This document summarizes key issues regarding exclusionary business conduct under antitrust laws. It discusses the cost standards for predatory pricing claims, including debates around the Areeda-Turner test. It also analyzes recent cases on bundled discounts, loyalty pricing, and the implications of the Third Circuit's decision in ZF Meritor v. Eaton, which declined to apply a price-cost test to certain exclusive dealing arrangements. The document concludes that while the consensus view favors a price-cost test, there remains room for aggressive predatory pricing claims under Section 2, and the Supreme Court will likely extend the Brooke Group test to all price-related unilateral conduct claims.
1. robust exclusion and market division through loyalty discountsMatias González Muñoz
This document summarizes research on the effects of loyalty discounts in markets. It finds that loyalty discounts with buyer commitments can effectively divide markets and raise prices even if the discounts are above cost and cover less than half the market. This is because loyalty discounts create an externality where each buyer that accepts a discount softens competition and raises prices for all buyers. Loyalty discounts without commitments can also raise prices through similar mechanisms related to their impact on competition for free buyers. The key effects of loyalty discounts are to condition prices on purchase shares and commit sellers to charge loyal buyers less than non-loyal ones in a way that softens competition.
3. the areeda-turner test for exclusionary pricing. a critical journalMatias González Muñoz
This document summarizes critiques of the Areeda-Turner test for predatory pricing that was proposed in 1975 and widely adopted by courts. It discusses three main critiques: 1) average variable cost is a poor surrogate for short-run marginal cost in assessing below-cost pricing; 2) the test is underdeterrent in markets with high fixed costs; and 3) short-run measures fail to address strategic predatory pricing. It also outlines how the test has made it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to prove predatory pricing and analyzes subsequent efforts to address criticisms, with the test remaining very favorable to defendants.
This document summarizes a paper by Aghion and Bolton on entry-prevention contracts. The paper argues that exclusive contracts between sellers and buyers are designed to prevent entry from potential competitors and extract some of the surplus an entrant could gain. These contracts introduce social costs by blocking more efficient entrants from the market. The contracts specify liquidated damages that act as an entry fee, requiring entrants to lower prices enough to induce the buyer to switch and pay damages to the incumbent seller. While initially arguing long-term contracts are mutually beneficial, the paper finds empirical evidence shows contracts are actually short-term, and seeks to determine the optimal contract length from the perspective of minimizing social costs from entry prevention.
Eco 550 final exam 36 questions with correct answersProfessorLance
This document provides 36 multiple choice questions about economics and finance concepts along with their correct answers. The questions cover topics such as cost functions, survivorship analysis, breakeven analysis, price discrimination, game theory, contract theory, capital budgeting, and weighted average cost of capital.
Eco 550 final exam 116 questions with answers 100% correctProfessorLance
This document provides 116 questions and answers related to an ECO 550 final exam. It covers a range of economics topics including cost functions, survivorship analysis, breakeven analysis, market structures, game theory, and more. The questions are multiple choice and include the question, possible answers, and the identified correct answer. This resource could be useful for studying for an exam in economics or business at the intermediate microeconomics level.
We extend the Ståhl-Rubinstein alternating-offer bargaining procedure to allow players, prior to each bargaining round, to simultaneously and visibly commit to some share of the pie. If commitment costs are small but increasing in the committed share, then the unique outcome consistent with common belief in future rationality (Perea, 2010), or more restrictively subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, exhibits a second mover advantage. In particular, as the smallest share of the pie approaches zero, the horizon approaches infinity, and commitment costs approach zero, the unique bargaining outcome corresponds to the reversed Rubinstein outcome (d =(1 + d); 1=(1 + d)), where d is the common discount factor.
Is the Concepcion Case a Pandora's Box for Class Arbitration?Shahram Shirkhani
Class arbitration is when a group of plaintiffs join together as claimants against an entity. This will happen more commonly when a group of consumers is affected by a defective product that may cause some type of loss to an individual. Know the Concepcion Case.
1. robust exclusion and market division through loyalty discountsMatias González Muñoz
This document summarizes research on the effects of loyalty discounts in markets. It finds that loyalty discounts with buyer commitments can effectively divide markets and raise prices even if the discounts are above cost and cover less than half the market. This is because loyalty discounts create an externality where each buyer that accepts a discount softens competition and raises prices for all buyers. Loyalty discounts without commitments can also raise prices through similar mechanisms related to their impact on competition for free buyers. The key effects of loyalty discounts are to condition prices on purchase shares and commit sellers to charge loyal buyers less than non-loyal ones in a way that softens competition.
3. the areeda-turner test for exclusionary pricing. a critical journalMatias González Muñoz
This document summarizes critiques of the Areeda-Turner test for predatory pricing that was proposed in 1975 and widely adopted by courts. It discusses three main critiques: 1) average variable cost is a poor surrogate for short-run marginal cost in assessing below-cost pricing; 2) the test is underdeterrent in markets with high fixed costs; and 3) short-run measures fail to address strategic predatory pricing. It also outlines how the test has made it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to prove predatory pricing and analyzes subsequent efforts to address criticisms, with the test remaining very favorable to defendants.
This document summarizes a paper by Aghion and Bolton on entry-prevention contracts. The paper argues that exclusive contracts between sellers and buyers are designed to prevent entry from potential competitors and extract some of the surplus an entrant could gain. These contracts introduce social costs by blocking more efficient entrants from the market. The contracts specify liquidated damages that act as an entry fee, requiring entrants to lower prices enough to induce the buyer to switch and pay damages to the incumbent seller. While initially arguing long-term contracts are mutually beneficial, the paper finds empirical evidence shows contracts are actually short-term, and seeks to determine the optimal contract length from the perspective of minimizing social costs from entry prevention.
Eco 550 final exam 36 questions with correct answersProfessorLance
This document provides 36 multiple choice questions about economics and finance concepts along with their correct answers. The questions cover topics such as cost functions, survivorship analysis, breakeven analysis, price discrimination, game theory, contract theory, capital budgeting, and weighted average cost of capital.
Eco 550 final exam 116 questions with answers 100% correctProfessorLance
This document provides 116 questions and answers related to an ECO 550 final exam. It covers a range of economics topics including cost functions, survivorship analysis, breakeven analysis, market structures, game theory, and more. The questions are multiple choice and include the question, possible answers, and the identified correct answer. This resource could be useful for studying for an exam in economics or business at the intermediate microeconomics level.
We extend the Ståhl-Rubinstein alternating-offer bargaining procedure to allow players, prior to each bargaining round, to simultaneously and visibly commit to some share of the pie. If commitment costs are small but increasing in the committed share, then the unique outcome consistent with common belief in future rationality (Perea, 2010), or more restrictively subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, exhibits a second mover advantage. In particular, as the smallest share of the pie approaches zero, the horizon approaches infinity, and commitment costs approach zero, the unique bargaining outcome corresponds to the reversed Rubinstein outcome (d =(1 + d); 1=(1 + d)), where d is the common discount factor.
Is the Concepcion Case a Pandora's Box for Class Arbitration?Shahram Shirkhani
Class arbitration is when a group of plaintiffs join together as claimants against an entity. This will happen more commonly when a group of consumers is affected by a defective product that may cause some type of loss to an individual. Know the Concepcion Case.
Cloud security deep dive infoworld jan 2011Kim Jensen
This document provides an overview of cloud security and how it differs from traditional security models. Some key points:
- Cloud computing introduces new security challenges due to its reliance on sharing resources over the internet, like computing power and storage.
- There are different cloud computing models including Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS).
- Cloud computing is defined by traits like internet accessibility, scalability, multitenancy, broad authentication, usage-based pricing, and lack of location specificity. These traits increase security risks.
- Multitenancy, where multiple users share the same cloud resources, introduces the risk of unint
Rain Garden Construction from Frazee Gardens (April 23, 2011)Tom Barrett
Frazee Gardens is located at 3480 North State Road 267 in Brownsburg, Indiana and can be contacted at 317-858-8440 or www.frazeegardens.net. They specialize in rain garden construction.
Examination of the need for a divestiture remedy in the United States v. Microsoft antitrust case, contrasting the intrusive enforcement effects of a conduct-oriented injunction with what the Supreme Court has called the “surer, cleaner remedy” of a structural break-up. Delivered at Ralph Nader’s Which Remedies?: Appraising Microsoft II conference, this call for restructuring Microsoft into so-called “Baby Bills” followed from my February 1999 White Paper on Microsoft remedy issues for the Software & Information Industry Association. April 1999
This document discusses patents and standards setting organizations. It notes that while a patent alone does not necessarily confer market power, patents incorporated into standards can augment market power. It outlines procedural constraints that courts have applied to standards development organizations to substitute for an antitrust merits examination. It also discusses the "fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory" (FRAND) licensing requirement of most SSOs and debates the legal sources and implications of this requirement. Finally, it provides practical advice to IP holders on SSO participation and notes open legal questions around unilateral refusals to license and the imposition of maximum license prices.
Brave New Worlds Growing Sales In A Down EconomyTom Barrett
Despite challenging economic conditions, some companies are growing their sales. This presentation demonstrates how to use this period of economic uncertainty to gain market share and redefine your business.
Trends in the Landscape Industry (ITODA)Tom Barrett
The current state and trends of the Landscape, golf Course, and Sports Turf Industry. How we stand out, where we rank, and how we are heard. You will be challenged in this provocative and sometimes controversial presentation to do things differently. Tom Barrett is a national speaker and author. His presentations empower people to become masters of change. Learn how to grow your business without busting the bank. Here are the key points:
- Business is rapidly changing
- Opportunities exist in areas unavailable five years ago
- Customers have different needs and require a new approach
- Companies investing in marketing are growing
OpenDNS is a DNS service that aims to make the internet safer, faster, smarter and more reliable. It was founded in 2005 and now has over 30 million active users, processing half a million queries per second and answering 30 billion DNS queries daily. OpenDNS provides content filtering, phishing and malware protection to households, schools and businesses. It translates domain names to IP addresses faster than other DNS services, improving internet speed and reliability.
This document provides predictions for security issues in 2016 from Forcepoint Security Labs. It predicts that the 2016 U.S. elections will drive significant cyberattacks themed around the elections, with hackers using social media and websites to spread misinformation. It also predicts that new mobile wallet and payment technologies will introduce opportunities for credit card theft and fraud. Finally, it predicts that the addition of new generic top-level domains will provide new opportunities for cybercriminals to use domain names for social engineering and malware attacks.
8. the appropriate legal standard and sufficient economic evidence for exclu...Matias González Muñoz
This document summarizes a paper analyzing the legal standard and economic evidence used in the FTC's case against McWane regarding exclusive dealing. It discusses the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Wright, who argued for a heightened legal standard requiring "clear evidence" of harm to competition. The authors argue this standard is too high and could lead to under-enforcement. They also analyze the economic theories of harm from exclusive dealing and the evidence presented in the case. The authors conclude Commissioner Wright's proposed standard is not appropriate and would weaken antitrust enforcement.
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LOYALTY DISCOUNTS AND REBATES AND THE ECONOMIC AND LEG...Luciana Ramondetti
This document provides an economic analysis of loyalty discounts and rebates. It begins with an introduction to different types of loyalty discounts, including fidelity rebates, target rebates, and bundle rebates. It then discusses recent legal cases involving loyalty discounts in both European and US competition law. The document analyzes the economic and legal implications of loyalty discounts, including potential anticompetitive effects like foreclosure of competition. It also considers potential procompetitive efficiencies. Finally, it examines alternative legal tests that have been used in Europe and the US to assess the legality of loyalty discount schemes.
The document summarizes an antitrust case between Conwood Company and United States Tobacco Company. Conwood alleged that USTC used monopolistic practices like exclusive deals and manipulating product placement to weaken competition. While USTC's actions increased profits, Conwood argued it harmed consumers and competition. USTC claimed its actions were just competitive strategies and didn't substantially lessen competition. The ruling found that USTC violated antitrust laws through monopolization and attempts to exclude rivals from the moist snuff market.
Patent Settlements as an endangered species: DG Comp’s latest Monitoring Exer...C5Live
On 9 December 2013, DG Comp published its fourth report on the monitoring in Europe of patent settlements. Like its predecessors, the report welcomes the continuously low level of settlements that may give rise to antitrust concerns and trumpets that the overall number of settlements has increased, which it says demonstrates that criticisms of DG Comp’s enforcement policy against patent settlements are unfounded.
This document provides an introduction and overview of price discrimination. It discusses three main reasons why competition policy may be concerned with price discrimination: 1) it can exploit consumers if used by a dominant firm, 2) it can prevent a single market from forming across regions, and 3) it can be used to exclude actual or potential rivals. The document outlines different forms of price discrimination, including third-degree, first-degree, quantity discounts, and bundling discounts. It aims to explain the economic motives for price discrimination and when it has adverse or beneficial effects on consumers, rivals, and welfare.
The document summarizes key concepts and provisions of US antitrust laws, including the Sherman Act and Clayton Act. It discusses prohibited activities like price fixing, monopolization, and mergers. It also outlines enforcement agencies and private rights of action under antitrust laws, as well as statutory exemptions.
This document provides an overview of the key elements relevant to analyzing and measuring economic damages in a judicial action. It discusses the goals of economic damages awards to compensate the damaged party and deter wrongful acts. It then covers various legal standards like causation, certainty, and mitigation. It also defines the types of courts, claims, and remedies involved in a judicial action. The document aims to help damages analysts understand the legal context and select appropriate damages measurement methods.
This document provides an overview of the key elements relevant to analyzing and measuring economic damages in a judicial action. It discusses the goals of economic damages awards to compensate the damaged party and deter wrongful acts. It then covers various legal standards like causation, certainty, and mitigation. It also defines the types of courts, claims, and remedies involved in a judicial action. The document aims to help damages analysts understand the legal context and select appropriate damages measurement methods.
Do arbitration clauses lead to lower prices for consumers?ArpitaGupta92
Arbitration is a mechanism of dispute resolution between the parties to a contract who voluntarily agree to submit their claims to a neutral third party. #PrivateCourt provides claim settlement which is benefitial to resolve the legal issues faced by the SMEs and freelancers.
This presentation by Robert Porter (Professor of Economics, Northwestern University, US) was made during a workshop on “Cartel screening in the digital era” held by the OECD in Paris on 30 January 2018. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at oe.cd/wcsde.
RESEARCH Opinion - Predatory Pricing - Shourya BariShourya Bari
The document discusses predatory pricing and establishes cause of action against a respondent. It analyzes several factors:
1) The respondent quoted an unrealistically low price to gain entry into the market for supplying wagons to Indian Railways, indicating possible predatory pricing.
2) Two tests for predatory pricing are examined - pricing below cost and the ability to recoup losses through later monopoly profits. Barriers to entry and market share trends are also considered.
3) The appropriate measure of cost is analyzed, including average variable cost, average avoidable cost, and long-run average incremental cost.
Cloud security deep dive infoworld jan 2011Kim Jensen
This document provides an overview of cloud security and how it differs from traditional security models. Some key points:
- Cloud computing introduces new security challenges due to its reliance on sharing resources over the internet, like computing power and storage.
- There are different cloud computing models including Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS).
- Cloud computing is defined by traits like internet accessibility, scalability, multitenancy, broad authentication, usage-based pricing, and lack of location specificity. These traits increase security risks.
- Multitenancy, where multiple users share the same cloud resources, introduces the risk of unint
Rain Garden Construction from Frazee Gardens (April 23, 2011)Tom Barrett
Frazee Gardens is located at 3480 North State Road 267 in Brownsburg, Indiana and can be contacted at 317-858-8440 or www.frazeegardens.net. They specialize in rain garden construction.
Examination of the need for a divestiture remedy in the United States v. Microsoft antitrust case, contrasting the intrusive enforcement effects of a conduct-oriented injunction with what the Supreme Court has called the “surer, cleaner remedy” of a structural break-up. Delivered at Ralph Nader’s Which Remedies?: Appraising Microsoft II conference, this call for restructuring Microsoft into so-called “Baby Bills” followed from my February 1999 White Paper on Microsoft remedy issues for the Software & Information Industry Association. April 1999
This document discusses patents and standards setting organizations. It notes that while a patent alone does not necessarily confer market power, patents incorporated into standards can augment market power. It outlines procedural constraints that courts have applied to standards development organizations to substitute for an antitrust merits examination. It also discusses the "fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory" (FRAND) licensing requirement of most SSOs and debates the legal sources and implications of this requirement. Finally, it provides practical advice to IP holders on SSO participation and notes open legal questions around unilateral refusals to license and the imposition of maximum license prices.
Brave New Worlds Growing Sales In A Down EconomyTom Barrett
Despite challenging economic conditions, some companies are growing their sales. This presentation demonstrates how to use this period of economic uncertainty to gain market share and redefine your business.
Trends in the Landscape Industry (ITODA)Tom Barrett
The current state and trends of the Landscape, golf Course, and Sports Turf Industry. How we stand out, where we rank, and how we are heard. You will be challenged in this provocative and sometimes controversial presentation to do things differently. Tom Barrett is a national speaker and author. His presentations empower people to become masters of change. Learn how to grow your business without busting the bank. Here are the key points:
- Business is rapidly changing
- Opportunities exist in areas unavailable five years ago
- Customers have different needs and require a new approach
- Companies investing in marketing are growing
OpenDNS is a DNS service that aims to make the internet safer, faster, smarter and more reliable. It was founded in 2005 and now has over 30 million active users, processing half a million queries per second and answering 30 billion DNS queries daily. OpenDNS provides content filtering, phishing and malware protection to households, schools and businesses. It translates domain names to IP addresses faster than other DNS services, improving internet speed and reliability.
This document provides predictions for security issues in 2016 from Forcepoint Security Labs. It predicts that the 2016 U.S. elections will drive significant cyberattacks themed around the elections, with hackers using social media and websites to spread misinformation. It also predicts that new mobile wallet and payment technologies will introduce opportunities for credit card theft and fraud. Finally, it predicts that the addition of new generic top-level domains will provide new opportunities for cybercriminals to use domain names for social engineering and malware attacks.
8. the appropriate legal standard and sufficient economic evidence for exclu...Matias González Muñoz
This document summarizes a paper analyzing the legal standard and economic evidence used in the FTC's case against McWane regarding exclusive dealing. It discusses the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Wright, who argued for a heightened legal standard requiring "clear evidence" of harm to competition. The authors argue this standard is too high and could lead to under-enforcement. They also analyze the economic theories of harm from exclusive dealing and the evidence presented in the case. The authors conclude Commissioner Wright's proposed standard is not appropriate and would weaken antitrust enforcement.
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LOYALTY DISCOUNTS AND REBATES AND THE ECONOMIC AND LEG...Luciana Ramondetti
This document provides an economic analysis of loyalty discounts and rebates. It begins with an introduction to different types of loyalty discounts, including fidelity rebates, target rebates, and bundle rebates. It then discusses recent legal cases involving loyalty discounts in both European and US competition law. The document analyzes the economic and legal implications of loyalty discounts, including potential anticompetitive effects like foreclosure of competition. It also considers potential procompetitive efficiencies. Finally, it examines alternative legal tests that have been used in Europe and the US to assess the legality of loyalty discount schemes.
The document summarizes an antitrust case between Conwood Company and United States Tobacco Company. Conwood alleged that USTC used monopolistic practices like exclusive deals and manipulating product placement to weaken competition. While USTC's actions increased profits, Conwood argued it harmed consumers and competition. USTC claimed its actions were just competitive strategies and didn't substantially lessen competition. The ruling found that USTC violated antitrust laws through monopolization and attempts to exclude rivals from the moist snuff market.
Patent Settlements as an endangered species: DG Comp’s latest Monitoring Exer...C5Live
On 9 December 2013, DG Comp published its fourth report on the monitoring in Europe of patent settlements. Like its predecessors, the report welcomes the continuously low level of settlements that may give rise to antitrust concerns and trumpets that the overall number of settlements has increased, which it says demonstrates that criticisms of DG Comp’s enforcement policy against patent settlements are unfounded.
This document provides an introduction and overview of price discrimination. It discusses three main reasons why competition policy may be concerned with price discrimination: 1) it can exploit consumers if used by a dominant firm, 2) it can prevent a single market from forming across regions, and 3) it can be used to exclude actual or potential rivals. The document outlines different forms of price discrimination, including third-degree, first-degree, quantity discounts, and bundling discounts. It aims to explain the economic motives for price discrimination and when it has adverse or beneficial effects on consumers, rivals, and welfare.
The document summarizes key concepts and provisions of US antitrust laws, including the Sherman Act and Clayton Act. It discusses prohibited activities like price fixing, monopolization, and mergers. It also outlines enforcement agencies and private rights of action under antitrust laws, as well as statutory exemptions.
This document provides an overview of the key elements relevant to analyzing and measuring economic damages in a judicial action. It discusses the goals of economic damages awards to compensate the damaged party and deter wrongful acts. It then covers various legal standards like causation, certainty, and mitigation. It also defines the types of courts, claims, and remedies involved in a judicial action. The document aims to help damages analysts understand the legal context and select appropriate damages measurement methods.
This document provides an overview of the key elements relevant to analyzing and measuring economic damages in a judicial action. It discusses the goals of economic damages awards to compensate the damaged party and deter wrongful acts. It then covers various legal standards like causation, certainty, and mitigation. It also defines the types of courts, claims, and remedies involved in a judicial action. The document aims to help damages analysts understand the legal context and select appropriate damages measurement methods.
Do arbitration clauses lead to lower prices for consumers?ArpitaGupta92
Arbitration is a mechanism of dispute resolution between the parties to a contract who voluntarily agree to submit their claims to a neutral third party. #PrivateCourt provides claim settlement which is benefitial to resolve the legal issues faced by the SMEs and freelancers.
This presentation by Robert Porter (Professor of Economics, Northwestern University, US) was made during a workshop on “Cartel screening in the digital era” held by the OECD in Paris on 30 January 2018. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at oe.cd/wcsde.
RESEARCH Opinion - Predatory Pricing - Shourya BariShourya Bari
The document discusses predatory pricing and establishes cause of action against a respondent. It analyzes several factors:
1) The respondent quoted an unrealistically low price to gain entry into the market for supplying wagons to Indian Railways, indicating possible predatory pricing.
2) Two tests for predatory pricing are examined - pricing below cost and the ability to recoup losses through later monopoly profits. Barriers to entry and market share trends are also considered.
3) The appropriate measure of cost is analyzed, including average variable cost, average avoidable cost, and long-run average incremental cost.
Morse Slides For Conference Board Merger Integration Program June 25, 2009morsemh
Slides presented to the Conference Board 2009 Post-Merger Integration Conference, Getting Past the Antitrust Hurdle, What has Changed? What is the Same? June 25, 2009, San Francisco, CA
Competition law prohibits agreements and practices that restrict competition in the marketplace. This includes per se offenses like price fixing, output restrictions, and market allocation. Competition authorities analyze other agreements under the rule of reason, weighing the pro-competitive effects against anti-competitive effects. Unlawful monopolization involves the willful acquisition or maintenance of market power through predatory or anticompetitive conduct. Horizontal agreements between competitors are more likely to restrict competition than vertical agreements between companies at different stages of production.
The document provides an overview of antitrust laws and prohibited activities from a credit management perspective. It discusses that while antitrust laws can be complex, the basic principles in a credit context are straightforward. It outlines activities like price fixing, bid rigging and exchanges of price information that are prohibited. It also addresses if different credit terms could constitute illegal price discrimination and how credit groups can operate legally.
Sangyun Lee, ‘Abuse of Economic Dependence in Competition Law From a Comparat...Sangyun Lee
Presentation slides prepared for the 2021 ASOCLA Asia regional session. I sincerely thank the seminar participants for their comments on my research. Special thanks go to Prof. Thomas K. Cheng and Prof. Masako Wakui, for organizing this seminar and giving me an invaluable opportunity to share my research findings and further develop and elaborate ideas. Please note that this research, as part of my Ph.D. research, is still in progress and has yet reached any definitive conclusion. When you want to use any contents included in this document, please reference this document with citation as follows: Sangyun Lee, ‘Abuse of Economic Dependence in Competition Law From a Comparative Perspective’ (ASCOLA Asia Regional Workshop 2022, Jan 5, 2022). Any comments, of course, are more than welcome and much appreciated. sangyunl@korea.ac.kr
This document discusses cross-subsidization in regulated industries. It begins by providing context on the topic, noting a 1975 paper that was influential in establishing definitions and analyzing various aspects of cross-subsidies. The document then examines conditions that facilitate cross-subsidization, particularly regulated monopolies. It identifies incentives regulators and regulated firms have to allow cross-subsidies. Next, the document outlines two common tests - stand-alone cost and incremental cost tests - used to identify cross-subsidized prices. It concludes by discussing some inefficient consequences of cross-subsidization, including unfairness to consumers, allocative inefficiency in regulated markets, and potential productive inefficiency in unregulated markets.
Omissions and commissions hood and lee - 02 28 14Paul Hood
This document discusses common issues seen in business valuation reports and expert testimony that have been criticized by courts. It summarizes quotes from several court cases that highlight problems such as: failing to adequately consider the perspectives of both a willing buyer and willing seller; ignoring the hypothetical nature of the willing parties; insufficient due diligence in investigating the company; and not conducting a site visit or interviewing key management. The document stresses the importance of balancing the interests of buyers and sellers, maintaining the hypothetical standard, thoroughly detailing due diligence efforts, and properly disclosing steps such as site visits and interviews.
Why is Antitrust activity so harmful to consumers and the economy W.pdffeelingspaldi
Why is Antitrust activity so harmful to consumers and the economy? What, if anything, can
consumers, competitors, or or the government due to prevent or detect this activity?
Solution
Answer:-
Before Understanding the Antitrust Activity let us understand what is \"Antitrust law\" this will
give you true picture of antitrust activites and how they are harmful to consumers.
Antitrust laws, also referred to as \"competition laws,\" are statutes developed by the U.S.
Government to protect consumers from predatory business practices by ensuring that fair
competition exists in an open-market.economy.
Some of Antitrust Activites are :- Causing un fair competition in economy using following
activites
1.Market Allocation
2.Bid Rigging
3.Price Fixing
4.Monopolies
5.Mergers and Acquisitions.
In short, They prohibit a variety of practices that restrain trade. Examples of illegal practices are
price-fixing conspiracies, corporate mergers likely to reduce the competitive vigor of particular
markets, and predatory acts designed to achieve or maintain monopoly power.
All such activities will eliminated healthy competition out of the market and will give rise to
unsatisfactory prices, price discriminations , excess increase in prices over a period of time,
creation of monopoly.
this will affect the consumer badly and create a disturbed trade environment in the country.
2.How to prevent or detect these activites ?
Answer:-
FEMA and state and local government agencies with whom FEMA is coordinating begin to
solicit competitive bids for rebuilding contracts, the Antitrust Division is prepared to provide
assistance to these agencies to protect against bid rigging, price fixing and other collusive
conduct among companies competing for rebuilding contracts.
Price fixing, bid rigging, and other collusive agreements can be established either by direct
evidence, such as the testimony of a participant, or by circumstantial evidence, such as
suspicious bid patterns, travel and expense reports, telephone records, and business diary entries.
If a Consumer . Competitior or Government have these kind of evidence in possession with them
, they can deliver these to FEMA and state and local government agencies to prevent such
antitrust activites .
Now Let us understand how to detect them:-
1. Market Allocation :-
In this scheme, co-conspirators agree to divide up customers or geographic areas. The result is
that the coconspirators will not bid or will submit only complementary bids when a solicitation
for bids is made by a customer or in an area not assigned to them. This scheme is most
commonly found in the service sector and may involve quoted prices for services as opposed to
bids.
2. Bid Rigging:-
In this type of scheme, one or more competitors agree not to bid, or withdraw a previously
submitted bid, so that a designated bidder will win. In return, the non-bidder may receive a
subcontract or payoff.
3. Price Fixing:-
Price Fixing impacts procurement when business is condu.
Competition policy, cartel enforcement and leniency programDr Danilo Samà
Competition policy, cartel enforcement and leniency program
Author:
Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University)
Abstract:
The present assessment focuses on the antitrust action in detecting and fighting oligopolistic collusion, analyzing the development of the innovative and modern leniency policy. Following the examination of the main conditions and reasons for cartel stability and sustainability, our attempt is to comprehend under which circumstances leniency program represents a functional and successful tool for preventing the formation of anti-competitive agreements.
Keywords:
cartels enforcement, competition policy, game theory, leniency program, oligopolistic markets
JEL classification:
C70; K21; L13
Year:
2008
Pages:
1-12
Citation:
Samà, Danilo (2008), Competition policy, cartel enforcement and leniency program, LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Rome, Italy, pp. 1-12.
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Appellate brief for petitioners challenging FCC's decision to effectively eliminate low-power television as part of the agency's ongoing incentive spectrum auction.
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This document is an emergency motion filed with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit requesting a stay of FCC administrative proceedings related to the nation's first incentive spectrum auction pending appellate review. The motion argues that petitioners are likely to prevail on the merits of their legal challenge, that they will face irreparable harm without a stay, and that a stay is in the public interest. The motion seeks to stay implementation of FCC orders governing the incentive auction, including the reverse auction scheduled to begin on March 29, 2016, until the court can fully review two related cases.
Statz, Inc. Privacy Comments (FTC Feb. 2011)Glenn Manishin
The document provides comments from Statz, Inc. in response to a preliminary FTC staff report on protecting consumer privacy. Statz commends the FTC for its forward-looking effort to adapt privacy policies to the current commercial environment. However, Statz argues that the FTC should move beyond transparency and focus on identifying companies that collect and sell consumer data without consent and compensation, as consumer data ownership is a fundamental right. Statz is developing a marketplace that will allow consumers to control their data and participate in its monetization through explicit consent and consideration.
The document provides comments from Statz, Inc. in response to a preliminary FTC staff report on protecting consumer privacy. Statz commends the FTC for its forward-looking effort to adapt privacy policies to the current commercial environment. However, Statz argues that the FTC should move beyond transparency and focus on identifying companies that collect and sell consumer data without consent and compensation, as consumer data ownership is a fundamental right. Statz is developing a marketplace that will allow consumers to control their data and participate in its monetization through explicit consent and consideration.
Net Neutrality & Broadband "Reclassification"Glenn Manishin
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The Politics of Bandwidth: Convergence, Globalization and the Future of Telec...Glenn Manishin
As communications networks produce more and more bandwidth, traditional regulatory classifications and policies no longer work well. This presentation to the United States Telecom Association explored the influence of bandwidth from a political, legislative and public policy perspective. It assessed the impact of concentration, interconnection and federal policies — and the continued failure to modify legacy rules — on competition, consumer welfare and United States global leadership in the communications space. September 2000.
This document discusses the uncharted legal issues surrounding social media and provides guidance on how to navigate related legal risks. It notes that while there is no comprehensive "law of social media," traditional common law and statutory principles are being adapted to new media. Some of the major legal topics covered include intellectual property issues around user-generated content, how social media impacts employment law and privacy, and the regulatory compliance concerns for different industries. The document advocates for clear social media policies, transparency, employee training, and a proactive approach to managing legal risks on social platforms.
This document summarizes legal issues and regulations around behavioral advertising, including in the United States, Europe, and the United Kingdom. In the US, the FTC regulates privacy policies and endorsement guidelines without comprehensive rules. Europe passed a new directive in 2009 requiring informed consent rather than just opt-out for behavioral ads. The UK has multiple regulators looking at the issue, and the ICO recently proposed a new code of practice focusing on transparency of behind-the-scenes processing and simple ways to disable behavioral ads.
The document summarizes a panel discussion on surviving and prospering in a hostile antitrust market and judicial environment. The panelists discussed topics such as price squeeze claims, standards and antitrust issues, VoIP and broadband antitrust concerns, and related antitrust litigation strategies. Some key unanswered questions were also presented, such as whether successful price squeeze claims can be proven in trials, and if anticompetitive behavior in digital content distribution will face regulatory constraints.
1. Glenn B. Manishin
Troutman Sanders LLP
http://law.manishin.com
Strafford Publications
Exclusionary Business Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws
December 18, 2012
2. Predation, Areeda-Turner and Matsushita
Cost standards, Linkline and “recoupment”
Two wrongs do not make right
Discounting, rebates and loyalty pricing
A ZF Meritor revolution?
Why pricing still matters
Conclusions
3. Pricing and “costing” are gateway issues for
unilateral Section 2 predation claims
Prices must be below some relevant measure of
costs (Brooke Group)
Correct economic standard has beguiled courts since
seminal Harv. L. Rev. “AVC” (incremental) proposal
Supreme Court has bypassed opportunities to clarify
standard and resolve circuit splits
Under Matsushita, predation is “rarely tried, and
even more rarely successful”
Inherent policy tension between price cutting and
putative monopolization liability
4. Pre-Matsushita, 9th Circuit prominently rejected AVC
screen (Inglis)
Brooke settled elements — below-cost prices and
likelihood of recoupment — but refused to specify
cost standard
Recoupment requires added Section 2 showing that
exclusionary conduct will be profitable
After Brooke, 90%+ predation cases resolved for Ds under
Rule 56
Linkline jettisoned “end run” of price squeeze theory
for dual-distribution defendants
No viable price squeeze claim when there is no duty to
deal at wholesale level and price to retailers is > cost
5. “Trinko holds that a defendant with no antitrust duty to deal with its rivals has
no duty to deal under the terms and conditions preferred by those rivals.
Brooke Group holds that low prices are only actionable under the Sherman Act
when the prices are below cost and there is a dangerous probability that the
predator will be able to recoup the profits it loses from the low prices.
“In this case, plaintiffs have not stated a duty-to-deal claim under Trinko and
have not stated a predatory pricing claim under Brooke Group. They have
nonetheless tried to join a wholesale claim that cannot succeed with a retail
claim that cannot succeed, and alchemize them into a new form of antitrust
liability never before recognized by this Court. We decline the invitation to
recognize such claims. Two wrong claims do not make one that is right.”
6. DOJ Section 2 Report Compare SmithKline
(2008) = even though (1978) with Ortho
bundled discounts Diagnostic
typically result in lower (1996), LePage’s Inc.
consumer prices, they (2003) and PeaceHealth
“may nonetheless harm (2008)
competition in some Widely criticized for
circumstances” providing inadequate
guidance to market
“Discount attribution
rule” of PeaceHealth
applied in 2011 DOJ
settlement
7. Third Circuit 2-1 decision (2012) affirmed jury verdict that D’s
market-share discounts were unlawful “de facto partial
exclusive” dealing although prices always > cost
Meritor declined to apply price-cost test to exclusive dealing
unless “price is the clearly predominant mechanism of
exclusion”
Overruled LaPage’s for market-share or volume rebates offered by
suppliers within a single-product market
Recognizes “safe harbor for above-cost discounting” w/r/t predatory
pricing involving a single product under Brooke
Vigorous and vituperative dissent suggests other circuits will
examine closely
Supreme Court’s two decade unwillingness to take up purely
unilateral predation case portends continued viability of
Section 2 (non-price) claims not alleging below-cost pricing
8. Modern consensus economic view that predatory
pricing can be successful business strategy, but courts
rely on earlier theory
Meritor shows that pricing can be separated from non-
price exclusion without “monopoly broth” objection
Lower courts remain conscious that AVC is short-
run, static test, thus continue to temporize on cost
standard
Current literature suggests emerging trend
recognizing “efficient” price predation which may
allow price-based Section 2 claims through the cracks
9. Legal advocacy favors price-cost test due to SJ
potential and economically conservative bench
Despite Linkline and Brooke, still room for
aggressive and thoughtful P claims
Given politicization of Section 2
enforcement, government complaint to settle
price-cost applicability quite unlikely
Over the long term, apparent that Supreme
Court will apply Brooke to all price-related
unilateral conduct claims due to perceived risk of
false positives
Another 35+ years before resolution?
Editor's Notes
Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975)Impact of Matsushita extends far beyond specific S.J. and collusion issues presentedConcern with false positives and high cost of incorrect intervention led to parallel dicta demoting impact of economically implausible inferences“With a perfect test for predation, we would not need to worry whether predation is rare or about the cost of confusing competition with predation. When predation occurs, it would be punished. Absent such a test, however, the legal standard should rationally take account both of the relative frequency of anticompetitive price reductions (compared with those that are just good, clean competition) as well as the cost of falsely labeling a competitive price cut as predatory.”Michael Salinger (FTC Bureau of Econ,.), The Legacy of Matsushita: Has this Thing Called Economics Gotten Way out of Hand? (2006)
Inglis v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981) Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 509 U.S. 209 (1993)Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009)Courts declined to adopt a per se rule, and instead augmented the Areeda-Turner formulation with other factors, which included cost-based presumptions,intent and market structure. While there were variations between judicial circuits, most commonly courts held that a price below average variable cost was presumptively unlawful, while a price above average total cost was conclusively lawful. A price falling between these two cost benchmarks was presumptively lawful, but the presumption could be rebutted by evidence of intent and market structure.The Brooke decision established a new framework for predatory pricing analysis. While elements of the new analysis were anticipated in two earlier Supreme Court decisions, Brooke melded them into a more fully articulated judicial policy. The Court’s exacting requirements of proof appear to be driven partly by the assumption that predatory pricing rarely occurs and partly by its skepticism toward predation by tacit coordination among rival firms, despite proof that Brown & Williamson held price < AVC fo4r 18 mos. after entry of “generic” manufacturer.The Court applied an exacting standard of proof to the specific evidence offered in the case. The facts in Brooke were unusual in that the alleged predator was not a single dominant firm, but a relatively small cigarette manufacturer holding only 12 percent of the total market, although the market itself was highly concentrated. Predation could occur only through the joint action of the leading firms engaged in oligopolistic price coordination. As no explicit agreement was alleged, the joint action necessarily rested on tacit coordination—a predatory theory the Court thought highly problematic, especially in the factual context of the case.Brooke held that summary disposition is appropriate where the market structure is unconcentrated, entry barriers are low or the defendant lacks excess capacity. See 509 U.S. at 209. To this list some lower courts have added a requirement that rivals should not be able to expand output. See Rebel Oil Co., Inc., v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995), cert denied, 516 U.S. 987 (1995) (existing rivals lack capacity to increase output in short run)
SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 427 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff’d, 575 F.2d1056 (3d Cir. 1978)Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. , 920 F. Supp. 455, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).“Whether a firm that enjoys a monopoly on one or more of a group of complementary products, but which faces competition on others, can price all of its products above average variable cost and yet still drive an equally efficient competitor out of the market.”In each of these cases, the court analyzed the discount based on the relationship between defendant’s prices and its costs to produce the goods that made up the bundle. The 2003 LePage’s decision represents a departure from this practice. In LePage’s, a manufacturer of private-label transparent tape charged that 3M maintained a monopoly in the market for transparent tape through a bundled-rebate (volume targets) program for large retail chains. The court did not require LePage’s to prove that either it or a hypothetical equally efficient competitor could not meet the discount without pricing below cost. Rather, the jury instructions, which the Third Circuit upheld, provided that conduct is illegal under section 2 when it “‘has made it very difficult or impossible for competitors to engage in fair competition.’”DOJ Settles Significant Section 2 Bundled Discount CaseOn February 25, the DOJ announced a settlement with United Regional Health Care System, a Wichita Falls, Texas hospital, of allegations that United Regional effectively prevents insurers from contracting with its competitors by offering price discounts to commercial insurers who make United Regional their sole in-network provider. Press Release, DOJ Antitrust Div., Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Texas Hospital Prohibiting Anticompetitive Contracts with Health Insurers (Feb. 25, 2011); Complaint, United States of America v. United Regional Health Care Sys., No. 7:11-cv-00030 (Feb. 25, 2011. The DOJ asserted that for the Wichita Falls MSA United Regional has a 90% share of the market for inpatient hospital services sold to commercial insurers, and a greater than 65% share of the market for outpatient surgical services sold to commercial insurers. By 2010, insurers with exclusionary contracts allegedly accounted for 35-40% of all payments United Regional received from commercial insurers. The case is significant because it is the Antitrust Division’s first case since 1999 charging a monopolist with engaging in anticompetitive unilateral conduct. Further, in May 2009, the Antitrust Division withdrew a 2008 Sherman Act § 2 report issued during the previous administration, announcing it would apply a “more rigorous” enforcement standard. In its competitive impact statement, the DOJ states that the appropriate test to apply to determine if the United Health bundled discounts are anticompetitive is a variant of the discount-attribution test adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008) (“PeaceHealth”). PeaceHealth held that the proper test requires “the full amount of the discounts given by the defendant on the bundle [to be] allocated to the competitive product or products.” If the prices are below the defendant’s incremental cost for those products – and hence would tend to exclude a hypothetical equally-efficient supplier of those products – the discounts can be deemed anticompetitive. In United Health, the DOJ asserted that the full discount should be attributed not to the entire volume of the competitive products, as suggested in PeaceHealth, but rather to the “contestable volume,” i.e., the volume that the defendant could actually be at risk of losing without the discounts to exclusivity. The DOJ looked at the share of Blue Cross and Medicare patients who went to hospitals other than United Regional. Blue Cross had not agreed to be subject to exclusivity restrictions. Based on volumes of Blue Cross and Medicare patients, the DOJ estimated that the “contestable” volume of patients was 10% of the patient volume United Regional received from payers that had agreed to exclusivity restrictions, and attributed the discount only to that 10%
ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corporation, Nos. 11-3301 & 11-3426, 2012 WL 4483899 (3d Cir. Sept. 28, 2012).The Court found that price was not the predominant mechanism of exclusion. Despite Eaton’s rebate pricing, “Plaintiffs [did] not allege that price itself functioned as the exclusionary tool.” Instead, Plaintiffs alleged that they were foreclosed from a substantial share of the market as a result of Eaton’s use of its monopoly power to force the OEMs to remove Plaintiffs’ products from the sales catalogues and to meet the market share penetration targets of 90% or more for Eaton’s products.
New view is founded on a more realistic assumption of imperfect and asymmetric information, where much is not known and where one party may have more knowledge than the other. For instance, prey can be deterred from remaining in market until oppty. for later price increase by monopolist signaling declining demand and preventing capital infusions by lowering prices.