2. Why does Cephalus leave the conversation?
Book I: Well said, Cephalus, I replied; but as concerning justice, what is it? --
to speak the truth and to pay your debts --no more than this? And even to
this are there not exceptions? Suppose that a friend when in his right mind
has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right
mind, ought I to give them back to him? No one would say that I ought or
that I should be right in doing so, any more than they would say that I ought
always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition.
But then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct
definition of justice.
I fear, said Cephalus, that I must go now, for I have to look after the
sacrifices, and I hand over the argument to Polemarchus and the company.
3. Is justice just the will of the stronger?
• And the different forms of government make laws democratical,
aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and
these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the
justice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses
them they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what
I mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of
justice, which is the interest of the government; and as the
government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable
conclusion is, that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which
is the interest of the stronger.
4. Being unjust but appearing just is the best
• Book II: And first I will speak of the nature and origin of justice according to
the common view of them. Secondly, I will show that all men who practise
justice do so against their will, of necessity, but not as a good. And thirdly, I
will argue that there is reason in this view, for the life of the unjust is after
all better far than the life of the just --if what they say is true, Socrates,
since I myself am not of their opinion. But still I acknowledge that I am
perplexed when I hear the voices of Thrasymachus and myriads of others
dinning in my ears; and, on the other hand, I have never yet heard the
superiority of justice to injustice maintained by any one in a satisfactory
way. I want to hear justice praised in respect of itself; then I shall be
satisfied, and you are the person from whom I think that I am most likely to
hear this; and therefore I will praise the unjust life to the utmost of my
power, and my manner of speaking will indicate the manner in which I
desire to hear you too praising justice and censuring injustice. Will you say
whether you approve of my proposal?
5. The beast and the beast-master
• Book VI:
Why, that all those mercenary individuals, whom the many call Sophists and whom they deem to be
their adversaries, do, in fact, teach nothing but the opinion of the many, that is to say, the opinions
of their assemblies; and this is their wisdom. I might compare them to a man who should study the
tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast who is fed by him-he would learn how to approach
and handle him, also at what times and from what causes he is dangerous or the reverse, and what
is the meaning of his several cries, and by what sounds, when another utters them, he is soothed or
infuriated; and you may suppose further, that when, by continually attending upon him, he has
become perfect in all this, he calls his knowledge wisdom, and makes of it a system or art, which he
proceeds to teach, although he has no real notion of what he means by the principles or passions of
which he is speaking, but calls this honourable and that dishonourable, or good or evil, or just or
unjust, all in accordance with the tastes and tempers of the great brute. Good he pronounces to be
that in which the beast delights and evil to be that which he dislikes; and he can give no other
account of them except that the just and noble are the necessary, having never himself seen, and
having no power of explaining to others the nature of either, or the difference between them, which
is immense. By heaven, would not such an one be a rare educator?
6. What is the Good?
Now, that which imparts truth to the known and the power of
knowing to the knower is what I would have you term the idea of good,
and this you will deem to be the cause of science, and of truth in so far
as the latter becomes the subject of knowledge; beautiful too, as are
both truth and knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this other
nature as more beautiful than either; and, as in the previous instance,
light and sight may be truly said to be like the sun, and yet not to be
the sun, so in this other sphere, science and truth may be deemed to
be like the good, but not the good; the good has a place of honour
yet higher.
