On Technological Determinism- A Typology- Scope Conditions- and a Mech.docx

On Technological Determinism: A Typology, Scope Conditions, and a Mechanism
Author(s): Allan Dafoe
Source: Science, Technology, & Human Values , November 2015, Vol. 40, No. 6 (November
2015), pp. 1047-1076
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Article
On Technological Determinism:
A Typology, Scope Conditions, and a Mechanism
Science, Technology, & Human Values 2015, Vol. 40(6) 1047-1076
Â© The Author(s) 20 1 5 Reprints and permission:
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Allan Dafoe1
Abstract

"Technological determinism" is predominantly employed as a critic's term, used to dismiss
certain classes of theoretical and empirical claims. Under- stood more productively as referring
to claims that place a greater emphasis on the autonomous and social-shaping tendencies of
technology, technological determinism is a valuable and prominent perspective. This article
will advance our understanding of technological determinism through four contributions. First, I
clarify some debates about technological determinism through an examination of the meaning of
technology. Second, I parse the family of claims related to technological determinism. Third, I
note that constructive and determinist insights may each be valid given particular scope
conditions, the most prominent of which is the scale of analysis. Finally, I propose a theoretical
microfoundation for technological determinism - military-economic adaptationism - in which
economic and military competition constrain sociotechnical evolution to deterministic paths.
This
'Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
Corresponding Author: Allan Dafoe, Yale University, 1 15 Prospect Street, Rosenkranz Hall,
New Haven, CT 06520, USA.
Email: [emailÂ protected]
1048 Science, Technology, & Human Values 40(6)
theory is a special case of a general theory - sociotechnical selectionism - which can be regarded
as also including (mild) constructivist theories as special cases. Greater understanding of, respect
for, and engagement with technological determinism will enhance the study of technology and
our ability to shape our sociotechnical systems.
Keywords technological determinism, constructivism, trends, momentum, unintended
consequences, autonomy, competition, selectionism, levels of analysis, functionality, power
Who - If Anyone - Controls Technological Change? A central issue in the study of technology is
the question of agency. To
what extent do we have control over the tools we use - and hence also our
systems of production, social relations, and worldview? To what extent are our technologies
thrust upon us - by controlling elites, by path-dependent decisions from the past, or by some
internal technological logic?
Prior to the 1980s, many scholars of technology took seriously the view that technological
change could be, in some sense, an out-of-control history-shaping process (Winner 1977). To

these scholars, often looking over large spans of time, technology seemed to develop
autonomously, following an internal technical logic, and profoundly shape society in ways that
were not intended by anyone.
More recently, this view has been dismissed by many sociologists and historians of technology
as "technological determinism." These scholars generally prefer constructivist approaches to the
study of technology, employing descriptive narrative and emphasizing historical and social
context, human agency, interpretive flexibility, and contingency. Con- structivist scholarship has
been very productive, in general by providing a rich framework for the study of the social
shaping of technology, and in particular by challenging technological determinism. Through
many detailed studies of the design, interpretation, and use of technology (for a useful overview,
see Hackett, Amsterdamska, and Wajcman 2008), constructivist scholarship has convincingly
shown the important role in the evolution of technology of different social groups, historical
context, and varying perceptions of the meaning and purpose of a technology. In so doing,
constructivist scholarship has shown the implausibility of simplis- tic technological
determinisms.
Dafoe 1 049
But the field of science and technology studies (STS) has gone much further, largely rejecting
the many questions and conjectures that are central to technological determinism. Summarizing
this rejection of technological determinism, Ronald Kline (2001) writes that "historians and
sociologists of technology have discredited the tenet of technological determinism, so much so
that it has become a critic's term and a term of abuse in their academic circles"(p. 15497), and
Michael Lynch (2008, 10) states that "technological determinism has been reduced to the status
of a straw position in technology studies." To provide some systematic evidence on the state of
the literature, I reviewed sixty references, selecting the twenty references that ranked highest in a
Google Scholar search for "technological determinism" within each of the following three
leading STS journals ( Science , Technology , & Human Values ; Social Studies of Science^
Technology and Culture ); of the twenty-five articles that offered an explicit judgment of the
merits of technological determinism, 76 percent of the references were critical (for data and cod-
ing details, see http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/28473).
While most STS scholars will agree that, in addition to the social shaping of technology, there is
an "influence of technology upon social relations" (Mackenzie and Wajcman 1999, 41),
questions about the effects and autonomy of technology are neglected. Important underexplored
areas of inquiry include the study of the political effects of technology, the inertia of tech-
nological systems, the existence of trends and an internal logic in technological developments,
and the historical transformations associated with key technological innovations.1 Leonardi and
Barley (2010), reflecting on the field of technology and organization, similarly argue that the
field has swung strongly away from technological determinism, in so doing neglect- ing issues of

"knateriality and power" (p. 42). The contemporary lack of interest in deterministic questions and
propositions within STS is all the more concerning because most of the disciplines in social
science, and business and the military, continue to take them seriously. In short, STS no lon-
ger seriously engages with one of its founding debates.
A recent move within STS to take technological determinism "more seriously" involves studying
beliefs about technological determinism using a constructivist lens (Wyatt 2008; SÃ¶derberg
2013). While these works do direct attention to technologically deterministic claims, they treat
them as subjects of study to be explained , not as potentially insightful theoretical arguments that
can explain.
I propose that "technological determinism" should be reclaimed from its use as a critic's term and
straw position and should instead be employed to
1050 Science , Technology, & Human Values 40(6)
(Mild) Social Constructivism (Soft) Technological Determinism
Radical
Social '* *'â– Technological Constructivism Determinism
Figure I . A continuum of scholarship, from social constructivism to technological determinism.
respectfully characterize works that are closer to the determinisi side of the continuum of
scholarly claims (similar to the proposed usage in Smith and Marx 1994, xiii). Going too far in
either direction leads to the generally implausible positions of hard technological determinism
(Smith and Marx 1994, 2) or radical social constructivism (Sismondo 1993; see Figure 1). The
question should not be a dichotomous one of whether technological determinism is right or
wrong, but a set of questions of degree, scope, and context: to what extent, in what ways, and
under what scope conditions are particular kinds of technology more autonomous and powerful
in shaping society? The complement of this framing also clarifies questions about human
agency: to what extent, in what ways, and under what scope conditions are particular groups of
people able to shape their sociotechnical systems?
This article seeks to reclaim "technological determinism" as a legiti- mate intellectual position
through the following contributions. The first section discusses the definition of technology,
clarifying some debates about technological determinism. The second section outlines the rich
family of ideas related to technological determinism. In it I clarify different aspects of technical
determinism and how they logically relate to each other; I discuss the role of technological trends
in deterministic thinking; and I note that deterministic claims are more prevalent in studies with

macro levels of analysis and that contrary findings from micro levels of analysis do not
necessarily invalidate macro-insights. The third section addresses a serious weakness in
technologically determinisi accounts: the lack of a compelling causal microfoundation. This
article outlines a theory of military-economic adaptationism in which military and economic
competition can give rise to harder forms of technological determinism. In so doing, it shows
how it is possible for both radical constructivism and hard determinism to be simultaneously true
on different scales of analysis. At the micro level, social groups can have extreme flexibility in
interpreting, using, and designing technology. At the macro level, however, strong military and
economic competition could lead to emergent
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patterns in which technology evolves as if according to an inner logic that determines society.
What Is Technology? Confusion about technological determinism is in part due to confusion
about the meaning of the term technology. Technology can refer to vast sociotechnical systems,
such as the Internet, as well as specific artifacts, standards, routines, and beliefs that make up
these systems, such as computers, the Internet protocol, e-mail routines, and beliefs about the
reliability of online information. Leo Marx (1997, 982-83) argues that the term technology , by
conflating specific artifacts and broad sociotechnical systems, induces erroneous deterministic
thinking and that the abstract concept "is almost completely vacuous." Whenever possible, this
ambiguity can be avoided through the use of more pre- cise terms. Artifact can stand for specific
objects intended for a function, such as machines, devices, and tools. Technique can refer to
"softer" functional configurations, such as habits of mind, analytical methods, and behavioral
routines. Institutions can refer to organizational hierarchies, legal codes, and incentive
structures. Sociotechnical systems can refer to the vast functional configurations of all these
components. While I agree that these other terms can clarify thinking, I nevertheless believe the
abstract term technology is useful. Technology , like its "immediate precursors - words like
machine , invention, improvement, and ... the mechanic (or useful . . . ) arts " (Marx 1997, 967,
italics in orig- inal) is rooted in the metaphor of the machine and the application of science to
commercial and military objectives. As such, technology highlights the functionality of
sociotechnical configurations. This is apparent in present-day definitions of technology as "a
manner of accom- plishing a task" (Merriam Webster 2005) and as "configurations that work "
(Rip and Kemp 1998, 330). The defining characteristic of technology is its functionality, not its
specific materiality. Technology , thus, (1) denotes those entities - artifacts, techniques,
institutions, systems - that are or were functional and (2) emphasizes the functional dimension of
those entities.
This understanding of technology helps to resolve a central confusion in debates over
technological determinism. Critics of technological determinism often portray the debate as

centered on the definition of technology as artifact. However, while some aspects of
technological
determinism are about artifactual determinism, the core of the literature is more about kinds of
functional determinism: the way that history often seems to follow inexorable functional logics
that drive and are driven by technological change.
Technological Determinism The term technological determinism , as Ronald Kline (2001) points
out, is presently employed to criticize the extreme position that (1) technology develops
according to an "internal logic independent of social influence" (p. 15495) and that (2)
"technological change determines social change in a prescribed manner" (p. 15495).
Exemplifying Kline's argu- ment, Bimber (1994) offers the extreme definition of technological
determinism as the view that history is "determined by laws. . .rather than by human will" (p. 86)
and that these laws involve physical artifacts as a necessary component (p. 88). Technological
determinism so defined does not allow the possibility of any human agency and thus does not
refer to the vast majority of perspectives that takes the effects of technology seriously.
I propose defining technological determinism more moderately as approaches that emphasize (1)
the autonomy of technological change and (2) the technological shaping of society. Following
Smith and Marx (1994, 2), who offer a similar moderate definition, we can situate deterministic
theories along a continuum, with harder determinists putting more emphasis on the autonomy
and power of technology, and softer determinists allowing for more social control and context.
This moderate definition provides a terminological umbrella for a large set of respectable
scholarship, spanning the disciplines that study technology.
In the following section, I analytically separate a number of distinct claims related to
technological determinism (with distinct theories itali- cized). The family of claims include the
views that: (1) functional entities (artifacts, techniques, institutions, and systems) exert an effect
on the world independent of human choice ( technical determinism ); (2) there is a broad
sequence and tempo of scientific and technological advance {technological trends) that seems to
follow an internal logic , making technological change seem autonomous ; and (3) that people
are insuffi- ciently conscious of their technological choices ( technological somnambulism) or
have been co-opted ( the magnificent bribe), such that the social order is becoming more
machine-like over time.

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Technical Determinism
The claim most often associated with technological determinism is that of artif actual
determinism : the view that artifacts shape social relations. Technical determinism , on the other
hand, denotes the broader view that technical entities, such as artifacts, routines, and the
technical dimensions of institutions and systems, exert effects on the world. Harder variants
claim that thes^ effects are more extensive and powerful. The form of technical determinism that
leaves the greatest role for human agency is the idea of technological politics (Winner 1980,
1986): intentions can be inscribed into technologies, which then influence others. In this view,
technological decisions "are similar to legislative acts or political foundings that establish a
framework for public order that will endure over many generations" (p. 29). Examples include
the construction of fences, speed bumps, bulletproof glass, surveillance technology,
encryption algorithms, and the broad linear Parisian boulevards that facilitated the Suppression
of riots (Lay 1992, 97). Prisons, schools, art studios, and other institutions all employ technology
to evoke specific kinds of behavior, from compliance to creativity. Latour (1992) refers to
technology as the "missing mass" of sociology, since it invisibly holds together the social order.
Feenberg (2010, 18) refers to the way that technology provides "material validation of the
social order" as the "'bias' of technology." A handful of other scholars have contributed to the
con- versation between ST S and the study of technological politics (Hamlett 2003; Wachelder
2003), though more is required given the importance of these questions. Two other technically
deterministic theories are the ideas of technological momentum (Hughes 1983, 295) and
technological frames (Bijker 1995). These ideas emphasize the constraints arising from
established technological systems; these can be regarded as more deterministic than
technological politics because the constraints need not have been designed by any particular
human or group. Hughes found that as systems mature they seem to gain inertia. This inertia
follows the logic of sunk costs: assets have been bought, standards set, infrastructure built,
employees trained, interactions routinized, and interests entrenched, all of which constrain
subsequent decisions. Likewise, Bijker (1995, 282) rejects the idea that "social groups [can]
fantasize whatever they want, without constraints." Instead, Bijker (1995, 264) argues that
practices, shared meanings, and infrastructure produce technological frames which "constrain
freedom of choice in designing new technologies."
Few scholars would deny the premise that there can be an "influence of technology upon social
relations" (Mackenzie and Wajcman 1999, 41). This premise, however, implies the possibility of
harder forms of technical determinism whenever technologies have unintended consequences.
Due to the lack of foresight or concern by the designer, or the sheer unpredictability

of complex sociotechnical processes, unintended consequences can arise that fundamentally
shape social relations.
Examples of unintended consequences abound in the history of technology: the invention and
deployment of the machine gun and barbed wire unexpectedly gave rise to a terrible form of
warfare that was abhorred by all - even the generals and politicians responsible for con- tinuing
the war (Ellis 1975). The decision by a few members of the Skolt Lapps of Finland to use
snowmobiles in their herding practice began a process that undermined their traditional
egalitarian culture (Pelto 1973). A report by the US National Security Council shares this view
that "as technologies emerge, people will lack full awareness of their wider economic,
environmental, cultural, legal, and moral impact
Trends- 2015 2000, 14). If technological change proceeds too quickly and extensively, "societies
face the distinct possibility of going adrift in a vast sea of 'unintended consequences'" (Winner
1977, 89). Under this perspective, while people may control initial technological choices, if they
are sufficiently ignorant of the consequences of their decisions society can be fundamentally
shaped in ways that no one intended. Taken to the limit so that technical effects are powerful and
conse-
quences unforeseeable, the simple premise that technology can shape social relations implies a
hard technological determinism: a world where technology evolves in a seemingly autonomous
and society-determining way. The difference between most mainstream STS theories and hard
determinism is
therefore not fundamental, but a matter of degree that depends on how strongly technologies
shape social relations and how foreseeable are the consequences of technology. The extent to
which hard technological determinism has merit, therefore, is an empirical and context-specific
question, not something that can be assumed, deduced, or casually generalized across empirical
domains.
Trends in Technological Change
A second prominent theme of technological determinism is that there are trends in the patterns of
sociotechnical evolution. Over the large sweep of time, the pool of artifacts seems to continually
increase in diversity and
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number. New innovations arise that exceed the previous in their complexity,

power, and utility. To cite some specific trends, there seems to have been a persistent increase in
the maximum levels of the: speed of transportation and communication, lethality of weapons,
durability of materials, efficiency of engines, marginal productivity of labor, ability to store and
reproduce information, height of buildings, and so forth. These "trends in the maximum" are
the easiest trends to define, though it seems likely that many other kinds of trends could be
operationalized given closer study. The medievalist historian Joseph Stray er (1955, 224),
summarizing the history of Western Europe during the Middle Ages, notes that "if there is steady
progress anywhere, it is in the field of technology." Similarly, a number of anthropologists and
archaeologists have identified a direction in the evolution of civilization toward increased
social complexity. Robert Wright (2000, 16), summarizing this literature, writes that
"archaeologists can't help but notice that, as a rule, the deeper you dig, the simpler the society
whose remains you find." These trends need not extend monotonically - in one direction at all
scales of analysis - for them to warrant being taken seriously. Some of these technological trends
follow logically from the apparent cumulative nature of technological innovation (Heilbroner
1967): it is hard to imagine a society developing nuclear power before first harnessing simpler
sources of power. Some technological trends are so predictable and persistent that they seem to
follow an internal logic. Historian of computing Paul Ceruzzi (2005, 593) observes that an
"internal logic is at work" in the evolution of some technologies. Specifically, over the past forty
years, the "exponen- tial growth of chip density has hardly deviated from its slope," (p. 586) as
described by Moore's Law. The belief in Moore's Law, Ceruzzi writes, is not "an indication of
the social construction of computing [but] an indication of the reality of technological
determinism. Computing power must increase because it can" (p. 590). Ceruzzi concludes that
historians of technology should "step back from a social constructionist view of technology"
and consider that, in at least some cases, "raw technological determinism is at work" (p. 593).
Similarly, many early theorists observed the trend that society was becoming more rationalistic,
technical, and materialistic. Max Weber (1978, lix) warned that "rational calculation . . . reduces
every worker to a cog in [the bureaucratic] machine and, seeing himself in this light, he will
merely ask how to transform himself from a little into a somewhat bigger cog." Ellul (1962, 30)
was concerned with the spread of "la technique," which "is artificial, autonomous, self-
determining, and independent of all
human intervention." Mumford (1966, 3) warned that "man will become a passive, purposeless,
machine conditioned animal." These processes could be due to our insufficient awareness about
our technological choices ( technological somnambulism , Winner 1977, 167).
A potential mechanism for the spread of la technique could be called the magnificent bribe : the
tendency for the system to co-opt individuals by using the material incentive to become a
"somewhat bigger cog." Mumford (1964, 6) writes that: "We are being asked to ratify ... a
magnificent bribe" under which "each member of the community may claim every material

advantage, every intellectual and emotional stimulus" in exchange for sur- render to
"authoritarian technics." Winner (1977, 167) concurs that "each group with any appreciable
social power has gained auxiliary membership in the technostructure or has been put on its
payroll." An example of this involves the 1997-1998 transformation of Massachusetts Institute of
Technology's Technology Review. Motivated by "years of declining advertising revenue" (Crum
1998), a former advertising director from Fortune magazine was brought in to increase the
magazine's profits. He managed to turn red ink to black, but only after a new editor ensured that
"nothing will be left of the old magazine except the name" (Warsh 1998, CI). The regular
columnists and editorial staff were fired. The magazine transformed from a policy-relevant
publication that was reflective about the social implications of technical choices to one whose
new mandate, as characterized by former editor Marcus, was "cheerleading for innovation"
(Warsh 1998, CI). The need for profit transformed Technology Review. How many other public
conversations about the sociotechnical order are similarly influenced?
The seeming trend toward greater rationalization may be explained by the fact that people
perceive it to be beneficial. Leo Marx (1987) describes the technocratic concept of progress in
which scientific, technological, and economic progress is thought to improve "all the conditions
of life - social, political, moral, and intellectual, as well as material" (p. 34). If enough people
perceive technological progress to improve life, then associated trends may not be evidence of
technological determinism, but simply the product of a social choice to pursue certain
technological changes. However, while technological development has improved many
dimensions of life for many people in recent decades, there remains abundant evidence in
history of technological trends going against the will of elites at the time (see, for example,
discussion of the Meiji Restoration below). The modern miracle of economic development may
only tempo- rarily coincide with the interests of most people; for example, trends in
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information technology and automation are plausibly eroding the income of the majority of
Americans.2 In summary, there appear to be trends in the evolution of human civilization,
particularly in the character of our technologies. Some of these trends follow logically from the
implausibility that an advanced technology could be developed before the development of its
prerequisites. Some of these trends are so striking and persistent in their rhythm that they seem to
suggest an internal logic of development. One trend is toward the greater rationalization of
society, which may arise from lack of consciousness,
selective co-opÄ¼tation, or from its perceived benefits.
Scope Conditions and Levels of Analysis

The sociotechnical trends that are most suggestive of determinism are generally those thÃ t
take place over longer time scales: five decades of expo-
nentially increasing density of transistors; two centuries of technological progress and economic
growth since the Industrial Revolution; and two mil- lennia of the growth in the size, complexity,
and energy intensity of civili- zations. In a survey of scholarship on technology, Thomas Misa
(1988) identified that technologically deterministic scholarship tends to look at larger scales of
time and space than scholarship that is more constructivist. Both across disciplines and "within
each discipline, the authors affirming some version of technological determinism adopt a
"macro" perspective, whereas those denying technological determinism adopt a "micro" per-
spective" (Mis^ 1988, 309). How can we reconcile these divergent findings? One response is to
assert epistemologicai superiority for micro studies', the findings of more detailed smaller scale
Scholarship are more valid than those adopting a macro- perspective. Misa (1998) articulates this
view: "the Machine as causal force vanishes when [scholars] adopt a detailed analysis" (p. 315),
"from a shop- floor perspective, the Machine is an irrelevant abstraction, and what makes history
is individuals (perhaps classes) in conflict or accommodation. A row of machine tools is not
itself a compelling historical agent" (p. 320). Simi- larly, Williams (2002, 116) writes that to a
historian, technological determinism is "self-evidently untrue: human beings construct
machines, not the reverse." Epistemologicai superiority for micro-studies is implicit any- time a
scholar rejects findings from macro-studies using evidence from micro-studies.
Is it not possible that different processes could be at work on different scales of analysis
(Leonardi and Barley 2010, 37)? In complex systems,
1058
there are often emergent patterns visible over larger scales of analysis which may be impossible
to perceive at smaller scales of analysis (Byrne 1998). Consider the example of traffic: the fact
that humans driving vehicles have intelligence, idiosyncrasies, and free will does not refute the
fact that traffic
patterns often follow a simple, counterintuitive, and unintended logic. For example, in some
situations, traffic throughput can be increased by inten- tionally slowing down traffic (Resnick
1996). Traffic jams do not need an obvious proximal cause, such as a car accident, to come into
existence; they emerge spontaneously when vehicle density exceeds certain levels (Nagel and
Paczuski 1995). Similarly, in history, there may arise unexpected, deterministic, macro-patterns
that are independent of human inten- tion and not apparent at smaller scales. Many of the claims
of technological determinists are macro-observations
about patterns in history. Scholars looking at smaller scales of analysis may reject these macro-
patterns because it is not clear how they could emerge from micro social processes. However,

such an inference does not follow. It would be incorrect to reject Boyle's Law because the
motion of individual molecules is chaotic and unpredictable. It would be incorrect for pre-
Newtonian scholars to reject the systematic association between the motion of the moon and
tides because they could not conceive of a mechanism to link them.
Social systems are complex and multileveled and are known to give rise to emergent unexpected
behavior. When limited to their respective empirical domains, could it not be that the claims of
both constructivists and the
determinists are valid? Is it not possible that on certain scales of analysis technology is socially
created, hacked, and interpreted, while on other scales of analysis technology exhibits trends, an
internal logic of development, and profoundly shapes history in ways unforeseen by humans?
The Missing Mechanism: Military-Economic Competition The previous section argued that it is
an error to discard macro-observations simply because they appear to be inconsistent with micro-
observations. However, macro-observations are much more compelling if a coherent and
plausible theory links the macro-patterns to a believable microfoundation. In this section, I
offer such a mechanism - military-economic competition - showing how deterministic macro-
patterns could emerge from social micro-processes. This explanation - military-economic adap-
tationism - can account for most of the claims of technological
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determinists. Military-economic adaptationism states that (CI) when there is sufficiently intense
and prolonged economic and/or military competition, and given that (C2) technology enables
new sociotechnical configurations, (C3) some of which confer advantages in economic/military
competition, sociotechnical systems will evolve to become more adapted to success in the
economic and/or military competition. This section will introduce the general theory of
sociotechnical selectionism and show how mild constructivism and military-economic adapta-
tionism can be regarded as special cases, differing on the empirical issue of what kind of
selection process (cognitive/social vs. economic/military) is dominant. I then discuss military-
economic adaptationism in more detail, showing how it could account for the deterministic claim
that there exist macro-trends in sociotechnical evolution that are (largely) independent of human
will.
Sociotechnical Selectionism
The claim that competition is the mechanism for technological determinism is a special case of
the theory of selectionism (also called Universal Darwin- ism). Selectionism generalizes the
mechanism at the heart of evolutionary biology: variation and differential proliferation. In a
population of varied forms, if some forms proliferate (reproduce, survive, grow) because of some

characteristic, then that characteristic will be more abundant in future popu- lations. Over time,
these forms, called organisms in evolutionary biology and interactors more generally (Hull
2001), will fit better with - will appear as if designed for - the criterion that determines superior
proliferation (the "selection environment").
This logic applies to sociotechnical entities: which exhibit variety ; for example, there are many
styles of hammer, production strategy, and military, and new variants persistently arise.
Sociotechnical entities proliferate at different rates (some negative) as a function of selection
pressures ; certain types of artifact, technique, and institution are reproduced, imitated,
imported to other contexts, or expand in scale. Other types - most types - of artifact, technique,
or institution die out. This proliferation is a function of cognitive, social, economic, military,
ecological, and other selection pressures. Over the long run , the population of technologies will
become more adapted to their selection environment: hammers become more effective,
production strategies more productive, and militaries more powerful. Military-economic
adaptationism is a special case of sociotechnical selectionism that emphasizes the selection
pressures associated with
economic and military competition; military and economic competition seem to operate over
longer time scales than cognitive and social selection processes, which may account for why
deterministic claims are most com- mon in studies of longer time scales.
Mild social constructivism can also be thought of as a special case of sociotechnical selectionism
in which the selection environment is primarily cognitive, social, or political. In fact, Pinch and
Bijker (1987, 22; see also Bijker 1995, 51) explicitly proposed selectionism as the model for the
Social Construction of Technology: "In SCOT the developmental process of a technological
artifact is described as an alternation of variation and selection." Other historians and
sociologists of technology have explicitly employed selectionist reasoning in their theories
(Basalla 1988; Vincenti 1990; O'Connell 1992, and the many contributors to Ziman's (2003)
edited volume Technological Innovation as an Evolutionary Process). In this model, cognitive
and social processes are crucial for determining the differential proliferation of ideas and
technologies. Note that sociotechnical selectionism, just like evolution by natural selection, does
not imply a linear evolution of forms (Pinch and Bijker refer to it as a "multidirectional model");
however, as discussed below, in Trends in Military-Economic Adaptationism subsection, it could
give rise to trends. Selectionist reasoning is also prominent in many other fields, including
psychology (Campbell 1974), philosophy (Dennett 1995), political science, economics, archaeol-
ogy (see below), and, of course, biology.
Military-economic Adaptationism

The theory of military-economic adaptationism applies when three conditions are present.
Condition 1 (military-economic competition): There is sufficiently intense and prolonged
military and/or economic competition between groups of people, such that the outcome of the
competition determines the ability of these groups to maintain and proliferate their ways of life.
The strength of economic or military competition varies by region and era and can be empirically
evaluated. Therefore, the appropriateness of military-economic adaptationism as a theory of
sociotechnical evolution will vary over time in a measurable way by the applicability of
condition 1 . Var- iation in the intensity of military-economic competition can be exploited to
study military-economic adaptationism (e.g., Turchin et al. 2013).
Dafoe 1 06 1
Condition 2 (technology enables): Technology enables new sociotechnical configurations.
This condition is probably the mildest definition of the effect of technology, and thus can be
assumed to be true for almost all situations. It does not assume that technology "constrains" or
has a particular "valence" or deter- ministically exerts effects of any kind on society. All that is
required is that some technologies enable groups to do things that they otherwise could not.
Condition 3 (imperfection): The configurations enabled by new technology are sometimes
superior to existing configurations for the selection environment.
This last condition is logically necessary to rule out the implausible sit- uation in which new
technology cannot possibly provide an advantage. The extent to which condition 3 is true (the
probability of a superior con-
figuration becoming feasible per unit time) affects the speed of sociotechnical adaptation.
These conditions then support some implications.
Implication 1 (differential proliferation): All else equal, those groups who adopt configurations
that convey economic or military
advantages ^vill proliferate, relative to those who do not.
Implication 2 (military-economic adaptation): Sociotechnical systems will evÃ²lve so as to be
more adapted to the economic and/or military competitive environment.

Interestingly, we see the mechanism of economic and military competition explicitly in the
writings of technological determinists. Ellul (1962, 84) explains that la technique proliferates
because it is powerful and that groups face an illusory choice over whether to adopt or reject la
technique : either they adopt it or they will be defeated. Mumford (1962, 195) argues that
societies pursued technical means because of economic and military competition. Similarly,
economic historian Joel Mokyr (1990, 206) summarizes that "the struggle for survival [in
Europe] guaranteed" that rulers had to accommodate themselves to economically beneficial
technological advances. Mokyr explains that without competition, technological progress would
probably have been willfully stopped long ago: "By and large, the forces opposing technological
progress have been stronger than those striv- ing for changes" (p. 16). But, "as long as some
societies remain creative,
others will eventually be dragged along" (p. 302). According to Mokyr, the "stronger" social
forces opposed to technological progress have been defeated because, though they were
proximally stronger, they competed against social groups that became more competitive because
of their attitude toward technol-
ogy. In a competitive world, so long as some communities pursue profitable or
powerful technologies, all societies will eventually be "dragged along." The mechanism of
military-economic competition is prominently theo-
rized in most fields that study the macroevolution of social systems. Many insights from
economics rely on the concept of competition, most notably in the economics of innovation
(Freeman and Soete 1997), evolutionary economics (Hodgson 2002; Nelson and Winter 1982),
economic history (Mokyr 1990; North 1990), the two fundamental theorems of welfare eco-
nomics, the idea of path dependence from increasing returns (Arthur 1994), and the justification
of the rational actor assumption in competitive markets (Samuelson 1998). The prominent
theoretical approach in international relations of structural realism asserts that international
competition constrains statesmen to pursue military-economic power, irrespective of their
ultimate goals (Waltz 1979). Many scholars see military-economic competition as the force that
gave rise to large coherent political orders such as the state and nation-state (Carneiro 1970; Tilly
1992; Spruyt 1994; Thompson 2001; Turchin et al. 2013), and even to the altruism-promoting
norms, institutions, and genetically rooted social preferences that allowed humans to become
such a successful cooperative species (Bowles and Gintis 2011). Emphasis on military-economic
adaptationist processes can be found in all fields of social science that examine large-scale
changes, such as history, sociology, anthropology, and archaeology (McNeill 1984; Sanderson
1990; Diamond 1997; Carneiro 2003; Wilson 2003; Richerson and Boyd 2004; Bowles and

Gintis 201 1). In summary, military-economic adaptationist theories are prevalent in macro
social science and are actively studied.
Military-economic adaptationism allows us to elaborate a prominent critique of some
constructivist approaches to technology, that it ignores social structure, such as the asymmetric
power of some groups over others (Russell 1986; Klein and Kleinman 2002). Military-economic
adaptationism extends this critique by pointing out that when military-economic competition
is severe, power goes to those groups who best adapt to the military-economic pressures.
Trends in Military-Economic Adaptationism
There is a third conditional implication of military-economic adaptationism.
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Implication 3 (trends): If over time the competitive environment con- tinues to select for more of
some trait (such as energy intensiveness, functional differentiation, processor speed, explosive
power), then the evolution of sociotechnical systems will exhibit trends in that trait.
One of the central differences between determinisi and constructivist
accounts of technological change is whether technology is seen as evol- ving in a linear or
multidirectional way. The theory of sociotechnical selectionism makes clear that the
directionality and linearity of evolution depends on the character of the selection process over
time. Even when military-economic competition dominates, technological change need not
exhibit trends, For example, though there seems to be a broad trend in history toward larger
polities and greater functional differentiation, certain technological innovations have reversed
this trend: the innovation of iron weaponry in 1000-1200 BC made flatter social structures more
competitive, reducing (for a time) the size of polities and functional differentiation (McNeill
1984, 13).
Trends in a selectionist system can arise if there is ongoing selection for the same trait over time.
Whether there is, in fact, ongoing selection for the same trait in sociotechnical evolution, perhaps
during particular periods, is an open scientific question, as is the analogous question in evolu-
tionary biology (McShea 1998). Military-economic adaptationism offers a mechanism by which
certain trends could arise and moves us toward more productive theoretical and empirical
questions: What kinds of selectionist processes give rise to trends? Were the selectionist
processes that were present at particular periods of history the kind that would induce trends? Do
we, in fact, observe these sociotechnical trends? Where are current selectionist processes likely
to take us?

Vicarious Selection
One particularly useful theoretical development is the notion of vicarious selection , developed
by Walter Vincenti (1990) and others. Vicarious selection is the process whereby a life-form
tries to anticipate the external selection environment and preemptively adapt to it. Accurately
doing so would convey a large advantage to the life-form. It would also accelerate the process of
adaptation and disguise from the analyst the ultimate cause of the adaptation.
Vincenti offers the example of an aeronautics engineering team. Rather than implement each
idea in a full-scale plane and then see how well it flies,
engineers test their ideas in simulated environments. These engineers first select their ideas about
wing design based on how well the idea fits with their cognitive model of a good design; they
then submit the idea to selection by the group's understanding of good design; they then select
wing designs based on performance in a wind tunnel. By simulating as closely as possible the
actual selection environment, aeronautical engineers can more quickly and less expensively
design the optimal wing shape. Ulti- mately, however, the wing will have to pass some external
selection criteria, such as the ability to efficiently move a plane through the air so as to con-
tribute to profitability or military efficacy. Similarly, any life-form will be more successful if it
can accurately anticipate and adapt to the external selection environment.
This concept is useful because it shows how the external selection environment could influence
the goals and values of an individual or group. A scholar who seeks to explain technological
change using only the decisions, beliefs, values, and ideologies of groups will fail to see the
prior structural causes of these decisions, beliefs, values, and ideologies. Soci- eties spend
tremendous resources trying to develop more powerful military systems and more profitable
economic enterprises. This obsession for power and profit has proximal causes in culture,
ideology, institutions, and the preferences of individuals. But ultimately, this social commitment
toward building powerful and profitable sociotechnical systems may be driven by the imperative
for states and firms to survive and proliferate in a competitive environment. Given competition
and enough time, groups that choose not to adapt to military-economic imperatives will be
defeated, absorbed by more competitive groups, or will realize their peril and imitate more
competitive groups. Many scholars argue that imitation is an important means by which
sociotechnical components or systems proliferate (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Rogers 1995;
Lynn 1996; Gold- man and Eliason 2003). When observed on a microscale, this decision to
imitate others may appear willful or the product of human psychology or a particular culture;
however, it would be a mistake to underestimate the underlying causal role of competitive
pressures.

An apt example of vicarious selection of military and economic pressures comes from Thomas
Hughes' history of electric systems. Hughes describes how the British systems of electric power
before World War I were much smaller than those in the United States and Germany because
"the British placed a high value on the power of local government" (p. 79). Under the imperative
to improve efficiency during World War I, however, they were networked and made larger,
contrary to "prevailing
Dafoe 1 065
British political values" (Hughes 1987, 79). Hughes explains that "engineers and managers
who, because of their experience and special compe- tence, were committed to smallness of scale
nevertheless acknowledged the primacy of output when personal and national survival seemed to
depend on it" (p. 285). This case illustrates how sociotechnical trends could arise counter to the
wishes of society: the technology of energy production and distribution in Britain became
larger, more centrally controlled, more complex and differentiated, despite the prevailing
political views. The British chose to have a larger power system in the trivial sense that a victim
chooses to give up his wallet at gunpoint. Another informative case comes from one of history's
best examples of a society controlling its technological course: the Tokugawa period of Japa-
nese history. In the sixteenth century, Japan had some of the most sophis- ticated firearms in the
world (Perrin 1979, 25). Japan was unified during this period due in large part to the advantages
conferred on larger warlords by firearms technology (Chase 2003, 184; Brown 1948). Following
this uni- fication, internal and external military competition subsided, permitting elites greater
control over their destiny: firearms technology was centralized and then largely eliminated
(Perrin 1979), and interchange with foreigners was strictly controlled. A samurai-dominated
social order persisted for over 200 years. This ended in 1853 when the military threat from
foreigners could no longer be ignored. Commodore Perry, of the US Navy, violated Japan's strict
seclusion policy with his four "black ships of evil" (Baruma 2004, 11) spewing smoke and
mysteriously moving upwind without sails. Under the implicit threat of bombardment and a
famine-inducing blockade (Samson 1963, 234), the Japanese made concessions. They observed
the fate of China to colonial exploitation and their own powerlessness to repel Perry's ships. A
debate and then civil war raged about how to respond. The individuals who emerged as the
leaders of Japan had come to appreciate the necessity of learning from Western countries. They
systematically observed foreign institutions and technologies and imitated those that seemed to
give the foreigners their military power. Within merely a few decades, the Japanese radically
transformed themselves - adopting many Western customs, institutions, and technologies -
contrary to the values of the Japanese elite pre-1853. The Japanese chose well; whereas Japan's
neighbors were colonized by Western powers, the Japanese were able to modernize on their own
terms (Totman 2000, chap. 12; Sims 2001, chap. 1). But the Japanese chose this path in only a
very limited sense; it is more accurate to say that the Japanese adapted to the military pressure

that they faced. Stark military-economic competition reduces our choice set to two options: adapt
or be dominated.
Limits of and Issues in Military-Economic Adaptationism
Some caveats and complexities need to be discussed. This article is not arguing that military-
economic competition is neces-
sary for technological determinism. As mentioned earlier, some features of technological
determinism can plausibly arise simply from the effects, inertia, and unintended consequences
of new technologies. What military-economic adaptationism offers is a plausible mechanism
for many of the harder claims of technological determinism.
Military-economic adaptationism is not a complete theory of socio- technological change. The
theory is only applicable to a limited set of questions and empirical domains, namely, those for
which the conditions (and most importantly condition 1) apply. As stated by condition 1, mili-
tary-economic adaptationism is most applicable when military-economic competition is severe.
In the modern world, for example, military competition is much less severe. Compared to a
hundred or a thousand years ago, there is much less risk to groups of having their resources
militarily con- quered. Groups (countries) today can afford to worry less about preparing for war
and focus more on material consumption and other goals (Mueller 2007; Pinker 2011). We thus
should expect military adaptationism to be less useful for understanding contemporary global
changes in society and technology.
There are many kinds of "military-economic competition," such as interstate military
competition, interstate economic competition, interfirm transnational economic competition, and
within-state economic competition. Each of these will have different implications for the
evolution of society and technology. The selection processes that generate more deterministic
outcomes are those whose rules are most given by nature, rather than by preferences, norms,
culture, or law. Accordingly, military competition between groups who don't share a culture or
institutions would likely be the most deterministic. By contrast, economic competition within a
well-regulated economy would be the least deterministic since it is most shaped by socially
shaped preferences, norms, and law. Given severe economic competition, firms will still
economically adapt, but the function determining success (the fitness landscape) is defined by
fac- tors - norms, culture, taste, and law - that are more amenable to social control. So long as the
rules governing economic competition are socially

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controlled, then so can be the processes of economic adaptation taking place beneath them.
Military competition can also be regulated by social processes, as exem- plified by the modern
taboo against the use of nuclear weapons and other norms about the proper conduct of war
(Morrow 2014). Norms and other social limits on war are more likely to arise when the
belligerents share a culture, and the advantages from violating a norm are not too beneficial.
However, throughout most of history, military competition was always present (Gat 2006), and
those social restraints that did arise were periodi- cally overrun during intense conflicts. In
summary, the more we value the social control of history, the more we should seek to understand
the consequences of different kinds of military and economic competition and to regulate
them accordingly. Just as there are many kinds of military-economic competition, so are there
many other kinds of selection processes, such as cognitive, social, and ecological selection
processes. Further, they can all operate simultaneously, at different levels, push in different
directions, be dominant over different timescales, and interact with each other. For some
questions, both constructivist and economic adaptationist theories will be necessary, as in the
study of the evolution of advertising: firms compete to optimize the technology of socially
constructing marketable desires. And, of course, agents are sometimes able to modify the very
rules of competition to favor them, as when firms lobby politicians for favorable legislation or
victors of major wars construct a new regional order to favor their strengths. Adaptationist theory
can accommodate these complexities, known in biology as niche construction. Recall that
selection pressures is simply a term for the, often complex, processes that determine differential
proliferation; adaptiveness is an emergent property of these processes. However, there is a
danger to adaptationist theorizing in such complex settings. When there is not a clear stable
selection process and not a self- evident definition of adaptiveness, adaptationist theories become
highly flexible, making it possible for scholars to construct unfalsifiable "just so stories" for
almost any observed outcome. This is a problem for any flexible theory. The fact that a theory is
flexible does not make it wrong, but it does require greater adherence to good scientific practice
to mitigate the risk of "just so" explanations. To mitigate this risk, adaptationist scholars should
try to: provide independent evidence of the character of the selection process, such as through
process tracing whether the alleg- edly adaptive trait really did help the agent to proliferate;
make predic- tions blind to the outcome and ideally out-of-sample so that there is no
possibility of fitting the theory to the outcome; and otherwise articulate all testable implications
and scope conditions of the theory so that other scholars can evaluate the theory using other
evidence.

There is one last category of selection process that needs to be discussed: ecological selection.
Ecological selection involves the differential proliferation of groups according to how well they
deal with toxins, patho- gens, extreme climate and climate change, and the need to sustainably
acquire necessary resources. Customs, institutions, and ways of life that are not well adapted to
the local environment can perish, either because they are abandoned or because the groups
holding them perish (for some examples, see Diamond 2005). Such collapses for ecological
reasons may be difficult to identify because they can "masquerade as military defeats" (Diamond
2005, 12).
Ecological selection differs from economic and military selection in an important way: success
in economic and military competition is often much more sensitive to relative performance. If
sociotechnical configuration A is slightly more ecologically adapted than B, then A will typically
proliferate slightly faster (or be slightly less likely to perish). By contrast, if sociotechnical
configuration A is slightly more economically adapted (say, more effi- cient at producing a
good), it will often proliferate much faster. In a perfectly competitive market, even the smallest
difference in efficiency will be sufficient to determine which configuration proliferates and
which per- ishes. Similarly, a slight absolute advantage in military performance can lead to a
huge advantage in military contests. When groups compete with each other, rather than just
"against nature," it is not enough to do well, one must continually do better .
Ecological selection tends to work on longer timescales than other selection processes, and it is
not uncommon for a way of life that is adapted to its social, economic, and military pressures to
be maladapted to ecological pressures. For example, it is an open question how well modern
civilization will fare in the face of climate change.
Conclusion
Who - If Anyone - Controls Technological Change? The answer, of course, is that it depends.
From a selectionist point of
view, the degree of human agency depends on the character and intensity of selection and the
character of variation. Neither extreme theoretical position - that of the radical social
constructivists or the hard technological determinists - provides a satisfactory general account.
There are contexts,
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usually found on smaller scales of analysis, in which the social constructivist insights are most
valid. This is because, in the absence of economic and military competition, humans often have
tremendous interpretive flexibility and freedom of choice. There are also contexts, usually found
on larger scales of analysis, in which the claims of the technological determinists appear to be

more valid. This is probably because military-economic competition directs the evolution of
sociotechnical forms, severely limiting the ability of humans to control their destiny. Rather than
judging theories by the degree of human agency that they allow, we should evaluate theories
based on how well they explain their subject of study. Assuming that individuals "have choice"
and assuming that humans have none are equally disempowering; we should be exploring the
hard questions of how much and what kinds of agency humans have in particular circumstances,
and why. Hard technological determinism dis- courages political action by claiming that
technological change is inevita- ble; radical social constructivism similarly handicaps political
action by ignoring the powerful competitive forces shaping history. Taking technological
determinism seriously reopens a large set of research questions: How should we think about the
effects of different kinds of technology? Can we better parse, evaluate, and understand the
different processes and concepts related to technological determinism, such as technological
politics , technological momentum, the internal logic of development, unintended
consequences, the magnificent bribe, technological progress , and military-economic
adaptationisml Under what contexts are these processes more or less amenable to particular
forms of social control? How have different societies regulated economic competition so as to
achieve desired goals, and what can we learn from them? Can we build global cultures,
institutions, and norms that will regulate military-economic competition to promote desired
goals? Explicit use of selectionist theories helps reframe some important research questions. It
helps illuminate the nature of human agency by drawing attention to the intensity of different
selection pressures. It provides a way of linking scholarship at different levels of analysis. It
gives the study of technology a general theoretical framework that spans the social sciences and
other fields. For constructivists, selectionist theory clarifies some questions and suggests
directions for research. For constructivist claims that generalize beyond the spatial-temporal
scope of the study, scholars should ask themselves: (1) Are there longer run selection processes
that constrain the ability of agents to socially construct their technologies? (2) How did the
groups come to adopt their beliefs and
preferences, and in particular, could these be adaptations to perceived competitive pressures?
Constructivist scholars could investigate the rich ways that groups harness and guide military-
economic competition and explore why these efforts succeed or fail. Finally, constructivist
scholars can investigate vicarious selection. What kinds of experiences are able to persuade a
group that they need to adapt their technologies and social order? How do individuals and groups
learn about and internalize external selection pressures?
Finally, military-economic adaptationism provides a solid microfoundation for technological
determinism. Humans are diverse and persistently generate new ways of living. Technology
enables new forms of sociotechnical life. The proliferation and survival of forms of sociotech-
nical life depend on how well adapted they are to different selection pressures. Over the long run,

military-economic competition has exerted powerful selection pressures, promoting forms of
sociotechnical life that are militarily powerful and economically productive. This could account
for the long-run trends in sociotechnical systems toward being large, complex, energy-intensive,
technical, functionally differentiated, and rationalistic. Selection for power and productivity,
thus, may account for many of the macro-patterns observed by technological determinists.
Lynn White, famous for arguing that the stirrup gave rise to feudalism, wrote that technology
"merely opens a door; it does not compel one to enter" (White 1962, 28). He was right.
Technology opens the door. It is military-economic competition that drags us through.
Acknowledgments I would like to thank Wiebe Bij ker, Shay David, Edward Hackett, Robert
Hudspith, Jofish Kay, Ronald Kline, Manjari Mahajan, Lisa Onaga, Sergio Sismondo, Nauba-
har Sharif, Janet Vertesi, and especially Judith Reppy for helpful comments, advice, and support.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or pub-
lication of this article.
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Notes
1. Some examples of science and technology studies work that do engage these questions, largely
emerging from neighboring disciplines, include Rosenkopf and Tushman (1994), Schroeder
(2007), Radder (2009), Feenberg (2010), and Leonardi and Barley (2010).
2. A survey of leading economists (Initiative on Global Markets Economic Experts
Panel 2014[) found that more of them agreed (33 percent) than disagreed (20 per-
cent) with the statement that " information technology and automation are the central
reason why median wages have been stagnant in the US over the past decade."
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Author Biography
Allan Dafoe is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Yale University.
He studies the causes of war and statistical methods, www.allandafoe.com.
 Contents
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o p. 1052
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 Issue Table of Contents
o Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 40, No. 6 (November 2015) pp.
883-1092
 Front Matter
 An Illusory Consensus behind GMO Health Assessment [pp. 883-914]
 Strategic Science Translation and Environmental Controversies [pp. 915-
938]
 Translating Science to Benefit Diverse Publics: Engagement Pathways for
Linking Climate Risk, Uncertainty, and Agricultural Identities [pp. 939-
964]
 Advertising Nanotechnology: Imagining the Invisible [pp. 965-997]
 Sociology of Low Expectations: Recalibration as Innovation Work in
Biomedicine [pp. 998-1021]
 Epistemic Commitments: Making Relevant Science in Biodiversity
Studies [pp. 1022-1046]
 On Technological Determinism: A Typology, Scope Conditions, and a
Mechanism [pp. 1047-1076]
 Review Essay
 Representing Representation [pp. 1077-1092]
 Back Matter
Vocabulary List
Below is a vocabulary list with terms divided in accordance with the headings for each of the
Required Learning Materials. Please use this as a guide for the terminology you should know for
this course.
The Elements of Culture
Â· nonmaterial culture
Â· material culture
Â· symbol
Â· Sapir-Whorf hypothesis

Â· formal and informal norms
Â· language
Â· ritual
Â· norms
Â· values
Kinds of Culture & Cultural Change
Â· subculture
Â· counterculture
Â· cultural lag
Â· globalization
Â· diffusion
Â· cultural evolution
Defining Terms in the Study of Technology
Â· Technology (list all possible definitions)
Â· Artifact
Â· Technique
Â· Institutions
Â· Technological determinism
Â· Artifactual determinism
Â· Technological politics
Â· Technological momentum
Â· Technological frames
Â· Unintended consequences

Technique
Â· techne
Â· semantic void
Â· mechanic arts
Â· sociotechnical system
Â· reification
Â· technological determinism
Â· Technological automatism
Â· Technological bluff
Technology as a Concept
Â· techne
Â· semantic void
Â· mechanic arts
Â· sociotechnical system
Â· technology
Technological Determinism & Social Constructivism
Â· technological determinism
Â· social constructivism
Digitization
Â· technocratic idea of progress
Â· material practice
Â· heterogenous technology
Â· information

Â· computerization
Â· digitization
Â· digital data
Â· artifacts

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