The document provides an analysis of Operation Serval, France's 2013 military intervention in Mali. It summarizes the operational design and objectives, and assesses how well the design achieved the objectives and set conditions for long-term stability in the region. Key elements of the design that contributed to success were clear objectives, use of local forces, and choosing an appropriate end date. However, weaknesses in sustainment and force protection posed risks. The design helped stability by empowering local forces and prioritizing major cities, but disarming militias and supporting Mali's government could have further solidified gains.

1. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.
Contemporary Operational Art Exam
Finding Victory – the French Way
By
Ben L. Anderson
LCDR USN
A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the
requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department course in Joint Maritime Operations.
The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the
Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.
Date: 13 MAY 2015
JMO 2015
LCDR Ben L. Anderson
Ben.Anderson@USNWC.edu

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Operation Serval provided an insight on how light, fast paced forces coupled with joint
fires capabilities could mount an offensive which would be challenging to resist by unorganized
and poorly equipped forces.
Question 1
The first question of the exam states "[d]escribe Gen Bernard Barrera's Operational
Design for SERVAL and assess how well the design achieved stated objectives." The author will
cover the key aspects of General Barrera's operational design that had the most significant impact
on the effectiveness of the operation.
Operation Serval was moderately successful in achieving its operational goals, as it
completed the first and third, was moderately successful on the second, and failed on the fourth.
The elements of the design which were critical to this success were providing clear objectives,
the utilization of the direct approach, the termination criteria, and the effects achieved through
use of local and regional forces.
The stated objectives of Operation Serval were:
1. “To stop the terrorist aggression;
2. Establish a secure environment in Mali for the thousands of French nationals,
3. Facilitate Mali's recovery of its internationally recognized boundaries;
4. And free the French hostages held by AQIM" (p 24).

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The first objective was essential to address quickly, as the French assessed the rebel forces had
the capital city Bamako as a strategic objective, and that should Bamako fall, recovery for the
Malian government would be substantially more challenging. It was for this reason that the
French government abandoned their previous position of waiting for an international force to
take action (p 8).
The second objective was primarily due to the threat the rebel forces posed to the
thousands of French nationals residing in Mali, but was also due to the rebel forces' practice of
taking Westerners hostage and demanding ransom money for them. The third objective was to
aid in the long term stability of the region through the preventing the establishment of an Islamic
state which was perceived as something which would continue to create chaos in the region. The
implied fourth objective was to rescue the French hostages being held by AQIM. Each of these
objectives were achievable, providing clear direction for the French forces in their efforts.
The first component of the operational design was to "move as fast as possible" in order
to "destroy the enemy before it successfully scattered or slipped out of reach" (p 9). While this
could also be discussed as the operational function of movement and maneuver, the use of the
French military's audacity in direct ground force engagement of the Islamist forces achieved an
element of surprise as the rebel forces were not anticipating the ferocity and speed of the French
response. This method, in keeping with French doctrine, is designed to "preserve 'tactical
initiative'," (p 10) which it certainly did achieve.

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Choosing the termination point for Operation Serval was critical to the operation, as
terminated too early or maintaining the offensive for too long could have presented several major
issues. First, had Operation Serval terminated too early, the Islamist forces would have the
opportunity to regroup and attempt to regain lost ground in the confusion following the French
withdrawal. Second, had the French forces remained for a longer period, they risked the
perception of them changing from being a "benevolent third party" (p 20) to a returning colonial
master, which could have led to gains in support for the rebel groups.
The effects achieved through the use of local and regional forces were substantial for two
reasons. First, the intimate knowledge of the land and people allowed for the French to work
with the local populace in a very efficient manner. Second, through the inclusion and emphasized
importance of both local and regional forces, the French were able to garner local support as they
seized territory. This mitigated the support the rebels received, and may have led to an increase
in reports on the rebel locations from the locals.
Two elements which could have been disastrous had the rebel forces demonstrated a
higher level of organization or resistance was the element of operational reach in its relation to
the operational function of sustainment, and the operational function of protection.
Based on the concept that "[o]ne should, in effect, move as fast as one's vehicles and the
need of discretion permit" may have been taken too literally during Operation Serval. Even with
allied forces providing 75% of the lift capacity as well as 30% of the air-to-air refueling (p 35),
the French forces at times were overextended. This resulted in making it extremely challenging

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to keep the vehicles in an operable condition (p 36). The vehicles were not the only things being
over-extended, as the French forces were compared to "Napoleon's army before the Italian
campaign" (p 37) due to the state of the troops’ weapons, uniforms and boots. Due to the rate at
which the forces advanced, they were unable to maintain troops within the range of medical
facilities to meet the "golden hour standard of medical support" (p 43) required within their own
doctrine. This forced commanders on the ground to assess which operations had the most risk,
and prioritized placement of medical facilities accordingly. It was for these reasons that it was
assessed in the RAND report that the French had "operated at or beyond their limits of their
sustainment capabilities" (p 42).
The operational function of protection was another aspect of the operational design which
was weak and could have resulted in disastrous consequences had the rebel forces realized the
French's weakness in this area. First, despite assessments that the weapon systems of rebel forces
included MANPADS, ATGMs, and other heavy weapons (p 6), the forces the French employed
were primarily light and fast, offering little protection against these weapons. Second, contrary
to the lessons learned regarding the vulnerability to IEDs from Afghanistan, the primary vehicle
used in Mali was the VAB vice the heavily armored and IED resistant VBCI. These risks were
acknowledged by the French and considered acceptable at the time, but upon review by the
French Army's Lessons Learned center, the consequences at times could have drastic
implications to the effort (p 9).
With the use of the direct approach, selection of good termination criteria, and the effects
achieved through the use of local and regional forces, Operation Serval was able to complete

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objectives one and three, partially complete two, and not complete four. These may not have
been achieved had the rebel forces been more organized or provided a higher level of resistance
due to the poor design of operational reach as it relates to sustainment, and the operational
function of protection.
Question 2
The second question states "[e]valuate how well the French Operational Design set
conditions for long-term stability in the region" then asks "[w]hat changes would you have
recommended?" The author will first present an analysis of the actions taken by the French to set
the conditions, then provide the deviations that would be recommended to ensure the long term
stability.
Two key aspects of the Operational Design helped provide the framework for the long-
term stability in the region. These aspects were the employment of local and regional forces and
focus on ground combat forces.
The French were very conscious of the sensitivities of the indigenous populations in the
region, and leveraged the careful employment of both local and regional forces to prevent
causing additional support for the rebel groups. Through their colonial ties to Mali, the French
had maintained sufficient local knowledge that they knew not only with whom they could work,
but how they would need to (p 6).

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With this local knowledge, the French understood that the insurrection was not popular
with the majority of the populace, and that through the careful choices on the employment of
forces they could avoid offending the locals and not incite them to align with the rebel forces (p
20).
One case of this strategic decision making was the liberation of Kidal. The French delayed
entering Kidal to allow for the Chadian forces to be the first to enter. This, along with having the
Tuaregs fighting alongside supported the perception that France was only acting as a "benevolent
third party" (p 20).
The French also understood that the MNLA was more "opportunistic" (p 20) then
altruistic in their intentions. With the MNLA having initiated the insurrection, then being ousted
by the Islamist factions, the French were righteously concerned with both the MNLA's behavior
and trustworthiness (p 20). Despite these concerns, the use of the MNLA and of Gamou's militia
provided a level of credibility to the allied force, leading to "local buy-in and popular support" (p
20).
The use of local and regional forces was instrumental in laying the framework for the
long term stability as it provided for the credibility of the forces as they entered into areas,
gaining the support of the populace, and did not contribute to shifting people to support the
Islamist movement. Through the use of the Malian Army and the MNLA, local faces were seen
as the liberators vice foreign faces, giving them a level of pride and credibility that otherwise
would not exist.

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The second aspect that aided in establishing long term stability was the focus on the
employment of ground forces. The paradigm employed by the French was to first seize the
terrain, then search and destroy the enemy forces located therein, followed by turning over the
area to preferably the Malian Army. In seizing of terrain, the objective was to leverage the
"audacity" of the French troops and pursue the insurgents as aggressively as possible in order to
prevent them from digging in and organizing a coordinated defense. This aggressive pursuit also
aided in preventing the insurgents from "slip[ping] out of reach" (p 9).
Using this paradigm, the French prioritized the liberation of Timbuktu and Gao.
Liberating these cities early was essential to the long term stability, as the two cities contain
"94.8%" (p 16) of the population of northern Mali. This allowed for a quick cutoff of resources
(both human and material) to the rebel groups.
Finally, through the focus on ground combat and the audacious spirit of the French
forces, the French were able to effectively clear an area with more certainty than precision strikes
could provide. Engaging in ground focused campaign allowed for a significant portion of the
rebel forces to be killed, their weapon caches captured and destroyed, and consolidation of
cleared areas.
While the French attempted to provide the frame work for long term stability, they were
also wary of "mission-creep" and the perception that they were acting as if they were still
colonial masters of Mali (p 25). This wariness prevented them for taking additional actions
which would have better positioned the Malian government to leverage the "window of

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opportunity" (p 25) the French had worked hard to create. Three recommended changes that
would have aided in setting the framework for long term stability are the disarmament of the
militia factions, the integration of MNLA forces back into the Malian army, and additional
support for the Malian government for stabilization efforts.
While the inclusion of the MNLA and Gamou's militia was vital to the success of
Operation Serval, at the conclusion of the operation these armed factions still existed, and were
not a positive influence on the state of security as they remained opposed to the Malian
government - just with less vigor than the Islamist groups had been (p 25).
Integration of these militia groups into the Malian Army would have achieved three key
items. First, as they were integrated in, the network of the militias could have been broken up,
making it more challenging to reform if they were distributed to various units. Second,
integration would have aided in giving the Malian Army additional credibility with the inclusion
of different tribe members. Finally, with the inclusion of different tribe members, the Malian
Army should be less likely to commit abuses as were attributed to it during the operation (p 25).
One must question why the French had faith in the Malian government and Army (with
the assistance of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission) to
reestablish peace and security in the region following the French's withdrawal considering it was
distrustful of both the Malian government and army that was part of the problem initially (p 25).
Using principles from JP 3-24 (Counterinsurgency), the leveraging of both diplomatic experience
and economic aid may have helped foster a stronger framework for stability. Through diplomatic

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assistance, the French could have helped the Malian government realize and take action on some
of the causes of distrust between the capital city and northern regions. Through economic
assistance and the French's comprehensive understanding of the communities, specific
improvements in the economy or infrastructure could have been made to provide for a higher
quality of living for the population. This investment, compared to the investment required should
Mali devolve into chaos would be minimal.
The French brilliantly leveraged the use of local and regional forces in Operation Serval.
This, combined with the focus on ground combat, allowed for the framework for a long term
stability to be facilitated at the operation's conclusion. Had the French included a plan to disarm
the various militias and aid in their integration into the Malian Army, the ability for future armed
insurrection would have been mitigated to some extent. Had the French combined these actions
with use of both the diplomatic and economic aspects of national power to better position the
Malian government in establishing a trusting relationship with the Northern provinces, the
prospects for long term stability would have been much higher.