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Nuclear Negotiations:
Back to the Future
Mark Koscinski CPA D.Litt.
Visiting Assistant Professor
Economics and Business
Be A Little
Revolutionary!
FOUNDED 1742
NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS:
BACK TO THE FUTURE
MARK KOSCINSKI
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF ACCOUNTING PRACTICE
MORAVIAN COLLEGE
July 23, 2019
GREAT DECISIONS SERIES
Mark Koscinski CPA
• Assistant Professor Accounting
Practice-- Moravian College
• Assisted the U.S. intelligence
community for about ten years
on various projects.
• Former CFO/COO of Butler
Aerospace and Defense, Inc.
2
Two Prominent Accountants in Nuclear Policy
Henry Kissinger Robert McNamara
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 3
A Tale of Two Accountants
Henry Kissinger—Well, Not Quite…
• Studied accounting at CUNY
• Studies engineering at Lafayette
• PhD Harvard
• Seminal book: Nuclear Weapons
and Foreign Policy
• Linkage in negotiations
• Shuttle diplomacy
Robert McNamara
• Well, we all know what he is
most associated with, but…
• He did help negotiate an end to
the Cuban missile crisis
• The Vietnam War never went
“nuclear”
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 4
And…
• Part of my business practice has been negotiating
for clients
• Acquisitions and Divestitures
• Divorces
• Lawsuits
• Other transactions
• I teach Decision Analysis on a graduate level where
we cover negotiating and game theory
5
Some Surprising Fans of Total
Abolition of Nuclear Weapons
6
• George Schultz, Henry Kissinger, William J Perry,
and Sam Nunn have all joined together to
advocate for increased controls over nuclear
weapons if not their total abolition.
• They testified in Congress in 2018 about the
dangers of a new generation of small nuclear
warheads.
• Reagan and Gorbachev discussed but could not
resolve the question of total abolition of nuclear
weapons.
On Thermonuclear War….
On Thermonuclear War
• It was possible
• It was winnable if the United
States had the will to win.
• Was not popularly received
Herman Kahn—Game Theorist
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 7
Some Say Cooler Heads Prevailed…
Reaction
• Dr. Strangelove was a
parody of this type of
thinking.
• Clearly, the idea of winning
a nuclear war did not strike
many people as being
palatable.
• Hence, negotiations.
Major Kahn from Dr. Strangelove
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 8
This Could Keep You Up at Night….
Source: Ploughshares Inc.
• Since 1993, there have been 454 confirmed incidents
of illegal possession, smuggling, purchasing, or selling
of nuclear or otherwise radioactive materials.
• The US President has the absolute and total authority
to order a nuclear attack. Neither Congress nor any
other governmental authority has oversight over a
launch decision.
• There are still nearly 15,000 nuclear weapons left on
the planet; over 90% are in the US and Russia, with
the remainder in China, France, India, Israel, North
Korea, Pakistan and the United Kingdom.
• There have been dozens of nuclear false alarms, yet
the president has a mere 10 minutes to decide
whether to launch an attack when an incoming strike
is reported.
Source: Washington Examiner
• How a nuclear war between India and
Pakistan could reverse global warming
• by Philip Klein
• | February 27, 2019 01:19 PM
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 9
TNW vs. Strategic
Nuclear Weapons
• Generally smaller than strategic weapons
• Designed to be used on a battlefield with friendly
troops or civilians nearby.
• One particularly heinous variety was the neutron
bomb
• The ultimate capitalist weapon
• Destroys life but not property
• There had been suspicion South Africa was developing
such a weapon
• The U.S will be introducing tactical nuclear
warheads back on submarines again.
7/25/2019
Nuclear Negotiaions 10
Who Has What?
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 11
Some of the Not
Quites…
• Who Has Them
• Who Had Them
• Who Tried to Get Them
• Who Could Try to Get Them
• There has been A LOT of
success in non-proliferation
efforts
How Does The United
States Deal With
Nuclear Weapons?
• Multinational Agreement
• NPT for example
• Includes regional treaties
• Bilateral Agreements
• Russia, U.S.-U.K
Cooperation
• Covert Activity or Military Action
• Covert action against
Iranian nuclear programs
• Cyber attack against Iranian
nuclear facilities
Nuclear Diplomacy Has a Long History
• 1959 Antarctic Treaty
• 1963 Hot Line Agreement
• 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty
• 1967 Outer Space Treaty
• 1967 Latin America Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
• 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
• 1971 Seabed Treaty
• 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I (Interim Agreement)
• 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
• 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty
• 1974 Vladivostok Agreement
• 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
• 1977 Environmental Modification Convention
• 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II
• 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II
• 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
• 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty - INF
• 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement
• 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
• 1993 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II
• 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba
• 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
• 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
• 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism
• 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 14
THIS IS A PARTIAL LIST ONLY
There Has Been A Lot of Progress Made…
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 15
Negotiating
Thinks to Keep in Mind
• You don’t negotiate simply to
establish a relationship. You
negotiate to achieve goals.
• It is very tough to negotiate with
someone you have demonized.
• Negotiations have to be a “win-
win” situation
• Don’t back anyone into a corner
Probable Outcomes
• We tend to demonize who we
negotiate with.
• We believe any negotiation must
be a complete victory
• We don’t like to renegotiate
• In short, it is going to be extremely
difficult to simply persuade
countries to voluntarily give up
nuclear weapons.
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 16
And You Have to Have Sitzfleisch
• Sitzfleisch
• Staying Power
• Patience
• Something we don’t have
a lot of in the United
States!
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 17
Some Observations…
Things I Don’t Like
• President often at odds with his
intelligence community (lack of
consensus)
• President likes to negotiate
himself.
• Nixon sent out Kissinger
• North Korea has gotten use to that.
• If the President negotiates, who is
going to tell him NO?
Things I Like
• “Only Nixon Can Go to China”
• He can walk back rhetoric
• Little Rocket Man
• “My Button is Bigger Than Yours”
• He can adjust his expectations and
he is an experienced negotiator
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 18
Not A Fan of Personal Diplomacy But….
Sometimes It Works…
 Kennedy’s with the Cuban
Missile Crisis
 Nixon/Kissinger with China
 Kissinger during the Middle East
War
 Reagan/Gorbachev IRM
Sometimes It Doesn’t….
• Woodrow Wilson—World War I
and League of Nations
• Some would argue FDR at Yalta
• Kennedy meeting with
Khrushchev
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 19
Why Are Nuclear Negotiations So Difficult?
• Lots of Players with Lots of
Different Motivations
• Tough to Negotiate with a country
that won’t even admit it has
nuclear weapons
• Non-state players
• What will be included in the
negotiations?
• Defensive weapons
• New technologies
• Tactical nuclear weapons
• Country Regimes are NOT
monolithic. Look at the U.S.
• President and Senate
• Congress when House is needed
• Some positions become
enshrined
• The TRIAD has a life of its own in
the United States because of inter-
service rivalry
• Justifies the existence of other
weapons systems such as aircraft
carriers.
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 20
Understanding Motivations—Why Do
Countries Have Nuclear Weapons
• Regime protection—North Korea, Syria, Iran
• Conventional weaponry inferiority—Iran, North
Korea, Russia?
• Minimalist deterrence—France, Britain
• Mutual Assured Destruction—United States, Russia
• “They have it too”—India, Pakistan
• Prestige—Too many to mention…
• Many other reasons
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 21
Negotiating is
hard enough on
a bilateral basis,
but differing
motivations
make negotiating
all the more
difficult.
Defensive Technology
• Reoriented now to negate smaller
strikes from “rogue nations”
• Examples:
• THAAD
• Patriot
• Aegis missiles
• Perhaps lasers
• Many wish to station the weapons
systems in space
• Real issue with the Russians
7/25/2019
Nuclear Negotiaions 22
Defensive Technology
• The ABM Treaty had been in place from 1972
to 2001
• It limited the U.S. and the Soviet Union to
two ABM sites. US has about sixty launchers
now
• The U.S. pulled out of the treaty in 2002 in
order to develop defenses against rogue
state attacks
• Russia looked at this as a means of enhancing
a first strike.
• Recently cited by Putin as the reason for
development of a new generation of
weapons.
7/25/2019
Nuclear Negotiaions 23
Does This Stuff Work?
• In 2008, a Navy cruiser shot down an
errant US satellite with one shot.
• Many observers believed it was the
United States flexing its muscles.
• This was ten years ago. With the
increase in technology, one can only
speculate about the possibilities…
• Still, there are only about 60 ground
launchers
7/25/2019
Nuclear Negotiaions 24
And Other Weapons of
Mass Destruction
• Biological
• Chemical
• Radiological
7/25/2019Nuclear Negotiaions 25
New Threats
and New
Technology
• “Rods From God”—
Kinetic bombardment
• The Rail Gun
• The “Daisy Cutter”
/MOAB
• Conventional
weapon dropped
from a cargo plan
• Yield similar to a
tactical nuclear
weapon
• Cyber Warfare
• Hypersonic cruise
missile
• Developed by
Russia and China as
anti-carrier
weapons and as a
way to avoid
ballistic missile
defenses
• Nuclear powered cruise
missile
• Hypersonic gliders
• New generation of
ICBMs
26
And Then There is Outer Space…
• 2/19/19—Trump signs
fourth Space Force Directive
• New Space Force will be a
separate but equal branch of
the military operating within
the Department of the Air
Force
• Make no mistake, space is
weaponized now.
• The Space Force could be
responsible for:
• Coordinating satellite
intelligence
• Denying enemy satellite
intelligence
• Denying enemy WMD in
space
• ABM defense
• Professional astronaut corps
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 27
War Games
• Admiral Crowe was Chairman of the JCS
• As a new admiral he was in charge of war
gaming.
• No one would order a nuclear strike no matter
what the circumstances
• Finally, he was ordered to
• Can we count on that?
• Game theory becomes less and less useful as
the number of nuclear players increases.
• This instability is what Schultz, Kissinger and
Perry were referring to when they wanted all
nuclear missiles eliminated.
7/25/2019
Nuclear Negotiaions 28
The U. S.
Nuclear
Triad—Still
Going Strong
• Nuclear Capable Bombers
• 76 B-52s
• 20 B-2
• F-35 and F-16 can also
carry smaller weapons
• Submarine Forces
• 14 Trident II
submarines
• Each carries 24
missiles
• Each missile
carries on average
4 warheads
• 4 British Vanguard
submarines
• Minuteman Missiles
• 399 missiles with
four warheads in
each missile
• Other Non-Triad
Delivery Systems:
• Carrier based
aircraft
• Guided missile
submarines
• Artillery
• IRBM
29
Key Players: Russia
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
ICBM SLBM Bomber Total
286
176
66
528
958 752
200
1810
Russian Platform and Warheads
Platforms Warheads
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 30
Key Players: Russia
• New Weapons Development:
• Hypersonic gliders
• Tactical nuclear torpedoes
• Hypersonic missiles
• New generation of ICBM
• Nuclear powered cruise missile
• Laser point defense weapons
• Motivations?
• Nuclear torpedoes aimed at US
carriers, not a TRIAD weapon
• Hypersonic weapons are relatively
short range weapons
• The ICBM stock was getting quite
old in the tooth.
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 31
Key Players: Russia
• Analysis
• We can’t shoot down their ICBMs
now.
• The TRIAD will provide deterrence
• How many of these new weapons
are operational?
• How much does each one cost?
• Do they really work?
• Commentary
• At least for short run Russia is
more interested in regional issues
than taking on the United States
• Russian bombers have been flying
off the coasts for decades. This is
for home consumption
• Russia’s financial resources
continue to be limited.
• Its current conventional forces are
in bad condition.
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 32
Active Duty Ground Forces (2017)
US Army and Marines
• Army 476,000
• Marine Corp 182,000
• TOTAL 658,000
Russian Army
• Army 350,000
• Marines 12,000
• Coastal Forces 35,000
• TOTAL 397,000
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 33
Doesn’t even include allied forces such as
the UK, Germany etc.
Graphical View of Active Duty Ground Forces
476
172
0
646
350
12
35
397
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
Army Marines Coastal Defense Total
Active Duty Troops By Branch in OOOs
US Russia
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 34
US Navy vs. Russian Navy
US Navy
• 10 Aircraft carriers (90,000 tons)
• 9 Small carriers (50,000 tons +)
• 22 Cruisers (10,000 tons)
• 63 Destroyers (8-10,000 tons)
• 14 Ballistic missile submarines
• 4 Cruise missile submarines
Russia Navy
• I Aircraft carrier (58,000 tons)
• 2 Battlecruisers (28,000 tons)
• 3 Cruisers (12,500 tons)
• 12 Destroyers (7,500 tons)
• 9 Ballistic Missile Submarines
• 8 Cruise Missile Submarines
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 35
Key Players: China
• U. S. has focused on the new
Chinese hypersonic weapons
• These will become active within
a year or two.
• The original thrust will be
regional usage, but could be
extended to international range.
• Even during détente, the United
States has never insisted China
relinquish nuclear weapons.
• China is considered more of a
regional power and is a
significant trading party to the
United States.
• Prediction: Status quo for the
foreseeable future. US will
continue to try to engage China
on Korean weapons.
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 36
Key Players:
North Korea
• North Korea will NOT denuclearize completely
• As it becomes included in the international
community, the risk of war will become less and
less.
• The negotiations will be long and drawn out, as the
North Koreans will demand a quid pro quo for each
step along the way.
• Short of stepping over the “bright line” we should
not pull out of negotiations. Our expectations need
to be adjusted.
37
Key Players: North Korea
• A key part of negotiating is
knowing your BATNA—Best
alternative to a negotiated
agreement.
• Sadly, in this case, it could be
either:
• More instability
• A shooting war
• Or more of the status quo.
• Military Options against North
Korea (Brookings Institute):
• Shoot Down a North Korean
Missile
• Naval Blockade (Act of War)
• First Strike on Nuclear
Infrastructure
• Target Kim personally
• Advanced weaponry not publicly
disclosed?
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 38
Recent Headlines
• North Korea executes 5 officials
over failed Kim-Trump summit:
South Korean media (Fox News)
• North Korea Executed and
Purged Top Nuclear Negotiators,
South Korean Report Says (New
York Times)
• North Korea's Short-Range
Missile Test Spotted from Space
(space.com, MAY 6, 2019
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 39
Prediction:
North Korea
7/25/2019
Nuclear Negotiaions 40
Forecast: North Korea
will try to outwait
Trump. Occasional
provocations. We have
reached a short term
equilibrium.
Key Players: Syria
• Israel destroyed its main nuclear facilities in 2007
• An example of dealing with a rogue state with
military action
• Fuel is still missing
• Syria may be attempting to restart its nuclear
program again.
• Other WMDs are of immediate concern
• Chemical weapons have been used not only by
Syria but by ISIS
• No real negotiations going on at this time.
41
Key Players: India and Pakistan
• Next to the Korean peninsula,
this is the most volatile border in
the world.
• India has six times the
population than Pakistan and
twice the conventional forces.
• This may in part explain
Pakistan’s anxiety
• When India and Pakistan
became nuclear powers in 1998,
sanctions followed.
• These were quickly lifted and the
world tacitly accepted the two
new nuclear powers.
• This could be what North Korea
is angling for in its current
negotiations with the US
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 42
Key Players: India and Pakistan
• Both nations have approximately
the same number of nuclear
weapons: 130-150
• India has already achieved Triad
status; Pakistan will do so soon.
• India has much stronger
conventional forces.
• Nevertheless, leadership of each
country rattles the sabers less
than the press does.
• Issues:
• Rogue elements could seize
weapons in Pakistan
• Pakistan is still “smarting” from
losing East Pakistan and looks to
nuclear weapons as a guarantee of
nuclear integrity.
• Prognosis:
• Neither India or Pakistan will not
negotiate its stockpile down below
a critical level it deems necessary
for survival.
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 43
Key Players: Iran
Their Perspective
• The U.S. obliterated the fifth biggest
army in the world
• The U.S obliterated the Iranian navy
• Iran is surrounded by the U.S.
• U. S. Cyber warfare attacked the Iranian
nuclear production
• Iranian nuclear scientists have
disappeared at an alarming rate.
44
Key Players: Iran
• Iran has had a long history of
flirting with nuclear weaponry.
• The U.S. and world communities
have sought to deal with this
issue by:
• Sanctions
• International agreements
• Covert military options
• Disappearing scientists
• Cyber warfare
• What will Israel do?
• The U.S. has recently pulled out
of the agreement negotiated
under the Obama administration
• There is a wide disparity of views
on whether Iran is building
nuclear weapons
• Certainly, it is building delivery
systems.
• Prognosis: No significant
progress will be made here for
years. We need a BATNA
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 45
Key Players: Non-State Players
• How do they obtain the
weapons?
• Obtaining it from the current stock
of nuclear nations
• Developing their own crude
devices.
• Delivery is the key problem. It is
one thing having a nuclear
weapon. It is another delivering
it.
• Very difficult problem for the
world:
• There have been multiple terror
attacks around the world.
• Nuclear weapons do go missing.
• Who do you negotiate with?
• Do you even want to negotiate?
• Prediction: Continue dealing
with this by international
agreements and military action
as needed.
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 46
Conclusions and Closing Comments…
• There is NO downside to
negotiations if done correctly.
• It has actually worked in the
past.
• We need to be patient and be
willing to continue to come to
the table as often as needed.
• We may need to adjust our
expectations about the process
of negotiating.
• Thank you for your attendance
today.
• I will have this posted on mark-
koscinski.com in short order.
• Questions?
7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 47

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Nuclear negotiations -july 2019

  • 1. Nuclear Negotiations: Back to the Future Mark Koscinski CPA D.Litt. Visiting Assistant Professor Economics and Business Be A Little Revolutionary! FOUNDED 1742 NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS: BACK TO THE FUTURE MARK KOSCINSKI ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF ACCOUNTING PRACTICE MORAVIAN COLLEGE July 23, 2019 GREAT DECISIONS SERIES
  • 2. Mark Koscinski CPA • Assistant Professor Accounting Practice-- Moravian College • Assisted the U.S. intelligence community for about ten years on various projects. • Former CFO/COO of Butler Aerospace and Defense, Inc. 2
  • 3. Two Prominent Accountants in Nuclear Policy Henry Kissinger Robert McNamara 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 3
  • 4. A Tale of Two Accountants Henry Kissinger—Well, Not Quite… • Studied accounting at CUNY • Studies engineering at Lafayette • PhD Harvard • Seminal book: Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy • Linkage in negotiations • Shuttle diplomacy Robert McNamara • Well, we all know what he is most associated with, but… • He did help negotiate an end to the Cuban missile crisis • The Vietnam War never went “nuclear” 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 4
  • 5. And… • Part of my business practice has been negotiating for clients • Acquisitions and Divestitures • Divorces • Lawsuits • Other transactions • I teach Decision Analysis on a graduate level where we cover negotiating and game theory 5
  • 6. Some Surprising Fans of Total Abolition of Nuclear Weapons 6 • George Schultz, Henry Kissinger, William J Perry, and Sam Nunn have all joined together to advocate for increased controls over nuclear weapons if not their total abolition. • They testified in Congress in 2018 about the dangers of a new generation of small nuclear warheads. • Reagan and Gorbachev discussed but could not resolve the question of total abolition of nuclear weapons.
  • 7. On Thermonuclear War…. On Thermonuclear War • It was possible • It was winnable if the United States had the will to win. • Was not popularly received Herman Kahn—Game Theorist 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 7
  • 8. Some Say Cooler Heads Prevailed… Reaction • Dr. Strangelove was a parody of this type of thinking. • Clearly, the idea of winning a nuclear war did not strike many people as being palatable. • Hence, negotiations. Major Kahn from Dr. Strangelove 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 8
  • 9. This Could Keep You Up at Night…. Source: Ploughshares Inc. • Since 1993, there have been 454 confirmed incidents of illegal possession, smuggling, purchasing, or selling of nuclear or otherwise radioactive materials. • The US President has the absolute and total authority to order a nuclear attack. Neither Congress nor any other governmental authority has oversight over a launch decision. • There are still nearly 15,000 nuclear weapons left on the planet; over 90% are in the US and Russia, with the remainder in China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the United Kingdom. • There have been dozens of nuclear false alarms, yet the president has a mere 10 minutes to decide whether to launch an attack when an incoming strike is reported. Source: Washington Examiner • How a nuclear war between India and Pakistan could reverse global warming • by Philip Klein • | February 27, 2019 01:19 PM 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 9
  • 10. TNW vs. Strategic Nuclear Weapons • Generally smaller than strategic weapons • Designed to be used on a battlefield with friendly troops or civilians nearby. • One particularly heinous variety was the neutron bomb • The ultimate capitalist weapon • Destroys life but not property • There had been suspicion South Africa was developing such a weapon • The U.S will be introducing tactical nuclear warheads back on submarines again. 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 10
  • 11. Who Has What? 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 11
  • 12. Some of the Not Quites… • Who Has Them • Who Had Them • Who Tried to Get Them • Who Could Try to Get Them • There has been A LOT of success in non-proliferation efforts
  • 13. How Does The United States Deal With Nuclear Weapons? • Multinational Agreement • NPT for example • Includes regional treaties • Bilateral Agreements • Russia, U.S.-U.K Cooperation • Covert Activity or Military Action • Covert action against Iranian nuclear programs • Cyber attack against Iranian nuclear facilities
  • 14. Nuclear Diplomacy Has a Long History • 1959 Antarctic Treaty • 1963 Hot Line Agreement • 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty • 1967 Outer Space Treaty • 1967 Latin America Nuclear Free Zone Treaty • 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty • 1971 Seabed Treaty • 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I (Interim Agreement) • 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty • 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty • 1974 Vladivostok Agreement • 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty • 1977 Environmental Modification Convention • 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II • 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II • 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty • 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty - INF • 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement • 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty • 1993 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II • 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba • 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty • 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty • 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism • 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 14 THIS IS A PARTIAL LIST ONLY
  • 15. There Has Been A Lot of Progress Made… 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 15
  • 16. Negotiating Thinks to Keep in Mind • You don’t negotiate simply to establish a relationship. You negotiate to achieve goals. • It is very tough to negotiate with someone you have demonized. • Negotiations have to be a “win- win” situation • Don’t back anyone into a corner Probable Outcomes • We tend to demonize who we negotiate with. • We believe any negotiation must be a complete victory • We don’t like to renegotiate • In short, it is going to be extremely difficult to simply persuade countries to voluntarily give up nuclear weapons. 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 16
  • 17. And You Have to Have Sitzfleisch • Sitzfleisch • Staying Power • Patience • Something we don’t have a lot of in the United States! 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 17
  • 18. Some Observations… Things I Don’t Like • President often at odds with his intelligence community (lack of consensus) • President likes to negotiate himself. • Nixon sent out Kissinger • North Korea has gotten use to that. • If the President negotiates, who is going to tell him NO? Things I Like • “Only Nixon Can Go to China” • He can walk back rhetoric • Little Rocket Man • “My Button is Bigger Than Yours” • He can adjust his expectations and he is an experienced negotiator 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 18
  • 19. Not A Fan of Personal Diplomacy But…. Sometimes It Works…  Kennedy’s with the Cuban Missile Crisis  Nixon/Kissinger with China  Kissinger during the Middle East War  Reagan/Gorbachev IRM Sometimes It Doesn’t…. • Woodrow Wilson—World War I and League of Nations • Some would argue FDR at Yalta • Kennedy meeting with Khrushchev 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 19
  • 20. Why Are Nuclear Negotiations So Difficult? • Lots of Players with Lots of Different Motivations • Tough to Negotiate with a country that won’t even admit it has nuclear weapons • Non-state players • What will be included in the negotiations? • Defensive weapons • New technologies • Tactical nuclear weapons • Country Regimes are NOT monolithic. Look at the U.S. • President and Senate • Congress when House is needed • Some positions become enshrined • The TRIAD has a life of its own in the United States because of inter- service rivalry • Justifies the existence of other weapons systems such as aircraft carriers. 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 20
  • 21. Understanding Motivations—Why Do Countries Have Nuclear Weapons • Regime protection—North Korea, Syria, Iran • Conventional weaponry inferiority—Iran, North Korea, Russia? • Minimalist deterrence—France, Britain • Mutual Assured Destruction—United States, Russia • “They have it too”—India, Pakistan • Prestige—Too many to mention… • Many other reasons 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 21 Negotiating is hard enough on a bilateral basis, but differing motivations make negotiating all the more difficult.
  • 22. Defensive Technology • Reoriented now to negate smaller strikes from “rogue nations” • Examples: • THAAD • Patriot • Aegis missiles • Perhaps lasers • Many wish to station the weapons systems in space • Real issue with the Russians 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 22
  • 23. Defensive Technology • The ABM Treaty had been in place from 1972 to 2001 • It limited the U.S. and the Soviet Union to two ABM sites. US has about sixty launchers now • The U.S. pulled out of the treaty in 2002 in order to develop defenses against rogue state attacks • Russia looked at this as a means of enhancing a first strike. • Recently cited by Putin as the reason for development of a new generation of weapons. 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 23
  • 24. Does This Stuff Work? • In 2008, a Navy cruiser shot down an errant US satellite with one shot. • Many observers believed it was the United States flexing its muscles. • This was ten years ago. With the increase in technology, one can only speculate about the possibilities… • Still, there are only about 60 ground launchers 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 24
  • 25. And Other Weapons of Mass Destruction • Biological • Chemical • Radiological 7/25/2019Nuclear Negotiaions 25
  • 26. New Threats and New Technology • “Rods From God”— Kinetic bombardment • The Rail Gun • The “Daisy Cutter” /MOAB • Conventional weapon dropped from a cargo plan • Yield similar to a tactical nuclear weapon • Cyber Warfare • Hypersonic cruise missile • Developed by Russia and China as anti-carrier weapons and as a way to avoid ballistic missile defenses • Nuclear powered cruise missile • Hypersonic gliders • New generation of ICBMs 26
  • 27. And Then There is Outer Space… • 2/19/19—Trump signs fourth Space Force Directive • New Space Force will be a separate but equal branch of the military operating within the Department of the Air Force • Make no mistake, space is weaponized now. • The Space Force could be responsible for: • Coordinating satellite intelligence • Denying enemy satellite intelligence • Denying enemy WMD in space • ABM defense • Professional astronaut corps 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 27
  • 28. War Games • Admiral Crowe was Chairman of the JCS • As a new admiral he was in charge of war gaming. • No one would order a nuclear strike no matter what the circumstances • Finally, he was ordered to • Can we count on that? • Game theory becomes less and less useful as the number of nuclear players increases. • This instability is what Schultz, Kissinger and Perry were referring to when they wanted all nuclear missiles eliminated. 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 28
  • 29. The U. S. Nuclear Triad—Still Going Strong • Nuclear Capable Bombers • 76 B-52s • 20 B-2 • F-35 and F-16 can also carry smaller weapons • Submarine Forces • 14 Trident II submarines • Each carries 24 missiles • Each missile carries on average 4 warheads • 4 British Vanguard submarines • Minuteman Missiles • 399 missiles with four warheads in each missile • Other Non-Triad Delivery Systems: • Carrier based aircraft • Guided missile submarines • Artillery • IRBM 29
  • 30. Key Players: Russia 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 ICBM SLBM Bomber Total 286 176 66 528 958 752 200 1810 Russian Platform and Warheads Platforms Warheads 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 30
  • 31. Key Players: Russia • New Weapons Development: • Hypersonic gliders • Tactical nuclear torpedoes • Hypersonic missiles • New generation of ICBM • Nuclear powered cruise missile • Laser point defense weapons • Motivations? • Nuclear torpedoes aimed at US carriers, not a TRIAD weapon • Hypersonic weapons are relatively short range weapons • The ICBM stock was getting quite old in the tooth. 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 31
  • 32. Key Players: Russia • Analysis • We can’t shoot down their ICBMs now. • The TRIAD will provide deterrence • How many of these new weapons are operational? • How much does each one cost? • Do they really work? • Commentary • At least for short run Russia is more interested in regional issues than taking on the United States • Russian bombers have been flying off the coasts for decades. This is for home consumption • Russia’s financial resources continue to be limited. • Its current conventional forces are in bad condition. 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 32
  • 33. Active Duty Ground Forces (2017) US Army and Marines • Army 476,000 • Marine Corp 182,000 • TOTAL 658,000 Russian Army • Army 350,000 • Marines 12,000 • Coastal Forces 35,000 • TOTAL 397,000 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 33 Doesn’t even include allied forces such as the UK, Germany etc.
  • 34. Graphical View of Active Duty Ground Forces 476 172 0 646 350 12 35 397 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 Army Marines Coastal Defense Total Active Duty Troops By Branch in OOOs US Russia 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 34
  • 35. US Navy vs. Russian Navy US Navy • 10 Aircraft carriers (90,000 tons) • 9 Small carriers (50,000 tons +) • 22 Cruisers (10,000 tons) • 63 Destroyers (8-10,000 tons) • 14 Ballistic missile submarines • 4 Cruise missile submarines Russia Navy • I Aircraft carrier (58,000 tons) • 2 Battlecruisers (28,000 tons) • 3 Cruisers (12,500 tons) • 12 Destroyers (7,500 tons) • 9 Ballistic Missile Submarines • 8 Cruise Missile Submarines 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 35
  • 36. Key Players: China • U. S. has focused on the new Chinese hypersonic weapons • These will become active within a year or two. • The original thrust will be regional usage, but could be extended to international range. • Even during dĂ©tente, the United States has never insisted China relinquish nuclear weapons. • China is considered more of a regional power and is a significant trading party to the United States. • Prediction: Status quo for the foreseeable future. US will continue to try to engage China on Korean weapons. 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 36
  • 37. Key Players: North Korea • North Korea will NOT denuclearize completely • As it becomes included in the international community, the risk of war will become less and less. • The negotiations will be long and drawn out, as the North Koreans will demand a quid pro quo for each step along the way. • Short of stepping over the “bright line” we should not pull out of negotiations. Our expectations need to be adjusted. 37
  • 38. Key Players: North Korea • A key part of negotiating is knowing your BATNA—Best alternative to a negotiated agreement. • Sadly, in this case, it could be either: • More instability • A shooting war • Or more of the status quo. • Military Options against North Korea (Brookings Institute): • Shoot Down a North Korean Missile • Naval Blockade (Act of War) • First Strike on Nuclear Infrastructure • Target Kim personally • Advanced weaponry not publicly disclosed? 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 38
  • 39. Recent Headlines • North Korea executes 5 officials over failed Kim-Trump summit: South Korean media (Fox News) • North Korea Executed and Purged Top Nuclear Negotiators, South Korean Report Says (New York Times) • North Korea's Short-Range Missile Test Spotted from Space (space.com, MAY 6, 2019 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 39
  • 40. Prediction: North Korea 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 40 Forecast: North Korea will try to outwait Trump. Occasional provocations. We have reached a short term equilibrium.
  • 41. Key Players: Syria • Israel destroyed its main nuclear facilities in 2007 • An example of dealing with a rogue state with military action • Fuel is still missing • Syria may be attempting to restart its nuclear program again. • Other WMDs are of immediate concern • Chemical weapons have been used not only by Syria but by ISIS • No real negotiations going on at this time. 41
  • 42. Key Players: India and Pakistan • Next to the Korean peninsula, this is the most volatile border in the world. • India has six times the population than Pakistan and twice the conventional forces. • This may in part explain Pakistan’s anxiety • When India and Pakistan became nuclear powers in 1998, sanctions followed. • These were quickly lifted and the world tacitly accepted the two new nuclear powers. • This could be what North Korea is angling for in its current negotiations with the US 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 42
  • 43. Key Players: India and Pakistan • Both nations have approximately the same number of nuclear weapons: 130-150 • India has already achieved Triad status; Pakistan will do so soon. • India has much stronger conventional forces. • Nevertheless, leadership of each country rattles the sabers less than the press does. • Issues: • Rogue elements could seize weapons in Pakistan • Pakistan is still “smarting” from losing East Pakistan and looks to nuclear weapons as a guarantee of nuclear integrity. • Prognosis: • Neither India or Pakistan will not negotiate its stockpile down below a critical level it deems necessary for survival. 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 43
  • 44. Key Players: Iran Their Perspective • The U.S. obliterated the fifth biggest army in the world • The U.S obliterated the Iranian navy • Iran is surrounded by the U.S. • U. S. Cyber warfare attacked the Iranian nuclear production • Iranian nuclear scientists have disappeared at an alarming rate. 44
  • 45. Key Players: Iran • Iran has had a long history of flirting with nuclear weaponry. • The U.S. and world communities have sought to deal with this issue by: • Sanctions • International agreements • Covert military options • Disappearing scientists • Cyber warfare • What will Israel do? • The U.S. has recently pulled out of the agreement negotiated under the Obama administration • There is a wide disparity of views on whether Iran is building nuclear weapons • Certainly, it is building delivery systems. • Prognosis: No significant progress will be made here for years. We need a BATNA 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 45
  • 46. Key Players: Non-State Players • How do they obtain the weapons? • Obtaining it from the current stock of nuclear nations • Developing their own crude devices. • Delivery is the key problem. It is one thing having a nuclear weapon. It is another delivering it. • Very difficult problem for the world: • There have been multiple terror attacks around the world. • Nuclear weapons do go missing. • Who do you negotiate with? • Do you even want to negotiate? • Prediction: Continue dealing with this by international agreements and military action as needed. 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 46
  • 47. Conclusions and Closing Comments… • There is NO downside to negotiations if done correctly. • It has actually worked in the past. • We need to be patient and be willing to continue to come to the table as often as needed. • We may need to adjust our expectations about the process of negotiating. • Thank you for your attendance today. • I will have this posted on mark- koscinski.com in short order. • Questions? 7/25/2019 Nuclear Negotiaions 47