2. 1.1. Bowman v. Monsanto Co.,Bowman v. Monsanto Co.,
2.2. Abbott .Vs. SandozAbbott .Vs. Sandoz
3.3. Horlicks vs Kartick SadhukanHorlicks vs Kartick Sadhukan
4.4. Amar Nath Sehgal v. Union ofAmar Nath Sehgal v. Union of
India,India,
5.5. Colgate Palmolive vs. Mr. Patel &Colgate Palmolive vs. Mr. Patel &
OthersOthers
6.6. DIAMOND v. CHAKRABARTYDIAMOND v. CHAKRABARTY
3. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. ___
(2013) was a United States Supreme
Court patent decision in which the Court
unanimously affirmed the decision of
the Federal Circuit that the Patent
Exhaustion Doctrine does not permit a
farmer to plant and grow saved, patented
seeds without the patent owner's permission.
4. The case arose after Vernon Hugh
Bowman, an Indiana farmer,
bought transgenic soybean seeds
from a local grain elevator for his
second crop of the season.
5. Monsanto originally sold the seed from
which these soybeans were grown to
farmers under a limited use license that
prohibited the farmer-buyer from using
the seeds for more than a single season
or from saving any seed produced from
the crop for replanting.
6. The farmers sold their soybean crops
(also seeds) to the local grain elevator,
from which Bowman then bought them.
After Bowman replanted seeds for his
second harvest, Monsanto filed a lawsuit
claiming that he infringed on their
patents by replanting soybeans without
a license.
7. In response, Bowman argued that
Monsanto's claims were barred
under the Doctrine of Patent
Exhaustion, because all future
generations of soybeans were
embodied in the first generation
that was originally sold.
8. In a unanimous opinion written
by Justice Elena Kagan, the Supreme Court
ruled that Bowman's conduct infringed upon
Monsanto's patent rights and that the
doctrine of patent exhaustion does not
permit a farmer to reproduce patented
seeds through planting and harvesting
without the patent holder's permission.
9. The Court held that, when a farmer
plants a harvested and saved seed,
thereby growing another soybean
crop, that action constitutes an
unauthorized "making" of the
patented product.
10. The case garnered attention in part due
to its potential impact on policy about
Genetically Modified Crops and self-
replicating technologies, and due to the
involvement of Justice Clarence
Thomas, who previously served as a
lawyer for Monsanto.
11. Commentators noted, however,
that the Court's ruling was narrow in
scope, and did not set a broad legal
precedent with respect to the
applicability of the doctrine of
patent exhaustion to self-
replicating technologies
12. Abbott v. Sandoz was a US patent law case
argued before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit that
established a bright-line ruling regarding
claims of patent infringement relating to
disagreements over so-called “Product-by-
Process" claims. The case was decided on
May 18, 2009
13. Background
Abbott Labs had a patent on a specific
drug called Omnicef used to combat ear
infections. Lupin Limited had a court
rule that a generic form of Omnicef it
produced did not infringe on Abbott's
patent since their process to make the
drug was different.
14. After the court had ruled in Lupin's
favor, Abbott appealed and the case
was combined with several other legal
suits against smaller pharmaceutical
companies, and thus was renamed
Abbott v. Sandoz. The federal court
affirmed the lower court's decision
15. CaseCase
For several years, the courts have disagreed on
the product-by-process definition. Product-by-
process refers to the question of determining if
a product is legally different from another if it
is created by a different process.
Federal courts have offered contradictory
resolutions on the subject. The court determined
that a patent may limit itself if it specifically
defines the process of creation
16. DecisionDecision
Despite the legal discrepancies, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC) held that using a different process in
this case did not infringe on Abbott's patent
and ruled in Sandoz's favor, along with ruling
in favor of the other small pharmaceuticals
companies.
Since Abbott had not patented all processes
to create its drug, it could not protect from
the processes being used by others
17. ImportanceImportance
This case further enforces the product-by-
process definition, and holds that a patent does
not protect from infringement through a
different process unless necessarily described.
Patent-holders seeking to cover their products
entirely must find ways to protect every
process to create the same item if they want
complete protection from infringement
18. This case revolves around the principle of
infringement of trademark and copyright
laws.
HORLICKS Limited (hereinafter referred to
as H) is a foreign company engaged in
manufacturing of a wide range of food products,
including foods for infants, children and invalids,
malted milk, biscuits, toffees, etc. under the
trademark HORLICKS, of which it claims to be
the original registered owner.
19. The trademark 'HORLICKS' was registered in
India in relation to foods for infants, children
as well as mailed milk as early as 1943, for
biscuits in 1961 and in respect of toffees in
1966.
H is also the owner of copyright of
HORLICKS label and is exclusively entitled to
reproduce and alter the features of the
HORLICKS label in any material form as it
deems fit.
20. KartickKartick Confectionery (hereinafter referred
to as K) started manufacturing a similar look-
alike product, namely, toffees under the
trademark ‘HORLIKS’ infringing the
trademark rights enjoyed by 'HORLICKS'.
K also reproduced the label of H thereby
amounting to the infringement of the
copyright of the latter.
21. H contended that since the consumers of the
product under the trademark HORLICKS
included infants, children and adults it was the
obligated to ensure that the quality and
standard of the product met the prescribed
requirements under the law.
They further stated that they ensured that the
products under the trademark HORLICKS
were made under strict hygienic conditions.
22. Accordingly, if K is permitted to use the
challenged trademark HORLIKS, the right of
which was never granted neither permitted by
H, the latter was at all times at a risk of facing
the consequences of K’s conduct and
unauthorized use.
Hence they filed for a suit seeking to
permanently restrain K from infringing the H's
trademark HORLICKS and also its copyrights
which it enjoyed over the product.
23. A Single Judge Bench of the Delhi High
Court comprising of Justice B
Chaturvedi found out that H was indeed
the original registered owner of the
trademark HORLICKS in respect of food
for children, malted milk, biscuits and
toffees and all other products as a result
of prior marketing and registration.
24. With regards to toffees registration was
done in India in 1966. And the company
carried out various advertisements of its
products under the trademark
HORLICKS and thereby enjoyed
sufficient goodwill and reputation for
its products in India.
25. The court ruled that use of the label and
trademark HORLIKS by K in respect of
toffees is very likely to cause confusion
among the people.
It would thereby lead to deception, majorly
as a result of K having copied the trademark
HORLICKS and also its label as and how it
appears on the products manufactured and
marketed by H.
26. Accordingly the court restrained K
from manufacturing and selling
toffees or other related goods under
the trademark HORLIKS or under
any other name that is similar in
expression to H’s trademark
HORLICKS.
27. Further the court barred K from
reproducing, printing or publishing
any label which was a mere
reproduction or imitation of K’s
HORLICKS label, thereby
protecting the latter’s copyright to
the label.
28. This is a landmark case decided
by the Delhi High Court which for
the first time upheld the moral
right of an author for his work
under the Indian Copyright Act.
29. Amar Nath Sehgal (hereinafter
referred to as the plaintiff) was a
renowned Artist and Sculptor. He
created a Mural to be placed in the
lobby of Vigyan Bhawan, a premier
convention center of Government
of India, in New Delhi.
30. It was done at the direction of the
appropriate authorities of the
convention center. In the year 1979
the plaintiff came to know that the
mural created by him was removed
from the lobby of the convention
center away from the public view.
31. This was done without the prior
consent or permission of the
plaintiff. Thereafter the plaintiff
made several requests to the
appropriate authorities to restore
the mural. However, in spite of that
the mural was not restored.
32. Aggrieved by this the plaintiff filed a suit
before the Delhi High Court under the
Section 57 of the Copyright Act, 1957 for
violation of his rights.
He sought a permanent injunction against
the authorities of the convention center,
thereby restraining them from distorting or
damaging his mural. And to further pay him
the damages for the same.
33. The case was heard by the Single Judge
Bench of the Delhi High Court
comprising of Justice P Narendra jog.
He observed that the author had a
express right in law to preserve, protect
and nurture his creations through his
moral rights.
34. Further that the Section 57 of the
Copyright Act enables to protect
the cultural heritage of the country
through the moral rights of the
artist.
35. The section provides that the author has
the right to restrain or claim damages in
respect of any distortion, mutilation,
modification or other act in relation to
the said work which is done before the
expiration of the term of copyright if
such distortion, mutilation, modification
or other act would be prejudicial to his
honor or reputation.
36. Thus, the court ruled that the
plaintiff had the right to maintain an
action under Section 57 even
though the copyright of the mural
vested with the authorities of the
convention center.
37. It further held that the authorities
not only violated the plaintiff's
moral rights with respect to the
mural but also violated the
integrity of the work in relation to
the cultural heritage of the country
as such.
38. Hence, the court ordered the
authorities of the convention center
to return the remainder of the
mural to the plaintiff. And also to
pay the damages to the plaintiff for
all the damage caused to his work.
39. This is a case relating to the legal
principle of infringement of a
trademark. It was decided by a
Single Judge Bench of the Delhi
High Court comprising of Justice M
Mudgal.
40. Colgate Palmolive Co. Limited
(hereinafter referred to as the
plaintiffs) is a company that has
been manufacturing and marketing
dental products in India under the
well-known trademark 'COLGATE'
since 1937.
41. The company undoubtedly is also an
international leader in the trade of tooth
paste and other dental related products. The
plaintiffs registered their trademark in India
in the year 1954.
Since then they have always marketed their
products in red cartons which had the word
COLGATE inscribed in white on it. They used
a particular font for printing the trademark
on the cartons.
42. Further they had even registered their
label relating to colors in India in the
year 1959.
From then on they have been exclusively
enjoying the ownership rights over the
trademark 'COLGATE' and also the label
containing the red and white colors
inscribed on it.
43. In the year 2003 the plaintiffs came to
know that Mr. Patel and his
company(hereinafter referred to as the
defendants) were using the plaintiff's
COLGATE trade dress in the packaging
of their products with relation to the
layout and color combination of the
cartons.
44. The defendants used the word 'AJANTA'
printed in white color in a red background
in their cartons.
Subsequently the plaintiffs filed a suit before
the Delhi High Court seeking a permanent
injunction against the defendants, thereby
restraining them from using the trade
dress that was similar in layout and
appearance even though the names printed
on the cartons were different.
45. They contended that the defendants
had infringed their trademark and
copyrights.
And further that they were indulging in
unfair competition by trying to sell their
products using the brand name of
trademark COLGATE.
46. On the other hand, the defendants
contended that there was nothing
distinctive in the color combination of
the plaintiff's container and that the
plaintiff could not have a trademark in
color combination.
Further they claimed that the red and
white label was common to the
toothpaste trade.
47. The Honorable Judge observed that essential
feature of the plaintiffs' mark was COLGATECOLGATE
inscribed in white color on a red background
and not merely red and white color
combination alone.
He held that the printing of the word
‘AJANTA’‘AJANTA’ on the defendants’ cartons in white
color on a red background does not give rise
to any infringement of the plaintiffs’ trade
dress.
48. Also affirmed the contention of the
defendants that red was a basic color
and the red & white color combination
is common to the tooth paste trade in
the domestic as well as the international
market.
Hence there cannot be any
monopolization of the same by any
party.
49. However, he finally held that the
defendants were liable for trying
to sell their products using the
brand name of COLGATE since
there was sufficient resemblance
between the plaintiffs' and the
defendants' product.
50. Further the court ruled that if the
defendant alters the packaging there
would not arise any question of
infringement of the copyright and
trademark of the plaintiff.
Accordingly the court ordered them to
substitute gold for white color in the
description of ‘AJANTA’ in their cartons.
51. Thus, the injunction application was
disposed of by the court and the
defendants were permitted to
market their products provided
they made the required alterations
in their packaging of the products.
52. Title 35 U.S.C. 101 provides for
the issuance of a patent to a
person who invents or discovers
"any" new and useful
"manufacture" or "composition
of matter."
53. Respondent filed a patent
application relating to his invention
of a human-made, genetically
engineered bacterium capable
of breaking down crude oil, a
property which is possessed by no
naturally occurring bacteria.
54. A patent examiner's rejection of
the patent application's claims for
the new bacteria was affirmed by
the Patent Office Board of Appeals
on the ground that living things
are not patentable subject
matter under 101.
55. The Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals reversed,
concluding that the fact that
micro-organisms are alive is
without legal significance for
purposes of the patent law.
56. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the
opinion of the Court.
We granted Certiorari to determine
whether a live, human-made micro-
organism is patentable subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. 101.
In 1972, respondent Chakrabarty, a
microbiologist,microbiologist, filed a patent application,
assigned to the General Electric Co.General Electric Co.
57. The application asserted 36 claims
related to Chakrabarty's invention of
"a bacterium from the genus
Pseudomonas containing therein at
least two stable energy-generating
plasmids, each of said plasmids
providing a separate hydrocarbon
degradative pathway.
58. " 1 This human-made, genetically
engineered bacterium is capable of
breaking down multiple components of
crude oil.
Because of this property, which is
possessed by no naturally occurring
bacteria, Chakrabarty's invention is
believed to have significant value for the
treatment of oil spills.
59. 2 .Chakrabarty's patent claims were of
three types:
First, process claims for the method of
producing the bacteria;[447 U.S. 303, 306]
Second, claims for an inoculums
comprised of a carrier material floating
on water, such as straw, and the new
bacteria;
and third, claims to the bacteria themselves.
60. The patent examiner allowed the claims
falling into the first two categories, but
rejected claims for the bacteria. His decision
rested on two grounds:
(1) that micro-organisms are "products of
nature," and
(2) that as living things they are not
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C.
101.
61. Chakrabarty appealed the
rejection of these claims to the
Patent Office Board of Appeals,
and the Board affirmed the
examiner on the second ground.
62. 3 Relying on the legislative history of the
1930 Plant Patent Act, in which
Congress extended patent protection to
certain asexually reproduced plants,
the Board concluded that 101 was not
intended to cover living things such as
these laboratory created micro-
organisms.
63. The Court refers to the logic employed by
Congress in choosing not to perpetuate
the "dichotomy" suggested by Secretary
Hyde. Ante, at 313.
But by this logic the bacteria at issue
here are distinguishable from a
"mineral . . . created wholly by nature"
in exactly the same way as were the new
varieties of plants.
64. If a new Act was needed to provide
patent protection for the plants, it was
equally necessary for bacteria.
Yet Congress Provided for patents on
plants but not on these bacteria.
In short, Congress decided to make only
a subset of animate "human-made
inventions," "ibid”., patentable.