The document outlines the initial police response to the Boston Marathon bombings and identifies areas for improvement. It recommends that police establish clear plans for responding to attacks, secure blast areas by clearing civilians and restricting access, and evacuate injured people to casualty points away from the scene to reduce risks of secondary explosions or ambushes targeting first responders. Police should form large perimeters around scenes and deny access to all but emergency personnel.

1. The Initial Police Response
THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING:

2. OUTLINE OF EVENTS
• April 15th, 2013 - Boston Marathon finish line suffers two explosions of
unknown origins
• Hundreds of people are injured, 3 people are killed
• The evidence quickly points to pressure cooker devices, and a terrorist
attack
• April 18th, 2013 – After days of unsuccessfully being able to identify the
suspected bombers, the FBI releases the images to the public
• April 19th, 2013 - The bombers, Tamerlan and Dzhokar Tsarnev come out
of hiding, and murder an MIT police officer. The brothers then carjack a
civilian
• Police locate the stolen vehicle, and after a shootout, Tamerlan is killed
• A manhunt for Dzhokar begins on April 19, 2013, and he is found later that
evening by a homeowner who discovers Dzhokar hiding in a boat
• Authorities respond, and take Dzhokar into custody

3. THE INITIAL POLICE RESPONSE
• The devices explode; police, civilians, and medical personnel rush to the
blast area
• Police work to move pedestrian barricades, and render first aid to some of
the victims
• Police congregate in the blast areas, and form a hasty perimeter, which
lacked integrity
• Police allow civilians and medical to rush to and from the blast areas, at
will, for several minutes
• Police begin to call for the transport vehicles to come to the blast areas to
transport victims
• Police begin to clear the area several minutes after medical starts to
arrive
• The scene is finally secured, and all injured victims are transported to
area hospitals

5. AREAS OF CONCERN
• Police did not restrict the movement within, in, or out of the blast area
• Police did not form a perimeter around the blast areas to deny access or
permit access to first responders
• The pedestrian barricades were difficult to manipulate and tear down
• Police did not have an organized and cohesive response
• Police did not move unnecessary personnel or civilians away from the
blast area
• Police called for emergency vehicles to come directly to the blast area
• Police did not give consideration to: Ambush, “kill box”, or secondary
devices

6. Threats:
Secondary Explosions:
Small Arms Fire:
Ambush:

7. BEST COURSE OF ACTION
• Utilize barricades that can easily be torn down and manipulated so police
and first responders have access to the crowd for a variety of reason
• Establish an Immediate Action Plan (IAP) prior to a major event, to
include: contingencies for attack, explosions, suicide bombers, active
shooter, medical emergencies, staging, rally points, communication, and
chain of command
• In the event of an explosion from an obvious terrorist attack:
 Respond to the scene to gauge the damage
 clear the area of any civilians not injured or rendering aid
 call for medical personnel
 establish a perimeter, do not allow anyone other than police or
medical to enter the area after an attack

9. BEST COURSE OF ACTION (CONT)
• The threat of a secondary explosion or another form of attack should be
considered high
• Clear as many people out of the blast area as possible, immediately
 Injured personnel may be ambulatory, move them
 Restrict the number of first responders to the lowest possible amount
to render aid, and evacuate injured civilians
 Create a casualty evacuation point away from, and out of the line of
sight of the initial blast area
 All emergency vehicles, to include transport should respond to the
casualty evacuation point, not the blast area
 Those who are critical victims that cannot be moved by a carry, should
be evacuated by gurneys

10. Casualty
Evacuation Points:
Primary –
Secondary –

11. UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT
• The blast area must be cleared as soon as possible to lower the number
of potential victims should a secondary attack or explosion occur
• The traditional response by first responders is to flood a scene, with an
abundance of resources and personnel, only enriching a target for an
attacker.
• In many cases, the attacker will have a line of sight on the first explosion,
and will wait until the area is saturated to detonate another device, or
begin another form of attack
• Moving victims to a casualty evacuation point, out of the line of sight of
the initial blast area, will lower the chances of being exposed to further
harm
• The response of medical personnel and emergency vehicles to the
casualty evacuation point, lowers the first responder foot print at the
scene, making the secondary attack, less catastrophic
• The large perimeter and area denial by Police will preserve a scene, and
prevent others from exposure to potential future attacks

12. CONCLUSIONS