This document discusses how political institutions create functional policy outcomes through balancing ethics, budgets, and power relationships. It argues that "imperfect virtues" like budgets, ethics rules, and defined roles help structure relationships and decision-making within governments. Legislative ethics and adequate funding are important for developing public trust. Overall policies and institutions aim to represent citizens effectively and achieve goals in an equitable manner.

1. PAD 632 FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY
Imperfect Virtues
A blueprint for how Sovereigns develop functional political institutions
Phillip Mitchell
7/24/2016
This journal provides scholarship and examples for how sovereigns create functional political
institutions by balancing ethics, budgets, and other legislative power relationships to produce
policy outcomes that can achieve policy goals and other public policy functions that represent
greater policy equity and defining how power relationships are formed within political
institutions.

2. Imperfect virtues (truths) create the environment for how political institutions to function.
These truths are realities that exist within political systems that define how relationships are
ordered. For example, budget scorecards, fiscal year budgets, capital and operating budgets,
morality and ethics, and absolute and nominal policy outcomes structure how power
relationships and ordered functions occur within political institutions. In addition, fiscal year
budgets, scorecards, operating budgetary expenses and authorizations determine how sovereign
entities meaning that agencies such as the DOD fund special military programs (with $1.4 billion
dollars) in terms of carrying out policy goals in the form of optimal policy outcomes making sure
military operations have war-planes, the latest technological advances, and submarine
capabilities to deter adversary conflict (Scully, M. & Burgess, R.R., 2015, p. 6-9). Moreover,
imperfect virtues structure the basis for policymaking to form and operate within nominal policy
outcomes because expenditure allocations determine how power relationships are brokered
within political institutions to form rational policy goals and incremental optimal policy
outcomes controlling Sovereign interest; meaning that citizen subject interests and other political
economy functions such as employment measurement, GDP growth, wage efficiency, and other
economic factors operate under capital operating budgets which offer nominal policy estimations
for how policy outcomes are brokered in a public policy environment (Ogujiuba, K.K. &
Ehigiamusoe, K., 2014, p. 299-314). In essence, imperfect virtues determine the order for how
policy outcomes achieve public policy recommendations and conclusions.
Political systems often clash between how public policy can be achieved and how policy
outcomes can be arranged within civil society. Often times power relationships broker optimal
policy outcomes creating nominal (utilities) and absolute (pure) bureaucratic arrangements which
define how power and influence are structured within a society to produce the most efficient and

3. effective way in creating a system of government shaping the relationship of men and institution
(Ogujiuba, K.K & Ehigiamusoe, K., 2014, p. 299-314). For example, this means that defined
bureaucratic arrangements help achieve utilitarian goals and egalitarian principles to help create
power structures to identify different assigned roles governments play inside a society and
political system to determine intergovernmental roles and relations among political institutions.
In this context, intergovernmental relationships define policy utility within the public policy
arena composing institutional craft of how political, constitutional, administrative, fiscal, and
financial arrangements are formed within intergovernmental settings creating optimal policy
goals for how institutions function (Sun, D., 2015, p. 165-169). Moreover, fiscal disparities,
fiscal expenditures, and budgetary constraints are three other policy utilities developed by
bureaucratic arrangements to produce power sharing arrangements to help solve revenue
shortages, budget deficits, and other fiscal equalization dilemmas local, state, and federal
governments face to produce greater performance management, service delivery, and equity of
resources to produce efficient government policies that are solvent and increase optimal
economic opportunity and development to generate ways in which governmental aid is arranged
(Zhao, B. & Coyne, D., 2015, p. 32-52).
Economic utility and income distribution are two other policy tools that shape
intergovernmental equity and define fiscal resources of governments creating power sharing
arrangements within political systems. Economic utility and income distribution structure and
delegate authority to determine how taxes, revenue, and income are collected to determine the
proper authority or role each level of government has in producing fiscal transfers, services, tax
authorities, and other defined policy goals to help shape redistributive policy efforts. These
redistributive policy efforts shape economic arrangements and create just economic policy for all

4. governments to produce the most egalitarian form of public administration (Huang, T-Y., Wu, P-
C., & Yan, C-W., 2014, p. 341-359). Finally, these policy arrangements between economic
utilities and income distributions form policy relationships in terms of crafting nominal public
policy outcomes that place emphasis on how power is ordered within political institutions to
foster greater policy development and policy outcomes within a public policy context.
Power relationships help structure policy utilities and tools in assisting governments in
being partners of collaboration and avenues for governance. These policy avenues define
jurisdictional authorities, power functions, units of policymaking, and governance arrangements
as policy utilities or power tools in shaping imperfect intergovernmental relations by
streamlining government to maximize efficiency institutional capacity within civil society
(Martin, S.A. & Long, C.N., 2014, p. 589-617). In addition, other policy avenues such as
intergovernmental politics and economics form policy utilities. Moreover, budget balances,
policy outcomes, debt obligations, socioeconomic factors, spending per capita, GDP functions;
debt-level politics, pork, electoral success, and political loyalty all serve as utilities that structure
effective bureaucratic arrangement of government (Stokes, A., 2015, p. 2-7). These sovereign
utilities create equitable revenues based on merits such as economic conditions and expenditure
revenues to provide better control over resources to assist all levels of government to be better
stewards of spending resources and revenue disbursements (Kemahlioglu, O., 2015, p. 51-74).
Moreover, economic and political arrangements intergovernmental arrangements inside political
systems to achieve political goals and fiscal alignments between governments to produce policy
harmony in structuring sound policy development in terms of creating policy equity in
contributing to governmental welfare, structuring urban communities, and defining how health-
care services are distributed, among other GDP functions of government in developing policy

5. regimes for governmental taxes and other sub-national capacities that require policy rationale in
the form fiscal capacity equalization grants, bonds, and other delegated sovereign debt to
determine economic harmony and other harmonious elements of a political system (Grewal, B.,
2008, p. 602-637).
Finally, intergovernmental relations structure functional political institutions in the form
States, local governments, sub-national governments, inter-sovereigns, intra-sovereigns,
partnerships, and other shared power arrangements between local, state, municipal, and federal
governments to create functional operations in terms of defining how authority, power, order,
influence, and other capacity elements are arranged to make government a positive tool of
policymaking inside civil societies.
Civil societies structure political behavior differently. Legislative ethics are part of
everyday institutional behavior that defines how ordered political activity is arranged. For
example, legislative ethics are essential frameworks for how political institutions determine how
legislative means and ends are ordered inside political systems to produce strong legislative
strategy, management, and other scholarship and knowledge to carry on political norms and
political scholarship of policy development and implementation. Legislative ethics measure
institutional capacity and moral obligation to identify collective practices to help shape
professional standards to increase legislative product, which oversee rational policy outcomes,
while reducing corruption, nepotism, and increase public trust to help increase effective
bureaucratic arrangements inside political systems (Holzer, M. & Schwester, R.W., 2016, p. 311-
315). Finally, increasing bureaucratic arrangements inside political institutions requires
administrative standards that provide self-triggering mechanisms in the form of statutes, codes,
and legal language that identifies how bureaucrats perform institutional behavior and

6. responsibilities in terms of defining how legislative product is developed, implemented,
executed, and chosen to determine the proper accountability for measuring institutional success,
policy outcomes, and ethical dilemmas by finding the proper balance between institutional
loyalty and fiduciary duty to determine how ordered behavior exists within political institutions
(Holzer, M. & Schwester, R.W., 2016, p. 315-333).
In sum, legislative ethics are defined by several different stakeholders to produce
accountability, transparency, and policy outcomes that respond to men’s materials within a
political system.
Legislative ethics determine how efficient stakeholders are in representing power
relationships. Stakeholders (sovereigns; e.g. legislatures, Parliamentarians’, legislators,
committees, government agencies, task forces, municipal governments, local and state
governments, and city councils) produce effective institutional standards for measuring
professional conduct which determine how defined authority is distributed within citizenry
functions. In addition, stakeholders define legislative virtues by balancing pure ethical standards
and policy morality creating democratic relationships between political institutions and men.
Moreover, policy morality and ethical standards are partial virtues or interests served in terms of
administering legislative material and institutional duty to structure policy outcomes and men’s
interest in an effective and functional way (Sabl, A., 2004, p. 221-233). In sum, partial virtues
determine how human nature exists within political institutions by developing how political
power is arranged within legislative committees, procedural votes, floor votes, and other
administrative functions of the legislative branch which determine how political power is
arranged to meet the demands of institutional duty and material men’s interests (Sabl, A., 2004,
p. 221-233). Partial virtues determine how political power is arranged within legislative-political

7. settings by structuring actors of ethical conduct that seek to increase public integrity and
strengthen institutional capacity by crafting legislation that responds to moral needs but still
achieves desired policy outcomes that strengthen institutional capacity and increases public trust
in political institutions.
Institutional behavior is always criticized by critics. Authority and power are the terms
for identifying critics of political power and legislative dissatisfaction. Institutional arrangements
are created by legislators who define the conditions of procedural rules, academia journals,
liberal and conservative media outlets, legislature inaction, government inaction/shifting
policymaking authority, and other institutional intolerances define imperfect structures of the
Sovereign which can be defiant authorities of the sovereign making legislative dissatisfaction the
norm for how institutional behavior exists (Mamora, A. O., 2006, p. 22-24). Furthermore, the
absence of intolerance and lack of institutional character define rational actors (policymakers) by
creating agents of moral peril who force legislative intolerance upon political institutions by
forcing institutional pain, suffering, policy dissatisfaction, political infighting, and other
institutional pain associated with institutional error or poor stewardship of political power and
ethical policymaking (Tuckness, A.S., 2002, p. 17-35). Moreover, moral peril plagues all
political institutions because moral intuitions guide policymakers which means that principles of
accountability are tested putting legislative virtue at risk of achieving ethical legislative product
and political power because misapplication and error can lead to policy punishment in terms of
reducing institutional capacity within political institutions creating a disservice to bureaucratic
arrangements in structuring moral policy outcomes and other norms of legislative power
(Tuckness, A.S., 2002, p. 36-56). Finally, the absence of institutional intolerance and
accountability plagues policymakers because at times political power and other power struggles

8. harbor institutional goals with men’s interest, creating the presence of immoral political
institutions who do not have the confidence of the public or public integrity to carry the public’s
will.
An added feature of political institutions is the implementation of ethics. In practical
terms, the administration of legislative ethics is one of institutional interpretation, meaning that it
depends on the Authority, Sovereign, or political entity implementing the ethics standards to
determine the impact they have on a political system. For example, sovereign authorities create
incremental policy choices that structure uniformity between state boundaries for determining
ethical standards. Strong regulations determine how state boundaries and other shared interests
structure the national identity of programs like the ABA or other legal, political, or analytical
field of study (Coquillette, D.R., 2011, p. 124-128). Defined regulatory authority and legal norms
can be guideposts for creating stronger accountability standards within legislative political
institutions meaning that stronger administrative functions could take place inside political
institutions to create a greater policy outcomes within institutional arrangements to increase
legislative product, policy outcomes, and other materials to increase public trust and integrity of
men within a political system (Coquilette, D.R., 2011, p. 124-128). Moreover, greater policy
outcomes can structure greater legislative product in terms of creating political institutions that
pass laws to make the legislative process an efficient end to representing men within a political
system to create a working relationship between government and the citizenry. Finally,
increasing legislative product fosters stronger confidence, public trust, and integrity within a
political system to give people hope that political institutions can still be agents of citizenry
needs.

9. Public policy can be arranged in many different ways to fit citizenry needs. For example,
monitoring institutional goals and arrangements requires a strong vision for how legislative and
political settings should look like in terms of defining the moral obligations of political
institutions. Furthermore, ethical standards such as strong civic engagement, dialogue, and
discourse to determine how training is administered, how theory and application are applied,
how the political environment is crafted and structured, how collective purposes are defined, and
finally how collaboration and other methods of cooperation can be achieved are elements of
strong ethics that can be installed within political institutions (Blacksher, E., Maree, G.,
Schrandt, S., Soderquist, C., Steffensmeier, T., & Peter, R. St., 2015, p. 485-489). Greater
political and legislative freedom establish greater public policy goals making moral obligations,
moral claims, and civic response be agents of change and institutional memory in terms of being
strong advocates for public trust, integrity, and confidence to affirm men’s interest are being
represented (Blacksher, E., Maree, G., Schrandt, S., Soderquist, C., Steffensmeier, T., & Peter,
R. St., 2015, p. 485-489). Finally, institutional performance should be at the heart of all
legislative memory and policymaking delegation because political power should be a test of how
institutional behavior is formed to create effective political institutions that govern and represent
the will of the citizenry and create avenues of trust and reciprocity to increase legislative-
political policy outcomes within a political system.
Public trust is an important feature for political institutions to possess. Adequate funding
for strong legislative ethics is an imperative for how political institutions develop public trust and
other mutual relationships with the public. Furthermore, legal aid programs, state legislatures,
political advocacy, legal service grants, scholarships, policy initiatives, public-private
partnerships are all methods for funding strong legislative ethics within political institutions

10. (Albiston, C.R. & Nielsen, L.B., 2014, p. 62-95). In addition, strong service initiatives such as
public scholarships, grants, legal service grants, state legislature appropriations, political
advocacy, and public-private partnerships all form powerful political actors and players who help
foster together academia experts, policymakers, former government officials who develop policy
papers, recommendations, and analyses for how ethical standards should be applied throughout
political institutions (Albiston, C.R. & Nielsen, L.B., 2014, p. 62-95). Moreover, this means that
membership dues, fees, monthly donations, contributions, and monthly giving-efforts are all
funds raised to pay for ethical programs to help increase institutional capacity and being a strong
broker in structuring legislative-political institutions increase uniform standards for increasing
professionalism and integrity within political institutions. In essence, funding for legislative
accountability is essential to preserving institutional integrity, public trust, and confidence within
a political system to increase legislative representation and civic engagement in making sure the
political system does not become a moral peril of its animal instincts and tendencies.
Ethical arrangements inside legislative-political institutions should be based on criteria.
Criteria should be justified. For example, avoiding conflict-of-interest scenarios, unethical
conduct, quid pro quo, racketeering/corruption, and other unprofessional conduct should be the
basis of the criteria. In addition, this means that ethical arrangements should be determined based
on institutional benefit, merit, and policy outcomes meaning that the will of the people are
represented to make public integrity, trust, and public confidence the ways to justify funding for
stronger ethics inside political institutions. Essentially, stronger ethical arrangements enhance the
legislative process by increasing legislative product to produce functional political-legislative
institutions inside a political system.

11. Public sector budgets control the legislative process forming spending priorities for how
Sovereigns develop policy. Subjective policy actors are formed within public sector budgets to
become part functional states of sustained optimal health, meaning that allocations and defined
resources, adjustments, bond allocations, bond authorities, and other sovereign capacities help
implement optimal utility for how policy goals are achieved by governments. Functional
authorities of public sector budgets create the conditions for how political institutions function,
meaning that budgetary policy decisions create the basis for how budgets are formed, requested,
implemented, produced, and structured to satisfy sovereign master’s. In addition, these
subjective authoritative authorities (budget committees, state legislatures, city councils, and
county executives) have the financial capacity to control how money is spent within a political
system allowing for budget surpluses to be formed, budget deficits to be racked up, and optimal
costs to be administered for line-item budgets and short-term capital budgets or continuing
resolutions to solve resource-exchange problems within political systems (Holzer, M. &
Schwester, R.W., 2016, p. 259-280). Moreover, these optimal values (budget components)
measure how government performs by creating self-triggering mechanisms the form of
budgetary means within political institutions controlling how spending is prioritized for how
policy choices and political attitudes are administered to create expenditures within a political
systems to make governments function (Holzer, M. & Schwester, R.W., 2016, p. 259-280). In
essence, these budgetary actions and constraints form the basis for how federal and state budgets
are administered to create lasting continuing resolutions and policy choices in the form of
statutes, public laws, and other ordinances to structure performance management for how policy
goals and political attitudes are achieved to help national and state governments function.

12. In reality, sovereigns assign optimal values to budgets to determine rational policy
choices. In practical terms, policy choices are rational adjustments and mathematically
proportions administered by sovereigns, meaning that budgetary allocations are achieved by a
utility value determined by fiscal budgets, funding levels, and other fiscal measurements for how
political economy are structured. Sovereign appropriations (utilities) determine how political
economy policy goals are structured based on capital-budgets or short-term resolutions that put
temporary sovereign authority in control of debt consolidation, funding projects, identifying
fiscal challenges, structuring optimal funding levels for how budgets are developed to make sure
sustained budget controls and policy equity is achieved to help governments produce optimal
utility in achieving zero-based budgeting requirements (balanced scorecards) (Keown, A.J. &
Martin, J.D., 1978, p. 21-27). In addition, this means that self-triggering budget controls help
structure sovereign policy choices and outcomes, in terms of producing funding goals for how
political-social objectives are meant, funding allocations for agencies and departments, and
defined optimal values (monetary constraints, e.g. nominal policy values ($180,000, $225,000, &
$280,000) for expenses and costs are arranged to produce policy utility and political unity for
how programs function (Keown, A.J., & Martin, J.D., 1978, p. 21-27). Moreover, operating
budgets are a sovereigns dream because better optimal values for how policy utility and costs can
be achieved for how sovereigns implement fiscal year adjustments and budgetary deadlines for
how services, revenues, expenses, and costs are achieved within a political and administrative
policy context. In sum, this means that zero-based budgets are the primary source for how
sovereign masters produce functional political institutions because investment projects, project-
funding goals, and other debt-ceiling authorities are created within capital budgets to illustrate

13. how optimal values are achieved and defined within a policy context (Keown, A.J. & Martin,
J.D., 1978, p. 21-27).
For example, political attitudes define how policy choices are arranged within a political
system to structure defined budgetary arrangements for implementing how the sovereign
produces an efficient state. Furthermore, defined resource allocation is the center for how
political attitudes are achieved within a policy context to serve the sovereign’s needs, creating
different relative values and political economy functions for how budgetary decisions are crafted.
In addition, these resource allocations, budgetary constraints, and optimal adjustments help
structure output levels for how grants are matched and distributed, meaning that defined political
economic activity can be created in terms of producing wage mechanisms, wage efficiency
standards, wage setting goals, and other optimal funding levels that structure budgetary
arrangements for how government functions (Johansen, K. & Strom, B., 2003, p. 215-228).
Moreover, optimal (monetary goals, funding allocations) output levels structure budget outcomes
meaning that wages are arranged and rearranged to make sure government agencies and
departments maintain their operating costs at sustainable levels maximizing employment and
optimal wage levels in producing budget utility allowing policy goals and choices in the form of
labor functions being achieved, wage growth increasing, elasticity forming, and grants increasing
wage conditions and optimal employment levels creating strong wage and labor utilities that
reduce inefficiencies and increase internal policy interaction within different political-economic
sectors of national and state governments (Johansen, K. & Strom, B., 2003, p. 215-228). In sum,
policy choices are continuous political attitudes that always get restructured to maintain balanced
scorecards and other streamlined functions of how the sovereign operates within a public
administrative context to produce the best possible policy solution for how capital and operating

14. budgets are structured to produce political attitudes that work for all agencies and departments
within a political system.
Effective maintenance of budget scorecards produces imperfect functions of the
sovereign. Furthermore, this means sovereigns structure revenue/cost distributions to produce
optimal utility in measuring absolute values (costs/revenues) and optimal values (profits/losses)
helping structure performance results for how governments collect revenue to disburse to select
agencies (Robinson, M., 2002, p. 17-33). In addition, this means that optimal and nominal values
help structure strong performance indicators by structuring strong fiscal policy goals and
management features of the sovereign to create greater spending allocations, adjustments,
savings, and performance delivery for how government agencies work to achieve greater policy
goals. For example, budgetary decisions determine how capital targets, budgetary
rewards/sanctions are administered, define how funding levels are achieved, and how allowances
(surpluses/shortfalls) in the form of additional/excess funding are administered and implemented
throughout government to produce efficient cost/ benefit analysis for greater governmental
efficiency and departmental output to help make government perform more efficiently
(Robinson, M, 2002, p. 17-33). Moreover, absolute values produce efficient policy outcomes to
help allow sovereign’s to be efficient public administrators of capital and operating budgets
while achieving defined authorities, political attitudes and policy goals to make sure the public
sector is an efficient agent of budgetary constraints and attitudes.
Budgetary constraints and political attitudes are at the core of how budget decisions and
functions are administered within a political system, meaning that the sovereign’s ability to
function is dependent upon imperfect budget plans. These imperfect budget plans form
budgetary assumptions that often times produce partial optimal policy goals, meaning that

15. mathematically errors occur based on GDP forecasting, revised economic jobs reports, policy
readjustments of economic stabilization reports, and of reassessments for how GDP and other
economic factors form the basis for how budgetary political attitudes are formed (Bhatti, I. &
Phaup, M., 2015, p. 89-105). Mathematically proportions, estimations, and budgetary
adjustments produce normal budget distributions for how budget variance and legislative errors
are crafted, meaning that appropriation bills and fiscal year policy goals become unpredictable
legislative products forming economic fluctuations that create economic contractions and other
regressive economic growth activities that harbor the sovereign’s ability to function (Bhatti, I. &
Phaup, M., 2015, p. 89-105). Moreover, self-triggering mechanisms impact sovereigns ability to
achieve legislative-political policy goals harder by creating an impression of decreasing policy
opportunity for flexibility and improve its ability to be an efficient agent of public policy in
structuring legislative-political goals, optimal policy solutions, and other political attitudes that
expand its ability to function in a political setting (Bhatti, I., Phaup, M., 2015, p. 89-105). In
essence, long-term operating budgets and capital investments in terms of increasing multi-year
capital budgets would allow legislative-political sustainability to be the norm within the
policymaking process by creating a legislative avenue for the sovereign to be a positive agent of
change that would transform the budget process and create growth within the public sector
allowing congressional action to achieve budgetary policy goals.
As sovereign entities are imperfect creatures of the political system, they fall victim to
unpredictable legislative environments. For example, short-term budget agreements, budget
constraints, debt ceiling adjustments, and other legislative products decrease its ability to bring in
revenue and monitor its debt obligations in an efficient way. However, structural obstacles can
be mitigated by reforming how entitlement programs are structured; how income security is

16. rearranged (reform how benefits are calculated), how economic growth is structured, and how
trade agreements are developed (restructure treaties to benefit U.S. economic interests) to
represent the budgetary challenges the nation government faces here in the United States. Policy
realignments and restructured policy agenda items would require how political-economic activity
would work inside our current political system by redefining the wage system, tax code, how
Congress functions, creating and granting new powers to the presidency by creating new
authorities that grant emergency authority to political institutions to administer structural reforms
for how we expand (readjust structural imbalances and trust funds) Social Security, Medicare,
and Medicaid, while also increasing international treaties and giving the executive branch greater
authority to reduce unnecessary troop presence to curb national debt totals would all be a part of
a five to ten year plan that would restructure the entire political system which would be very
costly in the first two years, put would pay for itself after that by finding new sources of revenue
and reducing unnecessary waste in federal programs. Moreover, sovereign reforms would
generate greater efficiency and distribution policy benefits that would create greater absolute
policy outcomes and other legislative-political goals that could serve public policy functions
well.
In conclusion, a more efficient sovereign creates greater legislative capacity to furnish
greater political utility to better represent balanced scorecards. Each legislative victory would
produce greater political attitudes within political institutions to foster efficient and specific
policies directed at making the sovereign an efficient representative of political and legislative
products meaning that service delivery would create greater public policy goals and objectives
within political institutions. Greater political utility creates efficient sovereign entities that
structure greater egalitarian attributes in terms of being strong policy alignments and

17. distributions for how public policies are formed, meaning that political institutions would
produce greater institutional memory and efficiency. Furthermore, legislative goals would
measure the progress of how political utility was being administered within political institutions
to make sure an abundance sovereign trust, confidence, and public integrity in how sovereigns
govern and produce efficient scorecards for how policy goals are achieved.
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