58-slide power point explaining why the Army Corps of Engineers levees failed during Hurricane Katrina, and what has happened since.

2. An iceberg on April 15, 1912 and a hurricane on
August 29, 2005 are examples of the same
thing.
Both were examples of mother nature
exposing human mistakes and human arrogance.

4. Disaster!
 After the levees broke in Greater New Orleans
during Katrina in 50 locations, the world watched on
TV.
 The world wanted to know why immediately.
 The answer was complex. And only highly trained
individuals could answer that question.
 The answer would take nearly 10 years.

5. Four weeks after the Flood, the GAO testified before Congress that the US
Army Corps of Engineers had been “trying” to build flood protection, but its
efforts were stalled by local opposition and environmental lawsuits.

6. Corps Commander Lt. Gen Carl Strock, and others, testified before
Congress in 2005 that “they could not explain exactly why the levees failed
at this point, but two independent panels are in the process of investigating
the levee failures and are expected to produce final reports by June 2006.”

7. The levees broke and the breaches had to be repaired!
Data was being lost daily.
In this context of chaos and confusion, myths took flight.
 Monster storm
 City below the Sea
 Corrupted local officials

8. A fairy tale was born
 The Corps proposed massive gated barrier
structures but the levee board used politics to force
the Corps to abandon its barrier plan, the superior
plan, and instead raise the heights of the canal
walls.

9. These are the canal walls that fell over during Katrina and flooded the
city’s main basin, the region with the most people, property and
infrastructure.

10. BUT years later, after the forensics are done, after people have sifted
through dusty documents in file cabinets without benefit of search engines,
the vetted facts has emerged. But first a wee tad of history.

11. The Pre Katrina
Orleans Levee Board
Owned considerable assets, mainly
real estate
Had a history of developing land and
selling it to raise money for levees
Owned a marina and a small
commercial airport
All needed to be managed

12. Then came Hurricane
Betsy and Flood
Control Act of 1965
Now, the Corps shall design and build
Orleans Levee Board (OLB) shall collect
money 30% and maintain levees
OLB is now principally money managers
and maintenance men
It was not their job to check the corps’
work.
No levee board in the nation did that.

13. After Katrina, arm chair critics
screamed!
A post Katrina article in the Times
Picayune describe the OLB’s cushy
finances & large interests
The OLB should have been
“watching the corps” and checking
their calculations, critics said.

14. Be mindful before
you judge
The corps is the federal agency
that had previously built
thousands of miles of levees
along the Ohio, Missouri and
Mississippi Rivers capable of
withstanding surge heights of up
to 20 feet for 30 days – or more!

15. The Corps had a
sterling reputation
And as noted by Mark Schleifstein
in his book Path of Destruction,
the corps, “with its two centuries
of experience and gold plated
reputation” was considered to
‘over-engineer’ their projects.

16. Monday morning
quarterbacking
Post Katrina Los Angeles Times
story (Christmas Day 2005):
“In a deft behind the scenes
maneuver” Congress forced corps
to build floodwalls instead of
barriers at the outfall canals.
The corps was “peeved when
they learned of OLB’s decision”

17. This is the alleged “politics of Katrina.”
Congressional language that allegedly “forced” the Army Corps, over its
alleged howling protest, to build canal walls that failed during Katrina.

18. This piece of politics received significant attention because the failure of
these canal walls is what caused flooding the Main Basin, the region
of New Orleans with the most people, property and infrastructure.

19. J. David Rogers and G. Paul Kemp in their 2015 article,
“Interaction between the Army Corps of Engineers and the Orleans
Levee Board preceding the flooding of New Orleans in 2005”
put this claim under the microscope.

20. In the 1980s, the Army Corps recommended raising the
heights of the canal walls of the 17th Street Canal.

21. The mighty 17th Street Canal is the most important in
the city, capable of pumping more water than the other
two main drainage canals combined.

22. The OLB wanted the same plan for Orleans and London.
But the Corps wanted a far cheaper plan – gates with no pump stations.
Raising walls cost 5X more for Orleans and 3X more for London!

23. So…Mr. OLB went to Washington
 In 1988, OLB hired a lobbyist to pursue the high walls
plan
 In a briefing paper dated Sept 1990, lobbyist addressed
concerns that overtopping would affect 56,000 residents
 Lobbyist attended nearly all the OLB meetings between
1988 and 1991; corps personnel were always present
 Lobbyist pulled some midnight magic; he slipped wording
in the WRDA bill in conferencing
 The scheme worked. Congress ordered Corps to build
high for all three canals, not just the 17th Street Canal

24. Scene from Orleans Levee Board meeting announcing news.
Congressman Senator J. Bennet Johnston,
OLB commissioners Janet Phillpott and Robert Ramelli.
Courtesy: WDSU Channel 6 archives

25. Remember the
Monday morning
quarterbacking?
Los Angeles Times story
(Christmas Day 2005)
“In a deft behind the scenes
maneuver” Congress forced corps
to build floodwalls instead of
barriers at the outfall canals.
The corps was “peeved when
they learned of OLB’s decision”

26. Baloney! The Corps:
 had already recommended the parallel plan for the
17th Street Canal,
 was aware that the OLB preferred the same
approach for the other two drainage canals, and
 was aware that the OLB was compensating a lawyer
to go to Washington DC to lobby for the parallel plan
alternative.

27. The gates plan was cheaper, not better.

28. More Monday
morning
quarterbacking
In Sept 2005 Los Angeles Times
article, Joseph Towers retired
chief corps counsel said locals
blocked its plan for a massive
barrier.
“The project was stopped in its
tracks…”
Greenies drowned New Orleans
in
“the barrier that could have been”

29. Douglas Kysar (U of Texas) and Thomas McGarity (Cornell U)
in their 2006 article, “The Hazards of Hindsight Analysis”
put this claim under the microscope.
 After Betsy, the corps
recommended massive sea
gates 2,000 feet wide at the
Rigolets, Chef Menteur
Pass.
 The group Save our
Wetlands: EIS did not meet
NEPA rules
 The Court agreed and
ordered the corps to return
with a better EIS.
 The corps decided that
high walls plan was
superior.

30. So ok. Now the corps has to raise all these canal walls
The corps was looking for ways to reduce costs
Steel is expensive
Driving it down 45 feet is expensive

31. The tragedy of the E-99 study
 US Army Corps of Engineers’ Mississippi Valley Division
HQ initiated large scale test
 In the Atchafalaya Basin with soils similar to New Orleans
 The corps misinterpreted the results of its study
 Corps wrongly concluded sheet piles don’t need to be
driven to depths more than 17 ft instead of between 31 to
46.
 HQ issued new criteria guidance to N.O. District

32. This switch to shorter sheet piles saved approximately $100 million,
but the savings would come at the expense of engineering
reliability.

33. Switch to shorter sheet piles
 The respected Hurricane Decision-Making
Chronology of 2008 states repeatedly there is no
reason to suggest corps knew the danger of the
switch.
 Dave Rogers, Co-chair ILIT: “Today, everyone
realizes that some interpretation errors were made
during the E-99 flood wall study in the Atachafalaya
Basin, and that this fact, was largely responsible for
the poor performance of the NO flood protection
system. “

34. On August 29, 2005, storm surge broke the floodwalls
of the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals when
water was still 3 feet or more from the tops

35. The Orleans did not break, due to an inadvertent
“spillway” or gap.

36. Orleans Avenue Canal
 Gap was located under a viaduct carrying I-610.
 Required coordination of four different agencies:
OLB, SWB, DOTD and Fed Hwy Administration
 Completion would have caused brick walls of pump
station to fail. Post K, the gap was a sore spot on the
record of the OLB and SWB. If not for the breaches,
water would flow several hours.
 But this was moot.

37. Long term effects
The New Orleans hydrologic
catastrophe of 2005 has strongly
influenced long-term, nationwide flood
control policies and practices.

38. Emergency Levee
Assessment
 Immediately after the
2005 disaster,
Congress directed the
Army Corps of
Engineers to conduct a
nationwide assessment
of levees built by the
agency.

39. National Levee Safety Act of
2007
 After four revisions,
Congress passed the
first ever country-wide
levee safety plan called
the National Levee
Safety Act of 2007.
 The Act contained five
important national
initiatives.

40. National Levee Safety Act of
2007
 National data base of federal and non-federal
levees,
 First-ever nationwide levee safety program
 Levee safety inspection tool using global positioning
technology
 Sixteen member levee safety committee, and
 Program to inform the public of the risks of living
near levees.

41. This is important because the majority (55%) of
American population lives in counties protected by
levees.

42. More Stringent Guidelines
More Rigorous Inspections
 The Army Corps of
Engineers’ Levee
Safety Program has
implemented new more
stringent guidelines in
the Levee Certification
Process including
more rigorous
inspections.

43. More Frequent Inspections
 The Army Corps of
Engineers’ Levee
Safety Program is now
requiring and
enforcing more
frequent inspections.

44. Post Katina Legislation
 After Katrina, assumptions
were made in haste by
Congress which believed
the Orleans Levee Board
had 1) hamstrung the corps
and 2) were not paying
sufficient attention to flood
protection.

45. Those untrustworthy rogues down there!

46. Post Katina Legislation
 So, lightning quick,
Congress ordered the
creation of a single state
agency to serve as local
sponsor
 In response, Governor
Kathleen Blanco created
the Coastal Protection and
Restoration Authority

47. Levee authorities
 In this same context of chaos
and confusion, the Business
Council of New Orleans
pushed for new legislation.
 Flood Authorities East/West
 Legislation created two
additional state-level boards
of experts to focus
exclusively on flood
protection projects

48. The failure of the corps’ levees during Katrina demonstrated that the corps’
work should be checked. Dr. Rogers has stated that the flooding during
Katrina “could have been prevented had the corps retained an external
review board to double-check its flood-wall designs.”

49. Therefore, the new state level levee boards could be useful. To the extent
legally possible and within budget, the East and West Levee Authorities
are checking the corps’ general plans. They are focused, have relevant
expertise and may catch egregious planning and/or design errors.

50. Levee lawsuit
 Included main basin
 In January 2008, Judge
Stanwood Duval ruled
Corps responsible for
the Floodwall collapses
of 17th and London
Canals
 Corps not financially
liable due to Flood
Control Act of 1928

51. MR-GO lawsuit
 Nov 2009, Duval ruled
Corps’ poor maintenance
of MR-GO is cause of the
flooding in Lower Ninth
Ward and St. Bernard
Parish
 Mar 2012 champagne was
opened; appeals court
ruled Duval right
 Six months later, same
three judges reversed
their ruling with no
explanation

52. U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals : The Corps was immune
from damages because of a provision governing suits against the
federal government that protects an agency when it makes a
discretionary decision.

54. What we do have is a gleaming
new $14 billion flood defense system
 Gates and enormous pump stations at the mouths of
the three drainage canals
 Water in drainage canals not allowed to rise more
than 7 feet from the tops, called "safe water level.”
 Mixed soil with cement and injecting this slurry into
the canal walls of the drainage canals.
 Armored all levees in the city to prevent washing
away in the event of overtopping.

55. What we do have is a gleaming
new $14 billion flood defense system
 On the west bank, the Army Corps has built a closure
complex, part of the New Orleans Drainage System,
consisting of a huge navigable floodgate and what is now
the largest pump station in the world.
 Installing relief wells that act as warning gauges if there is
a problem with the levees.
 The Army Corps has rewritten the guidelines for building
levees and canal walls nationwide.
 The Army Corps has built an enormous barrier to
prevent storm surge from entering the Industrial Canal.

56. Important links!
 Go.levees.org/WatPol
 Go.levees.org/pressNYT

57. Thank you

58. For your attention