The principle of proportionality applies to competition proceedings especially, when
it comes to the exercise by the competition authority of its powers of inspection.
Their use limits the economic freedom and right to privacy of the scrutinised
undertakings in order to protect free competition. The use of inspection powers
must thus be proportionate and remain the least onerous possible for the inspected
companies. In consequence, legislation must provide procedural guarantees of
proportionality of inspections.
Can the Right To Be Heard Be Respected without Access to Information about th...Michal
This article analyses Polish competition procedure from the perspective of a) the right
to be heard, and b) the right to receive information about the proceedings. It points out
problems with access to information about competition proceedings which influence the
level of protection of the right to be heard in these proceedings. In order to appraise
this issue, the article embarks upon an examination of the rules governing the right to
be heard in Polish competition enforcement proceedings. It then focuses on the extent
of the competition authority’s obligation to inform undertakings about the actions
addressed to them. The article includes discussion of the rules that circumscribe the
parties’ right of access to evidence in the proceedings. Finally, proposals for changes
in the practice of the competition authority, as well as in the Polish legal framework,
are put forth. The new rules governing competition proceedings before the European
Commission serve as an example for improvements in Polish competition procedures.
Fines for Failure to Cooperate within Antitrust Proceedings – the Ultimate We...Michal
The aim of this article is to analyse a powerful competence available to antitrust
authorities in Europe in the form of the imposition of fines for the failure to
cooperate within antitrust proceedings. While fines of that type are imposed in
practice very rarely, the article considers the existing decisional practice of the
Polish antitrust authority as well as the European Commission, and presents the
way in which their approach has evolved throughout the years. The article analyses
also the question of the formal initiation of proceedings concerning procedural
violations and the importance of the use of a uniform and fair approach towards
the scrutinized undertakings, especially as fine graduation is concerned. For that
purpose, the article provides also a comparative analysis of past proceedings
conducted by the European Commission and selected judgments of EU Courts.
P. podrecki, civil law actions against restricting practicesMichal
This paper’s aim is to describe the rules governing the assertion of civil law liability
in the event of a competition law infringement. Given the planned adoption and
implementation of a new EU legislative package concerning private enforcement, it
is useful to determine what legal instruments and procedures are already available
under Polish civil law that serve the protection of market players. This paper will
specify the legal basis for the assertion of civil claims associated with competition
law infringements and present its particularity. Considered will be the provisions
of the Polish Civil Code as well as the provisions of the law on combating unfair
competition and the law on unfair market practices. Discussed will be the full
catalogue of civil law claims that can be asserted in relation to antitrust infringements
as well as the specific purposes of civil law liability in this context. The paper will
also assess the model of determining the effects of competition law violations and
analyse whether private law principles for the calculation of loss can be applied in
antitrust infringement cases. Finally, the paper will discuss the issue of settling the
convergence of liability problem and the proposal concerning the introduction into
the Polish legal system of class actions.
E. rumak, p. sitarek, polish leniency programmeMichal
This paper is devoted to the Polish leniency programme, including the conditions
of obtaining lenient treatment and the applicable procedure. The type, scope
and form of information that must be submitted are commented on as well as
the marker system and summary applications. The intersection of the leniency
scheme with private enforcement of antitrust rules is discussed in detail. Special
attention is devoted to the possible ways in which private antitrust plaintiffs might
access information submitted to the UOKiK by leniency applicants. Thoroughly
analysed are the rules regulating the possibility of obtaining relevant documents
from the UOKiK and from the defendant in the course of civil proceedings as well as the status of the administrative decision in subsequent civil litigation. The paper
covers also the scope of the leniency recipient’s civil liability and touches upon
the possible ways in which it could be limited to enhance the effectiveness of the
leniency scheme. Some suggestions de lege ferenda are also provided concerning
the means of increasing this effectiveness without prejudice to the private parties’
right to compensation.
The Scope of Application of the Provisions of the Administrative Procedure Co...Michal
The main premise of this article is an attempt to determine the scope of application
of the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Code (KPA) in antimonopoly
proceedings. The legislator has introduced an extensive system of norm-referenced
proceeding provisions for antimonopoly law. In matters not regulated by the
legislature, however, it refers primarily to the solutions standardised by the
provisions of the KPA. In the opinion of the author of the article, the general
reference to the KPA contained in Article 82 is associated with the desire to create
strong safeguards to protect the rights of businesses involved. It is also to promote stability, consistency and transparency in the application of the model antimonopoly
proceedings. It seems that the legislature came to the conclusion that such a premise
might be achieved by establishing the Administrative Procedure Code as the basic
procedural instrument for proceedings conducted by the UOKiK President. This
rather means that the ‘main burden’ of the creation of a complex mechanism for
antimonopoly proceedings rests to a greater degree on the KPA.
EU Courts’ Jurisdiction over and Review of Decisions Imposing Fines in EU Com...Michal
The aim of this article is to analyse the extent of judicial review exercised by the EU
courts over the European Commission’s decision imposing fines in EU competition law. When considering appeals against fines in competition law, the position of
the EU courts are limited to a review of imposed fines in respect of the European
Commission’s Guidelines instead of an exercise of a more comprehensive appellate
review. The review should not only be a control of legality but it has to be an unlimited
merits control. An appeal control should be directed to review fully the facts and to
control proportionality of the imposed fines. The article analyses also the question
of the protection of fundamental rights in the scope of the review over decisions
imposing fines. For that purpose, the article provides also a comparative analysis of
the selected judgments of the EU courts and the European Court of Human Rights.
Can the Right To Be Heard Be Respected without Access to Information about th...Michal
This article analyses Polish competition procedure from the perspective of a) the right
to be heard, and b) the right to receive information about the proceedings. It points out
problems with access to information about competition proceedings which influence the
level of protection of the right to be heard in these proceedings. In order to appraise
this issue, the article embarks upon an examination of the rules governing the right to
be heard in Polish competition enforcement proceedings. It then focuses on the extent
of the competition authority’s obligation to inform undertakings about the actions
addressed to them. The article includes discussion of the rules that circumscribe the
parties’ right of access to evidence in the proceedings. Finally, proposals for changes
in the practice of the competition authority, as well as in the Polish legal framework,
are put forth. The new rules governing competition proceedings before the European
Commission serve as an example for improvements in Polish competition procedures.
Fines for Failure to Cooperate within Antitrust Proceedings – the Ultimate We...Michal
The aim of this article is to analyse a powerful competence available to antitrust
authorities in Europe in the form of the imposition of fines for the failure to
cooperate within antitrust proceedings. While fines of that type are imposed in
practice very rarely, the article considers the existing decisional practice of the
Polish antitrust authority as well as the European Commission, and presents the
way in which their approach has evolved throughout the years. The article analyses
also the question of the formal initiation of proceedings concerning procedural
violations and the importance of the use of a uniform and fair approach towards
the scrutinized undertakings, especially as fine graduation is concerned. For that
purpose, the article provides also a comparative analysis of past proceedings
conducted by the European Commission and selected judgments of EU Courts.
P. podrecki, civil law actions against restricting practicesMichal
This paper’s aim is to describe the rules governing the assertion of civil law liability
in the event of a competition law infringement. Given the planned adoption and
implementation of a new EU legislative package concerning private enforcement, it
is useful to determine what legal instruments and procedures are already available
under Polish civil law that serve the protection of market players. This paper will
specify the legal basis for the assertion of civil claims associated with competition
law infringements and present its particularity. Considered will be the provisions
of the Polish Civil Code as well as the provisions of the law on combating unfair
competition and the law on unfair market practices. Discussed will be the full
catalogue of civil law claims that can be asserted in relation to antitrust infringements
as well as the specific purposes of civil law liability in this context. The paper will
also assess the model of determining the effects of competition law violations and
analyse whether private law principles for the calculation of loss can be applied in
antitrust infringement cases. Finally, the paper will discuss the issue of settling the
convergence of liability problem and the proposal concerning the introduction into
the Polish legal system of class actions.
E. rumak, p. sitarek, polish leniency programmeMichal
This paper is devoted to the Polish leniency programme, including the conditions
of obtaining lenient treatment and the applicable procedure. The type, scope
and form of information that must be submitted are commented on as well as
the marker system and summary applications. The intersection of the leniency
scheme with private enforcement of antitrust rules is discussed in detail. Special
attention is devoted to the possible ways in which private antitrust plaintiffs might
access information submitted to the UOKiK by leniency applicants. Thoroughly
analysed are the rules regulating the possibility of obtaining relevant documents
from the UOKiK and from the defendant in the course of civil proceedings as well as the status of the administrative decision in subsequent civil litigation. The paper
covers also the scope of the leniency recipient’s civil liability and touches upon
the possible ways in which it could be limited to enhance the effectiveness of the
leniency scheme. Some suggestions de lege ferenda are also provided concerning
the means of increasing this effectiveness without prejudice to the private parties’
right to compensation.
The Scope of Application of the Provisions of the Administrative Procedure Co...Michal
The main premise of this article is an attempt to determine the scope of application
of the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Code (KPA) in antimonopoly
proceedings. The legislator has introduced an extensive system of norm-referenced
proceeding provisions for antimonopoly law. In matters not regulated by the
legislature, however, it refers primarily to the solutions standardised by the
provisions of the KPA. In the opinion of the author of the article, the general
reference to the KPA contained in Article 82 is associated with the desire to create
strong safeguards to protect the rights of businesses involved. It is also to promote stability, consistency and transparency in the application of the model antimonopoly
proceedings. It seems that the legislature came to the conclusion that such a premise
might be achieved by establishing the Administrative Procedure Code as the basic
procedural instrument for proceedings conducted by the UOKiK President. This
rather means that the ‘main burden’ of the creation of a complex mechanism for
antimonopoly proceedings rests to a greater degree on the KPA.
EU Courts’ Jurisdiction over and Review of Decisions Imposing Fines in EU Com...Michal
The aim of this article is to analyse the extent of judicial review exercised by the EU
courts over the European Commission’s decision imposing fines in EU competition law. When considering appeals against fines in competition law, the position of
the EU courts are limited to a review of imposed fines in respect of the European
Commission’s Guidelines instead of an exercise of a more comprehensive appellate
review. The review should not only be a control of legality but it has to be an unlimited
merits control. An appeal control should be directed to review fully the facts and to
control proportionality of the imposed fines. The article analyses also the question
of the protection of fundamental rights in the scope of the review over decisions
imposing fines. For that purpose, the article provides also a comparative analysis of
the selected judgments of the EU courts and the European Court of Human Rights.
Polish Telecom Regulator’s Decisions Regarding Mobile Termination Rates and t...Michal
The article presents key issues relating to the methods of mobile termination rates
calculation by the Polish National Regulatory Agency (NRA): the UKE President. It
analyses the provisions of Polish telecommunications law of 20041 with respect to the
rights and obligations of the UKE President. It invokes specific cases showing how
problematic rates calculation is for mobile operators. The Polkomtel, PTK Centertel,
PTC sp. z o.o. cases clearly show how unclear the calculation process may be in
practice and illustrate how broad the discretionary powers of the UKE President
are in this respect on the grounds of Polish telecommunications law. Highlighted
is also the dispute between the Polish NRA and the European Commission. Even
though the UKE President acts on the grounds of Polish law, its actions have to be
compliant with the European telecoms package and take into utmost account the
recommendations and comments issued by the European Commission.
Intersection between the activities of two regulators – shall prior actions t...Michal
The commented judgment of the Polish Supreme Court concerns Telekomunikacja
Polska S.A. (hereafter, TPSA)1 and the fines imposed upon the incumbent operator
by the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (in Polish:
Urząd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów; hereafter, UOKiK) for the abuse of its
dominant position. TPSA is a Polish telecoms provider formally established in 1991.
It is a public company – its shares are traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange with the
controlling stake owned by France Télécom2. TPSA is often the subject of competition
law decisions issued not only by the UOKiK President but also by the European
Commission, particularly with respect to dominant position abuse
Agata Jurkowska-Gomułka (ed.), Orzecznictwo sądów wspólnotowych w sprawach ko...Michal
The publication under review here edited by Dr. Agata Jurkowska–Gomułka from
the University of Warsaw (Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies) is a collection of
case studies concerning European competition law prepared by a number of individual
authors both academics and practitioners. As a presentation of landmark judgments
of EU courts, it is a continuation of the 2007 publication entitled: Jurisprudence of
the European Community Courts in competition matters in years 1964- 2004 edited
by Professor Tadeusz Skoczny and Dr. Agata Jurkowska (hereafter, Volume I). The
current book (hereinafter, Volume II), commences with 1 May 2004 – an important
date for this publication for two key reasons: first, because of its correlation with
Poland’s EU accession and second, because of its correlation with the entry into force
of Regulation 1/2003. However, the presented judgments do not refer to Regulation
1/2003 primarily due to the lengthy nature of judicial proceedings. There was thus
no chance, before the publication of Volume II, to discuss any jurisprudence based
on this act.
Procedural Autonomy of Member States and the EU Rights of Defence in Antitrus...Michal
The general rule concerning the application of EU law in the Member States is
that, unless the procedural issues are directly regulated in EU primary or secondary
law, the Member States possess a so-called ‘procedural autonomy’. This rule applies
fully to national antitrust proceedings, where the presumed infringement may
affect trade between EU Member States (decentralised EU antitrust proceedings). However, the procedural guarantees offered to undertakings in EU antitrust
proceedings before the European Commission, often referred to the undertakings’
‘rights of defence’, also form a part of the procedural acquis of EU law. This article
examines the question whether that procedural acquis, stemming mainly from EU
courts’s jurisprudence and formulated with regard to the proceedings before the
European Commission, should be applied as a standard in national (i.e. Polish)
antitrust proceedings where EU law applies.
Standards of Entrepreneur Rights in Competition Proceedings – a Matter of Adm...Michal
The question of standards of entrepreneur rights in competition proceedings has
been for many years considered as one the most controversial issues. Its importance
has been increasing considering that the application of antitrust regulations is often
concomitant with a wide-ranging interference with the freedom of economic activity.
This interference manifests itself in cases concerning both restrictive practices and
the control of concentrations. Valuable source of inspiration for a debate on the
need to take into account numerous standards of rights in competition proceedings was the dispute over the nature of competition proceedings and fines (the
controversy around ‘a criminal law nature’ of competition cases). The jurisprudence
of Strasbourg judiciaries explicitly stresses that in the assessment of a case nature
due consideration should rather not be given to formal classifications set forth
in legal provisions but to the real nature of the case. The ECJ did not share the
assumptions adopted by the European Court of Human Rights on the legitimacy of
a wide interpretation of the “criminal charge” notion within the meaning of Article
6(1) ECHR. In the present EU jurisprudence on competition law, there have been
more and more judgments which deal with standards of rights stemming from
the ECHR. In the context of an ever growing severity of penalties, the guarantee
function of law has been gaining in importance, and hence the standards to be
respected in competition proceedings are of a bigger weight.
Major changes were brought by the entry into force, on 1 December 2009, of the
Treaty of Lisbon. The implementation of the concept aiming at an even stronger
reinforcement of the position of fundamental rights was sealed by granting the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights of 2000 the binding force by including this Charter
into the EU primary law and by defining the basis for the EU accession to the
ECHR (Article 6 TEU). The introduction of new rules of judicial cooperation in
criminal matters may contribute in future to a better dynamic of the criminalization
of the most serious violations of competition law in the EU Member States (Article
83 and following of the TFEU).
New Amendments Introduced to European Union Competition Law Due to the Expira...Michal
On 7 June 2010, a conference under the title New Amendments Introduced to
European Union Competition Law Due to the Expiration of Block Exemption Regulations
took place at the Lazarski University in Warsaw.
The conference was opened by Professor Zbigniew Lasocik, the Dean of the Law
Faculty of the Lazarski University, who started his speech by introducing the University
and emphasizing the Faculty of Law’s aim to ensure high quality legal education.
Competence of Common Courts in Poland in Competition MattersMichal
The main aim of this article is to present current judicial practice, concerning
hearing cases stemming from appeals of Polish Competition Authority decisions.
The relevant court tends to review the cases only on merits, omitting to address
procedural infringements, clearly stated by the parties in appeals. In author’s
opinion this common practice does not have a legal leg to stand on. Author
analyses relevant laws and precedents pointing out, that full review of the decision
is Court’s duty, which could not be neglected. Furthermore, according to ECHR
rulings procedural guaranties should be assured on high level, especially in matters,
where quasi-criminal fines are concerned. As a legal practitioner Author perceives
possible crippling effect on effectiveness, assuming that the Court would have to
review all steps of the proceedings before Competition Authority. So in conclusion
Author proposes a compromise solution asserting, that the Court should at least
address all procedural infringement counts stated in appeal.
The Autonomy of Sector-Specific Regulation – Is It Still Worth Protecting? Fu...Michal
This article sets out to contribute to the on-going discussion regarding the
relationship between competition law and sector-specific regulation, as well as the
parallel application of competition law and regulatory instruments. Thus, this article
attempts to provide a systematic outline of arguments which are conclusive for the
proposition that sector-specific regulation must remain fully autonomous, while
taking a critical stance with respect to the views of both the Supreme Court and
academic lawyers who advocate the supremacy of competition law.
A. jurkowska, antitrust private enforcement in polandMichal
This article presents the main difficulties surrounding private enforcement of
antitrust law in Poland, currently the key implementation problem in the field of
antitrust law. Whereas the basic standards concerning the public pillar of antitrust
enforcement have already been established, either in the European Community
(EC) or in its Member States, the private pillar of antitrust enforcement has not
yet been fully developed. The fact that private enforcement of antitrust law is
possible, and in fact equal, to public enforcement is not yet commonly recognized.
In response to the European Commission’s White Paper on Damages actions for
breach of the EC antitrust rules, private enforcement of antirust law is presently under intense discussion in EC Member States. This article should be considered
as one of the contributions to this debate.
It presents the main legal framework of private enforcement of antitrust law in
Poland. In order to do so, it directly refers to the Polish Act on competition and
consumer protection, the Civil Code and the Civil Procedure Code. This article
also discusses Polish case law in this area. It aims to assess whether existing Polish
legal provisions are, in fact, sufficient to ensure effective private enforcement of
Polish as well as EC antitrust law. The article refers to the main proposals of the
European Commission’s White Paper.
It is concluded that private enforcement of antitrust law is indeed possible in
Poland on the basis of currently applicable procedural rules, even if there are no
special instruments designed to facilitate it. However, it cannot be expect that in the
current legal climate, private parties will eagerly and frequently apply for damages
in cases of a breach of Polish antitrust law. Antitrust cases are special in many
aspects and, thus, they require specific solutions in procedural terms. This article
aims to pinpoint those areas, where the Polish law needs to be changed in order to
develop and promote private enforcement of antitrust law in Poland.
More economic approach to exclusivity agreements: how does it work in practic...Michal
No other topic draws as much attention in competition law as the need for an
economic approach1 and yet, it is still a ‘deficit’ approach. Authorities enforcing
competition protection rules are still very attached to the formalistic approach and
this is an affliction not only of the Polish but also of the EU authorities and courts2
Polish Antitrust Legislation and Case Law Review 2010Michal
The article presents key developments in Polish antitrust legislation and case law
of 2010. Regarding legislation, the article focuses on a new group exemption for
agreements on motor vehicle distribution; also provided is a general characterisation
of antitrust jurisprudence, mainly the judgments of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals in Warsaw. The presented rulings are divided according to their
subject matter referring to particular types of restrictive practices, relevant market
definition, relationships between the Competition Act and other national legislation
as well as problems related to the UOKiK President’s decision-making process and
juridical control of antitrust decisions.
Polish Telecom Regulator’s Decisions Regarding Mobile Termination Rates and t...Michal
The article presents key issues relating to the methods of mobile termination rates
calculation by the Polish National Regulatory Agency (NRA): the UKE President. It
analyses the provisions of Polish telecommunications law of 20041 with respect to the
rights and obligations of the UKE President. It invokes specific cases showing how
problematic rates calculation is for mobile operators. The Polkomtel, PTK Centertel,
PTC sp. z o.o. cases clearly show how unclear the calculation process may be in
practice and illustrate how broad the discretionary powers of the UKE President
are in this respect on the grounds of Polish telecommunications law. Highlighted
is also the dispute between the Polish NRA and the European Commission. Even
though the UKE President acts on the grounds of Polish law, its actions have to be
compliant with the European telecoms package and take into utmost account the
recommendations and comments issued by the European Commission.
Intersection between the activities of two regulators – shall prior actions t...Michal
The commented judgment of the Polish Supreme Court concerns Telekomunikacja
Polska S.A. (hereafter, TPSA)1 and the fines imposed upon the incumbent operator
by the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (in Polish:
Urząd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów; hereafter, UOKiK) for the abuse of its
dominant position. TPSA is a Polish telecoms provider formally established in 1991.
It is a public company – its shares are traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange with the
controlling stake owned by France Télécom2. TPSA is often the subject of competition
law decisions issued not only by the UOKiK President but also by the European
Commission, particularly with respect to dominant position abuse
Agata Jurkowska-Gomułka (ed.), Orzecznictwo sądów wspólnotowych w sprawach ko...Michal
The publication under review here edited by Dr. Agata Jurkowska–Gomułka from
the University of Warsaw (Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies) is a collection of
case studies concerning European competition law prepared by a number of individual
authors both academics and practitioners. As a presentation of landmark judgments
of EU courts, it is a continuation of the 2007 publication entitled: Jurisprudence of
the European Community Courts in competition matters in years 1964- 2004 edited
by Professor Tadeusz Skoczny and Dr. Agata Jurkowska (hereafter, Volume I). The
current book (hereinafter, Volume II), commences with 1 May 2004 – an important
date for this publication for two key reasons: first, because of its correlation with
Poland’s EU accession and second, because of its correlation with the entry into force
of Regulation 1/2003. However, the presented judgments do not refer to Regulation
1/2003 primarily due to the lengthy nature of judicial proceedings. There was thus
no chance, before the publication of Volume II, to discuss any jurisprudence based
on this act.
Procedural Autonomy of Member States and the EU Rights of Defence in Antitrus...Michal
The general rule concerning the application of EU law in the Member States is
that, unless the procedural issues are directly regulated in EU primary or secondary
law, the Member States possess a so-called ‘procedural autonomy’. This rule applies
fully to national antitrust proceedings, where the presumed infringement may
affect trade between EU Member States (decentralised EU antitrust proceedings). However, the procedural guarantees offered to undertakings in EU antitrust
proceedings before the European Commission, often referred to the undertakings’
‘rights of defence’, also form a part of the procedural acquis of EU law. This article
examines the question whether that procedural acquis, stemming mainly from EU
courts’s jurisprudence and formulated with regard to the proceedings before the
European Commission, should be applied as a standard in national (i.e. Polish)
antitrust proceedings where EU law applies.
Standards of Entrepreneur Rights in Competition Proceedings – a Matter of Adm...Michal
The question of standards of entrepreneur rights in competition proceedings has
been for many years considered as one the most controversial issues. Its importance
has been increasing considering that the application of antitrust regulations is often
concomitant with a wide-ranging interference with the freedom of economic activity.
This interference manifests itself in cases concerning both restrictive practices and
the control of concentrations. Valuable source of inspiration for a debate on the
need to take into account numerous standards of rights in competition proceedings was the dispute over the nature of competition proceedings and fines (the
controversy around ‘a criminal law nature’ of competition cases). The jurisprudence
of Strasbourg judiciaries explicitly stresses that in the assessment of a case nature
due consideration should rather not be given to formal classifications set forth
in legal provisions but to the real nature of the case. The ECJ did not share the
assumptions adopted by the European Court of Human Rights on the legitimacy of
a wide interpretation of the “criminal charge” notion within the meaning of Article
6(1) ECHR. In the present EU jurisprudence on competition law, there have been
more and more judgments which deal with standards of rights stemming from
the ECHR. In the context of an ever growing severity of penalties, the guarantee
function of law has been gaining in importance, and hence the standards to be
respected in competition proceedings are of a bigger weight.
Major changes were brought by the entry into force, on 1 December 2009, of the
Treaty of Lisbon. The implementation of the concept aiming at an even stronger
reinforcement of the position of fundamental rights was sealed by granting the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights of 2000 the binding force by including this Charter
into the EU primary law and by defining the basis for the EU accession to the
ECHR (Article 6 TEU). The introduction of new rules of judicial cooperation in
criminal matters may contribute in future to a better dynamic of the criminalization
of the most serious violations of competition law in the EU Member States (Article
83 and following of the TFEU).
New Amendments Introduced to European Union Competition Law Due to the Expira...Michal
On 7 June 2010, a conference under the title New Amendments Introduced to
European Union Competition Law Due to the Expiration of Block Exemption Regulations
took place at the Lazarski University in Warsaw.
The conference was opened by Professor Zbigniew Lasocik, the Dean of the Law
Faculty of the Lazarski University, who started his speech by introducing the University
and emphasizing the Faculty of Law’s aim to ensure high quality legal education.
Competence of Common Courts in Poland in Competition MattersMichal
The main aim of this article is to present current judicial practice, concerning
hearing cases stemming from appeals of Polish Competition Authority decisions.
The relevant court tends to review the cases only on merits, omitting to address
procedural infringements, clearly stated by the parties in appeals. In author’s
opinion this common practice does not have a legal leg to stand on. Author
analyses relevant laws and precedents pointing out, that full review of the decision
is Court’s duty, which could not be neglected. Furthermore, according to ECHR
rulings procedural guaranties should be assured on high level, especially in matters,
where quasi-criminal fines are concerned. As a legal practitioner Author perceives
possible crippling effect on effectiveness, assuming that the Court would have to
review all steps of the proceedings before Competition Authority. So in conclusion
Author proposes a compromise solution asserting, that the Court should at least
address all procedural infringement counts stated in appeal.
The Autonomy of Sector-Specific Regulation – Is It Still Worth Protecting? Fu...Michal
This article sets out to contribute to the on-going discussion regarding the
relationship between competition law and sector-specific regulation, as well as the
parallel application of competition law and regulatory instruments. Thus, this article
attempts to provide a systematic outline of arguments which are conclusive for the
proposition that sector-specific regulation must remain fully autonomous, while
taking a critical stance with respect to the views of both the Supreme Court and
academic lawyers who advocate the supremacy of competition law.
A. jurkowska, antitrust private enforcement in polandMichal
This article presents the main difficulties surrounding private enforcement of
antitrust law in Poland, currently the key implementation problem in the field of
antitrust law. Whereas the basic standards concerning the public pillar of antitrust
enforcement have already been established, either in the European Community
(EC) or in its Member States, the private pillar of antitrust enforcement has not
yet been fully developed. The fact that private enforcement of antitrust law is
possible, and in fact equal, to public enforcement is not yet commonly recognized.
In response to the European Commission’s White Paper on Damages actions for
breach of the EC antitrust rules, private enforcement of antirust law is presently under intense discussion in EC Member States. This article should be considered
as one of the contributions to this debate.
It presents the main legal framework of private enforcement of antitrust law in
Poland. In order to do so, it directly refers to the Polish Act on competition and
consumer protection, the Civil Code and the Civil Procedure Code. This article
also discusses Polish case law in this area. It aims to assess whether existing Polish
legal provisions are, in fact, sufficient to ensure effective private enforcement of
Polish as well as EC antitrust law. The article refers to the main proposals of the
European Commission’s White Paper.
It is concluded that private enforcement of antitrust law is indeed possible in
Poland on the basis of currently applicable procedural rules, even if there are no
special instruments designed to facilitate it. However, it cannot be expect that in the
current legal climate, private parties will eagerly and frequently apply for damages
in cases of a breach of Polish antitrust law. Antitrust cases are special in many
aspects and, thus, they require specific solutions in procedural terms. This article
aims to pinpoint those areas, where the Polish law needs to be changed in order to
develop and promote private enforcement of antitrust law in Poland.
More economic approach to exclusivity agreements: how does it work in practic...Michal
No other topic draws as much attention in competition law as the need for an
economic approach1 and yet, it is still a ‘deficit’ approach. Authorities enforcing
competition protection rules are still very attached to the formalistic approach and
this is an affliction not only of the Polish but also of the EU authorities and courts2
Polish Antitrust Legislation and Case Law Review 2010Michal
The article presents key developments in Polish antitrust legislation and case law
of 2010. Regarding legislation, the article focuses on a new group exemption for
agreements on motor vehicle distribution; also provided is a general characterisation
of antitrust jurisprudence, mainly the judgments of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals in Warsaw. The presented rulings are divided according to their
subject matter referring to particular types of restrictive practices, relevant market
definition, relationships between the Competition Act and other national legislation
as well as problems related to the UOKiK President’s decision-making process and
juridical control of antitrust decisions.
Conditional merger approvals in Polish legislation and decision-making practi...Michal
A meeting of the CARS Open PhD Seminar took place on 16 November 2010.
It was dedicated to the basic problems arising in relation to conditional merger
decisions in Poland. The opening speech delivered by Professor Tadeusz Skoczny
was based on his research study concerning the quantitative and qualitative analysis
of the decision-making practice of the Polish Competition Authority with respect to
conditional merger decisions.
To regulate or not to regulate – economic approachMichal
The aim of this paper is to present an Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU) as a possible
remedy for telecom infrastructure EU projects that (in Poland) have been lagged
behind the time. Thanks for IRU, Beneficiaries of these EU projects will be able
to save both: time and money and will finish projects successfully. The author
discusses two possible methods of implementing IRU: via regulatory obligation and
via incumbent’s goodwill. The author proposes a game theory model with payoffs
depending on regulator’s and incumbent’s strategies. Using a game theory tree,
the author shows that if only the incumbent is willing to offer his own network,
IRU may be signed and most delays in EU projects disappear. The success is not
so obvious while implementing IRU as an obligation – in this case EU projects
will probably fail.
The European Commission published a White Paper on 2 April 2008 on damages
actions for breach of EU antitrust rules. The content of the White Paper is since
then being prepared to be converted into EU legislation on private antitrust
enforcement. This paper presents the developments in private antitrust enforcement
in Poland after 2 April 2008. It commences with an outline of EU actions in
this field which act as an introduction to the more detailed analysis of recent
jurisprudential and legislative developments in Poland. The latter part of the paper
covers, in particular, the 2009 Act on the Pursuit of Claims in Group Proceedings
and the 2011 Act Amending the Civil Procedure Code and Some Other Acts which
abolishes all specific elements of commercial proceedings, including the statutory ‘non-admission of evidence’ principle. These two legal acts are assessed in order
to establish whether their introduction is likely to help facilitate private antitrust
enforcement in Poland and to consider to what an extent are these developments
responding to the challenges outlined by the European Commission.
Sieci szerokopasmowe w polityce telekomunikacyjnej a book reviewMichal
A new book from Professor Stanisław Piątek, an established authority on
telecommunications law, brings the reader closer to the inner workings of broadband
technology in its legal environment. The title reflects the focus of telecoms policy
on access whereby the only access that matters is to the broadband network in its
many variations. The subject matter itself makes the book worth reading, particularly
in the absence of other major Polish works on this topic. Even if some authors
regarded broadband technologies as obsolete years ago1, in reality it still represents
a lion’s share of the telecoms business. Professor Piątek himself is well aware of the
historical and transitory nature of the subject matter when he defines broadband not
by association with any particular technology but as the ability of whatever technology
available at any given moment to provide a certain minimum transmission speed.
Thus the central notion is open to absorb technologies nonexistent as of yet. This in
turn may pose serious regulatory issues as to what future industries will be subject to
regulation, particularly since the distinction between content and carrier regulation
is becoming increasingly blurred.
Media audiovizualne. konflikt regulacyjny w dobie cyfryzacji a book reviewMichal
The book under review here is entitled Audiovisual Media: regulatory conflict in
the digitalisation era by Katarzyna Chalubinska- Jentkiewicz. As the title suggests,
I expected it to be a monograph on new regulatory problems in the increasingly
digital audiovisual field. The sector itself is well known to cause competence conflicts
between the as many as three different regulatory bodies overseeing it in Poland: the
national telecoms regulator (the UKE President), the audiovisual media supervisory
body (the KRRiT) and the competition authority (the UOKiK President). The impact
of the European Commission can also not be overlooked. The book does indeed
deal in great detail with what is seen as the ‘regulatory conflict’ in the audiovisual
field but the approach applied therein is that of the theory of administration and
administrative/constitutional law rather than that of market regulation. As a result,
the analysis focuses primarily on the perceived ‘conflict’ between Poland’s interests
and regulatory competences and the impact exercised by the European Union as
a whole, rather than on any existing or potential internal conflicts. Key to the entire
analysis is the contraposition of the notion of ‘public interest of a nation’ (State) and
the ‘general interest of the EU’ whereby the special characteristics of ‘national’ public
interest are associated with the notion of ‘public morality’ and also, ‘public mission’.
Legislative developments in the aviation sector in 2011 in polandMichal
The Polish Aviation Law Act of 3 July 2002 was amended six times in
2011. The only major change introduced in this period resulted from the
Amendment Act to the Aviation Law Act of 30 June 2011, most of which
entered into force 30 days after its publication1. In fact, changes introduced
thereby were so widespread and crucial to the entire aviation sector that it
can easily be referred to as a completely new law. Considerable effort went
into the preparation of this Act – its first draft was presented as early as 2009
followed by long consultations and the ultimate introduction of a number of
further changes.
Legislative developments in rail transport in 2011 in polandMichal
Most amendments of the Polish rail transport law in 2011 concerned the
organisation of rail transport including: improvements in timetable changing
procedures; mechanisms to ensure the observance and early publication of
timetables; interoperability of the rail system and; certification of train drivers.
Introduced were also some changes meant to restructure the incumbent state
rail operator (in Polish: Polskie Koleje Państwowe; hereafter PKP).
Legislative and jurisprudential developments in the telecommunications sector...Michal
The Telecommunications Law Act1 (in Polish: Prawo Telekomunikacyjne,
hereafter: PT) was subject to a number of amendments in 2011 introduced by
the Amendment Act of 14 April 2011 and the Amendment Act of 16 September
2011 as well as by the separate Act of 30 June 2011 on the implementation of
digital terrestrial television.
In response to the reservations expressed by the European Commission
regarding the compatibility of the way in which regulatory obligations
concerning the setting of wholesale prices are imposed in Poland, the
Amendment Act of 14 April 2011 changed Articles 39 and 40 PT2. The direct
reason for this amendment was set out in a reasoned opinion prepared by the
Commission in October 2010 under Article 258 TFEU3. It was stated therein
that Polish rules regarding the establishment of wholesale prices may give
rise to legal uncertainty and may be discriminatory towards certain telecoms
operators.
Legislative and jurisprudential developments in the postal sector in 2011 in ...Michal
Postal services in Poland are governed by the Postal Law Act of 2003 (in
Polish: Prawo Pocztowe)1 which maintains the monopoly of the public operator
Poczta Polska with respect of letters weighing up to 50 grams. However, Poland
will have to fully liberalize its postal services market by 31 December 2012.
For this reason, the Government adopted on 5 October 2010 Assumptions
for the Draft Postal Law Act as proposed by the Minister of Infrastructure2.
However, the Draft was not placed on the Government’s legislative agenda
for 2011. Thus, the majority of legislative work will have to be completed in
2012, a fact that jeopardizes the implementation of Directive 2008/6/EC. The
latter indicates 31 December 2012 as the deadline beyond which Member
States must not maintain a privileged position of operators providing universal
postal services
Legislative and jurisprudential developments in the energy sector in 2011 in ...Michal
The year 2011 brought about fundamental changes to the legal framework
affecting energy markets in Poland. The most important of these changes
concerned rules on obligatory public trading of electric energy (so-called,
exchange obligation) and the implementation of Nuclear Facilities Projects
and Obligatory Natural Gas Reserve System Projects.
Key legislative and jurisprudential developments of Polish Antitrust Law in 2011Michal
The article presents key developments in Polish antitrust legislation and jurisprudence
of 2011. Its legislative part focuses on the renewal of Polish Group Exemption
Regulations for vertical agreements, specialization and R&D agreements as well as
cooperation agreements in the insurance sector. Noted is also the sole amendment
of the Competition Act introduced in 2011 which concerns the financial liability of
the Polish competition authority. The article covers also the new Guidelines of the
UOKiK President on the criteria and procedures of merger notifications. Presented
in its jurisprudential part is a number of 2011 rulings, mainly those rendered by
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, divided according to their subject
matter with respect to particular types of restrictive practices and other problems
related to the decision-making process of the UOKiK President.
Is the parallel competence set out in regulation 12003 totally clear. case co...Michal
With a motion dated 28th of April 2005 submitted to the President of the Office of
Competition and Consumer Protection (in Polish: Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji
i Konsumentów; hereafter, UOKiK President), Tele2 Polska Sp. z o.o. (currently:
Netia S.A., hereafter, Applicant) requested the initiation of antitrust proceedings
against Telekomunikacja Polska S.A. (hereafter, TP). The Polish incumbent, TP, was
alleged to have engaged in practices restricting competition covered by Article 8(1)
and 8(2)(5) of the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection of 15th December
2000 (hereafter, Competition Act 2000) and in Article 82 of the Treaty establishing
European Community (hereafter, TEC), presently, Article 102 of the Treaty on the
functioning of the European Union (hereafter, TFEU).
How to facilitate damage claims private enforcement in croatiaMichal
Ever since the Croatian Competition Agency started functioning in 1997, public
enforcement of competition law has been the norm. Civil actions for breaches of
competition law have been the exception in Croatia. The existing legislation in the
area of competition law makes no effort to incentivise private enforcement. There
are no specific rules in the Competition Act 2009 dedicated to civil actions, except a
single provision that assigns jurisdiction over damages claims to commercial courts.
General tort law is applicable in order to prove damages. A number of issues arise
here mostly due to the complexity of competition cases. These issues were described
in the European Commission’s White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of
EC Antitrust Rules (2008). The level of uncertainty as regards the outcome of the
claim is high. It seems that special rules need to be adopted in Croatia in order
to improve the position of the injured side. The paper deals with a number of
procedural and substantive law issues relevant to the facilitation of civil proceedings
for antitrust damages. A domestic law perspective is applied taking into account
recent developments in EU competition law and policy.
European audiovisual sector – where business meets society’s needs a book r...Michal
The Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies (CARS), responsible for this
yearbook, also prepares the publication of textbooks and monographs. An Englishlanguage
textbook European Audiovisual Sector: Where business meets society’s needs
written by Dr. Ewelina D. Sage is one of the latest publication in this series
Differentiation between entrepreneurs and its legal consequences. case commentMichal
The discussed judgment was rendered in relation to the dispute between the
President of the Polish Competition Authority (hereafter, UOKiK President) on the
one hand and the Polish Football Association and the broadcaster Canal+ on the
other hand. These two undertakings were party to an agreement on exercising media
rights to football games of the two highest classes of the Polish league. The core of
the dispute consisted of the possibility of deeming the pre-emption right reserved
for Canal+ as a contractual provision restricting competition. The Courts involved
were also forced to answer the question whether performing tasks of a public service
character justified a decrease in the fine imposed by the competition authority
Development of the judicial review of the decisions in slovakiaMichal
The article provides an analysis of the most important judgments rendered by
Slovak courts at the end of 2010, in the course of 2011 and at the beginning of 2012.
The article focuses solely on judicial review of decisions issued by the National
Competition Authority of the Slovak Republic.
Slovak courts dealt with several key issues concerning public enforcement
of competition law such as: the application of the so-called ‘general clause’;
competences of the Slovak competition authority in regulated sectors; and the
application of the economic continuity test. Some of the conclusions resulting from
these judgments may be considered disputable. It may be argued, in particular, that
they may jeopardize the effective enforcement of competition law in the Slovak Republic. At the same time, the discussed jurisprudence has managed to clarify
a number of key issues which had been subject to debate for a number of years. The
article presents a review of these judgments, summarizes their key conclusions and
considers their possible impact on the system of public enforcement of competition
law in the Slovak Republic. The article is divided into a number of parts, each of
which covers an individual case, the titles of which refers to the main topic that was
under discussion in the presented judgment.
Commission guidelines on assessment of significant market power. case commentMichal
The ruling of the Court of Justice (hereafter, CJ) in the PTC case concerns the
interpretation of Article 58 of the Treaty of Accession1 establishing an obligation
to publish EU legal acts in the languages of Member States which accessed the EU
on 1 May 2004. A controversy emerged in this context whether the said obligation
also applied to European Commission Guidelines on relevant market analysis and
the assessment of significant market power in the field of electronic communication
(hereafter, 2002 Guidelines)2. In general, guidelines issued by the Commission are
regarded as acts of soft law, also called innominate acts or sui generis acts.
In the fifth year of its activities CARS focused on the pursuit of a number of
goals set in its founding documents. It was a particularly busy year for its Publishing
Programme which saw the issue of 6 separate titles: two monographs, an Englishlanguage
textbook, a collective works and two volumes of the ‘Yearbook of Antitrust
and Regulatory Studies’ [a special edition vol. 4(4) and the yearly vol. 4(5)]. 2011 was
also a very active period for the CARS Open PhD Seminar series with four meetings
taking place throughout the year. Several CARS members engaged also in the second
edition of a research project dedicated to regulatory and antitrust aspects of airport
activities (first phase of the project completed in 2010).
What do limitation periods for sanctions in antitrustMichal
Limitation periods represent a legal safeguard for a person who has once
broken the law in order not to be put at risk of sanctions and other legal liabilities
for an indefinite amount of time. By contrast, public interest can sometimes require
that a person who has committed a serious breach of law cannot benefit from
limitation periods and that it is necessary to declare that the law had indeed been
infringed and that legal liability shall be expected irrespective of the passage of
time.
Universal service obligation and loyalty effectsMichal
In network industries, a Universal Service Obligation (USO) is often seen as a burden
on an incumbent, which requires compensation for the net cost of such service
provision. This paper estimates the effects of consumer loyalty as an intangible
benefit of USO in the postal sector. In doing so, the agent-based modelling (ABM)
approach is applied, which makes it possible to model the behaviour of boundedly
rational consumers and is thus particularly appropriate for taking into account
intangibles considerations. The analysis shows that loyalty is crucial to whether
the USO uniform pricing constraint results in loss-making or profitability. Under
certain conditions and in the presence of a loyalty parameter, uniform pricing gives
a USO provider an advantage, when the size of the rural area is sufficiently big
and a disadvantage, if its size is too small. This finding is counterintuitive as USO
providers in countries with sparsely populated areas are typically expected to incur
a significant net cost of USO.
2010 and 2011 eu competition law and case law developments with a nexus to po...Michal
This third overview of EU competition and sector-specific regulatory jurisprudential
and case law developments with a nexus to Poland covers the years 2010 and 2011.
This period of time is worth noting for several reasons. First, EU courts delivered
a significant number of judgments in ‘Polish’ cases including an increased number of
preliminary rulings. Second, 2010-2011 developments were dominated by judgments
and decisions concerning telecoms. Finally, the Commission adopted only a handful
of Polish State aid decisions following a formal investigation procedure under
Article 108(2) TFEU.
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Adani SEBI investigation revealed that the latter had sought information from five foreign jurisdictions concerning the holdings of the firm’s foreign portfolio investors (FPIs) in relation to the alleged violations of the MPS Regulations. Nevertheless, the economic interest of the twelve FPIs based in tax haven jurisdictions still needs to be determined. The Adani Group firms classed these FPIs as public shareholders. According to Hindenburg, FPIs were used to get around regulatory standards.
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Implicitly or explicitly all competing businesses employ a strategy to select a mix
of marketing resources. Formulating such competitive strategies fundamentally
involves recognizing relationships between elements of the marketing mix (e.g.,
price and product quality), as well as assessing competitive and market conditions
(i.e., industry structure in the language of economics).
Powers of Inspection of the Polish Competition Authority. Question of Proportionality
1. YEARBOOK Peer-reviewed scientific periodical,
of ANTITRUST focusing on legal and economic
and REGULATORY issues of antitrust and regulation.
STUDIES Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies,
Creative Commons Attribution-No University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management
www.yars.wz.uw.edu.pl Derivative Works 3.0 Poland License. www.cars.wz.uw.edu.pl
Powers of Inspection of the Polish Competition Authority.
Question of Proportionality
by
Maciej Bernatt*
CONTENTS
I. Introduction
II. Limitations of rights and freedoms
III. Proportionality safeguards in Polish competition proceedings
IV. Distinction between a control and a search
V. Prior notice of an inspection
VI. Inspections during explanatory proceedings
VII. Right of complaint and judicial control
1. Objections under the Act on the Freedom of Economic Activity
2. Prior judicial control
3. Subsequent judicial control
VIII. Conclusions
Abstract
The principle of proportionality applies to competition proceedings especially, when
it comes to the exercise by the competition authority of its powers of inspection.
Their use limits the economic freedom and right to privacy of the scrutinised
undertakings in order to protect free competition. The use of inspection powers
must thus be proportionate and remain the least onerous possible for the inspected
companies. In consequence, legislation must provide procedural guarantees of
proportionality of inspections.
This article analyses whether the powers of inspection bestowed upon the Polish
competition authority are regulated in a way that guarantees the observance of
* Dr. Maciej Bernatt, lecturer at the Jean Monnet Chair on European Economic Law,
Faculty of Management, University of Warsaw; ordinary member of the Centre for Antitrust
and Regulatory Studies; assistant of justice in Polish Constitutional Court.
VOL. 2011, 4(5)
2. 48 MACIEJ BERNATT
the principle of proportionality. The analysis focuses on the powers of control and
search. Subsequently covered is also the issue of judicial control over the use of
the powers of inspection by the competition authority. Proposals for changes in
the practice of the competition authority as well as in the Polish legal framework
are made in conclusion.
Résumé
Le principe de la proportionnalité s’applique quand il vient à l’exercice des puissances
de l’inspection par l’autorité de concurrence. L’utilisation de ces puissances – limitant,
au nom de la protection de la libre concurrence, la liberté économique et le droit
des entreprises à l’intimité – doit être proportionnée et la moins onéreuse possible
pour les entreprises inspectées. Par conséquent, dans le cadre juridique les garanties
procédurales de la proportionnalité des inspections doivent être fournies. L ’article
analyse si les puissances des inspections de l’autorité de concurrence polonaise sont
réglées d’une manière qui garantit le respect du principe de la proportionnalité.
Classifications and key words: competition proceedings; antitrust proceedings;
dawn raids; inspection; right to privacy; right of defense; judicial control over the
administrative proceedings; procedural fairness.
I. Introduction
Proportionality is an essential legal principle which states that interference
by public authorities with the rights and freedoms of private entities is
permissible only if it is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society for the protection of key interests such as public order or
the rights and freedoms of others. For that reason, the use of public measures
in order to attain objectives legitimately pursued by legislation should remain
the least onerous possible for private entities. Actions of the State will be
disproportional if the same aim can be achieved in a less intrusive way.
The principle of proportionality is useful when analysing competition
proceedings. Competition authorities act for the protection of free competition
on the market and ultimately, for consumer welfare1. There is no doubt that
these interests can be a reason for limitations being placed on the economic
freedom of undertakings as well as their right to privacy. Competition
authorities, including the Polish President of the Office of Competition
and Consumers Protection (in Polish: Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i
Konsumentów; hereafter, UOKiK President), have major powers of inspection.
1 R. Whish, Competition Law, 6th ed., Lexis Nexis, London 2009, p. 1 and p. 19.
YEARBOOK OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY STUDIES
3. POWERS OF INSPECTION OF THE POLISH COMPETITION AUTHORITY… 49
Their use, limiting the economic freedom and right to privacy of undertakings
in the name of competition protection objectives, should be proportionate2.
This article analyses if the powers of inspection granted to the UOKiK
President by the Competition Act are formulated so as to guarantee the
observance of the principle of proportionality. Problematic issues in this
respect are discussed. Attention is drawn to the powers of control and searches
covered by Articles 105a-105l of the Act of 16 July 2007 on Competition and
Consumers Protection (the Competition Act)3. The article deals also with
judicial control over the use of the powers of inspection by the competition
authority. In conclusion, proposals for changes in the interpretation of the
current legal framework are made. Suggested are also certain amendments
of the Competition Act. Due to its limitations, the article does not deal with
powers of inspection concerning private premises nor with inspections run
by the UOKiK President under authorization of the European Commission.
II. Limitations of rights and freedoms
The principle of proportionality derives in the Polish legal system from
Article 2, as a consequence of the democratic state of law clause, and Article
31(3) of the Constitution of 19974. According to the latter rule, a limitation
upon the exercise of constitutional rights and freedoms may be imposed only
by statute, and only when necessary in a democratic State for the protection of
its security or public order, to protect the environment, health or public morals,
or the rights and freedoms of others. Such limitations shall not however violate
the essence of specific rights and freedoms. Interference with the economic
freedom and interests of companies [Article 64(1) of the Constitution] is thus
allowed only if it meets the requirements of Article 31(3) of the Constitution.
According to Article 22 of the Constitution, limitations upon the freedom of
economic activity may be imposed only by means of a statute and only for
important public reasons.
Inspections run by the UOKiK President interfere with the right to privacy
of the scrutinised companies (right to respect its premises). Taken into
consideration when assessing if an inspection is proportionate, must be the
standards of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
2 Compare in this respect 46/87 Hoechst AG v Commission, ECR [1989] 2859, para. 19. See
also C-94/00 Roquette Freres SA, ECR [2002] I-9011, para. 80.
3 Journal of Laws 2007 No. 50, item 337.
4 Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 (Journal of Laws 1997 No. 78,
item 483).
VOL. 2011, 4(5)
4. 50 MACIEJ BERNATT
which guarantees the right to privacy. The ECHR is binding and directly
applicable in Poland5. Consequently, all Polish public authorities including the
UOKiK President are under the obligation to observe the ECHR.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) confirmed directly in the
field of competition law procedure that Article 8 ECHR protects undertakings
against arbitrary inspections by competition authorities. The ECtHR noted in
Société Colas Est and Others v France6 that even if the scale of the steps taken
by the French competition authority in order to prevent the disappearance or
concealment of evidence of anti-competitive practices justified the interference
with the applicant’s right to respect its premises, law and practice had not afforded
the inspected company adequate and effective safeguards against power abuse.
The ECtHR pointed out that the French competition authority had extensive
powers of inspection which gave it an exclusive competence to determine the
expediency, number, length and scale of inspections. Moreover, inspections were
carried out without a prior warrant from a judge and without a senior police
officer being present. The ECtHR accepted at the same time however that the
entitlement of State authorities to interfere with the rights protected by Article
8 if the ECHR may be more far-reaching where the business premises of a legal
person are concerned7. It concluded nevertheless, having regard for the manner
of the proceedings in the case in question, that impugned inspections cannot be
regarded as strictly proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued8.
The principle of proportionality is also recognised by EU law as one of
its general principles. Article 5(4) of the Treaty on European Union9 clearly
specifies that under the principle of proportionality, the content and form
of EU actions shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives
of the Treaties. This stance is also confirmed by jurisprudence. In C-133/92
Crispoltoni, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that the principle of
proportionality requires that measures adopted by Community institutions do
not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain
the objectives legitimately pursued by the EU law in question10. If a choice
exists between several appropriate measures, the least onerous one must be
used and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims
5 See Article 91(1) in conjunction with Article 9 of the Constitution.
6 Application no. 37971/97, judgment of 16 April 2002, see para. 48-49.
7 See also Niemietz v Germany, application no. 13710/88, judgement of 16 December 1992,
para. 31.
8 See also other ECtHR judgments in which the proportionality of inspections was assessed
– Funke v France, application no. 10828/84, judgment of 25 February 1993, para. 55-57; Crémieux
v France, application no. 11471/85, judgment of 25 February 1993, para. 38-40; Miailhe v France,
application no. 12661/87, judgement of 25 February 1993, para. 36-38.
9 OJ [2010] C 83/13.
10 C-133/93 Crispoltoni v Fattoria Autonoma Tabacchi, ECR [1994] I-4863, para. 40.
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5. POWERS OF INSPECTION OF THE POLISH COMPETITION AUTHORITY… 51
pursued11. The ECJ held also that any intervention by public authorities in
the sphere of anyone’s private activities, be it a natural or legal person, must
have a legal basis and be justified on the grounds laid down by the law12.
Consequently, protection against arbitrary or disproportionate intervention
must be ensured by legislative means13.
EU courts identified procedural safeguards to be provided with respect to
inspections run by the European competition authority – the Commission. It
has been concluded that the Commission must, before starting an inspection,
be able to specify its extent and goal14, especially by describing the facts that it
wishes to establish through it15. Therefore, it should have prior to the inspection
significant knowledge that a possible violation of EU competition law may
have taken place16. Moreover, the inspected undertaking must be informed
about the reasons for the inspection before it is started. Such information is
crucial for the right of defence of those subject to an inspection. In addition,
coercive measures used in its course should be neither arbitrary nor excessive
having regard to the subject matter of the inspection17.
Taking all this into account it can be concluded that the economic freedom and
the right to privacy of undertakings can indeed be legitimately limited as a result
of an inspection run by competition authorities. However, such a limitation is
permissible only if procedural safeguards are put in place and only if the goal of
the inspection cannot be achieved with the use of less intrusive methods.
III. Proportionality safeguards in Polish competition proceedings
According to Polish competition law, the UOKiK President can run
inspections in two ways: an ordinary inspection known as a control (Article
105a of the Competition Act, in Polish: kontrola, hereafter called a control)
and; an inspection that includes a search of the premises and belongings of
the undertaking (Article 105c of the Competition Act, in Polish: kontrola
11 Ibidem.
12 Hoechst AG v Commission, para. 19.
13 Ibidem.
14 Ibidem, para. 29 and T-23/09 CNOP and CCG v Commission, not yet reported, para. 34.
15 136/79 National Panasonic v Commission, ECR [1980] 2033, para. 13, 21; see also
H. Andersson, E. Legnerfärt, ‘Dawn Raids in sector inquiries – fishing expeditions in disguise’
(2008) 29(8) ECLR 441.
16 Ibidem.
17 See Article 20(8) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ
[2003] L 1/1.
VOL. 2011, 4(5)
6. 52 MACIEJ BERNATT
z przeszukaniem; hereafter called a search). When it comes to a control,
inspectors are entitled to study materials provided on their request by the
employees of the scrutinised undertaking. During a search, inspectors are
entitled to look actively for proofs of the alleged infringement without the
cooperation of the employees of the inspected undertaking.
The Competition Act contains some provisions that safeguard the
proportionality of inspections run by the UOKiK President. First, both
ordinary controls and searches can be run only in the field of the proceedings
to which they belong to [Article 105a(1) in fine of the Competition Act]. There
must therefore be a direct link between the inspection (a control or a search)
and the subject matter of the proceedings. This means that there ought to be
a link between the alleged objections or objection already raised against the
undertaking and the scope of the inspection18. In consequence, items to which
inspectors had access to during a control or search should not be taken into
consideration or seized (under Article 105g of the Competition Act) unless
they are related to the subject matter of the actual proceedings19. A need to
run an inspection shall be supported by evidence already in the possession of
the UOKiK President before its commencement.
Another procedural safeguard set out in the Competition Act is the
obligation for the inspectors to deliver an authorisation issued by the UOKiK
President, which specifies the extent of the given control, to the representatives
of the undertaking subject to that control. According to Article 105a(1) of
the Competition Act, an authorisation to carry out a control must contain:
designation of the inspection authority; indication of the relevant legal basis;
date and location of issue of the authorisation; inspectors’ data; designation
of the entity to be inspected; determination of the object and scope of the
inspection; determination of the inspection starting and expected end date;
signature of the authorisation granting individual; instructions on the rights
and obligations of the entity being inspected. With respect to a search, handed
in must be an equivalent court order permitting it to start.
Any undertaking can become subject to an inspection under the Competition
Act20. Grounds for the limitation of the freedom of economic activity are
stronger however with respect to those suspected, even informally during
explanatory proceedings, to have infringed competition rules. Inspections
should thus concern alleged offenders first rather than those not believed to
have breached competition law. Only if proofs of the infringement cannot be
18
In this respect compare T-39/90 SEP v Commission, ECR [1991] II-1497, para. 29.
19
M. Swora, [in:] Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów, Komentarz, T. Skoczny,
A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds), Warszawa 2009, Art. 105b, No. 12.
20 C. Banasiński, E. Piontek (eds), Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz,
Warszawa 2009, p. 841.
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7. POWERS OF INSPECTION OF THE POLISH COMPETITION AUTHORITY… 53
found at the premises of the alleged offender can an inspection be carried out
at the premises of non-suspects (for example their competitors or distributors).
IV. The distinction between a control and a search
The fact that the Competition Act distinguished between a control and a
search makes Polish solutions different to EU law where inspections run under
Article 20 of Regulation 1/2003 include, automatically, the power of search21.
This distinction creates practical problems in Poland since procedural
safeguards circumscribing the powers of the UOKiK President are more
limited with respect to controls (ordinary inspections) than they are with
respect to searches. The authority does not need judicial consent to carry
out a control, unlike to start a search. Moreover, a control is merely based
on a written authorisation handed in to the representatives of the inspected
undertaking by the inspectors – UOKiK employees. The authorisation
issued by the UOKiK President does not take the form of an order22 in the
sense of Article 123 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (in Polish:
Kodeks Postępowania Administracyjnego; hereafter, KPA)23. The inspected
undertaking is thus deprived of the right to contest before a court the legality
and proportionality of such an informal decision authorising the control of
its premises. This situation takes place despite the fact that companies are
obliged to cooperate with the UOKiK inspectors during a control and cannot
deny them access to premises. Entry denial or lack of cooperation can in fact
cause the imposition of a fine of up to 50 000 000 Euro [Article 106(2)(3)
of the Competition Act]24. By contrast, a decision concerning an inspection
21 ECJ held in Hoechst AG v Commission, para. 27, that the right of the Commission to
enter any premises, land and means of transport of undertakings would serve no useful purpose
if the Commission’s officials could do no more than ask for documents or files which they
could precisely identify in advance. On the contrary, in the opinion of the ECJ, such right
implies the power to search for various items of information which are not already known or
fully identified; without such power, it would be impossible for the Commission to obtain the
information necessary to carry out the investigation if the undertakings concerned refused to
cooperate or adopted an obstructive attitude.
22 See the opinion of R. Janusz in this respect, ‘Dostosowywanie prawa polskiego do prawa
wspólnotowego w zakresie instytucji, procedur i sankcji antymonopolowych’, [in:] P. Saganek,
T. Skoczny (eds), Wybrane problemy i obszary dostosowania prawa polskiego do prawa Unii,
Warszawa 1999, p. 292.
23 Act of 14 June 1960 – Code of Administrative Procedure (Journal of Laws 1960 No. 30,
item 168, as amended).
24 A fine was recently imposed on undertakings in the UOKiK President’s decision of 4
November 2010, DOK-9/2010 and the decision of 24 February 2011, DOK-1/2011. See M. Kozak,
VOL. 2011, 4(5)
8. 54 MACIEJ BERNATT
issued under Article 20(4) Regulation 1/2003 – a decision that the undertaking
must submit to – can be appealed to EU courts by the inspected undertaking25.
Despite the procedural distinction between controls and searches, the
difference in the way they are run in practice may turn out rather minor.
The Competition Act fails to define either of the two forms of inspections.
Jurisprudence has pointed out that a search takes place when the inspectors
run it independently from the representatives of the company concerned,
without their cooperation and help26. During a search, inspectors are entitled
to look actively for proofs of the alleged infringement rather than only, as is the
case with respect to a control, to study the material provided by the employees
of the scrutinised undertaking. However, since controls can be performed
even without the presence in the premises of the company representative27,
procedural safeguards do not exist to stop a control from becoming a search.
This very problem has become the basis for a dispute between a specific
undertaking that was subject to a control and the UOKiK President. The
company in question refused to cooperate with the inspectors (computer files
were not made available to them) claiming that the officials were conducting a
search, rather than a control. A fine was thus imposed upon that undertaking
by the UOKiK President, later to be upheld by the courts28.
A search is more intrusive than a control with respect to an undertaking’s
freedom of economic activity and right to privacy. It should thus be used in
exceptional cases only when the UOKiK President is unable to obtain sought
after documents or when the undertaking in question fails to cooperation with
the inspectors29. A search may only be performed if there is a high probability
that the documents the competition authority wishes to get hold of cannot be
‘Simple procedural infraction or a serious obstruction of antitrust proceedings, are fines in the
region of 30-million EURO justified?Case comment to the decisions of the President of the
Office for Competition and Consumer Protection of 4 November 2010 Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa
Sp. z o.o. (DOK-9/2010) and of 24 February 2011 Polkomtel SA (DOK-1/2011)’ (2011) 4(5)
YARS.
25 See also Hoechst AG v Commission, para. 26. A complaint to EU courts does not suspend
the inspection.
26 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 7 May 2004, III SK 34/04, UOKiK Official Journal
2004 No. 4, item 330; the judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of
11 August 2003, XVII Ama 123/02.
27 Article 80(2)(3) of the Act of 2 July 2004 on the Freedom of Economic Activity (Journal
of Laws No. 173, item 1807, as amended) provides in the case of competition proceedings an
exception from general rules which state that the presence during a control of the representative
of the undertaking is obligatory.
28 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 7 May 2004, III SK 34/04. See also the judgement
of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 11 August 2003, XVII Ama 123/02.
29 E. Modzelewska-Wąchal, Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz,
Warszawa 2002, p. 228; M. Swora, [in:] Skoczny, Jurkowska, Miąsik (eds), Ustawa…, Art. 105c,
YEARBOOK OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY STUDIES
9. POWERS OF INSPECTION OF THE POLISH COMPETITION AUTHORITY… 55
obtained in a different, less intrusive manner (especially by way of a simple
information request under Article 50 of the Competition Act)30 or when there
is suspicion that the undertaking will hide, destroy or alter them unless a
search is carried out31. As the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure32
are applicable per analogiam to searches run by the UOKiK President33, for
a search to be started, a high probability must exist that proofs of the alleged
infringement will be found in the given premises (Article 219 § 1 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure)34.
V. Prior notice of an inspection
Another issue that poses questions about proportionality in Polish
competition proceedings is whether it is true that only unexpected can be
deemed effective. Under the standards of EU law, an unannounced inspection
is considered to be proportionate if it is justified in the given case35. Competition
authorities must be able to search for various items of information which are
not already known to them or fully identified36. Polish courts also accept that
control can be run without prior notice37.
In the light of the principle of proportionality, an unannounced control
should be seen as an exception rather than the rule. Unfortunately, the
Polish Act on the Freedom of Economic Activity38 provides in this respect
that, specifically in the case of competition proceedings, undertakings are not
given notice of a planned control [Article 79(2)(4)]. This provision constitutes
therefore an exception from the general rule of the prior announcement of
No 2; B. Turno, ‘Komentarz do Art. 105c’, [in:] A. Stawicki, E. Stawicki E. (eds), Ustawa
o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz, Warszawa 2011, p. 1071.
30 Por. B. Turno, ‘Komentarz….,’ [in:] A. Stawicki, E. Stawicki E. (eds), Ustawa..., p. 1071;
K. Róziewicz-Ładoń, Postępowanie przed Prezesem Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów
w zakresie przeciwdziałania praktykom ograniczającym konkurencję, Warszawa 2011, p. 275.
31 C. Banasiński, E. Piontek (eds), Ustawa…, pp. 868-869.
32 Act of 6 June 1997 – Code of Criminal Procedure (Journal of Laws 1997 No. 89, item
555, as amended.
33 See Article 105c(4) of the Competition Act.
34 E. Modzelewska-Wąchal, Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji..., p. 228; M. Swora, [in:]
T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds), Ustawa…, Art. 105c, No 9.
35 National Panasonic v Commission, para. 30.
36 Hoechst AG v Commission, par.a 27.
37 Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 16 December 1998, XVII Ama 62/98, (2000)
4 Wokanda.
38 Act of 2 July 2004 on the Freedom of Economic Activity (Journal of Laws No 173, item
1807, as amended).
VOL. 2011, 4(5)
10. 56 MACIEJ BERNATT
controls [Article 79(1)]. The existence of a general statutory rule excluding
prior notice in competition law proceedings is excessive. It is likely that a
forewarning may in many situations undermine the possibility of finding proofs
of the competition law infringement. Unlike searches however, controls are
based on cooperation between the undertaking and inspectors. They therefore
tend to focus on the physical examination of facts already known to the
authority. Indeed, a control can also concern those not suspected of a violation.
At least in such cases, controls should be carried out only if the undertaking
in question has been duly informed about it. The UOKiK President should
decide on the issue of prior notification on a case by case basis – statutory
provisions should thus not generally preclude the competition authority from
issuing a forewarning of an inspection.
VI. Inspections during explanatory proceedings
Proceedings before the UOKiK President can take the form of explanatory
or full competition proceedings (officially called antimonopoly proceedings
in the Polish Competition Act). Under Article 48(1) of the Competition Act,
the UOKiK President can institute explanatory proceedings if circumstances
indicate that it is likely that the provisions of the Competition Act had been
infringed39. Article 48(2) of the Competition Act states that explanatory
proceedings may, in particular40, aim at (1) initially determining whether
an infringement took place of the provisions of the Competition Act which
would justify the institution of antimonopoly proceedings41; (2) a study of
the market, including the determination of the structure and degree of
concentration thereof; (3) initially determining whether an obligation exists
to submit a notification of an intended concentration. There are no parties to
explanatory proceedings – objections against undertakings are not yet raised
at this stage. Companies are not informed about the start of explanatory
proceedings even if the actions of the UOKiK President undertaken therein
39Other reasons are: need to examine a given branch of economy, or as to matters regarding
the protection of consumer interests, and in any other cases as provided for by the Competition
Act.
40 The list of grounds for establishing explanatory proceedings is not exhaustive.
41 In the field of consumer law explanatory proceedings can also aim at (1) initially
determining whether there was an infringement of the provisions of the Competition Act,
such as may justify the institution of proceedings regarding the use of practices violating the
collective interests of consumers and (2) determining whether a violation of any consumer
interests being protected by the law occured.
YEARBOOK OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY STUDIES
11. POWERS OF INSPECTION OF THE POLISH COMPETITION AUTHORITY… 57
refer to them42. It is common for undertakings to not know officially about the
existence of explanatory proceedings until an inspection is carried out despite
the fact that they can lead to competition law charges.The question arises in
this context whether inspections (controls or searches) can take place during
explanatory proceedings. An affirmative answer derives from the wording of
Article 105a(1) of the Competition Act (a control) and Article 105c(1) of the
Competition Act (a search)43 which provide that an inspection can be carried
out during any kind of proceedings before the UOKiK President including
explanatory ones.
Still, the interpretation of any legal act cannot be limited to a literal
meaning of its provisions. Article 105a and 105c of the Competition Act read in
conjunction with Article 48 should be interpreted in the light of the principle of
proportionality. The use of inspections must thus be excluded in certain kinds
of explanatory proceedings. Generally speaking, a control and a search can
be carried out only when the explanatory proceedings may lead to a decision
being taken by the UOKiK President whether it is likely that a competition
law violation had occurred44. It is unfounded to consider that the authority
is entitled to carry out an inspection when the premise of Article 48(1) of
the Competition Act is not met, in other words, when the UOKiK President
has no knowledge about circumstances suggesting that Competition Act had
been infringed. The competence of the competition authority to carry out an
inspection (both controls and searches) must be excluded in particular with
respect to explanatory proceedings meant to conduct a market study, including
the determination of the structure and degree of concentration thereof and
initially determining whether an obligation exists to submit a notification of
an intended concentration. Performing an inspection in such cases would have
the character of a ‘fishing expedition’45 – an inspection that has no factual and
legal basis suggesting that competition rules could have been infringed.
Concerns arise in this context because controls are carried out primarily
during explanatory proceedings46 when undertakings have very limited powers
to oppose unfounded controls. Out of the 26 controls that took place in the
first half of 2011, 25 occurred during explanatory proceedings, the respective
42 Such situation was assessed critically by A. Jurkowska, [in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska,
D. Miąsik (eds), Ustawa…, art. 48, No 10.
43 A search (if accepted by the court) makes an integral part of a control.
44 Such a conclusion justifies opening of competition law proceedings by raising objections
against particular undertakings.
45 H. Andersson, E. Legnerfalt, Dawn Raids in Sector Inquiries..., pp. 439–440; A. Jones,
B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 1061.
46 Some scholars suggest that this is a correct situation – see C. Banasiński, E. Piontek
(eds), Ustawa…, p. 840 and K. Róziewicz-Ładoń, Postępowanie przed Prezesem Urzędu Ochrony
Konkurencji i Konsumentów..., p. 213.
VOL. 2011, 4(5)
12. 58 MACIEJ BERNATT
numbers were 23 out of the total of 28 in 2010, 23 out of 29 in 2009 and; 23
out of 36 in 200847. It is true that controls can often be effective only if carried
out without a forewarning. They must therefore take place before official
objections are raised – at the stage of explanatory proceedings. However, the
presumption for controls to be carried out during explanatory proceedings
has no legal basis. Respect for proportionality (the use of the least intrusive
methods possible to establish facts) suggests caution in their use48. A control
is an instrument that significantly interferes with the freedom of economic
activity of the inspected undertaking also because the UOKiK President has
the power to seize items that may constitute evidence in the case [Article
105g(1) of the Competition Act].
When it comes to searches, their use during explanatory proceedings
should be even more restrained and primarily concern possible hard-core
infringements of competition law. The Competition Court should decide on
authorising a search on a case by case basis rather than by a formal qualification
of given proceedings as dealing with cartels. The assessment whether a
search is needed must take into account the fact that it is permissible during
explanatory proceedings only if a justifiable suspicion exists of a breach of the
Competition Act, particularly if it is feared that evidence might be obliterated
(see Article 105c(2) of the Competition Act). As a rule therefore, a search
should be performed during full competition proceedings rather than in their
explanatory phase. Statistics of the last two year paint a different picture
however. Between January and June 2011, the UOKiK President carried out 6
searches all of which occurred during explanatory proceedings; 5 searches took
place in 2010 and again, all of them occurred during explanatory proceedings.
The situation was slightly different in earlier years: 2 out of the 5 searches
carried out in 2009 took place in explanatory proceedings as did 2 out of the
3 searches performed in 200849.
The UOKiK President is entitled to carry out a search during explanatory
proceedings only in situations described in Article 48(2)(1) of the Competition
Act – explanatory proceedings aiming at an initial determination whether
an infringement of the Competition Act took place which may justify the
institution of full competition law proceedings. The authority cannot carry
out a search in explanatory proceedings described in Article 48(2)(2-5) of
47
The situation was different in 2007 where only 8 out of the total of 30 controls were
carried out during explanatory proceedings. This data were obtained from UOKiK in effect of
the notion for disclosure of public information.
48 R. Janusz, Dostosowywanie prawa polskiego..., p. 294.
49 No searches were carried out in 2007.
YEARBOOK OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY STUDIES
13. POWERS OF INSPECTION OF THE POLISH COMPETITION AUTHORITY… 59
the Competition Act50. The performance of a search is excluded therefore
in explanatory proceedings meant to conduct a market study including
the establishment of its competitive structure51. It can be added that the
UOKiK President does not have, at such an early stage of the investigation,
justifiable suspicions of a serious infringement of the Competition Act. It is
also correct to state that conducting a search in concentration proceedings
would be contrary to the character of these proceedings52. For that reason,
the provisions of the Competition Act should be interpreted in the light of
the principle of proportionality and thus exclude the use of searches during
explanatory proceedings unless the UOKiK President has prior knowledge of
competition restricting practices.
VII. Right of complaint and judicial control
Procedural safeguards circumscribing the UOKiK President’s inspection
powers consist of: (1) the right to lodge an objection under the Act on the
Freedom of Economic Activity; (2) prior judicial control with respect to
searches and; (3) subsequent judicial control of final decisions issued by the
competition authority where it is possible to rise procedural objections about
the way in which the administrative proceedings were conducted.
1. Objections under the Act on the Freedom of Economic Activity
The Act on the Freedom of Economic Activity of 2004 states that an
undertaking may lodge an objection against the way public administrative
bodies exercise their inspection rights. Filing such an objection suspends the
inspection. The administrative body carrying it out has three days to decide
whether the objections are justified. If the administrative order concerning
the objections is negative for the company, in other words, if the control
is to be continued, the undertaking in question can file a complaint to an
administrative court.
50 This is also an opinion of B. Turno, ‘Komentarz…’, [in:] A. Stawicki, E. Stawicki E. (eds),
Ustawa..., p. 1073.
51 See different opinion, [in:] C. Banasiński, E. Piontek (eds), Ustawa…, pp. 869-870.
52 B. Turno, ‘Komentarz…’, [in:] A. Stawicki, E. Stawicki E. (eds), Ustawa..., p. 1073. The
concentration proceedings shall be deemed civil and not criminal in a light of the Article 6 of
the ECHR.
VOL. 2011, 4(5)
14. 60 MACIEJ BERNATT
The application of the Act on the Freedom of Economic Activity is very
limited with respect to competition proceedings. Companies may lodge
objections on the basis of Article 84c(1) of this Act claiming that a violation
occurred of its Article 79a(1) and 79a (3)-(9)53. Those subject to an inspection
may thus complain only on irregularities when it comes to the authorisation
to carry out a control within competition proceedings. Undertakings may, in
particular, lodge an objection that the extent of the control being carried out
is actually broader than that set out in its authorisation.
A company being controlled, Polkomtel S.A., has tried at one point, albeit
unsuccessfully, to use the above institution to complain also on the lack of
impartiality of the inspectors and disproportional character of actions taken in
the framework of the inspection with respect to the object of the explanatory
proceedings. The undertaking claimed moreover that the contested control
was run by UOKiK employee without an appropriate authorization. Polkomtel
alleged in this respect that the inspection was carried out on the basis of an
authorization issued prior to the initiation of the investigation, and that the
scope of the control was broader that the object of the proceedings. The
company noted additionally that the control was carried out outside its normal
working hours. Polkomtel’s objections were dismissed by the UOKiK President
as well as the Competition Court54.
2. Prior judicial control
In competition proceedings, prior judicial control over the UOKiK
President’s powers of inspections is limited to searches only [Article 105c(1)
of the Competition Act] because a control [Article 105a(1) of the Competition
Act] is carried out on the basis of a written authorisation issued by the
authority itself. Companies subject to controls can thus question them only in
cases prescribed in the Act on the Freedom of Economic Activity or complain
53Under the general rules of the Act on the Freedom of Economic Activity, objections may
refer to the violations of Article 79(1) and 79 (3)-(7), Article 80(1), Article 82(1) and Article
83(1). These provisions, due to the existence of a clear statutory exemption in this respect,
are not applicable in the case of proceedings before the UOKiK President. See also B. Turno,
‘Komentarz…’, [in:] A. Stawicki, E. Stawicki E. (eds), Ustawa..., p. 1156.
54 See the order of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 22 December
2009, XVII Amz 54/09/A, described in the decision of the UOKiK President of 24 February 2011,
DOK-1/2011, p. 12. The Court of Competition and Consumer Protection (not an Administrative
Court) is competent to deal with complaints on orders of the UOKiK President issued as
aźresult of objections raised under the Act on the Freedom of Economic Activity, see judgment
of the Regional Administrative Court in Warsaw of 5 March 2010, III SA/Wa 1496/09. See also
K. Róziewicz-Ładoń, Postępowanie przed Prezesem Urzędu..., pp. 261–262.
YEARBOOK OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY STUDIES
15. POWERS OF INSPECTION OF THE POLISH COMPETITION AUTHORITY… 61
to the Competition Court if the UOKiK President imposes on them a fine for
their lack of cooperation during a control.
Article 105a(1) and 1051(3) of the Competition Act fails to set out however
the extent of judicial control over searches carried out by the UOKiK President.
It provides only that the Competition Court has 48 hours for issuing an order
authorising a search upon the authority’s request. Lacking legal provisions
together with problems in distinguishing between a search and a control make
procedural guarantees unclear in this context. It has been pointed out in the
jurisprudence of the Polish Constitutional Court that those legal provisions
which result in a limitation of rights and freedoms must be characterized
by their non-ambiguity and precision as required by Article 2 of the Polish
Constitution55. The more far-reaching the limitation in question is, the stronger
the procedural guarantees shall be to protect them56.
The premises for consenting to a search should be interpreted in a strict
manner. The Competition Court must decide first whether a reasonable
basis exists to believe that possible proofs can be found in the premises
the authority wishes to search (per analogiam Article 219 § 1 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure)57. Proportionality requirements must be taken into
account next to decide if it is highly likely that the documents, or other items
the UOKiK President wishes to get hold of, cannot be obtained in a different,
less intrusive manner (such as a control) or if is suspected that the scrutinised
undertaking will hide, destroy or alter them. When dealing with a request to
consent to an exceptional search in explanatory proceedings, the Court has
to decide also whether a justifiable suspicion exists that the Competition Act
had actually been violated. It should assess in particular if past misconduct of
the undertaking the premises of which the authority wishes to search suggests
that there is an objective risk that evidence will be obliterated58.
55 Judgments of the Constitutional Court: of 22 May 2002, K 6/02, (2002) 3/A OTK ZU sec.
33 and of 11 January 2000, K 7/99, (2000) 1 OTK ZU sec. 2. See also judgment of ECHR of 16
February 2000 in case Amann v Switzerland, 27798/95, para. 56.
56 L. Garlicki, ‘Komentarz do art. 31 ust. 3 Konstytucji’, [in:] L. Garlicki (ed.), Konstytucja
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, t. III, Warszawa 2003.; K. Wojtyczek, ‘Zasada
proporcjonalności’, [in:] B. Banaszak, A. Preisner (ed.), Prawa i wolności obywatelskie
w Konstytucji RP, Warszawa 2002, p. 667. The judgments of the Constitutional Court: of 12
January 1999 r., P 2/98, (1999) 1 OTK ZU sec. 2 and of 22 September 2005, Kp 1/05, (2005)
8/A OTK ZU, sec. 93.
57 The UOKiK President should show in the request concrete informations he/she believes
can be established by way of a search in given premises, see M. Swora, [in:] T. Skoczny,
A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds), Ustawa…., Art. 105c, No 9.
58 M. Swora, [in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds), Ustawa…., Art. 105c, No 14.
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16. 62 MACIEJ BERNATT
Article 105c(3) of the Competition Act59 constitutes a negative exception
from the perspective of the constitutional requirement of a two-instance
judicial process [Article 78 and Article 176(1) of the Polish Constitution].
It specifies that the decision of the Competition Court concerning a search
cannot be appealed. This happens despite the fact that searches interfere
significantly with the rights and freedoms of private entities (especially their
right to privacy). It would be possible to amend the Competition Act so as
to compromise procedural effectiveness with adequate procedural standards
by introducing two-instance judicial proceedings and giving the inspected
undertakings the right to appeal the court order authorising a search at the
moment of its commencement (such appeal would not have to suspend a
search). Similar solutions exist in the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure
(Article 236).
Judicial control over the powers of inspections of the UOKiK President
cannot be illusory. Statistics put this issue into doubt however since the
Competition Court has in practice authorised all searches requested by the
UOKiK President in the last three and a half years (3 in 2008, 5 in 2009, 5 in
2010 and 6 in the first half of 2011).
3. Subsequent judicial control
According to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, decisions taken by
administrative bodies which do not satisfy the requirements of Article 6(1)
ECHR must be subject to subsequent control by a ‘judicial body that has full
jurisdiction’ over questions of facts and law60. Full jurisdiction means that
courts must be entitled and actually examine all relevant facts of the case61
as well as to have the power to quash the appealed administrative decision62
59 See also M. Swora, [in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds), Ustawa…., Art. 105c,
No 16.
60 Generally see Albert and Le Compte v Belgium, application no. 7299/75, 7496/76, judgment
of 10 February 1983, para. 29; Gautrin and others v France, application no. 21257/93, judgment of
20 May 1998, para. 57; Frankowicz v Poland, application no. 53025/99, judgment of 16 December
2008, para. 60. Specifically for judicial control over administrative bodies see: Bendenoun v.
France, application no. 12547/86, judgment of 24 February 2004, para. 46; Umlauft v Austria,
application no. 15527/89, judgment of 23 October 1995, para. 37–39; Schmautzer v Austria,
application no. 15523/89, judgment of 23 October 1995, para. 34; Janosevic v Sweden, application
no. 34619/97, judgment of 21 May 2003, para. 81. See also L. Drabek, ‘A Fair Hearing Before
EC Institutions’ (2001) 4 European Review of Private Law 561; K. Lenaerts, J. Vanhamme,
‘Procedural Rights of Private Parties in the Community Administrative Process’ (1997) (34)
CMLR 561-562.
61 Schmautzer v Austria, para. 35.
62 Ibidem, para. 36; Janosevic v Sweden, para. 81.
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17. POWERS OF INSPECTION OF THE POLISH COMPETITION AUTHORITY… 63
in all its aspects (facts and law). When it comes to the assessment of their
legality, the ECtHR expects the judiciary not to be limited to an assessment
whether the impugned decision is in line with substantive law63. Courts shall
also be empowered to set aside an administrative decision in its entirety or
part, if it is established that procedural requirements of fairness were not met
in the proceedings which led to its adoption64. The observance of the principle
of proportionality by the UOKiK President should thus be assessed by the
Competition Court during appeal proceedings where UOKiK infringement
decisions are being controlled65. This is an indispensable safeguard as
inspections are crucial for finding proofs of competition law violations.
Article 77(6) of the Act on the Freedom of Economic Activity states in
this respect that evidence obtained in violation of legal norms on inspections
cannot be considered as proof in any administrative proceedings regarding
the inspected undertaking, provided the violation influenced the results of
that inspection. EU jurisprudence follows the same line specifying that the
illegality of a Commission decision authorizing an inspection (as well as
its disproportional character) prevents it from using, for the purposes of
competition law infringement proceedings, any documents or evidence which
it might have obtained in the course of that investigation66. If that is not the
case, the final decision on the infringement might be annulled by EU Courts
in so far as it was based on such evidence67.
The Polish Competition Court should exercise effective control over the
way in which evidence is collected during inspections (both controls and
searches). If an infringement of procedural rules is established concerning
evidence, such as a violation of the principle of proportionality in the course
of an inspection, the Court should disregard such evidence. In cases where the
remaining evidence is insufficient to prove a competition law infringement, the
Court should change the UOKiK decision by not establishing an infringement
in line with the jurisprudence of the Polish Supreme Court68. The Competition
63 See Potocka and others v Poland, application no. 33776/96, judgment of 4 October 2001,
para. 55, 58; Sigma Radio Television Ltd v Cyprus, application no. 32181/04, 35122/05, judgment
21 July 2011, para. 153–154.
64 Ibidem.
65 With respect to Polish rules governing judicial control over procedural infractions in
competition proceedings see M. Bernatt, ‘The control of Polish courts over the infringements
of procedural rules by the national competition authority. Case comment to the judgement
of the Supreme Court of 19 August 2009 – Marquard Media Polska (No. III SK 5/09)’ (2010)
3(3) YARS 300–305.
66 C-94/00 Roquette Freres, para. 49; H. Andersson, E. Legnerfalt, Dawn Raids in Sector
Inquiries..., p. 444.
67 Ibidem.
68 The Supreme Court of 19 August 2009, III SK 5/09, LEX, No. 548862.
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18. 64 MACIEJ BERNATT
Court is also entitled to quash a decision of the UOKiK President if it is
establishes that the undertaking in question was deprived of, as a consequence
of an inspection, the opportunity to defend itself during the proceedings, that
is, if a violation took place of a requirement indispensable for their validity69.
VIII. Conclusions
Several problems were identified in this article concerning the observance
of the principle of proportionality when it comes to inspections carried out by
the Polish competition authority.
The first deals with the lack of clarity in the distinction between two
inspection powers granted to the UOKiK President – a control and a search.
It must be accepted that whenever the authority plans to actively look for
proofs of a competition law breach independently from the representatives
of the undertaking concerned, it should carry out a search (after obtaining
judicial authorisation to do so) rather than an ordinary control. Otherwise
the inspected undertakings will have a reasonable right to question before the
Competition Court the legality of such control.
Second, unannounced inspections should be an exception rather than
the rule. There is a need to abolish the general exception provided by the
Act on the Freedom of Economic Activity which states that undertakings
are not notified about planned inspections in competition law proceedings.
Prior knowledge can often undermine the possibility of finding proofs of
a competition law infringement. This, however, the competition authority
should decide on a case by case basis. The existence of a general statutory
exception in this regard brings about the risks that the inspected company’s
right of defence will be disproportionally limited at least in some cases.
Third, the sake of the principle of proportionality requires a reasonable
use of controls and an exceptional use of searches in explanatory proceedings.
The UOKiK President is not entitled to carry out an inspection (controls
and searches) during explanatory proceedings when the premise of Article
48(1) of the Competition Act is not met, that is, without a suspected breach
of the Competition Act. The competences of the UOKiK President in this
respect must be excluded in particular with respect to explanatory proceedings
aimed at conducting a market study. Such inspections would amount to a
69The Supreme Court in the judgment of 29 April 2009, III SK 8/09, suggested that
a violation of requirements indispensable for the validity of proceedings can be the ground for
the revocation of a UOKiK decision. With respect to the consequences of improper inspections
see also: C. Banasiński, E. Piontek (eds), Ustawa…, pp. 919–920.
YEARBOOK OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY STUDIES
19. POWERS OF INSPECTION OF THE POLISH COMPETITION AUTHORITY… 65
‘fishing expedition’ – an inspection that has no factual and legal basis. The
Competition Court must exercise caution especially when dealing with
authorization requests for a search at the stage of explanatory proceedings.
An approval should be granted only if the UOKiK President has managed
to shown a justifiable suspicion of a serious infringement of the Competition
Act and when a reasonable basis exists to believe that possible proofs of
anticompetitive behaviour can be found in the premises the authority wants
to search. It must be also borne in mind that a search during explanatory
proceedings is permissible only if they are aimed at an initial determination
whether an infringement of the provisions of the Competition Act took place.
Finally, judicial control over the UOKiK President’s powers of inspection
should be more intensive. The grounds for raising objections under the Act
on the Freedom of Economic Activity could be broader and refer directly to
the question of proportionality of inspections. When it comes to prior control
of searches, the Competition Court must check in detail – on a case by case
basis – whether carrying out a search is indispensable for finding proofs of the
competition law violation and whether less intrusive investigative measures
would not be sufficient. The Court must pay special attention to requests for
authorising a search in the course of explanatory proceedings. There is also
a need for an amendment of the Competition Act so as to introduce a two-
instance judicial procedure applicable to search requests submitted by the
UOKiK President. The right of the inspected undertaking to appeal an order
of the Competition Court authorizing a search would be better at guaranteeing
the proportionality of searches. Such an appeal, if not suspensory for a search,
would not undermine the effectiveness of the investigation. Moreover, the
Competition Court must consider procedural infractions when controlling
final infringement decisions issued by the UOKiK President. Thus, the way the
evidence was collected by the authority must be scrutinised by the judiciary.
If a violation of procedural rules is established concerning the inspection, or
indeed a direct violation of the principle of proportionality, the Competition
Court should disregard such evidence.
The aforementioned problems can be largely solved by changing the
enforcement practice of the UOKiK President and the approach of the
Competition Court as well as an alteration of the interpretation of existing
legal provisions. However, it would be wise for the UOKiK President to use
works under the mandate of the Competition Policy 2011-2013 program70
not only to increase the effectiveness of the authority’s investigative powers
but also to propose new legal solutions for guaranteeing the observance of
70 Polityka konkurencji na lata 2011–2013, Urząd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów
[Competition policy in 2011–2013, Office of Competition and Consumer Protection]; available
only in Polish at http://www.uokik.gov.pl/download.php?plik=10111, pp. 73–74.
VOL. 2011, 4(5)
20. 66 MACIEJ BERNATT
the principle of proportionality in the course of inspections carried out in
competition law proceedings.
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