Although painful, we are still learning the importance of the hard lessons about disaster resilience from the August 29-30, 2005 experience. Hurricane Katrina Exposed The Deadly Consequences In A Hurricane Prone Area Of Not Being Hurricane Disaster Resilient. Presentation courtesy of Dr. Walter Hays, Global Alliance for Disaster Reduction.
Hurricane katrina 2005 (uploaded from the NOAA Libraries Catalog at www.lib.n...mqcumber
The Power Point slide show of digital images captured an impact of Hurricane Katrina, August 29, 2005 on the Mississippi Gulf Coast area. The slide show incorporates digital images and song "Delicate" by Damien Rice. It was presented on November 3, 2005 at the NOAATech 2006 Conference by Sharon Mesick, Susan Gottfried, Stacy Ladnier, and Kathy Martinolich, all from the National Coastal Data Development Center, Stennis Space Center, Mississippi as the Conference closing event.
Risk Based Testing: Deferring the Right Bugsindus329
QA InfoTech is a professional Quality Assurance and Software Testing service provider with qualified Testing Experts who are committed to provide creative QA / Testing solutions to challenging technical projects.
Although painful, we are still learning the importance of the hard lessons about disaster resilience from the August 29-30, 2005 experience. Hurricane Katrina Exposed The Deadly Consequences In A Hurricane Prone Area Of Not Being Hurricane Disaster Resilient. Presentation courtesy of Dr. Walter Hays, Global Alliance for Disaster Reduction.
Hurricane katrina 2005 (uploaded from the NOAA Libraries Catalog at www.lib.n...mqcumber
The Power Point slide show of digital images captured an impact of Hurricane Katrina, August 29, 2005 on the Mississippi Gulf Coast area. The slide show incorporates digital images and song "Delicate" by Damien Rice. It was presented on November 3, 2005 at the NOAATech 2006 Conference by Sharon Mesick, Susan Gottfried, Stacy Ladnier, and Kathy Martinolich, all from the National Coastal Data Development Center, Stennis Space Center, Mississippi as the Conference closing event.
Risk Based Testing: Deferring the Right Bugsindus329
QA InfoTech is a professional Quality Assurance and Software Testing service provider with qualified Testing Experts who are committed to provide creative QA / Testing solutions to challenging technical projects.
Primaires de la droite et du centre : Suivi sur twitterKantar
Nicolas Sarkozy domine très nettement le débat relatif à la primaire de la droite et du centre sur Twitter. La supériorité de l’ancien président de la République est d’abord manifeste en niveau de mentions globales : Nicolas Sarkozy est le candidat dont on parle le plus sur le réseau social.
Running Header: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT POWERS 1
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT POWERS 2
· Review “The Katrina Breakdown” in Chapter 3. Setting aside the philosophical and legal issues this case raises, identify and explain two to three management or efficiency arguments for and against a more centralized response to large national disasters like Hurricane Katrina.
· Catastrophe struck the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005, when the eye of Hurricane Katrina made landfall near Buras, Louisiana, packing high storm surges and sustained winds of over 140 mph. The Category 4 hurricane would move slowly inland, carving a path of destruction across low-lying regions of southern Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. See map.
· Experts had long warned of the flood danger faced by New Orleans, much of which lies below sea level in a bowl bordered by levees that hold back Lake Pontchartrain to the north and the Mississippi River to the south and west. In fact, in the summer of 2004, hundreds of regional and federal officials had met in Baton Rouge for an elaborate simulation exercise. The fictional “Hurricane Pam” left the city under 10 feet of water. The report from the simulation warned that transportation would be a major problem.
· The simulation proved disconcertingly accurate. Katrina caused breaches in the levees, leaving about 80 percent of New Orleans under water and knocking out electrical, water, sewage, transportation, and communication systems. Katrina also flattened much of Gulfport and Biloxi, Mississippi, flooded Mobile, Alabama, and leveled or inundated small cities and towns across an area the size of Great Britain. Up to 100,000 people were stranded in New Orleans for days in squalid and dangerous conditions awaiting relief and evacuation.
· Katrina was the deadliest hurricane to hit the United States in more than 75 years. The confirmed death toll exceeded 1200, with more than 80 percent of the fatalities in Louisiana, predominantly in the New Orleans area. It was among the costliest natural disasters in U.S. history. Nearly three-fourths of all the homes in New Orleans, the fifty-ninth largest city in the United States, were damaged or destroyed.
· Poor coordination between local, state, and federal officials raises important questions not only about U.S. disaster preparedness but also about federalism. The following five government officials, in particular, were criticized for their response to the distaster: New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Director Michael Brown, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, and President George W. Bush. Before considering those criticisms, we need to review the facts of the case.
· Timeline
· Saturday, August 27, 2005
· 5:00A.M.: Hurricane Katrina is in the Gulf of Mexico 435 miles southeast of the Mississippi River Delta, gathe.
CASE 3.1 THE KATRINA BREAKDOWNCatastrophe struck the Gulf Coast .docxwendolynhalbert
CASE 3.1 THE KATRINA BREAKDOWN
Catastrophe struck the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005, when the eye of Hurricane Katrina made landfall near Buras, Louisiana, packing high storm surges and sustained winds of over 140 mph. The Category 4 hurricane would move slowly inland, carving a path of destruction across low-lying regions of southern Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. See map.
Experts had long warned of the flood danger faced by New Orleans, much of which lies below sea level in a bowl bordered by levees that hold back Lake Pontchartrain to the north and the Mississippi River to the south and west. In fact, in the summer of 2004, hundreds of regional and federal officials had met in Baton Rouge for an elaborate simulation exercise. The fictional “Hurricane Pam” left the city under 10 feet of water. The report from the simulation warned that transportation would be a major problem.
The simulation proved disconcertingly accurate. Katrina caused breaches in the levees, leaving about 80 percent of New Orleans under water and knocking out electrical, water, sewage, transportation, and communication systems. Katrina also flattened much of Gulfport and Biloxi, Mississippi, flooded Mobile, Alabama, and leveled or inundated small cities and towns across an area the size of Great Britain. Up to 100,000 people were stranded in New Orleans for days in squalid and dangerous conditions awaiting relief and evacuation.
Katrina was the deadliest hurricane to hit the United States in more than 75 years. The confirmed death toll exceeded 1200, with more than 80 percent of the fatalities in Louisiana, predominantly in the New Orleans area. It was among the costliest natural disasters in U.S. history. Nearly three-fourths of all the homes in New Orleans, the fifty-ninth largest city in the United States, were damaged or destroyed.
Poor coordination between local, state, and federal officials raises important questions not only about U.S. disaster preparedness but also about federalism. The following five government officials, in particular, were criticized for their response to the distaster: New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Director Michael Brown, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, and President George W. Bush. Before considering those criticisms, we need to review the facts of the case.
Timeline
Saturday, August 27, 2005
5:00 A.M.: Hurricane Katrina is in the Gulf of Mexico 435 miles southeast of the Mississippi River Delta, gathering strength and moving forward at just 7 mph.
10:00 A.M.: FEMA Director Michael Brown appears on CNN to encourage residents of southeastern Louisiana to leave as soon as possible for safety inland.
5:00 P.M.: Governor Kathleen Blanco and Mayor C. Ray Nagin appear in a press conference to warn residents of the storm. Nagin declares a state of emergency in New Orleans.
7:25–8:00 P.M.: Max Mayfield, director of the National ...
William & Mary Bill of Rights JournalVolume 15 Issue 1 A.docxadolphoyonker
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Volume 15 | Issue 1 Article 11
In Katrina's Wake: Rethinking the Military's Role in
Domestic Emergencies
Scott R . Tkacz
Copyright c 2006 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
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Repository Citation
Scott R . Tkacz, In Katrina's Wake: Rethinking the Military's Role in Domestic Emergencies, 15 Wm. &
Mary Bill Rts. J. 301 (2006), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol15/iss1/11
United States Army Sergeants Major Academy
Master Leader Course (MLC)
1
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IN KATRINA'S WAKE: RETHINKING THE MILITARY'S ROLE
IN DOMESTIC EMERGENCIES
Scott R. Tkacz
INTRODUCTION ................................................. 301
I. LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE KATRINA DISASTER ... 303
Hi. HISTORY OF THE LIMITATION ON THE USE OF THE MILITARY IN
DOMESTIC ARENAS ........................................... 307
A. Posse Comitatus Act ...................................... 307
B. Exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act ........................ 308
I. HISTORICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE POSSE
COMITATUS ACT ............................................ 312
A. Presidential Power in Federalizing the National Guard ........... 314
IV. OVERCOMING THE BARRIERS TO EXPANDING PRESIDENTIAL
AUTHORITY IN THE USE OF FEDERAL TROOPS DOMESTICALLY ......... 315
A. The Need for Centralized Decision-Making by a Single Individual
Is Critical in Emergency Situations ........................... 315
B. "Traditional Notions" of Domestic Military Action Are Not
Supported by History ...................................... 318
C. Federal Military Forces Can Receive Adequate Training for
Effective Execution of Domestic Law Enforcement ............... 324
D. Active Military Participation in Domestic Law Enforcement
Does Not Necessarily Mean Permanent Domestic Deployment ..... 326
E. The President Possesses Broad Discretion in Matters Authorized
by Congress ............................................. 330
F. Use of the Military in Domestic Affairs Would Serve to Protect
Civilians' Constitutional Rights, Not to Abrogate Them ........... 332
CONCLUSION .................................................. 333
INTRODUCTION
The massive devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana and
Mississippi in August 2005' left behind shattered communities that will be left to pick
up the pieces for months and years to come.2 The alarming number of hurricanes
See infra notes 6-12 and accompanying text. On June 23, 2006, 1 visited New Orleans and
witnessed the destruction firsthand. The severity of the damage is truly difficult to put into words.
2 See, e.g., Eric Lipton, FEMA Calls 60,000 Houses in Storm Area Beyond Repai.
The Hurricane Katrina Debacle 2005As Secretary Chertoff proceed.docxrtodd33
The Hurricane Katrina Debacle: 2005
As Secretary Chertoff proceeded with his reorganization, scientists like Max Mayfield (the director of the National Hurricane Center) predicted another active hurricane season. As always, the greatest fear was that a major storm would hit the Gulf Coast, particularly low-lying New Orleans.
Under James Lee Witt, a Category 5 hurricane impacting New Orleans was considered one of the three possible worst-case disaster scenarios. In fact, since the 1980s, FEMA funds had been used to contract multiple evacuation studies of the New Orleans area. In 1995, a national exercise of the Federal Response Plan entitled “Response 95” used a New Orleans hurricane scenario. This particular exercise was never completed because on the first day of play, a major flood event impacted the Gulf Coast (including the site of the exercise play, New Orleans) and abruptly ended the exercise.
Another disaster exercise termed “Hurricane Pam” was convened and completed in Jul. 2004 with appropriate follow-up requirements to correct the problems and deficiencies discovered during the previous exercise. Unfortunately, the funding to support these corrective actions, which had been adequately budgeted by FEMA, became part of a funding reallocation requested of FEMA by DHS management to support other DHS priorities.
The “Senate Report on Katrina” best describes what occurred during those fateful hours and days in late Aug. The specific danger Katrina posed to the Gulf Coast became clear on the afternoon of Friday, Aug. 26, when forecasters at the National Hurricane Center and the National Weather Service saw that the storm was turning west. Phone calls were immediately made to Louisiana emergency management officials, and in their 5 pm EDT Katrina forecast and accompanying briefings, the meteorologists alerted both Louisiana and Mississippi that the track of the storm was expected to shift significantly to the west of its original track to the Florida panhandle. The National Hurricane Center warned that Katrina could be a Category 4 or even 5 by landfall. By the next morning, Weather Service officials confirmed that New Orleans was squarely at risk.
Over the weekend, the drumbeat of warnings continued. FEMA held video teleconferences on both days, discussing the potential dangers of Katrina and especially the risks to New Orleans. Max Mayfield of the Hurricane Center called the governors of the affected states, something he had only done once before in his 33-year career, and President Bush took the unusual step of declaring a disaster in advance of an emergency event for the states in the projected impact zone.
Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Buras, Louisiana, on Monday, Aug. 25, 2005. At the time it was reported as a Category 4 storm when it made landfall. The National Hurricane Center would later downgrade it to a Category 3 storm. In any event, it was considered an extremely dangerous storm by weather forecasters and the National Hurr.
2. Effective Before Times-Picayune (New Orleans, LA) July 20, 2005 Tuesday Elevations reset for La.'s sinking coast; Federal officials unveiling new measurements "If subsidence continues and/or sea level rises and human action fails to take place, the entire coast will be inundated,” - Dokka said, adding that in many parts of the coastline, areas within hurricane levees also are sinking rapidly, along with the levees. "The current plans to save the coast are focused on fixing wetlands, which is incredibly important, but the problem is that subsidence is affecting the entire coast," he said. "We need to combine those plans with regional hurricane levees and sand shoals . We have to find some way to protect the people and valuable infrastructure we have on the coast."
3. Effective before The Pam Scenario Times-Picayune (New Orleans) December 1, 2004 Wednesday Under the Pam scenario, more than 450,000 people would need long-term temporary housing, some for as long as a year, as such a storm would cause flooding and damage to buildings that would make much of the area unlivable for months. Times-Picayune (New Orleans) July 24, 2004 Wednesday Even if government agencies do their job perfectly, there is only so much help they can provide in a worst case scenario in which floods, debris and power outages make it hard for rescue workers to reach everyone trapped by a storm. "Residents need to know they’ll be on their own for several days in a situation like this," Brown said. Among other things, an "action plan" developed during the exercise determined that the storm would generate: I Thirty million cubic yards of debris, the equivalent of 1. 5million truckloads of waste. I The need for 1, 000 shelters, which would need to stay open as many as 100 days. But the state has resources to operate the shelters for only three to five days, so the group developed plans for how the federal government and other groups would replenish supplies for a longer term
4.
5. Effective Before Times-Picayune, (New Orleans, LA) September 27, 2004 "...state officials are talking about a number of changes, including the idea of staggered evacuation.” "State officials also say that they realize more effort needs to be made to inform people about alternate routes that were underused during Ivan” "As for contraflow, state officials agree that opening eastbound lanes to westbound traffic needs to be done much more quickly -- as soon as Orleans and Jefferson Parish officials call for evacuation."
6. Times-Picayune (New Orleans, LA) November 16, 2000 Thursday Corps' storm plan grim; Flooding could last 6 months Ineffective Before: The scenario: Packing winds of 155 mph, a Category 5 hurricane -- the hurricane from hell -- scores a direct hit on the New Orleans area, rolling a dome of water 25 feet high across the levees and into the geographical saucer that lies within them. The question: How long will it take before the city can be pumped dry? Days? Weeks? Months? The answer is appalling even by the doomsday standards of hurricane science: half a year or more http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UPO6Q1oS-C0#t=39s
7. Ineffective Before: Times-Picayune (New Orleans, LA) June23, 2002 Sunday “In Harms Way” There currently is no defense against a surge from a major storm, a Category 4 or Category 5 hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson scale used by meteorologists. Such storms can generate surges of 20 to 30 feet above sea level -- enough to top any levee in south Louisiana. Sustained winds from major storms -- 131 mph to 155 mph for a Category 4, even more for a Category 5 -- can shred homes and do damage to almost any structure. Fortunately, such storms are relatively rare events. Hurricane Camille, which struck the Mississippi Gulf Coast in 1969, and an unnamed 1935 storm that hit the Florida Keys were the only Category 5 storms to strike the U.S. coast in the past century. Fifteen Category 4 hurricanes made landfall on U.S. soil during that time. The Army Corps of Engineers says the chance of New Orleans-area levees being topped is remote, but admits the estimate is based on 40-year-old calculations Today, billions of dollars worth of levees, sea walls, pumping systems and satellite hurricane tracking provide a comforting safety margin that has saved thousands of lives.
8. Effective During: The Response of Authorities New York Times August 29, 2005 President Bush declared a state of emergency, “We cannot stress enough the danger this hurricane poses to Gulf Coast communities” “I think the storm is bigger than anything we have dealt with before. This is not a minor problem.” - Gov. Kathleen Babineaux Blanco Hurricane Katrina could bring 15 inches of rain and a storm surge of 20 feet or higher that would “most likely topple” the network of levees and canals that normally protect the bowl-shaped city from flooding “We are facing a storm that most of us have long feared. This is a once-in-a-lifetime event” – Mayor C. Ray Nagin
9. Effective during The New York Times August 31, 2005 Wednesday NEW ORLEANS IS INUNDATED AS 2 LEVEES FAIL; MUCH OF GULF COAST IS CRIPPLED; TOLL RISES A day after New Orleans thought it had narrowly escaped the worst of HurricaneKatrina's wrath, water broke through two levees on Tuesday and virtually submerged and isolated the city, causing incalculable destruction and rendering it uninhabitable for weeks to come. A certain sense of relief that was felt on Monday afternoon, after the eye of the storm swept east of the city, proved cruelly illusory, as the authorities and residents woke up Tuesday to a more horrifying result than had been anticipated. Mayor Ray Nagin lamented that while the city had dodged the worst-case scenario on Monday. Tuesday was ''the second-worst-case scenario.''
10. Ineffective During New York Times August 25, 2005 NO MANDATORY EVACUATIONS OF LOW LYING AREAS “I feel pretty comfortable that this is a minor event” – Mark Golden (Miami Resident) There were no reports of heavy damage as the hurricane made landfall “People tend not to take these types storms very seriously because its not a major hurricane” –Lt. J.G. Pralgo
11. Ineffective During New York Times August 30, 2005 "Downtown New Orleans and the French Quarter appeared to have been spared as the eye of the powerful storm passed just east of the city. Dire predictions of 20 ft deep toxic rivers running in the streets and huge buildings coming apart did not materialize."
13. Effective After New York Times September 29, 2005 State officials have said that 10 people died at the Superdome and 24 died around the convention center -- 4 inside and 20 nearby. While autopsies have not been completed, so far only one person appears to have died from gunshot wounds at each facility. During six days when the Superdome was used as a shelter, the head of the New Orleans Police Department's sex crimes unit, Lt. David Benelli, said he and his officers lived inside the dome and ran down every rumor of rape or atrocity. In the end, they made two arrests for attempted sexual assault, and concluded that the other attacks had not happened. What became clear is that the rumor of crime, as much as the reality of the public disorder, often played a powerful role in the emergency response. A team of paramedics was barred from entering Slidell, across Lake Pontchartrain from New Orleans, for nearly 10 hours based on a state trooper's report that a mob of armed, marauding people had commandeered boats. It turned out to be two men escaping from their flooded streets, said FarolChamplin, a paramedic with the Acadian Ambulance Company. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3zXZ-R0mcN0#t=2m32s
14. Effective After The Advocate (Baton Rouge, Louisiana) September 12, 2005 Locals join criticism of tardy response "The culprit wasn't two-story floodwaters or downed power stations or gun-toting looters, local authorities claim.” "There are signs that FEMA knew it was wholly unprepared to handle the likes of Hurricane Katrina”
15. Effective After Plastics News November 7, 2005 Plastics News November 7, 2005 Not Your Usual Katrina Coverage "Natural disasters can bring out the worst in people. In the days and weeks following Hurricane Katrina's devastating punch to the Golf Coast, TV newscasts delivered disturbing images and reports about looting and violence.” "Yes, I saw signs that looting had ocured, and police and citizens warned me to be off the streets before dark. I'll remember scenes of destruction like I had never seen before and pray I'll never see again. But I'll also remember people who lost nearly everything but still had a positive outlook on life. "So while there were bad people who took advantage of a situation for their own personal gail, I'd like to think decent, caring and giving people like Mr. Alexander greatly outnumbered them
16. Ineffective After Birmingham Post September 3, 2005 New Orleans Troops facing Armed Looters "They will be greeted with scenes of death and violence at the New Orleans Superdome where up to 20,000 desperate refugees are at a breaking point.” "President Bush arrived amid reports of rapes, beatings and carjackings. Earlier evacuation attempts were disrupted by gunfire from armed looters."
17. Ineffective After Daily News September 1, 2005 CITY OF MISERY, GUNS & DESPAIR Two armed men - self-appointed sheriffs in a white pickup - confronted them. Spotting thieves who had commandeered a forklift and smashed into a Rite Aid store, the two men fired above the looters' heads and ran them off. [In the Superdome,] The rumor mill was off the hook. Four rapes had occurred, people told me. A baby had died. Officials denied that any baby had died. But they dodged questions about rapes, saying they couldn't confirm or deny the reports.
