PI Motion - Memo

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DAN SPARACO,
Plaintiff,
v.
LINDA H. LAMONE, et al.,
Defendants.
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CASE NO. 1:16-cv-01579-RDB
HEARING REQUESTED
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PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
DANIEL J. SPARACO, ESQ. (Bar No. 29258)
Plaintiff, pro se
1118 St. Paul Street, #2R
Baltimore, MD 21202
(443) 526-1501
dansparaco@gmail.com
Case 1:16-cv-01579-RDB Document 2-1 Filed 05/20/16 Page 1 of 35

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION........................................ 3
FACTS .............................................................................................................................................. 5
Parties............................................................................................................................ 5
Unaffiliated Candidate Ballot Access in Maryland. ..................................................... 6
1998 Election Law Overhaul Creates July 1 Deadline................................................. 7
2015 Change of the Unaffiliated Candidate Deadline to February 3.......................... 11
THE STANDARD GOVERNING THIS MOTION................................................................................... 14
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................... 14
I. In Light of controlling Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit Precedent, Plaintiff will likely
succeed on the merits. ........................................................................................................ 15
The Controlling Precedent.......................................................................................... 15
This Case is Indistinguishable from the Controlling Precedent.................................. 19
2016 Uniquely Demonstrates the “Peculiar Potential” of Independents. ................... 21
Events Plaintiff’s Council District Show the Effect of the Restriction. ..................... 23
II. With First and Fourteenth Amendment rights at stake, Plaintiff faces irreparable harm in
the absence of immediate relief.......................................................................................... 26
III. The balance of hardships runs to Plaintiff, because history shows no difference, for
Defendants, between the new deadline and the prior status quo........................................ 30
The 2004 General Election Held with July 1 Deadline in Effect. .............................. 31
Independent Candidates Duly Sought Ballot Access in 2004. ................................... 32
IV. The public interest in voters’ ability to cast a ballot for the candidate of their choice is
manifest. ............................................................................................................................. 34

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DAN SPARACO,
Plaintiff,
v.
LINDA H. LAMONE, et al.,
Defendants.
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CASE NO. 1:16-cv-01579-RDB
HEARING REQUESTED
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiff seeks access to the general election ballot in November 2016 as an unaffiliated
candidate for municipal office in Baltimore City. The first filing deadline applicable to his
candidacy used to be July 1. But last year, on the eve of the 2016 election cycle, and with no
stated justification, the General Assembly changed that deadline to February 3. This is the same
deadline applicable to major party candidates seeking nomination in a primary election – in
which unaffiliated candidates do not participate – and is 279 days before the general election.
Under controlling Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent, this new deadline is
unconstitutional. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), Cromer v. South Carolina,
917 F.2d 819 (4th Cir. 1990), Pisano v. Strach, 743 F. 3d 927 (4th Cir. 2014).
The 2015 amendment to the deadline applicable to Plaintiff’s candidacy – haphazardly
drafted, with multiple amendments – was passed with apparently no notice of the fact that the
new date turns Maryland into an outlier, both nationally and within this Circuit. Maryland now
has the earliest deadline in the nation applicable to an independent presidential candidate, and it
has a much earlier deadline than any other state in the Circuit applicable to independent
candidates for local office. Surely this is because of the controlling precedents.

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Cromer, relying on the Supreme Court in Anderson, and recently reaffirmed in Pisano,
disposed of the very same issue here: whether a state’s “requirement that to gain access to the
general election ballot an independent candidate must formally declare his candidacy
approximately 70 days before party primaries and approximately 200 days before the general
election imposes an unconstitutional burden.” 917 F.2d at 822. Cromer said yes, there is an
unconstitutional burden, because the early filing deadline results in “a premature cutting off of
opportunity,” 917 F.2d at 824, and thus a cut-off of the “peculiar potential that independent
candidacies have for responding to issues that only emerge during or after the party primary
process,” id. at 822.
The deadline at issue here – the only issue presented – is more restrictive than the one
invalidated in Cromer. Not just 70 days before the primary and 200 days before the general, but
83 days before the primary, and 279 days before the general.
The rights at stake here are those of Plaintiff, but more critically the First and Fourteenth
Amendment associational rights of voters, and their right to coalesce around the candidate of
their choice. The injury to these rights is exacerbated by the fact that more voters than ever
before will turn out to vote for municipal leadership this November, because Baltimore City’s
local election now corresponds with the presidential election. The point of holding the City’s
election with the presidential was to increase voter participation. There is no constitutionally
acceptable justification for an independent candidate deadline that reduces the choice these
voters will have.
The previous deadline of July 1 was constitutionally proper, and was born from a
comprehensive overhaul of Maryland election law in 1998 (not a one-off amendment as
happened in 2015). Defendants had successfully administered multiple elections while that

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deadline was in effect, including a Baltimore City municipal general election in 2004, held that
year in correspondence with the presidential election because of a conflict between state law and
the Baltimore City Charter. In that 2004 election, independent candidates for municipal office
sought and achieved ballot access under the July 1 deadline, with no resulting ballot confusion or
bureaucratic burden suffered by Defendants.
There was no reasonable, nondiscriminatory basis for the 2015 amendment. Plaintiff asks
the Court to invalidate it, permanently enjoin Defendants to enforce the previously effective
deadline, and to accept Plaintiff’s declaration of intent on or before July 1, 2016.
Plaintiff requests that the Court, under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 65(a)(2), accelerate
determination of the merits of the action. The issue is primarily legal in nature, and the relevant
facts – largely a matter of public record – have been placed before the Court with the
accompanying Declaration of Daniel J. Sparaco, Esq.
FACTS
Parties.
Plaintiff is a resident of Baltimore City’s 12th Council District and a registered voter
unaffiliated with any political party. (Decl. ¶3, 5.) He seeks access to the general election ballot
this November as a petition candidate for City Council in his District. (Decl. ¶6.) Plaintiff meets
the requirements for candidacy for City Council. He is a citizen of the United States, at least 18
years old, a registered voter of Baltimore City, and has been a resident of the district he seeks to
represent at least 1 year preceding the election. City Charter, Art. III § 1(b), Decl. ¶3-5.
Defendant Linda H. Lamone is the State Administrator of the Maryland Board of
Elections (“the Board”), and the chief election official for Maryland. Md. Code, Election Law §
2-103. Lamone and co-Defendants, who are members of the Board, supervise the conduct of

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elections in the State and ensure compliance with State and federal law. Md. Code, Election
Law § 2-102. They also direct and monitor the activities of each local election board across the
State. Id.
Unaffiliated Candidate Ballot Access in Maryland.
There are three ways for a candidate to get on the general election ballot in this state.1
For candidates such as Plaintiff, not affiliated with any political party, they may be nominated by
a petition signed by not less than 1% of the total number of voters who are eligible to vote for the
office for which the nomination by petition is sought, but not less than 250 registered voters.
Election Law § 5-703(e)(1). Such a candidate must file a declaration of intent to seek ballot
access by petition by the date and time specified for a principal party candidate to file a
certificate of candidacy. Election Law § 5-703(c)(3)(ii). Certificates of candidacy are governed
by § 5-301 et seq., and for elections other than those in the gubernatorial cycle, “a certificate of
candidacy shall be filed not later than 9 p.m. on the Wednesday that is 83 days before the day on
which the primary election will be held.” This year, that day was February 3.
Unaffiliated candidates, often referred to as “independent candidates,” are considered
“petition candidates” under Maryland law. The three terms are used interchangeably here.
1
In addition to access by petition, there are two other methods. First, a candidate can
seek the nomination of a principal political party, which choose nominees by primary. Md.
Code, Election Law § 5-701(1). The principal political parties are the two parties whose
candidates for Governor received the highest and second highest number of votes of any party
candidate at the preceding general election. Election Law § 1-101(dd), (jj), (kk). In a year in
which the President of the United States is elected, principal political party primaries are held on
the fourth Tuesday in April (which in 2016 was April 26). Elec. Law § 8-201(a)(2)(ii).
Second, a candidate may seek nomination as a candidate of an other-than principal
political parties that has secured ballot access; such parties are not required to hold a primary and
may nominate candidates in accordance with the constitution and by-laws of the political party.
Election Law § 5-703(3).

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1998 Election Law Overhaul Creates July 1 Deadline.
In 1996, because Maryland’s existing election laws were outdated and archaic, and
needed a substantial update to comport with the needs of modern election administration, the
Commission to Revise the Election Code was created by House Bill 127. (Exhibit 1.)2
That
Commission issued its report in December 1997. (Exhibit 2.) In its 1998 Session, the Maryland
General Assembly carried out the work of the Commission by enacting a complete overhaul of
Maryland election law, with Senate Bill 118. (Exhibit 3.)
In the context of that comprehensive revision, a deadline of July 1 was formalized as the
date by which a party-unaffiliated candidate seeking ballot access via petition had to file a
declaration of intent to do so, as was the date by which signatures were due:
5-703. Nomination by petition.
(a) Scope.
Except for a candidate for a county board of education, this section
applies to any candidate for public office subject to this title.
(b) In general.
A candidate for a public office may be nominated by petition under
this subtitle if the candidate does not seek nomination through a
party primary.
(c) Declaration of intent.
(1) A candidate for public office who seeks nomination by
petition shall file a declaration of intent to seek nomination
by petition.
(2) The declaration of intent shall be filed with the board at
which the candidate files a certificate of candidacy under
subtitle 3 of this title.
2
All Exhibits are annexed to the Declaration of Daniel J. Sparaco, Esq. that accompanies
this Motion.

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(3) The declaration of intent shall be filed as follows:
(i) In a year in which the governor is elected, by the
date and time specified for a candidate to file a
certificate of candidacy;
(ii) In a year in which the president is elected, by
July 1[.]
[. . . .]
(f) Time and place for filing petition signatures.
(1) . . . a petition that contains the required number of
signatures specified under subsection (e)(1) of this section
shall be filed with the appropriate board by 5 p.m. on the
first Monday in August in the year in which the general
election is held.
(Exhibit 3, emphasis added).
The 1998 bill also codified Baltimore City’s primary and general election dates:
8-201. Date of the primary.
(a) Generally.
(1) There shall be a statewide primary election in every
even-numbered year.
(2) A primary election shall be held:
(i) In the year in which the governor is elected, on
the second Tuesday after the first Monday in
September; and
(ii) In the year in which the President of the United
States is elected, on the first Tuesday in March.
(b) Baltimore City municipal primary.
In Baltimore City, there shall be a primary election for municipal
offices on the second Tuesday following the first Monday in
September in the year following the election of the governor.

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8-301. Date of general election.
(a) Generally.
(1) There shall be a statewide general election in each even-
numbered year.
(2) A statewide general election shall be held on the
Tuesday following the first Monday in November.
(b) Baltimore City municipal election.
In Baltimore City, there shall be a general election for municipal
offices on the Tuesday following the first Monday in November
in the year following the election of the governor.
(Exhibit 3, emphasis added.)
2012 Change in Baltimore City Election Cycle.
During the 2012 Session the General Assembly passed Senate Bill 597, which altered the
year in which the Baltimore City municipal primary and general elections are held so that,
beginning in 2016, each election coincides with the presidential primary and general elections.
(Exhibit 4.) A corresponding change to the Baltimore City Charter was passed by the Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore and approved by the voters in the 2012 general election. (Exhibit 5.)
Increasing voter participation was a key rationale for changing the year of Baltimore City
municipal elections, which had historically been held in odd years, e.g., 2007, 2011. (see Exhibit
6 at 194.) Low voter participation in the 2007 municipal election was seen as a sign of “a
troubling malaise” by the Baltimore Sun Editorial Board. (Exhibit 7.) And voter turnout was
even lower in the following municipal election. (Exhibit 8.) The approval of the City Charter
amendment in 2012, in correspondence with that year’s amendment of the state’s election law,
was celebrated as a victory of “efforts to boost voter turnout in future city elections by shifting
city elections to the presidential cycle.” (Exhibit 5.)

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SB 597 made no other change to state election law except to the date of Baltimore City’s
primary and general election.3
§ 8–201.
(b) In Baltimore City, there shall be a primary election for
municipal offices:
(1) IN THE YEAR 2016, on the [second] FIRST Tuesday
[following the first Monday in September in the year
following the election of the Governor] IN APRIL IN THE
YEAR IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES IS ELECTED; AND
(2) BEGINNING IN THE YEAR 2018, ON THE LAST
TUESDAY IN JUNE IN THE YEAR THAT THE
GOVERNOR IS ELECTED.
§ 8–301.
(b) In Baltimore City, there shall be a general election for
municipal offices:
(1) IN THE YEAR 2016, on the Tuesday following the first
Monday in November [in the year IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES IS ELECTED following the election
of the Governor]; AND
(2) BEGINNING IN THE YEAR 2018, ON THE TUESDAY
FOLLOWING THE FIRST MONDAY IN NOVEMBER IN THE
YEAR THE GOVERNOR IS ELECTED.
(Exhibit 4.)4
3
Capitals indicate matter the bill, as introduced, would add to existing law. Brackets
indicate matter the bill, as introduced, would delete from the existing law. Underlining indicates
amendments made to the bill in session. Strike-out language indicates matter stricken from the
bill in session by amendment or deleted from the law by amendment. Italics indicate opposite
chamber or conference committee amendments.
4
Note that the bill as introduced called for only the 2016 municipal election to
correspond with the presidential election. Winners would serve only two years, and would run
again in 2018, from which point forward all municipal elections would correspond with the
state’s gubernatorial election. This language, as quoted, was struck before passage. It was
included in the bill because of a lengthy dispute over the proper timing of the city’s municipal
election between members of the General Assembly (who believed the gubernatorial was best)

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2015 Change of the Unaffiliated Candidate Deadline to February 3.
During its 2015 Session, the General Assembly amended the date by which an
unaffiliated candidate must file a declaration of intent to seek ballot access by petition, with
Senate Bill 204.
The publicly-stated reason for that bill was to move the primary from early April to late
April “to avoid opening polls on Easter for early voting.” (Exhibit 9.)
But another goal of the bill, clear from the first draft, was to change the deadline for
unaffiliated candidates in a presidential election year from July 1 to “the date and time specified
for a candidate to file a certificate of candidacy.” (Exhibit 10.) That date is governed by § 5-301
et seq., and for elections other than those in the gubernatorial cycle, “a certificate of candidacy
shall be filed not later than 9 p.m. on the Wednesday that is 83 days before the day on which the
primary election will be held.”
In other words, the bill was designed to make the deadline for unaffiliated candidates
seeking access to the general election the same as the filing deadline for principal political party
candidates seeking to participate in a party primary.
§ 5–703.
(i) in a year in which the Governor is elected or the
Baltimore City municipal election is held, by the date and
time specified for a candidate to file a certificate 10 of
candidacy;
(ii) in a year in which the President is elected, by [July 1]
THE DATE AND TIME SPECIFIED FOR A
CANDIDATE TO FILE A CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY . . .
and local electeds in Baltimore City (who preferred the presidential cycle). This dispute is
described further below.

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But the first draft of the bill left language in subsection (3)(i) that suggested that “the
Baltimore City municipal election” was held separate from the presidential election, the subject
of subsection (3)(ii). It took an amendment in the House Ways and Means committee, after the
bill had already been passed by the Senate, to correct the language:
§ 5–703.
(c) (1) A candidate for public office who seeks nomination by
petition shall file a declaration of intent to seek nomination
by petition.
(2) The declaration of intent shall be filed with the board at
which the candidate files a certificate of candidacy under
Subtitle 3 of this title.
(i) in a year in which the Governor is elected or the
Baltimore City municipal election is held, by the
date and time specified for a candidate to file a
certificate of candidacy;
(ii) in a year in which the President is AND
MAYOR OF BALTIMORE CITY ARE elected, by
[July 1] THE DATE AND TIME SPECIFIED
FOR A CANDIDATE TO FILE A
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY . . .
(Exhibit 11.)
Other dates were left unchanged, particularly the date by which a petition candidate must
file their signatures, which continues to be the first Monday in August. (Exhibit 12.) See also
Election Law § 5-703(f)(1).
Because of the amendment the Election Law retains a circular reference that no longer
makes sense in light of the change. Subsection (d) of the section governing certificates of

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candidacy, § 5-301, continues to read as though unaffiliated candidates are treated differently
from party candidates: “A candidate who seeks nomination by petition shall file a certificate of
candidacy as provided in § 5-703 of this title.” But because of the amendment that obliterates
the distinction, § 5–703(c)(ii) simply refers back to § 5-301 regarding the all-important time of
filing.
The legislative history reveals no consideration of how much earlier this changed
deadline is compared to other states regarding independent presidential candidates5
:
Maryland 2/3/2016 Maine 8/1/2016 Utah 8/15/2016
Texas 5/9/2016 Nebraska 8/1/2016 Montana 8/17/2016
North Carolina 6/9/2016 New Jersey 8/1/2016 Alabama 8/18/2016
Illinois 6/27/2016 Pennsylvania 8/1/2016 Tennessee 8/18/2016
Indiana 6/30/2016 Vermont 8/1/2016 Iowa 8/19/2016
New Mexico 6/30/2016 West Virginia 8/1/2016 Louisiana 8/19/2016
Nevada 7/8/2016 Massachusetts 8/2/2016 Minnesota 8/23/2016
Georgia 7/12/2016 South Dakota 8/2/2016 New York 8/23/2016
Delaware 7/15/2016 Wisconsin 8/2/2016 Idaho 8/24/2016
Florida 7/15/2016 Alaska 8/10/2016 Virginia 8/26/2016
Oklahoma 7/15/2016 Colorado 8/10/2016 Oregon 8/30/2016
South Carolina 7/15/2016 Connecticut 8/10/2016 Wyoming 8/30/2016
Michigan 7/21/2016 Hawaii 8/10/2016 North Dakota 9/5/2016
Washington 7/23/2016 New Hampshire 8/10/2016 Arizona 9/9/2016
Missouri 7/25/2016 Ohio 8/10/2016 Kentucky 9/9/2016
Arkansas 8/1/2016 Washington, D.C. 8/10/2016 Mississippi 9/9/2016
Kansas 8/1/2016 California 8/12/2016 Rhode Island 9/9/2016
5
This website links each state’s election laws:
https://ballotpedia.org/Filing_deadlines_and_signature_requirements_for_independent_president
ial_candidates,_2016.

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The legislative history also reveals no consideration of how much earlier this changed
deadline is compared other states in this Circuit regarding candidates for local office6
:
Primary Date Filing Deadline Days before/after Primary
Maryland April 26, 2016 February 3, 2016 83 days before.
North Carolina March 15, 2016 June 9, 2016 86 days after.
South Carolina June 14, 2016 June 15, 2016 1 day after.
Virginia June 14, 2016 June 14, 2016 Same day.
West Virginia May 10, 2016 August 1, 2016 83 days after.
THE STANDARD GOVERNING THIS MOTION
Parties seeking preliminary injunctions must demonstrate that (1) “they are likely to
succeed on the merits,” (2) “they are likely to suffer irreparable harm,” (3) “the balance of
hardships tips in their favor,” and (4) “the injunction is in the public interest.” Pashby v. Delia,
709 F.3d 307, 320 (4th Cir. 2013); see also Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008).
ARGUMENT
Controlling authority of the United States Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit make
clear that a filing deadline applicable to independent or unaffiliated candidates 83 days before the
primaries and 279 days before the general election is an unconstitutional restriction on ballot
access and must be struck down. Maryland had a constitutionally acceptable deadline for
seventeen years, one created as part of a multi-year, comprehensive overhaul of the state’s
election laws. That date was July 1. Last year, that date was changed to February 3. The need
to change that long-standing deadline – via legislation introduced by members of Baltimore
City’s delegation to Annapolis – apparently only arose after Baltimore City’s elections were
6
See North Carolina General Statutes § 163-122; South Carolina Code of Laws § 7-13-
351; Virginia Code § 24.2-507; West Virginia Code § 3-5-24.

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moved to 2016 and made to correspond with the presidential election cycle. There was no
constitutionally acceptable justification for this change, which unduly restricts the field of
candidates from which voters might choose, and it should be struck down.
I. In Light of controlling Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit
Precedent, Plaintiff will likely succeed on the merits.
Plaintiff can make a “clear showing” of likely success on the merits because high courts
have looked at circumstances virtually identical to those presented here and ruled on his side of
the issue. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 575 F.3d 342, 349 (4th Cir.
2009), vacated on other grounds, 559 U.S. 1089 (2010), reinstated in relevant part, 607 F.3d
355 (4th Cir. 2010).
The Controlling Precedent.
In Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) the Supreme Court held unconstitutional
an Ohio statute that required an independent candidate to file a statement of candidacy on March
20, seventy-five days before the party primaries, in order to appear on the general election ballot
eight months later in November.
Candidate eligibility requirements such as the Ohio deadline directly impact the “basic
constitutional rights” of voters. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786. For the Court the “primary concern
is with the tendency of ballot access restrictions ‘to limit the field of candidates from which
voters might choose.’” Id., citing Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972). See also Dixon v.
Maryland State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 878 F.2d 776, 779 (4th Cir. 1989).
The holding in Anderson was based upon a balancing of interests test that remains the
proper analytical framework for the issue. First, a court must “consider the character and
magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments

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that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate”; then, the court “must identify and evaluate the precise
interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule”; then, the
court must “determine the legitimacy . . . of those interests” and “consider the extent to which
those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.” Anderson, 405 U.S. at 789.
The character and magnitude of the asserted injury was significant in Anderson. The
problem with the deadline there, so in advance of both the primary and the general election, was
that “even if intervening events create unanticipated political opportunities, no independent
candidate may enter the Presidential race and seek to place his name on the Ohio general election
ballot.” Anderson, 405 U.S. at 786.
At this point developments in campaigns for the major-party
nominations have only begun, and the major parties will not adopt
their nominees and platforms for another five months. . . . If the
State’s filing deadline were later in the year, a newly emergent
independent candidate could serve as the focal point for a grouping
of Ohio voters who decide, after mid-March, that they are
dissatisfied with the choices within the two major parties.
Id., 405 U.S. at 790-791.
The state, on the other hand, had no valid interest that made it necessary to burden these
fundamental rights with a too-early March 20 deadline for independent candidates. It was not
objectionable for the state to require a candidate in a party’s primary election to file seventy-five
days before the primary itself, because that “appears to be a reasonable time for processing the
documents submitted by candidates and preparing the ballot.” Anderson, 405 U.S. at 799. But
the March deadline was not at all necessary to count signatures or prepare a ballot for the
following November with regard to an independent. Id.

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All states, in the wake of Anderson’s invalidation of the Ohio deadline, have a filing
deadline for independent presidential candidates well after the major party primaries and well
before the general election. (See above at 10.)
This was true for Maryland as well – until 2015, when the deadline for unaffiliated
candidates to file a declaration of intent to seek ballot access was moved to a date more
egregious than that at issue in Anderson, despite the fact that the principles and rationale of that
case have been affirmed again and again by the Fourth Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit spoke definitively in a case that presents a virtual carbon copy of the
facts at issue here. Before an election law amendment, independent candidates in South Carolina
had until August 1 to submit a petition to gain access the ballot for a November general election.
But an amendment to the election law, with no legislative history explaining the basis for the
change, created a “statement of candidacy” deadline of March 30 for independent candidates –
the same date as the deadline for party primary candidates. That date was 70 days before the
party primaries, in which an independent candidate would not participate. The court would hold
that the injury to voters’ rights was significant, while the proffered state justifications were
insignificant, and that the deadline was unconstitutional. Cromer v. South Carolina, 917 F.2d
819, 825 (4th Cir. 1990).
For the court in Cromer, the character and magnitude of the injury was effectively
“total”:
The direct effect of the pre-primary filing requirement is that the
opportunity to run as an independent candidate for the office in
question is effectively cut off on March 30, seven months before
the November general election, which of course means that the
opportunity of voters to coalesce around such a candidacy is cut
off at the same time. “History . . . ends” for both potential
independent candidates and their supporters on that date. In

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practical terms this means that as of March 30, the emergence of
independent candidacies to respond to newly emerging issues, or to
major party or candidate shifts in position, or to moral, or ethical,
or mental, or physical collapses of party candidates in the seven-
month interval between filing date and general election date are
effectively precluded.
Cromer, 917 F.2d at 823 (citations omitted).
The court rejected the contention that the filing of a “statement of candidacy” was no
burden because it is an “easily done physical act,” when in fact it required a “draconian decision
at a time when a rational basis for making it does not exist. At this time the party candidates have
not been chosen, and even the identity of those who may become candidates may not be known.
The election itself is seven months of unfolding events away.” Cromer, 917 F.2d at 823.
The court also rejected the notion that Anderson was only relevant to national
candidacies, when in fact the Supreme Court’s ruling there “did not turn solely on that factor, but
provides general guidance for assessing ballot access challenges by local and state as well as
national office candidates and their supporters.” Cromer, 917 F.2d at 822.
The interests put forward by the state in defense of the deadline were unavailing. It was
improper to impose the same deadline upon independent and party primary candidates on the
grounds of “equal treatment,” since the two types of candidates are materially different, and the
“obvious administrative reasons for requiring primary candidates to file at that time simply do
not apply to independent candidates.” Cromer, 917 F.2d at 824. And while protecting the major
parties from splintering is not an unjustified goal, the early deadline for independents had no
connection to it. Id. The court affirmed the District Court order that the name of the
independent candidate whom had been denied ballot access be added to it.

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More recently, in Pisano v. Strach, 743 F.3d 927 (4th Cir. 2014), the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the close scrutiny that early deadlines merit, and provided a clear statement of the
relevant standard. “[E]lection laws that impose a severe burden on ballot access are subject to
strict scrutiny, and a court applying strict scrutiny may uphold the restrictions only if they are
narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. On the other hand, if a
statute imposes only modest burdens, then a State’s important regulatory interests will usually be
enough to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions. Pisano, 743 F.3d at 933 (citations
omitted).
While Pisano concerned new political parties, not independent candidate ballot access, it
had the occasion evaluate “the great weight of authority” requiring scrutiny of deadlines falling
before major party primaries. 743 F.3d at 935, citing Anderson as well as Nader v. Brewer, 531
F.3d 1028, 1038-40 (9th Cir. 2008) (striking down Arizona’s filing deadline for unaffiliated
candidates 90 days before the primary) and Council of Alternative Pol. Parties v. Hooks, 121
F.3d 876, 880 (3d Cir. 1997) (striking April 10 independent candidate deadline prior to June 4
primary). “As the Sixth Circuit has explained, ‘the great weight of authority . . . has
distinguished between filing deadlines well in advance of the primary and general elections and
deadlines falling closer to the dates of those elections.’” Pisano, 743 F.3d at 935, citing
Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Blackwell, 462 F.3d 579, 590 (6th Cir. 2006).
This Case is Indistinguishable from the Controlling Precedent.
After its 2015 amendment, Maryland Election Law § 5–703(c)(3)(ii) imposes a deadline
for an independent candidate to declare an intent to seek ballot access that is “the date and time
specified for a candidate to file a certificate of candidacy.” In a presidential election year, that
date is defined by § 5-301(a)(2), which requires that “a certificate of candidacy shall be filed no

20
later than 9 p.m. on the Wednesday that is 83 days before the day on which the primary election
will be held.” This year, that day was February 3, in advance of a primary held on April 26, as
called for by § 8-201(b) (“In Baltimore City, there shall be a primary election for municipal
offices on the fourth Tuesday in April in the year in which the President of the United States is
elected.”).
The injury imposed upon Plaintiff, and voters who may wish to coalesce around an
independent candidacy in his District, is identical to that in Anderson and Cromer. The deadline
unconstitutionally prevents independent candidacies from “serv[ing] important safety-valve
purposes not adequately served by major party candidacies alone, or by the availability of write-
in candidacies.” Cromer, 917 F.2d at 823, citing Anderson 405 U.S. at 790-94.
Maryland’s new deadline fatally undermines “the peculiar potential that independent
candidacies have for responding to issues that only emerge during or after the party primary
process.” Cromer, 917 F.2d at 823, citing Anderson, 460 U.S. at 790-92.
Meanwhile, no justification for the change of deadline appears to exist, and any proffered
administrative or bureaucratic reason for the move of the deadline from July 1 to February 3
would fail for the same reason such justifications failed in the above cases. There is no good
reason to require an independent candidate to file a declaration of intent 279 days before the
general election.
There certainly lacks a justification when the deadline to file the petition upon which
ballot access would be based – and which would establish that a candidate has an appropriate
modicum of support – was left unchanged by the same amendments. In Wood v. Meadows, 207
F.3d 708, 715 (4th Cir. 2000) for example, a deadline for independent candidates to file both a
declaration of candidacy and supporting petitions, falling on same day of party primaries in June,

21
was upheld because the state had an interest in “limiting the number of candidates on the general
election ballot, [and] requiring those candidates who will be included to demonstrate a
preliminary showing of sufficient voter support[.]” But Wood acknowledges the enduring logic
of Anderson and Cromer, “that courts have subjected to searching scrutiny state laws requiring
both party primary candidates and independent candidates to announce their candidacies by the
same March deadline, well prior to the primary elections.” 207 F.3d at 711.
Since even after the 2015 amendment a petition candidate’s signatures are still to be filed
in August, no more relevant information about a petition candidate is gathered under the
February 3 deadline than would have been the July 1 deadline. The interests pertaining to
election oversight – administrative convenience or the management of ballot access – are not
forwarded by the much earlier deadline to file a declaration of intent. While Defendants’ have
gained nothing by virtue of the deadline change, Plaintiff’s candidacy has been substantially, and
unconstitutionally, disadvantaged by it.
What little explanation for the 2015 legislation exists can be found in meager news
coverage that focuses on the need to change the date of the 2016 primary to avoid the Easter
holiday. (Exhibit 9.) The same news coverage notes that other deadlines were changed simply
to “reflect the changed primary date,” but the change from one primary date in April to another
was hardly a reason to change the long-standing deadline for petition candidates from July 1 to
February 3. And indeed the language of the First Reader of the bill makes clear that was a
primary intent of the bill all along.
2016 Uniquely Demonstrates the “Peculiar Potential” of Independents.
This election cycle uniquely shows the importance of independent candidacies, and how
“intervening events create unanticipated political opportunities” even in elections that at first

22
seemed headed towards predictable outcomes. Anderson, 405 U.S. at 786. With respect to both
national and local elections, Maryland’s too-early deadline prevents “a newly emergent
independent candidate [from] serv[ing] as the focal point for a grouping of [Maryland] voters
who decide, after [late April], that they are dissatisfied with the choices within the two major
parties.” Anderson, 405 U.S. at 790-791.
Nationally, the tumultuous presidential primaries have lead individuals such as former
New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg to consider an independent bid, but one that was on
the verge of being barred in Maryland almost at the moment those considerations began.
(Exhibit 13.) Indeed, the Wall Street Journal opined that Bloomberg had a viable path to the
presidency as an independent candidate on the very day after which he could no longer be one in
this state. (Exhibit 14.)
Locally, the April 26 primary that just took placed shows tremendous—and
unanticipated—voter dissatisfaction with incumbent politicians of the majority party in
Baltimore City. A number of voters not seen in twenty years flooded to the polls in the City’s
historically decisive Democratic primary – 145,000 in total. (Exhibit 15.) Plaintiff is aware of at
least two campaigns staffed by experienced campaign teams that greatly underestimated what
total voter turnout in the Democratic primary would be. (Decl. ¶7.) Further, Plaintiff is familiar
with one pre-primary analysis conducted by individuals who have worked on Democratic
campaigns that showed a likely increase in voter turnout of only ten to fifteen percent over the
2011 municipal election cycle. (Decl. ¶8.) Turnout in the 2016 Democratic primary was in fact
double what it was in the 2011 Democratic primary. (See below at 24.)

23
Aside from the six members of the City Council who declined to seek re-election, two
long-time incumbents were swept out of office in the 8th and 13th Council Districts, and another
long-time incumbent, in the 10th, won by just 105 votes. (Exhibit 15.)
And while two of the City’s three city-wide elected offices were left uncontested by an
established challenger, the incumbents in both lost a surprising percentage of the vote to virtually
unknown protest candidates. The incumbent City Council President won the Democratic
primary, but lost 30% of the vote to a candidate with a campaign funded by $3,000 in
contributions (Exhibit 16), a fraction of the incumbent’s war chest, (Exhibit 17). The incumbent
City Comptroller also won the Democratic primary, but lost over 20% of the vote to a candidate
that was equally unknown and underfunded. (Exhibits 18 and 15.)
It is only now, after the primary, that the extent of the electorate’s appetite for
alternatives to established major party figures is clear. Under the previous July 1 deadline for
independent candidates to file a declaration of intent, voters would have the opportunity to
coalesce around alternative candidates, but the now too-early deadline for petition candidates
makes that impossible. Sure, a candidate could have filed a declaration of intent on February 3
“to act as a standby just in case some need should later arise,” but credible candidates do not do
this; that it is theoretically possible does not “suffice[] as a practical basis for insuring the
viability of independent candidacies as the constitutionally protected best means for voter
response to late developments affecting issues or party candidates.” Anderson, 405 U.S. at 823-
824.
Events Plaintiff’s Council District Show the Effect of the Restriction.
Just as the early independent candidate deadline invalidated in Cromer would have
enabled the incumbent to effectively choose his predecessor, the early deadline in effect here has

24
– so far – allowed the incumbent in Plaintiff’s City Council District to exert similar, although not
identical, influence.
In both Cromer and in Plaintiff’s Council District, the early deadline helped the
incumbent ‘box out’ other challengers in favor of a chosen successor.
The incumbent that held the elected office at issue in Cromer announced, at the last
possible minute, on the date candidate filings were due, that he would not seek reelection; only
one candidate was able to meet the deadline, and he became the sole party candidate in the
general election. Cromer, 917 F.2d at 821. Since the independent candidate deadline was the
same as that for party candidates, the one person who knew to make the candidate filing at the
last minute was the only candidate for the seat in the general.
Meanwhile, in Plaintiff’s City Council District 12, the long-time incumbent filed to run
for mayor as a Democrat in 2016 on the very last day possible, and, has a history of feigning a
run for higher office but then filing to retain his incumbency at the last minute. (Exhibit 19.)
In 2011, the same District 12 incumbent had mounted an apparent run for mayor, only to file on
the day of the deadline to seek the Democratic nomination for his City Council seat. (Decl.
¶10.)7
This was an unexpected move, and in fact, a challenger had been running a well-funded
and well-organized campaign for the incumbent’s Council seat on the understanding that he
would vacate it, and seek the Democratic nomination for mayor. (Exhibit 20, Decl. ¶11.) That
challenger secured the Baltimore Sun endorsement for the seat, but lost. (Exhibits 21 and 22.)
In 2016, the concern that the long-time incumbent would again mount an apparent run for mayor
only to seek, at the last minute, to retain his Council seat kept at least two credible challengers
from seeking that office. (Decl. ¶12.) Ultimately the incumbent did file as a mayoral candidate
7
See also https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l-Mt9rKJ7uk.

25
at the last possible minute; but also just prior to the deadline, the incumbent’s long-time associate
and employee filed for the incumbent’s Council seat. (Exhibit 19.) That long-time associate had
also sought the Council seat in 2011, but stepped aside when the incumbent signaled he wished
to retain it. (Exhibit 23.)
In Cromer, an independent candidate was able to challenge the incumbent-chosen
successor because the deadline that would have barred him was invalidated; but here, Plaintiff
remains barred from challenging the incumbent-chosen successor, who was able to secure the
Democratic nomination. (Exhibit 15.) The circumstances here are worse, from the perspective
of voter choice, than the facts present in Cromer, because the results of the primary here already
indicate deep voter dissatisfaction with the incumbent-chosen successor. (Id.) Ironically,
Plaintiff was warned by several people in the District of the incumbent-chosen successor’s
popularity, and Plaintiff understands that the second-place candidate in the 2016 primary was
similarly warned that overcoming that popularity would be virtually impossible. (Decl. ¶¶12-
13.) Indeed, the successor was heavily supported by contributions from other politicians and
political action committees. (Exhibit 24.) But as with so much else about 2016, the
conventional wisdom was wrong about voter sentiment in the 12th District, and, supermajority of
voters in the 12th Council District chose a candidate other than the incumbent-chosen successor
in the primary election. (Exhibit 15.)
The incumbent-chosen Democratic nominee in Plaintiff’s City Council District has two
challengers, but they are both party-affiliated, and thus not substitutes for an independent
candidacy: “independent candidates . . . are free from ties and obligations to party organizations,
and support for them is not so total a commitment of political allegiance because it does not
require renunciation of major party affiliation.” Anderson, 405 U.S. at 792 n. 12 (citations

26
omitted). One challenger to the Democratic nominee is a nominee of the Green Party; the other
challenger is a Republican who declared as a candidate for the Republican Party nomination, but
then withdraw that filing, de-affiliated, and filed a declaration of intent to seek nomination by
petition. (Exhibit 19.) The voters in the District are overwhelmingly registered Democrats, and
for many, the choice of a Republican, or of a minor fringe party, is no choice at all. These are
not substitutes for an independent candidate.
II. With First and Fourteenth Amendment rights at stake, Plaintiff
faces irreparable harm in the absence of immediate relief.
“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673,
49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). See also Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality Cable
Operating Co., 22 F.3d 546, 551-52 (4th Cir. 1994) (irreparable harm is demonstrated where any
calculation of damages is difficult to ascertain or are inadequate, or when ascertaining with any
accuracy the extent of the loss is impossible).
The harm is not simply borne by Plaintiff, whose ability to respond to this current –
perhaps fleeting – political moment is totally restricted by the too-early filing deadline, but more
importantly, by the voters who have created that moment.
The harm is doubled by the very success of the 2012 change to the City’s municipal
election cycle. The point of aligning it with the presidential election was to increase voter
participation. (See above at 6.) While total turnout has yet to be certified, after twenty years of
declining participation, it looks like the change accomplished its goal.8
8
Baltimore City’s Board of Elections website, http://boe.baltimorecity.gov/, links results
here: https://www.electionwareresults.com/webResults/summary-112.html. All turnout data

27
The greater harm lies in the fact that turnout for the municipal general election this
November will be even higher. Well over 200,000 voters have come to the polls in Baltimore
City in every presidential general since 1988, except two:
discussed here can be found at the State Board of Elections website,
http://www.elections.state.md.us/elections/2016/index.html.
1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2016*
Mayoral Primary 230,372 155,861 108,510 155,114 116,559 89,423 83,672 74,225 145,000
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
VOTERS
MAYORAL PRIMARY
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
City Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections
Dem Primary Turnout General Turnout
Dem Primary % Turnout General % Turnout

28
Baltimore City’s odd-year primary has historically been followed by a general election
with much lower voter participation, because the primary is decisive in a jurisdiction where
voters are overwhelmingly registered members of the Democratic Party. (As of April 10, 2016,
there were almost 300,000 registered Democrats compared to just 31,000 Republicans, Exhibit
25.)
As compared to historical City elections, the presidential cycle shows the opposite, more
traditional, electoral trend – higher general turnout:
89,423 83,672
74,225
214,932
43,742 49,463
2003* 2007 2011
Municipal Election Turnout
Turount Dem Primary Turnout in General
54,987
107,273
47,854
214,932
245,422
257,399
2004 2008 2012
Presidential Election Turnout
Turnout Dem Primary Turnout in General

29
Choice – the value underlying the First and Fourteenth Amendment protections Plaintiff
seeks to vindicate here – is what brings voters to the polls. Historically, voters have had little
meaningful choice in the municipal general election that is effectively decided in the Democratic
primary. But this November – and in all future elections – 200,000 voters can be expected to
vote in the general because another choice is on the ballot at the same time – the choice for
President of the United States, arguably the most important one a voter in this country can make.
After taking steps to increase voter participation with the 2012 re-alignment of the City’s
municipal election, no good reason exists for the General Assembly’s 2015 amendment that
unjustifiably reduced the choices those voters would have. Before the amendment, such voters
would have had the opportunity, in the months between the April primary and the November
general, to coalesce around a petition candidate seeking to intervene and challenge the status quo
by providing a voice for voters who feel unrepresented by the prevailing political parties. But
after the amendment, that opportunity no longer exists.
There was no justification for the 2015 amendment because Defendants have already
successfully held a City municipal general election together with a presidential general election –
with independent candidates on the ballot under the prior July 1 deadline to boot. On the two
charts above, turnout is the same for the first general election shown on each because the City
election corresponding with the 2003 municipal primary was held at the same time as the 2004
presidential general. This is discussed further below, because the 2004 election demonstrates
that there is no hardship to Defendants if required to abide by the July 1 deadline.

30
III. The balance of hardships runs to Plaintiff, because history shows
no difference, for Defendants, between the new deadline and the
prior status quo.
To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the balance of
hardships tips in his or her favor. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. Plaintiff can do so here because he
bears all the hardship, and Defendants bear none.9
The legislative history of Senate Bill 204 contains no reference to administrative or
bureaucratic reasons for changing the 2016 filing deadline from July 1 to February 3.
(Exhibits 10-12.) In fact, Defendants, in 2004, successfully managed a municipal election in a
presidential election year in which independent candidates sought and achieved ballot access by
petition. Nothing in the history of Senate Bill 204 suggests a reason why the 2016 election
would so be materially different that the deadline applicable to unaffiliated candidacies had to be
accelerated by five months.
9
Plaintiff acknowledges the difference between mandatory injunctions that alter the
status quo, and prohibitory injunctions that “aim to maintain the status quo and prevent
irreparable harm while a lawsuit remains pending.” Pashby, 709 F.3d at 319. While the status
quo is “the last uncontested status between the parties which preceded the controversy,” id. at
320, “it is sometimes necessary to require a party who has recently disturbed the status quo to
reverse its actions,” which “restores, rather than disturbs, the status quo ante.” Aggarao v. MOL
Ship Mgmt. Co., 675 F.3d 355, 378 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Plaintiff’s position is that the relevant status quo is the election law as it stood for
seventeen years, with § 5–703(c)(ii) commanding a deadline of July 1 for an independent
candidate to file a declaration of intent to seek ballot access by petition. Further, Plaintiff
commenced this suit as soon as practicable after the April 26 primary, and it was only after the
result of that primary that Plaintiff’s injury arose. To require Plaintiff or any other petition
candidate to have filed suit disputing the 2015 amendment to § 5–703(c)(ii) at the time it was
passed runs contrary to the very rationale of such candidacies as outlined in Anderson and
Cromer.

31
The 2004 General Election Held with July 1 Deadline in Effect.
In 2004, the Baltimore City municipal general election was held in correspondence with
the presidential general election because of a conflict arising from a previous attempt, before
2012, to align the City’s municipal election with the presidential election:
 As discussed above at 4-6, the 1998 election law overhaul codified the long-
standing practice of Baltimore City’s municipal elections being held in odd-years
(1983, 1987, 1991, etc.) – specifically, the year after the year in which the
governor is elected (2006, 2010, 2014), and the year before the year the President
of the United States is elected (2008, 2012, and 2016).
 In 1999, Senate President Mike Miller introduced Senate Bill 330 (Exhibit 26),
designed to align the municipal primary and general elections with the
gubernatorial cycle, to increase turnout in gubernatorial elections, save money,
and prevent city officials from any longer being able to run for state office
without the risk of losing their local position. (Exhibit 27.) That alignment would
also avoid the long lame-duck period that would result from alignment with the
presidential cycle. (Id.) That legislation failed.
 But also in 1999, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City placed a City
Charter amendment on the 1999 general election ballot, which the voters
approved, that moved the municipal primary and general to the presidential
election cycle. (Exhibit 28.)
 The Charter amendment moving the municipal election to the presidential cycle
conflicted with the 1998 election law revision that placed it on odd-years.
 An amendment was required to state law, but because General Assembly
representatives at the time objected to aligning city elections with the presidential
election for the reasons outlined by the Senate President, efforts to pass an
amendment failed. (Exhibit 29: in 2000, with House Bill 782, in 2001, with
House Bill 311, and in 2003, with House Bill 323).
 Because the appropriate date for Baltimore City’s general election was unclear,
the Maryland Attorney General was asked to opine, and found the City Charter
amendment controlling, but only as to the general, not the primary. (Exhibit 6 at
195: the 1998 revision the Legislature included a timetable for the municipal
general election “consistent with the municipal charter at that time” but did not
revoke “the 1920 delegation to the City to set the date of the municipal general
election.”)

32
Because the conflict was not resolved the next municipal primary was held in September
2003 pursuant to state law as revised in 1998, but the following municipal general election was
held an entire 14 months later, in November 2004, pursuant to the City Charter as amended in
1999.10
(Exhibit 28.)
Independent Candidates Duly Sought Ballot Access in 2004.
In that general election, an unaffiliated candidate for the 8th Councilmanic District
sought and achieved ballot access by petition. (Exhibit 32.) Also in that election, it appears that
at least two other unaffiliated candidates, one for the office of mayor and another for the office of
City Council president, also sought ballot access by petition, but were unable to secure sufficient
signatures. (Exhibit 33.)
The happenstance of the 2004 municipal general election occurring with the presidential
election lead to a massive increase in voter participation that year, as the charts above at 25-26
show. Over 213,000 City voters participated in the 2004 general – 70% of all voters that year.
More people voted for Mayor than at any time since 1983. Another 185,000 people voted for
Council President, 166,000 for Comptroller, and two to three times the usual number of primary
10
This dispute was driven by incumbency protection. The General Assembly
representatives wanted municipal elections aligned with state-wide elections to prevent attacks
on their incumbency from local elected officials in Baltimore City who could safely take a “free
shot” while retaining their own incumbency. (Exhibit 27.) By seeking to align city elections
with the presidential year, municipal elected officials retained that advantage to their
incumbency. (Exhibit 30.) Because of the perceived recalcitrance of municipal officials,
General Assembly representatives backed an effort, in 2002, to reduce the size of the Baltimore
City Council from six three-member districts to fourteen single-member districts. (Exhibit 31.)
This of course threatened the incumbency of the officials whose positions disappeared, but also
subjected all remaining members to closer scrutiny since only one official was responsible for
each district, rather than three, and they could no longer seek re-election on three-person slates.
Incumbency is also protected by the 2015 amendment. By accelerating the unaffiliated
candidate deadline, it eliminates the unknown risk presented by a potential challenge from an
independent candidate after the party primary – a risk that manifested in 2004.

33
voters cast votes for City Council members. (Exhibit 34.) All of this occurred even though the
Democratic primary that took place fourteen months earlier had effectively decided most of the
seats in play.
The independent candidate who successfully gained ballot access in the 8th Council
District was able to make an appeal to all of the voters who turned out in November 2004 to vote
for president (just like they will in 2016). Compared to typical odd-year primaries, twice the
usual number of participants came to the polls, which was three to four times typical general
election turnout.
Had the amended deadline been in effect in 2004, the almost 6,000 voters who chose the
independent challenger would have been deprived of their constitutional right to do so. (Exhibit
34.) Even though the incumbent was a long-time public figure who had held office since 1995,
(Exhibit 35), the independent challenger, in a head-to-head race in the general, scored 39% of the
vote.
7,062 6,968 6,545
14,543
3,514 3,963
2003* 2007 2011
Council District 8
Primary General

34
The same drastic increase in voter participation occurred in Plaintiff’s District 12 in the
2004 general election:
The numbers as compared with the odd-year primary and general elections clearly show a
large number of voters consistently disengaged from local elections who can be re-engaged when
those elections are aligned with the presidential contest.
The 2012 cycle change was intended to make permanent the bump in voter participation
seen in 2004. It makes no sense for the General Assembly to make it more difficult for Plaintiff
and candidates like him to get on the ballot in light of the evidence from 2004 – that as many as
four times the traditional number of voters will appear at the polls this November in District 12.
IV. The public interest in voters’ ability to cast a ballot for the
candidate of their choice is manifest.
“In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the
public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Real Truth About
4715
3951
4779
8788
2004
2855
2003* 2007 2011
Council District 12
Primary General

35
Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2009), citing Winter, 129
S.Ct. at 376-77 (internal quotations marks and citation omitted).
In assessing the harm to the political action committee plaintiff in that matter – which
claimed their ability to raise funds was hampered by certain regulations – the court in Real Truth
found that any harm created was out-weighed by the public interest, identified by the Supreme
Court, in the enforcement of reasonable contribution limitations in politics. Real Truth, 575 F.3d
at 351-352 (citing cases).
In this action, the public interest here is manifest, and unlike in Real Truth, runs in
Plaintiff’s favor, not specious election regulations. “No right is more precious in a free country
than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good
citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined.” Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). That interest far out-weighs any
ground Defendants might proffer in favor of the February 3 deadline for an unaffiliated
candidate.
For all of the reasons stated, Plaintiff request the Court enter a permanent injunction
against Defendants pursuant to Rule Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 65(a)(2).
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/
DANIEL J. SPARACO, ESQ. (#29258)
Plaintiff, pro se
1118 St. Paul Street, #2R
Baltimore, MD 21202
(443) 526-1501
dansparaco@gmail.com

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