J.C. Penney's mission and vision statements lack clarity and direction, leading to low employee morale and dissatisfaction. The company frequently changes leadership and strategies without internal alignment. J.C. Penney's "dominant selling idea" of "If It Fits, You Feel It" does not effectively communicate their value proposition and fails to meet the criteria for an effective brand message. Financially, J.C. Penney has seen declining profits, returns, and market share in recent years as competitors improved and their pricing strategies proved unsustainable.

1. J.C. Penney Situational Market Analysis
Charleston Hurley
B.B.A. Marketing & Management: Mercer University

2. Internal Analysis:
The J.C. Penney Corporation Incorporated (JCP) mission began in 1902 following “The
Golden Rule” (Do unto others as you would have others do unto you) and followed the
mission with a vision statement, “The Penney Idea,” which aimed to deliver low-cost
pricing and provide value and quality products to satisfied customers. As company
leadership evolved, so did J.C. Penney’s mission. JCP’s “Golden Rule” now follows
eight “Winning Together Principles” which further diffuse the solidarity of its statement
and render JCP a mission-less corporation. The eight “Winning Together
Principles” (associates, integrity, performance, recognition, teamwork, quality, and
innovation) are more or less requirements for any successful company rather than an
industry-specific brand, like JCP. These elements do not qualify as an effective mission
statement. Additionally, JCP has endured a long journey to profitability, but still fails to
meet the requirements of a good mission because JCP experiences industry-consumer
disconnect and lack of internal buy-in.
Without a clear mission or vision statement, the company is left with an unhealthy
internal organizational culture, evidenced by high levels of employee dissatisfaction and
turmoil with executive company leadership. JCP is left without direction when company
leadership and strategy changes repeatedly. Employees feel that they are in a
rudderless ship; they are dissatisfied with their employer because of the secrecy and
insincerity that abounds concerning the pricing structure of JCP. Employees feel
punished if they wish to vocalize their concerns about the brand, brand integrity, and
discounting practices. Furthermore, employees do not feel any level autonomy
surrounding their job which leads them to low job satisfaction in their corporate culture.
Many employees have lost pride in their jobs.
JCP’s corporate structure is organized in such a way that it is unable to make marketing
and pricing changes quickly, and without target-market testing; this can largely be
attributed to the layers of bureaucracy under Ullman and Johnson’s leadership. For
example, JCP could not act as a “fast” or “flat” organization when their CEO, Johnson,

3. and his leadership team acted as “commuter-jetters” from California to headquarters in
Texas. If changes needed to be made quickly, many of the top leadership team were not
even in the same state to help implement that change quickly and effectively. These
leaders were not invested in their organization. Furthermore, the company has
positioned itself as “too flexible,” because it is overly-adaptable to market changes
because so many changes have been made under the changing leadership. For
example, Johnson abandoned the discounting loyal customers expected, but then over-
corrected his mistake a few months later, offering huge discounts on products that
ultimately left the company unprofitable and unsustainable.
JCP desperately needs a Dominant Selling Idea (DSI). Currently, the company uses an
“If It Fits, You Feel It” as their DSI, which does not fulfill the five qualifications of a DSI.
“If It Fits, You Feel It” is not superlative, important, believable, memorable, or tangible.
“If It Fits, You Feel It” is confusing, to say the least. Is JCP communicating “fitting” their
target market’s price point or clothing fitting them correctly? As a department store
offering more than just clothing, it is up to the consumer to determine the DSI as a tag
line for clothing or price point.
JCP describes “Our Fit Promise” as “fitting the diversity of America with products that fit
every shape, size, color, wallet, style and occasion.” The “Fit Promise” cannot
accommodate all customers because it is an extremely broad statement that fails to
accommodate consumers through its promise. While JCP advertises its clothing and
product lines to reflect “everyday low pricing,” the company still only offers low pricing
and not the lowest pricing. Therefore, it is not superlative in nature because it will never
offer the least expensive clothing achievable as Walmart does. “If It Fits, You Feel It” as
a DSI fails because it does not explain to customers the unique shopping experience
found in JCP stores, and so, is not important. Additionally, “If It Fits, You Feel It” is not
believable as a DSI because it does not communicate why customers should come into
the brick and mortar JCP store locations when cheaper options exist on online
platforms. What exactly are customers “fitting” so that they can “feel” it? JCP’s DSI fails
to “fit” customers’ needs. Like the mission, JCP’s DSI fails to be memorable because “If

4. It Fits, You Feel It” could be a slogan for virtually any company selling any product:
JCP’s DSI is not specific, thus making it not wholly memorable. Likewise, “Our Fit
Promise” is too broad in nature, and must be refined in order to qualify a valuable DSI.
Finally, “If It Fits, You Feel It” is not tangible because it is not specific, therefore cannot
be an effective DSI. Not only can customers not touch the DSI, it is difficult to
understand the concept. “If It Fits, You Feel It” is confusing and does not meet any of
the five criteria to satisfy the requirements of an effective Dominant Selling Idea.
Likewise, JCP does not meet the five elements of expression that characterize a good
DSI. For instance, J.C. Penney’s name is meaningless. J.C. Penney could be any
company, from a tire manufacturer to a chemical lab. The name alone does not attract
and reflect customers; the name is not highly supportive of the DSI and is not
descriptive, evocative, or colorful in any way. JCP’s “unique own-able specialty” is not
unique, nor is it own-able. “Everyday Low Pricing” can be found virtually anywhere and
does not guarantee the lowest pricing available to customers in the market. Likewise,
this specialty doesn’t reflect a reliable “trigger” for JCP’s DSI in the target customers’
minds. JCP’s DSI tag line “When It Fits, You Feel It” does not explain the attractiveness
of JCP to new customers. As explained above, JCP’s DSI does not have all of the five
necessary ingredients that characterize a good DSI. Perception of JCP is dull. The
company does not have a key-visual that customers immediately envision when they
hear of the brand. Finally, JCP fails to deliver DSI-Level performance to customers
because the physical differences in product selection and cost-effective pricing strategy
performance do not elevate or differentiate the customer’s experience beyond similar
retailers. The differences in price and quality are not tangible enough to express JCP’s
brand experience. JCP fails to have Total Consistent Alignment (TCA) among their
brand because specific product features and performance do not align with the “If It Fits,
You Feel It” DSI tag line, and therefore is not reflected throughout the organization.
Financial Analysis

5. Changing the pricing strategy of retailer markdowns and couponing practices has
spurred change in financial growth. Past performance metrics have revealed that JCP is
not improving over time and been continuing to decline in sales.
In the past four years, JCP’s profitability trends decline more rapidly than do any of its
competitors, showing a rapid decrease a 4.7 operating margin ratio in 2011 to -10.1 in
2013. The only other company that declined into the negative ratios was Sears Holdings
Corp. that went from a 1.1 operating margin to a -2.1 operating margin in 2013. The
department store industry benchmark reflects a 3.3% decline in profit from 2011-2014,
but a gross margin percentage increase of 5.3%; JCP gross margin declined 9.8%.
JCP’s profitability trends are the least sustainable against all of its competitors.
Continuing at this rate, JCP will not remain a viable competitor in the department store
industry. Refer to Financial Profitability Table in Appendix FRT1 for more detail.
JCP’s management effectiveness trends are not much stronger than its profitability
trends. In 2011, JCP’s Return on Equity (ROE) ratios reflected a 7.60. While still lower
than some of its competitors, it was not a bad position in which to be. However, by
2014, JCP’s ROE had declined to -44.36 by 2014. Sears Holding Corp and JCP were
the only direct industry competitors that had a negative ROE in the 2014 fiscal year.
Refer to Management Effectiveness Table in Appendix FRT2 for more detail.
Financial strength trends show a four-year comparison of JCP to its competition and to
industry. 2011-2014 quick ratios for JCP revealed a higher quick ratio than did any of its
major competitors. Interestingly, JCP’s current ratio 2011-2014 trends stayed fairly
consistent with department stores industry benchmarks, performing only slightly above
or slightly below the current ratio trends department store industry benchmarks. Refer to
Liquidity Ratios Table in Appendix FRT3 for more detail.
JCP efficiency trends mostly align with industry competition when analyzing inventory
turnover and asset turnover rates from the 2011-2014 years. Likewise, the leverage

6. ratios using debt-to-equity revealed JCP being in line with industry competition. Refer to
Efficiency Ratios Table in Appendix FRT4 for more detail.
As demonstrated by the 2011-2014 key financial analysis above, leading indicators in a
market-based metric assessment would reveal that while adjustments to the pricing
strategy lower costs, JCP lost existing market share and customer retention dropped.
JCP’s discounting strategy is ineffective in its “Everyday Low Pricing Strategy” because
the company must work harder to gain new customers, which led to high customer
turnover, and provoked industry competitors to improve their products and service to
customers, thus increasing the competition's power. The “Everyday Low Pricing
Strategy” is not a strategy because it is not sustainable, does not really distinguish JCP
from the competition, and does not create value for the customer. In total, it does not
achieve a sustainable competitive advantage for JCP.
Customer awareness to value-conscious consumers in JCP’s brand was lost when
access to reliable couponing was taken away. Additionally, diversifying the brand and
message made customers lose interest when their favorite brands no longer lined the
walls and shelves of JCP stores. Once-loyal JCP shoppers could no longer trust the
brand. Attitudes towards JCP’s relative service quality, costs, and perceived customer
value all plummeted.
Prosper data reports that only 13% of JCP shoppers have an average household
income of more than $100,000. Comparatively, over 1/4 (29%) of JCP shoppers earn
less than $35,000, whereas Macy’s serves 20% and Kohls 19% to this demographic.
Low-income families flock to JCP for cost-friendly pricing promotions, but are
disappointed when they realize that JCP is not the most cost-effective brand on the
market.
Likewise, JCP identified three primary initiatives to improvement in its 2014 annual
report summary: driving growth in omnichannel, driving growth in center core, and
driving growth in home. These identified areas promote room for improvement, but

7. largely customers have not seen great improvements in these areas. For example,
under “driving growth in omnichannel,” JCP promises to further develop their online
technology resources because almost half of JCP traffic originates from a mobile
platform; yet, in the same year, JCP resurrects its paper-back catalog citing data
revealing many online sales stemmed from customers inspired through print
advertisement. These ideas are mutually contradictory, even in conception.
JCP’s end result is nothing short of disappointing. Behaviors involving market share,
customer retention, and market coverage hold only a bleak future and have all dwindled
in numbers for the past few years. Unless JCP can re-evaluate and reconstruct its core
customer market through reassurance, re-building trust, and transparency, then the end
result for JCP is bleak.
One of JCP’s primary weaknesses stems from price consistency. Core consumers
expect low prices, and JCP can no longer deliver the lowest prices to customers. There
is a clear industry-consumer disconnect as demonstrated through multiple failed
strategies; even so, JCP has still failed to capture significant market share despite many
attempts at re-branding. The fear of an inability to provide cost-effective strategies to
customers spurred dishonest pricing strategies as a means of regaining former
customers. Additionally, changing pricing strategies led to widespread customer distrust
after inflated prices on products and misleading deals were nationally recognized and
JCP’s “Everyday Low Pricing” was exposed as “Smoke and Mirrors” games. A huge
weakness in the JCP brand is that they lack a clear, defined strategy. One of JCP’s
current largest competitors is the “old” JCP brand because of changing company
direction.
Likewise, another weakness is brand consistency. JCP has not stayed consistent in its
brand selection which causes changes in its customer base. Ultimately this alienated
new customers with too few brand offering incentives and price incentives to become a
regular shopper at JCP. Customers now realize at new JCP, they are over-paying for
much of the merchandise.

8. Additionally, knowledgeable and enthusiastic staff significantly lack throughout JCP.
Without any form of reward or loyalist program, what incentives to customers have to
shop at JCP? Many staff members have lost pride in their jobs, and similar stores carry
comparable items at lower prices. Staff cannot provide customers with helpful
information conveyed with a friendly attitude. This is viewed as a major weakness for
JCP.
A huge weakness of JCP is that most of the stores are not modern; likewise, many of
those stores feel unattractive with out-dated displays and ineffective (conflicting)
marketing strategies. Upon entering, many JCP stores can be viewed as weary and
drab which making shopping their wholly undesirable.
JCP’s primary strength is providing its own brands. Old JCP customers love the St.
John’s Bay brand. The private label is a program that works for a few of the “tried and
true” JCP brands. Re-introducing these brands back into the market has helped JCP re-
gain some once-loyal customers and is viewed as one of the company’s leading
strengths.
Likewise, JCP is known as the low-cost department store. Today, “low-cost” and
“department store” are rarely used in the same sentence, but this perception can be
viewed as a strength for JCP.
KSFs and Industry Key Success Factors
The IBIS Industry Report identifies Key Selling Features (KSF) that are the most
important for the department store industry as: the ability to control stock on hand,
experienced workforce, ability to expand and curtail operations rapidly in line with
market, attractive product presentation, and having a wide and expanding product
range.

9. In 1994, JCP was the first department store to sell its products online. Since then, JCP
has prided itself for its strength as a user-friendly, simpleton, digital space leader in the
department store industry. To most, the attractive product presentation online would
typically reflect an effective in-store layout, design, and have good shelf utilization;
however, the reality is that JCP’s in-store display reflects the huge industry-consumer
disconnect through its clothing and home goods presentation. JCP fails to evidence the
KSF for an attractive product presentation in-store partially because of a lack of friendly
or helpful service and the lack of a clean, mess-free, in-store environment. Many JCP
storefronts are difficult to navigate, and product placement can be illogical (e.g.
clearance rack of clothing geared for older, female customers placed in front of a
Juniors display).
Some of these problems may stem from JCP lacking an experienced and committed
workforce. JCP once used to be dedicated to customers by providing reasonable prices
to average families and following through on its commitment to “The Golden Rule” and
quality products. Customers were treated as in-store employees as far up as the
company president would wish to be treated. IThe company was committed to quality
customer service which made JCP’s strategy effective. Similarly, systems were put in
place to enable staff to deliver that level of service to customers and the staff was
committed to delivering the targeted level of service, excellence, and friendliness. As
JCP has grown, these factors encompassing experienced and dedicated workforce
have vanished, leaving JCP without another Key Selling Feature: an experienced and
engaged workforce.
Further, employees and customers often experience frustration from JCP’s inability to
expand operations quickly in order to meet market demand. Operations during peak
periods are lag behind industry competitors when JCP competes to meet increased
demand for certain products (such as Christmas spending or back-to-school shopping)
and limits operations to “the bare bones” only carrying in-store the most basic items.

10. JCP cannot meet market demand because of its antiquated attitude towards trend-
setting technology advancement which causes the company to not attain another KSF.
Likewise, this conservative attitude reflects JCP’s inability to carry a wide and
expanding product range (a huge industry KSF). One of JCP’s largest strengths is that
over half of JCP’s sales are stimulated from in-store brands. JCP’s private brands like
St. John’s Bay and Arizona are strengths that attract and retain customers’ attention.
Private brands are one of the biggest advantages over competition and give JCP a
stronger identity among the department store competitors. However, JCP does not carry
a wide product range beyond its own products. Found in JCP are only “staple” or
“necessity” products on which to build a basic wardrobe or home furnishings. JCP does
not provide customers with the ability to purchase beyond basic foundations and limits
them from attaining the “wide and expanding product range” KSF.
Similarly, JCP cannot control stock on hand. JCP does not do enough market testing to
determine stock control measures to ensure sufficient product lines are available in-
house. Without this precaution, JCP loses out on the final KSF for the department store
industry because it loses sales through lack of ability to control stock on-hand.
Analyzing Marketing Strategies
JCP has treated its marketing strategy as if it were a day-to-day evolving method by
changing price structures and swiftly taking away and changing brands without listening
or testing market information. Additionally, JCP’s strategy has been treated as a single
aspect of business (only to make a profit). Price promotions can actually heighten target
customers’ price consciousness as long as JCP can market price promotions as an
event rather than a strategy. In today’s market, price structure could be clarified to
communicate the JCP advantage and value, but marketing pricing strategies is not a
distinctive offering to customers.

11. Similarly, JCP has not communicated its passion through marketing strategy. A good
strategy requires making trade-offs, creating a niche, communicating passion, and
utilizing market information. To make a sustainable, dynamic, competitive advantage,
JCP must have built an advantage over competition that customers value and that its
leading competitors cannot substitute or duplicate.
It is easy to analyze the positive and negative effects of past and current market
strategies by breaking down the elements by 1) a value proposition 2) a profit
proposition and 3) a people proposition.
JCP’s current marketing strategy is “Everyday Low Prices” so that “When It Fits, You
Feel It.” While “Everyday Low Prices” may attract buyers, the utility buyers receive from
the offering may satisfy their needs, but the price they pay for it does not reflect the
price advertised. In JCP’s heyday, the value proposition actually met the utility and price
expectations of the customer. Their current pricing strategies are often deceitful and
consumers will look elsewhere to buy similar products at lower prices because current
marketing strategies fail to communicate value to customers in quality or price. If done
correctly, JCP could purposefully overprice products in efforts to create curiosity and
therefore spark customers to match a JCP price premium with price expectations.
The profit proposition incurred from many of JCP’s “deals” today usually work to JCP’s
advantage, but fail to attract customers. However, during Ullman’s over-correction of
Johnson’s pricing strategy mistakes, the company sometimes over-couponed, and over-
sold products so that it generated negative revenue for JCP. JCP’s marketing strategy to
attract buyers with deals, deals, and more deals fails to satisfy anyone, because when
those “deals” are not extended throughout the year, customers dependence to the
couponing “drug” are heightened; this marketing strategy allows customers to “boycott”
JCP until major sales are re-introduced and JCP runs at a negative profit. When JCP
fixates on price as a “strategy,” customers lose interest in any marketing
communications other than for the most radical innovations to pricing structure, causing
JCP’s target market to become commoditized.

12. Similarly, current employees feel like they are being motivated to act dishonestly
towards JCP customers by promoting and executing marketing strategies that reflect
unfair pricing strategies to customers. JCP’s people proposition component fails in
today’s marketing strategy because those working for JCP are not motivated or
incentivized to support and implement the strategy. There are high levels of employee
dissatisfaction that prohibit employees from fully embracing the marketing strategy that
emphasized mark-ups to only “discount” items. This is why customers can walk into
virtually any JCP store and find employees that are under-incentivized to make in-store
displays or in-store marketing strategies look decent: JCP employees are not supported
internally, and that is reflected in JCP’s current marketing strategy. Currently, the
message communicated to customers about price promotion sends a message to the
target market that JCP offers poor-quality products and overcharges for those products,
but pretends to market the products as a “sale.”
External Analysis:
Market Analysis
Three decades ago, JCP was a destination to shop. It represented good quality clothing
for the whole family and nice home goods (bedding, appliances) that were on trend.
Prices were reasonable for quality merchandise. Customers’ needs for cost-friendly,
trendy items were met either through the brick-and-mortar locations of JCP or through
the extensive JCP catalog, through which selection was much larger than in-store, and
was limitless for the geographically-limited population in small towns that did not have a
physical JCP storefront. Additionally, JCP offered credit-cards with easy terms that
incentivized repeat shoppers to continue shopping there. Except for groceries, JCP had
just about everything an average family needed.
Currently, traditional department stores within the department store industry have
suffered from price-based competition on online platforms. As such, demand for true

13. discount stores has sky-rocketed as a way for price-conscious customers to save
money.
Current market size and growth potential
Currently, JCP satisfies 8% of the total market share (whereas Target holds a whopping
38.1%, Macy’s at 18.1%, and Sears coming in at 14.2%). After closing 33 stores in
2014, and cutting 2,000 jobs, JCP is closing 39 stores in the 2015 year in hopes of
stimulating more growth on online platforms and eliminating the stores in unprofitable
malls.
A broad market definition reveals that customers either flock to up-market department
stores or discount variety stores. These are now the preferred shopping destinations.
Over the years, many consumers have turned away from the traditional department
store, JCP, because they could gain better value at discount variety stores such as
Tuesday Morning, Target, TJ Maxx, and Kohl's. According to IBIS reports, these
discount retailers have expanded considerably over the past 5 years. Likewise,
customers can find better selections at specialty stores such as Gymboree, SOMA, and
various specialty stores at outlet malls (e.g. Nike, Gap.)
Annual growth for the department store industry has declined a total of 4.5% this past
year alone. Shifted attitudes are the cause for discount stores now totaling the largest
share of industry revenue.
Coupled by these statistics, JCP has stopped offering in-store credit cards. This tactic
has caused the average family to stop shopping there and look elsewhere to fulfill their
average-family necessities. JCP lost its appeal of convenience to the working class and
cannot market itself as an up-market department store. This stimulates its current
market size to dwindle and its growth potential to decline even further. JCP can no
longer compete as a dynamic department store because it lacks cost-effective solutions.

14. Further, the company seemed to lose touch with lifestyle changes of its long-term
customers, and thus, has evolved into a “dino-store” versus department store.
Company’s market share
The department store industry is expected to account for 4.1% of the total 2015
revenue, yet is expected to slightly decrease throughout the next five years as more and
more discount variety stores rise in popularity and take a greater portion of the
industry’s market share.
For example, today much of JCP’s target consumers search designer items and trends
online, then shop for knock-off merchandise online or at unique stores such as World
Market, Pier 1, or discount outlets for the “original items” at a lower cost, such as
Neiman Marcus’ Last Call designer outlet. Additionally, many JCP and other department
industry competitors have not innovated to meet customer demands: outdoor malls are
the present preference, and they are the way of the future. Most JCP stores have
remained in walk-about (old school) malls and fail to meet geographic attractiveness for
potential customers. Their market share is tied to the mall foot traffic and price
incentives.
Market Attractiveness
As consumers go to the discount variety stores in favor of up-market department stores,
retailers such as JCP will be forced to expand discount offerings.
One of the single largest redeeming qualities about JCP that lures customers to their
store is having a “mini” Sephora inside; likewise, re-introducing popular brands like the
private label, St. Johns Bay, and designer labels Liz Clairborne and Disney has re-
attracted JCP shoppers.
New competitive groups

15. Designer discount stores (like T.J. Maxx and Marshalls) and outdoor malls are new
competitive groups in which JCP must share its customer base. While JCP may still
offer a fair selection of moderately priced clothing and home goods, most customers
can locate a better selection of similar items elsewhere more conveniently--and usually
priced lower than JCP. The market is highly saturated, so there is steep competition
even within the existing industries.
Barriers to entry/exit
A primary barrier to entry for JCP is the existing favorable supply contacts already in
place with its competition’s buyers, like Target. In fact, almost every department store
within the industry faces high rent costs because of high traffic location areas.
A barrier to entry for JCP’s current market is product differentiation: the perception of
JCP’s brand is a “dinosaur store” among younger generations. JCP does not advertise
to millennials, fails to meet the requirements for most Generation X members, and
equally does not hold the quality that Baby Boomers once “grew up” on. JCP is no
longer considered a “staple store.” Although there are women in the workforce that need
sharper business suits, divorced parents who need less expensive children's shoes and
clothing, retired customers who also need less expensive items, and teenagers who
want trendier apparel, JCP faces barrier to entry in the department store market
because they do not carry fashionable work apparel and trendier, lower-priced clothing.
This reality creates a barrier to entry the “Everyday Low Cost” image it has built for
itself. Among the department store brands, JCP is labeled as “the less expensive
department store,” however, it struggles to be successful because it is incapable of
delivering the lowest-priced quality goods and services. The reason is that competitors
now exist in the market and JCP is in-adaptable to market change. JCP does not supply
unique products to customers to satisfy their individual needs; furthermore, JCP is
trapped between the traditional department store segment and discount store

16. merchandise which causes a hugely different range of quality and value in their
products.
Competitor Analysis
Unlike JCP, Wal-Mart, Target and Kohl’s reach target customers with
advertising. Regardless of whether those customers decide to make a purchase, they
generally know what those JCP competitors have to sell, and what products are on sale.
Even ideal target demographics (past loyalty and a good income), do not always receive
knowledge about JCP’s promotions.
Stores like JCP are becoming irrelevant because they carry products which competitor
stores carry, and often which competitors provide lower prices. Likewise, low employee
morale and associate engagement are at an all-time low. Most department stores
appeal to older generations, however, Macy’s, Target, Kohl's, and Dillard's all stay
updated making sure to provide offerings that appeal to younger customers as well.
These stores offer points of parity that are compelling and keep competitors (like JCP)
out based on brand performance associations and consumer insights.
Macy’s Inc. garners about 25% of sales from exclusive in-house merchandise. This is a
strength for Macy’s, but does not lure the same amount of capital from in-house brand
sales as does JCP, which makes the 1/4 Macy’s brand-exclusive products appear as a
weakness. However, that might be the company’s only major weakness. Macy’s
incentivizes customers to stay loyal to Macy’s through a rewards program; this creates
competitive advantages over companies that don’t offer incentive programs because
customers have a logical reason why they stay with Macy’s. While Macy’s may be a
more upscale competitor to JCP, Macy’s largest strength relies within its advertising. For
example, Macy’s “Thanksgiving Day Parade” is a household name and classic
Thanksgiving tradition among most middle to upper-middle class families. This kind of
positive affirmation and warm brand imagery associations leave Macy’s with a
compelling difference that is unachievable for most other major department store

17. competitors. Likewise, their advertising is modern, trendy, and their tag line, “Way to
Shop!” relays confidence, enthusiasm, and value. A weakness could be identified in a
lower middle-class disconnect leaving the “working class” consumers unable to shop at
Macy’s department stores. Even so, Macy’s exudes DSI-level performance.
Furthermore, Macy’s strength is even communicated through its mission statement: “we
are moving faster than ever before, employing more technology and concentrating our
resources on those elements most important to our core customers.” Macy’s is a brand
that is committed to customer satisfaction and has a competitive advantage over other
retailers because it is a fast and flexible organization.
Target Corp. is another strong competitor to JCP. Like JCP, it is another major
discounter competitor, and its tag line even communicates it: “Target. Expect More. Pay
Less.” This tag line is exemplary because it promises exactly what it delivers:
outstanding value at low prices. Like Macy’s Target attempts to stay innovative in the
market and deliver the “Expect More. Pay Less” brand promise to customers. Target
sustains a competitive advantage over other major discount stores because it not only
provides cost-effective, quality clothing, but it gives quality products to customers and
private (ex. Archer Farms) brand that customers love. Brand imagery for Target garners
positive attention when customers think of the “Target” dog and target logo symbol.
Target is a household name that sustains a competitive advantage over the department
store industry because with the innovation of “Super Targets,” any product can be
purchased at a Target shopping complex. A huge competitive advantage for Target is
that it provides the “all-in-one” shopping experience to a customer. A weakness is that
they have low prices, but their brand is still considered an “upper” status symbol,
whereas lower middle class may go to a different store.
Kohl’s Corp is another major discounter competitor to JCP. However, unlike JCP, Kohl’s
has mastered the art of implementing couponing practices into its marketing strategy.
Reward-member incentives like “Kohl’s Cash” fulfill a need in the market for customer
incentive programs that solidify a sector of the market that desires “merchandise at the
best prices... to make your [their] shopping experience enjoyable.” Kohl’s has even

18. gone so far to link the Kohl’s “Charge Card” (Credit Card) to its “Kohl’s Cash” promotion
incentives by doubling “Kohl’s Cash” when using a credit card during peak promotion
seasons, thus further incentivizing price-conscious consumers to shop more frequently
and within a certain time period (before their “Kohl’s Cash” expires). While Kohl’s does
capitalize on pricing positioning as part of its marketing strategy, which is could be
viewed as a weakness, Kohl’s effectively implements this as a strategy to core
customers. Similarly to JCP, Kohl’s receives over half of its sales from in-house, private
brands. Like JCP, Kohl’s has built a large part of its competitive advantage by providing
in-house brands that retain loyal customers and keep them wanting more.
Sears Holdings Corp is the department store most similar to JCP in terms of its financial
disparity. Sears lacks a memorable tag-line, positive brand imagery associations, and
good KSFs. Like JCP, Sears once used to be valuable, but has since lost customer
awareness. Sears’ reputation once built on the foundations of any great business:
service, value, and quality however has since been replaced with other chain-offerings
of the same products as lower prices and more knowledgeable staff. Sears stood for
quality with exclusive lines only offered there that can now be found virtually anywhere.
While Sears has many weaknesses, Sears does have a “Shop Your Way” membership
program that can be viewed as a strength, and provides fast delivery service to
customers. Even though Sears is in the process of becoming irrelevant, the company
could still take action to become a once-again viable competitor in the department store
industry and sustain a competitive advantage over other department stores.
Dillard’s Inc is the final direct for JCP that will be used for comparison in this case study.
Dillard’s values customer care. It is impossible for shoppers to go through a Dillard’s
department store and not experience some level of “exceptional customer care” as its
mission statement promises. Dillard’s holds a competitive advantage over other
department stores because it achieves positive brand performance associations and
deliver DSI-level performance that embodies their tag line “The Style of your Life.”

19. A detailed chart analyzing the competitive analysis for the above mentioned JCP
competitors can be found in the Appendix.
Indirect and Future Strategic Groups
A future strategic group for JCP is the discount variety stores. They are a strategic
group that does not directly compete with JCP or other department stores within the
industry, but poses a viable threat with designer discount products.
Likewise, designer outlet malls attract a greater segment of the market because price-
conscious customers seek value that up-market department stores cannot offer.
Super-centers are another future strategic group: with the time constraints placed on
today’s society, customers now desire more than ever the efficiency that an “all-in-one”
shopping experience can provide them. This is a current indirect competitor, but as
witnessed by Woolworth’s in the U.K., department stores can successfully branch out to
include a fresh grocery section to their in-store offerings to make an even-more valuable
brand.
Customer Analysis
The 2015 IBIS report identifies customer segments based by age, because the
expenditure elicited from these age segmentations generally fell in-line with the
department store industry regardless of age group.
To begin, the first age segmentation includes consumers under 25 years of age. These
consumers account for almost 20% of total industry revenue. This customer
segmentation reveals that young adults have a limited disposable income and typically
are more trend-savvy, preferring to shop in niche markets that meet their style needs for
fashion products.

20. Likewise, the needs of consumers aged 25-40 have greater discretionary spending
patterns because they usually enjoy steady income streams. This customer
segmentation makes up the predominance (35%) of the market within the department
store industry. These are typically less trend or brand-focused and more value and
quality-focused in their spending behaviors. A demographic breakdown reveals that
people in this segmentation are more likely to have growing children and families for
which to provide.
Consumers aged 41-65 create the second largest age demographic at 30% market
share for the department store industry. These customers purchase upper-end
merchandise for themselves and their families because they have the most expendable
income of the four main age-based customer segmentations.
Customers over 65 years old have the least amount of spending power (15%) for this
industry because they are on a fixed income. Likewise, many customers over 65 have
less control when making purchasing decisions because they are limited by their
geographic locations in nursing homes or retirement villages and feel a reduced
demand for clothing and home goods sold in department stores.
JCP certainly falls in-line with other industry competitors’age-based market
segmentation, but also can be broken down into a few basic psychographic
segmentations that characterizes its target customers. While JCP no longer has either
the wholly cost-conscious customers or the brand-conscious customers, JCP shoppers
are predominately price-sensitive and are more fixed (or set) in their shopping habits
than other customers at different department or discount stores. That said, JCP has
three primary segments of the market to which it caters: “On-The-Run-Moms,” “Plain
Janes,” and “Conservative Consumers.”
These three segments cover the predominant shopping patterns for JCP. First, the “On-
The-Run-Moms” value affordable, easy, clothing that provides “staple” pieces for them,
their children, and their homes. Their decision journey is somewhat expedited because

21. these men or women are always burning the candle at both ends and just want an easy
shopping experience be it completely “valuable” in cost efficiency or not. JCP still
carries some reliable brands (like Levis, the Ralph Lauren spin-off brand “American
Living, and the in-store brands Arizona and St. John’s Bay) that appeal to the “On-The-
Run-Mom” (or Dad) because the products’ reliability has been proven throughout the
years.
This market segmentation for JCP primarily is locked within the loyalty loop because the
customers 1) Consider the products (quickly) 2) Evaluate (through past experience) 3)
Buy the products and 4) Re-evaluate their decision. “On-The-Run-Moms” (or Dads)
shop at JCP because the store is familiar and they do not have time to research
elsewhere. Their families have probably been shopping at JCP for generations because
it is a known factor, and as a blue-collar worker with children, they still hold the mindset
that JCP is a somewhat cost-effective solution for their needs. “On-The-Run-Moms” (or
Dads) experiences funnel-and-tunnel purchasing paths.
The “Plain Janes” are the wildcard of JCP’s customer segmentation. Unlike “On-The-
Go-Moms,” “Plain Janes” are the “vanilla” customers who do not like to stand out from
the crowd. Many of JCP’s “staple” items accomplish just this. “Plain Janes” do have
more time and disposable income than “On-The-Go-Moms,” but value tradition above
price-consciousness. Many of JCP’s signature lines appeal to “Plain Janes” because of
the traditionalist styles and roomier fits in clothing. The “Plain Jane” customer has
probably once been an “On-The-Run-Mom,” but has now transitioned to a slower pace
of life, and likewise, that is reflected in her access to technology and advertisement
accessibility.
The decision journey for “Plain Janes” is split between the loyalty loop (because a lack
of reliable advertisements and access to technology coupled with their traditionalist,
conservative mindset) leaves “Plain Janes” always coming back to JCP for their
“staple” clothing or home goods and the typical Customer Decision Journey: “Plain
Janes” that are a little more technology savvy have the opportunity to compare JCP

22. against other brands, but almost always end up defaulting to “classic” JCP apparel and
home goods. Their customer decision journey relies on enjoying the product, advocating
the product, then bonding with the product purchased from JCP. This customer
segmentation exhibits mostly tunnel purchasing path decisions, but occasionally use the
funnel purchasing path.
“Conservative Consumers” are the most price-sensitive of the three market
segmentations. These people are often the blue-collar workers who are the most value-
conscious in their decision-making and fall near or under the poverty line: their decision
making journey is precarious because they feel like the must find the best value of their
money because they do not have excess income to waste. These are JCP’s couponing
fanatics that will enter the store in the morning, and will not leave the store until the
afternoon because they have exhausted every cost-effective solution. Likewise, these
are also JCP customers who wait for promotions and door-buster days to come and
shop at JCP. Their decision journey must be informed about all the other deals and
promotions on the market before they can enjoy their product; likewise, they will
advocate JCP’s name because of the cost-effective solutions it provides (versus the
value gained from the product.) Then, they will bond with their new products.
Conservative Consumers mostly shop using the spindle purchasing path.
Despite JCP having three, clear, defined market segmentations, JCP’s customers still
experience un-met needs. While alienating professional or corporate women from
wanting to shop at JCP, the company fails to deliver cost-efficiency, and effective
shopping time to “On-The-Run Moms” (or Dads) when they visit the store. The physical
store location is prohibitive for a quick “in-and-out” shopping experience because the
store is difficult to navigate around is often placed inside a traditional mall. This
customer segmentation, “On-The-Run-Moms” (and Dads) prefer a shopping experience
in an outdoor mall where they can drive up to the store, and have a shopping
experience length of fewer than 20 minutes. “In-and-Out” and meets the basic needs.
Likewise, JCP lacks a fast delivery service and turn-around to its customers.

23. Similarly, many of the “Plain Janes” customer segmentation “grew up” with JCP as their
primary department store. Their shopping experience is less enjoyable because quality
perception has decreased over time, and size limitation in clothing has become
problematic. Likewise, “Plain Janes” often are repeat customers who don’t want to
spend all day in the store. These customers are affected negatively because of the
physical time spent in the store due to slow processing or ineffective store layout,
causing these customers to exhaust the entire store when seeking what they came to
purchase. Likewise, JCP fails to attract a customer segmentation for “Trendy
Fashionistas” in their marketing. They are failing to fully satisfy their “Plain Jane”
customers, but cannot serve “Trendy Fashionista” brand-conscious customers.
The largest unmet need of JCP’s “Conservative Consumers” is the complaint that the
prices offered are not always the lowest prices on the market. Also, other department
stores in the market now offer incentive programs for customers who are frequent
shoppers that provide additional discounts to loyal customers. JCP has yet to implement
this service; thus, JCP does not satisfy that need of the most cost-effective solution for
their “Conservative Consumer.” A huge competitor for this customer segmentation is
subscription-based clothing services such as Bombfell. The appendix includes a
customer analysis table that details both JCP’s primary customer segmentations as well
as the industry’s age-based demographics. The chart further analyzes the motives/
needs, unmet needs, and decision journeys of the varying customer segments.
Environmental Analysis
JCP’s environmental analysis identifies major socio-cultural threats and opportunities,
like the rise of subscription-based clothing services for the time-conscious consumer,
which impacts JCP’s ability to compete with its primary competitors. Likewise, the
company has examined economic, ecological, technological, and political/legal
opportunities and threats that could impact its viability as a sustainable business.

24. A huge socio-cultural opportunity for JCP is the growing market of divorced parents who
need cheaper alternatives to traditional department stores. Likewise, single women in
the workforce need a cheaper alternative for basic work attire. Heightened immigration
is also a potential socio-cultural factor that sparks opportunity for JCP. Many times, new
immigrants from poorer economies will seek affordable clothing. JCP can provide all of
these groups affected by socio-cultural circumstances a shopping mecca for affordable
clothing and home goods; however the biggest threat to this market is that JCP is not
trendy and does not engage with young adults. Largely, millennials are more engaged
with trends, but do not have the purchasing power to yet make those spending
decisions, however, they have the power to influence other trends and purchasing
decisions of individuals who are able to afford those purchases.
JCP’s environmental analysis reveals there are huge opportunities within the Economic
sector. For example, a rising movement to suburban areas (as opposed to rural
customers) allows for former catalog- or online-sales-only customers to physically visit
the brick and mortar locations of JCP. This is a huge opportunity for JCP because it can
now attract customers with heightened mailer-advertisements to come visit the store in
person and receive the “JCP experience.” Likewise, a big economic threat to JCP is the
shrinking middle class. Fewer and fewer people are able to afford “Everyday Low
Prices” for the middle class, and must seek “the lowest” prices; likewise, high-end
customers will flock to JCP competitors for upper-end selection and appeal.
JCP has a huge opportunity for young adults and young families: this segmentation of
the market is predominantly cause-driven individuals who feel compelled to purchase
products because they support the “cause” behind it. JCP has a big opportunity to
market to environmentally friendly or green-conscious consumers because of the rising
purchasing power of this segmentation of the market (cause-driven individuals). The
threat to JCP is twofold: while marketing more environmentally-friendly products in JCP
stores, existing green consumers already experience a large market for organic/free
trade (environmentally friendly) products in other markets. JCP could soon be a leading
department store for environmentally conscious consumers (distinguishing them as a

25. viable competitor with a unique selling proposition against other leading department
stores), but this brand-focus shift could also cause disaster for the JCP company
because the market is already becoming so deluded with green/cause-driven products.
Is the risk worth it?
The biggest threat to JCP’s online presence are existing, thriving, application-based
companies. These are companies whose entire storefront is online and that are still out-
performing brick-and-mortar-based companies. One of JCP’s goals for the 2015 year is
to develop its application for mobile devices so that it helps overcome this threat and
can serve as a competitor against solely application-based online companies. However,
without the marketing to stand behind this shift, taking focus away from its target market
of pedestrian customers could be detrimental to JCP. Conversely, the rise of online
shopping is a big opportunity for JCP. If capitalized and built correctly, JCP could prove
an online presence that overcomes any other competing department store. If done
incorrectly, however, spending valuable resources on building a less-technologically
advanced system could be detrimental to the company overall.
Another technology-based threat for JCP is the lack of advanced processing systems.
These technology systems can be seen from the slow cash-register experience within
the store, to the efficiency of new shipments. If a company who is making clothing for
JCP is less technologically-advanced, the supply chain turn-around reacts more slowly
because of the initial delays; this reflects on store readiness and responsiveness to
trends and supply outages.
These same “cause-driven” consumers spend their money supporting companies whom
they believe align with their political viewpoints. JCP must differentiate itself from
clothing companies who send clothing production overseas with little regard to the
exploitation of child or slave laborers in unsafe conditions. These consumers will pay
more for products which carry no “consumer guilt”—something that the lowest-priced
products cannot always fulfill.

26. New strategies that could help change the overall structure of JCP’s industry are:
making the store more environmentally conscious (and cause-oriented), being attune
with current market trends, and providing customer rewards incentive programs in
addition to current couponing practices are all strategic opportunities to create new
market space for the JCP brand.
JCP has been caught in the Positioning Paradox because the brand message “If It Fits,
You Feel It” is confusing, complicated, and long.
As it stands, JCP is not a good brand because it is a nebulous brand. JCP holds brand
equity because JCP is a household name. However, for most consumers, the name is
not only nebulous, but negative, and JCP holds negative brand equity.
Appendix:
Financial Ratio Table 1
Profitability RatiosProfitability RatiosProfitability RatiosProfitability RatiosProfitability RatiosProfitability RatiosProfitability RatiosProfitability RatiosProfitability Ratios
Name
Gross
Profit
Margin
(2011)
Operating
Margin
(2011)
Gross
Profit
Margin
(2012)
Operating
Margin
(2012)
Gross
Profit
Margin
(2013)
Operating
Margin
(2013)
Gross
Profit
Margin
(2014)
Operating
Margin
(2014)
J.C.
Penney 39.2 4.7 36.0 __ 31.3 -10.1 29.4 12.0
Macy’s Inc
40.7 7.6 40.4 9.1 40.3 9.6 40.1 9.6
Target
Corp 30.9 7.8 30.9 7.6 30.4 7.3 29.5 5.8
Kohl’s
Corp 38.2 10.4 38.2 11.5 36.3 9.8 36.5 9.2
Sears
Holdings
Corp
27.4 1.1 25.5 -3.6 26.4 -2.1 24.2 -2.6

27. Profitability RatiosProfitability RatiosProfitability RatiosProfitability RatiosProfitability RatiosProfitability RatiosProfitability RatiosProfitability RatiosProfitability Ratios
Name
Gross
Profit
Margin
(2011)
Operating
Margin
(2011)
Gross
Profit
Margin
(2012)
Operating
Margin
(2012)
Gross
Profit
Margin
(2013)
Operating
Margin
(2013)
Gross
Profit
Margin
(2014)
Operating
Margin
(2014)
Dillard’s
Inc 36.4 4.3 36.8 6.2 37.1 8.0 36.9 8.3
Financial Ratio Table 2
Management Effectiveness TableManagement Effectiveness TableManagement Effectiveness TableManagement Effectiveness TableManagement Effectiveness TableManagement Effectiveness TableManagement Effectiveness TableManagement Effectiveness TableManagement Effectiveness Table
Name
ROA
(2011)
ROE
(2011)
ROA
(2012)
ROE
(2012)
ROA
(2013)
ROE
(2013)
ROA
(2014)
ROE
(2014)
JC
Penney
3.04 7.60 -1.24 -3.21 -9.29 -27.43 -12.86 -44.36
Macy’s Inc 4.04 16.56 5.88 21.91 6.20 22.28 6.97 24.16
Target
Corp
6.62 18.94 6.48 18.71 6.33 18.52 4.25 12.02
Kohl’s
Corp
8.34 13.96 8.44 15.98 7.04 15.71 6.29 14.78
Sears
Holdings
Corp
0.54 1.51 -13.76 -49.09 -4.57 -26.44 -7.26 -60.75
Dillard’s
Inc
4.0 8.18 10.69 22.42 8.04 16.71 7.99 16.34
Financial Ratio Table 3

28. Liquidity RatiosLiquidity RatiosLiquidity RatiosLiquidity RatiosLiquidity RatiosLiquidity RatiosLiquidity RatiosLiquidity RatiosLiquidity Ratios
Name
Current
Ratios
(2011)
Quick
Ratio
(2011)
Current
Ratios
(2012)
Quick
Ratio
(2012)
Current
Ratios
(2013)
Quick
Ratio
(2013)
Current
Ratios
(2014)
Quick
Ratio
(2014)
J.C.
Penney
2.41 1.12 1.84 0.70 1.43 0.38 1.70 0.53
Macy’s
Inc.
1.36 0.37 1.40 0.51 1.55 0.43 1.52 0.47
Target
Corp
1.71 0.78 1.15 0.47 1.17 0.06 0.91 0.16
Kohl’s
Corp
2.08 0.84 1.84 0.47 1.86 0.21 1.93 0.35
Sear’s
Holdings
Corp
1.34 0.24 1.11 0.16 1.10 0.15 1.09 0.19
Dillard’s
Inc
2.05 0.44 1.83 0.29 1.94 0.20 2.13 0.34
Financial Ratio Table 4
Efficiency RatiosEfficiency RatiosEfficiency RatiosEfficiency RatiosEfficiency RatiosEfficiency RatiosEfficiency RatiosEfficiency RatiosEfficiency Ratios
Name
Inventory
Turnover
(2011)
Asset
Turnover
(2011)
Inventory
Turnover
(2012)
Asset
Turnover
(2012)
Inventory
Turnover
(2013)
Asset
Turnover
(2013)
Inventory
Turnover
(2014)
Asset
Turnover
(2014)
J.C.
Penney
3.46 1.39 3.60 1.41 3.39 1.22 3.17 1.10
Macy’s
Inc.
3.16 1.19 3.19 1.24 3.17 1.29 3.08 1.31
Target
Corp
6.31 1.53 6.23 1.55 6.45 1.55 6.14 1.57
Kohl’s
Corp
3.81 1.38 3.73 1.36 3.54 1.38 3.17 1.35

29. Efficiency RatiosEfficiency RatiosEfficiency RatiosEfficiency RatiosEfficiency RatiosEfficiency RatiosEfficiency RatiosEfficiency RatiosEfficiency Ratios
Name
Inventory
Turnover
(2011)
Asset
Turnover
(2011)
Inventory
Turnover
(2012)
Asset
Turnover
(2012)
Inventory
Turnover
(2013)
Asset
Turnover
(2013)
Inventory
Turnover
(2014)
Asset
Turnover
(2014)
Sear’s
Holdings
Corp
3.53 1.77 3.53 1.82 3.68 1.96 3.76 1.92
Dillard’s
Inc
3.07 1.39 3.12 1.47 3.27 1.62 3.20 1.65
Financial Ratio Table 5
Leverage RatiosLeverage RatiosLeverage RatiosLeverage RatiosLeverage Ratios
Name
Debt-to-Equity
(2011)
Debt-to-Equity
(2012)
Debt-to-Equity
(2013)
Debt-to-Equity
(2014)
J.C. Penney 0.57 0.72 0.93 1.59
Macy’s Inc. 1.26 1.12 1.12 1.08
Target Corp 1.01 0.85 0.89 0.78
Kohl’s Corp 0.21 0.64 0.74 0.79
Sear’s Holdings
Corp
0.24 0.49 0.71 1.63
Dillard’s Inc 0.44 0.40 0.42 0.41
Competitive Analysis Table

30. Competitive AnalysisCompetitive AnalysisCompetitive AnalysisCompetitive Analysis
Primary Competitors Competitive Advantage Strengths Weaknesses
J.C. Penney
• Sephora mini-shops
are a huge lure to shop
at JCP
• JCP’s private label
brands are one of the
strongest within the
department store
industry
• Good online presence
• Providing Private Label
Brands
• Low-Cost Reputation
• Price Consistency
• Industry-Consumer
Disconnect
• No Significant Market
Share
• Customer Distrust
• Brand Consistency
• Uneducated or
Unenthusiastic staff
• Lack of Loyalty
Program
• Antiquated
Macy’s Inc.
• Rewards program
provides customers a
reason to stay loyal
• Fast and Flexible
• Macy’s Thanksgiving
Day Parade associates
powerful, strong brand
imagery
• Rewards Program
• Upscale Market (more
disposable income)
• Good Advertising
• Innovative
• Lower middle class
disconnect
Target Corp
• All-In-One Shopping
Experience
• Discounter Competitor
• Positive Brand Imagery
• Great Private Label
Brands
• Lower middle class
disconnect
Kohl’s Corp
• Providing Private Label
Brands That Retain
Loyal Customers
• Low-Cost Reputation
• Good Implementation
of Couponing Practices
• Kohl’s Cash
• Strong Private Brands
• Using Pricing
Positioning as
Marketing Strategy
Sear’s Holdings Corp
• Viewed for
Representing Quality
and Reliability
• “Shop Your Way”
Membership Program
• Fast Delivery to
Customers
• Lost Customer
Awareness
• Competitors Offer
Same Products at
Lower Prices (Used to
Have the Entire Market
Share for Certain,
Exclusive Lines)

31. Competitive AnalysisCompetitive AnalysisCompetitive AnalysisCompetitive Analysis
Primary Competitors Competitive Advantage Strengths Weaknesses
Dillard’s Inc.
• Positive Brand
Performance
Associations
• Exceptional Customer
Care
• Lower Middle Class
Disconnect
Customer Analysis Table
Customer AnalysisCustomer AnalysisCustomer AnalysisCustomer Analysis
Customer Segments Motives/Needs Unmet Needs Decision Journeys
“On-The-Run-Moms”
• Good quality at low
prices
• Value-focused
• Time spent in store
• Fast delivery and
turn-around to
customers
• Funnel and tunnel
purchasing paths
“Plain Janes”
• Higher-end, quality
focused
• Decreased quality
perception
• Physical time spent in
store
• Tunnel and funnel
purchasing paths
“Conservative
Consumers”
• Cost-Conscious
• Value-focused
• Lowest prices in the
market
• No incentive program
• Spindle purchasing
paths
Customers Under 25 • Trend-savvy
• Trendy/savvy clothing
• Cause-oriented
apparel/accessories
• Customers usually
use spindle or funnel
purchasing paths
Customers Aged
25-40
• Value-focused
• Family-oriented
• Good quality at low
prices
• Cost Conscious
• Usually follow funnel
or tunnel spending
paths
Customers Aged
41-65
• Can afford higher-
end products
• Emotion-based
spending
• Desirable products
for the whole family
• Follows funnel and
spindle purchasing
behaviors

32. Customer AnalysisCustomer AnalysisCustomer AnalysisCustomer Analysis
Customer Segments Motives/Needs Unmet Needs Decision Journeys
Customers Aged 65+
• Value-focused
• Good quality at low
prices
• Difficult to navigate
around store
• Autonomy in
spending decisions
• Elderly customers
use all three
purchase paths in
their decision
journeys (funnels,
spindles, and
tunnels)