I gave this presentation at the 'Cyberwarfare and Nation States Conference' - one of the streams of the 'Safeguarding Australia' conference - in Canberra in September 2010. Whilst my paper preceded discussion of the Stuxnet (and other associated attacks) - the judgements I make in the presentation stack up pretty well.

1. Intelligence Support Requirements
for Offensive CNO: An Achilles’
Heel?
Jeff Malone - UNSW@ADFA
Cyber Warfare and Nation States Conference
Canberra - 23 September 2010

2. Scope
• Overview of Offensive CNO
• Intelligence Requirements Across the Weapon
System Life Cycle
• Intelligence Requirements of Offensive CNO
• Implications for a Usable CNO Capability

3. Caveats
• Presentation reflects my personal views
• Dependence on US (military) literature
• First principle arguments

4. CNO as an element of IO
• Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
• Military Deception (MILDEC)
• Operational Security (OPSEC)
• Electronic Warfare (EW)
• Computer Network Operations (CNO)
• Other Supporting Capabilities
– Physical Attack (etc)
Source: US Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, 13 February 2006

5. Components of CNO
• Computer Network Attack (CNA)
• Computer Network Exploitation (CNE)
• Computer Network Defence (CND)

6. Access Approaches to Offensive CNO
• Close Access
• Proximate Access
• Remote Access

7. Objectives of Offensive CNO
• Tactical – immediate battlefield
• Operational – theatre level
• Strategic – national level

8. The Weapon System Life Cycle
In-Service Modification and Upgrade
Acquisition and
Needs and Retirement and
Development Introduction to In-Service Use
Requirements Disposal
Service

9. Intelligence Requirements Across the
Weapon System Life Cycle
Intelligence Intelligence
Intelligence Support Support
Support In-Service Modification and Upgrade
Acquisition and
Needs and Retirement and
Development Introduction to In-Service Use
Requirements Disposal
Service
Intelligence
Planning
Support
Intelligence
Support
Assessment Operations

10. Types of Intelligence Requirements for
Offensive CNO
• Access-centred
– Relates to characteristics of target systems
– Collection emphasis on CNE
• Effect-centred
– Relates to outcomes sought by attack
– Collection emphasis will vary, but has greater role
for all-source collection

11. Factors Influencing Intelligence Support
Requirements for Offensive CNO
• Difficulty/complexity of access
• Precision of effect sought
• Overt versus covert action
• Target responsiveness

12. Vignette 1 – Close Access Attack on an
Integrated Air Defence System

13. Vignette 2 – Proximate Attack on an
Integrated Air Defence System

14. Vignette 3 – Remote Attack on
Strategic C3I Enabling Systems

15. Vignette 4 – Remote Attack to undertake
targeted PSYOP

16. Implications for a Usable Offensive
CNO Capability
• Intelligence support requirements crucial to a
usable offensive CNO capability
• Intelligence support requirements will impact
on all collection disciplines, not just CNE
• Intelligence support to offensive CNO as an
opportunity cost
• Less discriminate CNO attacks more likely to
be viable

17. Conclusion