A presentation detailing Goodwin Development Trust's proposals for transfer of ownership of the Humber Bridge

1. Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Arthur Montague Browning

3. In praise of hubris
• 1959 Humber Bridge Act, passed, estimated
build cost £28m
• 1972 work begins
• 1981 bridge completed, actual build cost
£98m with accrued interest £151m
• 2011 Bridge Toll review debt stands at £332m
and still rising

5. Some numbers
• Bridge income £23m
• Bridge maintenance £3.5m
• Bridge salaries £3m
• Bridge reserves £20m
• Bridge Board 22 local councillors
• Bridge Board mtgs 3 times a year

7. If it’s patently bust why not fix it?
• The bridge is profitable but can’t keep pace
with spiralling debt
• The ‘ historic solution’ of raising tolls has
failed miserably
• The governance structure is not fit for purpose
• As a result of the above the bridge is failing to
meet any of its original social or economic
aspirations

9. What a solution might look like
• Buy the £332m debt for £100m................. not
forgetting you have to raise the £100m
• Plan for toll reductions within a realistic and
realisable timeframe
• Radically restructure both the ownership and
governance arrangements
• Get a picture on a big lorry

11. What worked
• Being ambitious changed the game
• The coalition of the willing was a successful
gambit
• Our position was sound and well argued
• We were credible and they listened

13. ...and what didn’t
• We didn’t shift the dead weight of local
political self interest
• We couldn’t mobilise the really big players
• Winning the argument isn’t enough on its own
• My dad was right

15. What have we learned
• Radical solutions aren’t by definition
necessarily unpopular solutions
• We don’t have a lien on radical solutions
• New thinking creates new alliances
• Time and timing is critical (or not)
• My dad was wrong