The document summarizes how the Interstate Highway System in the US negatively impacted urban African American communities and neighborhoods. It uses the case study of Montgomery, Alabama to show how local highway officials deliberately routed Interstate 85 through the historic Centennial Hill neighborhood, destroying the middle-class black community. The highway director, Sam Engelhardt, had a history of segregationist policies and faced opposition to the proposed route at a public hearing, but the plan was approved anyway, displacing residents and disrupting the social and economic ties in the community. The routing of highways often targeted thriving African American areas under the guise of "urban renewal" and slum clearance.

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The Effect of Interstate Highway Policy on Urban Neighborhoods:
The Case of Montgomery, Alabama
James B. May
Abstract
The trans-American Interstate Highway system drastically altered the urban American
landscape, setting the stage for the populace suburb surrounding the desolate urban center, the
diffusion of economic resources over a greater land area, and the age of white flight and modern
segregation. Given complete control of the placement of the highway system, state and local
highway officials used the Interstate Highways as a targeted weapon to clear slums and
redevelop urban cores. In many jurisdictions this weapon was used to destroy African American
middle class neighborhoods. Montgomery, Alabama presents a perfect case study on the
targeted impact of the Interstate Highway System on the African American middle class and the
lasting effects of such a decision. A longitudinal study of socioeconomic factors, such as
property value and demographic statistics where available, of several census tracts targeted by
the construction verses the city as a whole will show the disparate impact of this policy on the
African American population of this southern town. This study will show how devastating large-
scale infrastructure investment can be when used as a weapon.
To begin, it is necessary to review the history of the Interstate Highway system to
remember the awesome power of this investment and how it changed the American way of life.
Within this history, we shall see how parochial interests and bigotry served as key factors in the
placement decisions of the roads. Next the areas targeted for “renewal” in Montgomery,
Alabama will be examined prior to the installation of the highway, followed by an explanation of
the battle that occurred, and failed to occur, in response to the planned path for “renewal.”
Finally, a longitudinal analysis of data from the official decennial census will show the rapid
decline of these areas measured in racial demographics as well as economic and employment
statistics.

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1. Introduction
1.1 Creation of the Slum
Prior to the economic collapse of 1929, urban cores, as the oldest and most established
areas of the city, enjoyed dynamic commercial zones and diverse populations. The Great
Depression brought that dynamism to a screeching halt as every sector of the economy
languished. In response to the ailing home construction and mortgage lending industries,
Congress passed the National Housing Act of 1934. A key component of this legislation, the
Federal Housing Administration proved integral to resolving the homeownership crisis, but had a
lasting impact on the diversity of the central business district. Underwriting guidelines for the
Federal Housing Administration recommended refusing mortgage insurance for racial and ethnic
minorities while encouraging investments in new developments on the edges of the city (The
Fair Housing Center of Greater Boston). As population and economic activity left, central
business districts became characterized by an increased concentration of poverty and a more
racially homogeneous population. With limited access to investment, central business districts
were soon surrounded by what in 1939 Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace called, “a wide
border of decadent and dying property which has become, or is in fact becoming, a slum area”
(Mohl 2002, 6).
Slums, especially inner-city slums created by the decline of the central business district,
faced problems of inadequate infrastructure, in both physical as well as social terms. Years of
neglect and decay ate away at the underused buildings like a cancer. As these structures
crumbled, they became vacant, uninhabitable monuments to urban despair. These empty tombs
complimented the haphazard construction of newly-built, overcrowded tenement buildings which
burst at the seams with dilapidation and disrepair. Inferior land usage and substandard housing,
in combination with a lack of access to basic life amenities like fresh food and water, gave the
central business district a pervasive air of desperation and depression. Citizens of these areas,
plagued by concentrated poverty and endemic unemployment, contended with high crime rates,
extreme pollution, and an overall poor quality of life. Furthermore, the economic isolation and
transitory nature of this population generally restricted the stability necessary for a strong
community (Moses 1945).
As the explosion of post-war suburbs facilitated “white flight,” five million African-
Americans migrated to city centers, producing large communities with multi-generational
populations and strong social networks. This population gravitated toward central business
districts and other areas that had been designated as black neighborhoods through decades of
zoning ordinances and restrictive covenants. Though racial zoning laws had been found
unconstitutional in 1917, several localities enacted and enforced them as late as the 1950s.
These laws, also known as redlining, served as the show of support from the local governments
for the discriminatory practices of real estate agents, insurance agents, banks, and other
professionals in the housing industry (Silver 1997).
1.2 Roads to the Rescue
The use of the Interstate Highway System as a weapon to combat urban decay had
remained popular from the beginning. The first proposal for a transcontinental highway argued
strongly that the planning of the roadways should be completely contained within the planning of
urban redevelopment. Presidents and Cabinet Secretaries of all stripes advocated coordinating
highway planning and road construction with slum clearance and urban renewal. The Urban
Land Institute, the American Road Builders’ Association, the automotive industry, and various
other interest groups championed urban freeways as “the salvation of the central business

3. 3
district.” State and local governments, local businesses, and urban planners saw roads as key to
eliminating slums and building strong urban centers. One such planner, Robert Moses, provided
an especially forceful argument for driving a freeway directly through the heart of the urban
center, claiming, “When you’re operating in an overbuilt metropolis you have to hack your way
with a meat axe” (Mohl 2002, 27).
Known as the Master Builder of New York, the opinions of Robert Moses on urban
development issues held considerable credence. Ostensibly a park builder, Moses spent his
career reclaiming large swaths of urban decay and converting them to more useful areas, such as
parks and parkways. Ribbon parks, as he called them, consisted of multi-lane highways winding
through the landscape propelling motorists at forty miles an hour without interruption, while
natural vistas offered urban denizens a respite from the concrete and steel of city life.
Understanding the necessary coordination of park building, road placement, and urban renewal,
Moses replaced the vacant and decrepit structures of urban decay with curving parkways and
verdant pastures designed to inspire civic involvement and investment. Moses went to great
lengths to ensure the success of his ribbon parks, taking personal responsibility for design and
placement. This attention to detail and demand for excellence safeguarded his roads from
destroying established neighborhoods and unduly displacing populations (Rodgers 1939).
1.3 Federal Highway Act of 1956
While ribbon parks provided examples of successful urban renewal projects, the proposed
Interstate Highways differed substantially in design and authority. Early in the process,
designers of the Interstates followed the advice of the commercial trucking industry and cost
conscious highway planners. These interests argued for the roads to be as straight as possible to
drive traffic at optimum speeds and argued against the meandering paths through parks and
population zones. Additionally, though the Interstate Highways program was a massive federal
investment in infrastructure, Congress included two provisions in the 1956 Federal Highway Act
that relinquished all authority for the urban sections to state and local officials unencumbered by
matters of cost. The first concerned relocating displaced residents. The second fateful decision
concerned the responsibility of routing the Interstates through the urban centers.
Urban renewal programs prior to the Highway Act appropriated funds to relocate and
rebuild a community, completing the “slum clearance” stage by transferring the population to a
more sustainable area. For other renewal programs, this could mean several square blocks of
residents removed and relocated, with the costs included in the budget for the individual
program. The Interstates would stretch over miles of urban real estate, displacing thousands of
families and requiring billions of dollars for relocation. With an initial price tag over twenty-
seven billion dollars making some fiscally conservative congressmen uncomfortable, adding
untold billions of aid to a politically weak minority proved to be a bridge too far. In an effort to
get the legislation passed, Congress eliminated federal relocation funding in the final bill,
claiming it to be in the purview of housing legislation instead (Mohl 2002).
Although the federal government agreed to contribute ninety percent of the funds for the
program, the question of routing was ultimately left to state highway departments and municipal
highway builders. Local officials, so the theory held, would be more familiar with the intricacies
and idiosyncrasies of the city and thereby choose the most appropriate area through which to
route the Interstate. Although Robert Moses saw the interstates as a great benefit to the
communities through which it would be routed, he also warned about the danger of leaving too
broad a definition of slum to allow for “favoritism, bad politics, and a dozen other evils” (Moses
1945). This diffusion of responsibility, along with the lack of a mandate to relocate the displaced

4. 4
population and the removal of cost as a concern allowed for an exceedingly broad definition of
slum.
2. Interstates and Race
Due to a confluence of forces, race quickly became an integral factor in how state and
local highwaymen defined the term slum. First, a lack of direction from above had produced an
overly broad definition. So long as the road penetrated the heart of the central business district,
federal officials gave little notice to which neighborhoods would be destroyed. Second,
demographic shifts had isolated the African-American population in the central business district
and the surrounding areas. Third, local governments had promoted this segregation with racial
zoning laws and other planning tactics bringing the value of the land down considerably. Last, in
an era of heightened racial tension, highway planners had complete discretion to follow their
own prejudices.
2.1 Creation of the Non-Slum
As African-American neighborhoods grew and expanded, many resisted becoming slums
and instead became strong, stable communities. Although pressed against the artificial
boundaries of redlining, these communities focused on land use and building construction to
prevent vacancy and overcrowding. Though constrained commercially by Jim Crow, these
communities developed complex social networks and prosperous business districts that fought
against the social diseases poverty, drug use, and crime. As home rehabilitation and business
investment accelerated and the populations became multi-generational as well as economically
diverse, these neighborhoods looked less like slums and more like vibrant city districts. The
major difference between what these African-American neighborhoods had become and an
inner-city slum in need of urban renewal is the quality of life available to the residents. While a
slum can only offer a substandard quality of life, residents of a vibrant city district can enjoy a
quality of life well above average.
In The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Jane Jacobs defines the four conditions
necessary for a vibrant city district: diversity of use, short blocks, varying age of buildings, and a
dense population. The first requires several primary uses for the area that demand a variety of
people on the street at many times of day. Constrained by racial zoning laws, African-American
neighborhoods commingled the residential and commercial areas with schools and other social
institutions. The second condition demands short, walkable blocks with several opportunities to
change direction and turn a corner, allowing for a variety of paths through the area. Located near
downtowns and in the older parts of town, African-American neighborhoods often enjoyed the
short blocks of early street design. The third demands the preservation of old buildings, in
various states of repair, which will allow a diversity of businesses to occupy the same district,
increasing the diversity of the population as a whole. The burgeoning professional class and the
older stock of buildings in these neighborhoods provided an extremely amenable environment
for a diversity of buildings. The final condition calls for a high density of population to take
advantage of the various amenities supplied by this district. As opposed to the dense population
of the slum, vibrant districts are not overcrowded. Buildings are able to house the population
comfortably without posing risks to the occupants or the building itself. The African-American
neighborhoods that grew out of the central business districts met all four of these conditions
(Jacobs 1961, 150-51).
2.2 Race as Determinant
Although these neighborhoods should not have been classified as slums, or considered
for urban renewal, many highway planners focused their efforts on these areas. From Baltimore

5. 5
to Birmingham, Miami to Minneapolis, racial politics increasingly informed the definition of
slum. The interstates followed a standard process for relocating and crippling the African-
American communities: destroy homes and businesses, redistribute the population to
“acceptable” areas of town, and sever all social ties within the community (Dreier 2004, 131). In
one fell swoop, the interstate destroyed the entire community, all housing regardless of livability,
as well as churches and prosperous business districts. The trend to target the Interstates toward
black neighborhoods became so apparent that the program became referred to as “Negro
removal” rather than “urban renewal.” One former federal highway official described this
concept in the most blatant terms possible, “Urban interstates gave city officials a good
opportunity to get rid of the local niggertown” (Mohl 2002, 29).
Miami serves as a prime example of the routing of the interstate as a politically motivated
weapon to destroy a thriving African-American community. In Miami, I-95 enters the city due
south until it meets I-395 at which point it hooks east. This hook sends the freeway directly
through the Overtown neighborhood, an area once known as the “Harlem of the South” for its
commercial and cultural influence. The original plan for the downtown expressway sent the road
through “low-value” industrial areas, such as warehouses, and along an abandoned rail corridor.
The adopted plan shifted the road several blocks to the west to slice through the Overtown
business district, “the heart of black Miami.” The intention was clear: “a complete slum
clearance effectively removing every Negro family from the present city limits” (Mohl 2004,
683-85).
In Birmingham, in order for the interstate to more drastically impact the African-
American community, the principles of speed and ease of travel were circumvented. Interstates
were routed to bisect black neighborhoods while avoiding white neighborhoods. I-59 diverts
from its normal, straight path to such a degree that travelers have to slow down from 60 to
around 45 miles per hour, all in the attempt to avoid the white neighborhood of Woodlawn.
Additionally, the interstate straddles the neighborhood of Smithfield, the once affluent black
neighborhood where Dr. Martin Luther King often stayed on his trips to Birmingham. Perhaps
the most troubling aspect of the Birmingham case is how clearly the interstates line up with the
boundaries of the racial zoning laws (Connerly 2002, 101-04).
3. Montgomery
As Interstate-85 drives to the heart of downtown Montgomery, it passes through one of
the most historic neighborhoods in the state of Alabama, known as Centennial Hill. The area
spans from Carter Hill Road on the south to Adams Street on the north, from Decatur Street in
the west to Chestnut Street in the east. This area encompasses Alabama State University, Oak
Park, and Jackson Hospital along with exit 2 of Interstate 85. Centennial Hill has been called
home by such luminaries as Johnnie Carr, Rev. Ralph Abernathy, Nat King Cole, and Dr. Martin
Luther King. Also located in this neighborhood were the headquarters of the People’s Taxi, an
integral part of the bus boycott, and the offices of the Montgomery Advertiser Negro Edition.
Centennial Hill was truly a center of middle-class black Montgomery.
1 Centennial Hill census block map. 1950

6. 6
3.1 Englehardt
The man in charge of routing the Interstates throughout Alabama was State Highway
Director Sam Engelhardt. Engelhardt saw the interstate as one tool in the planning process
charged with mitigating the growing problem of an increased population using more motor-
vehicles. While he professed the routing of the interstates would be decided based on the needs
of the city, his resume may help to inform his motivations. A political creature, Engelhardt
served in the Alabama State House as well as the Alabama Senate prior to accepting the position
as State Highway Department Director under Governor John Patterson. As a State Senator,
Engelhardt redrew the Tuskegee city limits as an “uncouth 28-sided figure” which left ninety-
nine percent of the African-American population out of the jurisdiction. This act of
gerrymandering led to the Supreme Court case Gomillion v Lightfoot, which declared the
redistricting of the city to be “fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their
pre-existing vote” (Gomillion v. Lightfoot 1960). A southern Democrat and ardent
segregationist, Engelhardt served as the chairman of the Alabama Democratic Executive
Committee and as the executive secretary of the Alabama Citizen’s Council, an organization
similar in views and membership to the Ku Klux Klan.
3.2 Opposition
On April 19, 1960 at a public hearing held in the City Auditorium to a crowd of more
than 700 individuals Sam Engelhardt presented the plan for I-85. The route headed south of Oak
Park and then turned to cut north of Alabama State University, directly through the city’s major
African American Community. According to the Alabama Journal, most opposed the route
while some opposed the basic assumption that the highway should go through the city at all
(Castleberry 1960). Douglas Goode, the administrator of Jackson Hospital argued the interstate
nullified the reason for the hospital to have chosen its present site, and would destroy its plans
for future expansion. The hospital had recently purchased land to the south under the assumption
that the highway would be routed to the north of the park and the hospital. Attorneys Thomas B.
Hill and Evans Hinson challenged the assumption of directing the highway through the city at
all, citing high property costs and the dramatic increase in homelessness. Rev. George W. Curry
and C. R. Williams spoke on behalf of the residents of the impacted area, and pointed to the lack
of available options for relocating the black population (York 1960). However, these
protestations fell only on deaf ears.

7. 7
After the hearing, Reverend Curry, head of a Property Owners Committee, distributed a
petition protesting the route as “racially motivated to uproot a neighborhood of Negro leaders.”
With 1,150 signatures, Curry sent his petition to local, state, and federal highway officials in
hope of redirecting the interstate away from Centennial Hill. The petition pointed out the lack of
options for relocation of the community and the destruction of two Negro churches, the social
and political centers of the African American community. Curry even proposed a cheaper route
through mostly vacant lands. He claimed that the reason this route was not chosen was because
Sam Engelhardt wanted to destroy the community of Centennial Hill. Curry went on to claim
that in a conversation with Mr. Engelhardt, “Mr. Engelhardt stated that it was his intention to get
Rev. Abernathy’s church.” In the face of these accusations Federal Highway Administrator Rex
M. Whitton advised Engelhardt to “let the dust settle for about six months and then proceed with
construction of the project” (Mohl, The Interstates and the Cities: Highways, housing, and the
Freeway Revolt 2002, 32-33). After the suggested six month waiting period, the construction of
Interstate 85 proceeded in early 1961.
Although the planning, development, and construction of the interstate system coincided
with the emergence of the civil rights movement and broader political empowerment throughout
the nation, only in certain areas did civic resistance prevent the destruction of communities. In
his study of the freeway revolts, Dr. Mohl identified four necessary motifs for the resistance to
have any affect. First, the movement needed to draw attention to the issue through cooperation
and coordination across city districts, across class, and especially across race. Second, the
movement needed to win allies in the media as well as government officials. Third, a history of
urban planning and activism within the locality provided a population versed in the issues of land
use and community involvement. Finally, a planning process amenable to citizen input, and a
judicial system that allows for litigation of complaints and delay of construction. Without these
four attributes, freeway revolts often failed and highway builders were free to disregard
community input (Mohl, Stop the Road: Freeway Revolts in American Cities 2004, 676).
Using Dr. Mohl’s prescribed prerequisites for a successful Freeway Revolt, the reason
behind the failure of the Montgomery protest of the interstate becomes clear. First, the protest to
the interstate came almost entirely from those immediately affected by the construction: residents
of Centennial Hill and administrators of Jackson Hospital. The broader community showed little
concern as whites saw this as a problem within the black community. Secondly, with little
public outcry or interest, the media took no notice and government officials saw no reason to get
involved. Finally, the power to route the interstate lay solely in the hands of Sam Engelhardt.
The system did not allow for litigation or protest to halt, or even slow the scheduled construction.
Although Centennial Hill had a history of community involvement and activism, the lack of the
other three requirements led to the failure of the movement.
4. Centennial Hill: Slum?
According to Robert Moses, a slum consists of poorly constructed buildings which are
either overcrowded or vacant, a population constantly in flux, and a below average standard of
living. The two most appropriate metrics to determine if an area meets this definition of a slum
are the rate of owner occupation and the rate of vacancy. The home often represents the single
largest investment, and the main repository of personal wealth, for the majority of homeowners.
Homeowners protect their investments by maintaining their properties which creates a safer,
more sanitary environment filled with more attractive properties. Similarly, homeowners tend to
stay in their homes for longer periods than renters, creating a more stable community with a
stronger social network. Conversely, vacant properties disrupt the safety and security of the

8. 8
community. Empty structures provide refuge for social ills such as crime, drug use, and disease-
carrying pests. Vacant lots and crumbling buildings are not only an eyesore, draining the
community pride, but are dangerous in their disrepair.
2 1950 Census
Data
Montgomery Centennial Hill Ward 4 Ward 7
Total Houses 32315 3432 2260 4982
Owner Occupied 12232 1268 575 2320
% Owner Occupied 37.90% 36.95% 25.44% 46.57%
Vacant Properties 1842 86 88 122
% Vacant 5.70% 2.50% 3.89% 2.45%
Minority Occupied 11375 2699 1087 1799
% Minority 37.30% 78.64% 48.10% 36.11%
Median Value $7,853 $4,895 $4,941 $7,050
During the 1950s, the rate of homeownership in Centennial Hill mirrored that of the city
of Montgomery. Moreover, Centennial Hill had a vacancy rate less than half that of the city as a
whole. While the median property value of Centennial Hill is considerably less than the median
of the city, this can be explained by the racial zoning laws of the time and does not necessarily
mean these homes are of lesser quality. Additionally, as vacancy rates are so low, one can
assume the structures are habitable and sound, and as the homeownership rates are so similar, the
population of Centennial Hill should be as stable as that of the city. Finally, while these metrics
provide clues to the first two attributes, quality of life must be examined differently.
The Centennial Hill of 1950 met these requirements for a vibrant city district. The two
major employers of the area, Jackson Hospital and Alabama State University, provided an influx
of professionals from outside the area as well as those who use the services provided by these
institutions. As an accompaniment to these outsiders, the residents of this area lived in densely
populated blocks of single family housing and enjoyed the services provided by the secondary
uses along the business districts of High Street, Hall Street, and Jackson Avenue. These densely
populated blocks had several corners and intersections allowing for various routes for travelers to
cross the area. Distributed throughout the business districts, throughout the neighborhood as
well, buildings of various ages, sizes, and uses allow for a variety of businesses to thrive. This
variety of businesses (coffee shops, supper clubs, dry cleaners, movie theaters, etc.) attracted a
dense population of various income levels to enjoy the district and call it home.
By these metrics, Centennial Hill did not meet the narrow definition of “slum” called for
by Robert Moses. The strength of this neighborhood can be seen in the story of Oak Park. Built
in 1886 and located in the center of the district between Jackson Hospital and Alabama State
University, this segregated park served as a roadblock for the residents of the community.
African Americans were not even allowed to cross through the park without fear of retribution,
from the police or the public. The park offered the white residents of Montgomery the first city
zoo as well as a public pool along with the manicured lawns and splendid foliage. The
Centennial Hill neighborhood grew around the park, creating the Hall Street-High Street-Jackson

9. 9
Avenue business district on the opposite corner of Jackson Hospital and Alabama State
University.
In late 1958, a group of citizens filed suit in federal court alleging the City of
Montgomery and the Parks and Recreation Department violated the civil rights of the African
American population throughout the city. The court found with the plaintiff and ordered the city
to desegregate all city parks. However, rather than allowing African Americans to enjoy the
same parks as whites, the city chose to close all parks, cutting off its nose to spite its face. The
zoo was closed and the pool filled up with concrete; the area became a dead zone blocking all
traffic, regardless of race. The park remained closed until 1965 (City of Montgomery, Alabama,
et al., v. Georgia Theresa Gilmore et al. 1960).
If this neighborhood were unstable, the closure of this park would produce catastrophic
effects on the neighborhood. However, because this park had served as an impasse for the
residents of the area for more than a generation, the impact of its closure was negligible. As the
rate of homeownership increased throughout the city, the tracts that included the Centennial Hill
area followed the trend closely. The rate of vacant property in the city remained nearly constant
over the decade. While the vacancy rate for Centennial Hill increased from 2.90% to 3.32%, this
average was still well below the city average of 5.80%. Wards 4 and 6, when combined, had a
39.85% minority population in 1950, nearly identical to the minority population of the city. The
minority population of Tracts 6 and 15 topped 61.88%, nearly double the city percentage at
29.85%. The increase in homeownership, coupled with the relatively low vacancy rate, shows
that the area had not moved to slum status even after the closure of Oak Park. The drastic
increase in minority population, more than fifty percent, can best be explained by the shifting
boundaries from Wards in 1950 to Tracts in 1960.
3 Housing Variables 1950 and
1960
Montgomery Ward 4/ Tract 6 Ward 7/ Tract 15 Combined
1950 1960 1950 1960 1950 1960 1950 1960
% Owner Occupied 37.90% 47.75% 25.44% 34.20% 46.57% 62.78% 39.98% 44.18%
% Vacant Property 5.70% 5.80% 3.89% 2.84% 2.45% 4.20% 2.90% 3.32%
% Minority Occupied 37.30% 29.85% 48.10% 93.70% 36.11% 2.64% 39.85% 61.88%
1
Prior to the imposition of the interstate, Centennial Hill more closely resembled what Ms.
Jacobs refers to as a “stable, low-rent area.” A stable neighborhood, like Centennial Hill, enjoys
residents with a highly developed yet informal social structure who have made investments in
their homes and enjoy a strong attachment to their community and the area. A slum, by contrast,
displays social ills such as crime, poverty, overcrowding, and pollution. (Jacobs 1961, 272). By
any legitimate measure, Centennial Hill was not a slum.
1
The data was collected from the decennial United States Census. The 1960 Tract map differed slightly from the
1950 Ward map. However, Ward 4 and Ward 7 closely align with Tract 6 and Tract 15.

10. 10
4 Census Tract Map 1960. Centennial Hill in green 5 Census Tract Map 1970
5. Clearance
For successful slum clearance, the main objective is the removal of blight. Blight
consists of unsafe, unsanitary, or unseemly structures or properties that undermine the stability of
the neighborhood. Once the blight is leveled, the lands can be converted to a more productive
use through urban renewal efforts. While slums contain an extreme amount of blight, it can exist
in any area. Although Centennial Hill has been determined to have not been a slum, the
clearance stage could have had a positive impact by targeting the few vacant and dilapidated
buildings while staying clear of the functional properties.
If the construction of the interstate had as negligible an affect as the closure of Oak Park,
then the rate of homeownership should follow a similar trend during the 1960s as it did during
the 1950s. In fact, due to the removal of so many houses and the conversion of so much land to
other uses, the rates of homeownership and vacancy should have bettered the rates of the city.
While the total number of households in the city increased by more than ten percent, the total
households for the combined tract area decreased by more than fifteen percent. However, even
as the rate of homeownership increased by more than ten percent across the city, the rate in the
combined tract area decreased by nearly ten percent. This crosscurrent shows Centennial Hill in
considerable decline after only the first decade of the interstate.

11. 11
6 Housing Variables 1960 and
1970
Montgomery Tract 6 Tract 15 Combined
1960 1970 1960 1970 1960 1970 1960 1970
Total Households 40801 45188 2746 1624 1475 1898 4221 3522
Owner Occupied 19482 23996 939 476 926 955 1865 1431
% Owner Occupied 47.75% 53.10% 34.20% 29.31% 62.78% 50.32% 44.18% 40.63%
Vacant Properties 2368 3613 78 146 62 141 140 287
% Vacant 5.80% 8.00% 2.84% 8.99% 4.20% 7.43% 3.32% 8.15%
Minority Occupied 12179 12077 2573 1189 39 789 2612 1978
% Minority 29.85% 26.73% 93.70% 73.21% 2.64% 41.57% 61.88% 56.16%
More troubling than the homeownership rates going in the wrong direction, the vacancy
rates for the area increased drastically over this decade. While the percent of vacant properties
increased throughout the city, the area surrounding Centennial Hill contained in the two census
tracts experienced this troubling pattern with intensity. Between 1960 and 1970, the number of
vacant properties, those that were left after the construction of the interstate and the leveling of
large swaths of homes, more than doubled. Due to the depletion of the housing stock, the
percent of properties that were vacant exploded from less than three percent to more than eight
percent. The percentage decrease in minority population during this period can best be explained
by the interstate itself. The total household population for the combined tract area dropped by
699 households, while the minority households dropped by 634 households. The interstate
effectively decreased the total minority population of the combined census tract area between
1960 and 1970 only by decreasing the total population of the area.
6. Urban Renewal
According to the plan to revitalize neighborhoods, after the identified slum undergoes the
clearance stage, the next step is for urban renewal. Robert Moses defined the intent of urban
renewal with his description of what came from the expressways he routed through New York
City. In his opinion, the gargantuan roads slicing through the area are “ribbon improvement(s)
of the entire area through which it passes” (Moses 1945). The entire theory of urban renewal
rests on the idea of converting land to a higher, more-beneficial use. If this goal were
accomplished, the benefit of the interstate would show in the general housing demographics,
employment rates, and the income of the residents of the area.
However, after the initial impact of the interstate, the trend toward less homeownership
and more vacant properties continued unabated. Even as homeownership approached record
levels in Montgomery, Centennial Hill homeownership remained well below average, at a rate of
little more than half that of the city. Additionally, as the rate of homeownership increased in
Montgomery, the rate in Centennial Hill fell. Clearly, the neighborhood experienced a drain of
wealth over the decades following the inception of the interstate as fewer and fewer residents of
the area owned their homes. As homeownership in the area decreased, the corollary of vacant
property naturally increased. While the percentage of vacant property in the combined tract area

12. 12
remained above, but relatively close to the rate for the city as a whole, by the 2000 Census, the
rate was more than double.
7 Housing Variables 1970 and 1980.
1970 1980 1990 2000
% Owner Occupied
Montgomery 53.10% 57.21% 60.08% 55.87%
Combined Tract 40.63% 38.69% 35.41% 33.24%
% Vacant Property
Montgomery 8.00% 6.89% 9.53% 9.68%
Combined Tract 8.15% 7.60% 16.15% 19.73%
% Minority Occupied
Montgomery 26.73% 31.75% 37.66% 42.84%
Combined Tract 56.16% 58.02% 55.77% 57.58%
It is interesting to note that over the decades following the construction, the percentage of
minority occupied homes in Centennial Hill remained nearly constant. While the percentage of
minority occupied homes in Montgomery nearly doubled, the percentage of minority occupied
homes in the combined census tracts hovered just below 60%. However, this number only tells
part of the story. As the population of the city multiplied to one and half times its 1960 size by
2000, the total population of the combined tract area lost more than half its population over the
same time period. Additionally, the minority population of the area grew to more than 80% by
the 2000 Census verses just over 50% for the city as a whole.
8 Total Population.
Montgomery Tract 6 Tract 15 Combined Tracts
1960 134393 10164 4512 14676
1970 133386 4929 5751 10680
1980 177857 3764 4861 8625
1990 187106 2945 4636 7581
2000 201568 2465 4353 6818
9 Minority Percentage of Population.
Montgomery Tract 6 Tract 15 Combined Tracts
1960 35.12% 96.90% 3.08% 68.06%
1970 33.38% 87.40% 52.01% 68.34%
1980 39.17% 91.18% 60.52% 73.90%
1990 42.34% 95.21% 66.59% 77.71%
2000 50.09% 98.13% 71.22% 80.95%
Therefore, as the area of study lost population over the study period, the remaining
population became less and less diverse. The rate of minority occupied homes did not change,
but the minority population percentage grew, implying an increase in number of occupants per
home, and at worst overcrowding. Clearly, had the interstate predicated an era of urban
renewal, the area would see a decrease in diversity while losing population, and at the same time
approach overcrowding. These are not the symptoms of a healthy neighborhood.

13. 13
10 Workforce
Montgomery Combined Tracts
Population % in Labor % of Labor Population % in Labor % of Labor
Force Force Force Force
Unemployed Unemployed
1960 91144 59.83% 4.29% 10407 58.18% 3.56%
1970 91355 59.39% 3.85% 7837 48.27% 3.50%
1980 130745 62.38% 6.27% 11144 42.39% 4.41%
1990 140996 66.00% 7.00% 5991 53.73% 9.33%
2000 154806 60.19% 6.91% 5444 48.31% 9.66% 2
Beginning in 1960, the census tracts containing Centennial Hill had a labor force and
unemployment commensurate with the city at large. By 1970, the percentage of the workforce
population active in the labor force had dropped nearly ten percentage points. This number
continued to fall in 1980, showing nearly six in ten adults in the work force were not actively
working or seeking work. The most troubling development occurs in 1990, when the workforce
population drops by one half, the labor force raises to over 53% but the unemployment rate
approaches double digits. By the turn of the century, the workforce population of the city broke
150,000, labor participation rate stayed above 60%, and the unemployment rate stayed below a
manageable 7%. In contrast, the workforce of the two census tracts fell below 5500, labor
participation fell to below 50%, and unemployment rose to 9.66%. As measured by economic
opportunity, the neighborhood of Centennial Hill began a downward trajectory in the 1960s that
has continued for nearly half a century.
Finally, the level of urban renewal must be measured in the median income of the area
along with the level of poverty. Beginning in 1960, the median income of Tract 6 was less than
half that of the city as a whole. When the census began recording poverty levels in 1970, Tract
15 had a lower than average level of poverty, but so little increase in median income over the
previous measurement. Tract 6 already had a poverty rate of almost three times the average and
a median income more than half that of the city. By 1980, the poverty rate in Tract 15 more than
doubled and more than half of Tract 65 lived below the poverty line. Over the subsequent
decades, both tracts saw a precipitous increase in poverty and a steady decline in relative median
income. By 2000, residents living in Tract 15 could expect their incomes to be a third less than
the city average, while residents of Tract 6 had a median income of less than one quarter of the
city average. Clearly, the two census tracts under study did not experience the urban renewal
promised by the road builders and highway men.
2
Population: 14 and older in 1960; 16 and older in 1970

14. 14
11 Income and Poverty
Montgomery Tract6 Tract15
MedianIncome %BelowPoverty MedianIncome %BelowPoverty MedianIncome %BelowPoverty
1960 $5,065 $2,382 $6,297
1970 $8,460 12.30% $4,035 32.90% $6,550 11.30%
1980 $18,049 14.70% $6,558 50.10% $13,390 23.60%
1990 $31,959 14.40% $10,152 52.00% $25,703 26.00%
2000 $44,297 13.90% $10,720 63.30% $29,286 29.80%
7. Centennial Hill: Renewed?
In 2007, the City of Montgomery Department of Planning and Development drafted a
Neighborhood Plan for Centennial Hill that identifies the need for reinvestment to restore
housing, commerce, and the community. One of the most striking aspects of the plan is the map
of vacant properties. The large swaths of vacant land that fills the area with pockets of
nothingness, act as a cancer on the area surrounding them, destroying property values and
serving to blight the general area. Interstates were originally planned to combat this type of
blight, but instead created it. Vacant properties present the best and easiest place to build
infrastructure due to the low price of the property and the absence of residents to relocate.
However, after nearly fifty years of living with the interstate in Centennial Hill, the community
has not revived, but slowly wasted away under the shadow of the hulking beast.
.
8. Conclusion
This study shows the impact of the interstate on the two census tracts that included the
area known as Centennial Hill. In 1950, the U. S. Bureau of the Census records show a thriving
city district under the definition set forth by Jane Jacobs. After the construction of the interstate,
Centennial Hill experienced a rapid economic decline especially as compared to the city as a
whole. More research, focused on block level data, may more clearly show the impact of the
interstate on a granular level for this neighborhood. Comparing the Centennial Hill
neighborhood to the surrounding neighborhoods, including Forrest Avenue to Zelda Road,

15. 15
Highland Avenue, Capital Heights, Cloverdale, and Downtown, may show the seismic effects of
this decision as the impact spread through the area.
This study shows the true impact of cataclysmic infrastructure investments on
neighborhoods targeted as “slums.” Primarily, when the definition of “slum” is unrestrained
enough to allow the investment to be used as a political weapon, the infrastructure will only
serve to destroy the vitality of the neighborhood. Secondly, massive investment in single-use
property that creates barriers for commerce and pedestrian travel will also create dead zones
along their perimeters. These dead zones contain little to no traffic and, therefore, cannot
support commercial or social districts. Finally, when an erroneously identified “slum” is
targeted for massive single-use infrastructure investment, the dead zones along the perimeter of
the infrastructure infect the rest of the neighborhood, effectively killing any vitality.

16. 16
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