Accompanying the "Global Corporate Governance and Corruption" presentation (http://bit.ly/1pKMfXq), this report (set as first person from the perspective of the firm) proposes a thorough set of recommendations, in order to restore the firm's confidence into recovery after scandal.
Petrobras - Corporate Governance and Corruption EvaluationRobert Au
Petrobras, Brazil's state-owned oil company, was embroiled in a major corruption scandal from 2014-2015. Key executives and political figures were found to have accepted bribes from construction companies in exchange for overpaying on contracts. This resulted in billions stolen from the company. Moving forward, Petrobras aims to reform its governance structures and implement stronger transparency and anti-corruption policies to prevent such failures from occurring again. This includes revising its board composition, audit functions, and policies regarding whistleblowers, related-party transactions, and the government's role.
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled. It specifies how power is distributed among shareholders, directors, and management. It also specifies the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs and structures the company's goals. The key principles of corporate governance are rights of shareholders, accountability, disclosure, integrity, and interest of stakeholders. SEBI issued a code of corporate governance for listed companies in India to improve standards. It covers requirements for boards, audit committees, disclosure, and shareholders.
This document summarizes the key points from the Naresh Chandra Committee report on corporate governance from 2002 presented by Sahana Hiremath. The report discusses how Kautilya's views on governing a monarchy can apply to successfully running modern corporations. It recommends strict corporate governance to build confidence among stakeholders. The report proposes establishing independent quality review boards to examine audit, secretarial, and cost accounting firms. It defines independent directors and recommends at least 50% of board members be independent. It also recommends exempting independent directors from certain civil and criminal liabilities and training programs for independent directors.
This document discusses key issues in corporate governance. It begins by defining corporate governance as the interaction between shareholders, the board of directors, and management in directing a company. It then lists 7 main issues: 1) Remuneration and rewarding of directors, 2) The board's responsibility for risk management and internal controls, 3) Reliability of financial reporting and external auditors, 4) Duties of directors, 5) Shareholders' rights and responsibilities, 6) Separation of the CEO and chairperson roles, and 7) Corporate social responsibility and business ethics. For each issue, it provides 1-2 paragraphs explaining the relevance and concerns around each topic.
The document discusses the composition of boards of directors. It distinguishes between insider directors who are employed by the corporation, and outsider directors who have no direct relationship with the corporation. It also notes several factors that contributed to increased interest in corporate governance reforms in the UK and US, such as institutional investment growth and executive compensation issues. Regulatory frameworks for corporate governance establish relationships between management, directors, and shareholders. Disclosure requirements include financial data, director backgrounds, executive compensation, and shareholder proposals requiring approval.
1. The Satyam case involved a $1.4 billion fraud perpetrated by its founder Ramalinga Raju through falsifying the company's accounts.
2. Raju inflated cash balances, receivables, interest income and profits in financial statements for years, deceiving auditors, investors and regulators.
3. The fraud was exposed when Raju confessed to overstating assets by $1.47 billion and income figures. An investigation found fake bank accounts, customers and invoices were used to hide the fraud.
1. The document is a student's project report on the financial ratio analysis of Wipro. It includes an acknowledgment section thanking various professors and institutions for their support and guidance.
2. There is a declaration by the student stating that the project is their original work and submitted for their Master's degree program.
3. The project contains a certificate from the student's teacher guide confirming they completed the research project on the given topic under their guidance.
Financial Statement Analysis With The Help of Ratios (Suyesh Metel Pressing p...Avinash Labade
If any have Need Project Report please call +919011888598 and I will provide only Word File.
and
Project Cost is Rs 500/- Per Project
Send Me Payment Phone Pay or Google Pay
Petrobras - Corporate Governance and Corruption EvaluationRobert Au
Petrobras, Brazil's state-owned oil company, was embroiled in a major corruption scandal from 2014-2015. Key executives and political figures were found to have accepted bribes from construction companies in exchange for overpaying on contracts. This resulted in billions stolen from the company. Moving forward, Petrobras aims to reform its governance structures and implement stronger transparency and anti-corruption policies to prevent such failures from occurring again. This includes revising its board composition, audit functions, and policies regarding whistleblowers, related-party transactions, and the government's role.
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled. It specifies how power is distributed among shareholders, directors, and management. It also specifies the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs and structures the company's goals. The key principles of corporate governance are rights of shareholders, accountability, disclosure, integrity, and interest of stakeholders. SEBI issued a code of corporate governance for listed companies in India to improve standards. It covers requirements for boards, audit committees, disclosure, and shareholders.
This document summarizes the key points from the Naresh Chandra Committee report on corporate governance from 2002 presented by Sahana Hiremath. The report discusses how Kautilya's views on governing a monarchy can apply to successfully running modern corporations. It recommends strict corporate governance to build confidence among stakeholders. The report proposes establishing independent quality review boards to examine audit, secretarial, and cost accounting firms. It defines independent directors and recommends at least 50% of board members be independent. It also recommends exempting independent directors from certain civil and criminal liabilities and training programs for independent directors.
This document discusses key issues in corporate governance. It begins by defining corporate governance as the interaction between shareholders, the board of directors, and management in directing a company. It then lists 7 main issues: 1) Remuneration and rewarding of directors, 2) The board's responsibility for risk management and internal controls, 3) Reliability of financial reporting and external auditors, 4) Duties of directors, 5) Shareholders' rights and responsibilities, 6) Separation of the CEO and chairperson roles, and 7) Corporate social responsibility and business ethics. For each issue, it provides 1-2 paragraphs explaining the relevance and concerns around each topic.
The document discusses the composition of boards of directors. It distinguishes between insider directors who are employed by the corporation, and outsider directors who have no direct relationship with the corporation. It also notes several factors that contributed to increased interest in corporate governance reforms in the UK and US, such as institutional investment growth and executive compensation issues. Regulatory frameworks for corporate governance establish relationships between management, directors, and shareholders. Disclosure requirements include financial data, director backgrounds, executive compensation, and shareholder proposals requiring approval.
1. The Satyam case involved a $1.4 billion fraud perpetrated by its founder Ramalinga Raju through falsifying the company's accounts.
2. Raju inflated cash balances, receivables, interest income and profits in financial statements for years, deceiving auditors, investors and regulators.
3. The fraud was exposed when Raju confessed to overstating assets by $1.47 billion and income figures. An investigation found fake bank accounts, customers and invoices were used to hide the fraud.
1. The document is a student's project report on the financial ratio analysis of Wipro. It includes an acknowledgment section thanking various professors and institutions for their support and guidance.
2. There is a declaration by the student stating that the project is their original work and submitted for their Master's degree program.
3. The project contains a certificate from the student's teacher guide confirming they completed the research project on the given topic under their guidance.
Financial Statement Analysis With The Help of Ratios (Suyesh Metel Pressing p...Avinash Labade
If any have Need Project Report please call +919011888598 and I will provide only Word File.
and
Project Cost is Rs 500/- Per Project
Send Me Payment Phone Pay or Google Pay
The Maharashtra Irrigation Scam involved over Rs. 35,000 crore spent on irrigation projects in Maharashtra over the last decade that resulted in very little increase in irrigation potential. Several politicians, including former deputy chief minister Ajit Pawar, and government officials have been accused of corruption and inflating project costs. Numerous investigations have been conducted into the scandal but it remains unresolved over 10 years later, with farmers continuing to suffer from lack of irrigation despite the massive public funds spent.
(A)Satyam: Key Facts and Unheard AnswersKashyap Shah
The Satyam scam was exposed when Ramalinga Raju confessed in January 2009 to inflating Satyam's accounts through fictitious revenues and profits. The gaps in Satyam's balance sheet had grown too large to cover up further. A whistleblower email also triggered investigations. Regulators and auditors failed to prevent the fraud despite signs of discrepancies. In response, India implemented new corporate governance regulations, including stricter rules for boards, independent directors, auditors, and increased accountability for fraud.
The document provides information about an internship report on the audit procedures of a cooperative housing society conducted at H.L Shah & Associates, a chartered accountancy firm in Patna. It includes details such as the introduction, objectives, and scope of the report. The report was prepared by Ravi Kumar, an accounting student, as part of their BCP internship program. It discusses the audit procedures followed by H.L Shah & Associates and provides insights gained from the internship experience.
The document discusses various challenges and issues related to corporate governance. It covers the scope of corporate governance, the role of shareholders and directors, codes of corporate governance, qualifications for directors and CFOs/CSs, financial reporting, audit committees, and enforcement issues. Poor corporate governance can ruin companies and destroy economies. Key aspects of governance codes include independent directors, separation of CEO/chairman roles, disclosure, and protecting shareholder and stakeholder rights.
The presentation discusses the comparative study of IDBI Federal Life Insurance Co. Ltd. and LIC of India. The comparison is done on the basis of products & plans, market share, new policies issued, grievances resolved percentage, premium collection, claim settlement ratio. The presentation also gives the analysis of customer awareness and satisfaction level for both the companies.
Over the past two decades, many corporate scandals have occurred due to failures of governance. Company managers prioritized short-term earnings over ethics and long-term goals. Boards failed to provide effective oversight, allowing improper accounting practices. Scandals like Enron and Worldcom led to reforms like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and new codes focused on transparency, board accountability, and auditor independence. International initiatives like the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and Cadbury Report also aimed to strengthen governance and protect shareholder rights.
The Blue Ribbon Committee was set up in 1998 by the SEC and NYSE to investigate wrongdoings of the government and its agencies. It recommended 10 measures to strengthen oversight of public company audits and improve financial reporting. These included mandating an independent audit committee, requiring the audit committee to adopt a written charter, and having the outside auditor discuss the quality of the company's financial reporting and accounting principles with the audit committee.
Corporate governance refers to the processes, customs, policies, laws, and institutions affecting how a company is directed, administered or controlled. It involves relationships between stakeholders and the goals for which the corporation is governed. According to the Cadbury Committee, corporate governance is defined as the system by which companies are directed and controlled. Key factors that have increased the importance of corporate governance include changing ownership structures, a focus on social responsibility, corporate scandals, and globalization. India has developed strong corporate laws and governance standards since independence.
The document summarizes a study on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance for companies listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange. The study developed a Corporate Governance Index (CGI) using 22 governance factors across three categories and analyzed its correlation with Tobin's Q valuation metric for 50 companies over three years. The results found a positive significant relationship between higher CGI scores and Tobin's Q, indicating better corporate governance is associated with higher firm valuation. Sub-index analyses found board composition and ownership factors most significantly linked to performance.
This document summarizes a presentation on corporate governance given to a class. It defines corporate governance and discusses the meaning, objectives, and importance of corporate governance. It also outlines the roles and responsibilities of boards of directors, factors influencing corporate governance, and various committees and codes that have been developed in different countries to improve corporate governance standards and practices.
An efficient financial reporting disclosure is a yardstick in measuring the strength of any company. The financial reporting disclosure of non-life insurance companies of Bangladesh is the topic of this thesis paper. For the ease of study the disclosures are divided into two categories –mandatory and non-mandatory financial reporting disclosures. The study has been conducted on the listed non-life insurance companies of Bangladesh.
The selection of listed non-life insurance companies has been done in a systematic and representative way. Among 32 companies, 13 companies have been selected to conduct the study. Annual Report 2012 and 2011 has been taken into considerations since the Annual Reports are the yardstick and mirror of the financial reporting disclosures.
The study has been structured with the use of checklists of mandatory disclosures, non-mandatory disclosures and financial reporting standards. These checklists have been analyzed very well to get the actual scenario of the financial reporting disclosure conditions of the non-life insurance companies. This revealed that most companies have poor financial reporting disclosure conditions. With proper compliance with the financial reporting standards this poor condition can be made efficient.
The document discusses various committees that are part of corporate governance structures, including audit, remuneration, nomination, compliance, and shareholders grievance committees. It also notes important characteristics of effective committees such as empowerment to obtain information, independence, and the ability to seek explanations from the board of directors. Some potential challenges that committees may face are also outlined, such as a lack of clear definitions, performance measures, and standardized guidelines.
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE UNDER COMPANIES ACT, SEBIJyoti Saini
The document discusses the legislative framework for corporate governance in India under the Companies Act, 2013 and SEBI Act, 1992. It outlines key aspects like the meaning and definition of corporate governance, provisions around corporate social responsibility under Section 135, roles of the board of directors and CSR committee, and disclosure norms under Clause 49 of the listing agreement. It also discusses regulations by SEBI to promote effective corporate governance practices in listed companies.
Satyam was a major Indian IT services company founded in 1987 with over 50,000 employees. In January 2009, its chairman resigned and confessed to a $1.47 billion accounting fraud, in what became known as India's Enron scandal. The fraud involved fake invoices, bank statements, and thousands of nonexistent employees. It damaged Satyam's reputation and corporate governance standards in India. The company's stock price plummeted from $300 to $6.30 after the scandal.
This document is a project report submitted for a B.COM HONOURS degree. It discusses ratio analysis of an unnamed company. The 39 page report includes an introduction outlining the background and objectives of the ratio analysis. It also includes chapters on the conceptual framework of ratio analysis, an analysis and findings section, and conclusions and suggestions. The document was submitted in March 2014 and supervised by Professor Amar Krishna Roy at Heramba Chandra College.
National Financial Reporting Authority - Established under Sec 132 of companies act 2013. Its powers and function explained. Useful for CA Final Audit and Law
The document summarizes the Satyam scam case involving corporate governance failures at Satyam Computer Services. Ramalinga Raju, the chairman of Satyam, allegedly siphoned off funds from Satyam into other companies he owned and inflated revenue and profits. This led to a loss of confidence in Satyam and impacted its employees, clients, and business partners. The case showed the importance of strong corporate governance and auditing to prevent such scams. Tech Mahindra later acquired Satyam to turn it around.
The document summarizes a study presented at a global conference on change management. The study examines the opportunities and challenges for small and medium enterprises in Brazil's oil supply chain given major planned investments in oil production. It notes that while investments could reach $400 billion, Brazilian companies are currently only prepared to meet 40% of expected demand, leaving opportunities for international competitors. The study proposes a framework and executive education program focused on change management to help local companies better prepare for the new demands through techniques like knowledge management, innovation, and strategic planning.
Brazil: A Macro-economic Outlook by Fabio Niccheri, Partner, PricewaterhouseCoopers. Presentation featured at the 2nd International Conference: Brazil: A pathway into the future from the Emerging Markets Institute at Cornell University's Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management and Better Brazil
The Maharashtra Irrigation Scam involved over Rs. 35,000 crore spent on irrigation projects in Maharashtra over the last decade that resulted in very little increase in irrigation potential. Several politicians, including former deputy chief minister Ajit Pawar, and government officials have been accused of corruption and inflating project costs. Numerous investigations have been conducted into the scandal but it remains unresolved over 10 years later, with farmers continuing to suffer from lack of irrigation despite the massive public funds spent.
(A)Satyam: Key Facts and Unheard AnswersKashyap Shah
The Satyam scam was exposed when Ramalinga Raju confessed in January 2009 to inflating Satyam's accounts through fictitious revenues and profits. The gaps in Satyam's balance sheet had grown too large to cover up further. A whistleblower email also triggered investigations. Regulators and auditors failed to prevent the fraud despite signs of discrepancies. In response, India implemented new corporate governance regulations, including stricter rules for boards, independent directors, auditors, and increased accountability for fraud.
The document provides information about an internship report on the audit procedures of a cooperative housing society conducted at H.L Shah & Associates, a chartered accountancy firm in Patna. It includes details such as the introduction, objectives, and scope of the report. The report was prepared by Ravi Kumar, an accounting student, as part of their BCP internship program. It discusses the audit procedures followed by H.L Shah & Associates and provides insights gained from the internship experience.
The document discusses various challenges and issues related to corporate governance. It covers the scope of corporate governance, the role of shareholders and directors, codes of corporate governance, qualifications for directors and CFOs/CSs, financial reporting, audit committees, and enforcement issues. Poor corporate governance can ruin companies and destroy economies. Key aspects of governance codes include independent directors, separation of CEO/chairman roles, disclosure, and protecting shareholder and stakeholder rights.
The presentation discusses the comparative study of IDBI Federal Life Insurance Co. Ltd. and LIC of India. The comparison is done on the basis of products & plans, market share, new policies issued, grievances resolved percentage, premium collection, claim settlement ratio. The presentation also gives the analysis of customer awareness and satisfaction level for both the companies.
Over the past two decades, many corporate scandals have occurred due to failures of governance. Company managers prioritized short-term earnings over ethics and long-term goals. Boards failed to provide effective oversight, allowing improper accounting practices. Scandals like Enron and Worldcom led to reforms like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and new codes focused on transparency, board accountability, and auditor independence. International initiatives like the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and Cadbury Report also aimed to strengthen governance and protect shareholder rights.
The Blue Ribbon Committee was set up in 1998 by the SEC and NYSE to investigate wrongdoings of the government and its agencies. It recommended 10 measures to strengthen oversight of public company audits and improve financial reporting. These included mandating an independent audit committee, requiring the audit committee to adopt a written charter, and having the outside auditor discuss the quality of the company's financial reporting and accounting principles with the audit committee.
Corporate governance refers to the processes, customs, policies, laws, and institutions affecting how a company is directed, administered or controlled. It involves relationships between stakeholders and the goals for which the corporation is governed. According to the Cadbury Committee, corporate governance is defined as the system by which companies are directed and controlled. Key factors that have increased the importance of corporate governance include changing ownership structures, a focus on social responsibility, corporate scandals, and globalization. India has developed strong corporate laws and governance standards since independence.
The document summarizes a study on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance for companies listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange. The study developed a Corporate Governance Index (CGI) using 22 governance factors across three categories and analyzed its correlation with Tobin's Q valuation metric for 50 companies over three years. The results found a positive significant relationship between higher CGI scores and Tobin's Q, indicating better corporate governance is associated with higher firm valuation. Sub-index analyses found board composition and ownership factors most significantly linked to performance.
This document summarizes a presentation on corporate governance given to a class. It defines corporate governance and discusses the meaning, objectives, and importance of corporate governance. It also outlines the roles and responsibilities of boards of directors, factors influencing corporate governance, and various committees and codes that have been developed in different countries to improve corporate governance standards and practices.
An efficient financial reporting disclosure is a yardstick in measuring the strength of any company. The financial reporting disclosure of non-life insurance companies of Bangladesh is the topic of this thesis paper. For the ease of study the disclosures are divided into two categories –mandatory and non-mandatory financial reporting disclosures. The study has been conducted on the listed non-life insurance companies of Bangladesh.
The selection of listed non-life insurance companies has been done in a systematic and representative way. Among 32 companies, 13 companies have been selected to conduct the study. Annual Report 2012 and 2011 has been taken into considerations since the Annual Reports are the yardstick and mirror of the financial reporting disclosures.
The study has been structured with the use of checklists of mandatory disclosures, non-mandatory disclosures and financial reporting standards. These checklists have been analyzed very well to get the actual scenario of the financial reporting disclosure conditions of the non-life insurance companies. This revealed that most companies have poor financial reporting disclosure conditions. With proper compliance with the financial reporting standards this poor condition can be made efficient.
The document discusses various committees that are part of corporate governance structures, including audit, remuneration, nomination, compliance, and shareholders grievance committees. It also notes important characteristics of effective committees such as empowerment to obtain information, independence, and the ability to seek explanations from the board of directors. Some potential challenges that committees may face are also outlined, such as a lack of clear definitions, performance measures, and standardized guidelines.
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE UNDER COMPANIES ACT, SEBIJyoti Saini
The document discusses the legislative framework for corporate governance in India under the Companies Act, 2013 and SEBI Act, 1992. It outlines key aspects like the meaning and definition of corporate governance, provisions around corporate social responsibility under Section 135, roles of the board of directors and CSR committee, and disclosure norms under Clause 49 of the listing agreement. It also discusses regulations by SEBI to promote effective corporate governance practices in listed companies.
Satyam was a major Indian IT services company founded in 1987 with over 50,000 employees. In January 2009, its chairman resigned and confessed to a $1.47 billion accounting fraud, in what became known as India's Enron scandal. The fraud involved fake invoices, bank statements, and thousands of nonexistent employees. It damaged Satyam's reputation and corporate governance standards in India. The company's stock price plummeted from $300 to $6.30 after the scandal.
This document is a project report submitted for a B.COM HONOURS degree. It discusses ratio analysis of an unnamed company. The 39 page report includes an introduction outlining the background and objectives of the ratio analysis. It also includes chapters on the conceptual framework of ratio analysis, an analysis and findings section, and conclusions and suggestions. The document was submitted in March 2014 and supervised by Professor Amar Krishna Roy at Heramba Chandra College.
National Financial Reporting Authority - Established under Sec 132 of companies act 2013. Its powers and function explained. Useful for CA Final Audit and Law
The document summarizes the Satyam scam case involving corporate governance failures at Satyam Computer Services. Ramalinga Raju, the chairman of Satyam, allegedly siphoned off funds from Satyam into other companies he owned and inflated revenue and profits. This led to a loss of confidence in Satyam and impacted its employees, clients, and business partners. The case showed the importance of strong corporate governance and auditing to prevent such scams. Tech Mahindra later acquired Satyam to turn it around.
The document summarizes a study presented at a global conference on change management. The study examines the opportunities and challenges for small and medium enterprises in Brazil's oil supply chain given major planned investments in oil production. It notes that while investments could reach $400 billion, Brazilian companies are currently only prepared to meet 40% of expected demand, leaving opportunities for international competitors. The study proposes a framework and executive education program focused on change management to help local companies better prepare for the new demands through techniques like knowledge management, innovation, and strategic planning.
Brazil: A Macro-economic Outlook by Fabio Niccheri, Partner, PricewaterhouseCoopers. Presentation featured at the 2nd International Conference: Brazil: A pathway into the future from the Emerging Markets Institute at Cornell University's Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management and Better Brazil
An epic bribe scandal at Petrobras, a major oil company controlled b.pdfezycolours78
An epic bribe scandal at Petrobras, a major oil company controlled by the Brazilian government,
that broke out in 2015 shocked the economic and political system of Brazil. Put simply, the
company insiders, outside suppliers and contractors, and politicians colluded and stole billions of
dollars from the company via kickbacks, bid riggings, overcharging for construction projects,
and the like. The Petrobras scandal led to a sharp drop of the company share price, laying off
thousands of workers, and tilting the national economy toward recession. The scandal also
seriously tarnished the image of Brazil as a promising emerging market. Discuss in detail what
happened at Petrobras and then investigate how the company’s governance and the country’s
political culture may have contributed to the scandal.
At least 6 sentences: 1 point
Grammar and punctuation: 1 point
Paragraph with transition sentences: 2 points
Appropriate and relevant content with explanation: 4 points
Solution
Operation carwash was a widespread money-laundering scheme in a state owned enterprise in
Brazil called Petrobras that was exposed in 2014. This scandal involved Petrobras top
management and high-ranking officials from the Brazilian federal government.
A brief summary of the scandal:
Paulo Roberto Costa who was the chief of Petrobras refinery from 2004 to 2014 unfairly used his
relationships with six of large construction firms in Brazil. These firms were awarded contracts
from Costa’s division and they overvalued these contracts by 3%. Petrobras employees turned a
blind eye when evaluating bids to these contracts. The overvaluation thus created excess capital
for the company. The excel capital was siphoned off in three ways- the officials from
construction company pocketed some amount of excess funds, and rewarded their partners inside
Petrobras. Some of the funds were also diverted to ruling political parties in terms of gifts,
donations etc. The total value of bribes involved in this scandal is approximated somewhere
between 3Bn to 5.3Bn USD.
Contribution of company’s governance model into scandal:
Contribution of country’s political culture into scandal.
July 2016 - Unemployment: How much longer?FGV Brazil
The current distressed labor market is likely to take a long time to improve.
The Brazilian Economy is one of the oldest publications for expert economic analysis of both the Brazilian and international economies. Through this publication, FGV’s Brazilian Institute of Economics and Finance (FGV/IBRE) compares different periods of the economy, assessing both macroeconomic considerations and scenarios related to finance, administration, marketing, management, insurance, statistics, and price indices.
For more information, and Brazilian economic index results, visit: http://bit.ly/1EA1Loz
Brazil has experienced strong economic growth over the past decade driven by its large population, growing consumer market, and abundant natural resources. However, growth has slowed recently due to lower global demand. The country remains an attractive market for multinational corporations due to its size and potential, though high business costs, infrastructure issues, and a challenging regulatory environment present obstacles. The recent national elections also introduced economic uncertainty as some corporate expansion plans were delayed until after the vote. Going forward, the new government will need to implement pro-growth policies to revive the economy and attract more foreign investment.
March 2015 - Lower commodities prices depress recoveryFGV Brazil
The depressing international outlook, in which the only bright spot is the recovery of the US economy, and Brazil’s misguided policies for making its industry more competitive are likely to prevent a vigorous recovery of the country's exports in 2015, after a fall of 7% in 2014.
The Brazilian Economy is one of the oldest publications for expert economic analysis of both the Brazilian and international economies. Through this publication, FGV’s Brazilian Institute of Economics and Finance (FGV/IBRE) compares different periods of the economy, assessing both macroeconomic considerations and scenarios related to finance, administration, marketing, management, insurance, statistics, and price indices.
For more information, and Brazilian economic index results, visit: http://bit.ly/1EA1Loz
Balance of robbery and incompetence management of petrobrasFernando Alcoforado
This document discusses the mismanagement of Petrobras, Brazil's state-owned oil company, under the governments of Lula and Dilma Rousseff. It outlines how reckless investment policies, forced suppression of fuel prices, and corruption led to massive losses for the company. In 2014, Petrobras lost $21.6 billion due largely to tuition fees, asset devaluations, and failed projects like Comperj and Abreu e Lima refineries. The document argues that managerial incompetence was more responsible for Petrobras' losses than direct corruption. As a result of the weakening of Petrobras, the Brazilian economy and hundreds of thousands of jobs have been negatively impacted.
This document presents two theoretical models of determinants of informality and tests their implications using survey data from over 50,000 small firms in Brazil. The first model finds that informal firms face higher capital costs and size limitations, resulting in smaller size and lower capital-labor ratios compared to formal firms. The second model highlights how value-added taxes can transmit informality between firms in a supply chain. Empirical analysis supports the models' implications and finds measures of supplier and purchaser formality are correlated with a firm's own formality, especially in sectors subject to value-added tax credits.
In this paper we investigate the determinants of informality. It is difficult to unam-biguously define informal activities but estimates indicate that in 1990-1993 around 10% of GDP in the United States was produced by individuals or firms that evaded taxes or engaged in illegal pursuits. It is also estimated that these activities produce 25 to 35% of output in Latin America, between 13 to 70% in Asian countries, and around 15% in O.E.C.D. countries. (see Table 2 in Schneider and Enste [17]).
Informality creates a fiscal problem, but there is also growing evidence that informal firms are less efficient,1 perhaps because of their necessarily small scale, perhaps because of their lack of access to credit or access to the infrastructure of legal protection provided by the State. For less developed countries, creating incentives for formalization is viewed as an important step to increase aggregate productivity. We present two equilibrium models of the determinants of informality and test their implications using a survey of 50,000+ small firms in Brazil. In both models informality is defined as tax avoidance.
Firms in the informal sector avoid tax payments but suffer other limitations. The first model can be seen as a variant of Rausch [14], who relied on the modeling strategy of Lucas [11] in which managerial ability differs across agents in the economy, and assumed a limitation on the size of informal firms. We make a key modification that generates testable implications. The firms in our model use capital in addition to labor and informal firms face a higher cost of funds. This higher cost of capital for informal activities has been emphasized by DeSoto [4] who wrote that “Even in the poorest countries, the poor save.
The value of savings among the poor is, in fact, immense − forty times all the foreign aid received throughout the world since 1945. (. . . ) But they hold these resources in defective forms: houses built on land whose ownership rights are not adequately recorded, unincorporated businesses with undefined liability, industries located where financiers and investors cannot see them. Because the rights of these possessions are not adequately documented, these assets cannot readily be turned into capital, cannot be traded outside of narrow local circles where people know and trust each other, cannot be used as collateral for a loan, and cannot be used as a share against investment.”2
This difference in interest rates 1McKinsey [12] provides case study evidence on the impact of informality on firms’ productivity.
Financial spoliation prevents economic recovery of brazilFernando Alcoforado
For the Brazilian government have the resources for investment in economic and social infrastructure, it´s necessary to do an audit of public debt and renegotiate with domestic and foreign banks, investment funds, pension funds and non-financial companies to reduce spending on payment of debt service prolonging the payment of interest and amortization of public debt. It is unacceptable that the Brazilian government allocate about 45% of the Republic's budget for the payment of public debt while allocates scarce resources to education (3.75%), health (3.98%), national defense (1.58%) and public security (0.33%), among other items. States and municipalities, almost all failed, receive transfer of the Union (federal government) only 9.19%. In other words, the lion's share in the budget of the Republic is for the payment of public debt, whose main beneficiary is the financial system. If there is no reversal of this scenario, Brazil will be led to bankruptcy.
The causes of success in the micro and small enterprises in Brazil paper - ...Cristiano Machado
Artigo apresentado na Conferência anual do Conselho Canadense para Pequenas Empresas e Empreendedorismo 2010.
Paper presented at CCSBE 2010 - Canadian Council for Small Business and Entrepreneurship - Annual Conference 2010.
Apresentação do artigo: "The Causes of Success of the Micro and Small Enterprises in Brazil: a review of the last few years" - Conferência anual (2010) do Conselho Canadense para Pequenas Empresas e Empreendedorismo - Calgary Canada
Presentation of the paper: "The Causes of Success of the Micro and Small Enterprises in Brazil: a review of the last few years" - CCSBE 2010 - Canadian Council for Small Business and Entrepreneurship Annual Conference 2010 - Calgary Canada
March 2010 - New Regulation for the Oil Sector - A Salty DebateFGV Brazil
The Brazilian Economy is one of the oldest publications for expert economic analysis of both the Brazilian and international economies. Through this publication, FGV’s Brazilian Institute of Economics and Finance (FGV/IBRE) compares different periods of the economy, assessing both macroeconomic considerations and scenarios related to finance, administration, marketing, management, insurance, statistics, and price indices.
For more information, and Brazilian economic index results, visit: http://bit.ly/1EA1Loz
The Brazilian Economy is one of the oldest publications for expert economic analysis of both the Brazilian and international economies. Through this publication, FGV’s Brazilian Institute of Economics and Finance (FGV/IBRE) compares different periods of the economy, assessing both macroeconomic considerations and scenarios related to finance, administration, marketing, management, insurance, statistics, and price indices.
For more information, and Brazilian economic index results, visit: http://bit.ly/1EA1Loz
April 2014 - Calming the financial watersFGV Brazil
The Brazilian Economy is one of the oldest publications for expert economic analysis of both the Brazilian and international economies. Through this publication, FGV’s Brazilian Institute of Economics and Finance (FGV/IBRE) compares different periods of the economy, assessing both macroeconomic considerations and scenarios related to finance, administration, marketing, management, insurance, statistics, and price indices.
For more information, and Brazilian economic index results, visit: http://bit.ly/1EA1Loz
Este guia de como abrir uma empresa no Brasil está com dizeres errôneos , pois diz que empresa LTDA e S/A são empresas estrangeiras no Brasil , dado como aberta por uma pessoa brasileira, passando á ser proprietário da empresa em questão ou seja seu representante legal com seu CPF e fazendo abertura feito pelo Banco Central Brasileiro e não fala nada da Sociedade estrangeira no brasil configurando filial brasileira da Sociedade estrangeira ..
Este guia de como abrir uma empresa no Brasil está com dizeres errôneos , pois diz que empresa LTDA e S/A são empresas estrangeiras no Brasil , dado como aberta por uma pessoa brasileira, passando á ser proprietário da empresa em questão ou seja seu representante legal com seu CPF e fazendo abertura feito pelo Banco Central Brasileiro e não fala nada da Sociedade estrangeira no brasil configurando filial brasileira da Sociedade estrangeira ..
November 2015 - The need to modernize Brazilian industryFGV Brazil
The Brazilian Economy is one of the oldest publications for expert economic analysis of both the Brazilian and international economies. Through this publication, FGV’s Brazilian Institute of Economics and Finance (FGV/IBRE) compares different periods of the economy, assessing both macroeconomic considerations and scenarios related to finance, administration, marketing, management, insurance, statistics, and price indices.
For more information, and Brazilian economic index results, visit: http://bit.ly/1EA1Loz
Expanding the simplified tax system for small businesses may have higher costs and fewer productivity, employment, and income distribution benefits.
The Brazilian Economy is one of the oldest publications for expert economic analysis of both the Brazilian and international economies. Through this publication, FGV’s Brazilian Institute of Economics and Finance (FGV/IBRE) compares different periods of the economy, assessing both macroeconomic considerations and scenarios related to finance, administration, marketing, management, insurance, statistics, and price indices.
For more information, and Brazilian economic index results, visit: http://bit.ly/1EA1Loz
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3. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Petroléo Brasileiro S.A., or Petrobras, is a multinational integrated energy corporation, ranked as
the 27th largest public company worldwide in terms of sales revenue (Petrobras, 2015). Despite the
company’s commercial success, its lack of a strong framework and culture of internal corporate gov-
ernance led to the emergence in 2014 of the scandal colloquially known as ‘Operation Carwash’; an
event that had profound financial implications for both Petrobras and the Brazilian economy at large.
This report provides an analysis of the issues within Petrobras’ corporate governance framework
that contributed to ‘Operation Carwash’. We will further evaluate the opportunities available to the
company to re-instill confidence not only in its shareholders, but also its consumers and the public,
and exemplify what it means for a company to have effective and strong corporate governance.
The factors found most responsible for the emergence of the scandal include, in the Brazilian gov-
ernance context, inadequate regulatory oversight caused by a concentration of ownership (Chavez
and Silva, 2009, p. 36), and more specific to Petrobras’ governance, an entrenched culture of unethical
behaviour, a lack of respect for regulatory standards among Petrobras’ top-level management and
executives, and an inadequate internal governance framework. These factors culminated in encour-
aging the company to exhibit low transparency, ineffective Boards, collusion and a lack of rights for
minority shareholders (Silveira and Saito 2009, p. 24). Whilst actions have been taken to establish
higher standards of corporate governance among Brazilian corporations, these remain largely vol-
untary, rather than mandatory (Silveira and Saito, 2009, p. 27), highlighting that the Brazilian corporate
environment still has a long way to go before its governance practices are aligned with international
standards.
From our evaluation, we recommend the following: a redevelopment of Petrobras’ core strategy, mis-
sion statement and values; a redesign of the company’s internal and external corporate governance
frameworks; and the implementation and strengthening of the company’s key governance policies
including: transparency, knowledge and ethics, whistle-blower protection, and relations with the Bra-
zilian federal government. These recommendations are intended to leverage the role of Petrobras’
Board of Directors as a provider of strategic leadership, adjust the company’s organisational con-
figuration to conform with international governance standards, and involve all stakeholders in the
organisation’s governance by making ethics and transparency a part of everyday company culture.
Robert Au
President
MGMT90038 Global Corporate Governance | 3
5. Founded in 1953 and headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Petrobras (Petróleo Bra-
sileiro S.A.) operates as a semi-public, multinational integrated energy corporation with
a focus on oil and gas exploration, production and distribution. In total, the company
oversees 135 production platforms, 15 refineries, 34,000 kilometers of pipeline and more
than 8,000 service stations across 17 countries (Petrobras, 2015).
A cornerstone of Brazil’s economy, Petrobras ranked as the 27th largest public com-
pany worldwide in terms of sales revenue in 2015 even despite the emergence of the
Lava Jato (Operation Carwash) scandal over the past two years (Forbes, 2015). Indeed,
its ranking as the 416th largest company overall would have been far higher had it not
been for the publication of a 2013 Merrill Lynch report describing Petrobras as the most
indebted company in the world (E&C, 2013).
OUR COMPANY
OVERVIEW
MGMT90038 Global Corporate Governance | 5
6. JAN
2014
JULY JAN
2015
JULY TODAY
Following his arrest in March
2014, Costa and another key
informant, Alberto Youssef,
struck plea bargains with au-
thorities and delivered the
names of numerous parlia-
mentarians and construction
officials involved with ‘Opera-
tion Carwash’ (Financial Times,
2015; New York Times, 2015).
As of August 2015, “117 indictments
have been issued” against individual
company executives, “five politi-
cians have been arrested, and crimi-
nal cases have been brought against
13 companies” in association with
the scandal (New York Times, 2015).
Petrobras’ external auditor subsequently
refused to sign off on the company’s quar-
terly financial statements throughout the
latter half of 2014, whilst police completed
a series of raids on the offices of Petrobras
and of construction companies linked to the
scandal. These raids culminated in the ar-
rest of 24 executives from Brazil’s major
construction firms (Financial Times, 2015).
‘Operation Carwash’ has had profound financial
implications both for Petrobras and the Brazil-
ian economy at large. The scandal is estimated
to have reduced the value of the company by
around US$70 billion relative to its 2010 Initial
Public Offering price (The Economist, 2014).
Prior to the scandal, Petrobras’ value ac-
counted for ~10% of Brazil’s gross domestic
product (GDP). Consequently, the revelation
of ‘Operation Carwash’ triggered a 1% con-
traction in Brazil’s GDP in 2014 (Forbes, 2015).
The principal political party implicated has
been the Workers’ Party, currently led by
Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, who was
also Petrobras’ chairman during the time
the kickback scheme was in operation (BBC,
2015). Whilst President Rousseff has thus far
avoided implication in the scandal, the pub-
lic outcry over the revelation of ‘Operation
Carwash’ has threatened her leadership and
triggered a significant drop in approval rat-
ings (International Business Times, 2015).
‘Operation Carwash’ refers to a widespread money-laundering scheme that was re-
vealed in 2014 between Petrobras’ top-level management and high-ranking officials from
the Brazilian Federal Government.
OPERATION CARWASH
THE SCANDAL EXPLAINED
The primary actor in the scheme was Paulo Roberto Costa, Petrobras’ Chief of Refinery between 2004 to 2012,
who was found to have unfairly leveraged his relationship with six of the largest construction firms in Brazil.
Firms that won contracts from Costa’s division were found to have overvalued their projects by as much as
three per cent, creating excess capital for the company that was then diverted into slush funds for aligned
political parties (BBC, 2015). The total value of the bribes resulting from the operation has been pegged by
Petrobras officials at $3 billion (New York Times, 2015).
6
7. Brazilian Corporate Governance Overview
To understand the key institutional weaknesses within Petrobras
that led to the emergence of ‘Operation Carwash’, it is first useful
to examine corporate governance in the Brazilian context. Like most
emerging economies, Brazil’s private sector is characterised by in-
adequate regulatory oversight caused by a concentration of owner-
ship (Chavez and Silva, 2009, p. 36). This system has its roots in
Brazil’s 1976 Corporation Law, which permitted companies to issue
non-voting shares to two-thirds of their equity capital (Pargendler,
2012, p. 507). As a result, family groups and single large shareholders
have been able to raise equity without diffusing control, which has
in turn allowed the conflation of management and ownership within
the majority of Brazilian companies (Chavez and Silva, 2009, p. 36;
Silveira and Saito, 2009, p. 23).
This model of corporate governance exemplifies what Berle and
Means (1933, p. 70) describe as control through almost complete
ownership, where an individual or majority group simultaneously
serves as both owners and managers of a company. Subsequently,
this lack of separation between ownership and control encourages
low transparency, ineffective boards, collusion, and lack of rights for
minority shareholders (Silveira and Saito 2009, p. 24). Thus in Brazil,
concentration of ownership has been the underlying cause of poor
standards of corporate governance.
Furthermore, the governance issues associated with the concentra-
tion of ownership are particularly visible within state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs), such as Petrobras. While the family control model
has had a significant impact on corporate governance standards, it
is the Brazilian government’s objective of protecting its interest in
SOEs that has had the greatest influence on the country’s regulatory
regime (Pargendler, 2012, p. 515).
In the early 1990s, like most Latin American states, Brazil enacted
reforms to partially or fully privatise SOEs in order to attract for-
eign direct investment (FDI) and encourage competition (Paz, 2015, p.
792). However, the Brazilian government’s ultimate objective was to
increase its own revenues rather than promote dispersed ownership
(Silveira and Saito, 2009, p. 22). By adjusting the Corporation Law to
eliminate tag-along rights, the government sold its ownership blocks
in order to maximise the capture of control premium at the expense
of the rights of minority shareholders (Silveira and Saito, 2009, p. 22).
As Pargendler (2012, p. 505) argues, the government’s position as
both the controlling shareholder in its SOEs and the arbiter of Bra-
zil’s legal and regulatory regime presents a considerable challenge
to Brazil’s corporate governance standards. In addition, corporate
boards in Brazil are prone to interference with government policy,
which gives tacit approval to the practice of collusion between man-
agers and politicians (Rabelo and Vasconcel, 2002, p. 323).
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
ANALYSIS
MGMT90038 Global Corporate Governance | 7
8. CORPORATE GOVERNACE
ANALYSIS (CONT.)
In light of the disadvantaged position of minority sharehold-
ers in the Brazilian business environment, a number of vol-
untary corporate governance codes have been established
to increase the confidence of foreign investors. In 2000, the
Sao Paulo Stock Exchange, known locally as Bovespa, cre-
ated a listing segment designed for companies seeking to
adopt higher standards of corporate governance practices
and transparency requirements not required under the Bra-
zilian Corporation Law (BM&F Bovespa, 2015). Consisting of
three listings, Level 1 requirements incorporate improved
methods of disclosure and ownership dispersion rules,
while Level 2 includes tag-along rights for minority share-
holders (BM&F Bovespa, 2015). The most stringent listing is
Novo Mercado, which involves the adoption of both Levels
1 and 2 as well requiring companies to issue voting shares
only (BM&F Bovespa, 2015). SOEs including Petrobras were
among the first to go public on Novo Mercado during the
privatisation process (Pargendler, 2012, p. 2940).
The two other main corporate governance codes in Bra-
zil are the Instituto Brasileiro de Governança Corporativa
(IBGC - Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance) and the
Comissão de Valores Mobiliarios (CVM - Brazilian Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission). Created in 1995, the IBGC
code applies the four basic principles of transparency, fair-
ness, accountability, and corporate responsibility to six sec-
tions of governance including ownership, board of directors,
management, independent auditing, fiscal council, and con-
duct and conflict of interests (IBGC, 1995). The CVM code
promotes protection of investors through transparency, ac-
countability, and monitoring (Securities and Exchange Com-
mission of Brazil, 2015).
While the above mentioned codes represent a move toward
promoting improved corporate governance practices, they
remain voluntary rather than mandatory (Silveira and Saito,
2009, p. 27). With the exception of Novo Mercado, which is
based on a contractual framework wherein companies can
be issued with warnings, fines, suspension of trading, or can-
cellation of registration for violating the terms of their listing
title, none of the codes include enforcement mechanisms
(Silveira and Saito, 2009, p. 31). Furthermore, as Pargendler
(2014, pp. 7-8) points out, Novo Mercado stipulations can be
amended for SOEs under the Corporations Law, which au-
thorises the government to “direct the activities of the com-
pany so as to attend to the public interest that justified its
creation.” While an improvement to the Corporation Law in
2001 adjusted the ratio of non-voting shares that corpora-
tions can issue from two-thirds to 50 percent, the new re-
quirement is only applicable to companies established after
31 October 2001 (Silveira and Saito 2009, p. 26). In all, this
highlights that the Brazilian corporate environment still has a
long way to go before its governance practices are aligned
with international standards.
8
9. CORPORATE GOVERNACE
ANALYSIS (CONT.)
Two primary issues within Petrobras’ corporate governance framework ultimately led to the development of ‘Op-
eration Carwash’: (1) an entrenched culture of unethical behaviour and lack of respect for regulatory standards
among Petrobras’ top-level management and executives; and (2) an inadequate internal governance framework
Corporate Governance Issues at Petrobras
As mentioned above, the primary issue of corruption and unethical corporate behaviour is by no means isolated to Petro-
bras. Such practices are prevalent across numerous public and private corporations in Brazil and are reflective of a nation-
wide absence of sound regulatory frameworks. Scholars believe that a voluntary self-regulated system in Brazil has failed
to raise corporate governance practices to international standards (Silveira and Saito, 2009, p. 27-32).
Whilst this culture of corruption is widely acknowledged at a macro level, lax internal governance standards at Petrobras
engendered an environment that fostered corrupt activities among individuals in management positions. The ability of man-
agers such as Paulo Costa to leverage pre-existing relationships with construction firms through Petrobras for both personal
benefit and the benefit of aligned political parties is emblematic of a corporate structure that lacks respect for regulatory
norms.
In large part, the issue of inadequate internal governance frameworks is attributable to the role of government in shaping
Petrobras’ Board. Petrobras’ Board currently has “ten members, seven of whom are appointed by the Federal Government
(including the Chairman of the Board), one by the minority holders of common shares, one by the holders of preferred shares,
excluding the controlling shareholder, and one by the employees” (Petrobras, 2014, p. 14). With distinct ties to the governing
political party, this board structure allows for potentially unethical collusion between government and Petrobras officials,
including the type seen in ‘Operation Carwash’. Furthermore, it serves to increase the degree of discretion enjoyed by the
Federal Government as controlling shareholder, a position that can and has been taken advantage of by unscrupulous politi-
cal figures (Pargendler 2014, p. 8).
MGMT90038 Global Corporate Governance | 9
10. Importantly, both of Petrobras’ key governance failings highlight the importance of a strong and independent Board of Direc-
tors, as the primary role of such a body is to supervise the company on behalf of the shareholders (Australian Institute of
Company Directors, 2015) and to set the strategic guidance of the company (the Strategic Role) (OECD, 2015).
We therefore recommend the following changes in order to prevent and overcome further governance issues:
1. Redevelopment of Petrobras’ core strategy, mission statement and values;
2. Redesign of the company’s internal and external corporate governance frameworks;
3. Implementation or strengthening of the following key governance policies within the company:
o Transparency, knowledge and ethics;
o Whistle-blower protection;
o Relations with the Federal Government.
Each of these recommendations will be outlined in further detail below.
With reference to the corporate governance issues pertaining to Petrobras and the wider Brazilian economy, we have pro-
posed a holistic set of recommendations that offer a comprehensive means of overcoming the scandal.
MOVING FORWARD
RECOMMENDATIONS
10
11. Firstly, we recommend that Petrobras redevelop its core strategy, mission statement
and values to emphasise ethics, transparency and integrity at all levels of its operations.
This recommendation is intended to leverage the role of Petrobras’ Board of Directors
as a provider of strategic leadership: a new vision and values promoted by the Board
has the potential to stamp out the poor internal culture at Petrobras that both fostered
and enabled ‘Operation Carwash’, replacing it with one of integrity and ethical behaviour.
IMPORTANCE OF OUR
CORPORATE MISSION
STATEMENT & VALUES STABLE FOUNDATION
Core values offer a stable foundation
for decision-makers to turn to in the
face of uncertainty and change, an is-
sue of growing significance in today’s
unpredictable business environment.
OFFERS INSPIRATION
Core values offer inspiration and
the potential to unite and motivate
employees.
DEFINED BOUNDARIES
Core values provide overarching
constraints on strategic decisions by
defining the boundaries within which
employees, including managers, are
given the freedom to innovate. In turn,
this discourages individuals from act-
ing unethically.
CLEAR OUTLINE
Core values provide a clear outline of
what the company, stakeholders and
shareholders will and will not accept.
Specifically, we recommend that Petrobras adopt an or-
ganisation-wide mission statement of “Leadership through
clarity and knowledge,” demonstrated through the follow-
ing core values:
1. Ethics & transparency across all operations;
2. Pride in being Petrobras;
3. Sustainable development;
4. Results and readiness for change; and
5. Stakeholder integration.
These values acknowledge Petrobras’ position as a glob-
al leader in the integrated energy industry, whilst striving
toward transparency and ethical behaviour. By placing
these values at the core of Petrobras’ operations, the
Board intrinsically emphasises the importance of ethical
and sustainable behaviour at every level of the organi-
sation – and that development and profit should not be
sought at their expense. Additionally, prioritising these
goals will reinforce adherence to and support for the
stricter governance controls and policies outlined in rec-
ommendations (2) and (3).
We also recommend that Petrobras adopt a values-based
vision statement outlining what the company hopes to
achieve in the near future. Collins & Porras have outlined
the benefit of what they term a “Big, Hairy, Audacious Goal
that requires significant change to be achieved as a driv-
ing force for [an] organisation” (1996, p. 66). As Petrobras’
“BHAG”, we would recommend working toward an ideal of
being “Corruption-free by 2020.” The concept is to pro-
vide a unifying goal for employees and to assist in key
decisions by management and the Board.
Finally, in implementing these changes, individual busi-
ness units will be encouraged to develop subsets of these
statements and values to further support and develop the
required change within the organisation.
STRATEGY & VALUES
RECOMMENDATIONS
Whilst a company’s vision and values can at times seem tangential to business objectives, stud-
ies show that companies that enjoy enduring success most often possess core values and a core
purpose (i.e., a ‘mission’) that remain fixed, while their business strategies and practices “endlessly
adapt to a changing world” (Collins & Porras, 1996, p. 65).
MGMT90038 Global Corporate Governance | 11
13. Having thus addressed the symbolic role that the Board plays in corporate governance, it is
equally imperative to address structural issues within Petrobras’ corporate governance frame-
work. Significant adjustment to Petrobras’ organisational configuration is inhibited as much
of the company’s structure is determined by law (Petrobras, 2015); however, we have worked
within these limitations to develop a set of recommendations that strengthen Petrobras’ govern-
ance while adhering to legal requirements.
Structure
As seen in Fig. 1, Petrobras currently has an Executive Board that sits below a supervisory Board of Direc-
tors, further overseen by an external Audit Committee.
CG FRAMEWORKS
RECOMMENDATIONS
Fig. 1:
Petrobras organisational
structure. Source: ‘Or-
ganization Chart,’ Petrobras,
retrieved 15 October 2015,
www.petrobras.br/en
The Board of Directors is comprised of independent directors appointed by Petrobras’ stakeholder groups,
including the Federal Government, labour unions, and preferred and minority shareholder groups; while
the Executive Board is comprised of the President of the company and the Vice-Presidents of the re-
spective divisions of the company. The Executive Board’s activities are audited by the company’s Internal
Auditing department, whose report is delivered alongside the Executive Board’s to the Board of Directors.
We recommend the following changes to the current structure:
1. The creation of a new Appointment and Remuneration Committee to sit alongside the Audit
Committee, in order to address issues of conflict of interest associated with the appointment of previous
Directors (discussed further in recommendation (3)).
2. The addition of a Chief Knowledge Officer, a Chief Transparency Officer and a Chief Audit Officer
to the Executive Board, emphasising the increased importance of these measures within the organisation.
These officers, and other members of the Executive Board, will be subject to the same additional appoint-
ment and remuneration criteria outlined in recommendation (3).
Membership
As well as their structure, the membership of Petrobras’ Board of Directors and Executive Board will
determine the effectiveness of these Boards (Ryan & Wiggins, 2004). Like many domestic legal systems,
Brazil’s corporate legislation places minimal constraints on who can be a Director of a private or public
company (Brazilian Federal Law no. 6,404). Thus, the responsibility for setting and enforcing standards for
Directors falls upon individual companies as a means of self-regulation. We recommend that Petrobras
apply the following standards in order to ensure that the members of each of its Boards are adequately
qualified to hold their positions.
MGMT90038 Global Corporate Governance | 13
14. Board of Directors
1. Members of the Board of Directors should be rec-
ommended to relevant stakeholders by the Appointment
and Remuneration Committee, rather than being chosen by
the controlling shareholder.
2. Directors cannot have been a ‘Related Party’ of the
organisation within the 24 months before their appointment.
3. Directors must have sufficient experience in an
industry relevant to the position in which they will serve,
aiming for representation from a broad range of industries
including legal, engineering, business, social services, gov-
ernment relations and the sciences.
4. Directors must have academic qualifications at a
level appropriate to the position in which they will serve,
and if not, must be prepared to undergo “on-boarding” via a
relevant management course from a qualified independent
organisation.
5. Directors must be an existing member of a relevant
industry body, relating either to the position in which they will
serve or to management at a Board level.
Executive Board
1. As with the Board of Directors, members of the
Executive Board should be recommended to the Board of
Directors by the Appointment and Remuneration Committee
rather than selected by the majority shareholder.
2. Members of the Executive Board must possess key
knowledge contacts within the organisation.
3. Members of the Executive Board must meet a
transparent set of key selection criteria based on merit, per-
formance, industry knowledge and expertise.
4. Members of the Executive Board must undergo
significant training as part of the “on-boarding” process to
gain familiarity with the requirements and responsibilities of
an executive position (including ethics and governance train-
ing).
These standards will ensure that Board members not only
have sufficient skillsets to occupy their nominated positions,
but will also bring with them significant reputations in their
fields that they will fear losing – this imperative, called the
management of reputation capital, has been shown to re-
inforce good corporate behaviour (Klewes & Wreschniok,
2004).
Finally, as described above, we recommend giving significant
care to the “on-boarding” and ongoing training of new Direc-
tors. Studies show that extremely high-performing compa-
nies pay extraordinary attention to managing what might
be called the socialisation process for their employees and
management – the development of a strong organisational
culture mutually reinforces the development of strong gov-
ernance standards within a corporation (Nadler, 2004).
Membership criteria
Notably, the membership criteria outlined above place a sig-
nificant emphasis on demonstrated industry experience and
skills. Whilst this may limit the pool of available Directors to
a certain extent, we believe that given the size, scope, and
complexity of Petrobras’ operations, demonstrated knowl-
edge and performance across the company’s technical ar-
eas of operation are a crucial indicator of a Director’s future
performance in the role (Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003).
We also emphasise appointing Directors with a diverse
range of experience - both geographical, cultural, and across
industries - as it has been demonstrated that when a Board
demonstrates a significant diversity of experience, company
performance improves along both business and governance
metrics (Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003). Boards with a
diversity of experience are also negatively correlated with
corruption (Upadhyay, 2014; Rhode and Packel, n.d.). Finally,
a diverse Board provides strategic benefits by allowing ac-
cess to a broader range of markets and networks and by
boosting reputation (Brammer, Millington and Pavelin, 2009).
Finally, we emphasise that Board members should be able to
demonstrate a commitment to activist directorship (Millstein
and MacAvoy, 1998). Referring to Nadler’s discussion of es-
sential Board “types”, the “activist” Board might sit some-
where between the “engaging” and the “intervening” Board:
while frequently involved in decision-making and quick to
provide operational guidance to management, it nonethe-
less does not interfere with management’s capacity to make
independent business decisions (Nadler, 2004; Millstein and
MacAvoy, 1998). We believe that given the challenges Petro-
bras faces at present, and the significant changes it will need
to undertake in order to mitigate the impacts of ‘Operation
Carwash’, the company requires strong, active and participa-
tory leadership. An activist Board, when designed well and
comprised of qualified individuals, can be a significant tool
for successfully implementing organisational change (Beer
& Eisenstat, 2000).
CG FRAMEWORKS
RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)
14
15. Implementation or strengthening of key governance policies
As mentioned above, we recommend that Petrobras implement or strengthen native policies in the following areas:
1. Transparency, knowledge and ethics;
2. Whistleblower protection;
3. Relations with the Federal Government.
Details of each of these policies are outlined below.
A key component of these new policies is that they involve the imposition of new requirements upon all of Petrobras’
stakeholders to various extents, from the executive to the operational level. As one of the world’s largest public companies,
Petrobras already possesses relatively comprehensive risk management and governance policies administered through its
Governance, Risk and Compliance department (Fig. 1). However, these policies were not enough to counter the widespread
and significant unethical practices that occurred during ‘Operation Carwash’. Therefore, we recommend strengthening these
policies by making them a contractual obligation to engagement with Petrobras: adherence to each policy would be a pre-
requisite to doing business with Petrobras on any level, whether as a Director, executive, employee or contractor. These
obligations would also apply to all suppliers, partners and resellers within the Petrobras network. Not only would this allow
for stronger enforcement of Petrobras’ governance policies, it would also serve to involve all stakeholders in the organisa-
tion’s governance by making ethics and transparency a part of their everyday induction and training, thus assisting in the
elimination of bribery and corruption within the organisation (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Similar efforts by other companies have
been shown to have a high efficacy rate in minimising both the opportunity for and prevalence of corruption within organisa-
tions (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).
Further, we recommend that all Petrobras stakeholders are required to undertake new training and initiation programmes
that address and explain the new policies as part of their implementation. Ongoing integration and communication are shown
to be significant components of enacting cultural change within a corporation and maintaining a strong corporate culture
(Martin, Frost and O’Neill, 2006).
KEY GOVERNANCE POLICIES
RECOMMENDATIONS
MGMT90038 Global Corporate Governance | 15
16. Transparency, Knowledge and Ethics
The Transparency, Knowledge and Ethics policy emphasises the obligation of
Petrobras and individuals within Petrobras to act in an open and transparent
manner across all operations. Given the industries that Petrobras operates
across, and given the Brazilian Federal Government’s status as both a ma-
jority shareholder and a significant stakeholder, there are some limits to the
extent of information that Petrobras can legally divulge. Still, in order to foster
accountability and help develop confidence in the organisation among inves-
tors and the public, we recommend that Petrobras adopt the continuous dis-
closure obligations of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), recognised by the
OECD as one of the most stringent reporting regimes in the world (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 2015). This will ensure that if Petrobras “is or becomes
aware of any information ... that a reasonable person would expect to have
a material effect on the price or value of [its] securities, [it] must immediately
tell ASX that information” (ASX, 2015). This ensures that all information that
should be publicly available is available.
In addition to strengthening the company’s disclosure and information-sharing
obligations, we recommend that employees and, where applicable, contrac-
tors of Petrobras should be required to abide by the same ethical standards
that are imposed on the Board and executives. These include:
1. Duty of good faith;
2. Duty to act in the best interest of the company;
3. Duty to avoid conflicts between the interests of the company and the
employee’s own interests (related party transactions); and
4. Duty to act honestly, and to exercise the requisite care and dili-
gence in all operations.
These duties would be integrated into Petrobras’ native employment policies,
such that if they are violated the employee in question would be liable in a
civil context as well as facing potential criminal liabilities.
Whistleblower Protection
A whistleblower is defined as an individual that exposes any kind of information
or activity that is deemed illegal, dishonest, unethical, or otherwise improper
within a public or private organisation (Johnson, 2003). Whilst a whistleblower
is often typecast as someone who exposes poor internal practices to an ex-
ternal regulator, an effective internal whistleblower policy is largely agreed to
be an integral piece of a company’s corporate governance framework, as it
enables the company to foster a culture of effective due diligence regarding
corrupt or illegal practices (Johnson, 2003). We therefore recommend that
Petrobras strengthen its existing whistleblower policy by installing whistle-
blower officers at all levels of the company, who are readily available and
responsible for receiving reports of illegal or unethical behaviour.
KEY GOVERNANCE
POLICIES
RECOMMENDATIONS (CONT.)
16
17. THE TRANSPARENCY, KNOWLEDGE
AND ETHICS POLICY EMPHASISES THE
OBLIGATION OF PETROBRAS TO ACT IN
AN OPEN AND TRANSPARENT MANNER
ACROSS ALL OPERATIONS
MGMT90038 Global Corporate Governance | 17
18. KEY GOVERNANCE POLICIES
RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)
An effective whistleblower policy should possess the following features:
1. Reporting responsibility - individuals have a duty to report any illegal or unethical behaviour by or involving a
Petrobras employee, contractor or other stakeholder that they may observe or otherwise become aware of;
2. No retaliation - individuals must be able to expect that a report to the whistleblower officer will not be met with
retaliation or punishment, either directly or indirectly, at any level of the company;
3. Reporting procedure - clear procedures must be followed in the reporting of all incidents to the whistleblower of-
ficer;
4. Good faith - all reports to the whistleblower officer must be made in good faith, i.e. the individual who makes the
report must have every reason to believe the information s/he is reporting is true;
5. Confidentiality - all reports to the whistleblower officer are made in complete confidence and should be kept in
complete confidence.
This policy is designed to encourage individuals within Petrobras’ network to report incidences of illegal or unethical be-
haviour that have a reasonable basis for claim; to ensure that the reporting individuals are not retaliated against; and to
establish policies that ensure all allegations receive sufficient follow-up. Importantly, there is an obligation of confidentiality
on all parties involved in the process, as well as a requirement that both the reporting and investigation parties act in good
faith (Near, Dworkin and Miceli, 1990). We believe these requirements sufficiently facilitate reporting and follow-up whilst
addressing the risk that allegations will be made against individuals as a form of personal retribution.
Relations with the Federal Government
As a state-owned enterprise (SOE), Petrobras is required by law to maintain the Brazilian Federal Government as its con-
trolling shareholder. This means that the Federal Government holds the majority of the company’s voting shares and, under
current policies, has the power to elect a majority of the members of its Board of Directors. Further to this, Petrobras dis-
closes in its 2014 Management Report that the Federal Government “has license to enact macroeconomic and social poli-
cies through [Petrobras],” that Petrobras “can carry out activities that prioritise the Federal Government’s policies, instead
of [its] own economic and business objectives,” and, of most concern, that Petrobras “can perform sales on terms that may
adversely affect [the company’s] operating results and financial condition” (Petrobras, 2014, p. 14).
This legally unavoidable situation represents a significant risk factor for the development of corruption within Petrobras’
company culture, particularly at the top levels (Transparency International, 2013, p. 2). Indeed, the relationship between
Petrobras and the Brazilian Federal Government was almost certainly a facilitating factor in the political kickbacks that oc-
curred during ‘Operation Carwash’: the government’s control over the membership of Petrobras’ Board would have allowed
it to keep renewing the mandate of officials like Paulo Roberto Costa for years on end.
That said, SOEs are not necessarily condemned to problems with corruption and cronyism. Insights from consultancies Mc-
Kinsey & Company and PwC show that well-governed SOEs can perform as well or better than private companies, in some
cases even cracking the Fortune Global 50 (McKinsey, 2009; PwC, 2015). However, appropriate layers of checks and balances
must be implemented between persons in office and persons in key positions at SOEs; and transparent disclosure of all
deals, contracts and other transactions between SOEs and current state officials is crucial (OECD, 2010; 2009).
18
19. Thus, while Petrobras is required under current law to maintain a structure that includes ownership by and partnership with
the Brazilian Federal Government, we recommend the following changes to Petrobras’ fiduciary and business relationship
with the government:
1. Government shares placed in a statutory body. This will serve as a means of establishing “a clear separation be-
tween the state’s role as market regulator and owner of the company,” which is “an essential requirement to ensure [good]
corporate governance in SOEs” (Transparency International, 2013, p. 3). Placing government shares in an independently
managed statutory body will help ensure that the state’s “ownership functions [are] separated from the responsibility for
industrial policy”; i.e., that Petrobras is no longer obliged to act as agent of macroeconomic policy for the Brazilian Federal
Government at the expense of its own operations or objectives (Transparency International, 2013, p. 3).
2. External audit of government appointees to the Board of Directors to ensure they comply with the standards for
appointment and remuneration outlined in recommendation (2).
3. Increase the proportion of “shared value” projects in Petrobras’ relationship with public sector. PwC (2015) notes
that since SOEs are inherently hindered from operating on a purely profit-oriented model, they are best served by leverag-
ing the policy-oriented aspect of their mandate to pursue shared value projects in collaboration with public and third-sector
organisations (p. 7). In the case of Petrobras, taking on an increased number of shared value or development projects in
partnership with the government could recast the perception of Petrobras’ relationship with the public sector from one of
cronyism to one of collaboration toward broader social and economic goals.
4. Lobby the Federal Government to alter legislation to move toward privatisation of SOEs. Though unlikely to see
results in the short term, it is worthwhile for Petrobras to lay the groundwork for a policy of lobbying for the privatisation of
SOEs in Brazil, as the nation’s increasing participation and influence in international economic organisations may eventually
see the government adjust its policies to fall in line with the liberal capitalist model favoured by the West. This will have to
be done tactfully and incrementally so as to avoid coming into direct conflict with the state, as occurred when the CEO of
the Brazilian mining firm Vale was forced by the government to depart his position for being too “independent-minded” (The
Economist, 2012).
KEY GOVERNANCE POLICIES
RECOMMENDATIONS (CONT.)
MGMT90038 Global Corporate Governance | 19
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All stock images provided by www.istockphoto.com
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23. Melbourne Business School, 2015
MGMT90038 Global Corporate Governance
5,455 words
Robert Au
Danna Diaz
Lennard Iosif
Marisa Pensky
Hunter Santamaria
Jedd Watmore
FOR PETER VERHEZEN
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