The document presents a case involving a complaint filed against two media companies, Zee Turner Ltd and Star Den Media Services Pvt Ltd, regarding their planned joint venture called Media Pro Enterprise India Pvt Ltd. The complainant alleged the joint venture would strengthen the companies' dominant position in the market, force out smaller players, and harm distributors and consumers. However, the Commission found the joint venture was formed for efficiency reasons and did not make the entities dominant in the relevant market. As such, the Commission concluded the joint venture did not violate competition laws.

1. Case Presentation on
Shri Yogesh Ganeshlaji Somani
Vs.
Zee Turner Ltd.(OP I)
&
Star Den Media Services Pvt.
Ltd.(OP II) 1

2. SECTIONS INVOLVED
Section 26(6) of the Competition Act, 2002:-
Procedure for inquiry on complaints under
section 19.
Section 19 of the Competition Act, 2002:-
Inquiry into certain agreements and dominant
position of enterprise.
Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002:-
Anti-competitive agreements.
Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002:-
Abuse of dominant position.
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3. PARTIES
Shri Yogesh Ganeshlaji Somani……Informant
Vs.
Zee Turner Ltd(OP I)
Star Den Media Services Pvt. Ltd(OP II)
(OPI + OPII = Mediapro)
3

4. FACTS
Informant is a subscriber.
Opposite Party No. 1 is a joint venture between Zee
Entertainment Enterprises Ltd and Turner
International India Pvt. Ltd. (74:26).
Opposite Party No. 2 is also a JV of STAR and
DEN. (50:50).
Note:- came to know from the newspapers and other
news items that Opposite Parties No. 1 & 2 were
forming a 50:50 joint venture company, namely,
Media Pro Enterprise India Pvt. Ltd. (JV).
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5. Relevant market
In the instant case is whole of India as both
Opposite Parties No. 1 & 2 are leaders in
distribution of channels in India.
Offers channels in 17 genres.
OP I : OP II :: 29 : 34
Total = 63
It has been alleged by
Informant that both
Opposite Parties are
being market leaders and
also being pioneers in
India have better
bargaining power due to
acceptability of content
by viewers across India
5

6. Facts Cont..
The channel distribution industries was worth Rs.2500
crore of which share of Opposite Party No.1 was about
Rs. 800 crore and share of Opposite Party No. 2 was
about Rs. 1000 crore which is 70% of the market in
total.
The Informant has alleged:-
• creation of JV would strengthen their position by
adversely affecting the competition in the market.
• would force the small players to shut down or to join
hands with each other.
• would adversely affect the interests of distributors
which will directly or indirectly affect consumers.
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7. Alleged that
• the said JV would be much stronger intermediary in
the market which would be able to kill the
competition as after subscribing channels out of 63
channels offered.
• The MSOs, LCOs, DTHOs & IPTVOs would not be
having enough financial capacity to subscribe
channels of other broadcaster.
• Other channels not in JV will lag behind.
• The holdings and their related LCOs would be getting
preferential rates for the channels of JV and
packaging treatment in comparison to other
distributors in the market.
• Consumers would not be able to get competitive rate
and there will exist undue advantage by JV. 7

8. DG Report
For the purpose of relevant market
DG has assessed the broadcasting industry and
reported that the supply chain of the Indian
broadcasting industry.
DG has also examined the structure of the
Industry in India.
Market Increased i.e. no. of channels.
Levy of carriage fee.
MSOs have devised carriage fees as essentially a
strategy, where such “scarce” frequency for
carrying the channel is sold at a premium by the
MSO/LCO to the broadcaster/intermediary. 8

9. DG Report Cont..
Levy of Placement Fee.
MSOs also charge placement fees from the
broadcasters/distribution alliances for placing their
channels in a particular frequency.
Note :- That MSO’s earn more from placement fees
rather than subscription revenue.
Service provided by aggregators and no. of aggregators
present in market.
Total aggregators = 24
Existence of alternative i.e. cable TV and DTH is
interchangeable/ substitutable from the consumer
side.
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10. Findings
• Fixing of price in the market or controlling the supply is
not possible.
JV < Market
As JV compromises less than 40% of the Market
• Preferential treatment to their subsidiaries :- Governed by
RIO regime(broadcasters are under obligation to file
Reference Inter Connect Offer (RIO) under Clause 13.2 of
TRAI Regulation)
• Any person aggrieved on account of discrimination by the
broadcaster or its agent can get its grievances redressed
by approaching appropriate forum i.e. TDSAT for redressal
of his grievances.
• In Clause 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5, specific directives have
been issued with regard to distribution of channels on
Non-discriminatory terms.
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11. Findings
• Must provide :-
as there is an obligation on the part of JV to
must provide all the channels to MSOs/ DTHOs,
however, there is no must carry obligation for
downstream players.
• Cannot be said less choice provided to
consumers as bouquet composition because
of JV has increased from 9 to 16.
11

12. Held
Relying on proviso 3(3) of the Competition Act 2002
that provides an exemption to agreements entered into by
way of joint ventures, in the event that such joint ventures
increase efficiency in production, supply, distribution,
storage, acquisition or control of goods or provision of
services.
The Commission came to the conclusion that based on the
nature of the market structure and the circumstances under
which the joint venture was formed, efficiency reasons
justify it in the facts of the case.
12

13. Held cont.
Accordingly, the Commission notes that since,
the JV formed by the Opposite Parties is not
dominant in terms of section 19(4) of the Act in
the relevant market; it cannot abuse its position.
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