Three long waves are evident in commodity price levels since the late 18th century:
1) Prices rose from 1789-1814 and fell from 1814-1849, completing a cycle over 60 years.
2) Prices rose from 1849-1873 and fell from 1873-1896, completing a 47-year cycle.
3) Prices rose from 1896-1920 and began falling again in 1920, with this third cycle still partially incomplete.
Similar long waves are visible in interest rates, wages, foreign trade, and production of coal, pig iron, and lead, with the cycle periods generally corresponding to those in commodity prices. This provides evidence that long cycles of approximately 50 years
1) The document discusses transitioning to a circular economy and factor 5 increases in resource productivity as pillars of sustainable development.
2) It provides examples of technologies and policies that can lead to factor 5-10 increases in efficiency for materials, energy, water, and transport.
3) The author argues for gradually increasing resource prices to incentivize further efficiency gains and recycling, coupled with tax revenues to fund the transition to a green economy.
1. Business intelligence is undergoing a revolutionary transition thanks to service-oriented architecture and Web 2.0 approaches to technology innovation.
2. Major trends driving this transition include the rise of cloud computing, social networking, and the exponential growth of digital content including images, video and new information.
3. Key lessons for business intelligence are that information will be more accessible through the cloud, social collaboration will become more important, and recognizing patterns in large amounts of structured and unstructured data will provide new opportunities.
This document summarizes an academic paper that investigates the roots of economic retardation in Spain between 1500-1850. It finds that:
1) Existing estimates of Spain's long-term economic performance show large variations and contradictions, with estimates ranging from a decline to a rise in per capita income over this period.
2) Spain's macroeconomic evolution during its imperial expansion remains unclear, with highly hypothetical estimates suggesting different outcomes from sustained decline to moderate increase in GDP per head.
3) Assessments of Spain's performance have largely focused on the Kingdom of Castile and agriculture, without considering other regions or economic activity outside of agriculture.
4) The authors construct new measures of agricultural output, total
THE CAUSES OF CHAOS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY AND HOW TO ELIMINATE THEM.pdfFaga1939
This article aims to present the causes of the chaos that has prevailed in the world economy for centuries and how to eliminate them. These causes are explained by the absence of feedback and control mechanisms in the world capitalist system that would allow mitigating the harmful consequences generated by long waves or long economic cycles of the world economy presented by Russian economist Nikolai Dimitrievitch Kondratieff who shows how the world capitalist system has evolved with cycles that go from prosperity to economic decline from 1780 to 2010, as well as mitigating the harmful consequences generated by waves of innovation presented by Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter who shows how technological innovations introduced into production processes in each Kondratieff cycle are responsible for the expansion and decline of the world capitalist economy. To deal with the cyclical crises of capitalism and put an end to global economic chaos, as well as ensuring that technological advancement does not cease and contributes to the progress of humanity, the only solutions for stabilizing the global economy are the adoption of Keynesianism in each country and globally and the existence of a world government.
good to read learn great for teachers and students to share with each other and even in the classroom this can be used. 39 total slides for your information,
This document discusses business cycles and their various types and theories. It defines a business cycle as a swing in total national output, income, and employment lasting 2-10 years, marked by widespread economic expansion and contraction. Business cycles have four phases: prosperity, recession, depression, and recovery. The document outlines several types of business cycles including Kitchin cycles, Juglar cycles, Kondratieff waves, building cycles, and Kuznets cycles. It also summarizes several theories that attempt to explain the causes of business cycles, such as monetarist, Keynesian, new classical, external shock, long wave, real business cycle, and political business cycle theories.
1) The document discusses transitioning to a circular economy and factor 5 increases in resource productivity as pillars of sustainable development.
2) It provides examples of technologies and policies that can lead to factor 5-10 increases in efficiency for materials, energy, water, and transport.
3) The author argues for gradually increasing resource prices to incentivize further efficiency gains and recycling, coupled with tax revenues to fund the transition to a green economy.
1. Business intelligence is undergoing a revolutionary transition thanks to service-oriented architecture and Web 2.0 approaches to technology innovation.
2. Major trends driving this transition include the rise of cloud computing, social networking, and the exponential growth of digital content including images, video and new information.
3. Key lessons for business intelligence are that information will be more accessible through the cloud, social collaboration will become more important, and recognizing patterns in large amounts of structured and unstructured data will provide new opportunities.
This document summarizes an academic paper that investigates the roots of economic retardation in Spain between 1500-1850. It finds that:
1) Existing estimates of Spain's long-term economic performance show large variations and contradictions, with estimates ranging from a decline to a rise in per capita income over this period.
2) Spain's macroeconomic evolution during its imperial expansion remains unclear, with highly hypothetical estimates suggesting different outcomes from sustained decline to moderate increase in GDP per head.
3) Assessments of Spain's performance have largely focused on the Kingdom of Castile and agriculture, without considering other regions or economic activity outside of agriculture.
4) The authors construct new measures of agricultural output, total
THE CAUSES OF CHAOS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY AND HOW TO ELIMINATE THEM.pdfFaga1939
This article aims to present the causes of the chaos that has prevailed in the world economy for centuries and how to eliminate them. These causes are explained by the absence of feedback and control mechanisms in the world capitalist system that would allow mitigating the harmful consequences generated by long waves or long economic cycles of the world economy presented by Russian economist Nikolai Dimitrievitch Kondratieff who shows how the world capitalist system has evolved with cycles that go from prosperity to economic decline from 1780 to 2010, as well as mitigating the harmful consequences generated by waves of innovation presented by Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter who shows how technological innovations introduced into production processes in each Kondratieff cycle are responsible for the expansion and decline of the world capitalist economy. To deal with the cyclical crises of capitalism and put an end to global economic chaos, as well as ensuring that technological advancement does not cease and contributes to the progress of humanity, the only solutions for stabilizing the global economy are the adoption of Keynesianism in each country and globally and the existence of a world government.
good to read learn great for teachers and students to share with each other and even in the classroom this can be used. 39 total slides for your information,
This document discusses business cycles and their various types and theories. It defines a business cycle as a swing in total national output, income, and employment lasting 2-10 years, marked by widespread economic expansion and contraction. Business cycles have four phases: prosperity, recession, depression, and recovery. The document outlines several types of business cycles including Kitchin cycles, Juglar cycles, Kondratieff waves, building cycles, and Kuznets cycles. It also summarizes several theories that attempt to explain the causes of business cycles, such as monetarist, Keynesian, new classical, external shock, long wave, real business cycle, and political business cycle theories.
Industrial Revolution of industries from first to 4.0Dudley Chifenga
The document focuses on the transformation of the industry from Industry 1.0 to 4.0. This explains how automation was implemented into the system also computers and microprocessors
This document discusses trends in extreme weather events since 1900 and presents a conundrum for policymakers. It summarizes evidence that:
1) Weather was more extreme in the first half of the 20th century compared to the second half, contradicting claims that extremes are increasing due to anthropogenic warming.
2) Many data sources show no change in frequency or severity of extreme weather over the last 100 years, against expectations of increased extremes.
3) Temperature data has been "homogenized" through adjustments that tend to increase reported warming trends, undermining claims based on this data.
4) The disconnect between historical data and predictions of increased extremes poses challenges for engineering assessments of climate policy.
Cambridge University Press and Economic History Association a.docxShiraPrater50
Cambridge University Press and Economic History Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
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http://www.jstor.org
Economic History Association
The Economic Crisis of 1619 to 1623
Author(s): Charles P. Kindleberger
Source: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), pp. 149-175
Published by: on behalf of the Cambridge University Press Economic History Association
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The Economic Crisis of 1619 to 1623
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER
Various states in the Holy Roman Empire prepared for the Thirty Years' War by
creating new mints and debasing the subsidiary coinage. The process spread
through Gresham's Law: bad money was taken by debasing states to their
neighbors and exchanged for good. The neighbor typically defended itself by
debasing its own coin. The resulting hyperinflation was terminated early in the
war by an agreement to return to the Imperial Augsburg Ordinance of 1559. The
Kipper- und Wipperzeit, as the period is called, illuminates the geographic spread
of financial crises, German hyperinflations of this century, and current proposals
for "free banking."
INTRODUCTION
The first quarter of the seventeenth century, up to and through the
beginnings of the Thirty Years' War with the defenestration at
Prague in 1618, has been widely described as a period of crisis. The
crisis was particularly acute between 1619 and 1623; sometimes and in
particular localities it was described as a "commercial crisis," some-
times as a "joint crisis in commerce and industry," but usually as a
"currency crisis" and in one instance as a ''monetary crisis and panic"
and even "a monetary corner."' Moreover, it was set within a deeper
structural crisis covering 100 to 150 years of transition from medieval to
modern times. The period has been variously described as a movement
from feudalism to capitalism; from a feudal to a nation-state society;
from the political and economic ascendency of the South (Italy and
Spain) to that of the North (the United Provinces of Holland and
England); from a "natural economy" based on the self-sufficient
household and barter to the use of markets and money; from separate
deals to continuous trade on bourses; and from th ...
1.Given the economic gap between the Soviet Union and the Western wo.docxfredellsberry
1.Given the economic gap between the Soviet Union and the Western world, to what extent did the goals of collectivization and the Five-year Plans justify the tremendous cost borne by the Soviet people?
2.
Below is a list of WW II battles/conflicts. Specify for each whether the Axis powers of the Allied powers gained an advantage over their enemies. Provide a brief (two to three sentences) explanation for each to support your choice.
Battle of Britain
War in the Balkans
Pearl Harbor
Battle of the Coral Sea
Battle of the Midway
Battle of Stalingrad
3.
Create timelines of the first Russian revolution in 1917 and the revolutionary events of 1985 to 1991. Then write a paragraph about the impact of the second revolution on Russia today.
Research Russian politics today. Pay attention to the following in your timeline and paragraph:
Is there still a Communist party? Is it trying to undo democratic reforms?
Include events on your timelines.
Illustrate your timelines with photographs, drawings or political cartoons.
Evaluate how successful you think that second Russian revolution was. Do you think that change will be long-lasting?
.
The document discusses the "long 19th century" in Europe, defined as the period from the 1789 French Revolution to the beginning of World War I in 1914. This time saw immense changes, as Europe transitioned from a rural society to industrialized nations. Nationalism grew stronger over this period, and tensions eventually erupted in WWI. The century was shaped both by common trends across Europe as well as divisions between regions in their political and economic development.
The document summarizes the economic effects of World War 2 on the city of York, England. It discusses how York's economy changed to support the war effort, with industries like Rowntree's shifting production from confectionery to munitions. The railway industry in York also expanded to transport troops and war goods. Small businesses had to adapt as well. Overall, the war caused significant changes to York's infrastructure and major employers. The document analyzes how Britain's economy more broadly transitioned during the war from free market to centralized management to maximize production for the war.
Unit 9: A Bird's Eye View: Acceleration and Global Chaos in the Twentieth Cen...Big History Project
What can population and economic data tell us about this era of war and instability? Read about what the numbers can tell us.
Register to explore the whole course here: https://school.bighistoryproject.com/bhplive?WT.mc_id=Slideshare12202017
9 A Historical Perspectiveon Economic Aspectsof the Popula.docxransayo
9 A Historical Perspective
on Economic Aspects
of the Population
Explosion: The Case of
Preindustrial England
Ronald Demos Lee
9.1 Introduction
The preindustrial context offers particular advantages for the study of
population change and its consequences. Over the course of centuries
the effects of population pressure on resources have a chance to emerge
and to dominate the more transitory influences. And other sources of
long-run economic change, such as technology, capital accumulation,
education, and institutional reorganization, were formerly weaker or
absent. Thus history may provide us with an actual ceteris paribus situa-
tion where statistical attempts to control for extraneous influences on
contemporary development have failed. Of course there is always the
risk that changing circumstances may have rendered the lessons of his-
tory obsolete, but one has to start someplace; the drunk looks for his
dime under the lamppost, though he lost it down the street.
There have been many studies of the effects of population growth on
economic development, but only a few of these studies are empirical.
Ronald Demos Lee is associated with the Department of Economics and the
Population Studies Center, the University of Michigan.
This research was funded by NICHD grant HD 08586-03. I am very grateful
to Professor E. A. Wrigley and Professor R. Schofield of the Cambridge Group
for the History of Population and Social Structure for making the aggregate parish
data set available to me. Philip Mirowski provided valuable research assistance at
all stages of this project, and I also profited from his knowledge of English history
and his creative insights. Professors Gavin Wright, Gary Saxonhouse, C. K. Har-
ley, and Albert Fishlow made helpful comments on earlier drafts. I am particularly
indebted to Professor Marc Nerlove for his detailed comments and his solutions
to some of the analytic problems.
517
518 Ronald Demos Lee
Theoretical studies, and the many simulation studies in the tradition of
the classic work by Coale and Hoover (1958), can be queried on their
premises (see Simon 1976). Cost-benefit studies of marginal lives, pio-
neered by Enke (1960), are empirical only in appearance; their results
can actually be derived a priori for virtually any country, regardless of
its economic situation, as Ohlin (1969) has shown in an ingenious
article. l Cross-national studies, seeking correlations of population growth
rates and growth rates of per capita income (see, e.g., Kuznets 1967;
Chesnai and Sauvy 1973; Easterlin 1972) have invariably found no
significant association. 2 Leff's (1969) well-known article on savings
rates and dependency rates has been so heavily criticized as to leave the
results in serious doubt. So although most economists and almost all
demographers believe high population growth rates are a problem, there
is a surprising shortage of empirical evidence. A study of the conse-
quences of population change in a historical cont.
1) The document analyzes the cyclical evolution of GDP in Portugal compared to several other economies from 1961 to 2011 using the Kalman filter.
2) It finds the Portuguese GDP cycle is highly correlated with the euro area and France, and moderately correlated with Spain, Germany, and Italy. The correlation is lowest with non-euro area countries like the US, Japan, and UK.
3) The cycles of euro area, France, and Germany show no lag relative to Portugal, while Spain leads Portugal by one quarter and the US and Greece lead Portugal by 4 quarters.
Historical And Contemporary Overview Of GlobalizationIntroductio.docxpooleavelina
Historical And Contemporary Overview Of Globalization
Introduction
Although “globalization” became the mot du jour to explain changes in the world economy in the late 1990s, today its meaning is still not very clear. People associate globalization with increased trade, financial volatility, business growth, lower commodity prices, cross-cultural conflict, multinational outsourcing, developing-world poverty (or progress), environmental degradation, speed-up in all aspects of life, and terrorism, among other things. Some of these associations make more immediate sense than others, but all of them point in one way or another to the integration of the world economy. This integration has been more pronounced in the last thirty years than in the previous thirty, but, as we will see, globalization is actually more the rule than the exception over the long-historical haul.
Globalization might have little clear meaning because of its association with freer trade and the fact that Americans hold notably changeable and somewhat contradictory views about free trade. A recent poll conducted by Newsweek suggested that a clear majority of Americans disagreed with the chair of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers’ claim that outsourcing is good for the American economy. At the same time, respondents were roughly evenly divided about whether trade agreements like NAFTA, which enshrine the principles that enable such outsourcing, were good for the economy. Likewise, an Investor’s Business Daily/Christian Science Monitor Poll in 2002 found that a large majority of Americans believed that the foremost goal of trade policy should be to increase exports (rather than restrict imports); at the same time, a similarly large majority said that American trade policy should include restrictions on imports to protect American jobs. As far as the theory of international trade goes, these two views are diametrically opposed. That a majority of polled Americans could claim to hold them at the same time perhaps speaks to the work that needs to be done to clarify the implications of free international trade and globalization.
So what does globalization mean? When did it begin?
Part 1: Before The World Wars
We can begin with a descriptive definition: globalization means economic integration. It means that nominally independent people, places, and institutions become economically important to each other. Japan’s banking sector depends upon the value of US Treasury Securities, which in turn depends upon the competitiveness of US manufacturers, which in turn depends upon the costs of intermediate goods imported from Mexico, and so on. It also means change outside of the strictly economic realm—in the political and cultural realms, for example. (Think: the European Union, animé on the Cartoon Network, anti-war protesters also collaborating to stop human rights abuses in China.) Moreover, globalization is not a new process; it has been fundamental to the modern world econom ...
The document provides guidance on writing a Change Over Time (COT) essay for the AP World History exam. It outlines the key components of a successful COT essay, including defining the topic in the introduction, discussing examples of change and continuity with evidence for each period, and analyzing the causes and impacts of changes over time while also noting continuities. Sample essay outlines, potential thesis statements, and rubrics are also included to exemplify how to structure a cohesive COT response.
1. SHORT ANSWER (200 words or less) Consider the price .docxdorishigh
1.
SHORT ANSWER (200 words or less): Consider the price index above.
What are the values for A, B, and C? Was there inflation from 2006 to 2009?
If the price changes above occurred for all goods across the economy during
the four year period, explain how nominal GDP and real GDP would differ.
. theory about how the econ-
orny works. At one tirne, for
examPle, a nation's eco-
nomic vitalitY was thought
to sPring from the stock of
precious metals accumu-
lated in the Public treasury'
This theory spawned a
''' po1iry called mercantiiism'
' which held that, as a waY of
accumulating gold and sil-
ver, a nation should try to
ir {" export more than it imPorts'
To achieve this, nations
duce a major tax increase
of the economy, just as we need not know
every
i","ii of the uoay. rut we must understand essen-
dal relationships among key variabies'
For example'
does the economy *otf *"U on its own' or does it
;;;;m poorly? If it performs poorly' are there
i**"di"tl can we u" ttt" that a proposed remedy
*""iJ "",
do more harm than good? When doctors
;idtt'; understand how the human body
worked'
,h"1,
",,u*pted
"cures" were often worse than the
Ji*r"r. Much of the history of medicine describes
misguided efforts to deal with maladies'
Even today'
medical care is based on less
mercanr*ism ffiiliTr:Ji1"[:""i?&t1:
the inrortecttheorythat onJ study, only one in seven
a nation's economic
urrt -!usJ t -'*t -,-. ,
li;u.*iu".t'ould be to medical interventions is sup-
J""u*utut" precious ported by reliable scientific
metals in the public lviaence.r For example, acet-
treasqrY; this theorY
prompted trade bar' aminophen (e'g', Tflenol) is
riers io
"ut
itnports, a popular pain reiiever, but
ffilljl'?#n t'oto^aY ruallY knows how it
trade and the gains {rorn works'
srecialization LikewiSe, policy makers
economic maY adoPt the wrong Pre-
{|::HlT;?i, .,, -"", scription
-b""""'"
or a flawed
nomie activitY relative
to the [ong'term growth t. As reported by Shenrvin Nuland,
fi:i:il:i::?JJJ'' ;r,rr'iicjlua',dran,Midwivesand
;;;J'
-- --
Leech es:' NewYork llmes' 25 January
1 S95.
during the Great Depression' Economists
have srnce
[-*,.'a that such a policy does-more harm than
;;.; "Jai
iott, debates about whether policies
are
i"fnf"f or harmful were prevalent as poiicy makers
t"tio"a*a to the zoo8-2oo9 economic downturn'
We turn now to the performance of the U'S'
economy.
Wz Hconomic Fluctuations
and Growth
The U.S. economy and other indush'ial
rnarket
u.orro*i"" historlcally have experienced alter-
;;;;; Fiods of expansion and contraction
in u.loo*ic activity' Economic fluctuations are
ti,"rir"andfaliofeconomicactivityrelativetothe
torrg-,ur* growth trend of the economy'
These fluc-
arr"iionr, oibusiness cycles, vary in length
and inten-
cirv- vet some featurua "ppu"t
common to all' Th*
;;i il il*"t"*"*ilv invot"e the entire nation ani
often many other eco-nomies around
the world' and
;;;;;;"early all ...
A Historical Perspective On Economic Aspects Of The Population Explosion The...Finni Rice
This document summarizes Ronald Lee's analysis of the effects of population change in preindustrial England from 1540 to 1800. Lee finds that population growth had significant negative effects on real wages, causing them to fall by around 60% from the late 15th century to the late 16th century. Population growth also increased rents paid to landlords and caused industrial prices to plummet relative to agricultural prices. Regression analysis showed that a 10% increase in population led to a 15% decrease in real wages. The rate of population growth that could be sustained without lowering wages (the absorption rate) was around 0.38% per year before 1810 but doubled to 0.88% after the Napoleonic Wars.
P O P U L A T I O N A N D D E V E L O P M E N T R E V I E W.docxgerardkortney
P O P U L A T I O N A N D D E V E L O P M E N T R E V I E W 3 1 ( 4 ) : 6 0 5 – 6 4 3 ( D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 5 ) 605
The Next 50 Years:
Unfolding Trends
VACLAV SMIL
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES in human affairs come both as unpredictable discon-
tinuities and as gradually unfolding trends. Discontinuities are more com-
mon than is generally realized, and technical developments offer some of
the best examples of these underappreciated shifts. Incremental engineering
progress (improvements in efficiency and reliability, reduction of unit costs)
and gradual diffusion of new techniques (usually following fairly predict-
able logistic curves, no matter whether the innovations are mass-produced
consumer items or advanced industrial processes) are very much in evidence,
but they are punctuated by surprising, sometimes stunning, discontinuities.
The modern history of flight is an apt illustration of these inherent
unpredictabilities (Smil 2006). In 1955 it did not require extraordinary imagi-
nation to see that intercontinental jet travel would become a large-scale en-
terprise. But no one could have predicted (just a year after the third fatal
crash of the pioneering British Comet and the consequent grounding of the
first program of commercial jet flight) that by 1970 there would be a plane
capable of carrying more than 400 people. The Boeing 747 was a result of
Juan Trippe’s vision and William Allen’s daring, not an inevitable outcome
of a technical trend. And more surprises followed, including a counterintui-
tively massive increase in the total volume of commercial flying: between
1972 and 1981 two rounds of large oil price increases more than quintupled
(in real terms) the price of crude oil (from which all of the aviation kerosene
is refined), yet worldwide passenger traffic expanded relentlessly and its vol-
ume was 60 times higher by century’s end than it was in 1955 (ICAO 2001).
Some political discontinuities of the past 50 years have been even more
stunning. Nineteen fifty-five was just six years after the Communist victory
in China’s protracted civil war, only two years after China’s troops made it
impossible for the West to win the Korean War and forced a standoff along
the 38th parallel, and three years before the beginning of the worst famine
in history (Smil 1999). At that time, China, the legitimacy of its regime
606 T H E N E X T 5 0 Y E A R S : U N F O L D I N G T R E N D S
unrecognized by the United States government, was an impoverished, sub-
sistence agrarian economy, glad to receive a few crumbs of wasteful Stalinist
industrial plant, and its per capita gross domestic product was less than 4
percent of the US average. Yet by 2005 China, still very much controlled by
the Communist party, had become a new workshop for the world, an in-
dispensable supplier of goods ranging from pliers to cell phones, and it is
now underwriting America’s excessive spending through its record purchases
of US Treasury bills. How could an.
Home4 Why Europe and not China1. Why does Landes think that Chi.docxpooleavelina
Home4 Why Europe and not China?
1. Why does Landes think that China would not have developed an industrial revolution on its own? (Landes 2006 “Why Europe and the West? Why not China?” is posted on file)
2. Why does he think that China failed to learn new technologies from Europeans in the period after 1500?
3. In Landes’ view, what did Europe have that China lacked? That is, what did Europe have that permitted it to have an industrial revolution?
4. What does Pomeranz say about the factors that Landes identifies as the crucial features of European society that permitted it to have an industrial revolution? Why does he say that these features did not matter?
5. What does Pomeranz think are the crucial factors that enabled Europe to have an industrial revolution?
Note: You can learn about Pomeranz’s ideas from Marks, pp 104-118.(Already posted it on file)
required that all goods be transported in their ships, and forced European
New World colonists to trade only with the mother country, even if
smuggling made such a policy somewhat porous. Mercantilist ideas also
led to policies that states should use their own raw materials to
manufacture within their own borders anything that was imported, an
action we saw the English take in the early 1700s to keep Indian cotton
textiles out. Although mercantilist policies did indeed lead to the
establishment of industries in European states, industrialization itself was
not the object: keeping gold and silver from flowing out of the state and
enriching others was. European states were obsessed with their silver
stocks: ‘‘the more silver, the stronger the state’’ was how a German once
put it.40
In these inter-European wars, the fates and fortunes of various states
rose and fell. As we have already seen, by the end of the sixteenth century,
Spain’s power had begun to wane, and Portugal proved to be too small to
mount much of a challenge to the French (or Spanish) in Europe, or to the
Dutch in Asian waters. The Dutch, being among the first Europeans to
apply vast amounts of capital to their trading enterprises in both Asia and
the Americas, saw their fortunes peak in the seventeenth century, just as
the French and the British were gaining power. Ultimately, though, the
Dutch did not have the manpower to build a standing army sufficiently
large to counter the French, and they ultimately allied with the British to
offset French power on the continent. By the eighteenth century, Britain
and France had emerged from the seventeenth-century crisis as the two
most powerful and competitive European states. (See map 3.1.)
The Seven Years’ War, 1756–1763
As the strongest and most successful European states, England and France
competed not just in Europe but in the Americas and Asia as well. In the
‘‘long’’ eighteenth century from 1689 to 1815, Britain and France fought
five wars, only one of which Britain did not initiate. Their engagement
(with others) in the War of Spanish Succession was ended by the 1713
Tr ...
19 c Europe, session 2.9; The German Question, 1850-66Jim Powers
Now we look at the question which had faced Germans since the great upheaval of 1848, should Germany be unified with or without the Austrian Empire. It will be decided in the Seven Weeks War.
This paper analyzes trends in income inequality in the United States from 1913 to 1998 using tax return data. It finds that the share of total income received by top earners follows a U-shaped pattern over the century. Top capital income shares declined significantly due to economic shocks like the Great Depression and World War II and never fully recovered due to progressive taxation. In contrast, top wage shares were flat until 1940 but surged from the 1960s onward, driving increased inequality. As a result, highly paid workers have replaced wealthy investors at the top of the income distribution.
The document provides tips on writing essays in history at level 4. It explains that there are two types of essays: causative and argumentative. Both require a clear introduction, body, and conclusion. The introduction should include the topic, explain key details, and state the aim. The body should have paragraphs with a statement, explanation, illustration, and link back to the statement. The conclusion should briefly summarize without new information. Causative essays explain reasons for an event, while argumentative essays assess significance by discussing points for and against.
Figaro's Mozart - Le Figaro's strange love affair with Mozart's operas, 1826-...Jean-Louis Gosselin
This is the dissertation I wrote for my Masters in Music at Kings College London. This involved doing interesting research at the British Library in Colindale, north London, digging up 200-year old articles from the French newspaper to support that idea that Mozart's music had a strong influence in setting up a French school and style of music.
This document discusses how asymmetric economic shocks that affect some parts of an economy more than others can create problems for policymakers trying to set macroeconomic policies. It gives the example of how some economies may be dependent on oil prices, so a drop in oil prices would help them but could hurt other parts of the economy. This is a constant problem for those setting interest rates for the eurozone given the differences among eurozone economies and their potential exposures to different shocks.
Kapcsolatfelvételi teszt - Mary Rodwell, Exopolitika Magyarország
Ha úgy gondolod, hogy volt már ufóélményed, de nem érted pontosan; ha úgy érzed, küldetésed van; ha nem érted miért vagy e bolygón, akkor ebből a tesztből válaszokra vagy válaszirányra lelhetsz.
Mary Rodwell és az Exopolitika Magyarország közös írása.
Ajánlott még: Csillaggyermek-teszt: http://www.slideshare.net/exopolitika/csillaggyermekteszt-exopolitika-magyarorszg
Mary Rodwell - New Human and Hybrids, 2021 lecture, 98 slidesExopolitics Hungary
Mary Rodwell - New Human and Hybrids, 2021 lecture, 98 slides. New children with cosmic knowledge and upgraded abilities - the future of mankind. Source https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ErlSH4rFmd0 (Positive Alien Agenda youtube-channel)
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Similar to Kondratieff Cycles - The Long Waves In Economic Life (1935)
Industrial Revolution of industries from first to 4.0Dudley Chifenga
The document focuses on the transformation of the industry from Industry 1.0 to 4.0. This explains how automation was implemented into the system also computers and microprocessors
This document discusses trends in extreme weather events since 1900 and presents a conundrum for policymakers. It summarizes evidence that:
1) Weather was more extreme in the first half of the 20th century compared to the second half, contradicting claims that extremes are increasing due to anthropogenic warming.
2) Many data sources show no change in frequency or severity of extreme weather over the last 100 years, against expectations of increased extremes.
3) Temperature data has been "homogenized" through adjustments that tend to increase reported warming trends, undermining claims based on this data.
4) The disconnect between historical data and predictions of increased extremes poses challenges for engineering assessments of climate policy.
Cambridge University Press and Economic History Association a.docxShiraPrater50
Cambridge University Press and Economic History Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to The Journal of Economic History.
http://www.jstor.org
Economic History Association
The Economic Crisis of 1619 to 1623
Author(s): Charles P. Kindleberger
Source: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), pp. 149-175
Published by: on behalf of the Cambridge University Press Economic History Association
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The Economic Crisis of 1619 to 1623
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER
Various states in the Holy Roman Empire prepared for the Thirty Years' War by
creating new mints and debasing the subsidiary coinage. The process spread
through Gresham's Law: bad money was taken by debasing states to their
neighbors and exchanged for good. The neighbor typically defended itself by
debasing its own coin. The resulting hyperinflation was terminated early in the
war by an agreement to return to the Imperial Augsburg Ordinance of 1559. The
Kipper- und Wipperzeit, as the period is called, illuminates the geographic spread
of financial crises, German hyperinflations of this century, and current proposals
for "free banking."
INTRODUCTION
The first quarter of the seventeenth century, up to and through the
beginnings of the Thirty Years' War with the defenestration at
Prague in 1618, has been widely described as a period of crisis. The
crisis was particularly acute between 1619 and 1623; sometimes and in
particular localities it was described as a "commercial crisis," some-
times as a "joint crisis in commerce and industry," but usually as a
"currency crisis" and in one instance as a ''monetary crisis and panic"
and even "a monetary corner."' Moreover, it was set within a deeper
structural crisis covering 100 to 150 years of transition from medieval to
modern times. The period has been variously described as a movement
from feudalism to capitalism; from a feudal to a nation-state society;
from the political and economic ascendency of the South (Italy and
Spain) to that of the North (the United Provinces of Holland and
England); from a "natural economy" based on the self-sufficient
household and barter to the use of markets and money; from separate
deals to continuous trade on bourses; and from th ...
1.Given the economic gap between the Soviet Union and the Western wo.docxfredellsberry
1.Given the economic gap between the Soviet Union and the Western world, to what extent did the goals of collectivization and the Five-year Plans justify the tremendous cost borne by the Soviet people?
2.
Below is a list of WW II battles/conflicts. Specify for each whether the Axis powers of the Allied powers gained an advantage over their enemies. Provide a brief (two to three sentences) explanation for each to support your choice.
Battle of Britain
War in the Balkans
Pearl Harbor
Battle of the Coral Sea
Battle of the Midway
Battle of Stalingrad
3.
Create timelines of the first Russian revolution in 1917 and the revolutionary events of 1985 to 1991. Then write a paragraph about the impact of the second revolution on Russia today.
Research Russian politics today. Pay attention to the following in your timeline and paragraph:
Is there still a Communist party? Is it trying to undo democratic reforms?
Include events on your timelines.
Illustrate your timelines with photographs, drawings or political cartoons.
Evaluate how successful you think that second Russian revolution was. Do you think that change will be long-lasting?
.
The document discusses the "long 19th century" in Europe, defined as the period from the 1789 French Revolution to the beginning of World War I in 1914. This time saw immense changes, as Europe transitioned from a rural society to industrialized nations. Nationalism grew stronger over this period, and tensions eventually erupted in WWI. The century was shaped both by common trends across Europe as well as divisions between regions in their political and economic development.
The document summarizes the economic effects of World War 2 on the city of York, England. It discusses how York's economy changed to support the war effort, with industries like Rowntree's shifting production from confectionery to munitions. The railway industry in York also expanded to transport troops and war goods. Small businesses had to adapt as well. Overall, the war caused significant changes to York's infrastructure and major employers. The document analyzes how Britain's economy more broadly transitioned during the war from free market to centralized management to maximize production for the war.
Unit 9: A Bird's Eye View: Acceleration and Global Chaos in the Twentieth Cen...Big History Project
What can population and economic data tell us about this era of war and instability? Read about what the numbers can tell us.
Register to explore the whole course here: https://school.bighistoryproject.com/bhplive?WT.mc_id=Slideshare12202017
9 A Historical Perspectiveon Economic Aspectsof the Popula.docxransayo
9 A Historical Perspective
on Economic Aspects
of the Population
Explosion: The Case of
Preindustrial England
Ronald Demos Lee
9.1 Introduction
The preindustrial context offers particular advantages for the study of
population change and its consequences. Over the course of centuries
the effects of population pressure on resources have a chance to emerge
and to dominate the more transitory influences. And other sources of
long-run economic change, such as technology, capital accumulation,
education, and institutional reorganization, were formerly weaker or
absent. Thus history may provide us with an actual ceteris paribus situa-
tion where statistical attempts to control for extraneous influences on
contemporary development have failed. Of course there is always the
risk that changing circumstances may have rendered the lessons of his-
tory obsolete, but one has to start someplace; the drunk looks for his
dime under the lamppost, though he lost it down the street.
There have been many studies of the effects of population growth on
economic development, but only a few of these studies are empirical.
Ronald Demos Lee is associated with the Department of Economics and the
Population Studies Center, the University of Michigan.
This research was funded by NICHD grant HD 08586-03. I am very grateful
to Professor E. A. Wrigley and Professor R. Schofield of the Cambridge Group
for the History of Population and Social Structure for making the aggregate parish
data set available to me. Philip Mirowski provided valuable research assistance at
all stages of this project, and I also profited from his knowledge of English history
and his creative insights. Professors Gavin Wright, Gary Saxonhouse, C. K. Har-
ley, and Albert Fishlow made helpful comments on earlier drafts. I am particularly
indebted to Professor Marc Nerlove for his detailed comments and his solutions
to some of the analytic problems.
517
518 Ronald Demos Lee
Theoretical studies, and the many simulation studies in the tradition of
the classic work by Coale and Hoover (1958), can be queried on their
premises (see Simon 1976). Cost-benefit studies of marginal lives, pio-
neered by Enke (1960), are empirical only in appearance; their results
can actually be derived a priori for virtually any country, regardless of
its economic situation, as Ohlin (1969) has shown in an ingenious
article. l Cross-national studies, seeking correlations of population growth
rates and growth rates of per capita income (see, e.g., Kuznets 1967;
Chesnai and Sauvy 1973; Easterlin 1972) have invariably found no
significant association. 2 Leff's (1969) well-known article on savings
rates and dependency rates has been so heavily criticized as to leave the
results in serious doubt. So although most economists and almost all
demographers believe high population growth rates are a problem, there
is a surprising shortage of empirical evidence. A study of the conse-
quences of population change in a historical cont.
1) The document analyzes the cyclical evolution of GDP in Portugal compared to several other economies from 1961 to 2011 using the Kalman filter.
2) It finds the Portuguese GDP cycle is highly correlated with the euro area and France, and moderately correlated with Spain, Germany, and Italy. The correlation is lowest with non-euro area countries like the US, Japan, and UK.
3) The cycles of euro area, France, and Germany show no lag relative to Portugal, while Spain leads Portugal by one quarter and the US and Greece lead Portugal by 4 quarters.
Historical And Contemporary Overview Of GlobalizationIntroductio.docxpooleavelina
Historical And Contemporary Overview Of Globalization
Introduction
Although “globalization” became the mot du jour to explain changes in the world economy in the late 1990s, today its meaning is still not very clear. People associate globalization with increased trade, financial volatility, business growth, lower commodity prices, cross-cultural conflict, multinational outsourcing, developing-world poverty (or progress), environmental degradation, speed-up in all aspects of life, and terrorism, among other things. Some of these associations make more immediate sense than others, but all of them point in one way or another to the integration of the world economy. This integration has been more pronounced in the last thirty years than in the previous thirty, but, as we will see, globalization is actually more the rule than the exception over the long-historical haul.
Globalization might have little clear meaning because of its association with freer trade and the fact that Americans hold notably changeable and somewhat contradictory views about free trade. A recent poll conducted by Newsweek suggested that a clear majority of Americans disagreed with the chair of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers’ claim that outsourcing is good for the American economy. At the same time, respondents were roughly evenly divided about whether trade agreements like NAFTA, which enshrine the principles that enable such outsourcing, were good for the economy. Likewise, an Investor’s Business Daily/Christian Science Monitor Poll in 2002 found that a large majority of Americans believed that the foremost goal of trade policy should be to increase exports (rather than restrict imports); at the same time, a similarly large majority said that American trade policy should include restrictions on imports to protect American jobs. As far as the theory of international trade goes, these two views are diametrically opposed. That a majority of polled Americans could claim to hold them at the same time perhaps speaks to the work that needs to be done to clarify the implications of free international trade and globalization.
So what does globalization mean? When did it begin?
Part 1: Before The World Wars
We can begin with a descriptive definition: globalization means economic integration. It means that nominally independent people, places, and institutions become economically important to each other. Japan’s banking sector depends upon the value of US Treasury Securities, which in turn depends upon the competitiveness of US manufacturers, which in turn depends upon the costs of intermediate goods imported from Mexico, and so on. It also means change outside of the strictly economic realm—in the political and cultural realms, for example. (Think: the European Union, animé on the Cartoon Network, anti-war protesters also collaborating to stop human rights abuses in China.) Moreover, globalization is not a new process; it has been fundamental to the modern world econom ...
The document provides guidance on writing a Change Over Time (COT) essay for the AP World History exam. It outlines the key components of a successful COT essay, including defining the topic in the introduction, discussing examples of change and continuity with evidence for each period, and analyzing the causes and impacts of changes over time while also noting continuities. Sample essay outlines, potential thesis statements, and rubrics are also included to exemplify how to structure a cohesive COT response.
1. SHORT ANSWER (200 words or less) Consider the price .docxdorishigh
1.
SHORT ANSWER (200 words or less): Consider the price index above.
What are the values for A, B, and C? Was there inflation from 2006 to 2009?
If the price changes above occurred for all goods across the economy during
the four year period, explain how nominal GDP and real GDP would differ.
. theory about how the econ-
orny works. At one tirne, for
examPle, a nation's eco-
nomic vitalitY was thought
to sPring from the stock of
precious metals accumu-
lated in the Public treasury'
This theory spawned a
''' po1iry called mercantiiism'
' which held that, as a waY of
accumulating gold and sil-
ver, a nation should try to
ir {" export more than it imPorts'
To achieve this, nations
duce a major tax increase
of the economy, just as we need not know
every
i","ii of the uoay. rut we must understand essen-
dal relationships among key variabies'
For example'
does the economy *otf *"U on its own' or does it
;;;;m poorly? If it performs poorly' are there
i**"di"tl can we u" ttt" that a proposed remedy
*""iJ "",
do more harm than good? When doctors
;idtt'; understand how the human body
worked'
,h"1,
",,u*pted
"cures" were often worse than the
Ji*r"r. Much of the history of medicine describes
misguided efforts to deal with maladies'
Even today'
medical care is based on less
mercanr*ism ffiiliTr:Ji1"[:""i?&t1:
the inrortecttheorythat onJ study, only one in seven
a nation's economic
urrt -!usJ t -'*t -,-. ,
li;u.*iu".t'ould be to medical interventions is sup-
J""u*utut" precious ported by reliable scientific
metals in the public lviaence.r For example, acet-
treasqrY; this theorY
prompted trade bar' aminophen (e'g', Tflenol) is
riers io
"ut
itnports, a popular pain reiiever, but
ffilljl'?#n t'oto^aY ruallY knows how it
trade and the gains {rorn works'
srecialization LikewiSe, policy makers
economic maY adoPt the wrong Pre-
{|::HlT;?i, .,, -"", scription
-b""""'"
or a flawed
nomie activitY relative
to the [ong'term growth t. As reported by Shenrvin Nuland,
fi:i:il:i::?JJJ'' ;r,rr'iicjlua',dran,Midwivesand
;;;J'
-- --
Leech es:' NewYork llmes' 25 January
1 S95.
during the Great Depression' Economists
have srnce
[-*,.'a that such a policy does-more harm than
;;.; "Jai
iott, debates about whether policies
are
i"fnf"f or harmful were prevalent as poiicy makers
t"tio"a*a to the zoo8-2oo9 economic downturn'
We turn now to the performance of the U'S'
economy.
Wz Hconomic Fluctuations
and Growth
The U.S. economy and other indush'ial
rnarket
u.orro*i"" historlcally have experienced alter-
;;;;; Fiods of expansion and contraction
in u.loo*ic activity' Economic fluctuations are
ti,"rir"andfaliofeconomicactivityrelativetothe
torrg-,ur* growth trend of the economy'
These fluc-
arr"iionr, oibusiness cycles, vary in length
and inten-
cirv- vet some featurua "ppu"t
common to all' Th*
;;i il il*"t"*"*ilv invot"e the entire nation ani
often many other eco-nomies around
the world' and
;;;;;;"early all ...
A Historical Perspective On Economic Aspects Of The Population Explosion The...Finni Rice
This document summarizes Ronald Lee's analysis of the effects of population change in preindustrial England from 1540 to 1800. Lee finds that population growth had significant negative effects on real wages, causing them to fall by around 60% from the late 15th century to the late 16th century. Population growth also increased rents paid to landlords and caused industrial prices to plummet relative to agricultural prices. Regression analysis showed that a 10% increase in population led to a 15% decrease in real wages. The rate of population growth that could be sustained without lowering wages (the absorption rate) was around 0.38% per year before 1810 but doubled to 0.88% after the Napoleonic Wars.
P O P U L A T I O N A N D D E V E L O P M E N T R E V I E W.docxgerardkortney
P O P U L A T I O N A N D D E V E L O P M E N T R E V I E W 3 1 ( 4 ) : 6 0 5 – 6 4 3 ( D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 5 ) 605
The Next 50 Years:
Unfolding Trends
VACLAV SMIL
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES in human affairs come both as unpredictable discon-
tinuities and as gradually unfolding trends. Discontinuities are more com-
mon than is generally realized, and technical developments offer some of
the best examples of these underappreciated shifts. Incremental engineering
progress (improvements in efficiency and reliability, reduction of unit costs)
and gradual diffusion of new techniques (usually following fairly predict-
able logistic curves, no matter whether the innovations are mass-produced
consumer items or advanced industrial processes) are very much in evidence,
but they are punctuated by surprising, sometimes stunning, discontinuities.
The modern history of flight is an apt illustration of these inherent
unpredictabilities (Smil 2006). In 1955 it did not require extraordinary imagi-
nation to see that intercontinental jet travel would become a large-scale en-
terprise. But no one could have predicted (just a year after the third fatal
crash of the pioneering British Comet and the consequent grounding of the
first program of commercial jet flight) that by 1970 there would be a plane
capable of carrying more than 400 people. The Boeing 747 was a result of
Juan Trippe’s vision and William Allen’s daring, not an inevitable outcome
of a technical trend. And more surprises followed, including a counterintui-
tively massive increase in the total volume of commercial flying: between
1972 and 1981 two rounds of large oil price increases more than quintupled
(in real terms) the price of crude oil (from which all of the aviation kerosene
is refined), yet worldwide passenger traffic expanded relentlessly and its vol-
ume was 60 times higher by century’s end than it was in 1955 (ICAO 2001).
Some political discontinuities of the past 50 years have been even more
stunning. Nineteen fifty-five was just six years after the Communist victory
in China’s protracted civil war, only two years after China’s troops made it
impossible for the West to win the Korean War and forced a standoff along
the 38th parallel, and three years before the beginning of the worst famine
in history (Smil 1999). At that time, China, the legitimacy of its regime
606 T H E N E X T 5 0 Y E A R S : U N F O L D I N G T R E N D S
unrecognized by the United States government, was an impoverished, sub-
sistence agrarian economy, glad to receive a few crumbs of wasteful Stalinist
industrial plant, and its per capita gross domestic product was less than 4
percent of the US average. Yet by 2005 China, still very much controlled by
the Communist party, had become a new workshop for the world, an in-
dispensable supplier of goods ranging from pliers to cell phones, and it is
now underwriting America’s excessive spending through its record purchases
of US Treasury bills. How could an.
Home4 Why Europe and not China1. Why does Landes think that Chi.docxpooleavelina
Home4 Why Europe and not China?
1. Why does Landes think that China would not have developed an industrial revolution on its own? (Landes 2006 “Why Europe and the West? Why not China?” is posted on file)
2. Why does he think that China failed to learn new technologies from Europeans in the period after 1500?
3. In Landes’ view, what did Europe have that China lacked? That is, what did Europe have that permitted it to have an industrial revolution?
4. What does Pomeranz say about the factors that Landes identifies as the crucial features of European society that permitted it to have an industrial revolution? Why does he say that these features did not matter?
5. What does Pomeranz think are the crucial factors that enabled Europe to have an industrial revolution?
Note: You can learn about Pomeranz’s ideas from Marks, pp 104-118.(Already posted it on file)
required that all goods be transported in their ships, and forced European
New World colonists to trade only with the mother country, even if
smuggling made such a policy somewhat porous. Mercantilist ideas also
led to policies that states should use their own raw materials to
manufacture within their own borders anything that was imported, an
action we saw the English take in the early 1700s to keep Indian cotton
textiles out. Although mercantilist policies did indeed lead to the
establishment of industries in European states, industrialization itself was
not the object: keeping gold and silver from flowing out of the state and
enriching others was. European states were obsessed with their silver
stocks: ‘‘the more silver, the stronger the state’’ was how a German once
put it.40
In these inter-European wars, the fates and fortunes of various states
rose and fell. As we have already seen, by the end of the sixteenth century,
Spain’s power had begun to wane, and Portugal proved to be too small to
mount much of a challenge to the French (or Spanish) in Europe, or to the
Dutch in Asian waters. The Dutch, being among the first Europeans to
apply vast amounts of capital to their trading enterprises in both Asia and
the Americas, saw their fortunes peak in the seventeenth century, just as
the French and the British were gaining power. Ultimately, though, the
Dutch did not have the manpower to build a standing army sufficiently
large to counter the French, and they ultimately allied with the British to
offset French power on the continent. By the eighteenth century, Britain
and France had emerged from the seventeenth-century crisis as the two
most powerful and competitive European states. (See map 3.1.)
The Seven Years’ War, 1756–1763
As the strongest and most successful European states, England and France
competed not just in Europe but in the Americas and Asia as well. In the
‘‘long’’ eighteenth century from 1689 to 1815, Britain and France fought
five wars, only one of which Britain did not initiate. Their engagement
(with others) in the War of Spanish Succession was ended by the 1713
Tr ...
19 c Europe, session 2.9; The German Question, 1850-66Jim Powers
Now we look at the question which had faced Germans since the great upheaval of 1848, should Germany be unified with or without the Austrian Empire. It will be decided in the Seven Weeks War.
This paper analyzes trends in income inequality in the United States from 1913 to 1998 using tax return data. It finds that the share of total income received by top earners follows a U-shaped pattern over the century. Top capital income shares declined significantly due to economic shocks like the Great Depression and World War II and never fully recovered due to progressive taxation. In contrast, top wage shares were flat until 1940 but surged from the 1960s onward, driving increased inequality. As a result, highly paid workers have replaced wealthy investors at the top of the income distribution.
The document provides tips on writing essays in history at level 4. It explains that there are two types of essays: causative and argumentative. Both require a clear introduction, body, and conclusion. The introduction should include the topic, explain key details, and state the aim. The body should have paragraphs with a statement, explanation, illustration, and link back to the statement. The conclusion should briefly summarize without new information. Causative essays explain reasons for an event, while argumentative essays assess significance by discussing points for and against.
Figaro's Mozart - Le Figaro's strange love affair with Mozart's operas, 1826-...Jean-Louis Gosselin
This is the dissertation I wrote for my Masters in Music at Kings College London. This involved doing interesting research at the British Library in Colindale, north London, digging up 200-year old articles from the French newspaper to support that idea that Mozart's music had a strong influence in setting up a French school and style of music.
This document discusses how asymmetric economic shocks that affect some parts of an economy more than others can create problems for policymakers trying to set macroeconomic policies. It gives the example of how some economies may be dependent on oil prices, so a drop in oil prices would help them but could hurt other parts of the economy. This is a constant problem for those setting interest rates for the eurozone given the differences among eurozone economies and their potential exposures to different shocks.
Similar to Kondratieff Cycles - The Long Waves In Economic Life (1935) (20)
Kapcsolatfelvételi teszt - Mary Rodwell, Exopolitika Magyarország
Ha úgy gondolod, hogy volt már ufóélményed, de nem érted pontosan; ha úgy érzed, küldetésed van; ha nem érted miért vagy e bolygón, akkor ebből a tesztből válaszokra vagy válaszirányra lelhetsz.
Mary Rodwell és az Exopolitika Magyarország közös írása.
Ajánlott még: Csillaggyermek-teszt: http://www.slideshare.net/exopolitika/csillaggyermekteszt-exopolitika-magyarorszg
Mary Rodwell - New Human and Hybrids, 2021 lecture, 98 slidesExopolitics Hungary
Mary Rodwell - New Human and Hybrids, 2021 lecture, 98 slides. New children with cosmic knowledge and upgraded abilities - the future of mankind. Source https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ErlSH4rFmd0 (Positive Alien Agenda youtube-channel)
STE Competency Guidelines for Professionals - Spiritually Transformative Expe...Exopolitics Hungary
American Center for the Integration of Spiritually Transformative Experiences - Cultural Competency Guidelines for Professionals Working with Clients who report issues related to their Spiritually Transformative Experiences. See more: aciste.org
NDE Study - University of Maryland. This dissertation is based on a comprehensive study which investigated the meaning and social significance of "near-death experiences" (NDEs) by situating 50 experiencers (NDErs) as the "inside" experts on these profound, subjective experiences and their real-world impact.
I used a phenomenological, "person-centered" ethnographic approach, new to Near-Death Studies, to make experiencers' lives the orienting framework for my study. Informed by "reformist" qualitative-research ethics and health-education-and-counseling values, I analyzed study-participants' life-history narratives against medical-scientific Near-Death Studies explanatory models, an NDE-Integration-Trajectory (NDE IT) patterns model, and social construction and identity-alternation theory.
My findings were, first, that study participants' descriptions of NDE impact and aftereffects, which matched previous findings, were adequately explained by neither social construction nor medical-scientific theory.
Second, participants in this and previous studies described significant NDE interpretation and integration problems, in which I recognized a previously unidentified, health-education-and-counseling-related, pattern of unmet NDE integration needs.
Third, my findings supported the previous NDE IT findings and model; and also recognized the importance of individuals' multiple cultural meaning systems in shaping their NDE integration patterns.
Fourth, 29 of 50 study participants had not sought out and did not identify Near-Death Studies as a useful NDE integration context or resource; and they described it negatively if they mentioned it at all.
Moreover, the 21 participants who had sought a connection with Near-Death Studies expressed similar dissatisfactions.
My findings speak to the need for development of a research agenda and model(s) designed to assess and address the education and counseling needs of tens of millions of NDErs, and their health care providers.
My analysis addresses the potential social-wellness value, as well as the needs, of a community of 13 million adult NDErs, in the U.S. alone.
It situates its analysis within a context of escalating social and ecological crises and an in-progress paradigm-shift away from the still-official Newtonian/Cartesian material world view of Western culture.
It recognizes the potential social value of NDErs' collective visibility as agents, among many others of a (re)emergent sacred worldview; one that is linked to the world views of diverse indigenous knowledge systems as well as of quantum physics.
Yvonne Kason - After-Effects of Spiritually Transformative Experiences (STEs)Exopolitics Hungary
Yvonne Kason - After-Effects of Spiritually Transformative Experiences.
Spiritually Transformative Experiences are sometimes referred to as “extraordinary experiences”, “exceptional human experiences”, “spiritual emergence syndrome”, samadhis, siddhis, ascension experiences, and other terms.
All types of Spiritually Transformative Experiences tend to transform experiencers’ values in a more spiritual direction and propel an increased desire to be loving, ethical, and of service to others.
CE-5 Handbook 2020 (Steven Greer - Close Encounters movie)Exopolitics Hungary
This document provides an overview and guide for conducting Close Encounters of the Fifth Kind (CE-5), which involves humans intentionally initiating contact with extraterrestrial life. It discusses the origins and key elements of CE-5, including connecting to one-mind consciousness, maintaining a sincere heart, and having a clear intention. The document also offers tips for raising vibration, group coherence, believing visual sightings will occur, joining with others, finding people to conduct CE-5 with, running a group, picking locations, preparing for first contacts, keeping logs, using equipment, communicating with ETs, types of sightings to expect, meditations, music, sample agendas and more.
Onstellar terms of sale - it requires an Ethereum account :-/ It is a blockchain based alternative for facebook. It collects personal data at the beginning, so it is not anonymous, but it grants financial rewards for contents created, so this is understandable. Its main power is that it cannot be censored, yet it allows embedding social media elements (like youtube videos), which are a weak link: youtube videos can be censored/deleted on youtube.
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Kondratieff Cycles - The Long Waves In Economic Life (1935)
1. TheReviewof EconomicStatistics
NOVEMBER, 1935VOLUME XVII NUMBER 6
THE LONG WAVES IN ECONOMIC LIFE
N. D. KONDRATIEFF
FOREWORD
The editors of the REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STATISTICS are happy to be able to present in translation the
peculiarly important article by Professor Kondratiefi, which, under the title “Die langen Wellen der Konjunktur,”
appeared in the Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik in 1926 (vol. 56, no. 3, pp. 573-609). The combining
circumstances of an increasing interest in “long waves” and the difficulty of securing access to the original article
would alone justify translation and publication of Kondratieff’s contribution to the theory of the trade cycle. In
addition, the editors would take this means of indicating their intention from time to time of rendering available to
the English-using world outstanding articles in foreign periodicals.
This translation of Professor Kondratieff’s article was made by Mr. W. F. Stolper of Harvard University.
Due to the limitations of space, the editors have taken the liberty to summarize certain sections of this translation.
With the exception of a ten-page appendix of tabular material, however, all tables and charts have been included.
I. INTRODUCTION
/ I 'HE idea that the dynamics of economic life
A in the capitalistic social order is not of a
simple and linear but rather of a complex and
cyclical character is nowadays generally recog¬
nized. Science, however, has fallen far short of
clarifying the nature and the types of these
cyclical, wave-like movements.
When in economics we speak of cycles, we gen¬
erally mean seven to eleven year business cycles.
But these seven to eleven year movements are
obviously not the only type of economic cycles.
The dynamics of economic life is in reality more
complicated. In addition to theabove-mentioned
cycles, which we shall agree to call “intermedi¬
ate,” the existence of still shorter waves of about
three and one-half years’length has recently been
shown to be probable.1
But that is not all. There is, indeed, reason
to assume the existence of long waves of an
average length of about 50 years in the capital¬
istic economy, a fact which still further compli¬
cates the problem of economic dynamics.
to an inquiry into various problems connected
with these long waves. Investigation here is
made difficult by the fact that a very long period
of observation is presupposed. We have, how¬
ever, no data before the end of the eighteenth
century and even the data that we do have are
too scanty and not entirely reliable. Since the
material relating to England and France is the
most complete, it has formed the chief basis of
this inquiry. The statistical methods used were
simple when no secular trend was present in the
series. If the series displayed a secular trend, as
was the case among physical series, the first step
was to divide the annual figures by the popula¬
tion, whenever this was logically possible, in
order to allow for changes in territory. Then the
secular trend was eliminated by the usual sta¬
tistical methods applied toeach series as a whole;
and Kondratiefi refersspecifically to the methods
presented by Dr. Warren M. Persons in this
REVIEW in 1919 and 1920. The deviations from
the secular trend were then smoothed by a nine-
year moving average, in order to eliminate the
seven to eleven year business cycles, the short
cycles, and randomfluctuations possibly present.]
IV. THE WHOLESALE PRICE LEVEL
While the index of French prices goes back
only to the end of the 1850’s, the English and
American indices date back to the close of the
eighteenth century. In order not to overburden
[ 105]
II-III. METHOD
[Sections IIand III of Kondratieff’sexposition
may be summarized as follows:
The succeeding study is to be confined solely
1 Cf. J. Kitchin, “Cycles and Trends in Economic Factors,”
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STATISTICS [hereafter referred to as
“this REVIEW”], V (1923), pp. 10-16.
2. THE REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STATISTICS106
CHART I.
—INDEX NUMBERS OF COMMODITY PRICES*
(.1901-10=100)
360380
+ 360360
340340
3603E0
France
300300
EGOEBO
£60£60
£40£40
£50eeo
EDO£00
1B0ISO
il 16 016 D England.
140 14Qv
iso1£0
Unite1 stales
1D0 100
BQ80
60 60
17BG ’85 1730 ’95 151 ’55 1810 ’15 M ’£5 1838 ’35 1848 45 1&5B ’55 I860 ’85 1828 ’75 1800 ’85 1838 ’35 1900 ’05 1910 15 1980 ’85
* The French data are taken from the Annuaire Statistique [Statistique G6n6rale de la France],1922, p. 341; the index
number has been recalculated on a gold basis through use of dollar-franc exchange rates.
For England, there is for r 782-1865 the index of Jevons; for 1779-1850, a new index number, computed by Silberling
and published in this REVIEW, V (1923); for the period after 1846, we have Sauerbeck’s index, which at present is carried
on by the Statist. Since Silberling’s index is based upon more complete data of the prices of individual commodities than
that of Jevons, we have used the former for the period 1780-1846. From 1846 on we use Sauerbeck’s index number. Both
indices have been tied together on the basis of their relation during 1846-50, for which period they are both available; after
this procedure, we have shifted the series to a new base, 1901-10. For the period 1801-20 and since 1914, in which periods
England was on a paper standard, the index numbers have been recalculated on a gold basis.
For the United, States, we use the following series, which have been tied together: for 1791-1801, H. V. Roelse (Quarterly
Publications of the American Statistical Association, December, 1917); 1801-25, A. H. Hansen {Hid., December, 1915); 1825-39,
C. H. Juergens {ibid., June, 1911); 1840-90, Falkner (Report from the Committee on Finance of the United States Senate
Wholesale Prices, Wages, and Transportation, 52d Congress, 2d session, Report No. 1394, Part 1 [Washington: Government
Printing Office, March 3, 1893]); since 1890, the B. L. S. index. All index numbers are on the base 1901-10. For the Green¬
back period (1862-78), they have been recalculated on a gold basis. All data [except Silberling’s index] are taken from the
Annuaire Statistique, 1922 [which utilizes the sources above cited].
on
this study with figures, the statistical data are
presented exclusively in the form of charts.1
The index numbersof pricesplotted on Chart 1
have been neither smoothed nor treated in any
other way. Nevertheless, a mere glance at the
chart shows that the price level, despite all
deviations and irregularities, exhibits a succes¬
sion of long waves.
The upswing of the first long wave embraces
the period from 1789 to 1814, i.e., 25 years; its
decline begins in 1814 and ends in 1849, a period
1[Ten pages of tabular material were given by Kondratieff
at the end of his article. The charts presented in this trans¬
lation are not merely reproductions of those in the original
article but have been drawn anew from the data given in his
tabular appendix. A few slight discrepancies between the
new charts and those of Kondratieff were discovered, but in
no case were the discrepancies significant.—Editors.]
of 35 years. The cycle is, therefore, completed
in 60 years.2
The rise of the second wave begins in 1849and
ends in 1873, lasting 24 years. The turning
point, however, is not the same in the United
States as in England and France; in the United
States the peak occurs in the year 1866, but this
is to be explained by the Civil War and casts no
doubt on the unity of the picture which the
course of the wave exhibitsin the two continents.
The decline of the second wave begins in 1873
and ends in 1896, a period of 23 years. The
length of the second wave is 47 years.
2 In the upswing, the English index exhibits several peaks,
which fall in the years 1799, 1805, 1810, and 1814; but since
after the year i8t4 a distinctly downward tendency can be
observed, we regard this year as the turning point.
3. THE LONG WAVES IN ECONOMIC LIFE 107
The upward movement of the third wave
begins in 1896 and ends in 1920, its duration
being 24 years. The decline of the wave, accord¬
ing to all data, begins in 1920.
It is easily seen that the French prices after
the close of the 1850’s move generally parallel to
the English and American prices. It is, therefore,
very probable that this parallelism existed in
the preceding period as well.
We conclude, therefore, that three great cycles
are present in the movement of the price level
during the period since the end of the 1780’s, the
last of which is only half completed. The waves
are not of exactly the same length, their duration
varying between 47 and 60 years. The first wave
is the longest.
V. THE RATE OF INTEREST
The courseof theinterest rate can be seen most
conveniently from the movement of the discount
rate and the quotations of interest-bearing secu¬
rities. Because the latter depend less on random
fluctuations and reflect more accurately the influ¬
ence of long-run factors, we use here only the
quotations of state bonds.
CHART 2
QUOTATIONS OF INTEREST-BEARING SECURITIES
The quotations of interest-bearing securities
manifest, as is well known, a movement opposite
to that of general business activity and of the
interest rate. Therefore, if long waves are opera¬
tive in the fluctuations of the interest rate, the
movement of bond quotations must run in a
direction counter to that of commodity prices.
Just this is shown in our chart, which exhibits
clearly the long waves in the movement of the
quotations and consequently of the interest rate.
The chart starts only after the Napoleonic
Wars, i.e., about the time that the first long wave
of commodity prices had reached its peak; it
does not cover the period of the upswing of the
latter. Considering the data at hand, however,
we may suppose that the quotations of state
bonds took part in this movement also.
English consols actually manifest a decidedly
downward tendency between 1792 and 1813.
Their quotation in 1792 is 90.04; in 1813, on the
other hand, it is 58.81. Although they drop most
rapidly in the years 1797 and 1798, yet this steep
decline is only an episode, and the general down¬
ward tendency from 1792 to 1813 stands out
quite clearly.3
Accordingly, the period from the beginning of
the 1790’s up to 1813 appears to be the phase of
rising interest rates. This period agrees perfectly
with that of the rising wave of commodity prices.
The wave of bond quotations rises after 18134
—or the wave of the interest rate declines —even till the middle of the forties. (See the
chart.) According to the unsmoothed data, con¬
sols reached their peak in 1844; the Rente, in
1845. With this, the first great cycle in the
movement of the interest rate is completed.
The downward movement of bond quotations
(or the rise of theinterest rate) during the second
cycle lasts from 1844-45 t0 1870-74.6 From this
time onward until 1897, the market price of
interest-bearing securities rises again, and conse¬
quently the interest rate goes down. With this,
the second great cycle is completed.
The new decline of the quotations (rise in the
3 Cf. N. J. Silberling, “British Financial Experience, 1790-
1830,” this REVIEW, I (1919), p. 289.
4 The first years have disappeared from our chart because of
the use of the nine-year moving average.'
5 According to the original data, consols actually reach their
lowest point in 1866, but the general tendency continues to
be one of decline until 1874. The slump of quotations in 1866
is connected with the increase in the interest rate just preced¬
ing the money-market crisis of that year, and with the Austro-
Prussian War.
+E0
French Rente;
40
-Jt-'d0 V A console V/
-10 -10
-eo-ED T
’15 1BE0 ’£51830 Ti18#151851 Ti I860 IS Iffl T) 188!’85 1830 T5 M '051910 ’1513£0 ’£5
Chart 2 shows the quotations of the French
Rente1 and of English consols.2 Both have a
secular trend during the period of observation.
The chart shows the deviations from the secular
trend smoothed by means of a nine-year moving
average.
1 Until 1825 the quotations of the five-per-cent Rente, after
this the quotations of the three-per-cent Rente. In order to
connect both series, we have first computed relatives with the
base 1825-30 for both series. Then we shifted the base of the
combined series to 1901-10, in order to make them comparable
with the price curve. The original data are taken from the
Annuaire Statistique [Statistique G6n6rale de la France], 1922.
2 According to the data in William Page, ed., Commerce and
Industry, Vol. 2 (London, 1919), statistical tables, pp. 224-25.
Relatives have been calculated from the figures, with the base
1901-10.
4. THE REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STATISTICS108
rate of interest) lasts from 1897 to 1921. Thus
the existence of great cycles in the movement of
the interest rate appears very clearly.1 The
periods of these cycles agree rather closely with
the corresponding periods in the movement of
wholesale commodity prices.
VI-VII. WAGES AND FOREIGN TRADE
[In Section VI, Kondratieff examines the
course of weekly wages of workers in the English
cotton-textile industry since 1806 and of English
agricultural laborers since 1789.2 The original
wage data are reduced to a gold basis and then
expressed in the form of index numbers with
1892 as the base year. Chart 3 presents these
For his foreign-trade series presented in Sec¬
tion VII, Kondratieff takes the sum of French
exports and imports. The figures were first cor¬
rected for population changes, and thereafter the
secular trend (in the form of a second-degree
parabola) was eliminated. The resulting devia¬
tions, smoothed by use of a nine-year moving
average, are presented in Chart 4. After an
CHART 4.—FRENCH FOREIGN TRADE
+40 +40
+E0 +eo
0 11
s-eo -eo
N-40 -40
-60 -60
1831 ’3S 104# ’45 1851 ’55 10E0 15 1871 ’15 1880 ’85 1830 ’35 1300 ’05 1310
examination of the chart, the author concludes
that the data on foreign trade also show the
existence of two great cycles, the periods of
which coincide with those observed in the other
data.]
CHART 3.—WAGES IN ENGLAND
Scale lornScale tori
+1511
+30FH7h:+80
--/--k +1M-
AhAjriculiural laBoren
+5.0
0W-TV-.. VIII. THE PRODUCTION AND
CONSUMPTION OF COAL AND PIG IRON,
AND THE PRODUCTION OF LEAD
So far we have examined the movements only
of such magnitudes, sensitive to changes in busi¬
ness conditions, as possess either a purely value
character, e.g., commodity prices, interest rates,
and wages, or at least a mixed character such as
the data on foreign trade. Our study, however,
would lose much of its force if we did not also
analyze the behavior of purely physical series.
For this purpose we choose English coal pro¬
duction,3 and French consumption of coal,4 as
well as the English production of pig iron and of
lead.6 We divided the original figures by the
population, and eliminated from the resulting
series the secular trends. The deviations from
the lines of trend, after being smoothed by use
of a nine-year moving average, were then ana¬
lyzed. The results are shown in Chart 5.
Continuous data are available, unfortunately,
only for the period after the 1830’s, in part even
only after the 1850’s. Consequently, only one
and one-half to two great cycles can be shown,
but these appear with striking clarity in both
charts.
3 According to the data of W. Page, op. cit.
4 Annuaire Statistique, 1908 and 1922.
6 According to British and Foreign Trade and Industry, and
the Statistical Abstract [for the United Kingdom].
'I-Gottm-lexiilE workers
I I I I I I
L-IB -3.1
n173115180tl151811’MM151838151841’451851151868151878151881'151831 ’151311151311
wage figures as deviations from trend, smoothed
by use of a nine-year moving average. Kon¬
dratieff devotes the remainder of this section to
a description of the series presented in Chart 3,
from which analysis he concludes that, despite
the scantiness of the available data, “long waves
are undoubtedly present in the movement of
wages, the periods of which correspond fairly
well with those in commodity prices and the
interest rate.”
1 The existence of these cycles is also confirmed by several
zur Geschichte des Zins-other studies: P. Wallich, “Beitrage
fusses von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart,” Jahrbiicher fur National-
okonomie und Stalistik, m. Folge, Vol. 42, pp. 289-312;
J. Lescure, “Hausses et Baisses Gcnerales des Prix,” Revue
d’Economic Politique, Nr. 4 (1912); R. A. Macdonald, “The
Rate of Interest Since 1844,” Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society, LXXV (1912), pp. 361-79; T. T. Williams, “The Rate
of Discount and the Price of Consols,” ibid., pp. 380-400.
Also ibid., pp. 401-11, the discussion of the last-mentioned
studies, especially the speech of E. L. Hartley, pp. 404-06.
2 [Earnings of cotton-textile workers for 1806-1906 are taken
from G. H. Wood, The History of Wages in the Cotton Trade
(London, 1910), p. 127; beginning with 1906, they are from
the Abstract of Labour Statistics.
For agricultural laborers, wage data for 1789-1896 are from
A. L. Bowley, “The Statistics of Wages in the United King¬
dom During the Last Hundred Years: Part IV, Agricultural
Wages,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Lxn (1899),
PP- SSS F- Thereafter, the figures are from Page, op. cit. The
data refer to England and Wales.]
5. THE LONG WAVES IN ECONOMIC LIFE 109
There is a retardation in the increase of coal above, although several other series did not
consumption [in France] until the end of the show the cycles with the same clarity. Value
1840’s, then the advance becomes more rapid series which show long waves are the deposits
and reaches its peak in 1865, according to the and the portfolio of the Bank of France, and
smoothed curve (on the chart), and in 1873, deposits at the French savings banks; series of
according to the unsmoothed curve. In the latter a mixed (quantity x price) character are French
year, English coal production also reaches a max- imports and English imports, and total English
imum, according to the unsmoothed curve. Then foreign trade. As regards the movement of
indices of a physical character, the existence,of
long waves has been established in the coal pro¬
duction of the United States, of Germany, and
of the whole world; in the pig-iron production of
the United States and of Germany and of the
whole world; in the lead and coal production of
the United States; in the number of spindles of
the cotton industry in the United States; in the
cotton acreage in the United States and the oat
acreage in France, etc.
It was absolutely impossible, on the other
hand, to establish long waves in French cotton
consumption; in the wool and sugar production
of the United States; and in the movement of
several other series.
CHART 5.—CONSUMPTION OF COAL IN FRANCE AND
PRODUCTION OF COAL, PIG IRON, AND LEAD IN ENGLAND
Coal production and coal consumption
Scale tor France 3cale for England
+4S +eoa
A«-l.....l-l-1 1
v Coal consumption/'v>
„ France/ ;
U sr- t~T ***
+100
0
I :
/
-CD -100
V Coal production,ÿ
I I England > J
-40 -EDO
-BO -300
1S30 ’35 1840 ’45 1550 ’55 I860 Vi 1010 ’15 1880 *80 1830
„ . , . Tig iron andlead production, in E
Scale torpig iron
’35 1900 HO 1910- ”15
nglani
5cal£toi
+E0
X. STATISTICAL FINDINGS
The evidence we have presented thus far per¬
mits some conclusions.
(i) The movements of the series which we
have examined running from the end of the
eighteenth century to the present time show long
cycles. Although the statistical-mathematical
treatment of the series selected is rather compli¬
cated, the cycles discovered cannot be regarded
asthe accidental result of the methodsemployed.
Against such an interpretation is to be set the
fact that these waves have been shown with
about the same timing in all the more important
of the series examined.
(2) In those series which do not exhibit any
marked secular trend —e.g., prices —the long
cycles appear as a wave-like movement about the
average level. In the series, on the other hand,
the movement of which shows such a trend, the
cycles accelerate or retard the rate of growth.
(3) In the several series examined, the turning
points of the long waves correspond more or less
accurately. This is shown clearly by Table i,
which combines the results of the investigation
not only of the data considered above but also
of several other series.1
1 Table 1 enumerates tbe maxima and minima according to
the original data. The problem of the most accurate method
Li
IXAtin +150
A-
Tfyiron--/
TNt.
00
O Leal
-10 -150
-2D -300
-450-30
1840 ’45 1851) ’55 I860 ’65 1818 75 1881 ’81 1890 ’95 1301 ’05 1910 75 1950
follows the decline, which comes to an end in
1890-94, giving way to a new long upswing. So
we observe in the data relative to the rapidity in
the increase of coal production and coal con¬
sumption nearly the whole of two large cycles,
the periods of which correspond closely to the
periods we have already found when considering
other series.
Similarly, English production of pig iron and
lead indicates sufficiently clearly the existence of
one and one-half large cycles.
IX. OTHER SERIES
For the sake of brevity, we break off here the
systematic analysis of the long waves in the
behavior of individual series. We have also
examined other data, some of which likewise
showed the same periods as those mentioned
6. THE REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STATISTICSno
TABLE I
Third cycleSecond cycleFirst cycle
Country and series
Beginning of Beginning of
rise decline
Beginning of
rise
Probable
beginning of
decline
Beginning of Beginning of
declinerise
France
i. Prices
2. Interest rate
3. Portfolio of the Bank of France
4. Deposits at the savings banks..
5. Wages of coal miners
6. Imports
7. Exports
8. Total foreign trade
9. Coal consumption
10. Oat acreage1
18961873 1920
1921
1914
1816*
18x0*
189418721844
18731851 1902
1892
189S
18741844
18741849
189618801848 1914
18941848 1872 1914
18961848 1872 1914
189618731849
1850*
1914
1892187s 1915
England
1. Prices
2. Interest rate
3. Wages of agricultural laborers
4. Wages of textile workers
5. Foreign trade
6. Coal production
7. Pig iron production
8. Lead production
United States
1. Prices
2. Pig iron production
3. Coal production
4. Cotton acreage
1896187318491789 l8l4 1920
192118971816 1844 18741790
188918441812-17
1810*
1810*
18751790
x85ot
1842}
1850*
18901874
18941873 1914
18931873 1914
1871§ 1891 1914
18921870 1914
189618661814 1849 1920
1920
1918
1915
1790
1875-80 1900
18961893
1892-951874-81
Germany
Coal production
Whole world2
1. Pig iron production
2. Coal production. ..
1873II 1895 1915
1872H 1894 1914
18961873 1914
(0S,'1 Reversed cycles.
2 The data which refer to the whole world have not been corrected for population changes.
* Approximate dates.
f Another minimum falls in the year 1835.
t Other minima lie in the years 1837 and 1855.
§ Another maximum falls in the year 1881.
|| Another maximum falls in the year 1883.
If Another maximum falls in the year 1882.
It is easy to see from this table that there is a
very close correspondence in the timing of the
wave movements of the series in the individual
countries, in spite of the difficulties present in the
treatment of these data. Deviations from the
general rule that prevails in the sequence of
the cycles are very rare. It seems to us that
the absence of such exceptions is more remark¬
able than would be their presence.
(4) Although for the time being we consider
it to be impossible to fix exactly upon the years
that marked the turning points of the long
cycles, and although the method according to
which the statistical data have been analyzed
for the determination of the maxima and minima would
deserve a special analysis; at present we leave this question
open. We believe only that the indicated turning points are
the most probable ones.
(
7. THE LONG WAVES IN ECONOMIC LIFE HI
permitsanerror of 5-7 years in the determination (1) The long waves belong really to the same
of the years of such turnings, the following limits complex dynamic process in which the interme-
of these cycles can nevertheless be presented as diate cyclesof the capitalisticeconomy with their
being those most probable: principal phases of upswing and depression run
their course. These intermediate cycles, how¬
ever,secure a certain stamp from the very exist¬
ence of the long waves. Our investigation
2. The decline lasted from 1810-17 demonstrates that during the rise of the long
until 1844-51.
1. The riselasted from the end of the
1780’s or beginning of the 1790’s
until 1810-17.First long wave
waves, years of prosperity are more numerous,
I. The rise lasted from 1844-51 until whereas years of depression predominate during
the downswing.1
(2) During the recession of the long waves,
agriculture, as a rule, suffers an especially pro-
1. The rise lasted from 1890-96 until nounced and long depression. This was what
happened after the Napoleonic Wars; it hap¬
pened again from the beginning of the 1870’s
onward; and the same can be observed in the
(5) Naturally, the fact that the movement of year® after the World War.2
the series examined runs in long cycles does (3) During the recession of the long waves, an
not yet prove that such cycles also dominate the especially large number of important discoveries
movement of all other series. A later examina- and inventions in the technique of production
and communication are made, which, however,
1870-75.
2. The decline lasted from 1870-75
until 1890-96.
Second long wave
1914-20.
2. The decline probably beginsin the
years 1914-20.
Third long wave
tion with this point especially in mind will have
to be made to show which ones of these share are usually applied on a large scale only at the
beginning of the next long upswing.
(4) At the beginning of a long upswing, gold
production increases as a rule, and the world
the described wave-like movement. As already
pointed out, our investigation has also extended
to series in which no such waves were evident.
On the other hand, it is by no means essential market [for goods] is generally enlarged by the
that the long waves embrace ah series. assimilation of new and especially of colonial
(6) The long waves that we have established countries.
above relative to the series most important in
economic life are international; and the timing long waves> i-e-> during the Periodof high tenslon
of these cycles corresponds fairly well for Euro- m the expansion of economic forces, that, as a
pean capitalistic countries. On the basis of the the most disastrous and extensive wars and
data that we have adduced, we can venture the revolutions occur.
statement that the same timing holds also for
the United States. The dynamics in the develop- these recurring relationships an empirical char-
ment of capitalism, however, and especially the acter only, and that we do not by any means
timing of the fluctuations in the latter country hold that they contain the explanation of the
may have peculiarities. long waves-
(5) It is during the period of the rise of the
It is to be emphasized that we attribute to
XII. THE NATURE OF LONG WAVES
Is it possible to maintain that the existence of
of statistical series characterizing the movement long cycles in the dynamics of the capitalist
of the capitalist economy. From another point economy is proved on the basis of the preceding
of view, the historical material relating to the statements? The relevant data which we were
development of economic and social life as a able to quote cover about 140 years. This period
whole confirms the hypothesis of long waves, comprises two and one-half cyclesonly. Although
We neither can nor shall undertake here an anal- the period embraced by the data is sufficient to
ysis of this material. Nevertheless, several
XI. EMPIRICAL CHARACTERISTICS
We were led to these conclusions by the study
1 Cf. A. Spiethoff, “Krisen,” (Eandworterbuch der Staatswis-
' general propositions which we have arrived at senschaften, 4th edition).
concerning the existence and importance of long J2JaÿG.’F wSena™A. person,7h?AgriZtuml
waves may be presented. Situation (New York, 1924).
8. THE REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STATISTICS112
decide the question of theexistenceof longwaves,
it is not enough to enable us to assert beyond
doubt the cyclical character of those waves.
Nevertheless we believe that the available data
are sufficient to declare this cyclical character to
be very probable.
We are led to this conclusion not only by the
consideration of the factual material, but also
because the objections to the assumption of long
cyclical waves are very weak.
It has been objected that long waves lack the
regularity which business cycles display. But
this is wrong. If one defines “regularity” as
repetition in regular time-intervals, then long
waves possess this characteristic as much as the
intermediate ones. A strict periodicity in social
and economic phenomena does not exist at all
—neither in the long nor in the intermediate
waves. The length of the latter fluctuates at
least between 7 and n years, i.e., 57 per cent.
The length of the long cycles fluctuates between
48 and 60 years, i.e., 25 per cent only.
If regularity is understood to be the similarity
and simultaneity of the fluctuations of different
series, then it is present to the same degree in
the long as in the intermediate waves.
If, finally, regularity is understood to consist
in the fact that the intermediate waves are an
international phenomenon, then the long waves
do not differ from the latter in this respect either.
Consequently, there is no less regularity in the
long waves than in the intermediate ones, and
if we want to designate the latter as cyclical,
we are bound not to deny this characterization to
the former.
It has been pointed out [by other critics] that
the long waves —as distinct from the interme¬
diate ones which come from causes within the
capitalistic system —are conditioned by casual,
extra-economic circumstances and events, such
as (1) changes in technique, (2) wars and revolu¬
tions, (3) the assimilation of new countries into
the world economy, and (4) fluctuations in gold
production.
These considerations are important. But they,
too, are not valid. Their weakness lies in the fact
that they reverse the causal connectionsand take
the consequence to be the cause, or see an acci¬
dent where we have really to deal with a law
governing the events. In the preceding para¬
graphs, we have deliberately, though briefly,
considered the establishment of some empirical
rules for the movement of long waves. These
regularities help us now to evaluate correctly the
objections just mentioned.
1. Changes in technique have without doubt a
very potent influence on the course of capitalistic
development. But nobody has proved them to
have an accidental and external origin.
Changes in the technique of production pre¬
sume (1) that the relevant scientific-technical
discoveries and inventions have been made, and
(2) that it is economically possible to use them.
It would be an obvious mistake to deny the cre¬
ative element in scientific-technical discoveries
and inventions. But from an objective view¬
point, a still greater error would occur if one
believed that the direction and intensity of those
discoveries and inventions were entirely acci¬
dental; it is much more probable that such direc¬
tion and intensity are a function of the necessities
of real life and of the preceding development of
science and technique.1
Scientific-technical inventions in themselves,
however, are insufficient to bring about a real
change in the technique of production. They can
remain ineffective so long as economic conditions
favorable to their application are absent. This is
shown by the example of the scientific-technical
inventions of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries which were used on a large scale only
during the industrial revolution at the close of
the eighteenth century. If this be true, then the
assumption that changes in technique are of a
random character and do not in fact spring from
economic necessities loses much of its weight.
We have seen before that the development of
technique itself is part of the rhythm of the long
waves.
2. Wars and revolutions also influence the
course of economic development very strongly.
But wars and revolutions do not come out of a
clear sky, and they are not caused by arbitrary
acts of individual personalities. They originate
from real, especially economic, circumstances.
The assumption that wars and revolutions acting
compelling arguments for the
assumption that scientific and technical inventions and dis¬
coveries are not made accidentally but are intimately con¬
nected with the needs of practical life is given by the numerous
e inventions and discoveries
at the same time at different
of one another. Cf.the long
Social Change (New York, 1924), p. 90. Cf. also Dannemann,
Die Naturwissenschaften in ihrer Entmckelung und in ihrem.
Zusammenhange (Leipzig, 1923).
1 One of the best and most
made
places and entirely independently
list of such cases in W. F. Ogburn,
cases in which the sam
9. THE LONG WAVES IN ECONOMIC LIFE 113
from the outside cause long waves evokes the
question as to why they themselves follow each
other with regularity and solely during the
upswing of long waves. "Much more probable is
the assumption that wars originate in the accel¬
eration of the pace and the increased tension
of economic life, in the heightened economic
struggle for markets and raw materials, and that
social shocks happen most easily under the pres¬
sure of new economic forces.
Wars and revolutions, therefore, can also be
fitted into the rhythm of the long waves and do
not prove to be the forcesfrom which thesemove¬
ments originate, but rather to be one of their
symptoms. But once they have occurred, they
naturally exercise a potent influence on the pace
and direction of economic dynamics.
3. As regards the opening-up of new countries
fortheworld economy, it seemsto be quiteobvious
that this cannot be considered an outside factor
which willsatisfactorily explain the origin of long
waves. The United States have been known for
a relatively very long time; for some reason or
other they begin to be entangled in the world
economy on a major scale only from the middle
of the nineteenth century. Likewise, the Argen¬
tine and Canada, Australia and New Zealand,
were discovered long before the end of the nine¬
teenth century, although they begin to be
entwined in the world economy to a significant
extent only with the coming of the 1890’s. It is
perfectly clear historically that,in the capitalistic
economic system, new regions are opened for
commerce during those periods in which the
desire of old countries for new markets and new
sources of raw materials becomes more urgent
than theretofore. It is equally apparent that the
limitsof this expansion of the world economy are
determined by the degree of this urgency. If
this be true, then the opening of new countries
does not provoke the upswing of a long wave.
On the contrary, a new upswing makes the
exploitation of new countries, new markets, and
new sources of raw materials necessary and pos¬
sible, in that it accelerates the pace of capital¬
istic economic development.
4. There remains the question whether the
discovery of new gold mines, the increase in gold
production, and a consequent increase in the gold
stock can be regarded as a casual, outside factor
causing the long waves.
An increasein gold production leadsultimately
to a rise in prices and to a quickening in the
tempo of economic life. But this does not mean
that the changes in gold production are of a
casual, outside character and that the waves in
prices and in economic life are likewise caused by
chance. We consider this to be not only unproved
but positively wrong. This contention originates
from the belief, first, that the discovery of gold
mines and the perfection of the technique of gold
production are accidental and, secondly, that
every discovery of new gold mines and of tech¬
nical inventions in the sphere of gold production
brings about an increase in the latter. However
great may be the creative element in these tech¬
nical inventions and the significance of chance
in these discoveries, yet they are not entirely
accidental. Still less accidental —and this is the
main point —are the fluctuations in gold pro¬
duction itself. These fluctuations are by no
means simply a function of the activity of inven¬
tors and of the discoveries of new gold mines.
On the contrary, the intensity of inventors’ and
explorers’ activity and the application of techni¬
calimprovement in thesphereof goldproduction,
as well as the resulting increase of the latter,
depend upon other, more general causes. The
dependence of gold production upon technical
inventions and discoveries of new gold mines is
only secondary and derived.
Althoughgoldisa generallyrecognizedembodi¬
ment of valueand,therefore, is generally desired,
it is only a commodity. And like every com¬
modity it has a cost of production. But if this
be true, then gold production —even in newly
discovered mines —can increase significantly
only if it becomes more profitable, i.e., if the
relation of the value of the gold itself to its cost
of production (and this is ultimately the prices
of other commodities) becomes more favorable.
If this relation is unfavorable, even gold mines
the richness of which is by no means yet ex¬
hausted may be shut down; if it is favorable, on
the other hand, even relatively poor mines will
be exploited.
When is the relation of the value of gold to
that of other commodities most favorable for
gold production? We know that commodity
prices reach their lowest level toward the end of
a long wave. This means that at this time gold
has its highest purchasing power, and gold pro¬
duction becomes most favorable. This can be
illustrated by the figures in Table 2.
10. THE REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STATISTICS114
Gold production, as can be seen from these the time when the relation of the value of gold
figures, becomes more profitable as we approach to its cost becomes more unfavorable than there-
a low point in the price level and a high point in tofore, the need for technical improvements in
the purchasing power of gold (1895 and the fol- gold mining and for the"discovery of new mines
necessarily becomes more urgent and thus stim¬
ulates research in this field. There is, of course,
TABLE 2.
—SELECTED STATISTICS OE GOLD MINING IN a time-lag, until this urgent necessity, though
THE TRANSVAAL, 1890-1913* already recognized, leads to positive success. In
reality, therefore, gold discoveries and technical
improvements in gold mining will reach their
peak only when the long wave has already passed
its peak, i.e., perhaps in the middle of the down¬
swing. The available facts confirm this supposi¬
tion.1 In the period after the 1870’s, the follow¬
ing gold discoveries were made: 1881 in Alaska,
1884 in the Transvaal, 1887 in West Australia,
1890 in Colorado, 1894 in Mexico, 1896 in the
Klondike. The inventions in the field of gold¬
mining technique, and especially the most impor¬
tant ones of this period (the inventions for the
treatment of ore), were also made during the
1880’s, as is well known.
Gold discoveries and technical improvements,
if they occur, will naturally influence gold pro¬
duction. They can have the effect that the
increase in gold production takesplace somewhat
earlier than at the end of the downswing of the
long wave. They also can assist the expansion
of gold production, once that limit is reached.
This is precisely what happens in reality. Espe¬
cially after the decline in the 1870’s, a persistent,
though admittedly slender, increase in gold pro¬
duction begins about the year 1883;2 whereas, in
spite of the disturbing influences of discoveries
and inventions, the upswing really begins only
after gold has reached its greatest purchasing
power; and the increased production is due not
only to the newly discovered gold fields but in a
considerable degree also to the old ones. This is
illustrated by the figures in Table 3.
1 Berridge, loc. cit., p. 181.
2 Cf.Statistical Abstract of the United States,1922, pp. 708-09.
lowing years).
ProfitCost of production
Year
Per ton of gold
7 sh. 2 d.
11 sh. 11 d.
14 sh. 3 d.
14 sh. 11 d.
11 sh. 6 d.
9 sh. 10 d.
42 sh. 2 d.
33 sh. s d.
28 sh. o d.
24 sh. 9 d.
22 sh. 2 d.
17 sh. 11 d.
1890
I89S
1899
1903
1906
1913
* Cf. W. A. Berridge, “The World’s Gold Supply,” this
REVIEW, n (1920), p. 184.
It is clear, furthermore, that the stimulus to
increased gold production necessarily becomes
stronger the further a long wave declines. We,
therefore, can suppose theoretically that gold
production must in general increase most mark¬
edly when the wave falls most sharply, and vice
versa.
In reality, however, the connection is not as
simple as this but becomes more complicated,
mainly just because of the effect of the changes
in the technique of gold production and the dis¬
covery of new mines. It seems to us, indeed,
that even improvements in technique and new
gold discoveries obey the same fundamental law
as does gold production itself, with more or less
regularity in timing. Improvements in the tech¬
nique of gold production and the discovery of
new gold mines actually do bring about a low¬
ering in the cost of production of gold; they
influence the relation of these costs to the value
of gold, and consequently the extent of gold pro¬
duction. But then it is obvious that exactly at
TABLE 3. —GOLD PRODUCTION, 1890-1900
{Unit: thousand ounces)
Canada Mexico IndiaUnited States Australia RussiaWorld total Transvaal
6s1,589
2,255
3,437
1,588
2,356
4,46i
1890. 7371435
1,388
1,072
95,749
9,615
14,838
440
1895 2302,017
3,638
101 290
1,029 411 4121900,
Source: Berridge, loc. cit., p. 182
11. THE LONG WAVES IN ECONOMIC LIFE US
From the foregoingone may conclude, it seems
to us, that gold production, even though its
increase can be a condition for an advance in
commodity prices and for a general upswing
in economic activity, is yet subordinate to the
rhythm of the long waves and consequently can¬
not be regarded as a causal and random factor
that brings about these movements from the
outside.
development, but this development obviously
proceeds not only through intermediate waves
but also through long ones. The problem of eco¬
nomic development in toto cannot be discussed
here.
In asserting the existence of long waves and
in denying that they arise out of random causes,
we are also of the opinion that the long waves
arise out of causes which are inherent in the
essence of the capitalistic economy. This nat¬
urally leads to the question as to the nature of
these causes. We are fully aware of the difficulty
and great importance of this question; but in the
preceding sketch we had no intention of laying
the foundations for an appropriate theory of long
waves.1
11 arrived at the hypothesis concerning the existence of
long waves in the years 1919-21. Without going into a special
analysis, I formulated my general thesis for the first time
shortly thereafter in my study, The World Economy and Eco¬
nomic Fluctuations in the War and Post-War Period (Mirovoje
chozjajstvo i jego konjunktury vo vremja i posle vojny [Moscow,
1922]). During the winter and spring of 1925, I wrote a
special study on “Long Waves in Economic Life” (“Bol’schije
cykly konjunktury”), which was published in the volume of
the Institute for Business Cycle Research, Problems of Eco¬
nomic Fluctuations (Voprosy konjunktury, Vol. 1). Only at the
beginning of 1926 did I become acquainted with S. de Wolff’s
article “Prosperitats- und Depressionsperioden,” Der lebendige
Marxismus, Festgdbe zum 70. Geburtstage von Karl Kautsky.
De Wolff in many points reaches the same result as I do. The
works of J. van Geldems, which de Wolff cites and which
have evidently been published only in Dutch, are unknown
to me.
XIII. CONCLUSIONS
The objections to the regular cyclical character
of the long waves, therefore, seem to us to be
unconvincing.
In view of this circumstance and considering
also the positive reasons developed above, we
think that, on the basis of the available data, the
existence of long waves of cyclical character is very
probable.
At the same time, we believe ourselves justi¬
fied in saying that the long waves, if existent at
all, are a very important and essential factor
in economic development, a factor the effects of
which can be found in all the principal fields of
social and economic life.
Even granting the existence of long waves, one
is, of course, not justified in believing that eco¬
nomic dynamics consists only in fluctuations
around a certain level. The course of economic
activity represents beyond doubt a process of
12. The Long Waves in Economic Life
Author(s): N. D. Kondratieff and W. F. Stolper
Source: The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 17, No. 6 (Nov., 1935), pp. 105-115
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1928486
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