Napoleonic warfare is fundamentally similar to modern warfare in three key areas: combined arms doctrine, modular units, and professional soldier development. Napoleon emphasized combined infantry, cavalry, and artillery operations to overwhelm enemies, influencing modern doctrines. Similarly, Napoleon organized flexible corps like modern brigade combat teams. Finally, Napoleon and modern militaries develop professional armies through education and training of volunteer citizens and conscripts.

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US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
H100 Argumentative Essay
Similarities between Napoleonic and Modern Warfare
PHILLIPS, E. SHANE
MAJ, LG
CLASS 14-01
STAFF GROUP 12 D
November 7, 2013

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“While much of the Napoleonic Era is now outdated, the study of his wars remains of the
greatest value to us, because the lessons of these wars form the basis of military thought today1”
Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven, 1910
Warfare in the Napoleonic era is fundamentally similar to warfare today because of key
parallels in doctrine, unit structure, and professional soldier development. Napoleon influenced
doctrine for generations because he understood combined operations. More precisely, he
understood that the distinct branches of infantry, cavalry, and artillery units could not stand alone
on the battlefield. Additionally, the maneuverability and independence built into the design of
the French Corps is remarkably similar to the design of the modern brigade combat team.
Furthermore, Napoleon realized that an army was much more effective when well-trained,
disciplined soldiers served under the leadership of well-educated officers. These key similarities
in combined arms warfare, along with adaptable, flexible, and self-sustained units, as well as
armies comprised of citizen soldiers are why warfare today is fundamentally similar to that
practiced in the Napoleonic era.
The first obvious modern resemblance to Napoleonic warfare comes from Napoleon’s
emphasis of combined arms warfare and his understanding that it was critical to winning battles.
Specifically, Napoleon was keenly aware that speed, audacity, and the combination of infantry,
cavalry, and artillery capabilities were necessary to achieve victory.2 He depended on his forces’
capacity to move quickly and take his enemies by surprise.3 Napoleon insisted that daring was
necessary when making decisions in order to seize the initiative and develop opportunities for his
combined arms forces to exploit.4 In comparison, the U.S. Army manual for offensive and
defensive operations published in 2012 mirrors much of this philosophy. This manual states that
caution is a secondary consideration to speed and audacity for military operations and that bold

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decision-making gives the greatest chance for success.5 While there are many differences in the
actual conduct of war, modern combined arms warfare can trace its roots back to the Napoleonic
era. The adaptive capabilities that came from these complementary forces produced independent
units that could wreak devastation on the battlefield, which Napoleon demonstrated during his
most famous victory at Austerlitz. Napoleon’s battalion commanders at Austerlitz knew the plan
well in advance and were already preparing for battle. In contrast, the allied corps commanders
did not receive orders until an hour after they were on the march.6 Expecting to find Napoleon’s
army in retreat, instead the allies were shocked to find key high ground recently occupied by
French infantry and artillery.7 The allied forces were soon in full retreat but not before suffering
loses that outnumbered their enemies by three to one.8 The Grand Armee at Austerlitz combined
speed and agility with the mutually reinforcing capabilities of infantry, cavalry, and artillery9 to
overwhelm the allied Russian and Austrian forces.
Another visible inspiration by Napoleon on modern thinking is the concept of modularity.
Napoleon grouped his organizations into flexible combinations of units according to their current
mission.10 The modern brigade combat team, similarly, is an independent, maneuverable, and
self-sustaining unit much like the corps d’armee.11 The corps d’armee could function as an
independent organization or as part of a collection of synchronized forces participating in a
larger operation.12 This is very similar, if not in size then certainly in function, to the modular
brigade combat team concept, which can deploy and operate with robust combined arms
capabilities either as an independent organization or as part of a larger division.13 Additionally,
the Napoleonic corps was more capable of supporting itself logistically14 than much larger units
just as the brigade combat team is self-sustaining today albeit in a very different fashion.
Napoleon’s corps was much easier to sustain logistically because its size made it easier to forage

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and operate using independent supply lines.15 The brigade combat team design includes an entire
support battalion whose sole mission is sustainment of the unit.16 This logistical flexibility, both
for Napoleon17 and for today’s battlefield commanders,18 allowed for bold decision-making
without the limitations imposed by rigid supply lines. The corps d’armee was not without
limitations however, and the size of these units was far too large for a single person to control.
Napoleon solved this problem by developing the general staff.19 Napoleon’s staff allowed him to
provide command and control of immense and widely dispersed armies. Today’s commanders, at
the battalion level and above, likewise rely heavily on their staffs to process and provide them
with accurate and timely information with which to make sound decisions. Thus, the general
staff is just as critical a tool for modern commanders as it was to Napoleon.
A final key comparison from the Napoleonic Era is the advent of citizen soldiers in
conjunction with a comprehensive training and education system for soldiers and officers. Prior
to the French Revolution, a major fear of the combatant commander was desertion by his
troops.20 After the Revolution, soldiers were proud and tenacious.21 Napoleon capitalized on this
tenacity and the radical nationalism provided by the Revolution and the resulting, almost
fanatical patriotism22 to fill his army with citizen-soldiers. Whether they were volunteers or
conscripts, Napoleon’s soldiers were proud and loyal. This gave them the morale and discipline
to fight and ultimately less temptation to desert their army,23 and by proxy their nation, under the
fog of war. Today’s all volunteer army is reminiscent of these French soldiers after the
Revolution. Modern American soldiers, likewise, serve more out of a sense of national pride,
duty, and camaraderie than for fear of some consequence.
Napoleon also compounded upon his soldiers’ high morale and disciplined service by
establishing a vigorous training and education system. A champion of professional education for

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his officers and consistently tough training for his soldiers, Napoleon devoted considerable time
and resources to training his army so both his men and their officers understood the science of
combat.24 He trained his army six days out of every week with emphasis on battalion, division,
and corps level operations.25 Approximately every two weeks he held training events for multi-
echelon maneuvers.26 As a result, Napoleon’s Grand Armee of 210,00027men emerged victorious
against nearly 285,00028 Russian and Austrian allied troops in the Austerlitz Campaign of 1805.
Modern armies likewise expend vast resources to train and educate their soldiers. The
U.S. military’s all-volunteer force in particular holds many similarities to Napoleon’s
professional army. Enlisted members in the U.S. Army attend basic combat training in addition
to advanced individual training. As their careers progress, they attend programmed courses in
basic through advanced leadership topics. Commissioned officers also have professional
education requirements throughout their careers but they have the added expectation to complete
an advanced degree as part of their self-development.29 Lastly, the clearest indicator of the
importance of military education to the modern army is the most recent manning guidance
published by the U.S. Department of the Army that allows commanders to release soldiers for
attendance at a professional military education course even if they are within six months of their
unit deploying to war.30
Warfare in the Napoleonic era is fundamentally similar to warfare as practiced today
because of basic similarities in combined arms warfare doctrine, the adaptation of more
maneuverable and self-sustained units, and the use of armies filled with citizens turned
professional soldier. Napoleon may not have invented combined arms warfare but he clearly
emphasized how important it was to overcome an adversary. He was also a big proponent of
maneuverable units that were flexibly employable, adaptable to any circumstance, and could

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sustain themselves on the move. Finally, he took great pains to train and discipline his soldiers
for combat and to educate his officers for warfare. While todays modern armies have better
technology, they are still employing some of the same concepts that Napoleon touted over 200
years ago.31 32

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End Notes
1
Peter Paret,“Napoleonandthe Revolutionin War” in Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret
(Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1986), 139.
2
Steven Ross, “NapoleonandManeuver Warfare”In The HarmonMemorial Lectures in Military History, 1959–1987,ed. HarryR. Borowski,
30924.Reprintedin USArmy CommandandGeneral Staff College, H100 Bookof Readings,93-104. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, June
2013), 94.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Department of the Army. ADRP 3-90OFFENSEAND DEFENSE(Washington, DC: Government PrintingOffice. August 2012),1-4.
6
Ibid, 108.
7
Ibid, 109.
8
Ibid, 112.
9
Leslie Anders, “Austerlitz,a Clash of CommandSystems”Military Review (June 1958), Reprintedin USArmy CommandandGeneralStaff
College, H100 Book of Readings, 105-112. (Fort Leavenworth,KS: USACGSC, June 2013), 108.
10
MacGregor Knox,“Mass Politics andNationalism as MilitaryRevolution: TheFrench Revolution andAfter” InThe Dynamics of Military
Revolution, 1300—2050,ed. WilliamsonMurrayandMacGregor Knox, 57-73.(NewYork, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 67.
11
DavidChandler, “Napoleon, Operational Art, andtheJena Campaign”In Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art, ed. Michael D. Krause
andR. Cody Phillips, 27–68. Reprintedin USArmy CommandandGeneral StaffCollege, H100Book of Readings, 113-139. (Fort Leavenworth,
KS: USACGSC, June 2013), 117.
12
Steven Ross, “NapoleonandManeuver Warfare”In The HarmonMemorial Lectures in Military History, 1959–1987,ed. HarryR. Borowski,
30924.Reprintedin USArmy CommandandGeneral Staff College, H100 Bookof Readings,93-104. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, June
2013), 98.
13
Department of the Army. FM 3-90.6The Brigade Combat Team (Washington,DC: Government PrintingOffice.September 2010), 1-1.
14
MacGregor Knox,“Mass Politics andNationalism as MilitaryRevolution: TheFrench Revolution andAfter” In The Dynamics of Military
Revolution, 1300—2050,ed. WilliamsonMurrayandMacGregor Knox, 57-73.(NewYork, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 67
15
John Lynn, “Nations in Arms.”In The CambridgeHistory of Warfare, ed. GeoffreyParker, 189-216. (NewYork,NY: Cambridge University
Press, 2005),202.
16
Department of the Army. FM 3-90.6The Brigade Combat Team (Washington,DC: Government PrintingOffice.September 2010), 1-8.
17
MacGregor Knox,“Mass Politics andNationalism as MilitaryRevolution: TheFrench Revolution andAfter” In The Dynamics of Military
Revolution, 1300—2050,ed. WilliamsonMurrayandMacGregor Knox, 57-73.(NewYork, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 67
18
Department of the Army. FM 3-90.6The Brigade Combat Team (Washington,DC: Government PrintingOffice.September 2010), 1-6.
19
MacGregor Knox,“Mass Politics andNationalism as MilitaryRevolution: TheFrench Revolution andAfter” In The Dynamics of Military
Revolution, 1300—2050,ed. WilliamsonMurrayandMacGregor Knox, 57-73.(NewYork, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 67
20
Ibid, 62.
21
Ibid, 65.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Steven Ross, “NapoleonandManeuver Warfare”In The HarmonMemorial Lectures in Military History, 1959–1987,ed. HarryR. Borowski,
30924.Reprintedin USArmy CommandandGeneral Staff College, H100 Bookof Readings,93-104. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, June
2013), 99.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid. Accordingto Ross, Napoleon faced 95,000 Austrians in Italy, 23,000in Tyrol, and70,000in Bavaria. Anadditional 95,000 Russian troops
followedthe Austrians intoGermany.
29
Department of the Army. DA PAM 600-3Commissioned Officer Professional Development andCareer Management (Washington, DC:
Government PrintingOffice. February2010),2.
30
Department of the Army. HQDAEXORD 10-13ISO HQDA FY13-15ACTIVE COMPONENT MANNING GUIDANCE(Washington, DC:
Pentagon.October2012), 3.
31
Steven Ross, “NapoleonandManeuver Warfare”In The HarmonMemorial Lectures in Military History, 1959–1987,ed. HarryR. Borowski,
30924.Reprintedin USArmy CommandandGeneral Staff College, H100 Bookof Readings,93-104. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, June
2013), 104.
32
Faith Phillips readthis paper for clarity.

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