32
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................................................... 33
FURTHER READING ........................................................................................................................................... 37

3
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AIDS Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome
ANP Arakan National Party
ART Anti-Retroviral Treatment
BEAC Bid Evaluation and Awarding Committee
BSPP Burmese Socialist Programme Party
CDNH Centre for Diversity and National Harmony
CFZ Costal Fishing Zone
CITIC China International Trust and Investment Corporation
DPT3 Diphtheria, Pertussis, and Tetanus
EPZ Embankment Paddy Zone
FEER Far Eastern Economic Review
GAM Global Acute Malnutrition
HDDS Household Dietary Diversity Score
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IAZ Inland Agriculture Zone
ICG International Crisis Group
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IHLCA Integrated Household Living Conditions Assessment
LIFT Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MICS Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
MMK Myanmar Kyat
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
MSF Medécins Sans Frontières
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NLD National League for Democracy
PMTCT Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
PTU Project Technical Unit
SAM Severe Acute Malnutrition
SEZ Special Economic Zone
TLC Temporary Learning Centre
TVET Technical Vocational Education and Training
UNDP United National Development Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs
USD United States Dollar
USDP Union Solidarity and Development Party
WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WBG World Bank Group
WHO World Health Organisation

4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Located in the western part of Myanmar, Rakhine (Arakan) state occupies a unique
geographic position in the Southeast Asian region. Historically, the ancient Arakanese
kingdoms served as an important bridge between the Islamic civilizations to the west and the
Buddhist tradition to the east. Despite its low level of economic development, Rakhine
serves as an essential political as well as economic corridor for Myanmar, connecting the
country to regional centres in Africa and the Middle East, as well India. The state is rich in
natural resources, and has emerged as a popular tourist destination in recent years, opening
up its pristine beaches and archaeological sites to the world.
Decades of political turmoil as well as Myanmar’s exclusion from the world economy have
left Rakhine impoverished, a pattern of socio-economic exigencies that are quite similar to
those faced by other regions within the country. However, the state has also dealt with
sporadic episodes of communal conflict and violence between the ethnic Rakhine Buddhists
and Muslims. Since the outbreak of violent riots in 2012, more than 140,000 people have
lived in temporary displacement camps in various parts of the state. Furthermore, it is
estimated that overall more than 300,000 people in Rakhine are currently in urgent need of
humanitarian assistance, a majority of who are concentrated in Northern Rakhine.
The purpose of this report is to inform donors, aid agencies, government ministries, and
other key stakeholders interested in the socio-economic status of Rakhine state over the last
five years. Rakhine, along with the rest of Myanmar, now stands at the threshold of a new
political reality that has the potential to transform lives. In these times of rapid transition, it is
hoped that this report can provide interested groups and individuals with necessary facts
about Rakhine and its people. The report is divided into six sections focusing on history,
demographics, the economic context, the social context, conflict, and a fact sheet for quick
reference.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
This report has been written with the overall objective of informing relevant stakeholders,
including donors, aid agencies, government ministries, and other interested individuals
and/or groups who wish to learn more about the current socio-economic status of Rakhine
state. The report combines quantitative data from a variety of different sources, as well as
qualitative information which serves to provide context to the former.
The report also serves a few specific objectives:
1. On key social and economic indicators, the data presented aims to provide a comparative
outlook with the Myanmar national averages.
2. The methodology used (described below) serves to extract the most reliable and readily
available data on the region to ensure validity.
3. The report also aims to provide the most up to date information that is currently available,
within the parameters of reliability and validity.
4. The report however, is not designed to be prescriptive. It is instead hoped that the data
presented in this report can be used to aid any prescriptive exercise in the future.
5. The report does not intend to reflect the views and opinions of any particular
organisational/institutional entity, and tries to achieve this through a mix of information drawn

5
from government, independent research, news media, and international and local NGO
sources operating in the region.
This report has been visualised as a document that shall remain ‘work in progress’ as more
socio-economic research and data becomes available on Rakhine state. For this reason, we
welcome continued feedback from all interested parties.
METHODOLOGY
The report is designed to ensure reliability and validity, and relies on a broad-based literature
review of relevant publications from different sources. The sources used include government
reports, publications produced by think tanks, research institutes, international organisations
and local NGOs, and international and local news media. The choice of sources was guided
by the reliability of the source (organisational as well as individual in the case of news
media), and the time frame within which a particular publication was made available to the
public. Where possible, this report has tried to use the most recently available statistical
data, while at the same time ensuring that the reliability and validity of the source is not
compromised. This report does not make use of primary data, although some contextual
research was carried out by the author over the course of writing this report through a field
visit to Sittwe, Rakhine state in February 2016.
One of the main aims of the chosen methodology is to present the data as it appears in the
source, and subsequently attempt to provide relevant insight into any significant variations
that exist (particularly statistical variations among sources). The overall methodology
however, is not guided by an aim to be prescriptive. It should be noted that since information
has been extracted from sources that were based on different individual methodologies of
their own, terminological differences often arise within this report. Where possible, such
differences have been highlighted in the footnotes. However, it is not an aim of this report to
account for these differences.
Although a key aim of this report is to help the readers make comparisons with available
data, the aforementioned variation in source methodology might limit the extent to which this
is possible. Nonetheless, this report tries to ensure that where comparisons are made, data
is drawn from the same source, or sources that have been produced in a similar time frame.
A key limitation that directly affects the twin aim of reliability and validity is the dependence
on government sources for important census data. It should be recognised that currently
available data from the Government of Myanmar excludes a section of the population in
Rakhine state (classified as non-enumerated in census reports). The data presented is
therefore often skewed in favour certain populations. This report tries to overcome this by
presenting information from other sources, wherever possible and desirable.
We also recognise that there still exists a wealth of information on the region that has not
been incorporated into this report, and it is hoped that readers might find the section on
Further Reading useful in this regard.

6
RAKHINE FACT SHEET
Capital: Sittwe
Population1
: 3, 188, 807 (total); 1, 526,402/47.9% (male); 1, 662,405/52.1% (female)
Urban Population2
: 354, 288 (17%)
● Urban Centres (% of urban population in each district)3
: Sittwe (25%), Maungdaw
(23%), Thandwe (17.8%), Mrauk-U (13.5%), Kyaukphyu (10.1%)
Rural Population4
: 1, 744,519 (83%)
IDP (Internally Displaced Persons) Population5
: 118,084
Ethnicities6
: 60% (Rakhine), 30% (Muslim), 10% (Chin, Kaman (also Muslim), Mro,
Chakma, Dainet, and Maramagri)
Religion7
: 65% (Theravada Buddhism), 30% (Islam), 5% (Hinduism, Christianity, others)
Administrative Divisions8
: 5 districts (Sittwe, Mrauk-U, Maungdaw, Kyaukphyu, Thandwe),
17 townships:
● Sittwe (Sittwe, Ponnagyun, Pauktaw, Rathedaung)
● Mrauk-U (Mrauk-U, Kyauktaw, Minbya, Myebon)
● Maungdaw (Maungdaw, Buthidaung)
● Kyaukphyu (Kyaukphyu, Mannaung, Rambree, Ann)
● Thandwe (Thandwe, Taungup, Gwa)
133 Wards, 1040 village tracts, 3931 villages
2015 Election Results9
: Amyotha Hluttaw or Upper House (Arakan National Party or
ANP, 10 seats; National League for Democracy or NLD, 1 seat; Union Solidarity and
Development Party or USDP, 1 seat)
1
Myanmar Population and Housing Census, 2014. Note: Census data from government sources is
currently unlikely to be completely representative given the exclusion of non-enumerated populations.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Shelter NFI CCCM Rakhine Cluster Analysis Report, UNHCR et al., 1 March 2016.
6
Myanmar: The Politics of Rakhine State, International Crisis Group, 2014. Note: The source does
not define the terms ‘Muslim’ and ‘Rakhine’ explicitly, although it could be assumed that ‘Rakhine’
refers to the ethnic Rakhine people. Since the Kaman are Muslim as well, but not accounted for in the
30% for Muslim, it is difficult to identify specific demographics in the absence of officially recognised
data.
7
Ibid. Note: The figures have been estimated from the data available on ethnicity, since official
census data according to religion is currently unavailable.
8
Myanmar Population and Housing Census, 2014.; The State of Local Governance: Trends in
Rakhine, UNDP, 2015.
9
“No official objections yet against election winners in Rakhine State”, Myitmakha News Agency, 27
November, 2015.

7
Pyithu Hluttaw or Lower House (ANP, 12 seats; NLD, 4 seats; USDP, 1 seat)
Rakhine State Legislature (ANP, 22 seats; NLD, 9 seats; USDP, 3 seats; Independent, 1
seats; Military Appointees, 12 seats)
2016-2017 State Budget10
: MMK 145 billion (USD 118 million)
Poverty11
: 78% (World Bank, 2014), 43.5% (UNDP IHLCA, 2011)
Income sources12
: Casual labour (26%), fishing (26%), small non-agricultural businesses
(15%).
Maternal Well-being13
: 1.4% (mortality); 88.7% (ante-natal care visits); 11.7% (births in
health facility)
Child Well-being14
: 7.5% (under-5 mortality); 37.4% (underweight); 49.9% (stunting); 10.8%
(wasting); 99.4% (immunization)
Malnutrition15
: 4.5% (severe acute malnutrition, rural camps); 14.4% (global acute
malnutrition, rural camps), 3.1% (global acute malnutrition, urban camps)
Adult Literacy16
: 80.1% (Union average 95.8%)
Net enrollment17
: 71.4% (primary), 32% (secondary)
Natural Resources18
: Petroleum, natural gas, hydropower, industrial minerals
10
“Reduced Rakhine State budget under fire”, Myanmar Times, 28 January 2016.
11
Myanmar: Ending poverty and boosting shared prosperity in a time of transition, World Bank, 2014;
Integrated Household Living Conditions Assessment (IHLCA) 2009-10. Note: The World Bank figure
is based on a re-estimation of the same data used in the IHLCA, along with a more comprehensive
measure of consumption expenditures including health costs and durable goods, and adjustment for
cost of living differences in different regions of Myanmar.
12
LIFT Baseline Assessment conducted for Tat Lan Programme, 2014.
13
Rakhine Response Plan, UNOCHA, 2013; Rakhine State: A Snapshot of Child Wellbeing, UNICEF,
2013. Note: The UNOCHA data is based on the Ministry of National Planning and Economic
Development, CSO, Statistical Yearbook 2011; Health Management Information System (2011);
Myanmar Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (2009-10); Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey
(2009-10); Fertility and Reproductive Health Survey (2007); and Reproductive Needs Assessment
(1999). The UNICEF data is based on results of the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) 2009-10
and the Myanmar National AIDS Programme 2012.
14
Ibid.; Note: The figure for under-5 child mortality is from the Myanmar Population and Housing
Census, 2014. The UNICEF document gives a figure of 26.9% (per 1000 births).The exclusion of non-
enumerated population in the census, as well as new data collected since 2009-10 might account for
this difference.
15
Rakhine Response Plan, UNOCHA, 2013. Note: The UNOCHA data is based on results from
Nutrition Surveys conducted by Save the Children and Action Contre la Faim in Sittwe IDP camps in
December 2012 and January 2013.
16
Integrated Households Living Conditions Assessment (IHLCA-2), IHLCA PTU, 2011.
17
Ibid.
18
“Rakhine push for fair share of resources”, Myanmar Times, 25 August 2013.

8
SECTION ONE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF RAKHINE
Throughout its history, Burma has witnessed a fluid movement of populations across
borders, and Rakhine state is no exception. It should be noted at the very outset however,
that much of this history remains contested, and multiple Rakhine identities have existed
simultaneously during different moments in history.
1.1 Pre-Colonial Period (327 AD - 1826 AD)
Prior to 1989, Rakhine was known as the Arakan State. The pre-colonial history of Arakan
consists of five historical periods, beginning with the ancient Arakanese kingdom of
Dhanyawadi. The centre of Arakanese subsequently moved to Waithali around 4th century
AD, and subsequently to Lemro. Little historical evidence is available about the ancient
Arakanese kingdoms that existed before the kingdom of Mrauk-U was established in 1430
with the military assistance from the Sultan of Bengal.19
The kingdom went through an initial
period of subordination to the Sultan, and hence even Rakhine Buddhist kings are thought to
have adopted Muslim titles.20
Mrauk-U became an independent kingdom in 1531, and finally
fell to the Burmese forces led by the Burmese King Bodawpaya in 1784-85.21
The Rakhine
kingdom was officially annexed into Burma, and an estimated 200,000 fled to Chittagong (in
present day Bangladesh).22
The Burmese control over Arakan did not last, and following the
First Anglo-Burmese War in 1825, Arakan was annexed into British India. The British shifted
the capital of Arakan to Akyab (now known as Sittwe).
1.2 British Colonialism (1826 AD - 1948 AD)
The experience of British colonialism shaped much of Rakhine state into its present-day
political realities. Following the annexation of Arakan, a significant number of Muslims
migrated to the state from Bengal. The religious and ethnic fabric created by such migration
resulted in significant resentment within the Rakhine Buddhist community who blamed their
socio-economic problems on the Muslim migrants.23
The British used a decisive divide-and-
rule policy to ensure complete control over the region. By 1942 however, the simmering
communal tensions in the state erupted into violence, when the Japanese invasion of Burma
caused a significant difference in loyalties among the Rakhine Buddhists and the Muslims.24
After the end of World War II in 1945, just as Burma prepared to gain independence from the
British, a Rakhine Muslim mujahideen rebellion further complicated the relationship between
the two communities.25
19
International Crisis Group. “Myanmar: The Politics of Rakhine State.” Yangon, Brussels: ICG. 22
October 2014, p.2. Web.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid., p.3
24
Ibid.; Far Eastern Economic Review. “Distant Exile: Rohingyas seek new life in Middle East.” Hong
Kong: FEER. 28 January 1993, p.24. Print.
25
Thit Maung, Yebaw. “Civil Insurgency in Burma.” Yangon: Ministry of Information. 1989, p.30. Print.

9
1.3 Political Turmoil Post-Independence (1948 AD- Present)
The post-independence period is marked by two distinct experiences in the history of
Rakhine: the Rakhine Muslim mujahideen rebellion; and the 1962 military coup. The Rakhine
Muslim mujahideen rebels demanded the right of the Muslim population in northern Rakhine
to live as full citizens in an autonomous Muslim zone. This demand was rejected by the
newly formed Burmese government, and authorities placed restrictions on the movement of
Muslims from the north to Sittwe.26
The restrictions caused deep resentment among the
Muslims rebels, while the Rakhine Buddhists viewed the breakdown of law and order in the
state as a matter that must be dealt with strongly by the government.27
Although the rebellion
was ultimately defeated by the Burmese military, the experience permanently altered the
personal histories of the local population. In 1961, the government set up the Mayu Frontier
Administration in northern Rakhine, and this was also the time around which populations of
the Mayu Frontier began to use the word “Rohingya” to describe themselves.28
The 1962 military coup, however, put an end to the political violence in the state. It also put
an end to Muslim political activity, and the military took on a more hardline stance towards
the status of minorities in the country.29
The Muslims of Rakhine state particularly bore the
brunt of prevailing political turmoil during this period. The mass refugee exodus of 1971 and
1992, as well as the government’s decision to establish Buddhist settlements in north
Rakhine characterised the crux of Rakhine’s post-independence historical experience in
terms of religious and ethnic tensions (See section V on Conflict for more details).
In 1989, the military government of Myanmar renamed Arakan State as ‘Rakhine’.
Following the violent crackdown of student protestors during the 1998 Nationwide Popular
Pro-Democracy Protests, and the Burmese military government’s rejection of popular
mandate for the NLD in the 1990 elections, Rakhine witnessed greater militarization and
Bamar control in a manner similar to that experienced by other regions in Myanmar. In 2008,
the new Constitution was adopted by the government through a referendum. It was however,
criticised by ethnic leaders in the country (including in Rakhine) as “entrenching Bamar
power and authority over the seven ethnic states”,30
fuelling dissatisfaction over the
management of ethnic and local affairs by the central government.
26
Ibid.; International Crisis Group. “Myanmar: The Politics of Rakhine State.” Yangon, Brussels: ICG.
22 October 2014, p.4. Web.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30 Centre for Diversity and National Harmony. “Rakhine State Needs Assessment.” Myanmar: CDNH.
September 2015, p.3. Web.

RAKHINE STATE CRISIS AND MYANMAR ECONOMY

RAKHINE STATE CRISIS AND MYANMAR ECONOMY

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