4. 02
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008FOREWORD
The emergence of a pan-European
security agenda has seen ASD
members respond with positive and
innovative approaches offering their
capacity to develop advanced high
technology solutions, to the rapidly
changing security scenarios.
There is clearly a growing need for
improved measures to protect society
and citizens in areas like maritime
security, crisis management and
emergency response as well as to
protect critical infrastructure and
secure transportation, in other words
to protect flows in society.
ASD has played an important role in
supporting the creation of the EC
Security R&D programme within FP7,
seeking to develop technologies which
enhance the security of the European
citizen.WehavealsoseenASDmembers
successfully forming consortia and
winningcontractsintheinitialcallsofthe
Security R&D programme within FP7.
ASD was also a key catalyst for the
foundation and development of the
European Organisation for Security
(EOS), which is going from strength to
strength. EOS membership includes a
number of ASD members as well as
other companies.
As a launch event, EOS is hosting a
conference on Security in mid-May,
where the development of a coherent
European Security market in support
of EU security policies and high
security priorities will be discussed
between regulators, users, operators
and suppliers.
Supporting the development of short-
term capability in a European context;
is increasingly important to the security
community. Promoting and realizing
the concept of a technologically
advanced European security orientated
industrial base and to initiate and foster
ASD MEMBERS
RESPOND TO GROWING
EUROPEAN SECURITY
AGENDA
SMEsupportmeasuresareotherareas
that requires further development.
ASD member companies are increa-
singly involved in supplying systems
which manage information flows and
co-ordinate information exchanges
between various civil authorities res-
ponsibleforpreventingterroristthreats,
responding to natural disaster and
tackling organised crime.
Securitysolutions,whereourmembers
can contribute, also cover systems
development, systems integration and
system security for government de-
partments, defence agencies and the
telecommunications industries, who
work together to build and protect a
variety of infrastructure.
As the market for civil security systems
continues to grow, new opportunities
and challenges are created. ASD
members have shown creativity and
innovation in the development of pro-
ducts and solutions in areas as diverse
as reconnaissance, surveillance, com-
munication and command control.
I believe that through the continued
active involvement of ASD members
and through the partnership with
EOS we can play a major role in the
definition of a global, coherent and
structuredsecuritypolicyacrossEurope
and also help in shaping the market.
I sincerely hope that our active enga-
gement, will contribute to building a
more secure Europe.
°
AkeSvensson
ASDPresidentandCEOofSaab
ASD has played
an important role
in supporting the creation
of the EC Security
and R&D programme
within FP7.
5. 03
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008FOREWORD
FrançoisGayet
SecretaryGeneralASD
The perception and the understanding
of security have evolved markedly in
recentyears.Theconceptofthesecurity
of a country has broadened to now
focus much more clearly on the secu-
rity and protection of citizens rather
than primarily addressing political and
economy stability.
The globalisation of security threats
andtheincreasedlikelihoodofnational
securitycrisesmeanssecurityconcerns
are now much closer to EU citizens’
everyday life than traditional interna-
tional conflicts.
External security missions (e.g.
“Petersberg’s tasks”) with the use of
military capabilities and internal
security activities demanding the
intervention of specific and well
equiped forces, have contributed to
the transformation of the perception in
the needs for security and stabilisation
of countries. The line between defence
and security is increasingly blurred
and dual technology is more and more
used in both domains, arising from
defence in the form of performance
issueswhilecomingfromciviliansectors
in areas for cost and rapid availability.
ASD and our members are heavily
involved in this transformation of the
security sector and have had a consi-
derable impact on the evolution and
implementation of a range of security
solutions taking place at both the
national and international level.
European defence has taken close to 60
years to reach the current level of
cooperation across member states.
Security cooperation is still in its
infancy, but European-wide and urgent
security needs exist and are more
visible with each passing day.
The European Commission has initi-
ated a specific security research pro-
gramme to help with the development
and implementation of European se-
curitytechnologies.Therecentcreation
of ESRIF (European Security Research
and Innovation Forum) will help
facilitate the dialogue between the
demand and supply elements of secu-
rity technologies and solutions as well
as the development of European-wide
security policies.
ASD and its members are strongly
present in all the new developments
and activities, affecting security. ASD
was the initiator of EOS, the European
Organisation for Security, formed to
support the progress and implemen-
tation of European security techno-
gies as well as challenging the frag-
mentation of the European security
market. Increased cooperation on
security issues goes well beyond the
aerospace and defence sectors, de-
manding a more holistic approach to
communicating, with a broad range of
stakeholders. It is my firm conviction
that ASD and our members’ industries
are committed to creating effective
sustainable security solutions, based
on innovative technologies that respect
the rights of citizens, while satisfying
the specific requirements coming from
private and public users.
EUROPEAN
SECURITY MOVES UP
EU AGENDA
ASD and its members
are strongly present
in all the new developments
and activities,
affecting security.
6. 04
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008FOREWORD
€22b (some 0,22% of US GDP) whilst
the EU market for security is only
around €10b (some 0,08% of EU GDP).
In order to increase the protection of
its citizens and develop innovative
security technologies, systems and
services, Europe must leverage on the
high level competence and innovation
capacity of its industry. Large compa-
nies with a broad technological base
should partner with innovative SMEs
and research organisations.
Security Research
Research on security plays a growing
role in providing solutions to evolving
threats, satisfying demanding criteria
of performance, reliability, and at the
same time increasing European indus-
tries’ competitiveness.
The European Commission actively
supports the growth of European com-
petence in civilian security by allocating
€1,4b in the FP7 (for the period 2007-
2013)totheEuropeanSecurityResearch
Programme(ESRP).EuropeanIndustries
participated extensively in the first
ESRP call for tender (with 328 bids),
demonstrating that they are willing
to co-operate and invest, to promote
sustainablesolutions.ASD strongly and
successfully supported this action.
In order to help the co-ordination of a
pan-Europeaneffort,theCommisioners
for Enterprise & Industry and Justice
Security: a Concern
for European Citizens
Protectionofcitizens,governmentsand
theeconomyisanissuethathasalways
existed, but today it is considered as
one of the greatest challenges of the
century. According to Eurobarometer,
Europe’s security (in particular relating
toterrorism,organizedcrimeandillegal
immigration) together with unemploy-
ment, is among the most important
issues for European citizens. Today’s
threats are international and can be
difficult to anticipate and this explains
whysecurityisthemostimportantarea
where citizens believe that an inte-
grated European approach is needed.
Europecountriesareincreasinglycons-
cious of the need to coordinate their
actions.Ahigherlevelofcoordinationis
needed to face growing challenges and
give EU Citizens adequate levels of se-
curity, both in terms of Sustainable
Security (e.g. engaging the constituen-
ciesthatwillinfluencesecurityoverthe
long-term)andsociallyacceptedsecurity
(e.g. individual rights, privacy and the
rule of law).
The worldwide Homeland Security
Civil market is developing at a rate
estimated at over €40b p.a. Despite
Europe’s increased awareness of the
importance of protecting its citizens
and assets, America still gives
“Security” a much higher value: US
investment in security is approximately
THE EUROPEAN
INDUSTRY SUPPORTS
AN EU INTEGRATED
SECURITY APPROACH
GiancarloGrasso
FINMECCANICASeniorAdvisortothePresident
ChairASDSecurityCommittee;viceChairESRIF
Freedom and Security have created
the European Security Research and
Innovation Forum (ESRIF).
ESRIF will define the roadmap of the
European effort to achieve Sustainable
Security, linking research needs both
at national and European level with
security policies as well as promoting
aEurope-widesinglemarketforadvan-
ced security systems and services.
Security Sustainability
How European security stakeholders
can support Security Sustainability ?
The following activities are proposed:
/ Exploiting relevant information avail-
able in different areas, through a
Network Centric Operations (NEC)
approach; Defining a Strategic
Research and Innovation Agenda
for technological development;
/ Defining a European Industrial Secu-
rity Policy aiming to reinforce its
technological strengths. This will
support the development and imple-
mentation of cost-effective solutions
to improve international competiti-
veness while overcoming European
weaknesses like fragmentation;
/ Specifying Security as one of the
crucial requirements to be embedded
into new systems;
/ Ensuring an optimal use of resources
throughout the product life-cycle by
partnering with users;
/ Integrating Security functions in sys-
tems intended for other applications:
e.g.Safety(Crisismanagement);Earth
Monitoring (GMES and management
of Earth resources); Defence (C3 for
Maritime Safety and Security);
/ Developing new Security Services
for the protection of Citizens, the
Economy and Country stability.
Research on security
plays a growing
role in providing
solutions to evolving
threats.
G1
Limited level
of integration products
and services that were
available on the security
market before 9/11
G2
Moderate level
of integration products
whose core technologies
were available
on 9/11 in other fields
(especially in the
military field)
G3
High level of integration
technologies that are
in the R&D phase,
specifically designed
to cope with the new
security requirements
G1
G2
G3
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Homeland Security Technologies Evolution
7.
8. COPING
WITH BORDER
SECURITY
CHALLENGES
RobertHavas
Security,EADS,Defence&Security
All sides involved in the provision of se-
curity systems, suppliers as well as
end-users and operators, essentially
think in terms of threat assessment
and related mission definition, respec-
tivetotheirdistinctduties.Thetaskofthe
industrialsidehereistodevelop,deploy
- and perhaps also support operations
- solutions that enable end-users and
operators to effectively and satisfacto-
rily deal with these threats and vulner-
abilities and thus fulfil their missions.
This is also one of the main reasons
why, in security research in Europe
and elsewhere, the linkage between
demand and supply, already at an
early stage, is rightly stressed as an
important factor in achieving success
in security projects.
Illegal crossing of borders by people
and goods is a threat to European
security as well as potentially destruc-
tive for social consensus. Borders and
their checkpoints also constitute natu-
ral strategic lines and chokepoints for
security authorities. Bordercheckpoints
are especially tasked with the problem
of facilitation of movement across the
border while not compromising secu-
rity (terrorism and social). These are
the challenges driving R&D related to
border security capabilities.
Preparing the Future
It is therefore worthwhile to take stock
of existing and future technologies
enabling this balance between a maxi-
mum of freedom of movement and an
optimum in border security.
/ Intrusionprevention:Implementingand
hardeningofphysicalobstacles:barriers,
fences, (fire-) walls, etc. integration of
physical/hardwaresecuritytoolswith
software-based logical components,
andinparticular,encryption;
/ Intrusion detection: Optical and
electro-optical sensors, acoustic
sensors, pressure sensors, IT intru-
sion detection systems; again we see
an integration of physical / hardware
security tools with software-based
logical components;
/ People, material, and systemsauthen-
tication and tracking: identity mana-
gement, including biometrical and
patternsensorsandsystems,RFID,etc.
06
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008BORDERSECURITY
9. / Material analytics: x-ray, CBRNE
(Chemical, Biological, Radiological/
Nuclear, and Explosive) sensors, in
particular Laser Ion Mobility Spec-
trometry (LIMS), etc;
/ SensorPlatforms:fixedandrotorwing
manned and unmanned aircrafts,
vehicles and satellites;
/ Integrated, inter-operable, secure,
real-time IT with multiple functions
(See Box). These systems are based
onopenstandardsandprotocols,which
allow interoperability and, where
appropriate, harmonization.
/ Secure fixed and mobile digital voice
and data (including media data)
communication systems.
Industries as Security
Capability Enabler
Associetiesgrowincreasinglycomplex,
so do their vulnerabilities and thus
also the security solutions required.
Security responsibles will therefore
rather require comprehensive security
systems instead of individual, isolated
technologies geared towards one
specific challenge. Future security
solutions will need to be embedded
into a network of legacy security
systems, interact with them and
provide the benefits of their synergies.
More and more security solutions will
therefore become part of complex
systems,or"SystemsofSystems".Ifwe
wantend-userstofullytakeadvantages
of the increased capabilities thus pos-
sible, solution designers and suppliers
not only are required to possess high
technological skills, but also system-
level thinking and a profound knowl-
edge of the end-users' operational
processes. This is a requirement from
beginning to end, from architectural
design, technological implementation
and project management, sourcing
and vendor management, training,
financial controlling, and, last but not
least, quality control and assurance.
It is crucial that these "Systems of
Systems" be easy to operate, cost-
effective for the operational expenses
and scalable.
This in turn requires the system de-
signers to be aware of and to under-
stand future challenges the end-user
might face. Lastly, these systems will
also need to be resilient against dis-
ruptions, allow the control of service
limitation resulting thereof and rapidly
re-establish service provision. Only
then can the "Security Capability
Enabler" truly stimulate science, tech-
nology research, and innovation for the
benefit of the end-users and ultimately
become his long-term partner.
With the growth of the European Union
by gaining new member states, border
security is a huge area for R&D devel-
opments and a promising market.
07
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008BORDERSECURITY
Main Functions of IT Systems
/ Danger Prevention & Preparedness
Management / Crisis & Emergency
Response Management
/ Intelligence (HUMINT, SIGINT,
intelligent surveillance means);
Situational Awareness; Common
Relevant Operational Picture,
Data Fusion
/ Operational Concepts Modelling
and Simulation, Training
/ Command, Control, Computers,
Communication (fixed and mobile),
Sensors, Biometrics, Identity
Management
/ Criminal investigation systems,
Prosecution support systems,
Fines collection systems
/ National and international
interagency cooperation &
interoperability, civil-military
collaboration
/ Operational and organizational
resource management
and logistics.
10. 08
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008BORDERSECURITY
Effective border
management does
not exist without
sophisticated systems
of data collection
and analysis.
Border authorities in Europe are being
challenged today as never before.
Globalisation, a term used by econo-
mists and sociologists to characterise
today’s world, also touches the area
of border security. We observe three
phenomena in Europe which make
border management a real challenge:
growths in migration, international
travel and trade globalisation, these
have also created increased demands
for more security.
Hundreds of millions of people are
travelling around the globe. Accord-
inglytoIATA,thetenbiggestaircarriers
transported more than 640 millions
passengers in 2006. Their estimations
show that this number will be increa-
singbyalmost5%everyyearuntil2010.
Frontex, is one of major the players in
this field in Europe, promoting a pan-
European model of Integrated Border
Management,whichconsistsofseveral
measures which are not only limited
to border checks. An exhaustive model
of border management actually com-
prises five dimensions:
/ border control, including relevant
risk analysis and crime intelligence,
/ detection and investigation of cross-
border crime in coordination with all
competentlawenforcementauthorities,
/ the four-tier access control model
(measures in third countries, coope-
ration with neighbouring countries,
border control, control measures
within the area of free movement,
including return),
/ inter-agency cooperation in border
management(borderguards,customs,
police, national security and other
relevantauthorities)andinternational
cooperation,
/ coordination and coherence of the
activities of Member States and
institutions and other bodies of the
Community and the Union.
The implementation of this model is a
major challenge for Frontex and law
enforcement authorities of the EU
Member States. In the 21st century
border management must
be intelligence-driven.
Thisisaprerequisiteofallactionstaken
regarding borders. Effective border
management does not exist without
sophisticated systems of data collec-
tion and analysis followed by its timely
dissemination to officers making deci-
sions on the ground, such as the eligi-
bility for crossing of a person or cargo.
Illegal entries represent a small per-
centage of the overall flow across a
border. Nevertheless, in real numbers
it is a massive flow.
That’s why the concept of a “virtual
border” is so important, because the
management of a border starts even
while gathering intelligence or issuing
a visa in a third country. The physical
borderis,sotosay,the“lastborderline”.
The next part of the puzzle is the phys-
ical security of the border. Operational
efficiency can be achieved only through
coordinated actions, not only between
countries but also internally among
agencies securing the flow of people
and cargo. Border management agen-
ciesshouldbealignedaroundthesame
mission and should ensure consistent
strategic coordination among them.
To complete the picture it should be
stressed that all these activities have
to be ensured through adequate re-
sources. Constant updating of infra-
structure, equipment and investments
in training activities is a sine qua non
condition if we want to effectively safe-
guard tourists and European citizens
while at the same time not harming
their privacy. All new technologies,
such as biometrics, unmanned aerial
vehicles or entry-exit systems are ex-
pensive, but they will allow Europe to
remain open and be to ready for a fast
responsetoconstantlychangingthreats.
SHAPING EUROPEAN
SECURITY
IlkkaPerttiJuhaniLaitinen
FrontexExecutiveDirector
With security screening,
the physical borders of
Europe are now becoming
the “last border line”.
11. 09
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008MARITIMESECURITY
Implementing the International Ship
and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code
in Rotterdam was quite a job. Although
over 150 port facilities had to be as-
sessed, audited and certified within
approximately a year, Rotterdam was
able to report 95% of all terminals
ISPS compliant by July 2004. Certifica-
tion proved to be only the first hurdle,
since we are now finding that a well-
organised system of inspections and
enforcement is just as important.
Every month, specially trained Port
Authority personnel perform approxi-
mately 40 unannounced ISPS inspec-
tions in the port of Rotterdam.
Supply Chain Security
At an operational level, ISPS will con-
tinue to require a commitment from
port authorities. But in terms of policy,
the focus is swiftly shifting towards
Supply Chain Security, especially con-
tainer security. Although there have
been numerous developments in this
area for some years, many of them
originating in the US, it seems that the
transport world is only now appreciat-
ing their full value. A global under-
standing of and approach to transport
security is on the horizon, providing
a business case for investments in
supply chain security.
Worldwide Security Language
This global approach to supply chain
securitycanbeseeninthe“Framework
of Standards to Secure and Facilitate
Global Trade” introduced by the World
Customs Organization (WCO) and the
new ISO standard for security mana-
gement: ISO 28000. These systems of
certification allow logistics operators
to communicate their proven status of
trustworthiness. With these new and
widely accepted standards, a common
security language can finally be spoken
worldwide.
Besides certification, technology plays
an important role in securing freight
transport. We see two major develop-
ments in this field:
/ Firstly, the introduction of so-called
Container Security Devises (CSD)
that monitor container integrity and
offer tracking and tracing;
/ Secondly, we see advanced scanning
technology, making it feasible to scan
large volumes of containers without
disrupting the logistical process.
Going Further
To prepare the port of Rotterdam for
the security demands of tomorrow we
are seriously investigating the possi-
bility of cargo scanning at a central
pre-gate facility. At this facility, all ex-
port containers would be subject to
electronic data exchange, damage in-
spection, non-intrusive inspection and
nuclear detection. The scanning done
at the pre-gate facility is expected to
provide advantages over decentralized
scanning.
Optimal Security
Optimalsupplychainsecuritywillnot,of
course, be limited to action in seaports.
Allelementsinthetransportchainmust
participate, starting with the shipper.
Since most of these logistics service
providers are not subject to mandatory
regulations,theyshouldcriticallyassess
their facility’s security and seek an in-
ternationally accepted security certifi-
cate. This will not appeal to all ope-
rators, but companies involved in inter-
national supply chains should seriously
consider it.
ISPS: New Requirements
for Security
/ The International Ship and Port
Facility Security (ISPS) code was
adopted by the members of the
International Maritime Organization
(IMO) in 2002. Among them are
the 108 Contracting Governments
to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea
Convention (SOLAS).
/ This new, comprehensive security
regime for international shipping
entered into force in July 2004.
The code contains detailed security-
related requirements for govern-
ments, port authorities and shipping
companies in a mandatory section,
together with a series of guidelines
about how to meet these require-
ments in a second, non-mandatory
section.
ROTTERDAM:
ENHANCING SECURITY
WITH TECHNOLOGY
PeterMollema
DirectorPortPlanning&Development
forthePortofRotterdamAuthority
Heading the IAPH
Safety and Security
Committee, Peter
Mollema explains
how Rotterdam
is preparing for the
security demands
of tomorrow.
12. 10
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008MARITIMESECURITY
“A global understanding of transport
security provides a business
case for investments”
MARITIME
SECURITY
PaoloNeri
VicePresidentLargeArchitectureSystems,
SelexSistemiIntegrati
The European Commission (EC) has a
vision for an integrated maritime
policy. This vision emerged as a result
of the consultation process which
started with a debate on the Green
Paper and led to the Decision N
527/2007. The action plan linked to
Decision N 527/2007 highlights the
mainguidelinesthattheECiswillingto
undertake to implement an ambitious
work programme in marine security,
for the coming years.
The need for a “European Network for
Maritime Surveillance” – has emerged,
this is viewed as paramount in
contributing to the improvement of
maritime safety and security.
One relevant outcome of the consulta-
tion process is the need for better co-
ordination and integration between the
different stakeholders and agencies in
charge of the maritime operations. The
complexity of the legal framework and
the variety of procedures and means
available at European county level can
cause a fragmented response in the
above-mentioned context.
Hence, as the need to reduce fragmen-
tation and improve coordination bet-
ween all actors emerges, the question
arises,howisthisachieved?Oneanswer
being primarily with the high quality
data sharing of different fields both at
horizontal level (i.e. adjacent national
coastguardcansharedata)andvertical
level (i.e. vessel traffic data can be
shared with the environmental agency
to determine the environment impact
on critical areas).
Because of the specific area of mari-
time security, it is now clear that any
effective response can only be achieved
through an integrated approach, look-
ing at the problem as a whole, paying
attention to the mix of social, cognitive,
informative and physical domains.
Clearlythisprovidesgreatopportunities
for companies such as SELEX Sistemi
Integratioperatinginthedeploymentof
worldwide scale solutions with special
focus on maritime security.
SELEX Sistemi Integrati has developed
the Italian Vessel Traffic System and
border control: the largest VTS system
intheworldwithsimilarbutcustomised
versionsimplementedinYemen,Poland
and St. Petersburg. The company has
therefore the knowledge and the skill
tomanagetheevolutionofsuchsystems.
Moreover, SELEX Sistemi Integrati has
already carried out, within its system
architecting activities, the shift towards
network centric architecture, namely
the enabling approach to achieve the
required data sharing between diffe-
rent maritime sectors.
The need for
a European network
for maritime
surveillance
has emerged.
13.
14. MARITIMESECURITY
12
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008
Lastbutnotleast,becauseofitsfavour-
able geographical position in the
Mediterranean Sea, Italy is mandated
to play a major role in the implementa-
tionoftheEuropeanpoliciesonmaritime
matters.
The challenge for SELEX Sistemi Inte-
grati and the other European major
playersistodevelopacapabilitytoman-
age a wide variety of evolving require-
ments in an ever changing scenario.
The viable approach will be to design
flexible, loosely coupled system of
systems, able to dynamically adapt to
the different situational needs.
To achieve this goal SELEX Sistemi
Integrati has developed valuable skills
to manage the complexity of System
on System Engineering methods. In
particular, the application of capability
basedmethods(CBM)providesameans
to capture real mission needs and
develop a spiral understanding process
to validate, step by step, the solution
adoption.
The way to reach this end is to develop
a network enabling capability solution
centred on data sharing that can guar-
antee the exchange of timely informa-
tion to solve critical issues.
Validated data and network, open
architecture, service-based system
development, ability to exploit the
current system functionalities are key
drivers for success.
A key point will be represented by
the ability to manage the maritime
security infospace as resulted from the
fusion of a variety of data sources.
The right approach will be to develop
an upper level set of enabling func-
tionalities leveraging from the current
system availability and progressively
filling in the gap with appropriate new
technologies.
EU Country #1
/ Coast Guard
/ Navy
/ Customs
/ Anti-fraud
/ Law Enf. Agency
EU Country #3
Coast Guard /
Navy /
Customs /
Anti-fraud /
Law Enf. Agency /
Control
Immigration
Control
Fishing
Control
Environment
Control
Maritime
Traffic
Perform
SAR
Control
Illegal
Goods
Trafficking
Info Space Management
A Mission Capabilities View for Maritime Surveillance & Security
Suggested approach for Maritime Info Space exploitation
FRONTEX
EMSA
EDA
REMPEC
CFCA
EU Country #2
/ Coast Guard
/ Navy
/ Customs
/ Anti-fraud
/ Law Enf. Agency
EU Country #4
Coast Guard /
Navy /
Customs /
Anti-fraud /
Law Enf. Agency /
M
ember state org Acces
s
Mar
itime Data InfoSp
ace
EU
LevelledAcc
ess
It is now clear that any
effective response can only
be achieved through
an integrated approach.
Maritime Surveillance & Security
15. 13
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008ICT/BIOMETRICSECURITY
In a globalised
world with highly
interdependent
infrastructures,
internal security
is becoming
more and more
important.
With many government and business
organisations being linked across
national borders in a globalised world
with highly interdependent infrastruc-
tures, internal security is becoming
moreandmoreimportant.Inthiscontext,
efficient information and identification
systems such as biometric systems
can play a significant role.
Siemens IT Solutions and Services has
extensive experience in implementing
security solutions in the public sector,
ranging from national identification
documents,suchaselectronicpassports
and ID cards, to access and border
control systems.
One Single Solution
Given the need to protect sensitive data
and facilities, access controls for public
buildings are an important component
of internal security. That is why the
Dutch Ministry of Defence is putting its
faith in Siemens technology with its
“Defence ID Card”. By the end of this
year, all military and civilian employees
of the ministry will be issued chip cards
thatwillcontroltheiraccesstobuildings
and computer systems, and as well as
allow them to encrypt their e-mail
messagesanddigitallysigndocuments.
Siemens is responsible for integrating
the entire system, operating the card
management software and linking the
solution to existing IT systems.
E-passports
Germany has been a trailblazer in the
introduction of digital passports in
Europe, issuing these since 2005.
Since November 2007 Germany’s
E-passport also includes a second
required biometric feature, the finger-
print of two fingers.
Since 2006, Swiss citizens have been
able to apply for passports that include
a digitally stored passport picture
identifying their holders without the
possibilityoferror.Thesystemcompares
those features that do not change with
facial expressions, such as the upper
edges of the eye sockets, the cheek-
bones and the sides of the mouth. The
data is stored on a chip that is em-
bedded into the passport and protected
against unauthorized access. Siemens
IT Solutions and Services supplied the
full-service solution with which the
Swiss passport authorities record and
process the biometric data.
Prof.JoergSauerbrey
HeadofPublicSecurity
atSiemensITSolutionsandServices
The Czech Republic began issuing
biometric passports in 2007 and
Siemens is involved in the system
implementation and the production of
these passports. The solution has
already been designed to accom-
modate the planned addition of digital
fingerprints, an EU requirement due to
come into effect on May 1, 2008.
Upgrading Controls
Tobeabletoreadthebiometricpassport
data, border control systems must be
upgraded accordingly. In February of
last year, Croatia was the first country
in Europe to take this step. At Zagreb
Airport and the Bajakovo border cros-
sing, Siemenshasimplementedaborder
control system capable of reading the
new biometric EU passports.
In the future, the procedure may beco-
me even more efficient, for example,
with so-called ‘registered traveller
programmes’ (RTPs) for automated
biometriccontrols. With its new border
security system, Croatia meets the
requirements of the Schengen Agree-
ment, which is a prerequisite for the
country's application for EU member-
ship in 2009.
What the Future Will Bring
For the medium term, IT service provi-
ders such as Siemens IT Solutions and
Services are working to standardize
the systems of the various countries
and authorities in order to consolidate
them into a single system.
In the not too distant future, the
biometric EU visa for controlling
travellers and immigrants from non-
EU countries will be a genuine
possibility. Based on current develop-
ments, a global identity management
system and electronic documents with
biometric functions may also become
an everyday reality.
The market will continue to grow until
a level of security has been reached
that meets citizens’ requirements. As a
leading supplier of infrastructure
equipment, Siemens is well equipped
to meet this challenge.
DEVELOPING
A EUROPEAN
SECURITY IDENTITY
16. 14
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008ICT/BIOMETRICSECURITY
Biometric solutions were already mak-
ing inroads as early as the mid-1990s,
although in Europe we were not neces-
sarily aware of this trend. The initial ap-
plications were for healthcare in the
United States, pension management in
Africa and ID cards in Asia. These uses
reflectthetwodistinctcontextsinwhich
biometric solutions began to be deplo-
yed.Foremergingcountrieswithoutthe
systems needed to manage public
records,biometricswasawayofquickly
setting up a reliable citizen identifica-
tion system. For developed countries,
mainlyinEurope,biometricswasapart
of “e-government” initiatives. In these
countries, the primary issues were the
relationship between the State and its
citizens, protection of personal data
and confidentiality, and trade-offs
between security and comfort.
Since 2004, countries have teamed
up to ensure identification system
interoperability through work carried
out by the ICAO (International Civil
Aviation Organization). This is actually
a remarkable trend, since it reverses
the usual process; that is, countries
are seeking solutions for problems
facing people around the world, before
addressing issues concerning ID man-
agement for their own citizens!
This situation obviously impacts the
timetable for the deployment of natio-
nal solutions.
However, these national projects will
undoubtedly rebound very quickly, all
the more so since countries can call on
infrastructures and procedures that
have been deployed in the meantime
for cross-border e-passports and/or
e-visas.
Today, one thing is sure: when a coun-
try undertakes the modernization of its
national ID system, biometrics will be
part of the recipe.
In the commercial market, as opposed
to federal applications, biometric
applications are developing in the
bankingindustry,aswellasforphysical
access control. Company heads have
seen the advantages brought by bio-
metric passport or airport control ap-
plications, and are ready to apply them
within the corporate world. For instan-
ce, office entrance sensors made by
Sagem Sécurité alone have already
performedmillionsofbiometricchecks.
Sagem Sécurité has carved out a po-
sition as supplier of a range of identi-
fication solutions, including of course
biometrics. Its solutions are used for a
number of rights management appli-
cations, including State-citizen (border
crossing, driver licenses, healthcare
system access, voting rights, etc.),
company/employee (physical access
control, connection to information sys-
tems) and service provider/user
(transport access, etc.).
The distinguishing characteristic of
Sagem Sécurité is that it is the only
prime contractor to cover all con-
stituent components in a complete
identificationsystem:tokens,terminals,
encryption devices, biometrics, etc.
This means that the company can
offer customers – generally the State –
solutionstailoredtotheirspecificneeds.
Because of this unrivaled capability,
Sagem Sécurité systems are now
deployed in 70 countries and support
160 different types of ID solutions
worldwide. Its priority markets are
those in which security factors are
decisive, with stringent standards, and
governed by extremely demanding
assessmentandcertificationprocesses.
In practice this means government
markets, or commercial and industrial
applications subject to governmental
regulations. Sagem Sécurité is the
world leader in this growth sector, with
more than 100 million biometric ID
documents delivered around the world.
At Sagem Sécurité, we explain the
technical possibilities so that the au-
thorities can make informed decisions.
Biometrics use is growing rapidly,
especially for control functions in the
civil sector. High-value sites such as
airports, nuclear power plants and
ports are all equipped with effective ID
systems. It’s been democratised, even
gadgetised, in applications where fa-
cility takes precedence over security.
For example, we may now use biomet-
rics in so-called logical control appli-
cations, to unlock a PAD or mobile
phone, instead of the usual password
or code.
Note: Sagem Sécurité offers proven
expertise in fingerprint, facial and iris
recognition technologies.
BIOMETRICS;
THE CITIZEN
& THE STATE
“Today when
a country undertakes
the modernisation
of its national ID
system, biometrics
will be part of the
solution”
Biometrics use
is growing rapidly,
especially for control
functions in the
civil sector.
BernardDidier
SeniorVP,
R&T-BusinessDevelopment
atSagemSécurité
17. 15
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008ICT/BIOMETRICSECURITY
Threats to security are of growing
concerntoallEuropeancitizens.Thelat-
est of these many threats, the planned
terror attacks in Germany, were luckily
discovered in time. This situation con-
firms that it is of crucial importance
to better coordinate our efforts to
increase security, so as to be better
able to prevent such attacks. Security
research on this issue is one important
way to bring about cooperation.
Research Cooperation
Through increased research coope-
ration, collaborative projects and
activities, duplication of efforts can
be avoided and synergies reached.
Furthermore, by networking with key
security stakeholders in Europe, we
can also promote a common European
approach to dealing with this issue. On
the so called ‘demand-side’, this pro-
motes the creation of common and
compatible standards and procedures,
while on the ‘supply-side’, it helps to
create a European market for security
equipment.
The objectives of research at the Euro-
pean level are to respond to political
needs and to the needs of European
citizens, as well as to increase the
competitiveness of the European in-
dustry. The European security industry
must convert this challenge into an op-
portunity to become the leader in the
emerging worldwide market for secu-
rity equipment and solutions.
Joint Security Research Agenda
The newly established European Se-
curity Research and Innovation Forum
(ESRIF) will contribute to meeting this
challenge. ESRIF will help increase
transparency and joint planning in
security research programmes and
activities in Europe, with a view to
enhanced cooperation between the
various security stakeholders. It will
support civil security policy with the
appropriate technology and knowledge
base by establishing and carrying
forward a mid- and long-term Joint
Security Research Agenda, involving
all European stakeholders, from both
the supply and the demand sides.
The Lisbon Strategy
Research has also been recognized as
playing a key role in achieving the
goals of the Lisbon strategy in the EU,
and in making Europe the most com-
petitive economy in the world by 2010.
Members States have therefore been
urged to increase their R&D spending.
The EU has also drastically increased
its spending on R&D: the budget of the
Seventh Research Framework Pro-
gramme (FP7) 2007-2013 is more than
40% higher budget than the previous
FP6 (some €54 billion in total).
For the first time FP7 also includes se-
curity research as one of its ten key
themes under the largest Specific Pro-
gramme “Cooperation”, with a budget
of €1.4 billion, which will be used in a
complementary way, with different
types of projects and coordination and
supporting activities. In the first call for
proposals, 325 eligible proposals were
received. We have now started the
preparation of “grant agreements” for
44 of them.
REAPING
THE BENEFITS
OF EUROPEAN R&D
PaulWeissenberg
DirectorAerospace,GMES,
securityanddefenceattheDGEnterprise
andIndustry,EuropeanCommission
“Through the
Development
of a European
Security Identity”
FP7 in a Nutshell
FP7 is the EU's main instrument
for funding research in Europe.
This framework identifies 10
thematic areas, corresponding
to major fields in science and
research, including 5 fields
of direct interest for ASD:
/ Information and Communication
Technologies;
/ Nanosciences, Nanotechnologies,
Materials and new Production
Technologies;
/ Transport (including Aeronautics);
/ Space;
/ Security.
The identified “missions” for security
researcharerecognisedasbeinghighly
relevant in addressing threats to secu-
rity in Europe. Ensuring the ‘Security
of citizens’, the ‘Security of infrastruc-
tures and utilities’, ‘Intelligent surveil-
lanceandbordersecurity’,and‘Restoring
security and safety in case of crisis’ re-
main the key ones, while due attention
will also be given to ‘Security and So-
ciety’ issues. Research in these areas
should deliver the needed knowledge
and technologies in Europe.
European Security
EU investments in R&D for security
must be coordinated with national and
private investment. By combining
efforts in Europe we can effectively
increase the security of citizens and
industry. R&D, therefore, in many ways,
is the buttress of European security.
Security Research on the Web
/ The DG Enterprise and Industry
website dedicated to Security
Research with useful links for SMEs:
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/
security/index_en.htm
18. SergeLebourg
DassaultAviation
Safety objectives as they are defined
for civil aircraft (FAR/CS 25, FAR/CS
23) are aimed at the protection of
people on board the aircraft. As there
are no humans on-board the UAV, the
safety objectives must be reoriented
to the protection of people on the
ground. This explains why the UAV
safety objectives must be "a priori"
different from the safety objectives
used on civil aircraft. These safety
objectives are closer to those of
military aircraft than to civil ones.
To operate a UAV in airspace you need,
as a minimum (depending on the type
of airspace), to obtain a Certificate
of Airworthiness and approval to
operate in the airspace. Dassault
Aviation has proposed a method based
on kinetic energy to allow determina-
tion of UAV categories and associated
safety objectives. This method is
published as part of the report of the
"JAA Eurocontrol UAV task force".
The reorientation of the safety objec-
tives towards the protection of people
on the ground of course has conse-
quences: Firstly, there are no reasons
to justify the use of different safety
objectives for military UAVs operating
in the same airspace as civil ones.
Secondly, the risk for “over flown”
population must be the same
whatever the certification authority,
this means that there is a need for a
worldwide agreement on UAV safety
objectives. Most of the key elements
of future UAV certification regulations
are now available. National regulations
are developing. In France the DGA
(Délégation Générale de L'Armement)
has published an airworthiness code
named USAR, for military UAVs. In
addition, the NATO FINAS group has
amended and published its code
under USAR4.
All airspace users believe that UAVs
operate in the air-space just as any
other aircraft would. While this is
indeed a given, it has to be recognized
that UAVs do have specificities, as do
all other types of aircraft, and these
specificities must be considered.
Detection of other users and conse-
quent separation from other users is a
specific & difficult task for UAVs. Initial
operations of UAVs have so far been
made in segregated airspace, efforts
are now focusing on operations in
controlled airspace, this is airspace
where all aircraft are cooperative
(Transponder mode S) and where ATC
is in charge of traffic separation. With
this evolution, rules of the air (as
published by ICAO or FAR91) will have
to be updated.
Operations in Controlled Airspace
Currently, conditions exist which allow
for UAV operations in controlled
airspace. However, in order to convince
the aeronautical community of this
fact, it is now time to develop a
comprehensive UAV demonstration
programme. New developments in
technology in the CNS domains will
both facilitate and improve the safety
of UAV operations in a controlled
airspace.
Currently airspace collision avoidance
is covered by the agreement with the
ICAO rule And based on the "see &
avoid" principle. Fortunately, to impro-
ve the safety of operations, regulations
have introduced the requirement that
aircraft above 5700 kg must install
TCAS / ACAS.
Communications: ATC can commu-
nicate with the UAV pilot (ground
based) through the UAV or better still,
through a direct phone line. Thus,
UAVs benefit from safer means of
communication between ATC & the
pilot than aircraft do. Contrary to
aircraft, UAVs need a communication
data link between the UAV pilot and
the machine. When such data link is
UAV
OPERATIONS
IN FUTURE
ATM
“Safety objectives as they are defined
for civil aircraft are aimed at the protection
of people on board the aircraft”
16
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008UAVs
There are no reasons
to justify the use
of different safety
objectives for military
UAVs operating
in the same airspace
as civil ones.
19. ATC can communicate
to the UAV pilot based
on the ground, through
the UAV or better still
through a direct phone line.
lost then UAVs have the option of flying
in an autonomous mode (similar to
aircraft operation following loss of
communication). ATC might be infor-
med by a specific XPDR code set by
the UAV.
Navigation: The location of a UAV
can be determined by the UAV pilot
independently of an on board UAV
navigation system by using radar
or a multilateration system.
Surveillance: Separation is achieved
through the communication of instruc-
tions to pilots by the ATC. The UAV pilot
might have in front of them the same
tactical situation as the ATC, a display
that an aircraft pilot does not have
today. The UAV pilot is thus in a better
position than an aircraft pilot to
understand the situation. UAVs can
address Collision Avoidance in two
ways, first by using the ATC tactical
situation,andsecondbyinstallingTCAS
equipment on UAV. It will be possible to
demonstrate an equivalent level of
safetyforUAVsascomparedtoaircraft.
Improving Safety
CPDLC (Controller Pilot Data Link
Communications): Data link will
improve communications between
ATC & the "UAV pilot" and will allow
partial automation of UAV answers
(this will improve safety in case of loss
of communication between the "UAV
pilot" and UAV). CPDLC also gives the
UAV the capacity to operate in full
autonomous mode (in cases of loss of
data link between the UAV pilot and the
UAV) and so any drawback due to loss
of data link between the pilot and the
UAV is eliminated. ADS-B (Automatic
Dependence Surveillance-Broadcast):
will allow all aircraft, including UAVs,
to have a perfect knowledge of the
tactical situation before them.
Operations in Non-Controlled
Airspace
Such operations require that all aircraft
have a means to locate and separate
from all other traffic. Two different
technologies might be used.
Cooperative technologies
Most aircraft are equipped with
transponders. Yet, very light machines
which have no on board power supply
source cannot be equipped with these
devices. Therefore, there is a need
for technology developments. Certain
technologiesusedbytheglidercommu-
nity, such as FLARM, can be candidate.
Other technologies such as those
based on a combination of cellular
phone GPS and TIS are also affordable
candidates.
Non-cooperativetechnologies:Mature
solutions in the area of non-coopera-
tive technologies need to be developed.
It can be difficult to cover detection in
all directions, some UAV systems have
a field of detection similar to the
aircraft cockpit field of view. Although
such a system might provide a level of
safety equivalent to the "see & avoid"
principle, it still might not provide a
level of safety acceptable for future
operations. It might be difficult to
develop and certify a system which
will be able to detect and allow
collision avoidance in only 80% of the
conditions.
Presently, cooperative technologies
seem to be more promising. However,
this does not mean that development
efforts in non-cooperative technologies
must be slowed down. Europe, with
the help of SESAR, and the US with the
help of NextGen, are developing large
programmes to update their ATM
systems. In order to be successful in
integrating all users into the same
airspace,theseprogramsmustaddress
theconcernsandneedsofall,including
UAVs - whenever this is possible.
At Dassault Aviation, our knowledge of
air transport, business aviation and
military and UAV operations allow us
to fully understand the synergies and
to promote solutions for the benefit of
all new concepts. Insertion of UAVs
into the controlled airspace will help
ATM stakeholders (pilots, controllers,
authorities) to identify the remaining
ATM safety issues and to fix them.
UAVs will not be a security risk for
other users, but will point the way
towards ATM safety.
See & Avoid:
an Inadequate Principle?
UAV specificity paves to the way
to better safety principles. Human eye
limitations, limited field of view (blind
zones), weather conditions, light
conditions, collision speed, as well as
many other factors, explain why the
see & avoid principle is considered by
most safety authorities as inadequate.
Suggestion: Collision avoidance must
no longer be based on this principle,
or on the application of operational
rules. It is recommended that "Aircraft
separation and collision avoidance" be
validated by a method similar to the
method used for certification of
aircraft systems (CS/FAR 25 or CS/FAR
23 paragraph 1309). This method is
based on "safety targets" validated
by "safety analysis".
Communication: a deficient tool?
UAV specificity can be used for the
development of the future ATM.
Controllers and pilots use voice
communications in order to commu-
nicate with each other. This type of
communication carries with it high
risks, which include: - loss of critical
communications (due to improper
frequency setting or wrong squelch
setting) - transmission of misleading
information (risk of mix-up of aircraft
identification by pilots or ATC) -
misunderstanding (due to the use of
non mother tongue language).
Suggestion: Develop communication
systems based on data link using
standard messages and used as the
primary means of communication.
17
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008UAVs
Europe with SESAR
and the US with
NextGen are developing
large programmes
to update ATM.
20. 18
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008UAVs
EUROCONTROListhejointcivil/military
European Organisation for the Safety of
Air Navigation, in which role it regards
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) as
legitimate airspace users. EUROCON-
TROL focuses on an ATM-driven pers-
pective of the UAS airspace integration
issue. Airspace requirements should
thus form the basis for UAS perform-
ance standards/specifications, to be
developed by appropriate bodies with
the support of EUROCONTROL.
The integration of UAS into the pan-
Euro-pean ATM network requires that
similar performance considerations be
afforded to UAS as to manned aircraft.
EUROCONTROL therefore supports the
integration of UAS with due considera-
tionoftheevolvingrequirementsofother
civil and military airspace users.
EUROCONTROLalsoconsidersthatUAS
can provide a foundation for improve-
ments to manned aviation (e.g.: safety
enhancing sense and avoid systems)
andfutureATM(e.g.autonomousflight).
UAScanonlybeintegratedintotheATM
network through effective working
arrangements between all partners in
European aviation. EUROCONTROL is
therefore coordinating with organisa-
tions such as ICAO, State aviation au-
thorities, EUROCAE, EASA, JAA, RTCA,
FAA, as well as ASD. Moreover, since
civil UAS MASPS/MOPS (Minimum Avi-
ation System Performance Standards/
Minimum Operational Performance
Specifications) and military UAS certifi-
cation standards will provide the basis
for compliance with the ATM network
airspacerequirements,EUROCONTROL
is active in the NATO FINAS Task
Force where military UAS certification
specifications are under development.
In addition, EUROCONTROL was ins-
trumental in the establishment of the
EUROCAE Working Group 73 on UAS
(WG73 UAS) where MASPS for civil UAS
are being actively developed.
EUROCONTROL provides the chairman
for WG-73 and other expert support.
EUROCONTROL has produced a set of
“ATM Specifications for Military UAVs
as Operational Air Traffic outside Seg-
regated Airspace”. Based upon com-
mon acceptance that UAS operations
outside segregated airspace should be
conductedatalevelofsafetyequivalent
to that for manned aircraft, the specifi-
cations follow three basic principles:
/ Firstly, UAS operations should not
increase the risk to other airspace
users;
/ Secondly, ATM procedures should
mirror those applicable to manned
aircraft; and,
/ Thirdly, the provision of air traffic
services to UAS should be
transparent to ATC controllers.
The specifications are also innovative
insofar as they are not constrained by
limitations in current UAS capability
such as sense-and-avoid. The specifi-
cations will therefore only be practica-
ble once industry develops this and
other necessary technologies.
The EUROCONTROL Agency has re-
cently established an internal “UAS
ATM Integration Activity”, consisting of
a coordinated agency work program-
me intended to support all facets of
UAS ATM integration issues.
In a first work stream, the drive will be
to accommodate,an integration of UAS
into non-segregated airspace on the
basisofa“phasedintegration”approach
(possibly supported by restricted UAS
type certificates and/or UAS permits to
fly).Suchphasedintegrationwillprovide
the important first steps from which
critical operational experience and
lessons-learned can be derived. EU-
ROCONTROL will work closely with
specific national authorities in sup-
porting phased integrations of indivi-
dual UAS systems as well as
undertaking airspace studies and UAS
real-time ATM simulations.
The Agency’s UAS activity will interface
closely with civil and military stake-
holders as well as other international
and national organisations dealing
with UAS. The area of activity will also
link with the FAA in the frame of the
EUROCONTROL-FAA Memorandum of
Cooperation, where a dedicated UAS
Action Plan has been established.
A second work stream will focus on
providing deliverables to, and interfac-
ingfully with, SESAR to ensure full con-
siderationofUASaslegitimateairspace
users during the SESAR development
and deployment phases.
SESARmustbeaffordedtheopportunity
to assess the technological enhance-
ments emerging for UAS, and their
possible application to manned aviation
for building overall ATM network im-
provements.Theworkstreamwillseek
to coordinate the work necessary to
develop a complete set of UAS certifi-
cation specifications as a basis for full
integration to the pan-European ATM
network, consistent with the SESAR
ATM Target Concept.
As regards interface with industry,
effective formal working relationships
have already been established between
ASD and EUROCONTROL. This will fa-
cilitate solutions to areas such as
sense and avoid and radio frequency
standardisation for communications,
command and control.
Finally, EUROCONTROL supports the
recently established ICAO UAS Study
Group. This global technical UAS body
aims to entrench the regulatory re-
quirements of civil UAS into the ICAO
Standards and Recommended Prac-
tices (SARPs) contained in the 18 An-
nexes to the Chicago Convention. The
process will be a complex yet key ele-
ment of the complete UAS integration
issue.
SUPPORT UAS
ATM INTEGRATION
MikeStrong
EUROCONTROL
MilitaryExpert
HolgerMatthiesen
EUROCONTROL
ATMExpert
EUROCONTROL will
work closely with specific
national authorities
in supporting phased
integrations of individual
UAS systems.
21. 19
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008UAVs
Most UAS experience has been gained
through military missions achieved in
segregated airspace over battlefields
or in training areas, with UAS ranging
from light systems operated at very
short range to High Altitude Long En-
durance (HALE) systems operated
through a satellite data-link. These
military operations, like the SAFRAN
SagemDéfenseSécuritémadeSperwer
UAS operations in Afghanistan and
Kosovo, have confirmed UAS as
increasingly valuable assets. They
have also underlined a key challenge
around drastically extending their use
for more efficient governmental and
commercial applications: including
routine access to civil airspace.
UAS access to civil airspace, com-
monly called non-segregated airspace
to illustrate the capability to fly both
manned aircraft and unmanned air-
craft in the same airspace area, is a
new type of challenge for the aviation
community: How to manage the inte-
gration of a new family of aerial sys-
tems in the very mature and structured
manned aviation system? And how to
ensure these are accepted by manned
aviation stakeholders such as airlines,
pilots, air traffic controllers and the
general public?
Safety First
The first consideration has to be the
safety of air transport, particularly
manned aviation, must not be affected
in any negative way by UAS operations.
This is of paramount interest in defin-
ing and regulating UAS operations in
non-segregated airspace. Quantified
safety objectives need to be defined by
the relevant regulatory bodies at the
European (Eurocontrol, EASA) and na-
tional (CAAs) levels. The fulfilment of
these safety objectives will have to be
demonstrated as part of the certifica-
tion and flight authorisation process.
Safety simulations and real flight
demonstrations will be required to
support this safety process.
Many issues must be addressed to
demonstrate the safe integration of
UAS into civil airspace. All that is con-
tributing to the safety of manned avia-
tion will have to be reviewed and
adapted for the specific case of UAS:
airworthiness/certification, operational
approvalitems,maintenance,UAScrew
qualification and training and aero-
drome operations. All of these issues
encompass technical, safety and regu-
latory aspects but have different levels
of complexity. For example, the appli-
cation of the ICAO annex 2 regulations
relative to the rules of the air (the com-
monly called UAS Sense and Avoid
concept) makes that the scenario of an
Unmanned Aircraft (UA) flying accord-
ing to Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)
with Air Traffic Control providing sepa-
ration from other aircraft is easier to
address compared with flying the same
UA according to Visual Flight Rules
(VFR) in non-controlled airspace.
FLYING UAS
IN CIVIL AIRSPACE
GérardMardiné
Programmemanager,
UASinsertionprojects
“Do you really
think there
is a need for UAS
Collision Avoidance
systems?”
Moreover, the less complex, the
shorter is the resulting timeframe to
establish the suitable regulations and
for industry to develop adapted techni-
cal solutions.
A Step-by-Step Approach
The goal is to provide UAS users with
significant additional operational ca-
pabilities (when compared with flight
in segregated airspace) in a medium-
term timeframe. Routine UAS IFR op-
erations in controlled airspace will
most probably be part of this first step,
offering a cruise flight capability in
non-segregated airspace.
This first step, which could be achieved
by 2015, would be to operate UAS for
border surveillance and maritime sur-
veillance missions.
Standards have also to be developed
step by step in order to ensure UAS
compatibility with manned aviation and
to provide UAS manufacturers with
agreed requirements to support the
development of UAS.
European standardisation efforts have
been achieved in the framework of the
EUROCAE Working Group 73 . These
efforts must be supported by the defi-
nition of a common UAS concept of op-
eration in non-segregated airspace
and of a pertinent safety case. The
group also benefits from the participa-
tion of all the aviation and UAS stake-
holders (regulatory bodies, Air Naviga-
tion Service Providers, pilots, industry,
research lab) to generate widely
agreed material suitable for future
regulatory endorsement.
A significant and coordinated effort is
required to progressively and safely in-
troduce UAS into civil airspace. This
will lead to major positive repercus-
sions for manned aviation as it will
benefit from the technological progress
and will also develop European aero-
space industry leadership.
Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (UAS) have
demonstrated in recent
years a growing potential
to fulfil a wide range
of missions for both
governmental and
commercial applications.
22. “European policy makers
need to ensure that aviation
security measures are
efficient and risk-based”
UlrichSchulte-Strathaus
SecretaryGeneral,AssociationofEuropeanAirlines
Aviation security, although high on the
agenda of governments, European
institutions, airlines and airports alike,
still suffers from a lack of efficiency
and an excess of complexity. Security
rules are often audit-driven rather
than based on policy, foresight or real,
on-the-ground expertise. Duplication
and lack of international harmoni-
sation – even within the European
Union – are a real challenge to airlines’
and airports’ operations. The costs of
the current system are shared by
airports and airlines, with a direct
impact on passengers. These various
challenges caused the Association of
European Airlines (AEA) and the
European branch of Airports Council
International (ACI Europe) to join
forces in 2006 to set up ESPAS, the
European Strategic Partnership for
Aviation Security.
ESPAS aims to remedy some of the
current shortcomings of the security
system,bysettinglong-termprinciples,
in cooperation with European policy-
makers,toensurethataviationsecurity
measures are efficient and risk-based,
and by providing a platform for joint
AEA/ACI positions to be presented to
European Institutions.
Itisintheinterestofairlinesandairports
to have security rules developed on the
basis of, on the one hand, the assess-
ment of the risk or threat, and, on the
other, of the impact that they will have
on operations. The overall objective
must be to deliver proactive, customer-
focused, sustainable security in an
efficient manner.
ESPAS is an innovative venture which
will regularly propose ‘green field’
approaches to reviewing the system,
getting rid of unnecessary duplications
and building a system in which indus-
try, regulators and passengers can
have faith. This approach will not only
strengthen deterrence, but it will also
drive costs down as resources are
pooled to core priorities.
ESPAS operates on a series of basic
principles, which drive all its activities.
Assessing the Risk of Each
Element in the Overall System
Europe’s aviation security system has
been built incrementally over recent
decades, starting from the ECAC
Document 30 which was adapted to
become an EC Regulation on the eve
of the 9/11 attacks. The main elements
of today’s aviation security system are
centralsearch(passengerandbaggage
screening), access control, the setting
up of critical parts at airports and the
protection of cockpit doors in the
aircraft.
Anynewlegislationshouldmeanadding
elements wherever necessary and
reinforcing these general, cornerstone
rules, rather than creating multiple
A HOLISTIC
APPROACH
TO AVIATION
SECURITY
20
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008TRANSPORTSECURITY
23. layers of measures to compensate for
previous, unsatisfactory ones. In the
current setup, however, attention has
been focused on accumulating
responses to possible scenarios on an
arbitrary basis, without reviewing the
overall system, risk and existing
mitigations. In practice, some areas
seem subjected to a disproportionate
amount of measures (e.g. protection of
aircraft).Undera'greenfield'approach,
we might expect some reapportioning
to better address the broader risk.
Security Layers in theory
Security Layers in practice
Prioritise and Focus Resources
on where the Risks are
Resources dedicated to counter
terrorist threats in air transport are
not only financial but also human,
physical and spatial (notably at the
airport), technological, and operati-
onal. Such resources are necessarily
limited. Airports’ security infrastruc-
ture cannot be stretched to infinity, nor
can passenger fares be increased
continuously to cover increasing secu-
ritycosts.Securityisaconstraintwhich
must be adapted to, and integrate in,
the very specific environment that is
civil aviation. Eliminating 100% risks
and threats to air transport is not
possible if airports and airlines are to
continue to open their doors to pas-
sengers.Instead,prioritiesmustbeset,
and we must find the most effective
waytocounterthemainrisks.Similarly,
giventhesefiniteresources,timeshould
be spent to re-balance the overall
setting and to re-allocate resources
where the main vulnerabilities are.
This is all the more relevant as the
industry and its passengers are cur-
rently asked to bear the costs of nearly
all of aviation security in Europe.
Research into new technologies is
essential for producing more efficient
andmoreeffectivesecuritysolutionsto
counter significant threats to civil
aviation.Technologydeployedtoprotect
the air transport infrastructure must
fulfill complex technical and operati-
onalcriteriathatmustworkinharmony
with air transport operations to secure
passenger and freight facilitation
processes, not to paralyse them.
Defining future research and deve-
lopment priorities must be dependent
on the need to minimise or eliminate
vulnerabilities that pose a significant
risk to the air transport industry. Prio-
rities must also take full account of
emerging and evolving threats to air
transport. The backing of European
Community and national government
resourcesiscriticalfordefining,stimu-
lating and co-ordinating initiatives in
the European Union. Industry stake-
holders should be fully involved in the
process.
Distinguish the “Possible”
from the “Probable”
Too often today, European aviation
security is either rule-based or audit-
based. Rather than addressing what is
likely to happen (what is “probable”), it
addresses everything that can theore-
tically happen (what is “possible”). The
difference between what is possible
and what is probable is assessed not
only by knowing about the threat, but
also by looking at the wider context
and at existing mitigations.
Measure the Relative Effectiveness
of Security with the “3 Ds”
of Detection, Denial and Deterrence
Any given security measure should aim
to address at least one of the following
objectives: detect, deny, and deter (the
3 Ds”). However, strengthening one
may lead to the cancellation of the
others, and that must be put in the
balance. A series of security measures
to counter the same threat might
increase detection but will also give a
signal to possible terrorists that secu-
rity is poor and needs to be compen-
sated(therebydecreasingthedeterrent
effect). Similarly, a fourth element
which must be taken into account is
the passenger’s perception or feeling
of security. Taking the example of
baggage reconciliation, it is likely that
this added measure to baggage scree-
ning adds to actual security (by preven-
ting unaccompanied baggage from
being placed on board aircraft);
however, it also adds to the passen-
ger’s perception that the central
search was weak and that s/he is at
risk, as the captain communicates to
passengers that the said baggage
must be offloaded.
A measure applied 100%, i.e. syste-
matically, is also 100% predictable,
which risks diverting potential terro-
rists to a different target. As a rule of
thumb, unpredictability and random-
21
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008TRANSPORTSECURITY
Aviation security,
although high on the agenda
of governments, European
institutions, airlines and airports
alike, still suffer from a lack
of efficiency and an excess
of complexity.
nessshouldthusbefurtherintroduced,
both for their facilitation effect (the
need for fewer resources) and for their
deterrent effect. They are also able to
match the threat if percentages are
adaptable. It should be noted however
that deterrence should only be used
when security is visible or procedures
known (by passengers or staff). It
applies, therefore, mainly to people
screening and access control but
much less to cargo or catering.
To set these principles into action, ACI
and AEA are committed to long-term
cooperation. This implies continuous
joint identification of problems and
priorities, but also a regular exchange
of information on ongoing operational
issues, such as the differing levels
of security according to shifts, lack
of synchronisation between the shifts
and volume of traffic, etc. To convey
this strategic vision to the regulators,
ESPAS representatives regularly meet
with the European Commission and
national authorities to set common
priorities.
The work of ESPAS does not stop
there: ultimately, it aims to associate
all relevant stakeholders, institutional
or economic players, to counter the
threat tothe European aviation industry
from international terrorism.
24. 22
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008TRANSPORTSECURITY
As it is unlikely that we will see a re-
duction in the threat level posed to air
travel in the foreseeable future, Smiths
Detection has looked toother avenues-
to technology advancements - to assist
in smoothing our passage through the
security channel.
Screening Procedures
The checkpoint security procedure has
two main targets: the screening of
passengers and of their carry-on bags.
For both of these areas, new technolo-
gies promise to address the extra re-
quirements that recent events have
imposed. Screening activity is stan-
dardised by regulation and generally
resultsinauniformconfigurationofX-ray
andmetaldetectorequipment,together
with their associated procedures.
aTiX Deployment Worldwide
With the recent development by Smiths
Detection of the HI-SCAN 6040aTiX
system, which is now being deployed, a
quiet revolution is occurring in the area
of carry-on baggage screening. Tech-
nologies that have previously been the
preserve of sophisticated hold baggage
screening methods are now finding
their way into the passenger check-
point. The multi-view X-Ray aTiX sys-
tem offers the screener several
perspectives of a scanned bag and
thus assists greatly in the resolution of
suspicious objects in a carry-on item.
ALLEVIATING THE
SECURITY BOTTLENECK
StefanAust
DirectorofProductManagement
SmithsDetectionEMEA
“Recent technical
advances from
Smiths Detection
offer improved
security and more
efficient processes
at airport checkpoints
worldwide”
Moreover, adding threat detection ca-
pabilities to this multi-view approach
leads to the real breakthrough of pro-
viding automated detection of explo-
sives – both liquid and solid – as well
as other substances of interest. By
providing the system operator with
alarm prompts in the displayed image,
the detection performance and time
taken in clearing bags are greatly
enhanced. The ability of this Smiths
Detection technology to distinguish
between benign and dangerous liquids
holds out the promise of a return to the
days before the term 3:1:1 entered the
airport lexicon. Additional inspection
angles and the tomography capability
of the multi-view aTiX system already
permit passengers at UK airports,
including London Heathrow and
Glasgow, to leave laptops in the bag on
a trial basis.
Passenger Flow =
Passenger Convenience
Throughput performance depends on
various aspects such as equipment
balance, alarm resolution and tray re-
turn. Here, technical enhancements
that assist the procedures can greatly
boost the efficiency of the overall
checkpoint operation. Observations of
the flow process through the security
channel have identified where en-
hancements to the checkpoint infra-
structure can make significant
differences to the throughput and op-
erational costs. Bottlenecks such as
divestment of personal items onto the
X-Ray conveyor offer an example of
how small changes can make a big dif-
ference. Lengthening the loading con-
veyor so that several people can
simultaneously off-load their personal
items turns a sequential – one at a
time – process into a parallel operation
where a slow passenger does not
delay the whole line. Motorized ramps
now are used to transport empty trays
from the end of the channel back to the
start, saving on operator time while
also ensuring continuous supply of
trays to passengers entering the secu-
rity lane.
Reconfiguring the balance between
people and baggage screening proces-
sesreduceslabourandequipmentcosts
and at the same time harmonises the
movement of people and their bags, as
they move through the checkpoint.
Smiths Detection has encapsulated
these operational improvements to the
checkpoint flow into an integrated
handling system concept – iLane.
iLane facilitates the passenger to pass
quickly through the channel.
It’s first major application is at London
Heathrow’s new Terminal 5.
Increased Security Plus
Improved Passenger Convenience
at a Checkpoint Near You!
Using an integrated automation ap-
proach, the Smiths Detection iLane
concept incorporates a sophisticated
tray handling system, with sensors
identifying empty trays which auto-
matically return to the beginning of the
checkpoint for passengers entering
the lane. Extended entry conveyors
allow several passengers to load bags
and personal items at any one time.
Bags that are deemed suspicious by
the X-ray screener are automatically
diverted by the conveyor system into
the secondary search area for follow-
up inspection. Cleared bags carry
straight through for reclaim by the
passenger. By incorporating these pro-
cedural approaches into a single han-
dling system, the overall efficiency of
the checkpoint has been dramatically
improved.
25.
26. 24
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008TRANSPORTSECURITY
FranckGreverie
VPStrategy,BusinessDevelopment&Marketing
Thales–SecuritySolutions&Services
Freedom of movement is the lifeblood
of modern European economies and is
one of the founding principles of the
European internal market. But con-
straintsremain.Today,travelisimpeded
notonlybytransportefficiencyproblems
and by the lack of trans-European net-
works, but also by the myriad security
checks that passengers must go
through, and by the plethora of obsta-
cles they encounter – such as different
ticketing systems – every time that they
switch between transport operators.
The response to these challenges is
twofold.Itinvolvesfindingwaystomake
public transport easier to use, and it
meansdeployingsecuritysolutionsthat
enhancepassengersafetywithoutbeing
obtrusive. This applies to travellers at
airports,ontrains,onroads,ferries and
sea transportation. So what are the key
technologies that should be deployed
to address public transport security is-
sues? And what can be done on a Euro-
peanleveltofosterinnovativesolutions?
Enhancing Transport Security
Public transport systems face a wide
range of safety and security threats.
These cover a broad spectrum, from
low-probability, high-impact events
such as terrorist attacks, to everyday
anti-socialandpettycriminalbehaviour.
The traditional solution has been the
widespread deployment of CCTV sys-
tems monitored by operators and
recorded for evidential purposes. Often
these have been isolated systems
under local control. But systems of this
type depend on the vigilance of individ-
ual operators – and the limitations of
this approach are widely recognised.
Furthermore, conventional on-board
systems – such as CCTV on trains and
buses–areessentiallypassive.Theout-
put is often simply recorded and cannot
beviewedinreal-timeaseventsunfold.
Dealing with the increasing amounts
of information generated by security
systems – such as CCTV networks –
presents a major challenge. But smart
technology can help. The latest inno-
vation in integrated operation control
comes with intelligent data processing
performed by advanced security sys-
tems. Major developments in this area
include the integration of data to en-
able rapid situation assessment and
response planning, support for control
operators, and forensic tools for evi-
denceextractionfrommassiveamounts
of data.
Key features of today’s advanced
systems include facial recognition,
behaviour recognition, automatic
tracking of suspicious individuals,
INNOVATIVE
SOLUTIONS FOR
PUBLIC
TRANSPORT
SECURITY
“Developing an integrated
security approach to intermodal
transport systems”
27. 25
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008TRANSPORTSECURITY
automatic detection of suspect objects
and detection of overcrowding. Other
technologies that have an impact
on transport security include access
control to secure public spaces and
geo-localisation for vehicle tracking
systems. Technology can also be used
to reduce fiscal risks: transactional
security plays a key role in ensuring
the security of revenue collection for
transport operators.
Integrated Solutions
Smart technologies like these bring
major benefits and can be applied
on all modes of public transport. But
ratherthan deploying them in isolation,
the trend is now to integrate these
technologies to create truly intermodal
systems. In recognition of this fact,
Thales offers ground transportation
operators solutions that integrate both
security and safety dimensions to de-
liver improved passenger comfort.
Intermodality occurs when public
transport users are able to easily
switch between modes of transport
and between transport operators in
the course of the same trip. The main
area for improvement lies in ensuring
thattheswitchoverhappensassmoothly
as possible. Innovation in the sphere
of intermodality is being led by
European countries. For public trans-
port, there are certain areas where
intermodality should be improved to
increase safety, security and competi-
tiveness.Forinstance,whilemosturban
and interurban systems are now physi-
cally interconnected, the ticketing
systems that they use are not. But that
is beginning to change.
Seamless Travel
Several countries are adopting an in-
tegrated, national approach to their
public transit systems. In the Nether-
lands, Thales and its partners have
paved the way for a national, fully in-
teroperable secure e ticketing system
to be used by multiple transport oper-
ators throughout the country. When
fully operational, the system will allow
more than two million passengers
daily to use a single ticket on the com-
muter trains, subways, buses and fer-
ries of all major operators nationwide.
Thales is providing know-how in the
design and implementation of large-
scale, secure and integrated fare col-
lection systems based on contactless
smart cards. These are easy to use,
create smooth passenger flows and
offer very high security – three critical
success factors for the deployment of
integrated ticketing systems.
This experience is now being repli-
cated in Denmark and is heralding an
age of seamless intermodality. ‘Park
& ride’ projects, where a single ticket
can be used to pay for parking and
travelling on public transit systems,
offer similar benefits. A system of this
sort was successfully implemented in
Turin by Thales for the Winter Olympics
in 2006.
Fostering Security Innovations
For now, intermodality is still ham-
pered by national regulations and
standards that limit the interoperabil-
ity of transport systems across bor-
ders. But much more could be
achieved if travellers in Europe’s
trans-regional border areas could
move swiftly from one country to an-
other. In this context, initiatives aimed
at abolishing the ‘border effect’ be-
tween European member states would
have a significant positive impact.
Anumberofexistingprogrammeshave
proved to be highly successful in pro-
moting enhanced transport integra-
tion. These include the European Rail
Traffic Management System (ERTMS),
an initiative set up to enhance cross-
border interoperability and signalling
procurement by creating a single Eu-
ropean standard for train control.
The Galileo programme should also be
a source of inspiration for policy mak-
ers looking to foster public security re-
search and innovation. Similarly, the
Security Research Programme estab-
lished and funded by the European
Commission with a cross-border
scheme that brings together opera-
tors, academics and industry, paves
the way for the next generation of
safety and security systems. These
provide for the detection of abnormal
situations in an aircraft cabin (SAFEE),
railway explosives detection and re-
sponse to luggage NRBC alerts
(TRIPS), integrated passenger inspec-
tions (EFFISEC) and resilient au-
tonomous transmission means for
disaster response (ASPIS).
Advanced integrated technologies –
from smart ticketing to intelligent se-
curity systems – have the capacity to
transform transport networks, making
them easier to use and safer than ever.
Fostering these innovations, with the
help of increased co-ordination at the
European level, will play a pivotal role
in turning the dream of free movement
into a reality.
Initiatives aimed
at abolishing
the “border effect”
between European
member states would
have a significant
positive impact.
28. 26
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008
Valère Moutarlier, head of the
European Commission’s GMES Bureau
explains the security dimensions
of the GMES programme
GMES
CONTRIBUTION
TO SECURITY
ValèreMoutarlier
HeadoftheEuropeanCommission'sGMESBureau
ASD: Can you explain what GMES is
and what it will provide, in a nutshell?
V.Moutarlier:GMES (Global Monitoring
for Environment & Security) aims at
coordinatingexistingobservationsystems,
producing services of guaranteed vali-
dity and, crucially, ensuring their sus-
tainability. As many of these systems
already exist, GMES is meant to make
best use of the existing (civilian or dual)
capabilities, but also to develop new
systems filling the observation gaps.
The challenge for an operational serv-
ice is the guarantee of service provi-
sion at European level. This requires
homogeneity of the coverage (in par-
ticular in new member states), access
to data from non-European infrastruc-
ture for addressing global issues, and
harmonisation of technical standards
for data exchange.
Finally, efficient data management
and information sharing is a prerequi-
site for GMES services. In that respect,
the INSPIRE (Infrastructure for Spatial
Information in Europe) Directive will
contribute to facilitating access, use
and harmonisation of geospatial infor-
mation at a pan-European level.
What is the security dimension
of this programme and what is the
budget dedicated to this area?
GMES will ensure a continuous moni-
toring of the main Earth elements for
purposes mainly linked to environ-
mental policies but also to security
issues. For the latter, different imple-
mentationapproachesarerequiredand
different partners involved, i.e. the
Member States and the Council, as
well as their agencies and bodies, e.g.
EDA and EUSC.
For the development of the GMES
services security components, the
European Commission uses its R&D
programmes, and especially the FP7
Space thematic programme. For the
period 2007-2013 GMES will benefit
from about 85% of the FP7 Space
budget, which amounts to €1,2 billion.
Do you have some indication of the
industrial input of aerospace and
defence industries in this initiative?
For several years the EC and the Eu-
ropean Space Agency (ESA) have been
supporting projects aimed at integrat-
ing existing information systems for
security applications. Industry is
deeply involved in these projects,
which are the real test beds of GMES
service components. Successful re-
sults have been and are being achieved
through ESA or FP6 and now FP7 proj-
ects. These will now pave the way to
future GMES Services in the security
domain.1
1) For more information: www.gmes.info
Considering the increasing number
of risks and threats, how will the
GMES programme address security
concerns in the future?
The concept of security has evolved
since the end of the Cold War and the
term “security” is now used in a variety
of contexts. In its wider definition, se-
curity refers to combating all threats
that might affect our population, our
institutions, our environment, our in-
frastructure,oursocio-economicworld
etc. Many threats are man-made, but
the impact of major natural catastro-
phes should not be underestimated.
The memory of the Asian Tsunami of
December 2004 or the dramatic fires
in Greece during the summer of 2006
showed that the use of early warning
and crisis management tools for natu-
ral disasters is crucial.
A society that lives in, and takes for
granted a secure environment, de-
mands action from its authorities to
maintain this level of security, no mat-
ter what threats may arise in a chang-
ing world. In this environment, no
single country is able to tackle such
complex problems on its own. Through
its Earth observation operational
capability, GMES will contribute to the
answer given at the European level.
A continuous research effort (within
GMES and within the security research
in FP7) will also guarantee that serv-
ices are state-of-the-art.
29. 27
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008
GMES will ensure
a continuous monitoring
of Earth for purposes mainly
linked to environmental
policies but also
to security issues.
Could you give some examples
of how GMES has contributed
to the security field?
The security domains relevant to GMES
include: "Homeland" security address-
ing the security of the citizen and of in-
frastructures and utilities; Border and
"deep border" security including land
border security and maritime surveil-
lanceandsecurity;and"Global"security,
including global situation awareness
and EU external interventions.
For all these domains, observation in-
frastructure (especially through high
spatial resolution optical or radar in-
struments) and derived service com-
ponentscouldenablepatternrecognition
(e.g. detection of vessels, buildings,
vehicle) as well as mapping, e.g. refer-
encemapping,rapidmappinginsupport
to intervention or damage assessment
incaseofemergencyorcrisissituations.
These products should be combined or
merged with information derived from
othersystemssuchaspositioningones.
Moreover, this data and these products
should also be combined with other in-
formation provided by GMES, such as
land cover and use, sea state, air qual-
ity, as well as with information external
to GMES (e.g. meteorological fore-
casts, maps provided by National Map-
ping Agencies).
To what extent will GMES
contribute to building a significant
security capability in Europe?
Taking into account the particular ins-
titutional framework around security,
the work on the "S" part of GMES was
kickedoff with a seminar in Paris orga-
nised by the Institute for Security Stud-
ies (ISS) on 16 March 2007. The con-
clusion that was derived from this
seminar is clear: we need to work to-
gether among institutions and across
pillars, driven by operational security
needs and not hindered by administra-
tive procedures.
Through its security component, GMES
will contribute to existing and future
security activities in Europe. These ac-
tivities are undertaken by pan-Euro-
pean and national authorities which
have a specific mandate in this area. It
is hoped that by adding a European di-
mension and by reinforcing an appro-
priate Earth Observation capacity at
the service of these authorities, a truly
European capability in security will be
gradually built up. An European di-
mension also implies that synergies
between defence, security and civilian
needsandcapacitiesregardingobserva-
tion infrastructure and derived informa-
tion services should clearly be explored.
The Community Research
programme has set up GMOSS -
Global Monitoring for Stability and
Security. What is the purpose of
this project and how does it work?
GMOSS is a network of excellence
financed under the 6th EU Research
Framework Programme managed
by DG Enterprise and Industry. The
aim of GMOSS is to integrate Europe’s
civilian security research, through the
involvement of entities addressing
both technical and political issues,
in order to acquire and enrich the au-
tonomous knowledge and expertise
base of Europe needs, and to foster the
transfer of knowledge and methodolo-
gies to the service developers and op-
erators, including industry. In addition
to the security-dedicated FP6 and FP7
projects, GMOSS is an important pre-
cursor of the future GMES security
components.
Are you already working with future
end-users in the field of security?
The GMES Bureau is working both
within the EC and with the Council and
its agencies and bodies (such as EDA
and EUSC) in order to identify the
users' needs in the field of security.
In order to make sure that the invest-
ment that we are creating at the Euro-
pean level has the best added value, we
need to listen to all EU users. In this
context, existing forums of experts in
security are being screened and mo-
bilised in a phased approach. First,
GMES is presented to them; then they
are asked to reflect on what contribu-
tion GMES could bring to their activi-
ties; finally, their feedback is used
in order to shape the GMES service
requirements.
The GMES action plan runs from
2004 to 2008 and a first set
of operational GMES services
is scheduled for 2008. How far
has this programme progressed
and where are we now
in the agenda?
Since the Bureau was created, impor-
tant progress has been made towards
achieving key goals in 2008.
Through projects co-funded by the Eu-
ropean Framework Programme for
Research and Development, there have
been precursors for the first GMES
services that will be demonstrated this
year, covering marine, land and emer-
gency response.
In the last years, Expert User Groups
have prepared the ground for a defini-
tion of the scope and architecture of
the GMES operational services. They
have delivered strategic implementa-
tion plans which, following consulta-
tion with Member States and other
stakeholders, are now the main guide-
lines for validation of the first services
to start through FP7 projects. While
the current phase of moving towards
real services is of course an exciting
development, it is important to under-
stand that what we are preparing with
thefasttrackservicesisonlyafirststep.
Later on, these services will have to
evolve, and service evolution will also
be a function of evolving user needs.
Moreover, other services are following
a similar path and should become
available shortly after 2008. Work has
started for a GMES atmospheric serv-
ice, while, as already explained, the
Bureau is working with its Council
counterparts to define users’ needs in
the security field. In parallel, the Bu-
reau is progressing in defining with
stakeholders the overall architecture
for GMES and in preparing proposals
for GMES governance. So, when serv-
ices are ready to become operational,
the necessary financial and institu-
tional framework should be available.
I think the most challenging task for
the Commission in order to meet our
political commitment to establish an
autonomous and operational capability
is three-fold: to successfully validate
the first operational services; to en-
dorse a common programmatic vision
for GMES and to propose an institu-
tional framework for governance and
funding that enables this common vi-
sion to be operational and sustainable.
We are firmly committed to progress
onalltheseissuesinthecomingmonths.
30. 28
ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008
Kathleen Barthe of Airbus
explains how the Simplified Technical
English initiative is an essential
tool for aircraft manufacturers.
KathleenBarthe
FormerChairoftheASDSimplifiedTechnical
EnglishMaintenanceGroup
Airbus
ASD: STE is the acronym
of Simplified Technical English.
What is the purpose of this project?
K. Barthe: STE is a set of writing rules
and basic vocabulary for writing tech-
nical documentation. Why is it needed?
Well, aerospace technical documenta-
tion is provided in English. But it is read
by people in many countries, and by
people whose mother tongue is not
necessarilyEnglish.So,inorder to avoid
the risks that can arise due to misun-
derstandings, the documentation has
to be easy to understand for all users.
When was this
initiative launched and why?
It all started way back in 1979. You have
to remember that at that time, there
were far more aircraft manufacturers
than there are today, and although they
all wrote in English using the same ATA
Specification (known as ATA 100 at the
time), their writing styles were very dif-
ferent. There was documentation writ-
ten in American English (Boeing,
Douglas, Lockheed…),inBritishEnglish
(Hawker Siddeley, British Aircraft Cor-
poration) and by companies whose na-
tive language was not English (Fokker,
Aeritalia, and some of the companies
that formed Airbus at the time, for ex-
ample). On top of that, some European
airlines had to translate parts of their
maintenance documentation into their
local language so that their mechanics
could understand it.
This was a source of problems for the
European airline industry, and is what
led them to approach AECMA in 1979
to ask the manufacturers to investi-
gate the possibility of using a con-
trolled form of English – and of course,
for all manufacturers to use this same
form. After investigation into the types
of controlled languages that existed in
other industries, AECMA decided to
produce its own controlled English,
and in 1983, set up a project group,
under the leadership of Fokker.
The project was not limited to the Euro-
pean industry, however. The American
Aerospace industry, through the AIA
(Aerospace Industries Association
of America) was invited to participate,
especially as some AIA companies had
already done some standardization
along the same lines.
Is STE a new technical jargon
for a happy few?
On the contrary. STE is not a “technical
jargon”. It does not controlwhatwecall
“Technical Names” (for example,
words such as “bolt”, “grease”, and
“corrosion”),or“Technical Verbs” (such
as “drill”, “anneal”, and “upload”). It
will not tell you whether you should
use “landing gear” or “undercarriage”
to name the element that the aircraft
stands on when it’s on the ground.
That’s a question for each company
to decide. But it does tell you which
MAKING IT
SIMPLE
general words you can use, “general”
meaning words such as “disconnect”,
“hold”, and “sharp” – the sort of words
you need to have in order to make sen-
tences with the Technical Names and
Technical Verbs.
What criteria are used
in choosing words for STE?
The criteria used to choose these gen-
eral words were simplicity, flexibility
andfrequencyofuse.Forexample,“do”
issimpler,moreflexibleandmuchmore
frequent than “achieve”, “carry out”, or
“accomplish”.
In most cases, the general words that
are approved only have one approved
meaning and one part of speech. This
is to avoid misunderstandings. For ex-
ample “about” is only approved with
the meaning “concerned with”. You
cannot use it to mean “approximately”
or “around” (these words are them-
selves approved). “Check” is only ap-
proved as a noun (as in “do a check”),
not as a verb (as in “check the lights”).
So you will see that, as I explained
above, STE is designed to help authors
write in simple English, to make their
documentation understandable to as
many readers as possible.
