Philosophy 11: Introduction to Philosophy
Professor Michael Hicks

12 February 2014

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

1/8
Introductory

Administrative issues

Midterm: Friday

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

2/8
Introductory

Administrative issues

Midterm: Friday
Study Guide up now

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

2/8
Introductory

Administrative issues

Midterm: Friday
Study Guide up now
Open book, open hand-written notes

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

2/8
Introductory

Administrative issues

Midterm: Friday
Study Guide up now
Open book, open hand-written notes
No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

2/8
Introductory

Administrative issues

Midterm: Friday
Study Guide up now
Open book, open hand-written notes
No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.
No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

2/8
The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

3/8
The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

3/8
The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.
What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

3/8
The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.
What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

3/8
The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.
What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?
More complex laws

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

3/8
The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.
What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?
More complex laws
More ignorance about initial conditions

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

3/8
The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.
What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?
More complex laws
More ignorance about initial conditions
Epistemological indeterminacy

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

3/8
The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.
What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?
More complex laws
More ignorance about initial conditions
Epistemological indeterminacy
Potentially non-deterministic laws

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

3/8
The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.
What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?
More complex laws
More ignorance about initial conditions
Epistemological indeterminacy
Potentially non-deterministic laws

Determinism

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

3/8
The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.
What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?
More complex laws
More ignorance about initial conditions
Epistemological indeterminacy
Potentially non-deterministic laws

Determinism
Initial state and laws of nature yield all other states

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

3/8
The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.
What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?
More complex laws
More ignorance about initial conditions
Epistemological indeterminacy
Potentially non-deterministic laws

Determinism
Initial state and laws of nature yield all other states
Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodiction

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

3/8
The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.
What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?
More complex laws
More ignorance about initial conditions
Epistemological indeterminacy
Potentially non-deterministic laws

Determinism
Initial state and laws of nature yield all other states
Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodiction
Divine Foreknowledge

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

3/8
The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.
What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?
More complex laws
More ignorance about initial conditions
Epistemological indeterminacy
Potentially non-deterministic laws

Determinism
Initial state and laws of nature yield all other states
Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodiction
Divine Foreknowledge

Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

3/8
The Problem of Free Will

Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside

Epistemic indeterminacy

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

4/8
The Problem of Free Will

Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside

Epistemic indeterminacy
Precludes perfect prediction/retrodiction

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

4/8
The Problem of Free Will

Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside

Epistemic indeterminacy
Precludes perfect prediction/retrodiction
Basic problem still remains

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

4/8
The Problem of Free Will

Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside

Epistemic indeterminacy
Precludes perfect prediction/retrodiction
Basic problem still remains

What about non-deterministic laws?

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

4/8
The Problem of Free Will

Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside

Epistemic indeterminacy
Precludes perfect prediction/retrodiction
Basic problem still remains

What about non-deterministic laws?
Work at wrong scale: macro-phenomena are deterministic

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

4/8
The Problem of Free Will

Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside

Epistemic indeterminacy
Precludes perfect prediction/retrodiction
Basic problem still remains

What about non-deterministic laws?
Work at wrong scale: macro-phenomena are deterministic
If my activities were determined randomly, it isn’t obvious that would be any
better

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

4/8
Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategy

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

5/8
Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategy
Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

5/8
Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategy
Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom
Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

5/8
Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategy
Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom
Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.
It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

5/8
Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategy
Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom
Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.
It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.

If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn
out that freedom is compatible with necessity.

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

5/8
Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategy
Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom
Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.
It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.

If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn
out that freedom is compatible with necessity.

Necessity

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

5/8
Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategy
Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom
Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.
It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.

If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn
out that freedom is compatible with necessity.

Necessity
Everyone believes in it.

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

5/8
Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategy
Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom
Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.
It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.

If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn
out that freedom is compatible with necessity.

Necessity
Everyone believes in it.
Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

5/8
Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategy
Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom
Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.
It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.

If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn
out that freedom is compatible with necessity.

Necessity
Everyone believes in it.
Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])
Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

5/8
Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategy
Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom
Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.
It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.

If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn
out that freedom is compatible with necessity.

Necessity
Everyone believes in it.
Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])
Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])
Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

5/8
Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategy
Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom
Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.
It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.

If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn
out that freedom is compatible with necessity.

Necessity
Everyone believes in it.
Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])
Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])
Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])
Necessity is opposed to chance.

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

5/8
Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategy
Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom
Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.
It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.

If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn
out that freedom is compatible with necessity.

Necessity
Everyone believes in it.
Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])
Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])
Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])
Necessity is opposed to chance.

If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

5/8
Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

Freedom

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

6/8
Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

Freedom
Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to do

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

6/8
Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

Freedom
Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to do
Freedom is a lack of constraint

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

6/8
Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

Freedom
Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to do
Freedom is a lack of constraint
Is constraint necessity? No.

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

6/8
Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

Freedom
Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to do
Freedom is a lack of constraint
Is constraint necessity? No.

Compatibilism

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

6/8
Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

Freedom
Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to do
Freedom is a lack of constraint
Is constraint necessity? No.

Compatibilism
Our psychological states are subject to natural laws

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

6/8
Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

Freedom
Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to do
Freedom is a lack of constraint
Is constraint necessity? No.

Compatibilism
Our psychological states are subject to natural laws
So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problem

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

6/8
Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

Freedom
Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to do
Freedom is a lack of constraint
Is constraint necessity? No.

Compatibilism
Our psychological states are subject to natural laws
So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problem
There is no other idea of freedom

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

6/8
Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

Freedom
Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to do
Freedom is a lack of constraint
Is constraint necessity? No.

Compatibilism
Our psychological states are subject to natural laws
So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problem
There is no other idea of freedom

The problem of free will

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

6/8
Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

Freedom
Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to do
Freedom is a lack of constraint
Is constraint necessity? No.

Compatibilism
Our psychological states are subject to natural laws
So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problem
There is no other idea of freedom

The problem of free will
Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

6/8
Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

Freedom
Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to do
Freedom is a lack of constraint
Is constraint necessity? No.

Compatibilism
Our psychological states are subject to natural laws
So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problem
There is no other idea of freedom

The problem of free will
Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?
“Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessity

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

6/8
Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

Freedom
Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to do
Freedom is a lack of constraint
Is constraint necessity? No.

Compatibilism
Our psychological states are subject to natural laws
So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problem
There is no other idea of freedom

The problem of free will
Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?
“Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessity
Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

6/8
Incompatibilism

How to dispute compatibilism

Rationalism

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

7/8
Incompatibilism

How to dispute compatibilism

Rationalism
Do we “intuit” that we are free in an incompatibilist sense?

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

7/8
Incompatibilism

How to dispute compatibilism

Rationalism
Do we “intuit” that we are free in an incompatibilist sense?
We certainly intuit that there is a puzzle here

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

7/8
Incompatibilism

How to dispute compatibilism

Rationalism
Do we “intuit” that we are free in an incompatibilist sense?
We certainly intuit that there is a puzzle here
But is there, really?

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

7/8
Incompatibilism

How to dispute compatibilism

Rationalism
Do we “intuit” that we are free in an incompatibilist sense?
We certainly intuit that there is a puzzle here
But is there, really?

The experience of freedom

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

7/8
Incompatibilism

How to dispute compatibilism

Rationalism
Do we “intuit” that we are free in an incompatibilist sense?
We certainly intuit that there is a puzzle here
But is there, really?

The experience of freedom
What we need to do is investigate our feeling of puzzlement

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

7/8
Incompatibilism

How to dispute compatibilism

Rationalism
Do we “intuit” that we are free in an incompatibilist sense?
We certainly intuit that there is a puzzle here
But is there, really?

The experience of freedom
What we need to do is investigate our feeling of puzzlement
If there is an experience that gives us an idea of incompatibilist freedom, we
will have found the problem

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

7/8
Incompatibilism

How to dispute compatibilism

Rationalism
Do we “intuit” that we are free in an incompatibilist sense?
We certainly intuit that there is a puzzle here
But is there, really?

The experience of freedom
What we need to do is investigate our feeling of puzzlement
If there is an experience that gives us an idea of incompatibilist freedom, we
will have found the problem
Does incompatibilism entail libertarianism?

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

7/8
Incompatibilism

How to dispute compatibilism

Rationalism
Do we “intuit” that we are free in an incompatibilist sense?
We certainly intuit that there is a puzzle here
But is there, really?

The experience of freedom
What we need to do is investigate our feeling of puzzlement
If there is an experience that gives us an idea of incompatibilist freedom, we
will have found the problem
Does incompatibilism entail libertarianism?

Searle is a “hard determinist” (incompatibilist anti-libertarian)

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

7/8
Incompatibilism

Searlean Determinisms
Psychological determinism

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

8/8
Incompatibilism

Searlean Determinisms
Psychological determinism
Hypnosis victim claims to have reasons for doing what he does

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

8/8
Incompatibilism

Searlean Determinisms
Psychological determinism
Hypnosis victim claims to have reasons for doing what he does
We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are
mere rationalizations

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

8/8
Incompatibilism

Searlean Determinisms
Psychological determinism
Hypnosis victim claims to have reasons for doing what he does
We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are
mere rationalizations
Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are
rationalizations

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

8/8
Incompatibilism

Searlean Determinisms
Psychological determinism
Hypnosis victim claims to have reasons for doing what he does
We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are
mere rationalizations
Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are
rationalizations
Is Hume a psychological determinist?

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

8/8
Incompatibilism

Searlean Determinisms
Psychological determinism
Hypnosis victim claims to have reasons for doing what he does
We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are
mere rationalizations
Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are
rationalizations
Is Hume a psychological determinist?
Psychological determinism is false (91)

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

8/8
Incompatibilism

Searlean Determinisms
Psychological determinism
Hypnosis victim claims to have reasons for doing what he does
We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are
mere rationalizations
Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are
rationalizations
Is Hume a psychological determinist?
Psychological determinism is false (91)

Physical determinism

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

8/8
Incompatibilism

Searlean Determinisms
Psychological determinism
Hypnosis victim claims to have reasons for doing what he does
We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are
mere rationalizations
Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are
rationalizations
Is Hume a psychological determinist?
Psychological determinism is false (91)

Physical determinism
The argument against psychological determinism is that reason (sometimes)
matters.

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

8/8
Incompatibilism

Searlean Determinisms
Psychological determinism
Hypnosis victim claims to have reasons for doing what he does
We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are
mere rationalizations
Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are
rationalizations
Is Hume a psychological determinist?
Psychological determinism is false (91)

Physical determinism
The argument against psychological determinism is that reason (sometimes)
matters.
But is reason deterministic or anti-deterministic?

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

8/8
Incompatibilism

Searlean Determinisms
Psychological determinism
Hypnosis victim claims to have reasons for doing what he does
We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are
mere rationalizations
Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are
rationalizations
Is Hume a psychological determinist?
Psychological determinism is false (91)

Physical determinism
The argument against psychological determinism is that reason (sometimes)
matters.
But is reason deterministic or anti-deterministic?
Searle argues that there is no good reason to think the invocation of reason
avoids the problem.

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

8/8
Incompatibilism

Searlean Determinisms
Psychological determinism
Hypnosis victim claims to have reasons for doing what he does
We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are
mere rationalizations
Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are
rationalizations
Is Hume a psychological determinist?
Psychological determinism is false (91)

Physical determinism
The argument against psychological determinism is that reason (sometimes)
matters.
But is reason deterministic or anti-deterministic?
Searle argues that there is no good reason to think the invocation of reason
avoids the problem.

Models of causation

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

8/8
Incompatibilism

Searlean Determinisms
Psychological determinism
Hypnosis victim claims to have reasons for doing what he does
We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are
mere rationalizations
Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are
rationalizations
Is Hume a psychological determinist?
Psychological determinism is false (91)

Physical determinism
The argument against psychological determinism is that reason (sometimes)
matters.
But is reason deterministic or anti-deterministic?
Searle argues that there is no good reason to think the invocation of reason
avoids the problem.

Models of causation
Top-down story: mental states (e.g., decisions) cause physical events (e.g.,
hand-movings)

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

8/8
Incompatibilism

Searlean Determinisms
Psychological determinism
Hypnosis victim claims to have reasons for doing what he does
We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are
mere rationalizations
Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are
rationalizations
Is Hume a psychological determinist?
Psychological determinism is false (91)

Physical determinism
The argument against psychological determinism is that reason (sometimes)
matters.
But is reason deterministic or anti-deterministic?
Searle argues that there is no good reason to think the invocation of reason
avoids the problem.

Models of causation
Top-down story: mental states (e.g., decisions) cause physical events (e.g.,
hand-movings)
Bottom-up story: physical states (e.g., neural processes) explain mental states
(e.g., decisions)

Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

8/8
Incompatibilism

Searlean Determinisms
Psychological determinism
Hypnosis victim claims to have reasons for doing what he does
We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are
mere rationalizations
Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are
rationalizations
Is Hume a psychological determinist?
Psychological determinism is false (91)

Physical determinism
The argument against psychological determinism is that reason (sometimes)
matters.
But is reason deterministic or anti-deterministic?
Searle argues that there is no good reason to think the invocation of reason
avoids the problem.

Models of causation
Top-down story: mental states (e.g., decisions) cause physical events (e.g.,
hand-movings)
Bottom-up story: physical states (e.g., neural processes) explain mental states
(e.g., decisions)
Searle: top-down causal stories can always be replaced with bottom-level only
causal stories.
Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

8/8
Incompatibilism

Searlean Determinisms
Psychological determinism
Hypnosis victim claims to have reasons for doing what he does
We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are
mere rationalizations
Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are
rationalizations
Is Hume a psychological determinist?
Psychological determinism is false (91)

Physical determinism
The argument against psychological determinism is that reason (sometimes)
matters.
But is reason deterministic or anti-deterministic?
Searle argues that there is no good reason to think the invocation of reason
avoids the problem.

Models of causation
Top-down story: mental states (e.g., decisions) cause physical events (e.g.,
hand-movings)
Bottom-up story: physical states (e.g., neural processes) explain mental states
(e.g., decisions)
Searle: top-down causal stories can always be replaced with bottom-level only
causal stories.
Prof. Hicks

Phil 11

February 12

8/8

Intro day 16

  • 1.
    Philosophy 11: Introductionto Philosophy Professor Michael Hicks 12 February 2014 Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 1/8
  • 2.
  • 3.
    Introductory Administrative issues Midterm: Friday StudyGuide up now Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 2/8
  • 4.
    Introductory Administrative issues Midterm: Friday StudyGuide up now Open book, open hand-written notes Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 2/8
  • 5.
    Introductory Administrative issues Midterm: Friday StudyGuide up now Open book, open hand-written notes No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc. Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 2/8
  • 6.
    Introductory Administrative issues Midterm: Friday StudyGuide up now Open book, open hand-written notes No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc. No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 2/8
  • 7.
    The Problem ofFree Will Determinism as a problem Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or out). Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 3/8
  • 8.
    The Problem ofFree Will Determinism as a problem Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or out). We can predict where they’ll all end up. Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 3/8
  • 9.
    The Problem ofFree Will Determinism as a problem Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or out). We can predict where they’ll all end up. What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc. Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 3/8
  • 10.
    The Problem ofFree Will Determinism as a problem Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or out). We can predict where they’ll all end up. What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc. Scaling up: what changes? Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 3/8
  • 11.
    The Problem ofFree Will Determinism as a problem Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or out). We can predict where they’ll all end up. What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc. Scaling up: what changes? More complex laws Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 3/8
  • 12.
    The Problem ofFree Will Determinism as a problem Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or out). We can predict where they’ll all end up. What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc. Scaling up: what changes? More complex laws More ignorance about initial conditions Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 3/8
  • 13.
    The Problem ofFree Will Determinism as a problem Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or out). We can predict where they’ll all end up. What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc. Scaling up: what changes? More complex laws More ignorance about initial conditions Epistemological indeterminacy Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 3/8
  • 14.
    The Problem ofFree Will Determinism as a problem Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or out). We can predict where they’ll all end up. What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc. Scaling up: what changes? More complex laws More ignorance about initial conditions Epistemological indeterminacy Potentially non-deterministic laws Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 3/8
  • 15.
    The Problem ofFree Will Determinism as a problem Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or out). We can predict where they’ll all end up. What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc. Scaling up: what changes? More complex laws More ignorance about initial conditions Epistemological indeterminacy Potentially non-deterministic laws Determinism Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 3/8
  • 16.
    The Problem ofFree Will Determinism as a problem Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or out). We can predict where they’ll all end up. What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc. Scaling up: what changes? More complex laws More ignorance about initial conditions Epistemological indeterminacy Potentially non-deterministic laws Determinism Initial state and laws of nature yield all other states Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 3/8
  • 17.
    The Problem ofFree Will Determinism as a problem Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or out). We can predict where they’ll all end up. What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc. Scaling up: what changes? More complex laws More ignorance about initial conditions Epistemological indeterminacy Potentially non-deterministic laws Determinism Initial state and laws of nature yield all other states Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodiction Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 3/8
  • 18.
    The Problem ofFree Will Determinism as a problem Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or out). We can predict where they’ll all end up. What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc. Scaling up: what changes? More complex laws More ignorance about initial conditions Epistemological indeterminacy Potentially non-deterministic laws Determinism Initial state and laws of nature yield all other states Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodiction Divine Foreknowledge Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 3/8
  • 19.
    The Problem ofFree Will Determinism as a problem Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or out). We can predict where they’ll all end up. What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc. Scaling up: what changes? More complex laws More ignorance about initial conditions Epistemological indeterminacy Potentially non-deterministic laws Determinism Initial state and laws of nature yield all other states Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodiction Divine Foreknowledge Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world? Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 3/8
  • 20.
    The Problem ofFree Will Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside Epistemic indeterminacy Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 4/8
  • 21.
    The Problem ofFree Will Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside Epistemic indeterminacy Precludes perfect prediction/retrodiction Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 4/8
  • 22.
    The Problem ofFree Will Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside Epistemic indeterminacy Precludes perfect prediction/retrodiction Basic problem still remains Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 4/8
  • 23.
    The Problem ofFree Will Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside Epistemic indeterminacy Precludes perfect prediction/retrodiction Basic problem still remains What about non-deterministic laws? Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 4/8
  • 24.
    The Problem ofFree Will Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside Epistemic indeterminacy Precludes perfect prediction/retrodiction Basic problem still remains What about non-deterministic laws? Work at wrong scale: macro-phenomena are deterministic Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 4/8
  • 25.
    The Problem ofFree Will Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside Epistemic indeterminacy Precludes perfect prediction/retrodiction Basic problem still remains What about non-deterministic laws? Work at wrong scale: macro-phenomena are deterministic If my activities were determined randomly, it isn’t obvious that would be any better Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 4/8
  • 26.
    Humean Compatibilism Hume’s Compatibilism Thestrategy Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 5/8
  • 27.
    Humean Compatibilism Hume’s Compatibilism Thestrategy Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 5/8
  • 28.
    Humean Compatibilism Hume’s Compatibilism Thestrategy Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks, a confusion. Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 5/8
  • 29.
    Humean Compatibilism Hume’s Compatibilism Thestrategy Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks, a confusion. It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all. Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 5/8
  • 30.
    Humean Compatibilism Hume’s Compatibilism Thestrategy Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks, a confusion. It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all. If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn out that freedom is compatible with necessity. Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 5/8
  • 31.
    Humean Compatibilism Hume’s Compatibilism Thestrategy Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks, a confusion. It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all. If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn out that freedom is compatible with necessity. Necessity Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 5/8
  • 32.
    Humean Compatibilism Hume’s Compatibilism Thestrategy Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks, a confusion. It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all. If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn out that freedom is compatible with necessity. Necessity Everyone believes in it. Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 5/8
  • 33.
    Humean Compatibilism Hume’s Compatibilism Thestrategy Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks, a confusion. It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all. If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn out that freedom is compatible with necessity. Necessity Everyone believes in it. Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19]) Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 5/8
  • 34.
    Humean Compatibilism Hume’s Compatibilism Thestrategy Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks, a confusion. It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all. If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn out that freedom is compatible with necessity. Necessity Everyone believes in it. Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19]) Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20]) Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 5/8
  • 35.
    Humean Compatibilism Hume’s Compatibilism Thestrategy Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks, a confusion. It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all. If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn out that freedom is compatible with necessity. Necessity Everyone believes in it. Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19]) Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20]) Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21]) Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 5/8
  • 36.
    Humean Compatibilism Hume’s Compatibilism Thestrategy Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks, a confusion. It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all. If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn out that freedom is compatible with necessity. Necessity Everyone believes in it. Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19]) Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20]) Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21]) Necessity is opposed to chance. Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 5/8
  • 37.
    Humean Compatibilism Hume’s Compatibilism Thestrategy Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks, a confusion. It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all. If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn out that freedom is compatible with necessity. Necessity Everyone believes in it. Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19]) Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20]) Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21]) Necessity is opposed to chance. If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem? Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 5/8
  • 38.
  • 39.
    Humean Compatibilism Compatibilism, continued Freedom Constraintis being prevented from doing something one wants to do Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 6/8
  • 40.
    Humean Compatibilism Compatibilism, continued Freedom Constraintis being prevented from doing something one wants to do Freedom is a lack of constraint Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 6/8
  • 41.
    Humean Compatibilism Compatibilism, continued Freedom Constraintis being prevented from doing something one wants to do Freedom is a lack of constraint Is constraint necessity? No. Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 6/8
  • 42.
    Humean Compatibilism Compatibilism, continued Freedom Constraintis being prevented from doing something one wants to do Freedom is a lack of constraint Is constraint necessity? No. Compatibilism Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 6/8
  • 43.
    Humean Compatibilism Compatibilism, continued Freedom Constraintis being prevented from doing something one wants to do Freedom is a lack of constraint Is constraint necessity? No. Compatibilism Our psychological states are subject to natural laws Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 6/8
  • 44.
    Humean Compatibilism Compatibilism, continued Freedom Constraintis being prevented from doing something one wants to do Freedom is a lack of constraint Is constraint necessity? No. Compatibilism Our psychological states are subject to natural laws So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problem Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 6/8
  • 45.
    Humean Compatibilism Compatibilism, continued Freedom Constraintis being prevented from doing something one wants to do Freedom is a lack of constraint Is constraint necessity? No. Compatibilism Our psychological states are subject to natural laws So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problem There is no other idea of freedom Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 6/8
  • 46.
    Humean Compatibilism Compatibilism, continued Freedom Constraintis being prevented from doing something one wants to do Freedom is a lack of constraint Is constraint necessity? No. Compatibilism Our psychological states are subject to natural laws So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problem There is no other idea of freedom The problem of free will Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 6/8
  • 47.
    Humean Compatibilism Compatibilism, continued Freedom Constraintis being prevented from doing something one wants to do Freedom is a lack of constraint Is constraint necessity? No. Compatibilism Our psychological states are subject to natural laws So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problem There is no other idea of freedom The problem of free will Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom? Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 6/8
  • 48.
    Humean Compatibilism Compatibilism, continued Freedom Constraintis being prevented from doing something one wants to do Freedom is a lack of constraint Is constraint necessity? No. Compatibilism Our psychological states are subject to natural laws So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problem There is no other idea of freedom The problem of free will Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom? “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessity Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 6/8
  • 49.
    Humean Compatibilism Compatibilism, continued Freedom Constraintis being prevented from doing something one wants to do Freedom is a lack of constraint Is constraint necessity? No. Compatibilism Our psychological states are subject to natural laws So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problem There is no other idea of freedom The problem of free will Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom? “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessity Is there an idea of libertarian freedom? Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 6/8
  • 50.
    Incompatibilism How to disputecompatibilism Rationalism Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 7/8
  • 51.
    Incompatibilism How to disputecompatibilism Rationalism Do we “intuit” that we are free in an incompatibilist sense? Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 7/8
  • 52.
    Incompatibilism How to disputecompatibilism Rationalism Do we “intuit” that we are free in an incompatibilist sense? We certainly intuit that there is a puzzle here Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 7/8
  • 53.
    Incompatibilism How to disputecompatibilism Rationalism Do we “intuit” that we are free in an incompatibilist sense? We certainly intuit that there is a puzzle here But is there, really? Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 7/8
  • 54.
    Incompatibilism How to disputecompatibilism Rationalism Do we “intuit” that we are free in an incompatibilist sense? We certainly intuit that there is a puzzle here But is there, really? The experience of freedom Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 7/8
  • 55.
    Incompatibilism How to disputecompatibilism Rationalism Do we “intuit” that we are free in an incompatibilist sense? We certainly intuit that there is a puzzle here But is there, really? The experience of freedom What we need to do is investigate our feeling of puzzlement Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 7/8
  • 56.
    Incompatibilism How to disputecompatibilism Rationalism Do we “intuit” that we are free in an incompatibilist sense? We certainly intuit that there is a puzzle here But is there, really? The experience of freedom What we need to do is investigate our feeling of puzzlement If there is an experience that gives us an idea of incompatibilist freedom, we will have found the problem Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 7/8
  • 57.
    Incompatibilism How to disputecompatibilism Rationalism Do we “intuit” that we are free in an incompatibilist sense? We certainly intuit that there is a puzzle here But is there, really? The experience of freedom What we need to do is investigate our feeling of puzzlement If there is an experience that gives us an idea of incompatibilist freedom, we will have found the problem Does incompatibilism entail libertarianism? Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 7/8
  • 58.
    Incompatibilism How to disputecompatibilism Rationalism Do we “intuit” that we are free in an incompatibilist sense? We certainly intuit that there is a puzzle here But is there, really? The experience of freedom What we need to do is investigate our feeling of puzzlement If there is an experience that gives us an idea of incompatibilist freedom, we will have found the problem Does incompatibilism entail libertarianism? Searle is a “hard determinist” (incompatibilist anti-libertarian) Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 7/8
  • 59.
  • 60.
    Incompatibilism Searlean Determinisms Psychological determinism Hypnosisvictim claims to have reasons for doing what he does Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 8/8
  • 61.
    Incompatibilism Searlean Determinisms Psychological determinism Hypnosisvictim claims to have reasons for doing what he does We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are mere rationalizations Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 8/8
  • 62.
    Incompatibilism Searlean Determinisms Psychological determinism Hypnosisvictim claims to have reasons for doing what he does We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are mere rationalizations Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are rationalizations Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 8/8
  • 63.
    Incompatibilism Searlean Determinisms Psychological determinism Hypnosisvictim claims to have reasons for doing what he does We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are mere rationalizations Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are rationalizations Is Hume a psychological determinist? Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 8/8
  • 64.
    Incompatibilism Searlean Determinisms Psychological determinism Hypnosisvictim claims to have reasons for doing what he does We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are mere rationalizations Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are rationalizations Is Hume a psychological determinist? Psychological determinism is false (91) Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 8/8
  • 65.
    Incompatibilism Searlean Determinisms Psychological determinism Hypnosisvictim claims to have reasons for doing what he does We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are mere rationalizations Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are rationalizations Is Hume a psychological determinist? Psychological determinism is false (91) Physical determinism Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 8/8
  • 66.
    Incompatibilism Searlean Determinisms Psychological determinism Hypnosisvictim claims to have reasons for doing what he does We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are mere rationalizations Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are rationalizations Is Hume a psychological determinist? Psychological determinism is false (91) Physical determinism The argument against psychological determinism is that reason (sometimes) matters. Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 8/8
  • 67.
    Incompatibilism Searlean Determinisms Psychological determinism Hypnosisvictim claims to have reasons for doing what he does We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are mere rationalizations Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are rationalizations Is Hume a psychological determinist? Psychological determinism is false (91) Physical determinism The argument against psychological determinism is that reason (sometimes) matters. But is reason deterministic or anti-deterministic? Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 8/8
  • 68.
    Incompatibilism Searlean Determinisms Psychological determinism Hypnosisvictim claims to have reasons for doing what he does We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are mere rationalizations Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are rationalizations Is Hume a psychological determinist? Psychological determinism is false (91) Physical determinism The argument against psychological determinism is that reason (sometimes) matters. But is reason deterministic or anti-deterministic? Searle argues that there is no good reason to think the invocation of reason avoids the problem. Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 8/8
  • 69.
    Incompatibilism Searlean Determinisms Psychological determinism Hypnosisvictim claims to have reasons for doing what he does We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are mere rationalizations Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are rationalizations Is Hume a psychological determinist? Psychological determinism is false (91) Physical determinism The argument against psychological determinism is that reason (sometimes) matters. But is reason deterministic or anti-deterministic? Searle argues that there is no good reason to think the invocation of reason avoids the problem. Models of causation Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 8/8
  • 70.
    Incompatibilism Searlean Determinisms Psychological determinism Hypnosisvictim claims to have reasons for doing what he does We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are mere rationalizations Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are rationalizations Is Hume a psychological determinist? Psychological determinism is false (91) Physical determinism The argument against psychological determinism is that reason (sometimes) matters. But is reason deterministic or anti-deterministic? Searle argues that there is no good reason to think the invocation of reason avoids the problem. Models of causation Top-down story: mental states (e.g., decisions) cause physical events (e.g., hand-movings) Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 8/8
  • 71.
    Incompatibilism Searlean Determinisms Psychological determinism Hypnosisvictim claims to have reasons for doing what he does We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are mere rationalizations Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are rationalizations Is Hume a psychological determinist? Psychological determinism is false (91) Physical determinism The argument against psychological determinism is that reason (sometimes) matters. But is reason deterministic or anti-deterministic? Searle argues that there is no good reason to think the invocation of reason avoids the problem. Models of causation Top-down story: mental states (e.g., decisions) cause physical events (e.g., hand-movings) Bottom-up story: physical states (e.g., neural processes) explain mental states (e.g., decisions) Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 8/8
  • 72.
    Incompatibilism Searlean Determinisms Psychological determinism Hypnosisvictim claims to have reasons for doing what he does We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are mere rationalizations Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are rationalizations Is Hume a psychological determinist? Psychological determinism is false (91) Physical determinism The argument against psychological determinism is that reason (sometimes) matters. But is reason deterministic or anti-deterministic? Searle argues that there is no good reason to think the invocation of reason avoids the problem. Models of causation Top-down story: mental states (e.g., decisions) cause physical events (e.g., hand-movings) Bottom-up story: physical states (e.g., neural processes) explain mental states (e.g., decisions) Searle: top-down causal stories can always be replaced with bottom-level only causal stories. Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 8/8
  • 73.
    Incompatibilism Searlean Determinisms Psychological determinism Hypnosisvictim claims to have reasons for doing what he does We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are mere rationalizations Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are rationalizations Is Hume a psychological determinist? Psychological determinism is false (91) Physical determinism The argument against psychological determinism is that reason (sometimes) matters. But is reason deterministic or anti-deterministic? Searle argues that there is no good reason to think the invocation of reason avoids the problem. Models of causation Top-down story: mental states (e.g., decisions) cause physical events (e.g., hand-movings) Bottom-up story: physical states (e.g., neural processes) explain mental states (e.g., decisions) Searle: top-down causal stories can always be replaced with bottom-level only causal stories. Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 8/8