This summarizes a document analyzing the debate between David Hume and John Searle on whether moral 'ought' claims can be derived from descriptive 'is' claims. It argues that while Searle believes institutional facts allow for ought claims, he fails to address Hume's core argument that reason alone cannot establish morality. Hume believes morality arises from human sentiment and passions, not descriptive facts. The document analyzes their arguments and concludes Searle does not sufficiently answer Hume's questions about how and why particular institutions give rise to moral evaluations.

1. Ought From Is:
In Defense of David Hume
Alicia Tutini
PHIL 251: Logic
12 December 2014

2. Morality shows itself to be a tricky but enticing concept, elusive yet essential to the
functionality of a civilization. Its elusiveness lies in the ambiguity surrounding its roots – how
are morals formed? To address this question, two philosophers will be brought forth with
combatting theories: David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature and John Searle’s “How to
Derive ‘Ought’ From ‘Is’”. The former contends that claims describing the world cannot
produce suggestions on how the world ought to be, while the latter argues that
recommendations can be formulated from these descriptions. While there may exist other
plausible arguments positing the allowance of an ought claim from a set of is statements, the
one presented by Searle fails to satisfy the difficulties in achieving this raised by Hume. First I
will describe the arguments presented by Searle and by Hume, secondly I will elaborate on the
failure of Searle’s objection to Hume’s argument, and finally I will address the relevance of the
philosopher’s arguments.
The difference between evaluative claims and descriptive claims is rather muddy
through Searle’s scope, but it can be articulated. An evaluative claim is a claim that prescribes,
that suggests, that recommends; a claim that is evaluative is making evaluations. An evaluative
claim cannot be proven true or false by examining the meaning of a claim – to state that
‘abortion should not be legal’ or ‘tomatoes should not be allowed in a fruit salad’ appeals to
one’s own personal beliefs.
Any justification a speaker can give of one of his evaluative statements
essentially involves some appeal to attitudes he holds, to criteria of assessment he has
adopted, or to moral principles by which he has chosen to live and judge other people
(Searle 53).
Succinctly put, evaluative claims are subjective. Descriptive claims, contrastingly, can be
proven true or false by observing the world and the way things are. Presented with the
statement ‘water is comprised of two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen,’ we can refer to the

3. construction of atoms and molecules and show that only by combining two parts hydrogen and
one part oxygen can we attain what is colloquially named water. For Searle, however, there are
varying types, or functions, of descriptive claims. He argues that these different types are
necessary, as descriptive claims perform differently in differing contexts. He presents the
claims “’Jones is six feet tall’” and “’Jones got married’” and contends that both are
descriptive, as both can be confirmed as true or false in an objective sense. We can measure
Jones to confirm his height and perhaps check the legitimacy of his marriage certificate to
confirm that he is indeed married. But, while both these claims can be validated or falsified,
they strike Searle as distinct. Marriage is a culturally understood concept, or institution –
without the institution of marriage, all that has been accomplished is gestures and words and
scribbles on a paper – actions that Searle calls brute facts. These brute facts take on additional
meaning when it is recognized that the actions are occurring within a culture that understands
and accepts the institution of marriage. The meaning of these actions is contained within the
rules constituting the institution.1 A legal marriage is finalized only if certain actions are
completed – there is no independently existing marriage to be found in the wild.
Companionship certainly exists, but marriage is a construct composed of specific actions;
without these completed actions, marriage has not occurred. This differentiation within
descriptive claims is what enables Searle to infer an ought from an is. Without such
distinctions, we fail to gain “any coherent account of such notions as commitment,
responsibility, and obligation” (Searle 54). Searle concludes the following:
(1) The classical picture fails to account for institutional facts. (2) Institutional facts
exist within systems of constitutive rules. (3) Some systems of constitutive rules involve
1 Searle delves into two different sorts of institutions - regulative and constitutive – which,
while important, need not be outlined explicitly.

4. obligations, commitments, and responsibilities. (4) Within those systems we can derive
“ought’s” from “is’s” on the model of the first derivation (Searle 57).
Hume argues that inferring an ought from a set of is statements, or a prescriptive claim
from a set of descriptive claims, is logically invalid.2 For Hume, reason alone cannot supply
morality – vice and virtue – for reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood – it is inactive,
only unearthing what is already in existence independent of the mind. Morals, contrarily, are
intended to “go beyond the calm and indolent judgments of the understanding…Morals excite
passions, and produce or prevent actions” (Hume 457). The mind can only exert itself in
forming perceptions – actions of love, hate, judgment – and thus, “to approve of one character,
to condemn another, are only so many different perceptions” (Hume 456). He finds it obvious
that our passions and actions are not subject to agreement or disagreement that can be applied
to the objective world. Morality stems from the interaction of our passions and the external
world, though reason can prove helpful in explaining this interaction. Hume does not deny the
influence of reason on human conduct, but it is a contingent influence – it brings the existence
of something to the attention of the passions, and also informs the passions of cause and effect,
illuminating the means to exert the passions. Hume contends that morality cannot be attributed
singly to either internal actions or external objects, but rather from their interaction. He presents
the example of parricide, a rather universally agreed upon horrific act. Then he removes
animation – replacing human parents with an oak tree that produces a sapling, which eventually
overtops and destroys its parent tree. If demonstrative reasoning discovered morality, then it
follows that any instance demonstrating this behavior would be subject to moral judgment.
Indeed, “[i]s not the one tree the cause of the other’s existence; and the latter the cause of the
destruction of the former, in the same manner as when a child murders his parent?” (Hume
2 Hume calls descriptive claims “matters of fact” and evaluative claims “relation of ideas.” For
the sake of consistency, I will use the terms descriptive and evaluative.

5. 467). Yet, we would resist saying that the sapling was guilty or suffering from moral deformity.
Likewise with incestuous relations – while considered morally repugnant for humans to engage
in such behavior, that disdain does not carry over to animals engaging in identical behavior.
Herein lies part of his argument – if reason is sufficient to establish morality, then animals,
even lacking human reason, would still be susceptible to morality; morality would exist
independently of the mind, allowing reason to discover, unearth, find morality, but never
produce it (Hume 468). The second part of Hume’s argument dissects willful murder, an act
considered vicious, and challenges the reader to pinpoint the vice. He finds this impossible,
finding only feelings – passions, thoughts, intentions, motives. Thus he believes that morality
comes from within, identifying the sentiment of condemnation as an object of feeling,
[s]o that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing,
but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame
from the contemplation of it” (Hume 469).
He concludes that morality cannot be determined by descriptive facts alone; there exist human
feelings that form our understanding of morality.
Searle’s objection to Hume’s argument misses the mark – for recognizing that a society
accepts certain institutions does not explain why those particular institutions are of moral
nature. He acknowledges that “’promise’ is an evaluative word,” but insists that it is also
“purely descriptive” (Searle 58). But, for a claim to be of pure descriptive nature, it must be
ascertainable to all humans, for it is reachable through reason. Searle claims that by
undertaking to play baseball, he is committed to the rules of the game. He illustrates the
necessity of this by elaborating on what happens if he does not follow the rules – but this begs
the question: why are rules important to follow? If I am a citizen of a country, then according to
Searle, I have accepted the rules of the country. But this does not explain why defying the

6. country, even in an extreme case of treason, is an act that can be determine to be virtuous or
vicious. Hume presents the example of parricide as an extreme form in ingratitude, but notes
that the morality of an act of ingratitude is not discovered through reason, for where is the act
that constitutes moral deformity? It is not the institution of gratitude, but rather how that feeling
manifests within individuals that determines the moral deformity. The institutions do not exist
independently of the society, and the society does not exist independently of the individuals
comprising it. Explaining that a given society recognizes the institution of promises does not
allow us to extrapolate the source of that recognition – why does that particular institution
matter? Why does that particular society recognize the institution of promising? Searle does not
answer these questions, yet these are the ones that Hume is asking – how do morals arise?
Indeed, Searle seems to fall victim (for lack of a better term) to the circular reasoning criticized
by Hume by claiming that reason can supply varying morals for varying societies given the
institutions recognized (Hume 467). Such a claim would seem to reinforce the argument
presented by Hume, who notes that feelings, particularly human sympathy, provide the basis
for morality. Social settings enable these human behaviors to manifest, and it is our
perceptions, our impressions of behavior, that give rise to morality. To state that the institution
of promises exists is not sufficient, because there is something that precedes the institution. As
Hume questions, “is property, or right, or obligation, intelligible, without an antecedent
morality?” (462). For Searle to claim that a promise is tautological ignores its foundations –
why is there an obligation to fulfill promises? The origin is not reason, but the perceptions
within each individual. If reason were the sole source of morals, then changing the characters
within the situation would not change the direction of the moral compass. Let us examine –
genocide is an act that carries universal condemnation – yet genocide is more than the act of

7. killing. There is a feeling within the individuals committing genocide, a desire to eliminate a
certain group of people that distinguishes genocide from other acts of killing. And yet, those
committing the killings will contend that the deaths resulted from battle, and that they are
justified in killing those individuals as the situation merits it. Within the institution of war,
killing is allowed, but genocide is not. If the latter is simply an aggrandized version of the
former, where is the moral deformity? The sentiment of moral repugnance to the act of
genocide stems not from the act itself but the motivating feelings behind it. It cannot be derived
from a set of is statements about the situation of war that genocide is an immoral act. Reason
assists us in explaining why genocide is a deplorable act, but it does not unearth the immorality
in its implementation. For that we must delve into the feelings that make us human, the
sentiments and passions that produce a feeling of disgust towards a certain act. The existence of
different types of descriptions and the institutions they encompass does not explain why those
institutions came into existence and why they are pertinent to morality.
These philosophical theories are relevant because morality is ubiquitous, yet elusive.
There is something compelling us to behave in a particular fashion, and that something is
curiously tricky. What we ought to do in a circumstance is of great interest to the conscious
mind. We ponder if morality is universal or if it depends upon the passions of individuals – if
morality is universal then reason should be sufficient to uncover it – but this is not the case.
Morality is temporally and spatially contingent. It was once considered acceptable to
discriminate based on skin color, but this is no longer the case. Morality has shifted, as the
passions of individuals and the world that houses these passions continues to change. Colors
too are perceptions, and we can observe varying societies embracing varying color

8. wheels/names, which leads to these varying societies perceiving colors in different ways.3
Perceptions and passions combined with the describable objective reality may produce a
tentative moral threshold, but reason alone cannot supply the vice or virtue in an act.
Distinguishing between various types of descriptive claims does not logically permit moving
from a set of “is” statements to an “ought.”
3 http://6thfloor.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/its-not-easy-seeing-green/?_r=0

9. Works Cited
Hume, David, David F. Norton, and Mary J. Norton. "Part I, Section I." A Treatise of Human
Nature, Book III: Of Morals. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. 455-70. Print.
Searle, John R. "How to Derive "Ought" From "Is"" The Philosophical Review 73.1 (1964): 43.
JSTOR. Web.

10. Alicia Tutini
In Defense of Hume
Logic 251
11 December 2014