Download to read offline
![Analysis of the IRTPA and the 9/11 Commission
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 27
internal changes in how it conducted intelligence activities. The FBI
created the National Security Division (NSD) but ignored a call for the
FBI to “allocate sufficient resources and authority to the new
Intelligence Directorate to perform its assigned mission.”4
The memo
further added that previous efforts by the FBI to create a National
Security workforce prior to the attacks on 9/11 had failed to launch and
that, “The [current] FBI Plan is inconsistent with the core
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission regarding the FBI.”5
The
Commission noted that it was not for lack of trying that the FBI goals
had not been met, but that the director of the FBI lacked the proper
authority to successfully integrate foreign intelligence collection,
analysis, and operations. This evaluation by the Executive Branch was
met by a rebuttal from the FBI, which responded with reciprocal
concerns over the danger of mixing criminal investigative matters with
intelligence gathering. The decision by the FBI to keep management
decisions within the organization has not changed since its
establishment. The Commission expressed the need to bring the FBI
completely into the role of intelligence, and not teeter the line between
criminal investigation and intelligence operation. Changing the
mentality of the FBI would be difficult, considering its success in the
criminal investigation role.
4
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Letter to the President, last modified March 29,
2005, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/about.html.
5
Ibid.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/93d94247-1ccf-43e3-8d20-6722a414cb0c-150429191515-conversion-gate02/85/GlobalReview-34-320.jpg)
![Analysis of the IRTPA and the 9/11 Commission
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 37
Federal law regardless of Executive decision to do so. It would appear
that history had indeed come full circle in the form of the war on terror.
The impact this has had on the IC is damaging but not at all considered
grave. More reforms and increased oversight have reigned in
warrantless activities to a knee-jerk reaction by the White House.
The impact the IRTPA has had on the CIA, FBI, and DoD was
described in a progress report in May 2006. With regard to information
sharing, there has been a significant enhancement since the DNI was
emplaced. “The [chief information officer] is streamlining the processes
and organizations by which community elements acquire and manage
information technology and sharing, and is using designated authorities
to ensure that agencies build networks and databases that can support
rapid and efficient information-sharing, and to eliminate those that
cannot.”16
Improvement of analysis has shown progress as well.
Analysis of intelligence is considered the most important part of
the intelligence process. Analysts can de-conflict information coming in
from the field and send additional collection requirements that fill gaps
in the realm of intelligence. For example, current gaps exist in
intelligence coming in from Russia regarding the new Russian
President’s intentions with regard to foreign policy. The invasion of
Georgia was not a direct surprise, but it did catch intelligence officials
off guard with its timing and execution. Had proper intelligence gaps
16
Director of National Intelligence, “Report on the Progress of the Director of
National Intelligence in Implementing the ‘Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004,’” Federation of American Scientists, May 2006,
http://fas.org/irp/dni/implement.html.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/93d94247-1ccf-43e3-8d20-6722a414cb0c-150429191515-conversion-gate02/85/GlobalReview-44-320.jpg)
![Vol. 3, 2013/2014 77
International Law and Human Trafficking
Ryan Jay Burch
Introduction
uman rights issues comprise what is often one of the most
overlooked areas of international law, as their effect tends to be
limited to individuals or areas that are not considered
strategically valuable. It is, therefore, easy for human rights
violations to be overlooked by organizations such as the United
Nations and individual countries. The times when human rights
violations become most noticed are when issues such as genocide are
brought to light, due to the sheer number of people involved. However,
there is another issue that involves a tremendous amount of victims–
human trafficking. The United States Department of Homeland Security
estimates that there are between 12 million and 27 million
enslaved/trafficked persons in the world (Department of Homeland
Security n.d.). The sad (and scary) truth is that “after drug dealing,
human trafficking … [is the] second-largest criminal industry in the
world” (Johnson 2010). People are trafficked for a variety of reasons,
including debt bondage, and forced labor in the domestic, agricultural,
restaurant, or construction fields, as well as the sex industry.
Oftentimes, human trafficking (or trafficking of persons) is thought of as
H](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/93d94247-1ccf-43e3-8d20-6722a414cb0c-150429191515-conversion-gate02/85/GlobalReview-84-320.jpg)
![Ryan J. Burch
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 82
trafficking in persons… requires a comprehensive international
approach in the countries of origin, transit, and destination that
includes measures to prevent such trafficking, to punish the traffickers
and to protect the victims of such trafficking, including by protecting
their internationally recognized human rights” (United Nations 2000).
This supplement is an important step to ensure all persons, especially
those who are most vulnerable (women and children), are able to be
recognized as victims and the perpetrators of the crimes punished.
Similar to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
definition of human trafficking, the protocol defines the trafficking of
persons as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring [sic]
or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other
forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control
over another person, for the purpose of exploitation” (United Nations
2000). Having a solid international definition of human trafficking, which
focuses on the exploitation factor, nations that don’t have national laws
related to trafficking and/or that have varying laws with less useful
definitions now benefit from having a mutually agreed upon standard.
Further, the Protocol demands that each state signatory criminalize the
act of trafficking of persons (United Nations 2000). Again, this goes a
long way, as states with lax laws are now required to criminalize
something that once may have been seen as a source of income for
them, despite the human rights issues.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/93d94247-1ccf-43e3-8d20-6722a414cb0c-150429191515-conversion-gate02/85/GlobalReview-89-320.jpg)
![Will Israel Launch a Preventive Attack?
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 91
prospect that the opponent will acquire or develop a powerful new
offensive or defensive capability (2006, 7-9).
Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
and has the right to obtain nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
However, because of its continued violations of the safeguards
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and NPT
dating back to 1983 (along with other suspect activity), Israel and the
permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council plus
Germany (P5 plus 1), now suspect that Iran is masking a nuclear
weapons program. In early 2009, Iran’s government declared that it
now controls the entire cycle for producing nuclear fuel (Associated
Press 2009). Moreover, the United States, United Kingdom, and France
recently revealed that Iran has a second uranium enrichment facility
next to a military base inside a mountain near the Holy City of Qom, a
fact that serves to confirm the Israeli fear that their suspicion with
regard to Iran’s intentions of acquiring a nuclear bomb holds true. As a
result, Israel has increased the pressure on Iran by making it clear that it
will not stand idly by and wait for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons and
by upgrading Armed Forces defensive and offensive capabilities with the
latest technology and equipment. Though it seemed that the added
pressure by the United States and the international community
motivated Iran to agree to a dialogue through the P5 plus 1 negotiations
in Geneva, Iran’s subtle tone of defiance still rings clear as its Parliament
has stated that “[It] will not compromise on its legitimate nuclear rights”
(Associated Press 2009). Currently, Iran is faced with robust sanctions](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/93d94247-1ccf-43e3-8d20-6722a414cb0c-150429191515-conversion-gate02/85/GlobalReview-98-320.jpg)
![Will Israel Launch a Preventive Attack?
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 93
Literature Review
Beres (2009) offers a comprehensive retrospective analysis
concerning Israel’s strategic policy in confronting the existential threat
posed by an Iranian regime focused on becoming a nuclear power.
Beres, along with the other six members of the study named “Project
Daniel”, recommended that “Israel take certain initiatives in removing
imminent threats. These included preemptive strikes against enemy
WMD development, manufacturing, storage, and control and
deployment centers” (Beres 2009, 495). Beres’ group further
recommended that Israel “do whatever is necessary to prevent enemy
nuclearization, up to and including pertinent acts of preemption” (Beres
2009, 504). One important observation made by the group was that
preemption would be most successful only against an enemy that had
not yet gone nuclear (Beres 2009, 506). This is a policy-related study
that draws its observations, analysis, and conclusions through a
qualitative approach. The study is further enhanced by the sound use of
preemptive war doctrine (Sun Tzu and The Art of War), empirical
analysis, and personal professional experience of the project members.
Though all members have personal ties to the Nation of Israel, most
concerns of biases are overshadowed by the group’s viewing of the
issues through a realistic lens of sound military doctrine and by their
“combining legal with strategic analysis [that] links the jurisprudential
concept of “anticipatory self-defense” to various preemption scenarios,
and to The National Security Strategy of The United States of America
(20 September 2002)” (Beres 2009, 493).](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/93d94247-1ccf-43e3-8d20-6722a414cb0c-150429191515-conversion-gate02/85/GlobalReview-100-320.jpg)
![Orlando Fonseca
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 96
perspective. As such, this work helps us understand Israel’s strategic
approach concerning Iran’s nuclear facilities through a scholarly and
objective lens.
Harel (2009) offers a timely analysis on Israel’s military
capabilities in confronting Iran’s nuclear facilities with preventive
attacks. He then examines the possible post-attack Iranian responses,
either directly or via proxies, such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Gaza’s
Hamas. Harel’s most important finding is that the Mossad may have
exhausted its efforts to further delay Iran’s nuclear programs, and that
at present, no action looms, other than a [preventive] attack that is
capable of preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power. Harel’s
journalistic analysis is biased in that it paints a pessimistic outlook on
the possibility of a diplomatic breakthrough based on Israeli popular
sentiment. However, this analysis is important as it serves to measure
the level of impatience and anxiety existent in Israel with regard to the
Iranian nuclear issue. This analysis uses a qualitative approach based on
intuition and unclassified sources of information, and is both current
and pertinent.
Mueller et al. (2006) presents a thorough scholarly historical
analysis of the following Israeli preventive and preemptive attack case
studies: The Sinai Campaign of 1956, the Six Day War of 1967, the
October War of 1973, and the Osirak Raid of 1981. The study explores
the historical record, and compares and contrasts each of the cases’
situational settings, levels of threat, policy options, and resulting
outcomes. Mueller’s most important finding is that whenever Israel’s](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/93d94247-1ccf-43e3-8d20-6722a414cb0c-150429191515-conversion-gate02/85/GlobalReview-103-320.jpg)
![Will Israel Launch a Preventive Attack?
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 99
would not appreciably increase Washington’s ability to deter
Iran from launching a nuclear or conventional attack. It could
however, play into the hands of Tehran’s proxies by inflaming
anti American and Israeli sentiment and fanning civil unrest in
the Persian Gulf. Washington may also be tempted to further
undermine Iran’s economy by imposing broad based economic
sanctions. (2010, 11)
The above measures would adversely affect Iran’s citizens and not the
leadership within the government. Lindsay and Takeyh exhort that
Washington should resist any urge to sign mutual security
treaties with Arab countries in the Middle East. [Rather], an
alliance of sorts would secure all the benefits of a region-wide
commitment to deterrence without exposing the United States
and its allies (Israel) to the complexities of formal bilateral or
multilateral security treaties. Containment would not be a
substitute for the use of force. To the contrary, its success
would depend on the willingness of the United States [and
Israel] to use force against Iran or threaten to do so should Iran
cross Washington’s red lines. (Lindsay and Takeyh 2010, 11-12)
Israel’s responses, however, will hinge on how it perceives
United States’ actions or inactions toward the existential threat posed
by a nuclear armed Iran. According to Alon Ben-Meir, Israel’s national
resolve to act unilaterally against Iran hinges on the following facts: The
first is if Israel concludes that stern sanctions and other behavior-
changing tactics taken by the international community have failed to
produce improved results. The second is if Israeli intelligence
unequivocally confirms, “that the Iranian [nuclear] threat is deemed
imminent, and no one else is willing to act. Under these circumstances,](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/93d94247-1ccf-43e3-8d20-6722a414cb0c-150429191515-conversion-gate02/85/GlobalReview-106-320.jpg)
![Orlando Fonseca
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 106
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, a friend and ally of the United States for
many years after the Iranian Revolution of 1978 has also confirmed the
conviction that the United States is not dependable (Mokhtari 2005,
225). In an article titled “Iran and the Shah. What Really Happened,”
James Perloff best describes how the United States government, under
the Carter administration, betrayed the Shah, an alleged ally. Perhaps
the words of the Shah himself could shed some light on Iranian
perceptions of Western powers. He wrote that
in 1973 we succeeded in putting a stop, irrevocably, to sixty
years of foreign exploitation of Iranian oil resources … In 1974,
Iran at last took over the management of the entire oil industry,
including the refineries at Abadan and so on … I am quite
convinced that it was from this moment that some very
powerful, international interests, identified, within Iran, the
collusive elements which they could use to encompass my
downfall.” (Perloff 2009, 6)
Iraq’s invasion of Iran, Arab and U.S. support for the invader, and the
stunning silence of all when Iraq used chemical weapons against
Iranians, [further served to convince the Iranians that its national]
interests had to be safeguarded by Iranians and Iranians alone”
(Mokhtari 2005, 225-226).
Economics
Despite high international oil prices in recent years, the
contribution of the oil and gas sector to economic growth has been
more modest. Iran’s oil economy has been faced with low levels of
production and inadequate investment. United States and U.N.
sanctions imposed against Iran, along with the poor domestic business](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/93d94247-1ccf-43e3-8d20-6722a414cb0c-150429191515-conversion-gate02/85/GlobalReview-113-320.jpg)
![Jo McIntire
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 126
of a vulture) (Sosa 2002, 170-1); the "barbed wire" Pinochet of Chile
(Sosa 2002, 173); the "cerdísimo" (His Most Swinish Excellency) Rafael
Leonidas Trujillo of the Dominican Republic - "hated by the living, hated
by the dead" (Sosa 2002, 174-5); and Efrain Rios Montt the "Boa
Anaconda" of Guatemala (Sosa 2002, 178). These men were, after all,
not abstractions but real human beings. Sosa unabashedly declares war
against them all. He does not hesitate to draw the ties between the
dictatorships of Latin America and the United States' political/economic
interests. In "Fué en el año 32. Y no hay olvido6
," Sosa takes aim at
Franklin D. Roosevelt whose "bleary eyes . . . shone with maximum
splendor" at the news of campesino deaths (Sosa 2002, 177). In "La casa
de la piedras puntiagudas" (the house of pointy stones), Sosa focuses on
the tragedy of Honduras. "The History of Honduras," he writes, "can be
written on a gun / on a bullet wound, or rather, inside a drop of blood"
(Sosa 2002, 159). Indeed, dictatorships shredded Latin American society
for several decades.
In November 2009, Sosa wrote a cover story for The
Progressive, one of the leading voices for peace and social justice in the
United States, denouncing the middle-of-the-night abduction of
President Manuel Zelaya and the successive coup. Zelaya was a popular
president. In the article, Sosa refers to Roberto Micheletti and General
Romeo Vásquez, who together seized power, as "the two-headed
monster" (2009)., "They [the military] are thrilled to be smelling blood
again," he wrote (Sosa 2009). The coup was a "coronation of death"
6
It was in the year 32. And there is no forgetting.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/93d94247-1ccf-43e3-8d20-6722a414cb0c-150429191515-conversion-gate02/85/GlobalReview-133-320.jpg)
![China’s Commitment to Foreign Aid
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 139
Ventures and Cooperative Projects, and the expanded role of low-
interests loans financed through the Export-Import Bank of China.12
China’s final phase of foreign assistance transition began at the
turn of the century. The State Council Information Office of the PRC, in
China’s first public release of its foreign aid policy, cited, “On the basis
of sustained and rapid economic growth and enhanced overall national
strength, China’s financial resources for foreign aid have increased
rapidly, averaging 29.4 percent [of its annual budget] from 2004 to
2009.”13
This increase was coupled with an annual growth rate that
averaged 10 percent during the same time period. China’s foreign
assistance has expanded to include aid projects arranged, not only
bilaterally, but through multinational and regional associations.
Ministries, Organizations, and Elements of China’s Aid
The majority of developed donor nations have established
independent agencies whose focus is dedicated solely to bilateral
foreign aid programs; an example is the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID). China’s bilateral foreign aid
program is directed by the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries, a
department within its Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). This marriage
of foreign aid and commerce was not an accident. During the infancy of
the PRC, aid was primarily in the form of material goods and was
controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. In March of 1982, the NPC
restructured and merged the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Ministry of
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/93d94247-1ccf-43e3-8d20-6722a414cb0c-150429191515-conversion-gate02/85/GlobalReview-146-320.jpg)
GlobalReview
- 1. GLOBAL REVIEW Volume Three| 2013/2014 A compilation of papers on International Relations by members of Sigma Iota Rho, Gamma Omega Chapter SIGMA IOTA RHO National Honor Society for International Studies
- 2. Global Review Volume 3 2013/2014 SigmaIota Rho Gamma Omega Chapter www.apus.edu
- 3. Global Review ispublished by the American Public University System ePress. Editor in Chief: Hedi BenAicha Production Editor: Molly Fischer Copy Editor: Nancy McKeithen Web Editor: Brittany DeLong Acquisitions Editor: Sarah Canfield Fuller Cover Design: Benjamin Cave, American Public University System Visual Arts Copyright © 2014 by the Authors First Printing American Public University ePress American Public University ePress 111 West Congress Street Charles Town, WV 25414 http://apus.campusguides.com/APUS_ePress
- 4. Editorial Staff Abdul Abid Editor KristinaColburn Project Manager Faculty Advisors Kate Brannum Ryan Harding Kimberly Ruff Michelle Watts Faculty Reviewers Kate Brannum Ginny Haddock Ryan Harding Richard Mahoney Daniel Opstal Jennifer Osetek Kimberly Ruff Kyle Snyder Michelle Watts Assistant Editors Leslie Barstow Michael Breen Jean Carminati Jack Sigman Danielle Spencer
- 5. Disclaimer The analysis andopinions expressed in the Global Review’s papers are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the official position or view of American Public University System or its faculty. The SIR GO chapter welcomes any suggestions, corrections, and feedback. To contact the editor, you can send a message via e-mail to journal@sirgo.org.
- 6. Table of Contents 1| Letter from the Editor 3 | Note from the President 5 | Contributors 8 | Egypt’s Democratic Inertia Sergei Oudman 22 | Analysis of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act and the 9/11 Commission Arthur Ceballos 45 | Fighting Transnational Crime: New Techniques from Reliable Standards Samuel J. Caramela 58 | Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention: Should Sovereignty Be Ignored? Jack F. Sigman 77 | International Law and Human Trafficking Ryan J. Burch 89 | Will Israel Launch a Preventive Attack Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities? Orlando Fonseca 120 | Roberto Sosa: Honduran Poet Jo McIntire 132 | China’s Commitment to Foreign Aid: Truth or Fiction James D. Kates
- 7. 161 | U.S.Influence in Syria: A New Approach Kristina J. Colburn and Abdul Abid 186 | Acknowledgements 187 | Appendix A: Chapter History 191 | Appendix B: Past and Current Chapter Administrations
- 8. Vol. 3, 2013/20141 LETTER FROM THE EDITOR Dear readers, Welcome to the third edition of the Global Review, a journal organized and produced by members of Sigma Iota Rho’s Gamma Omega (SIR GO) chapter. This year’s edition features nine papers by ten writers. The edition is unique from our past two editions in that it features two papers by guest writers, contributors’ biographies, a new appendix section which contains useful information on the organization, and a collaborative paper on one of the biggest global stories of the year by members of the journal’s leadership team. Jack Sigman, who contributed to the first edition of the Global Review, returns with a paper on unauthorized humanitarian intervention. Arthur Ceballos’ paper explains the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act and the 9/11 Commission. Samuel Caramela describes approaches to fighting transnational crime. Ryan Burch examines international law and human trafficking, while Sergei Oudman writes on the political situation in Egypt. Orlando Fonseca discusses whether Israel would launch a preventive attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Our first featured guest writer, Jo McIntire, explores the life of the Honduran poet, Roberto Sosa. Our second featured guest writer, James Kates, analyzes China’s commitment to foreign aid. And finally, the Global Review’s program manager, Kristina Colburn, and I write about U.S. influence in the Syrian conflict. Our journal has now published 31 papers in its first three editions. We hope you enjoy reading the papers and find them to be
- 9. Vol. 3, 2013/20142 informative. We also encourage other SIR GO members to submit their best papers on current topics of international relations. For the past four years, I have been pleased to be given the opportunity to serve as this organization’s past president, our GO Global newsletter’s editor, and editor of the Global Review journal. I look forward to future editions of the Global Review. Respectfully, Abdul Abid
- 10. Vol. 3, 2013/20143 Note from the President Dear Gamma Omega members and friends: As president of Gamma Omega, it is my pleasure to present the 2013/2014 edition of the Global Review. I take great pride in being a part of an organization that has a goal to encourage honor and innovation in the practice of international relations. The papers selected for this edition showcase thought-provoking topics in world affairs that demand attention, intellect, and voice. I would like to extend special thanks to Abdul Abid and Kristina Colburn for leading this project to its successful completion. I would also like to thank our organization’s faculty advisors, Michelle Watts, Kate Brannum, Ryan Harding and Kimberly Ruff. Finally, I want to express my sincere gratitude to the following ten members for submitting exceptional papers, without them, we would not have a journal: 1. Sergei Oudman 2. Arthur Ceballos 3. Samuel Caramela 4. Jack Sigman 5. Ryan Burch 6. Orlando Fonseca 7. Jo McIntire 8. James Kates 9. Abdul Abid 10. Kristina Colburn
- 11. Vol. 3, 2013/20144 In closing, I ask all members to consider submitting papers for publication in the next Global Review. This will ensure another high-quality edition that reflects Gamma Omega’s wide range of international relations knowledge and expertise. Best regards, Gina L. Schell President, SIR GO 2012 - 2014
- 12. Vol. 3, 2013/20145 CONTRIBUTORS Ryan Burch works within the Anti-Money Laundering/Regulatory Operations division of a large global financial institution. Ryan has a bachelor’s degree in Criminal Justice and a master’s degree in International Relations. In addition, Ryan has earned the prestigious Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) and Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (CAMS) designations. His academic and professional areas of interest include human trafficking, terrorist financing, and civil-military relations. Ryan is a fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, and resides in Houston, TX. Samuel Caramela is a Sergeant at the Green Brook Police Department and is assigned as the supervisor of the Detective Bureau. He is currently studying Intelligence Studies at American Military University (AMU) with a concentration in Law Enforcement Intelligence. Samuel resides in New Jersey. Arthur Ceballos joined the SIR GO chapter in winter 2010. He has a bachelor’s degree in Intelligence Studies from AMU. Arthur resides in San Diego. Orlando Fonseca is an Iraq War veteran from the Illinois Army National Guard. He served in the capacity of combat medic and military police officer from 1989 through late 2004. Orlando is also an 11-year veteran of the Chicago Police Dept. He joined the SIR GO chapter in summer 2011. Orlando holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies from Roosevelt University and a master’s degree in Intelligence Studies from AMU. He resides in Chicago. James Kates is a retired U.S. Army NCO with multiple deployments in support of America’s war on terror. He has a bachelor’s degree in Criminal Justice from Troy University and a master’s degree in National Security Studies from AMU. He is a member of the Golden Key
- 13. Vol. 3, 2013/20146 International Honour Society, the Pi Gamma Mu International Honor Society, and the 2013 International Scholar Laureate Program’s Delegation on International Relations and Diplomacy conducted in China. James resides in Ewa Beach, HI. Jo McIntire was brought up in Italy, studied Mechanical Engineering in England, and returned to Italy to work in agriculture. In 1980, he traveled to the U.S. and became involved in Central American social issues. For 10 years, he and his wife worked in Central America with several humanitarian organizations. He was also a co-founder of two non-profit organizations: ProNica (‘84) and The Friendship Association (‘00). Jo went on to work as a technical editor for a UNDP project based in Rome and later in the Philippines. In Florida, he worked as a rehabilitation inspector for a statewide housing project for the poor. He retired in 2011 to dedicate time to further study. He recently earned a B.A. in International Relations (concentration in Latin America) from AMU. Sergei Oudman is a political consultant and security analyst with more than 10 years of experience in both private and government sectors. He has extensive experience in working in different countries and regions with expertise in international relations and law, EU policy and affairs, social media, southeast Europe, and the Middle East. Jack Frank Sigman completed his M.A. in International Relations (with honors) in November 2013. He completed a 20-year naval career in 1994, specializing in nuclear engineering onboard submarines. During the last 19 years, he was elected Director of the North Valley County Water and Sewer District (St. Marie, Montana) 1998-99, was a professional actor in Florida from 2000-10, and is currently a member of the engineering department of Algenol, a bio-fuel R & D firm. Jack is a member of SIR GO, Golden Key, and Mensa. He is married to Janet
- 14. Vol. 3, 2013/20147 Nislow Sigman, a nationally recognized educator and a Ph.D. candidate at Nova Southeastern University. Abdul Abid has a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice from AMU and a master’s degree in information assurance from Norwich University. He is a member of SIR GO, Alpha Phi Sigma, Pi Gammu Mu, Golden Key, Student Veterans of America, and Upsilon Pi Epsilon. Abdul has served as president of the SIR GO chapter, as well as president of the Alpha Phi Sigma criminal justice chapter at AMU. He grew up and resides in the New York City metropolitan area. Kristina Colburn is a research coordinator at the Polar Science Center at the Applied Physics Laboratory at the University of Washington. She has a B.S. in Physics from Seattle University and a M.A. in International Relations with a focus in International and Transnational Security from AMU. She joined SIR GO in summer 2010 and has been the Global Review journal’s program manager for the past two years.
- 15. Vol. 3, 2013/20148 Egypt’s Democratic Inertia Sergei Oudman hen the Arab Spring began, media outlets were buzzing with change, a change that would alter the political dimension in the Middle East. At least, that was the high hope the West attached to it. Democracy was on the rise, and a critical feature in the implementation of this democracy was the toppling of regimes and dictators.1 The enthusiasm in the West was somewhat naive; it was as if we were expecting the polity in Middle Eastern countries to change regimes like they would an Internet Service Provider. An immediate sense of euphoria was present and anything was possible. Would the Middle East finally make a transition toward democracy? Clearly, there were high expectations. These were fueled by perceived successes in Tunisia and Libya. Other nations in the region followed with demonstrations and promises of reforms by different administrations. The euphoria was later replaced by fear when, in Egypt's case, the people voted for the Muslim Brotherhood. Many feared the Brotherhood would dismantle democracy and turn Egypt into an Islamic republic. Slowly, expectations were curbed as the civil war 1 Jonathan Adelman, “Why we should be patient with Middle East,” CNN, last modified August 13, 2013, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/08/13/why-we-should-be- patient-with-middle-east/. W
- 16. Egypt’s Democratic Inertia Vol.3, 2013/2014 9 that has been raging since 2011 in Syria further deteriorated, and the situation in Egypt became increasingly complicated. Maintaining a stable administration plays a crucial role in the development of a nation on social and economic levels.1 Hosni Mubarak’s regime created a bureaucratic government, having a fully developed judiciary system and a very involved military with regard to the country’s economic structure. These two entities play a crucial role in Egypt today, as its polity was able to topple Hosni Mubarak and, Mohamed Morsi. Any elected party that wants to reform Egypt should do this within the boundaries of the existing system without usurping any power from the military. Egypt’s military is too powerful to be ignored, and any transition toward more freedom and democracy will only be accepted by the military when it does not endanger national security and interests from their point of view. There is also a similarity between the situation today in the Middle East and that of fifty years ago, when young officers in Egypt staged a coup.2 In Syria and Iraq there were revolutions, and these events led to significant changes in economic policies.3 An economy in decline, social unrest, and a younger 1 Lisa Anderson, “The State in the Middle East and North Africa,” Comparative Politics 20, no. 1 (October 1987): 1-18. 2 “Egypt armed forces chief Abdul Fattah al-Sisi – a man of destiny,” EuroNews, last modified August 19, 2013, http://www.euronews.com/2013/08/19/egypt- armed-forces-chief-abdul-fattah-al-sisi-a-man-of-destiny/. 3 Rodney Wilson, Economic Development in the Middle East, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2010), 7.
- 17. Sergei Oudman Vol. 3,2013/2014 10 generation demanding change all contributed to the movement for change. Christians guarding Muslims during prayer time and vice versa were among the images that went all over the world, and there was a sense of euphoria that everything would be fine.4 Mubarak was removed from office fairly easily compared to Gadhafi, who plunged a nation into disarray by ordering his army to open fire on protesters in Benghazi. However, the revolution that started so smoothly and swiftly changed into a crisis. At the beginning of the revolution, all parties had unified goals: more freedom, better economic conditions, and free elections. Thus, democracy was moving forward and there was a sense of unity, although it was fragile. But there is a big difference between the removal of Mubarak and that of Morsi. During the demonstrations against Mubarak, Muslim and Coptic Christians alike were demanding his removal and more freedom on Tahrir Square. In the case of Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters blame the Coptic Christian community for the removal of Morsi.5 It is this detail that demonstrates an underlying chronic problem. Missed Chances Morsi had a unique chance in history after he and his party won a democratic election. Morsi was given a chance to reform Egypt and to 4 “Images of solidarity as Christians join hands to protect Muslims as they pray during Cairo protests,” Daily Mail, last modified February 3, 2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1353330/Egypt-protests-Christians- join-hands-protect-Muslims-pray-Cairo-protests.html/. 5 “Egypt authorities delay Morsi protest camps crackdown,” BBC, last modified August 12, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23662651.
- 18. Egypt’s Democratic Inertia Vol.3, 2013/2014 11 prove to the outside world that there should not be any fear of the Muslim Brotherhood; a political party with strict Islamic roots had the chance to show that it can maintain and further sustain a democracy. But not even a year later, through his tactics of altering the constitution would Morsi disrupt the already fragile balance of rule-of-law, which would be subjected to rule-by-law. Instead of fostering the national identity and democracy, Morsi started to polarize the country further. This polarization was due to the effects of Morsi’s policies and actions, which were aimed at expanding the power base of his party at the expense of democracy. If left unchecked, the country would have disintegrated into a civil war. The ramifications of Mubarak's downfall were contained because the military let him fall; however, a civil war would have more far- reaching consequences. Morsi’s attacks on the judicial system also motivated Egypt's military to move, due to the fact that the constitution doesn’t allow a civilian to be responsible for the military in the government. Morsi’s attempts to change the constitution were a direct attack on the army’s political power. In both the case of Mubarak and Morsi, Egypt’s army made the same choice to initially withdraw its support for the administrations, which would escalate later on in the case of Morsi due to the perceived threat by Egypt's military.6 A failed state has several characteristics, but the rule-of-law in its broadest sense is a crucial factor in the stability of a state. Especially 6 Omar Ashour, “Showdown in Egypt,” The Brookings Institution, last modified July 2, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/07/02-egypt- tamarod-morsi-ashour.
- 19. Sergei Oudman Vol. 3,2013/2014 12 if the country already has a fully developed judicial system, any degradation of this system would have far-reaching consequences. The most visible would be the loss of equality the polity enjoyed during the Mubarak regime. Morsi's constant strife with the judicial system meant that his administration fell short of any of the required reforms to give people more freedom and equality under law.7 The fragile rule-of-law would be slowly replaced by Islamic Law. Morsi violated or did not follow up on his election promises. Egypt's troubled economy also became a stumbling block as tourists stayed away and the new administration took on additional debts. Funds were supposed to be used to stimulate the economy. However, Egypt needed heavy reforms in order to repair the imbalance in its economy. The lack of economic reforms and absence of other crucial reforms to bring the country back on track made its debt a stumbling block. Money was poured into a dysfunctional system with virtually no impact.8 A year after his election, Morsi's focus was on applying Islamic Laws and his constant battles with the judicial system took away his attention from required reforms. The 7 Mirette F. Mabrouk, “The View From a Distance: Egypt’s Contentious New Constitution,” The Brookings Institution, last modified January 31, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/01/31-egypt-mabrouk. 8 Patrick Werr, “UAE offers Egypt $3 billion support, Saudis $5 billion,” Reuters, last modified July 9, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/09/us- egypt-protests-loan-idUSBRE9680H020130.
- 20. Egypt’s Democratic Inertia Vol.3, 2013/2014 13 International Monetary Fund also advised Egypt to reduce the country's budget deficit.9 Morsi steered the country further toward civil unrest, and the economic malaise was increasing to such an extent that it appeared to be reaching a point of no return.10 The polity realized that Morsi was not upholding his promises of revolution by creating coalitions either it appeared that they wanted him out with the same determination as they wanted Mubarak out. Egypt's military acted and removed him from office. The pivotal reason for the army to act was the potential for Egypt to become a failed state if the army did not intervene,11 especially after threats from groups like al-Qaida and others such as Belmokhtar which would only attribute to a growing conflict.12 On top of that, Egypt's soft border at the east has become increasingly vulnerable to groups like al- Qaida.13 9 Borzou Daragahi, “Egypt to put IMF loan talks on back burner,” Financial Times, last modified July 15, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e8901092- ed3a-11e2-ad6e-00144feabdc0.html. 10 “Egypt Overview,” The World Bank, accessed August 8, 2013, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/egypt/overview. 11 “Failed States: An Annual Special Report by FP and the Fund for Peace,” Foreign Policy, 2013, accessed August 8, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/24/2013_failed_states_intera ctive_map. 12 “Belmokhtar joins forces with African jihadists and vows attacks in Egypt,” The Guardian, last modified August 22, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/22/belmokhtar- mourabitounes-alliance-egypt-attacks. 13 Daniel Byman and Khaled Elgindy, “The Deepening Chaos in Sinai,” The National Interest 127 (September-October 2013): 43-55, http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-deepening-chaos-sinai-8957.
- 21. Sergei Oudman Vol. 3,2013/2014 14 Inertia Removing Morsi, however, is a quick fix to a deeper problem. In the year that Morsi was in power, the lack of proper reforms resulted in delays with regard to democratic and economic reforms. These delays are a luxury Egypt cannot permit itself, as any delay in reform puts the country under further stress from both outside and inside stressors. In order to maintain stability, Egypt's military is resorting to excessive behavior that violates human rights. Dialogue between Morsi’s camp and the opposition has become all but impossible. Egypt's military sees the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat and wants to ban them again. This would push the Muslim Brotherhood into hiding, and excluding an influential party would not work in favor of building a lasting democracy.14 It is very unlikely that Egypt's military will change its approach toward the Muslim Brotherhood; it is very likely that the Muslim Brotherhood will intensify efforts in order to retain its current foothold.15 This situation puts both parties on a collision course. The Egyptian Army's actions have removed Morsi, but this is not a solution for the problem that Egypt is facing. On top of that, the courts recently decided that Mubarak can await trial at home, which could be regarded as a political statement from the military, showing that they are in 14 “Ikhwanweb: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Official English web site,” Ikhwanweb, accessed August 28, 2013, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/. 15 Maggie Fick and Lin Noueihed, “Egypt's bruised Brotherhood seeks to show street power,” Reuters, last modified August 23, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/23/us-egypt-protests- idUSBRE97M0DW20130823.
- 22. Egypt’s Democratic Inertia Vol.3, 2013/2014 15 control.16 Mubarak was put in power by the military and he was removed; sending him home to await trial signaled the influence the military had over the judicial system, something Morsi could not usurp. The Egypt scenario shows several things, but the underlying problem is perhaps more important than anything else. One of the biggest factors is that thus far people were allowed only limited political freedom, and the lack of a democratic system that has periodic elections created many aspirations, but experienced leaders are lacking. The Art of Statecraft and the proper application of power is something that has been underestimated by Morsi and his followers, as it requires much experience.17 Morsi did not have democracy on his agenda. This could perhaps be the temptation of power, in which a politically suppressed party rises to power and subsequently in fear of losing this power, begins to usurp power. The end result for the polity is the same, as they exchange administrations without any improvement in the government. Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood exercised their leadership the only way they knew, and the only way they have experienced life thus far. Any experience they did have from the past was based on opposition status, which cannot be compared to that of more free democratic states in the West. The illusion of total control is unrealistic, and the desire and apparent need from Morsi and the 16 Matt Bradley and Tamer El-Ghobashy, “Mubarak To Be Placed Under House Arrest After Release,” The Wall Street Journal, last modified August 21, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732416520457902657236191 8800.html. 17 Charles W. Freeman Jr., Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997).
- 23. Sergei Oudman Vol. 3,2013/2014 16 Muslim Brotherhood to impose this on others resulted in another revolt.18 The crackdown in mid-2013 on the Muslim Brotherhood was excessive. The dualistic approach by Egypt's army and temporary government does show the intention to hold new elections again. However, the crackdown has serious potential to fuel the militant side of the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaida in the region. Egypt’s military will use its resources internally, enabling organizations like al-Qaida to fuel the conflict further in their benefit. The polity in the meantime is confronted with polarization, while they were unified in their protests to oust Mubarak, and this puts Egypt on a dangerous path. Egypt has more examples of violence in its past than democracy. As stated earlier, in order for democracy to develop properly all parties should be involved. This includes the Muslim Brotherhood, despite its failure in its responsibility to protect (R2P). The basis of R2P should be part of any political party’s aspiration in Middle Eastern states, as it can be applied not only to external foreign relations but also internal. A nation state must protect its citizens, including minorities and political parties. The attempts to usurp power at the expense of 18 H.A. Hellyer, “How Morsi let Egyptians down,” Foreign Policy, last modified August 2, 2013, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/02/morsis_disappointing_yea r.
- 24. Egypt’s Democratic Inertia Vol.3, 2013/2014 17 others clearly shows that it failed in its responsibility to prevent and rebuild in a sense when it discarded the option of forming coalitions.19 The developments in Egypt during the first part of 2013 clearly show that once a regime is changed the effort of transforming into a stable democracy is more complex than it may appear at first view. The Muslim Brotherhood had a golden opportunity to show the Egyptian polity and the world that it is different by accepting the basic tenets of democracy. The question that still remains to be answered is who can lead the country to stability without undermining democracy? If Egypt manages to organize new elections, with a new democratically elected administration, there will be a chance that they can escape the current spiral of violence and destabilization.20 If not, the democratic inertia in Egypt will only feed further escalation and a potential civil war. 19 Edward C. Luck, “The Responsibility to Protect: Growing Pains or Early Promise?,” Ethics and International Affairs 24, no. 4 (Winter 2010), accessed August 15, 2013, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/journal/24_4/response/001.html . 20 Shadi Hamid, “Demoting Democracy in Egypt,” The New York Times, last modified July 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/05/opinion/demoting-democracy-in- egypt.html.
- 25. Sergei Oudman Vol. 3,2013/2014 18 BIBLIOGRAPHY Adelman, Jonathan. “Why we should be patient with Middle East.” CNN. Last modified August 13, 2013. http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/08/13/why-we- should-be-patient-with-middle-east/. Anderson, Lisa. “The State in the Middle East and North Africa.” Comparative Politics 20, no. 1 (October 1987): 1-18. Ashour, Omar . “Showdown in Egypt.” The Brookings Institution. Last modified July 2, 2013. http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/07/02- egypt-tamarod-morsi-ashour. “Belmokhtar joins forces with African jihadists and vows attacks in Egypt.” The Guardian. Last modified August 22, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/22/belmokhtar- mourabitounes-alliance-egypt-attacks. Bradley, Matt, and Tamer El-Ghobashy. “Mubarak To Be Placed Under House Arrest After Release.” The Wall Street Journal. Last modified August 21, 2013. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732416520457 9026572361918800.html. Byman , Daniel, and Khaled Elgindy. “The Deepening Chaos in Sinai.” The National Interest 127 (September-October 2013): 43-55. http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-deepening-chaos-sinai- 8957.
- 26. Egypt’s Democratic Inertia Vol.3, 2013/2014 19 Daragahi, Borzou. “Egypt to put IMF loan talks on back burner.” Financial Times. Last modified July 15, 2013. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e8901092-ed3a-11e2-ad6e- 00144feabdc0.html. “Egypt armed forces chief Abdul Fattah al-Sisi – a man of destiny.” EuroNews. Last modified August 19, 2013. http://www.euronews.com/2013/08/19/egypt-armed-forces- chief-abdul-fattah-al-sisi-a-man-of-destiny/. “Egypt authorities delay Morsi protest camps crackdown.” BBC. Last modified August 12, 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- middle-east-23662651. “Egypt Overview.” The World Bank. Accessed August 8, 2013. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/egypt/overview. “Failed States: An Annual Special Report by FP and the Fund for Peace.” Foreign Policy. 2013. Accessed August 8, 2013. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/24/2013_failed _states_interactive_map. Fick, Maggie, and Lin Noueihed. “Egypt's bruised Brotherhood seeks to show street power.” Reuters. Last modified August 23, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/23/us-egypt-protests- idUSBRE97M0DW20130823. Freeman, Charles W., Jr. Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997. Hamid, Shadi. “Demoting Democracy in Egypt.” The New York Times. Last modified July 4, 2013.
- 27. Sergei Oudman Vol. 3,2013/2014 20 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/05/opinion/demoting- democracy-in-egypt.html. Hellyer, H.A. “How Morsi let Egyptians down.” Foreign Policy. Last modified August 2, 2013. http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/02/morsis_dis appointing_year. “Ikhwanweb: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Official English web site.” Ikhwanweb. Accessed August 28, 2013. http://www.ikhwanweb.com/. “Images of solidarity as Christians join hands to protect Muslims as they pray during Cairo protests.” Daily Mail. Last modified February 3, 2011. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article- 1353330/Egypt-protests-Christians-join-hands-protect-Muslims- pray-Cairo-protests.html/. Luck, Edward C. “The Responsibility to Protect: Growing Pains or Early Promise?” Ethics and International Affairs 24, no. 4 (Winter 2010). Accessed August 15, 2013. http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/journal/24_4/res ponse/001.html. Mabrouk, Mirette F. “The View From a Distance: Egypt’s Contentious New Constitution.” The Brookings Institution. Last modified January 31, 2013. http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/01/31-egypt- mabrouk.
- 28. Egypt’s Democratic Inertia Vol.3, 2013/2014 21 Werr, Patrick. “UAE offers Egypt $3 billion support, Saudis $5 billion.” Reuters. Last modified July 9, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/09/us-egypt-protests- loan-idUSBRE9680H020130. Wilson, Rodney. Economic Development in the Middle East. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2010.
- 29. Vol. 3, 2013/201422 Analysis of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act and the 9/11 Commission Arthur J. Ceballos ABSTRACT A strong intelligence infrastructure is key to winning the war on terror. The attacks on 9/11 dealt a hard blow to the safety and security of the United States, prompting Congress to ask the obvious question of why and how this could have happened with what was believed to be a strong intelligence apparatus. A commission comprising lawmakers and politicians was asked to form The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly referred to as the 9/11 Commission, to identify weaknesses in the intelligence and law enforcement entities. The recommendations eventually led to the passing of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, marking the beginning of America’s journey to strengthen its security. … In response to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, Congress passed a new, major intelligence reform law - the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. It remains to be seen whether the Act represents a sea-change in the way the United States goes about the intelligence game, or whether it is simply a recipe for more of the same bureaucratic bottlenecks and “
- 30. Analysis of theIRTPA and the 9/11 Commission Vol. 3, 2013/2014 23 buck-passing that led, in part, to 9/11.”1 These words of former U.S. Representative Bob Barr rang true when it came to stating the obvious. In the aftermath of the attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) towers, the 9/11 Commission assessed the reasons why the Intelligence Community (IC) had no foreknowledge of the event in an effort at preventing the attacks. The 9/11 Commission was formed for the sole purpose of identifying missteps made by various intelligence and investigative agencies. The Commission set forth recommendations for overhauling the IC’s ability to deter any future terrorist attacks before they happen. The recommendations identified mistakes and their potential remedies ahead of future attacks. It is significant to compare the implementation of the IRTPA recommendations with those of the 9/11 Commission. The IRTPA implementation provides a measure of how far the federal government would go to protect America. The impact of that implementation on the IC would test the government’s ability to successfully carry out the changes recommended by the commission. Of the dozens of recommendations made, several from both the 9/11 Commission and IRTPA are summarized below. The 9/11 Commission made a total of forty-one recommendations based on the perception of a seemingly broken system. The implementation of these recommendations was deemed necessary in strengthening National Security as well as eradicating 1 Bob Barr, "Is It Time to Reform Intelligence Reform? Why We May Come to Regret the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,” FindLaw, last modified January 21, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20050121_barr.html.
- 31. Arthur J. Ceballos Vol.3, 2013/2014 24 terrorist networks that posed a threat to the United States. The first recommendation of the IRTPA includes the identification and prioritization of terrorist sanctuaries. The commission requested that assistance from other countries be pursued in identifying and rooting out terrorist sanctuaries. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, along with other countries in Africa and the Middle East, have gone to great lengths to identify individuals suspected of conducting terrorist-related activities within their own borders. Many of the hijackers of the planes that struck the WTC were Saudi citizens, and the Saudi government publicly disowned any support to the attackers. U.S. support to Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan anti-terrorism efforts was the focus of the second recommendation. Much of the U.S. effort at supporting anti- terrorism in these countries includes the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that use a variety of ordnance. The UAVs would play a large role in stabilizing Afghanistan. The stabilization of post-war Afghanistan was the third recommendation and called for the United States to support and strengthen the Afghan government as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Supporting Afghan efforts to strengthen their security is an important task in rooting out terrorists who wish to use the country as a platform for staging attacks. The commission emphasized the importance of efforts aimed at ensuring Afghanistan does not end up becoming another safe haven for Al Qaeda and its operatives. The fourth recommendation dealt directly with the Saudi government, citing that the need to build a strong relationship should
- 32. Analysis of theIRTPA and the 9/11 Commission Vol. 3, 2013/2014 25 extend beyond the oil business. The United States should encourage Saudi Arabia to foster an environment that embraces cultural respect and rebukes extremists who teach terrorist ideologies. The thirteenth recommendation involved tracking terrorist funding, a job suitably handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). When the FBI began going down the proverbial rabbit hole that is terrorist financing, it found that much of the money handled by certain Islamic charities was from front businesses for terrorist groups. The FBI traced these funds to numerous individuals around the globe and was successful in arresting and turning them over to their respective governments for interrogation/prosecution. This assisted in tracking terrorist activities and movements. Tracking terrorist travel around the globe is the fifteenth recommendation and is cited as the inspiration for the No Fly List, which contains hundreds of thousands of names of suspected terrorists who are deemed a threat to U.S. national security. The No Fly List came under scrutiny for adding individuals who had never been involved in terrorist-related operations.2 The two other recommendations involved the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), and the appointment of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to oversee all intelligence activities. After the drafting of the recommendations, it was up to Congress to put forth 2 Jonathan J. Cooper, “No-Fly List Lawsuit: Court Rules to Allow Challenge to Proceed,” The Huffington Post, last modified July 26, 2012, accessed October 01, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/26/no-fly-list- lawsuit_n_1707504.html.
- 33. Arthur J. Ceballos Vol.3, 2013/2014 26 legislation implementing them, which would later be known as the IRTPA. The reason for creating IRTPA was to assist in reforming the IC and the related activities of the U.S. government.3 Each component contributes important pieces of information toward identifying and preventing terrorist activities. Some of the members of the IC include the FBI, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), and the Department of Defense (DoD). The FBI, the longest- running agency of all three, was selected as the executive agency to deal with matters involving domestic terrorism investigations. The FBI was granted power to collect intelligence on a broad scale and has yet to harness the full potential of intelligence gathering. When the FBI was subsequently tasked with an increased role in intelligence gathering after 9/11, its seamless transition toward its new focus on terrorism was not well received by Congress. One of President George W. Bush’s recommendations for strengthening security included having all intelligence agencies fall under the control of the DNI. Furthermore, the FBI was tasked to develop an intelligence unit that dealt specifically with National Security. A memo to President George W. Bush from the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction dated March 29, 2005 revealed a key concern involving the decision by the FBI to make 3 Director of National Intelligence, “Report on the Progress of the Director of National Intelligence in Implementing the ‘Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,’” Federation of American Scientists, last modified May 2006, https://www.fas.org/irp/dni/implement.html.
- 34. Analysis of theIRTPA and the 9/11 Commission Vol. 3, 2013/2014 27 internal changes in how it conducted intelligence activities. The FBI created the National Security Division (NSD) but ignored a call for the FBI to “allocate sufficient resources and authority to the new Intelligence Directorate to perform its assigned mission.”4 The memo further added that previous efforts by the FBI to create a National Security workforce prior to the attacks on 9/11 had failed to launch and that, “The [current] FBI Plan is inconsistent with the core recommendation of the 9/11 Commission regarding the FBI.”5 The Commission noted that it was not for lack of trying that the FBI goals had not been met, but that the director of the FBI lacked the proper authority to successfully integrate foreign intelligence collection, analysis, and operations. This evaluation by the Executive Branch was met by a rebuttal from the FBI, which responded with reciprocal concerns over the danger of mixing criminal investigative matters with intelligence gathering. The decision by the FBI to keep management decisions within the organization has not changed since its establishment. The Commission expressed the need to bring the FBI completely into the role of intelligence, and not teeter the line between criminal investigation and intelligence operation. Changing the mentality of the FBI would be difficult, considering its success in the criminal investigation role. 4 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Letter to the President, last modified March 29, 2005, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/about.html. 5 Ibid.
- 35. Arthur J. Ceballos Vol.3, 2013/2014 28 The FBI has a long history of law enforcement accomplishments, which include the dismantling of organized crime, the capture and successful prosecution of spies on American soil, and other high-profile crimes. In the world of intelligence, the normal route of traffic with collection and dissemination is typically cradle to grave or rather, start to finish. For example, when intelligence is gathered in the field, it is sent to analysts who vet it either by returning it to the field or through massive amounts of research, which helps verify the information received. Once analyzed, it goes to various management channels, which are charged with cleaning up the report for the policymakers in Washington, where it is disseminated accordingly and given to the President during his morning Presidential Daily Brief. The FBI contends that it does not possess the manpower to carry out such tasks solely on intelligence matters. The FBI considers the amending of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) a welcome change in assisting the investigative efforts of the FBI. Amending FISA allowed the FBI to obtain wiretaps on suspected terrorists without having to prove a connection to a foreign power. Prior to the amendment, the FBI had to establish probable cause that an individual had a connection to a foreign power and was being directed to conduct illegal activities on its behalf. The FBI had a difficult time obtaining wiretaps on suspected terrorists prior to the amendment mainly due to the inability to uncover a foreign tie, thus impeding critical stages of investigations.
- 36. Analysis of theIRTPA and the 9/11 Commission Vol. 3, 2013/2014 29 With the passing of the amendment, wiretaps were granted much more easily and led to the gathering of important terrorist threat information. In one example, the FBI realized that terror suspects used tradecraft typically associated with narcotics suspects, who would often use throwaway phones to make it more difficult for law enforcement to obtain a wiretap. Throwaway phones were used for short durations before being discarded for a new phone, which made it difficult for the FBI to maintain continuous coverage. Terror targets were beginning to use this same methodology to avoid detection, and the FBI scrambled to try to close this gap. Roving wiretaps authorized continuous collection on the target rather than just the phone itself; this way, any device the target used could be targeted.6 The IRTPA mandated that the FBI create an intelligence-based position that would continue the reforms within the Bureau long after the current director’s exit. The CIA would not escape scrutiny, as reforms would be introduced to fix deficiencies in the agency. The CIA adopted many important intelligence collection methods stemming from the IRTPA, which helped streamline the way it collected intelligence abroad. Satellites serve a multi-functional purpose with capabilities that far eclipse those put into orbit just 30 years ago. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) and measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT) are used to collect radar, nuclear, and biological 6 Jerome P. Bjelopera, The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism Investigations, report no. R41780, Congressional Research Service, April 24, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41780.pdf.
- 37. Arthur J. Ceballos Vol.3, 2013/2014 30 intelligence. It is rumored that some of these capabilities were used to capture Osama Bin Laden, and led to his eventual death. According to a publication from the Bipartisan Policy Center titled Jihadist Terrorism: A Threat Assessment, it was widely believed that the death of Bin Laden would lead to a fracturing and potential splintering of Al Qaeda, but recent terrorist events by groups like Al-Shabaab have revealed otherwise.7 It may have been wishful thinking on the part of the West: the true reason militants could have for joining Al Qaeda involve many factors, some of which include the fallout of two consecutive wars. Although this topic is of interest to those who study terrorism, the discussion would be lengthy and fall outside the scope of this assessment. The important factor when dealing with technological intelligence gathering is to take into account significant collection gaps, specifically human intelligence (HUMINT), which is handled overseas exclusively by the CIA. When the CIA was first created under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was created. With the DCI in charge of the CIA as well as the other intelligence components of the DoD and FBI, a conflict was created that would stifle how information flowed from one agency to the next. With no definable way to share intelligence among respective agencies, information would never reach the analysts whose job it was 7 Peter Bergen, Bruce Hoffman, Michael Hurley, and Erroll Southers, Jihadist Terrorism: A Threat Assessment, Bipartisan Policy Center, September 2013, http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Jihadist%20Terrorism- A%20Threat%20Assesment_0.pdf.
- 38. Analysis of theIRTPA and the 9/11 Commission Vol. 3, 2013/2014 31 to connect the dots. The 9/11 Commission recommended removal of this obstacle by establishing one central head for all civilian intelligence agencies in the form of the DNI. The 9/11 Commission recommended that information be shared between the CIA and FBI so that information pointing to a potential attack would never again be missed. The IRTPA placed the DNI in charge of national and foreign intelligence, excluding military intelligence, the ultimate responsibility for which rests with the Secretary of Defense. However, concern over the protection of civil liberties would prove to be an ongoing issue. Protections afforded by the Constitution are an important facet of American life, and preserving them is essential. It is vital to note that criminal investigations are different than counterintelligence (CI) investigations in the sense that in criminal cases information can be kept for an indefinite amount of time. During CI investigations, the government has ninety days to uncover ties relating to terrorism- or espionage-related activities before the information must be destroyed.8 These protections were put in place following the abuses by Richard Nixon’s presidential administration when he tasked the CIA, the FBI, and the DoD to spy on American citizens for political gain. The controversy of telecom companies working with the NSA to collect phone data, some of it American, brought back fear that history was beginning to repeat itself. Recent decisions by the Obama Administration to continue 8 “Executive Order 12333 – United States Intelligence Activities,” Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight, Department of Defense, last modified January 30, 2008, http://atsdio.defense.gov/Library/EO12333.aspx.
- 39. Arthur J. Ceballos Vol.3, 2013/2014 32 with telecommunications collections showed that grey areas would continue to be a concern. Although the FBI was tasked as the executive agency on terrorism in the United States, the DoD was working on revamping its capabilities to do its part in securing the homeland. In October 2002, the Pentagon announced the creation of a new command known as the Northern Command, or NORTHCOM, whose mission is to "deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States.”9 The information gathered from NORTHCOM consisted of intelligence threats with some type of DoD nexus. The FBI is the lead on all matters domestic, but the difference in the mission of NORTHCOM involves responding to direct attacks on the homeland in North America. An added measure to the new command dealt with the collection of intelligence involving potential terrorists hiding in the United States. The DoD started a new program called the Threat and Local Observation Notice (TALON), which enlisted the aid of the community to report suspicious activities. TALON reports were compiled in a database that could be searched by analysts looking for indicators of potential terrorist activities. Unfortunately, the program included collecting intelligence on protestors of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, a repeat of the Nixon-era tactics and a violation of 9 Devin Fisher, “USNORTHCOM Vision Focuses on Defending Homeland,” U.S. Northern Command, August 4, 2005, http://www.northcom.mil/Newsroom/tabid/3104/Article/2097/usnorthcom- vision-focuses-on-defending-homeland.aspx
- 40. Analysis of theIRTPA and the 9/11 Commission Vol. 3, 2013/2014 33 information operations (IO) rules.10 However, as a proactive approach to collecting terrorist-related information, it inspired the creation of the NCTC. The IRTPA created a national center for the collection of terrorist-related information and dissemination to federal, state, local, and tribal entities around the country: “In August 2004, the President established the NCTC to serve as the primary organization in the United States Government (USG) for integrating and analyzing all intelligence pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism (CT) … the NCTC is a multi- agency organization dedicated to eliminating the terrorist threat to US interests at home and abroad.”11 The NCTC gathers all pertinent information and sends it out to local law enforcement agencies around the country as well as the world. It was created to help lift the compartmentalization of information that led to the missed intelligence before the attacks of 9/11. Unfortunately, reporting from an NCTC insider revealed that the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) system was on the verge of collapse.12 Assessments found that changing the whole system would leave the country more vulnerable to 10 “Pentagon to Shut down Controversial Database,” NBC News, last modified August 21, 2007, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/20375361/ns/us_news- security/t/pentagon-shut-down-controversial-database/. 11 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), Pub. L. No. 108-458, 108th Cong. (December 17, 2004), http://www.nctc.gov/docs/pl108_458.pdf. 12 Michael, Krigsman, “Failed Government IT: ‘The Mother of All Databases,’” ZDNet, last modified August 26, 2008, http://www.zdnet.com/blog/projectfailures/failed-government-it-the-mother- of-all-databases/995.
- 41. Arthur J. Ceballos Vol.3, 2013/2014 34 attack since the changeover would take too long to implement. TIDE contains data such as the No Fly List for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), as well as a host of other information. The TSA would have a very difficult time keeping passengers safe if TIDE were taken offline. At least half a million people have been added to the NCTC’s database and security measures have been increased in response to prevention of a future attack. Prior to the hijacking of planes on 9/11, security contractors hired to police the system before passengers boarded planes missed items that should never have passed through security checkpoints. After the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), TSA was brought under the new department and given new mandates to step up security procedures. The Social Security Administration (SSA) was given new IRTPA mandates on how to verify birth records as well as upgrade the security of their documents to cut down on fraudulent card counterfeiting. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) also upgraded the integrity of its systems to better comply with those of the IRTPA. ICE would also lead the way in computer investigation of suspected terrorists, which would yield leads for other IC agencies to follow up on for possible exploitation. As part of the 2004 IRTPA, Congress addressed this issue. Section 5501 of the IRTPA amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to include participation in torture or extrajudicial killings as grounds of inadmissibility and deportability. Further, Congress made this provision of the INA retroactive, so that
- 42. Analysis of theIRTPA and the 9/11 Commission Vol. 3, 2013/2014 35 human rights violators who had previously been granted legal status in the United States could now face having that status revoked in immigration court. ICE quickly moved to implement this change in law, using it as the grounds to successfully deport a former Ethiopian army officer who was directly involved in torturing suspected political opponents under the repressive Mengistu Regime.13 One negative impact the IRTPA had on one agency would become national news, leading to more questions about diminishing civil liberties within America: the NSA’s wiretapping scandal. During a forum with President George W. Bush, an audience member who did not agree with the decision to wiretap telecommunication lines went so far as to ask the president to apologize; the president replied that he would not apologize and defended his decision to protect American lives during a time of war.14 Although later a federal judge would rule the wiretaps were illegal, the program would spark a debate on whether a distinction of importance was made with regard to civil liberties and national security.15 The dissension of average citizens to the wiretapping program brought it to the forefront of debate as Congress began its probe into whether or not 13 Marcy M. Forman, “Fact Sheets: Human Rights Violators Investigations,” Sierra Herald, last modified August 15, 2008, http://www.sierraherald.com/ice- action.htm. 14 Jim Rutenberg, “Facing Tough Questions, Bush Defends War,” The New York Times, last modified April 7, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/07/us/07prexy.html. 15 “NSA Eavesdropping Was Illegal, Judge Says,” Washington Post, last modified April 1, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2010/03/31/AR2010033102442.html.
- 43. Arthur J. Ceballos Vol.3, 2013/2014 36 the legal language supported the President’s decisions. The U.S. Constitution protects its citizens from unlawful search and seizure by its government, with the exception of certain circumstances. A serious debate on the issue of warrantless searches cannot be told without the introduction of the FISA system. The IRTPA expanded the powers for all members of the IC in the hopes that none would abuse those powers. During the 1970s, warrantless searches and wiretaps, as well as surveillance, had been carried out on citizens who opposed the Vietnam War; those actions led to the creation of the FISA courts to hear arguments on surveillance, searches, and seizures of matters dealing with terrorist- and intelligence-related issues. FISA reviews all requests for warrants and ensures that specific rules are followed prior to them being sent to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) for its approval. The George W. Bush Administration believed there were too many constraints to issuing warrants—specifically, the requirement to tie a target to a foreign power. This was hard to do if targets were tied to Al Qaeda, a group whose ties were to no one but their own. A sixty-six-page change was introduced into the FISA, eleven of which were approved. The one change that would make it easier to approve any warrant was the change of tying a person to a foreign power. This change introduced warrantless wiretaps into the spectrum. The NSA was given permission to begin listening in on millions of calls inside the country in hopes of finding sleeper cells domestically. The unfortunate circumstance is that average American citizens were being listened to, a direct violation of
- 44. Analysis of theIRTPA and the 9/11 Commission Vol. 3, 2013/2014 37 Federal law regardless of Executive decision to do so. It would appear that history had indeed come full circle in the form of the war on terror. The impact this has had on the IC is damaging but not at all considered grave. More reforms and increased oversight have reigned in warrantless activities to a knee-jerk reaction by the White House. The impact the IRTPA has had on the CIA, FBI, and DoD was described in a progress report in May 2006. With regard to information sharing, there has been a significant enhancement since the DNI was emplaced. “The [chief information officer] is streamlining the processes and organizations by which community elements acquire and manage information technology and sharing, and is using designated authorities to ensure that agencies build networks and databases that can support rapid and efficient information-sharing, and to eliminate those that cannot.”16 Improvement of analysis has shown progress as well. Analysis of intelligence is considered the most important part of the intelligence process. Analysts can de-conflict information coming in from the field and send additional collection requirements that fill gaps in the realm of intelligence. For example, current gaps exist in intelligence coming in from Russia regarding the new Russian President’s intentions with regard to foreign policy. The invasion of Georgia was not a direct surprise, but it did catch intelligence officials off guard with its timing and execution. Had proper intelligence gaps 16 Director of National Intelligence, “Report on the Progress of the Director of National Intelligence in Implementing the ‘Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,’” Federation of American Scientists, May 2006, http://fas.org/irp/dni/implement.html.
- 45. Arthur J. Ceballos Vol.3, 2013/2014 38 been identified by collectors in the field, there could have been a way to fill those gaps. The Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis (DDNUA) scrubbed its analytic process by looking at personnel training. It is extremely important to train analysts how to spot trends in the massive amount of raw data received, and an overhaul of this area had been long overdue. Source validation is another important tool often overlooked by intelligence collectors on the ground. Sources in the field can either be electronic or human, and each has their own weaknesses. The HUMINT aspect is trickiest at finding good solid intelligence that is not driven by greed, revenge, or just plain attention-seeking. Greed entered intelligence due to the fact that millions of dollars were given to HUMINT sources and seldom did that intelligence, or did the sources themselves, get vetted for accuracy. The DDNUA wanted to make sure that proper vetting was taking place and instituted training programs for those in the field who wished to vet their sources. The end result is better and more accurate intelligence aimed at real threats and real people. Training is also being given in languages, and the budget for it has more than doubled in size. The ODNI created a “National Intelligence University (NIU) system to draw together existing IC schools and training centers, and provide centralized management and common educational standards. The NIU enables intelligence officers to take courses across the community, to better link training and education to professional development, and to
- 46. Analysis of theIRTPA and the 9/11 Commission Vol. 3, 2013/2014 39 derive and share lessons learned.”17 This addition is extremely important to the future of intelligence processing, as well as the creation of mission centers in the country. Mission centers deal specifically with one type of threat. For example, the NCTC deals specifically with domestic counterterrorist information and its sharing and dissemination to lower levels. The National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) was created to handle all intelligence gathering regarding weapons of mass destruction. The two areas with the most emphasis were North Korea and Iran, two rogue nations that were not only identified by President George W. Bush as part of the Axis of Evil, but also states that are constantly trying to obtain nuclear materials. North Korea has repeatedly stopped and restarted its nuclear facilities and shows no signs of shutting them off forever. Iran on the other hand has consistently voiced its intentions to build and operate nuclear power plants. Through the progress reports, it is evident that changes are being made and improvements to those changes are ongoing. But what are the impacts to local law enforcement agencies? According to Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA), a non-profit membership organization that serves the military and IC communities, the integration has been difficult. An example of the difference between law enforcement and intelligence is that law enforcement gathers information and evidence to support prosecution, whereas intelligence gathers information that may reach 17 Ibid.
- 47. Arthur J. Ceballos Vol.3, 2013/2014 40 across two or three different spectrums. This provides a unique challenge to law enforcement individuals who may need a piece of information for a case but are stripped of it for National Security concerns. Also, the intelligence gathered does not have to meet the burden of proof of a criminal trial. This could jeopardize a case that may have high-interest press coverage, a gamble that law enforcement or intelligence officials may be reluctant — or not willing — to make. With information sharing between law enforcement and intelligence officials still ongoing, it is important not to forget that the final destination of all intelligence gathered and provided is those who make the decisions to support and defend this nation: the policymakers. Policymakers have one role in the intelligence system: to look at the intelligence provided and make an informed, unbiased opinion on whether or not to act on it. The situation in Iran has grown increasingly heated as time passes, further emboldening the Iranian regime into supporting terrorists flowing into Iraq to harm U.S. personnel and their allies. Intelligence is being collected constantly that shows where Iran is the nuclear process as well as the tools they provide to terror, yet there is no solid intelligence that shows what top-level Iranian officials are thinking. In one story during the initial Iranian hostage crisis in 1979, the Iranians opened a back channel with the U.S. Government in order to resolve the standoff peacefully. The Iranians were shot down and the situation worsened, leading to the constant deterioration of ties between the two governments. The IRTPA has strengthened the ability to peek inside and outside the country’s once declining intelligence
- 48. Analysis of theIRTPA and the 9/11 Commission Vol. 3, 2013/2014 41 system. Vice President Dick Cheney was an advocate of restoring powers to the Executive Branch and accomplished exactly that through the passing of the U.S. PATRIOT Act and the IRTPA. America’s ability to detect future attacks has strengthened considerably, and overall the IC has improved its intelligence-gathering capabilities, but at what cost to American citizens’ civil liberties? Shortfalls within the IC were corrected after the passing of the IRTPA and provided enhanced measures for improvement. Pitfalls in the law enforcement community and its hesitance to use or provide information to the IC can either help or hurt a case they may try to prosecute later. With recommendations from the 9/11 Commission, the path toward a well-structured intelligence apparatus would soon come to fruition. Since the inception of IRTPA, it had been met with accusations of unethical activities involving warrantless wire-tapping. The recommendations of the 9/11 Commission were outlined in accordance to its findings on why the IC was caught off guard to indicators of an impending attack. With the passing of the IRTPA, America has a more broad-reaching infrastructure. Mistakes of the past are less likely to be repeated, allowing Americans to feel a great sense of security.
- 49. Arthur J. Ceballos Vol.3, 2013/2014 42 BIBLIOGRAPHY Barr, Bob. “Is It Time to Reform Intelligence Reform? Why We May Come to Regret the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. ” FindLaw. Last modified January 21, 2005. http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20050121_barr.htm l. Bergen, Peter, Bruce Hoffman, Michael Hurley, and Erroll Southers. Jihadist Terrorism: A Threat Assessment. Bipartisan Policy Center. September 2013. http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Jihadist%20Terror ism-A%20Threat%20Assesment_0.pdf. Bjelopera, Jerome P. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism Investigations. Report no. R41780. Congressional Research Service. April 24, 2013. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41780.pdf. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. Letter to the President. Last modified March 29, 2005. http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/about.html. Cooper, Jonathan J. “No-Fly List Lawsuit: Court Rules to Allow Challenge to Proceed.” The Huffington Post. Last modified July 26, 2012. Accessed October 1, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/26/no-fly-list- lawsuit_n_1707504.html.
- 50. Analysis of theIRTPA and the 9/11 Commission Vol. 3, 2013/2014 43 Director of National Intelligence. “Report on the Progress of the Director of National Intelligence in Implementing the ‘Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.’” Federation of American Scientists. Last modified May 2006. https://www.fas.org/irp/dni/implement.html. “Executive Order 12333 – United States Intelligence Activities.” Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight. Department of Defense. Last modified January 30, 2008. http://atsdio.defense.gov/Library/EO12333.aspx. Fisher, Devin. “USNORTHCOM Vision Focuses on Defending Homeland.” U.S. Northern Command. August 4, 2005. http://www.northcom.mil/Newsroom/tabid/3104/Article/2097 /usnorthcom-vision-focuses-on-defending-homeland.aspx. Forman, Marcy M. “Fact Sheets: Human Rights Violators Investigations.” Sierra Herald. Last modified August 15, 2008. http://www.sierraherald.com/ice-action.htm. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). Pub. L. No. 108-458. 108th Cong. (December 17, 2004). http://www.nctc.gov/docs/pl108_458.pdf. Krigsman, Michael. “Failed Government IT: 'The Mother of All Databases.’” ZDNet. Last modified August 26, 2008. http://www.zdnet.com/blog/projectfailures/failed-government- it-the-mother-of-all-databases/995. “NSA Eavesdropping Was Illegal, Judge Says.” Washington Post. Last modified April 1, 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
- 51. Arthur J. Ceballos Vol.3, 2013/2014 44 dyn/content/article/2010/03/31/AR2010033102442.html. "Pentagon to Shut down Controversial Database." NBC News. Last modified August 21, 2007. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/20375361/ns/us_news- security/t/pentagon-shut-down-controversial-database/. Rutenberg, Jim. “Facing Tough Questions, Bush Defends War.” The New York Times. Last modified April 7, 2006. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/07/us/07prexy.html.
- 52. Vol. 3, 2013/201445 Fighting Transnational Crime: New Techniques from Reliable Standards Samuel J. Caramela Introduction ransnational crime and terrorism is a growing threat to the civilized world, and a challenge to law enforcement professionals and policymakers. With the evolution of the Internet and other communications technologies, new global law enforcement initiatives must be implemented to cope with the rise of transnational criminal groups and their use of these technologies. Criminal exploitation of these technologies allows transnational criminal organizations to perpetrate new crimes and facilitate commission of their classic criminal efforts. Further challenging law enforcement is the new “globalized” economic environment and the “open border” policies of the world’s democratized nations. The movement of people and product across borders has never been easier, creating an environment that enables transnational criminal groups to operate throughout the world from nations that have little or no effective law enforcement or government structure. Additional global law enforcement initiatives must address transnational crime and its proliferation in this new global economy. At no previous time has it been easier for organized criminal groups to become transnational in their exploits. Policymakers must provide the T
- 53. Samuel J. Caramela Vol.3, 2013/2014 46 needed tools for law enforcement to effectively combat this new threat and coordinate with partner nations to develop initiatives that reduce its spread throughout the world. The Growing Threat With the end of the Cold War and the increasing globalization of the economy, many people expected an era of peace and sustained global well-being to be the hallmark of the twenty- first century. The new century, however, took an unexpected turn: greater disparity of wealth and opportunity around the globe, regional instability and conflict, and the threatened failure of many states all contributed to a surprising number of transnational threats to the security of many, if not most, nations.1 This statement by Kimberly Thachuk best describes the environment in which the world’s law enforcement community must operate. Organized criminal groups exploit the present conditions to further their operations and recruit new members, while leaders of these empires operate in relative anonymity from regions with unstable governments.2 The disparity of wealth throughout the world provides easy recruitment of members by those looking for a way out of poverty, while regional instability affords them government structures that are ripe for influence by corruption and bribery. Add to this the new global economy with relaxed policies of travel and trade, and new technologies (the Internet) that allow 1 Kimberly L. Thachuk, ed., Transnational Threats (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 5. 2 Phil Williams and Dimitri Vlassis, Combating Transnational Crime (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001).
- 54. Fighting Transnational Crime Vol.3, 2013/2014 47 communications and transactions to occur across borders unabated, and you have an environment ripe for criminal groups to operate in and expand. William F. Wechsler, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats, in his remarks to The Washington Institute stated, “Taking advantage of open borders, rapid increases in the volume and speed of global trade, and the dissemination of technology tools, criminal organizations that once dealt almost exclusively in narcotics began trafficking in small arms and light weapons, people, counterfeit goods, and money, while continuing to ship vast quantities of drugs along an expanding set of transportation routes. Criminal organizations recognized the additional profits and operational flexibility that a broader range of trafficking activities could provide.”3 This realization by criminal organizations has led to the expansion of their criminal enterprise and their influence in the world. As these conditions facilitate criminal behavior, they also suppress law enforcement efforts, and the efforts of stable governments attempting to partner with their neighbors and finding corruption and mismanagement are hindering their endeavors. Cross- border crimes, either through open trade or conducted through the Internet, pose an additional challenge to law enforcement. Previously, criminal organizations conducted business in a hidden global economy that has now been replaced by the use of Internet technologies that 3 William F. Wechsler, "Combatting Transnational Organized Crime," The Washington Institute, April 26, 2012, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/WechslerPrepared20120426.pd f.
- 55. Samuel J. Caramela Vol.3, 2013/2014 48 accelerate the transfer of money and provide anonymity for their transactions.4 While transnational criminal organizations operate easily across borders and anonymously on the Internet, law enforcement must operate within their jurisdictional limitations, making collaboration with neighboring countries a requirement for successful crime interdiction. It is this collaboration that must be addressed by policymakers throughout the globe in order for law enforcement to effectively battle this new transnational criminal threat. Though some states may be hesitant to partner in this endeavor, either due to complicity or fear of lost revenues, incentives and sanctions should be used to encourage cooperation from these developing nations. A New Approach Traditional crime prevention tactics do not always work when dealing with organized crime, as with la Cosa Nostra (the Sicilian Mafia) in the United States, which led to the enactment of the Racketeering (R) Influenced (I) and Corrupt (C) Organization (O) Act. This act allowed law enforcement to apprehend the leaders of organizations whose members commit crimes on their behalf. It is this type of legislative ingenuity that is needed to combat this new organized criminal element, which operates in our new borderless world. It is understandable that transnational crimes require a transnational response. Although it is difficult to identify what response is best for the 4 Ibid.
- 56. Fighting Transnational Crime Vol.3, 2013/2014 49 present environment, the past will always provide directions to solving future problems. Directing energy toward enforcing individual crimes has not always been the most efficient approach to combating criminal organizations with large network structures. The same is true for many transnational criminal organizations that commit numerous crimes all over the world, while their command structures reap the benefits without the exposure. In order for law enforcement to be effective against them, it must focus on the mediums that support their networks and crimes, rather than the criminal activity itself. Whether a criminal or organization is trafficking in illegal drugs, people, guns, or any other type of illicit activity, the same approach can be used to disrupt its operation. With that in mind, a three-pronged approach is needed to attack the structures that support transnational crime. The first approach must focus on mitigating the criminal exploitation of technology. In this approach, world governments would implement global policies governing Internet usage and define what constitutes illegal practices. The second approach must address the open borders and free trade that enable transnational criminal organizations to expand in size and venture. In this approach, governments need to collaborate to enable law enforcement agencies from all member nations with the freedom to operate in partner nations and receive the cooperation of their governing law enforcement agencies, and to codify international standards on the definition of illegal activities and crimes.
- 57. Samuel J. Caramela Vol.3, 2013/2014 50 The third approach will focus on money and other illegal financial activities. Law enforcement partners must emphasize on the seizure of funds from transnational criminal organizations and penalize legitimate businesses that knowingly facilitate the laundering of those funds. These three techniques will be effective in combating any transnational criminal organization, and will reduce the effectiveness of their networks while limiting their abilities to encourage local government corruption. Targeting Technology In his book Transnational Crime and the Twenty-First Century, author Jay S. Albanese points out that the invention of the automobile led to the doubling of criminal laws in most countries and relates it to the influence the computer will have on our laws in the future.5 Inventions that have affected the world as much as the automobile or the computer and Internet do not occur that often; but when those items come into existence and criminals exploit them to facilitate crime, the time is short to enact legislation that criminalizes that exploitation. In Albanese’s example, creating criminal statutes covering automobiles was an easy task. Each country was free to enact any legislation that it saw fit to regulate the criminal use of the automobile or its manufacture and sale. In the cases of the computer and the Internet, any statute that was not implemented globally would be ineffective in fighting Internet crimes. To facilitate this type of 5 Jay S. Albanese, Transnational Crime and the 21st Century (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2011), 74.
- 58. Fighting Transnational Crime Vol.3, 2013/2014 51 cooperation, the United States must use its influence on developing countries to persuade their leaders to adopt similar criminal statutes and offer assistance in enforcing them. In many cases the larger world community will be behind these efforts, and institutions like the United Nations will offer a venue for promotion and funding for nations to develop law enforcement resources. In addition to creating statutes, there are technological avenues that can help both mitigate the commission of Internet crimes and make it more difficult for organizations from outside the United States to commit crimes against American citizens. The United States can also use technology to limit regional access to United States websites to particular regions generating criminal activity. This would encourage those governments to police their regions more thoroughly, lest they lose access to a wide array of American sites. It is imperative that law enforcement use technology to fight crime that is being perpetuated by technology. The same is true for the situation created by free trade and the open border policies as is true for the Internet. Though clues to restricting criminal exploitation may lie in past experiences, the nature of transnational crime adds complication that requires collaboration between all countries involved. In this instance, policymakers can collaborate internationally as has been and continues to be done in the global fight against drug trafficking and terrorism. This is best accomplished by expanding collaborations already present rather than reinventing the wheel. Adding additional components to present
- 59. Samuel J. Caramela Vol.3, 2013/2014 52 alliances can facilitate agreement and speed implementation. Partners with investment in existing treaties are more likely to agree on further cooperation as these arrangements already contain the needed networks to implement policies. Wechsler’s earlier quote is in reference to the same drug trafficking organizations that have expanded their reach in this new global economy and added to their criminal exploits.6 This example further illustrates why building on existing efforts that were developed to combat drug trafficking networks is the best way to implement new policies and law enforcement initiatives. The same can be done in the information-sharing (intelligence) arena. Intelligence sharing has expanded exponentially since 9/1l. These networks are well established and can be used to facilitate information sharing that focuses on transnational criminal networks. Much of our intelligence gathering already involves criminal intelligence, but the primary focus is on drug smuggling activities. Criminal intelligence gathering must be expanded to where criminal empires and their operatives are identified, observed, and to where information is shared regarding their activities, movements, and operations. This will require law enforcement agencies across borders to collaborate in intelligence collection and sharing to develop profiles on all aspects of the organization, its associations, its crimes, its locations, and its assets. 6 Wechsler.
- 60. Fighting Transnational Crime Vol.3, 2013/2014 53 Targeting Finance On September 11, 2001 the attacks on our country prompted the United States government to enact legislation that would assist in combatting terrorism. This included targeting a terrorist organization’s finance. The resulting enactment of the United States PATRIOT Act included legislation that enabled the government to seize assets of foreign banks that operated in the United States, but were uncooperative in assisting the United States in recouping laundered funds of criminal and terrorist organizations using their banks.7 This 2001 act was the first change in the money laundering statutes since the 1986 Money Laundering Control Act. In addition to the international component of the PATRIOT Act, it also added provisions that made non- banking monetary institutions liable for the same laws as banks.8 This was an important step in fighting transnational crime and terrorism. However, to further shut down criminal networks, additional laws should be considered that penalize not only banking institutions, but also businesses that knowingly support criminal enterprise. The implementation of international laws governing the forfeiture of property and monies throughout the world should be promoted by the United States, building upon the efforts that the Financial Action Task Force implemented in 1989 at the G-7 economic summit.9 This measure, 7 Albanese, 111. 8 Ibid. 110. 9 Office of National Drug Control Policy, "International Money Laundering and Asset Forfeiture," The White House, n.d,
- 61. Samuel J. Caramela Vol.3, 2013/2014 54 which supports law enforcement efforts to regain funds from criminal organizations, is the most important of the three strategies. The Council on Foreign Relations cites that transnational crime makes up 3.6 percent of the global economy, with money laundering accounting for two percent. Recovering that money and investing it back into funds slated toward fighting transnational crime will go a long way toward supporting developing nations in creating new law enforcement initiatives to further that cause. Another reason to focus on disrupting financing is the reality that much of that funding goes to support terrorist and insurgency operations. Referring to the situation in Afghanistan, Wechsler states that drug money is used to facilitate insurgencies, corrupt government officials, and create a situation that allows terrorist or criminal organizations to replace an ineffective and corrupt government.10 This is only one example of the way illicit proceeds are used to facilitate insurgencies, promote terrorism, and destabilize governments. Hezbollah turned to illicit activities after the United States cut off other funding sources to the organization.11 This illustrates the need to target transnational criminal organization financing and to make it the cornerstone of the three-pronged approach. http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/international-money-laundering-and- asset-forfeiture. 10 Wechsler. 11 Ibid.
- 62. Fighting Transnational Crime Vol.3, 2013/2014 55 Conclusion With transnational criminal organizations on the rise, law enforcement agencies must adapt to combat their new strategies and associations. Criminal networks are spreading and their use of technology is growing. Through collaboration, technology, and finance, these organizations are corrupting governments, exploiting people, and trafficking in drugs, guns, people, and violence—all while supporting terrorists and insurgencies. It is in this environment that law enforcement must operate, but they sometimes lack the support tools they need. Fighting individual crimes is a necessary part of the plan, but a more comprehensive strategy should be implemented to address the entire criminal network and the structures that support its operations. This strategy focuses on disrupting those structures both financially and operationally, weakening the operation from its source. By attacking their use of technology and reliance on the protection of borders to insulate themselves from law enforcement, and by taking away their most important resource—money, partner nations and their law enforcement entities can mitigate criminal exploits throughout the world.
- 63. Samuel J. Caramela Vol.3, 2013/2014 56 BIBLIOGRAPHY Albanese, Jay S. Transnational Crime and the 21st Century. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2011. Council on Foreign Relations. "The Global Regime for Transnational Crime." Council on Foreign Relations. March 22, 2013. http://www.cfr.org/global-governance/global-regime- transnational-crime/p28656 (accessed April 16, 2013). McCarter, Mickey. Strategy To Combat International Crime Spells Out New Authorities, Initiatives. July 26, 2011. http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/industry-news/single- article/strategy-to-combat-international-crime-spells-out-new- authorities- initiatives/a493ce23d9b9423e17f12b307960a66b.html (accessed April 16, 2013). National Security Council. "Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime." The White House. July 25, 2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnati onal-crime (accessed April 16, 2013). Office of National Drug Control Policy. "International Money Laundering and Asset Forfeiture." The White House. n.d. http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/international-money- laundering-and-asset-forfeiture (accessed April 16, 2013). Thachuk, Kimberly L., ed. Transnational Threats. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007.
- 64. Fighting Transnational Crime Vol.3, 2013/2014 57 United Nations Information Service. "Impact of Corruption on Development and how States can Better Tackle Corruption to be Under the Spotlight at UN Anti-Corruption Conference in Morocco." United Nations Information Service. October 21, 2011. http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2011/uniscp6 58.html (accessed April 16, 2013). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. "Organized Crime." United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2013. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/index.html (accessed April 16, 2013). Wechsler, William F. "Combatting Transnational Organized Crime." The Washington Institute. April 26, 2012. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/WechslerPrepar ed20120426.pdf (accessed April 16, 2013). Williams, Phil, and Dimitri Vlassis. Combating Transnational Crime. New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001.
- 65. Vol. 3, 2013/201458 Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention: Should Sovereignty Be Ignored? Jack Frank Sigman ABSTRACT Some state diplomats would argue that given the concept of inviolate state sovereignty, intervention in the domestic affairs of another state, particularly their own state, is never justified. Others, such as Francis Deng and Gareth Evans of the Brookings Institute, and the former United Nations General Secretary, Kofi Annan, argue that with sovereignty comes responsibilities, and when a state grossly and inhumanely violates the rights of its people, it has abdicated its right to sovereignty. When, if ever, is humanitarian intervention, without the invitation of that state, justified? This paper seeks to answer that question with a view that affirms the doctrine of “Responsibility to Protect.” umanitarian intervention is one of the most controversial actions within the realm of international relations. Given the concept of inviolate sovereignty since the Peace of Westphalia, it would seem hard to prove that sovereignty can and should be violated to stop action taken within a state’s borders (Deng, Kimaro, Lyons, Rothchild, Zartman 1996, 2). However, justification does exist and there are many reasons for such justification. The likely father of the concept of humanitarian intervention, Hugo Grotius, is also the father of the scholars criticizing such. Proposed in 1625, Grotius espoused that “just war” includes the assistance H
- 66. Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention Vol.3, 2013/2014 59 rendered to those outside the state who are battling oppression emanating from their own sovereign (Green 2003, 104). However, in almost the same breath, he opined that this principle would more than likely be exploited by those who sought the resources of that state, thus utilizing the circumstances to justify a war for conquest (Goodman 2006, 107). Since that time, debate has continued. Indeed, in 1999 then United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan stated the two sides of the debate: Is it legitimate for an organization to intervene without a UN mandate, or is it legitimate to allow genocide to occur? (Merriam 2001, 113). Currently, there are two types of humanitarian intervention: authorized, or that which is sanctioned by the UN; and unauthorized, or that which is not sanctioned by the UN. Another name for unauthorized humanitarian intervention is unilateral humanitarian intervention, or UHI (Goodman 2006, 107). Intervention sanctioned by the UN is done under authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Whether or not there is such authority, humanitarian intervention is intended for “preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens” (Keohane 2003, 1). Regardless, even with the best intention, there are those with considerable power who still find this concept anathema. Indeed, Henry Kissinger, former United States (U.S.) Secretary of State, indicates that the United States insists that intervention into the affairs of other states is inadmissible, regardless of the desire to export American-style liberal democracy (Kissinger 1996, 17). However, since the 1989 U.S.
- 67. Jack F. Signman Vol.3, 2013/2014 60 intervention in Panama, which theoretically brought human rights and democracy to that state, there has been a change in American and international opinion (Papp, Johnson and Endicott 2005, 492). It is the success of the intervention in Panama that changed that opinion. The major events of the 1990s involving intervention, including Iraq, East Timor, and the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo)-and the lack of a response to the Rwandan genocide-reopened examination of justifications marshaled to support unilateral humanitarian intervention. This is not the first time such an examination was made. In 1945, France attempted to amend the charter of the UN to allow states to intervene without UN authorization (Franck 2003, 206). The concept proved too vague to override the UN charter’s proscription of nonviolence. As David Mednicoff, Director of Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Massachusetts, relates, “International law in general and the post-World War II United Nations-based legal order in particular were established to deter the resort to war by powerful states” (Mednicoff 2006, 375). Today, as recent interventions show, the concept is no longer as vague. Francis Boyle, a Professor of Law and an international lawyer, in his examination of the legality of the Israeli raid into Entebbe, Uganda, for the purpose of rescuing hostages, indicates that in times of crises, states will redefine international law to take into account national interest (Boyle 1985, 79). Actually, Boyle is incorrect in this example as the protection of one’s citizens, regardless of their location, is within international law. However, in this same episode, Boyle reflects that a
- 68. Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention Vol.3, 2013/2014 61 successful operation while violating international law may lead to a change in the law (Boyle 1985, 135). In this regard, it seems that the UN’s shift from inviolate sovereignty to “right to protect” signals such a change. Indeed, the UN investigation of NATO’s UHI in Kosovo led the UN to endorse the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) policy (Mingst & Karns 2007, 112). However, there is still debate over R2P fundamentally altering the traditional Westphalian conception of sovereignty. To this end, and despite progress, there exist various justifications for humanitarian intervention, specifically, justification of UHI, as well as objections. Each justification and objection will be examined through the lenses of liberal idealism and conservative realism for the purpose of determining if UHI can ever be justified. One of the iconic realist U.S. presidents, Theodore Roosevelt, in the 1904 State of the Union Address, declared that the United States must be prepared to militarily intervene in the affairs of sovereign states in situations wherein it is justified by virtue of halting mass atrocities, limited only by having the will and the strength of arms to do so (Walker & Schaffer 2007, 747; Bass 2008, 1). In contrast, Michael Desch, gives the conservative realist side of the argument regarding the process of deciding to entertain humanitarian intervention for the purpose of safeguarding human rights: that war is legitimate only when it advances or safeguards the national interest; that individual human rights are superseded by the rights of the community; and that human interaction will always contain elements of conflict (Desch 2001). Therefore, it is better to respect international law, expecting other
- 69. Jack F. Signman Vol.3, 2013/2014 62 states to do so in response, which in turn should reduce the need for “constant vigilance” to safeguard national security. In this same vein, Oded Löwenheim, Professor of International Relations at Hebrew University, explores the realist position regarding an episode of UHI about 190 years earlier: the British intervention in North Africa to end white slavery (Löwenheim 2003, 24-48). During various periods of social reform in Great Britain, starting in 1787, British abolitionists campaigned to end black slavery and the black slave trade. The movement finally succeeded in 1807 with Parliament outlawing the slave trade, and by 1833, outlawing slavery throughout the British Empire. This occurred, despite Britain’s position as the dominant slave trader between Europe and Africa, because of societal changes which caused the public to see slavery as abhorrent, and because national honor required the end of slavery (Quirk and Richardson 2010, 263-4). However, there were accusations of hypocrisy, that the crusade was being undertaken without addressing the issue of white slavery. Narrating one of the oldest such episodes in modern history-the British intervention that ended the white slavery trade in the Barbary Pirate regencies of Algeria, Tunis, and Tripoli-Löwenheim puts forward that the Barbary pirates were not enslaving British nationals and their ships left British ships untouched (Löwenheim 2003, 24). In addition, Britain benefited by trade with the Barbary states. So, clearly, there was no material benefit to be gained by Great Britain by this humanitarian intervention.
- 70. Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention Vol.3, 2013/2014 63 Löwenheim (2003, 25) gives three reasons for intervention in the realist viewpoint: (1) intervention as cover for expansion; (2) intervention as response to a threat to national interest; and (3) intervention in order to secure favorable world or regional opinion (Löwenheim 2003, 25). It seems that there was no desire to expand into the area, although Richard Gott, a British historian, indicates that Great Britain’s appetite for colonies was close to insatiable, and there was no great national interest involved wherein Great Britain would extend considerable military power to end the trade (Gott 2003, 45). However, Löwenheim’s assertion that British nationals were not enslaved is disputed by Jay Freemen (Freeman 2005, 1620). That leaves the third reason: intervention to secure favorable opinion. While Great Britain was undergoing a campaign to eradicate the African slave trade, as mentioned above, there were accusations of hypocrisy, that the crusade was being undertaken without addressing the issue of white slavery. In order to maintain the moral high ground in its campaign to end the slavery of black Africans-during which time Great Britain intervened several times into the affairs of other states-Great Britain needed to act to resolve the issue of white slavery in northern Africa (Bass 2007, 17-19). In order to enforce its political will, Britain acted in a manner that seems to belie its national interests, a supposedly sure sign of strict humanitarian interest (Bass 2007, 19). Löwenheim disagrees with Gary Bass’ conclusion, claiming that such activity is based on realism in that the action taken reflects the moral values upon which the state builds its identity (Löwenheim 2003,
- 71. Jack F. Signman Vol.3, 2013/2014 64 28). However, national values is more of an internal struggle for the soul of the state and what it will stand for, rather than just what is in the national interest of the state, which is normally limited to security and prosperity. This is the reason why there was overwhelming support within the British public, as well as Parliament, to end both black and white slavery. Regardless, Ambassador Chas Freeman considers such concerns to be based on “tactical interests” as well as “national values,” those behaviors that reflect the national judgment of right and wrong, decent and abhorrent (Freeman 1997, 11-12). A champion of conservative realism, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of State Colin Powell’s doctrine for utilizing military force agrees with Löwenheim’s analysis. While much stricter in finding purpose for usage, Powell does deem “overwhelming congressional and public support” as a base requirement for UHI (Desch 2001). On the other hand, liberal theorists espouse that a major purpose of the state’s existence is to “protect and secure human rights” (Teson 2003, 93). Desch offers that individual rights trump national interest; that norms are more important than power; and that “military force should only be used in our pursuit of altruistic objectives” (Desch 2001). Therefore, it would seem that violating or ignoring the major purpose of the state should place the state outside the protection of international law. In addition, Fernando Teson, the Tobias Simon Eminent Scholar at Florida State University, insists that sovereignty serves the people of the state, and those that violate that policy cannot
- 72. Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention Vol.3, 2013/2014 65 hide behind the shield of sovereignty (Teson 2003, 93). That being said, it appears, in the liberal point of view, that humanitarian intervention is justified when it is undertaken to secure human rights. Teson lists eight principles relating to liberalism and humanitarian intervention (Teson 2006, 94-107): 1. Governments are mere agents of the people, consequently, their international rights derive from the rights and interests of the individuals who inhabit and constitute the state. 2. Tyrannical governments forfeit the protection afforded them by international law. 3. The fact that all persons have rights entails the following consequences for foreign policy. Governments have: a. the obligation to respect human rights at home and abroad; b. the obligation to promote respect for human rights globally; c. The prima facie obligation to rescue victims of tyranny or anarchy, if they can do so at a reasonable cost to themselves. This obligation analytically entails the right to rescue those victims—the right of humanitarian intervention. 4. A justifiable intervention must be intended to end tyranny or anarchy.
- 73. Jack F. Signman Vol.3, 2013/2014 66 5. Humanitarian interventions are governed, like all wars, by the doctrine of double effect. 6. In general, only severe cases of anarchy or tyranny qualify for humanitarian intervention. 7. The victims of tyranny or anarchy must welcome the intervention. 8. Humanitarian intervention should preferably receive the approval or support of the community of democratic states. Items (5) and (8) require further explanation. For Item (5), Teson describes the doctrine of double effect as a means for the determination of fault regarding the death of innocents caused by action taken during a humanitarian intervention: According to this doctrine, an act in which innocents are killed is legitimate if, and only if, it satisfies three conditions: 1. The act has good consequences -/ such as ending tyranny. 2. The actor’s intentions are good, that is, he aims to achieve the good consequences. Any bad consequences—such as the killing of noncombatants—are not intended; and 3. The act’s good consequences—such as ending tyranny—outweigh its bad consequences—such as the killing of non-combatants. (Teson 2006, 102) Approval or support of the community of democratic states, item (8), deals with both authorized and unauthorized humanitarian interventions. This support can come as a UN Security Council
- 74. Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention Vol.3, 2013/2014 67 resolution authorizing such or, lacking such resolution, the nodding approval of a significant number of liberal democracies. The current nature of the permanent veto allows that no authorized action can take place against one of the permanent five and likely that no such action will ever be approved against a significant ally of the five. While such UHI action took place in Kosovo against Serbia, an ideological ally of Russia, it occurred while Russia was politically weak. Unfortunately, the need for support entails the need to promote the cause of a particular UHI in a way to sway the majority of states. In this, it seems perception is more important than reality in what will cause international opinion to shift in either direction. The cause of Bangladesh was promoted by India, the state that militarily intervened against West Pakistan, to the extent that world sympathy was on the side of the Bangladeshi (Karem 2005). Likewise, focusing UHI discussion on Holocaust imagery is both used and abused (Desch 2006, 106). During the 1992 Bosnian campaign, Holocaust comparisons routinely flooded major media. The aftermath of the effect of the publicity caused the United States to arm Muslims and Croats in 1994 (Desch 2006, 117). Again in 1998, Holocaust imagery brought the Kosovo conflict to the forefront, giving greater cause for the eventual NATO bombardment in which was later claimed, “This time the world was not silent. This time we respond. This time we intervene” (Desch 2006, 117). Finally, U.S. President G. W. Bush used such imagery to justify removal of the Iraqi Ba’athist regime, stating, “In this century,
- 75. Jack F. Signman Vol.3, 2013/2014 68 when evil men plot chemical, biological and nuclear terror, a policy of appeasement could bring destruction of a kind never before seen on earth” (Desch 2006, 118). However, Desch argues that actual intervention during the height of the Holocaust may not have accomplished anything close to what is perceived (Densch, 2006, 120– 130). Indeed, the massive sectarian violence that continues to this day in Iraq shows that the interaction has likely made life worse for Iraqis. In the example discussed earlier, the British decision to intervene militarily in the affairs of other states in order to end slavery also falls under the liberal theory. However, just because British culture found slavery morally repugnant does not mean that other cultures did also. In addition, it cannot be said that liberal democracies are the only legitimate governments. However, consent of the governed, whether actual or hypothetical, is required for a government to be legitimate. As Teson implies, consent may be hard to distinguish, but a tyranny is easy to spot (Teson 2006, 95). It is likely that the only legitimate nondemocratic governments are those in isolated, deeply religious communities such as in Tibet before the invasion of Communist China. The previous notion of sovereignty, at least that which is enshrined in the UN charter, owes its allegiance to the concepts derived from the Peace of Westphalia. Indeed, the concepts of sovereignty from Westphalia are still a basis for contemporary international relations: “The government of each country is unequivocally sovereign within its territorial jurisdiction, and countries shall not interfere in each other’s
- 76. Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention Vol.3, 2013/2014 69 domestic affairs” (Osiander 2001, 261). In this, it appears that sovereignty is inviolate. However, political sovereignty has undergone a change from control of activity within a real and political border to responsibility for what occurs within those borders. In other words, “the focus has shifted from the rights of sovereignty to the responsibility of sovereignty” (Reed 2012, 314). As recent events indicate, it appears that the major powers, at least those that are liberal democracies, are examining this focus closely. With this concept, Kofi Annan’s challenge to the UN—to what is the proper response “to gross and systemic violations of human rights that affect every precept of humanity,”—was answered (Gierycz 2010, 112). An independent international committee, which included the Brooking Institute’s Francis Deng and Gareth Evans, recommended a shift away from the concept of humanitarian intervention which violated state sovereignty and a shift toward a concept of an “international responsibility to protect the victims of a humanitarian crisis” (Gierycz 2010, 112). The difference between humanitarian intervention and R2P is that while there are myriad scenarios wherein humanitarian intervention might be contemplated, R2P is reserved for the “prevention of genocide and mass atrocities” (Bellamy 2009, 3). In this same vein, Evans considers genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity to be lumped into the all-encompassing term: Mass Atrocities (Evans 2008, 11).
- 77. Jack F. Signman Vol.3, 2013/2014 70 With this shift comes another notion: the possibility that mere sovereignty no longer trumps legitimacy. Criton Zoakos discusses the aspect of legitimacy when he compares sovereignty granted through the principle of Westphalia and the same via the U.S. Constitution wherein legitimacy is granted the U.S. Government through exercise of the human right to be governed by consent (Zoakos 2003, 1). This shift in doctrine leads to the legitimacy of UHI, by states whose sovereignty is legitimized by such consent, into states whose sovereignty has no such legitimacy, for the purposes of relieving massive human suffering (Green 2012, 314). Allen Buchanan, the James B. Duke Professor of Philosophy at Duke University, goes further in justifying UHI, arguing that the observation of the law should not and does not hinder fidelity to basic moral values (Buchanan 2003, 131). Following this line of reasoning, Buchanan lists three principles for which UHI are justified: moral necessity, protection of human rights, and moral improvement to the legal system (Buchanan 2003, 131). Unfortunately, all three principles can be abused. As asserted by Leslie Green, Professor of International Law at Monash University, massive suffering must be relieved; however, not all suffering requires the violation of sovereignty to relieve (Green 2012, 314). It would seem helpful if there is a condition applied to the moral necessity clause, which would be that it would put an end to acts that ‘‘shock the moral conscience of mankind’’ (Beitz 2009, 326). In addition, the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights lists several rights for which it would be sheer folly for one state to violate the
- 78. Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention Vol.3, 2013/2014 71 sovereignty of another to enforce such rights as the (23) right to work, the (26) right to an education, or the (27) right to participate in the cultural life of the community (UN 2012). As for intervention with the goal of a moral adjustment of international law, it is too ambiguous a concept on which to base action. However, based on the above-mentioned example wherein Britain violated the sovereignty of several states in the 1800s in order to eradicate slavery, this principle should be considered, no matter how difficult it may be to arrive at a satisfactory philosophy. Indeed, the ongoing conflicts in Sudan and the slave labor camps in North Korea are issues that should evoke such a response today. Finally, the debate over UHI will continue as long as the UN can be deadlocked over acting on authorizing humanitarian intervention. However, as seen in the aftermath of such action in East Pakistan by India, Cambodia by Vietnam, Uganda by Tanzania, and Kosovo by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, such intervention will continue to occur as long as international opinion supports it and the cost of such intervention is not onerous. In that regard even Kissinger, who portrayed the United States as being against such intervention in 1996, professed that “humane convictions are so integral a part of the American tradition that both treasure and, in the extreme, lives must be risked to vindicate them anywhere in the world” (Kissinger 2001, 253). Accordingly, the moral reaction to unforeseen events seems to have a habit of changing international opinion.
- 79. Jack F. Signman Vol.3, 2013/2014 72 That being said, it may seem that UHI, as envisioned today, is hypocritical in that it appears, obviously, that some states are impervious to intervention. However, it is hoped that one day no state will be able to hide behind the concept of inviolate sovereignty while abusing its citizenry. Indeed, in those circumstances sovereignty must be ignored. As Bass concludes, the responsibility of preventing the violence associated with the massive abuse of human rights belongs to the states that profess liberal democratic governments (Bass 2008, 382). As of yet, no state, or group of states, has undertaken to shoulder that responsibility.
- 80. Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention Vol.3, 2013/2014 73 BIBLIOGRAPHY Bass, Gary. 2008. Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Beitz, Charles R. 2009. “The Moral Standing of States Revisited.” Ethics & International Affairs 23, no. 4: 325-347. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed August 25, 2012). Bellamy, Alex J. 2009. Responsibility to Protect. Cambridge: Polity Press. Boyle, Francis A. 1985. World Politics and International Law. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Buchanan, Allen. 2003. “Reforming the International law of Humanitarian Intervention.” In Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, ed. J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, 130-173. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Deng, Francis M., Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild, and I. William Zartman. 1996. Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute. Desch, Michael. 2001. Liberals, Neocons, and Realcons. Orbis 45, no. 4:519. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed August 24, 2012). Desch, Michael. 2006. “The Myth of Abandonment: The Use and Abuse of the Holocaust Analogy.” Security Studies. 15:1, 106-145.
- 81. Jack F. Signman Vol.3, 2013/2014 74 Evans, Gareth. 2008. The Responsibility to Protect. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute. Franck, Thomas. 2003. “Legal Interpretation and Change.” In Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, ed. J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, 204-231. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Freeman Chas. 1997. Arts of Power. Washington: USIP Press. Freeman, Jay. 2005. “White Gold: The Extraordinary Story of Thomas Pellow and Islam’s One Million White Slaves.” The Booklist 101 (18): 1620-1620. http://search.proquest.com/docview/235563572?accountid=82 89. Goodman, Ryan. 2006. “Humanitarian Intervention and the Pretext for War.” The American Journal of International Law. 100:107, 107- 141. Gott, Richard. 2003. "America and Britain: The Dangers of Neo- Imperialism and the Lessons of History." Global Dialogue 5 (1): 42-51. http://search.proquest.com/docview/211505989?accountid=82 89. Green, Leslie C. 2003. “Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law.” Journal of Conflict and Security Law. 8:1, 101–131. Gierycz, Dorota 2010. “From Humanitarian Intervention (HI) to Responsibility to Protect (R2P).” Criminal Justice Ethics, 29:2, 110-128.
- 82. Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention Vol.3, 2013/2014 75 Karem, M.M. (2005) “The Recognition Story.” http://www.bdsdf.org/forum/index.php?showtopic=3072 (accessed August 26, 2012). Keohane, Robert O. 2003. “Introduction.” In Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, ed. J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, 1-11. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kissinger, Henry. 1994. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster. Kissinger, Henry. 2001. Does America Need a Foreign Policy? New York: Simon & Schuster. Löwenheim, Oded. 2003. “Do Ourselves Credit and Render a Lasting Service to Mankind: British Moral Prestige, Humanitarian Intervention, and the Barbary Pirates.” International Studies Quarterly. 47:1 23-48. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3096075 (accessed August 8, 2012). Mednicoff, David. 2006. “Humane wars? International law, Just War theory and Contemporary Armed Humanitarian Intervention.” Law, Culture and the Humanities. 2006:2, 373-398. Mingst, Karen A. and Margaret P. Karns. 2007. The United Nations in the 21st Century, 3rd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview. Osiander, Andreas. 2001. “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth.” International Organization 55, no. 2: 251- 287. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed August 25, 2012).
- 83. Jack F. Signman Vol.3, 2013/2014 76 Papp, Daniel S., Loch K. Johnson, and John E. Endicott. 2005. American Foreign Policy: History, Politics, and Policy. New York: Longman. Quirk, Joel, and David Richardson. 2010. "Religion, Urbanisation and Anti-Slavery Mobilisation in Britain, 1787-1833." European Journal of English Studies 14, no. 3: 263-279. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed October 15, 2013). Reed, Esther D. 2012. “Responsibility to Protect and Militarized Humanitarian Intervention.” Journal of Religious Ethics. 40:2, 308-344. Teson, Fernando. 2003. “The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention.” Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, ed. J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, 1- 11. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Teson, Fernando. 2006. “Eight Principles for Humanitarian Intervention.” Journal of Military Ethics. 5:2, 93-113. UN. 2012. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” UN.org. http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ (accessed August 8, 2012). Walker, Stephen G., and Mark Schafer. 2007. “Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson as Cultural Icons of U.S. Foreign Policy.” Political Psychology 28, no. 6: 747-776. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed August 12, 2012). Zoakos, Criton M. 2003. “The US and the UN: Legitimacy vs Sovereignty.” Asia Times Online.
- 84. Vol. 3, 2013/201477 International Law and Human Trafficking Ryan Jay Burch Introduction uman rights issues comprise what is often one of the most overlooked areas of international law, as their effect tends to be limited to individuals or areas that are not considered strategically valuable. It is, therefore, easy for human rights violations to be overlooked by organizations such as the United Nations and individual countries. The times when human rights violations become most noticed are when issues such as genocide are brought to light, due to the sheer number of people involved. However, there is another issue that involves a tremendous amount of victims– human trafficking. The United States Department of Homeland Security estimates that there are between 12 million and 27 million enslaved/trafficked persons in the world (Department of Homeland Security n.d.). The sad (and scary) truth is that “after drug dealing, human trafficking … [is the] second-largest criminal industry in the world” (Johnson 2010). People are trafficked for a variety of reasons, including debt bondage, and forced labor in the domestic, agricultural, restaurant, or construction fields, as well as the sex industry. Oftentimes, human trafficking (or trafficking of persons) is thought of as H
- 85. Ryan J. Burch Vol.3, 2013/2014 78 something that happens “over there” and does not have much effect on first-world countries such as the United States. This is a common misconception. Understanding the broad reaches of human trafficking, as well as what international laws are in effect to help bring traffickers to justice, is critical to bringing an end to this insidious crime. Human Trafficking: A Misnomer When people think of human trafficking, they often think of someone needing to travel across international borders to be considered “trafficked.” The truth, however, is that crossing borders isn’t required—nor is movement of any kind. Human Trafficking focuses primarily on exploitation. It is defined by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement as “sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such acts has not attained 18 years of age; or recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debit bondage, or slavery” (Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2013). While transportation may sometimes be a component of human trafficking, it is not required; thus, the term “trafficking” is a misnomer. Contemporarily, and even as defined above, human trafficking is comparable to slavery, as it is involuntary servitude. An Important Distinction Human smuggling is not human trafficking. This is an important distinction to recognize; the terms are often erroneously used
- 86. International Law andHuman Trafficking Vol. 3, 2013/2014 79 interchangeably. Human smuggling focuses on the transportation aspect of the crime; human smuggling is defined as transporting people across international borders while deliberately evading immigration laws (Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2013). Essentially, in human smuggling the relationship between the victim and the perpetrator ends once they cross the border. In human trafficking, that relationship is ongoing via involuntary servitude. Despite this distinction, it is also important to recognize that human smuggling is often a component of human trafficking, as individuals are often smuggled prior to being coerced into involuntary servitude (Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2013). This distinction is critical, especially when it comes to enforcement actions and judicial proceedings. Examples of Human Trafficking Human trafficking takes many forms. Some examples are below. A fake massage business, usually Asian in nature, (Polaris Project 2013a) is a common way in which victims of human trafficking are hidden in plain sight. Fake Massage Businesses We worked on a case of multiple fake massage businesses that were raised by the federal authorities. The women were often offered legal jobs, but then were forced into prostitution. Most of the women did not go outdoors for weeks at a time. Several were threatened with gang violence, and others were threatened with harm to their family members if they tried to leave. Some women were in debt bondage, and most had some
- 87. Ryan J. Burch Vol.3, 2013/2014 80 type of sexual violence or coercion from customers frequenting the brothels. All of them wanted to escape. (Myles 2013) Residential Brothels She came from Guatemala, a woman in her early 20s, smuggled into the United States for what she thought was a housekeeping job. The journey from her small town to the Texas border took 26 days. From there she was whisked to a safe house near Houston, then brought to Tampa, and moved once more to a house in Jacksonville. There, an enforcer for the human trafficking operation told the woman her debt had jumped from $5,000 to $30,000. The enforcer demonstrated how to use a condom by rolling it over a beer bottle. He said she’d have to pay back the debt as a prostitute, according to the authorities. She turned 25 tricks the next day and nearly every day for eight or nine months. This tortured existence – the daily life of a human trafficking victim – ended May 22, 2007, when authorities intervened .(Polaris Project 2013b) This particular example shows how what was originally just human smuggling (to get the woman into the country) turned quickly to human trafficking when she was coerced into becoming a prostitute to pay off her debt. International Human Rights Law It is evident that the problem of trafficking is worldwide – and a severe worldwide problem at that. But what action, if any, has been taken in the international community by way of laws to try and prevent it, and when it can’t be prevented, to prosecute those involved, for
- 88. International Law andHuman Trafficking Vol. 3, 2013/2014 81 these atrocities? The Universal Declaration of Human Rights emphasizes that “recognition of the inherent dignity of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation for freedom, justice, and peace in the world” (Shaw 2008, 265). As victims of trafficking are humans and have their freedom taken away, they would presumably find recourse through Universal Declaration. As such, international organizations, in this case, the United Nations, has brought to light the issue of human trafficking through the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and two related protocols: the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons and the United Nations Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air (King n.d.). The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime was adopted by the general assembly in November 2000, and is designed to combat any number of issues that span the globe. Primarily, the adoption was to provide new “frameworks for extradition, mutual legal assistance and law enforcement cooperation” (UNODC 2013). As any issue related to transnational crime can become expensive and requires cooperation amongst many nations, this convention goes a long way in helping bring together the connected parties in new and more efficient ways. A supplement to the Convention, specially related to the trafficking of persons, was added in the form of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons…. This supplemental protocol declares that “effective action to prevent and combat
- 89. Ryan J. Burch Vol.3, 2013/2014 82 trafficking in persons… requires a comprehensive international approach in the countries of origin, transit, and destination that includes measures to prevent such trafficking, to punish the traffickers and to protect the victims of such trafficking, including by protecting their internationally recognized human rights” (United Nations 2000). This supplement is an important step to ensure all persons, especially those who are most vulnerable (women and children), are able to be recognized as victims and the perpetrators of the crimes punished. Similar to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement definition of human trafficking, the protocol defines the trafficking of persons as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring [sic] or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation” (United Nations 2000). Having a solid international definition of human trafficking, which focuses on the exploitation factor, nations that don’t have national laws related to trafficking and/or that have varying laws with less useful definitions now benefit from having a mutually agreed upon standard. Further, the Protocol demands that each state signatory criminalize the act of trafficking of persons (United Nations 2000). Again, this goes a long way, as states with lax laws are now required to criminalize something that once may have been seen as a source of income for them, despite the human rights issues.
- 90. International Law andHuman Trafficking Vol. 3, 2013/2014 83 The health and safety of a victim, once identified, is something that must also be considered, as he or she might have serious medical (or psychological) issues. The protocol requires that states must be able to provide a certain level of care to ensure the proper treatment of victims following their removal from trafficking operations. Further, it recognizes that the victim’s physical safety is critical. It calls upon the domestic legal system to treat them as victims, as opposed to violators of law. This is important because the victims are often forced into illegal acts. For example, if prostitution is illegal in many countries, victims shall not be punished for coerced prostitution (United Nations 2000). A state must also have special considerations to allow the victim to remain in their jurisdiction and any repatriation “shall preferably be voluntary” (United Nations 2000). By not having to fear legal consequences, cooperation on the part of the victim is more likely. In addition, the added stress associated with these concerns would not be conducive to the health (mental and otherwise) of the victim, which may be considered a breach of the health and safety provisions of the protocol. The protocol stipulates that states attempt to limit the vulnerability of their citizens to becoming victims through combatting poverty, underdevelopment, and lack of equal opportunity. Further, cooperation with non-governmental organizations and research on the topic is also demanded as part of the prevention process. By the protocol setting forth a standard by which nations must conduct themselves when it comes to human trafficking, a great deal has been
- 91. Ryan J. Burch Vol.3, 2013/2014 84 accomplished in ensuring that at least basic steps are being taken to prevent such an atrocious crime to continue. Two other relevant Protocols related to Human Trafficking and covered by the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime are the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air, and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and the Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunitions (UNODC 2013). Smuggling is often merely a predicate offense to an act (through force, fraud, or coercion) that leads to trafficking. This has been noted by the United Nations; addressing the same issues on smuggling as are being addressed on trafficking allows for more severe criminal punishment and requires certain preventative steps to lessen the amount of persons trafficked. The same is said for the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and the Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunitions. The weapons Protocol is a transnational organized crime issue and been linked to human trafficking; as the proceeds of illegal weapons trafficking often intertwine with proceeds of human trafficking. While policing the trafficking of weapons does have its own unique challenges, regulations, and requirements, because of the linkage between the two, it is critical that every possible aspect leading to the crime be addressed, so as to effectively combat human trafficking. Regional Acts Related to Human Trafficking While a great deal can be done through international law, it is individual states that are affected by human trafficking. As such, it is on
- 92. International Law andHuman Trafficking Vol. 3, 2013/2014 85 the regional (or even state level) that the enforcement of human trafficking is most effective and efficient (King n.d.). In the United States, the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act has been adopted. This public law has three key components; it created new federal crimes with more severe penalties, it provided relief for victims in the form of immigration status and the funding of aid programs, and provided incentives for trafficking source countries to strengthen their anti-trafficking efforts (King n.d.). Another effort would be the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. In 2008, this European convention put forth new legislation related to the prevention of trafficking and the prosecution of traffickers. It further applies to all forms of trafficking, national or transnational, and applies to all victims, regardless of the form of exploitation (COE n.d.). By further defining trafficking and how it affects the EU, the Council was taking another step to help combat human trafficking. There are several other regional rules and regulations, such as the Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative against Trafficking (COMMIT), which is a combined group of China, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam. The purpose of these regional groups is to create rules/regulations that are in line with any international agreements (such as the UN Convention and protocols) “while tailoring their enforcement and monitoring methods to the needs of the region or state” (King n.d.). This type of regionalization facilitates individual states, in conjunction with those with similar circumstances, to set forth regulations most appropriate for the situation in that area. This allows for stronger controls to combat
- 93. Ryan J. Burch Vol.3, 2013/2014 86 human trafficking, as specific issues may be overlooked by a larger body, such as the United Nations. Final Thoughts Human trafficking is a complex and heinous issue that has long been sitting on the backburner of the international community, despite the numbers of people affected. Human trafficking is a modern form of slavery (The White House 2012). While slavery may have a new face, it is still slavery, and it must be stopped. The international community has come a long way, particularly with the UN Convention against Transnational Organized crime and the related protocols. Action by the international community has not only helped bring a critical issue to light but requires signatories to take certain actions which benefit the whole. We have a long way to go, because “trafficking, like pollution, is everyone’s problem. The world collectively objected to slavery, and it will require a collective effort once again to abolish the practice of human trafficking” (King n.d.). Only with collective effort can we combat the crime of human trafficking.
- 94. International Law andHuman Trafficking Vol. 3, 2013/2014 87 BIBLIOGRAPHY Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. n.d. CETS no. 197. http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Summaries/Html/1 97.htm (accessed January 27, 2013). Department of Homeland Security. n.d. Human Trafficking. http://www.dhs.gov/topic/human-trafficking (accessed January 26, 2013). Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2013. Fact Sheet: Human Trafficking. http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/human- trafficking.htm (accessed January 26, 2013). Johnson, Teddi Dinely. 2010. Ending Human Trafficking: Health Workers Help to Identify Victims: Global Problem Reaches Inside U.S. Borders. The Nation's Health. (October) http://thenationshealth.aphapublications.org/content/40/8/1.3 .full (accessed August 7, 2013). King, Lindsey. n.d. International Law and Human Trafficking. University of Denver. http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/researchdigest/trafficking/Int ernationalLaw.pdf (accessed January 27, 2013). Myles, Bradley. 2013. Fake Massage Businesses. Polaris Project. http://www.polarisproject.org/human-trafficking/sex- trafficking-in-the-us/massage-parlors (accessed January 26, 2013).
- 95. Ryan J. Burch Vol.3, 2013/2014 88 Polaris Project. 2013a. Fake Massage Business. http://www.polarisproject.org/human-trafficking/sex- trafficking-in-the-us/massage-parlors (accessed January 26, 2013). Polaris Project. 2013b. Residential Brothels. http://www.polarisproject.org/human-trafficking/sex- trafficking-in-the-us/residential-brothels (accessed January 26, 2013). Shaw, Malcolm. 2008. International Law. 6th. New York: Cambridge University Press. The White House. 2012. Remarks by the President to the Clinton Global Initiative. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- office/2012/09/25/remarks-president-clinton-global-initiative (accessed January 27, 2013). United Nations. 2000. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final_d ocuments_2/convention_%20traff_eng.pdf (accessed January 27, 2013). UNODC. 2013. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and Protocols Thereto. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/treaties/CTOC/index.html (accessed January 27, 2013).
- 96. Vol. 3, 2013/201489 Will Israel Launch a Preventive Attack Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities? Orlando Fonseca “No one yet knows what awaits the Jews in the twenty-first century, but we must make every effort to ensure that it is better than what befell them in the twentieth, the century of the Holocaust.” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu Introduction ince the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Israel has fought many wars in defense of its right to exist among its Arab neighbors. Among other factors, Israel’s small geographic, demographic and economic status places it in a predicament vis-à- vis its adversaries. These disadvantages have led Israel to adopt the strategic doctrine of military prevention and preemption. This doctrine--along with Israel’s nuclear ambiguity, which in itself is a topic for a separate study--has served Israel well in maintaining a posture of military dominance in the region and has been a cornerstone in its national security strategic approach for the protection of its interests and its citizens. Today, Israel perceives that it faces another existential threat, but this time, it may be in the form of a nuclear-armed Iran. However, what makes the threat even more pressing in the Israeli psyche is the belligerent rhetoric of its former President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who declared that Israel S
- 97. Orlando Fonseca Vol. 3,2013/2014 90 should be “wiped off the map” (Fathi 2005). Even though Iran now has a new President, Hasan Rowhani, it is believed that the same radical clerics and Revolutionary Guards Corp that held power under Ahmadinejad, still hold that power over Rowhani. In this context, the paper seeks to answer the following specific research question: Will Israel launch a preventive attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities? The historical record shows that Israel, when confronted with what it perceives to be an existential threat, will not hesitate to take immediate actions to preserve its right to exist, even against U.S. authorization or advice. For the reader that is not too familiar with the difference between the concepts of preemption and prevention, here are some working definitions presented by Karl P. Mueller, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation: (1) Preemptive attacks are based on the belief that the adversary is about to attack, and that striking first will be better than allowing the enemy to do so. Preemption may be attractive because it promises to make the difference between victory and defeat, or merely because it will make the ensuing conflict less damaging than it would be if the enemy struck first. (2) Preventive attacks are launched in response to less immediate threats. Preventive attack is motivated not by the desire to strike first rather than second, but by the desire to fight sooner rather than later. Usually, this is because the balance of military capabilities is expected to shift in the enemy’s favor, due to differential rates of growth or armament, or the
- 98. Will Israel Launcha Preventive Attack? Vol. 3, 2013/2014 91 prospect that the opponent will acquire or develop a powerful new offensive or defensive capability (2006, 7-9). Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has the right to obtain nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, because of its continued violations of the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and NPT dating back to 1983 (along with other suspect activity), Israel and the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany (P5 plus 1), now suspect that Iran is masking a nuclear weapons program. In early 2009, Iran’s government declared that it now controls the entire cycle for producing nuclear fuel (Associated Press 2009). Moreover, the United States, United Kingdom, and France recently revealed that Iran has a second uranium enrichment facility next to a military base inside a mountain near the Holy City of Qom, a fact that serves to confirm the Israeli fear that their suspicion with regard to Iran’s intentions of acquiring a nuclear bomb holds true. As a result, Israel has increased the pressure on Iran by making it clear that it will not stand idly by and wait for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons and by upgrading Armed Forces defensive and offensive capabilities with the latest technology and equipment. Though it seemed that the added pressure by the United States and the international community motivated Iran to agree to a dialogue through the P5 plus 1 negotiations in Geneva, Iran’s subtle tone of defiance still rings clear as its Parliament has stated that “[It] will not compromise on its legitimate nuclear rights” (Associated Press 2009). Currently, Iran is faced with robust sanctions
- 99. Orlando Fonseca Vol. 3,2013/2014 92 against it because of failed diplomatic efforts with the West. This paper sheds light on the implications of Iran’s attainment of nuclear power status for Israel policy/action toward Iran. Moreover, because of the United States’ position as Israel’s protectorate, the implications for United States’ interests in the region are serious and may be imperiled. In light of these circumstances, the purpose of this study is to seek an answer to the specific research question presented above through the application of the Wheel of (social) Science, as illustrated below. Illustration obtained from the American Military University School of National Security, Intelligence Studies Program. Theory Hypothesis (-es) Data Collection Data Analysis Research Question/Puzzle Lit Review/Identify Variables Causal Diagram/Model Research Design Identify Type Study Population/Sample Operationalize Variables
- 100. Will Israel Launcha Preventive Attack? Vol. 3, 2013/2014 93 Literature Review Beres (2009) offers a comprehensive retrospective analysis concerning Israel’s strategic policy in confronting the existential threat posed by an Iranian regime focused on becoming a nuclear power. Beres, along with the other six members of the study named “Project Daniel”, recommended that “Israel take certain initiatives in removing imminent threats. These included preemptive strikes against enemy WMD development, manufacturing, storage, and control and deployment centers” (Beres 2009, 495). Beres’ group further recommended that Israel “do whatever is necessary to prevent enemy nuclearization, up to and including pertinent acts of preemption” (Beres 2009, 504). One important observation made by the group was that preemption would be most successful only against an enemy that had not yet gone nuclear (Beres 2009, 506). This is a policy-related study that draws its observations, analysis, and conclusions through a qualitative approach. The study is further enhanced by the sound use of preemptive war doctrine (Sun Tzu and The Art of War), empirical analysis, and personal professional experience of the project members. Though all members have personal ties to the Nation of Israel, most concerns of biases are overshadowed by the group’s viewing of the issues through a realistic lens of sound military doctrine and by their “combining legal with strategic analysis [that] links the jurisprudential concept of “anticipatory self-defense” to various preemption scenarios, and to The National Security Strategy of The United States of America (20 September 2002)” (Beres 2009, 493).
- 101. Orlando Fonseca Vol. 3,2013/2014 94 It is important to understand the Israeli predicament of a nuclear Iran and the imminent threat it poses to its national security. The project demonstrates the use of sound military doctrine and takes into account the realistic assessments of intentions versus capabilities on either side of the equation. But more importantly, this work demonstrates how good strategic policy influences both the conduct and limitations of intelligence and counterintelligence operations as they relate to the successful implementation of preemptive operations. Raas and Long (2007) present an analytical assessment of Israel’s capability to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities. The study focuses on the Israeli Air Force and compares it to the capabilities of the Iranian Air Force. It further seeks to assess the risks and benefits of a preventive Israeli air strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities by upgrading the Osirak Raid case to account for Israel’s improved Air Force capabilities and the much tougher Iranian targets (Raas and Long 2007, 10). Raas and Long find that “in contrast to the modern systems of the Israeli Air Force-- including the possession of precision guided munitions-- the Iranian military possesses an odd amalgamation of technologies and is inferior in terms of their capabilities, lack of integration and quality” (2007, 21). The assessment underscores two important findings: (1) That a preventive air strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities would appear to be no more risky than Israel’s 1981 attack on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor, and (2) that there is a critical need for heavy investment in intelligence collection and analysis in order to secure a successful preventive and/or counter proliferation operation (Raas and Long 2007, 30-31). The
- 102. Will Israel Launcha Preventive Attack? Vol. 3, 2013/2014 95 assessment makes use of statistical analysis, mathematical calculations, and public reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency in reaching its conclusions and thus classifies as a mixed-methods study. The importance of the assessment lies in its ability to help one weigh military capabilities on both sides against their respective limitations, both of which are essential when conducting a predictive study. Parsi (2007) maintains that the fundamental rift between Israel and Iran is geopolitical. In this context, he hints at the possibility that Israel may be using the Iranian nuclearization issue as a pretext in order to advance its military superiority in the region. Parsi reveals how the Israeli government, as leverage against the United States, uses the Israeli threat of preventive attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities, as this would undermine United States’ strategic interests in the region (Parsi 2007, 268). An important observation Parsi makes is “that contrary to the depiction of Iranians as irrational, Israeli strategic thinkers recognize that the Iranian government is extremist and radical but rational. Former Mossad director Efraim Halevi seems to agree with Parsi’s view along with Reuven Pedatzur, director of the Galili Center for Strategy and National Security and a fighter pilot in the Israeli Air Force Reserves” (Parsi, 270). However, Parsi states that “because of Israel’s smaller population and geographic size, the standard doctrine of preemption will continue to hold” (Parsi, 282). This qualitative study derives its observations and findings from past behavioral history of the regional powers in question. Overall, the study is objective and attempts to analyze the Israel versus Iran rift from both an Iranian and Israeli
- 103. Orlando Fonseca Vol. 3,2013/2014 96 perspective. As such, this work helps us understand Israel’s strategic approach concerning Iran’s nuclear facilities through a scholarly and objective lens. Harel (2009) offers a timely analysis on Israel’s military capabilities in confronting Iran’s nuclear facilities with preventive attacks. He then examines the possible post-attack Iranian responses, either directly or via proxies, such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Gaza’s Hamas. Harel’s most important finding is that the Mossad may have exhausted its efforts to further delay Iran’s nuclear programs, and that at present, no action looms, other than a [preventive] attack that is capable of preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power. Harel’s journalistic analysis is biased in that it paints a pessimistic outlook on the possibility of a diplomatic breakthrough based on Israeli popular sentiment. However, this analysis is important as it serves to measure the level of impatience and anxiety existent in Israel with regard to the Iranian nuclear issue. This analysis uses a qualitative approach based on intuition and unclassified sources of information, and is both current and pertinent. Mueller et al. (2006) presents a thorough scholarly historical analysis of the following Israeli preventive and preemptive attack case studies: The Sinai Campaign of 1956, the Six Day War of 1967, the October War of 1973, and the Osirak Raid of 1981. The study explores the historical record, and compares and contrasts each of the cases’ situational settings, levels of threat, policy options, and resulting outcomes. Mueller’s most important finding is that whenever Israel’s
- 104. Will Israel Launcha Preventive Attack? Vol. 3, 2013/2014 97 military dominance is challenged by its neighbors, Israel more likely than not will resort to preventive or preemptive attacks and will seek regime change (Mueller et al. 2006, 193). The comprehensive nature of this case study analysis is important as it serves to set a historical precedent, which may be useful in predicting the likely Israeli strategic policy in confronting the Iranian nuclear issue and/or threat. Overall, the study is shielded from any biases by the use of collective scholarly thinking and contributions of multiple project members that are experts in their respective fields as they relate to military policy and science. A second layer of protection against bias is the element of intrinsic peer review that results from a collective research project. This is a mixed-methods study in that it draws its observations and conclusions through the examination of the written record and quantitative analysis as it relates to evaluating military capabilities on both sides of the Israeli/Iranian equation. Anthony Cordesman examines Israel’s strategic and tactical considerations for a possible preventive attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. One of the key findings in the article is that according to reports by the IAEA and other sources, it is evident “that whether or not Iran ties all of its efforts into a formal nuclear program, Iran has acquired all of the elements necessary to make and deliver nuclear weapons” (Cordesman 2009). Cordesman’s risk assessment points out that Israel does have the military capability to launch a one-time surprise attack on Iran’s best-known nuclear facilities but that it would
- 105. Orlando Fonseca Vol. 3,2013/2014 98 be unable to launch an extensive and repetitive attack due its limited economic and military resources. Cordesman offers a necessary analysis of Israel’s Armed Forces strategic and tactical capabilities but falls short of highlighting the utmost importance of the need for immaculate intelligence, without which a successful preventive attack would not be possible. Nonetheless, the article is of importance in that it brings to light reported facts “that Israel is increasing the range-payload of its nuclear armed missiles, and that it is developing sea-based nuclear armed cruise missiles for its submarines” (Cordesman 2009). These actions are an indication that Israel may be planning either to expand its policy on prevention and preemption, or, due to the nuclear nature of this particular conflict, decide that the risks of conventional attack are too great and thus resume its policy of deterrence and containment. It is important to note however, that any attempts at containing Iran would have to involve the United States. James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh agree that the United States will have to draw clear red lines in the sand and be willing to back up the firm rhetoric with swift and decisive actions, to include nuclear strikes against Iran, if it crossed any of the lines. Just as important as what the United States and its allies (particularly Israel) should do to contain Iran is what the United States should not do. The United States “might be tempted to respond by substantially expanding the presence of U.S. troops in the Middle East” (2010, 11). However, according to Lindsay and Takeyh, an increase in boots on the ground
- 106. Will Israel Launcha Preventive Attack? Vol. 3, 2013/2014 99 would not appreciably increase Washington’s ability to deter Iran from launching a nuclear or conventional attack. It could however, play into the hands of Tehran’s proxies by inflaming anti American and Israeli sentiment and fanning civil unrest in the Persian Gulf. Washington may also be tempted to further undermine Iran’s economy by imposing broad based economic sanctions. (2010, 11) The above measures would adversely affect Iran’s citizens and not the leadership within the government. Lindsay and Takeyh exhort that Washington should resist any urge to sign mutual security treaties with Arab countries in the Middle East. [Rather], an alliance of sorts would secure all the benefits of a region-wide commitment to deterrence without exposing the United States and its allies (Israel) to the complexities of formal bilateral or multilateral security treaties. Containment would not be a substitute for the use of force. To the contrary, its success would depend on the willingness of the United States [and Israel] to use force against Iran or threaten to do so should Iran cross Washington’s red lines. (Lindsay and Takeyh 2010, 11-12) Israel’s responses, however, will hinge on how it perceives United States’ actions or inactions toward the existential threat posed by a nuclear armed Iran. According to Alon Ben-Meir, Israel’s national resolve to act unilaterally against Iran hinges on the following facts: The first is if Israel concludes that stern sanctions and other behavior- changing tactics taken by the international community have failed to produce improved results. The second is if Israeli intelligence unequivocally confirms, “that the Iranian [nuclear] threat is deemed imminent, and no one else is willing to act. Under these circumstances,
- 107. Orlando Fonseca Vol. 3,2013/2014 100 Israel will likely strike unilaterally because the risk of inaction could outweigh any regional or global repercussions” (Ben-Meir 2010, 75). Reuven Pedatzur lays out seven Israeli options delineated by Alon Ben- Meir in the face of a nuclear-armed Iran. The seven options are: (1) A preemptive military operation. (2) Retention of the existing policy of ambiguity. (3) Reliance on the protection of an American nuclear umbrella. (4) Negotiations with Iran regarding disarmament and inspection arrangements. (5) Passive defense. (6) Active defense. (7) Unconditional nuclear deterrence (Ben-Meir 2010). Of these, Pedatzur claims that the most reasonable and effective option that Israel should adopt is unconditional nuclear deterrence. It will need to make clear to Iran the price they will be forced to pay if they launch missiles against Israel. Accordingly, Israel will have to abandon the policy of nuclear ambiguity and switch to unconcealed deterrence, in which it will make clear explanations regarding the red lines that, by crossing, the Iranians risk an Israeli nuclear response on targets like Tehran, Tabriz, Kom, Ispahan, etc. Pedatzur asserts that such clarification will force the Iranians to decide whether the killing of several hundreds of thousands of Israeli citizens is worth the price of the destruction of the modern Iranian state and its return to the Middle Ages. Of note here is that much of the literature on deterrence emphasizes the problem of achieving credibility. Israel does possess this
- 108. Will Israel Launcha Preventive Attack? Vol. 3, 2013/2014 101 credibility, as it has attacked nuclear sites in Iraq and Syria in the past. Nevertheless, with a nuclear-armed Iran, Israel’s effectiveness in terms of credibility and capability relies on a second strike capability, which negates Iranian thinking of surprising Israel with a nuclear strike that would neutralize its capability of striking Iran (Pedatzur 2007, 10, 20 and 22). Dr. Tony Klug by far presents the most compelling option left for Israel to take against an Iranian regime that finds itself isolated and insecure. Klug asserts that the Iranian leadership knows that by parading as the chief defender of Palestinian rights, and making a show of threatening Israel, it makes it difficult for pro-Western Arab states, which also share Israel’s concerns about Iranian intentions, to form any sort of alliance with the Jewish state. According to Klug, the best way for Israel to combat the perceived Iranian threat is to pull the carpet from under the Iranian regime by smartly embracing the Arab Peace Initiative, doing the two-state bargain with the Palestinians, and concluding a deal with Syria (Klug 2009, 45). In 2007, the RAND Corporation released a conference report entitled “Coping with Iran: Confrontation, Containment or Engagement?” The participants in the conference engaged in the discussion of alternative futures relating to a nuclear-armed Iran and the possible policy responses of regional states, the United States, and Israel. The report concluded that after close examination of the pros and cons involved in armed conflict with a radical and nuclear-armed Iran, the best option available was for the United States and its allies to
- 109. Orlando Fonseca Vol. 3,2013/2014 102 engage in promoting liberalization within Iranian society. The objective is to support anti-regime forces within Iran in the hope to have them create regime change internally, rather than by direct foreign intervention. First, steps should be taken to expand engagement with Iranian society to include a wide array of cultural and educational exchange programs and reopening embassies, consulates, and information centers in both countries. Second, the U.S. and its allies (Israel) should support efforts through multilateral financial and other institutions aimed at increasing transparency, promoting market reform, and discouraging corruption. Such moves toward transparency would have the effect of weakening the economic foundations of the theocratic regime, which relies heavily on money from state-controlled enterprises as a source of patronage and financing for its domestic and international operations (Dobbins, Harting and Kaye 2007, 29). The report suggests that--simultaneously with the above measures--the international community should continue to enforce selective (not broad) embargoes on the transfer of sensitive technologies and materials to Iran. Finally, the report recommends that the United States accelerate and field new capabilities to ensure that U.S. forces will be able to counter any Iranian military responses. Specifically, comprehensive missile defense systems; better capability to detect, track, and destroy small mobile targets such as missile launchers; and improved means for destroying or disrupting weapons in hardened and deeply buried facilities are needed. In combination, these recommendations would represent for the United States and its allies a
- 110. Will Israel Launcha Preventive Attack? Vol. 3, 2013/2014 103 policy of both containment and engagement with Iran, without confrontation (Dobbins, Harting and Kaye 2007, 30). Preemption, though remaining an option, was not favored by any of the experts that participated in the conference. James Dobbins concluded that what most participants agreed on was on some degree of containment and engagement (2007, 67). In sum, the above authors suggest that options aimed at a nuclearizing or nuclear-armed Iran range from a balanced combination of deterrence, containment, and limited use or force, to promotion and support of dissident entities within Iranian society (like the Green Movement) to bring about political/regime change. Others promote a much more realist approach of unconditional nuclear deterrence. Yet the most important takeaway in all suggested options, especially when speaking about deterrence, is the issue of credibility in the ability of the United States and its allies to back up their rhetoric and drawn red lines with decisive action. Israel certainly possesses this credibility, as demonstrated by the Osirak and Syrian preventive bombing raids. Theoretical Framework & Methodology In attempting to answer the specific research question, the study will merge two independent variables from Geller and Singer’s (1998) model for predicting war-prone dyads with a simple causal model-independent variable. The logic for combining the models stems from the predictive nature of my research question as it relates to a probable military conflict between Israel and Iran. Of the seven independent variables in Geller and Singer’s model, only two will apply
- 111. Orlando Fonseca Vol. 3,2013/2014 104 to my specific research question. The first independent variable is operationalized as Dynamic Capability Balance, derived from Balance of Power Theory, and the second is Enduring Rivalries, derived from empirical fact and researcher observation. As for the other independent variable from my simple causal model, the third variable is operationalized as Failed Diplomacy, derived from Liberal Internationalism Theory. The causal diagram for combining Geller and Singer’s (1998) model and the simple model appears as follows: This paper will rely on the qualitative nature of the studies/literature, as reviewed above. For the sake of understanding the causal diagram above, here are the definitions of the three theories: • Dynamic Capability Balance – Empirical Pattern: The presence of parity in capabilities or shifts toward parity increases the probability of war within a dyad. • Enduring Rivalries – Empirical Pattern: The presence of an enduring rivalry increases the probability of war within a dyad. Dynamic Capability Balance Enduring Rivalries Failed Diplomacy Israel’s preventive attack on Iran’s nuclear Facilities
- 112. Will Israel Launcha Preventive Attack? Vol. 3, 2013/2014 105 • Failed Diplomacy – Failure to reach settlements on diplomatic negotiations increases the probability of war within a dyad (Geller and Singer, 1998). Actors and Perceptions In order to make an objective assessment of possible responses by all interested actors, an understanding of each actor’s perceptions and concerns is necessary. Toward that end, let us begin by studying what leads Iran to want to be a nuclear armed state. IRAN Fariborz Mokhtari’s article, “No One Will Scratch My Back: Iranian Security Perceptions in Historical Context,” best explains that for Iranians, geopolitical and national psychology realities define their national security. In this context, it is not difficult to understand that “when the foundation of a community’s entire existence as a nation is based on shared historical experiences, detachment from history equates denouncing one’s identity” (2005, 210). Iran looks at the world through a prism “tainted by a historical perception of repeated letdowns and betrayals” (Mokhtari 2005, 211). Mokhtari lays out in detail the many national disappointments suffered by Iran in the hands of foreign occupiers, such as Russia and Great Britain. Just as they did in World War I, Russia and Britain invaded Iran yet again despite her neutrality and in blatant defiance of international law (2005, 217). The oil nationalization crisis of 1951-53 is another example that has confirmed Iranian perception of Western intentions. The treatment of
- 113. Orlando Fonseca Vol. 3,2013/2014 106 Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, a friend and ally of the United States for many years after the Iranian Revolution of 1978 has also confirmed the conviction that the United States is not dependable (Mokhtari 2005, 225). In an article titled “Iran and the Shah. What Really Happened,” James Perloff best describes how the United States government, under the Carter administration, betrayed the Shah, an alleged ally. Perhaps the words of the Shah himself could shed some light on Iranian perceptions of Western powers. He wrote that in 1973 we succeeded in putting a stop, irrevocably, to sixty years of foreign exploitation of Iranian oil resources … In 1974, Iran at last took over the management of the entire oil industry, including the refineries at Abadan and so on … I am quite convinced that it was from this moment that some very powerful, international interests, identified, within Iran, the collusive elements which they could use to encompass my downfall.” (Perloff 2009, 6) Iraq’s invasion of Iran, Arab and U.S. support for the invader, and the stunning silence of all when Iraq used chemical weapons against Iranians, [further served to convince the Iranians that its national] interests had to be safeguarded by Iranians and Iranians alone” (Mokhtari 2005, 225-226). Economics Despite high international oil prices in recent years, the contribution of the oil and gas sector to economic growth has been more modest. Iran’s oil economy has been faced with low levels of production and inadequate investment. United States and U.N. sanctions imposed against Iran, along with the poor domestic business
- 114. Will Israel Launcha Preventive Attack? Vol. 3, 2013/2014 107 environment, may contribute to low levels of investment (Ilias 2010, 4). High rates of inflation complicate matters even more. Domestically, the high rate of inflation is linked to expanding economic policies and an increase in consumer demand. External factors include international sanctions against Iran and rising international food and energy import prices. The unemployment rate remains high, reaching over 14%. According to CIA estimates, 18% of the population lives below the poverty line. With approximately 750,000 young Iranians entering the labor market for the first time each year, the government is under pressure to create jobs. (Ilias 2010, 5) As a result, Iran now faces a serious emigration of human capital. Politics Iran’s theocratic form of government is based on the Islamic legal system of sharia law, which is weaved into every aspect of governance and public life. Even though Iran has a president of the republic, the chief of state is the Supreme Leader Ali Hoseini-Khamenei. Ray Takeyh describes the current political party as the New Right, which he then divides along militant and realist lines. “For the militants, ideological imperatives remain the primary focus of their policy, while the realists appreciate the need to modify their rhetoric and even objectives along more pragmatic lines” (2009, 238). However, in the implementation of foreign policy, the differences between the two sides prove limited. President Ahmadinejad comes from the militant camp and as such, he adheres to a pure form of Islamist commitments and projects his agenda with an ardent sense of nationalism. At the crux of his perspective is that enemies of the state are always plotting to
- 115. Orlando Fonseca Vol. 3,2013/2014 108 undermine the theocracy. For these reasons, the New Right under president Ahmadinejad pursues a confrontational style of diplomacy. Nothing exemplifies this approach more than the nuclear issue, which in the clerics’ view, positions the Islamic Republic as the leading power in the Middle East (2009, 238-239). ISRAEL Israel’s history of prevention and preemption, as well as its policy of nuclear ambiguity are well documented, and have served Israel well in maintaining a posture of military dominance in the Middle East and has been a cornerstone in its national security strategic approach for the protection of its interests and its citizens. Like Iran, Israel also sees international relations through a grim historical prism. Eiran and Malin confirm that the effect of the Holocaust is further amplified in the minds of many Israelis due to a common cyclical view of history. Many Israelis believe that “In every generation they rise against us to destroy us” (Garber 2011). Benjamin Netanyahu referred a number of times to the annihilationist plans for Jews in the biblical book of Esther, perhaps because those plans were devised in the court of the ancient Persian Empire (2013, 77). Kazemzadeh asserts that perceptions of reality, whether true or false, many times determine behavior. The perception of Israeli decision makers is that Iran will use nuclear weapons against them. In October 2007, Israel’s Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, reportedly told Russia’s Vladimir Putin that Israel increasingly regards Iran as an Israeli problem that might require an Israeli response (2009, 38).
- 116. Will Israel Launcha Preventive Attack? Vol. 3, 2013/2014 109 Israel’s current Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, points out that Israelis are worried about an entire complex of problems, not only that Iran or one of its proxies might destroy Tel Aviv, but that a nuclear armed Iran will use its new advantage to buttress its terrorist proxies in their attempts to make life difficult and dangerous (Goldberg 2010, 58). Furthermore, Netanyahu emphatically underscores that Iran is not Israel’s problem alone; it is the world’s problem, and the world, led by the United States, is duty bound to wrestle with the problem (Goldberg 2010, 58). Interestingly, like Iran, Israel, too, has suffered many letdowns throughout its history as a nation. Historical tragedies that have befallen the Jews, such as the Spanish Inquisitions in the 15th century and the Holocaust during World War II, remain forever etched in the hearts and minds of Jews, old and young alike. Economics Israel has a technological market economy dependent on imports of crude oil, grains, raw materials, and military equipment (mainly from the United States). Israel posts sizable trade deficits, which are covered by large transfer payments from abroad and by foreign loans. Approximately half of the government’s external debt is owed to the United States, its major source of economic and military aid. Israel’s real growth rate was at 3.4% for 2010, with an unemployment rate of 6.4% and population below the poverty line at 23.6 %. Due to Israel’s harsh security environment, it spent 7.3% of GDP (2006) in military expenditures. This total is more than the military expenditures of the United States’ 4.06% of GDP (2005), and Iran’s 2.5% of GDP (2006)
- 117. Orlando Fonseca Vol. 3,2013/2014 110 combined (CIA 2011). Eiran and Malin state that Israelis are concerned that Iran armed with nuclear weapons would hinder the state’s ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Fifteen out of 100 industrial and service companies are FDI-based enterprises that include not only technology companies, but also food, metal, and paper producers (2013, 81-82). Politics Domestically, Israeli political parties remain unified against a nuclear-armed threat posed by Iran. With regard to a nuclearized Muslim fundamentalist Iranian regime, Daniel Gordis’ depiction of today’s Israeli political leaders is most compelling. Gordis explains that all of Israel’s senior politicians understand Israel’s historic responsibility to and for the Jewish people. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s father was secretary to Ze’ev Jabotinsky, the founder of the hardline Revisionist Zionist Movement. The head of the Kadimah Party, Tzipi Livni, was born to parents who had been members of the Irgun underground. All four of Labor Party leader Ehud Barak’s grandparents were murdered in Europe (Gordis 2010, 15). As demonstrated above, today’s Israeli leaders possess an intimate understanding of the historical Jewish plight in the face of helplessness, and the inability of the Jews to fend off their aggressors. As Alan Dowty notes, Israeli foreign policy derives largely from security interests and ideologies. It often seems as though strategic logic, however understood, dominates all other considerations in Israeli policy (1999, 1). When faced with imminent threat to its national security, the
- 118. Will Israel Launcha Preventive Attack? Vol. 3, 2013/2014 111 Israeli state has taken decisive action to preserve the life and vital interests of its people. Conclusion In November 2013, the P5+1 reached a deal with Iran in Geneva. Under the agreement, Iran would curb its nuclear program in exchange for limited sanctions relief (Dahl 2013, 2). Even though the milestone should merit praise, on November 26, 2013, merely three days after the White House press released a fact sheet on the deal, the Iranian government gave a press release of its own. The Iranian press release stated that the White House fact sheet was a one-sided interpretation of the agreement text in Geneva (Fars News Agency, 2013). This scenario, two steps forward and three back, between Iran and Western powers is nothing new. It shows how deeply entrenched the suspicions and lack of trust are on both sides of the negotiations. What one has to discern is that Iran has managed to gain a six-month reprieve from some sanctions, a power play that translates to seven billion dollars from petrochemical and gold sales (The White House 2013, 4). On February 8 and 9, 2014, Iran held technical meetings with the IAEA and reached agreement on seven practical measures to be implemented by Iran by May 15, 2014 (IAEA 2014, 1). Six out of the seven steps generally focus on the idea that Iranian authorities are required to provide some information about the country’s nuclear enrichment, and to permit access to nuclear sites, particularly Fordow. According to diplomats engaged in the negotiations, Iran has followed
- 119. Orlando Fonseca Vol. 3,2013/2014 112 the seven steps in an acceptable fashion. (Rafizadeh 2014, 1). However, there has not been any progress in bridging the gap between both parties at the negotiation table on every area of concern. In particular, positions remain far apart on the key issue of Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity. Iran wants to expand the number of centrifuges it uses for uranium enrichment, but the P5+1 have called for a significant reduction. (Relevant Council resolutions call for Iran to suspend all enrichment-related activities.) Iran’s refusal to discuss its ballistic missile program seems to have complicated the talks (Security Council Report 2014, 1). Iran is simply trying to string the P5+1 along in the hope to reach a long-term deal by the Joint Plan of Action’s (JPA) July 20, 2014 deadline. In the meantime, it is conducting stealthy cyber espionage by hacking into the social media accounts of foreign leaders, some of which are members of the P5+1, as claimed in recent media reports (Haaretz 2014, 1). This is an effort by Iran to have the upper hand in negotiations and a means of assessing its negotiating counterpart’s strategic goals. Drawing from the available literature, the alternative futures (scenarios) and possible policy responses presented by the likes of Cordesman, Pedatzur, Beres, et al., vary from a combination of diplomacy and containment to limited military engagement to a nuclear preemptive strike. Where it seems that Israel’s near future vis-à-vis Iran is not certain; what is certain is that Israel at the end will protect its right to exist. There is a failure to underscore the value of what Terrence Henry calls the “Covert Option” of sabotage and assassination of key scientific equipment and personnel that would facilitate Iran’s
- 120. Will Israel Launcha Preventive Attack? Vol. 3, 2013/2014 113 attainment of a nuclear armed power. Here again, Israel has a proven track record of success with regard to preventive operations against a state seeking to nuclearize. Although never openly admitting it, the 1979 explosion of a warehouse in France that was to ship the cores for Iraq’s Osirak reactor by a shadow group named the French Ecological Group was more likely than not conducted by the Mossad. Later in 1980, Yahya al-Meshad, an important scientist in Iraq’s nuclear program, arrived in France to test fuel for the reactor. The morning he was to return home, he was found stabbed and bludgeoned to death (Henry 2005, 54). Ashton Carter, former assistant secretary of defense, said, I would be surprised and disappointed if a covert campaign wasn’t already under way. … Conducted skillfully, such a campaign might not merely forestall Iranian progress toward a bomb; it might also sow doubt, causing Iranian officials to question whether their equipment actually worked and whether the people involved in the program could be trusted. (Henry 2005, 56) According to open source material, it seems Israel and its allies are already engaged in covert operations against Iran. The recent Stuxnet bug that hit Iran’s nuclear facilities’ computers is evidence of such. The assassination of key nuclear scientists and other important figures close to Iran’s nuclear program also point toward this direction. Whether the agents inflicting these blows are Mossad or contracted by them to do the work is irrelevant. What is certain is that the hypothesis this paper sought to test--that an Iranian increase in modern defensive and offensive military capabilities coupled with the pursuit of nuclear
- 121. Orlando Fonseca Vol. 3,2013/2014 114 weapons will cause Israel to launch a preventive attack against Iran’s nuclear facility--has proven to be true. This, of course, hinges on scholars’ and policymakers’ acceptance of covert operations involving sabotage and assassinations as essential elements of a robust policy of prevention. In this context, Israel has already launched a preventive attack against Iran’s nuclear program.
- 122. Will Israel Launcha Preventive Attack? Vol. 3, 2013/2014 115 BIBLIOGRAPHY Associated Press. 2009. ‘Nuclear fuel cycle complete’. Gulfnews.com. April 12. Retrieved from http://archive.gulfnews.com/article/09/04/12/10303329.html. Associated Press. 2009. Iran Parliament warns P5+1 against ‘past mistakes’. PressTV. September 29. Retrieved from http://www.presstv.ir/pop/print/?id=107394. Ben-Meir, Alon. 2010. Israel’s Response to a Nuclear Iran. International Journal on World Peace 27, no.1: 61-78. Beres, Louis Rene. 2009. Facing Iran’s Ongoing Nuclearization: A Retrospective on Project Daniel. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. 22(3):491-514. Retrieved June 10, 2011 from http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/08850600902896977. CIA. 2011. Middle East: Israel. The World Fact Book. Retrieved March 8, 2011 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world factbook/geos/is.html. Cordesman, Anthony H. 2009. The Iran Attack Plan. The Wall Street Journal. September 25. Retrieved from http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020451850457 4418813806271306.html. Dahl, Fredrik. 2013. Implementation of Iran nuclear deal could begin next month. The Christian Science Monitor. (November 29) 1-3. Retrieved from http://www.csmonitor.com/Worldmentation-
- 123. Orlando Fonseca Vol. 3,2013/2014 116 of-/Latest-News-Wires/2013/1129/implementation-of-iran- nuclear-deal-could-begin-next-month. Dobbins, James, Harting, Sarah and Dalia D. Kaye. 2007. Coping with Iran: Confrontation, Containment, or Engagement? A Conference Report. The Rand Corporation. Dowty, Alan. 1999. Israeli Foreign Policy and the Jewish Question. Meria Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal, 3, no.1 (March). Eiran, Ehud and Martin B. Malin. 2013. The Sum of all Fears: Israel’s Perception of a Nuclear Armed Iran. The Washington Quarterly. 36:3, 77-89. (Summer). Center for Strategic and International Studies. Fact Sheet: First Step Understandings regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program. The White House Office of the Press Secretary. (November 23). Retrieved December 1, 2013 from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/23/fact- sheet-first-step-understandings-regarding-the-islamic-republic- iran-s-n. Fathi, Nazila. 2005. “Wipe Israel ‘off the map’ Iranian says. The New York Times. Retrieved December 8, 2013 from http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/26/world/africa/26iht- iran.html?_r=0. Garber, Leah. 2011. A View from Jerusalem. Jewish Community Centers of North America. Retrieved December 8, 2013 from http://www.jcca.org/a-view-from-jerusalem-2/.
- 124. Will Israel Launcha Preventive Attack? Vol. 3, 2013/2014 117 Gordis, Daniel. 2010. The Other Existential Threat: Iran’s bomb, Israel’s soul, and the future of the Jews. Commentary Magazine. (October). Retrieved from http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/the-other- existential-threat/. Geller, Daniel S. and J. David Singer. 1998. Nations at War: A Scientific Study of International Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Goldberg, Jeffrey. 2010. The Point of No Return. The Atlantic, (September). Retrieved May 20, 2011 from http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/09/the- point-of-no-return/308186/. Harel, Amos. 2009. Analysis: Clock Ticking for Iran as Israel Appears Ready for Strike. Haaretz.com. (September 27) Retrieved June 15, 2011 from http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1113816.html. Henry, Terrence. 2005. The Covert Option: Can Sabotage and Assassination Stop Iran From Going Nuclear? The Atlantic Monthly. Foreign Affairs. (December): 54-56. IAEA. 2014. IAEA and Iran Conclude Talks in Connection with Implementation of Framework for Cooperation. (February 9). 1. http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2014/iaea_iran090214. html
- 125. Orlando Fonseca Vol. 3,2013/2014 118 Ilias, Shayerah. 2010. Iran’s Economic Conditions: U.S. Policy Issues. Congressional Research Service, RL34525. (April 22). Iran Strongly Rejects Text of Geneva Agreement Released by White House. Fars News Agency. (November 26). 1-5. Retrieved from http://english.farsnews.comprint.aspx?nn=13920905001087. June 2014 Monthly Forecast: Middle East Iran. Security Council Report. (May 30). http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly- forecast/2014-06/iran_6.php (accessed June 16, 2014). Kazemzadeh, Masoud. 2009. U. S. –Iran Confrontation in the Post-NIE World: An Analysis of Alternate Policy Options. Comparative Strategy, 28:37-59. Klug, Tony. 2009. Meeting the Iranian Challenge. Palestine-Israel Journal 16, no. 3&4: 42-45. Lindsay, James M. and Ray Takeyh. 2010. After Iran Gets the Bomb: How Washington Can Limit the Damage From Iran’s Nuclear Defiance. Foreign Affairs (March/April). Mokhtari, Fariborz. 2005. No One Will Scratch My Back: Iranian Security Perceptions in Historical Context. Middle East Journal, 59, no. 2, (Spring): 209-229. Mueller, Karl P., Jasen J. Castillo, Forrest E. Morgan, Negeen Pegahi and Brian Rosen. 2006. Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. Retrieved June 15, 2011 from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/rand_MG403.pd f.
- 126. Will Israel Launcha Preventive Attack? Vol. 3, 2013/2014 119 Parsi, Trita. 2007. Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S. New Haven: Yale University Press. Pedatzur, Reuven. 2007. The Iranian Nuclear Threat and the Israeli Options. Contemporary Security Policy, 28:3, 513-541. Raas, Whitney and Austin Long. 2007. Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities. International Security 31, no.4 (Spring): 7-33. Retrieved on June 28, 2011 from thttp://ciaonet.org.ezproxy2.apus.edu/wps/isp9676/isp9676.pd f. Rafizadeh, Majid. 2014. Failed Negotiations with Iran. Front Page Mag, (May 9). http://www.frontpagemag.com/2014/majid- rafizadeh/the-islamic-republic-human-rights- should-be-a- priority/ (accessed June 16, 2014). Reuters. 2014. Iran Hackers Spy on U.S. Leaders, Israel Lobby Using Phony Facebook Profiles. Haaretz.com (May 29). http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/1.595949 (accessed June 16, 2014). Takeyh, Ray. 2009. Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.
- 127. Vol. 3, 2013/2014120 Roberto Sosa Honduran Poet Jo McIntire oberto Sosa (1930 – 2011) is considered Honduras' preeminent poet: a symbol of culture and education—an expression of ever- present solidarity with those in need (Cantarero 2012). As he transited through different phases of his life, he wrote what flowed from his day-to-day perceptions about existence and society, in particular, the pain he saw inflicted on the Honduran poor by the ongoing political crisis. He was a modest man with a deep social conscience. He will be remembered for having purposefully dedicated his life to speaking out for freedom, democracy, and dignity—for humanity. R (Source: Engelbert 2013)
- 128. Roberto Sosa Vol. 3,2013/2014 121 The geopolitical context of Sosa's entire life was persistent with tragic social unrest: political repression, fueled by the U.S. "backyard" policies that Medea Benjamin ably wrote about in Don't be Afraid, Gringo: A Honduran Woman Speaks from the Heart (1987). Programmed assassinations by paramilitary death squads were widespread. Capitalist greed had torn apart the social fabric of Honduras and all but wrecked the nation. Debt and a lopsided balance of trade had fueled inflation and provoked recession. The result was the loss of justice: landless campesinos, hunger, unemployment, disempowerment, suffering, poverty, misery, corruption, coups d'état, extreme violence, and impunity. His early family life was humble and loaded with hardship. Sosa could not attend a regular elementary school until he was eleven (Wang 2003, 4). It was then that he discovered his love for metaphors and how poetry "connected heaven with earth" (Engelbert 2103). At seventeen, Sosa studied the autobiography of Giovanni Papini's Un Uomo finito (1912) in which the Italian author pessimistically portrays himself as an utter failure (Wang 2003, 2). Sosa was impacted by Papini's aversion to all belief systems, churches, and any form of servitude (Engelbert 2013). He was also greatly influenced by poets, including, among others, Victor Hugo, Rubén Darío, and Juan Ramón Molina (Engelbert 2013; Wang 2003, 2). They, and other masters, helped Sosa develop his own poetic skills. Sosa used poetry as an instrument of indignation, to clarify social realities (Caratula 2011). In 1979, even though he had not
- 129. Jo McIntire Vol. 3,2013/2014 122 graduated from the teachers’ training course that he was attending, he was given a scholarship to the University of Cincinnati to undertake a Master’s Degree in Latin American Literature (Wang 2003, 8). And in 1985, when he was receiving death threats in Honduras, was awarded a Fulbright Scholarship to Upper Montclair College in New Jersey (Engelbert 2013). Sosa was a poet with a brilliant sense of humor expressed as irony and sarcasm with which he attacked privilege and denounced oppression and violence. Samaí Torres, the winner of the "Guillermo Castellanos Enamorado" award for cultural journalism, emphasizes Sosa's humility, lack of pretentiousness, and internal calm (2012). Torres notes the poet's verses are characterized by a rare depth of perception and by "painful" precision. American poet, translator, and literary critic Sam Hamill extolled Sosa's poetry: "Roberto Sosa joins passion and humility, ecstasy and grief, clarity and wisdom, to make poems as lucid and incandescent as anyone writing today" (1994). The clarity and richness of language and the simple, down to earth verses give his lyrics "absolute authenticity" (Morris n.d., 11-12). Sosa's writing is a mixture of power, passion, and humility. In what could be seen as a service to society, he compressed reality into its raw essence – leaving esoteric academic analyses and rambling rhetoric to others. Sosa was thirty when his first book, Caligramas (calligrams), was published. In it, the poem "Submarina" (Submarine) is dedicated to his future wife and lifelong companion, Lidia Ortiz Luna. Even in this early celebration of love, Sosa describes himself as eternally "sad" and
- 130. Roberto Sosa Vol. 3,2013/2014 123 "underwater." "My underwater depths / were lit by your smile / . . . oh sad part of me . . ." (Sosa 2002, 7).1 Perhaps one of Sosa's greatest contributions to his generation was his dedication to Presente, a magazine published in Tegucigalpa, which became the first literary clearinghouse for intellectuals across Latin America (Engelbert 2013). Los Pobres, Un Mundo Para Todos Dividido, and Secreto Militar are Sosa's best-known social commentaries critical of Honduran political affairs. They epitomize his function as a poet. Each is powerful, intense, and urgent (Genoways 2002, 50). For writing such commanding works, Sosa was repeatedly proclaimed a subversive and received death threats; his poetry was banned in Honduras and, for a time, he was forced to leave his teaching position at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras (UNAH) (Curbstone 1994). All through his life, Sosa remained an adversary of the Honduran plutocracy. Los Pobres (1968), a collection of twenty-one poems concerning the misery caused by poverty, brought Sosa international fame in 1969 when it was awarded the prestigious Spanish Premio Adonáis de Poesía. The seminal poem in the collection, "Los pobres," demonstrates Sosa's compassion for the poor and his poetic genius. It is powerful for what it says about poverty, oppression, and neglect. The poetry never leaves the darkness of elegy, but each of Sosa's poems, in fact, eulogizes life. Hope shines by its absence (Wang 2003, 7). According to scholar Rick 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all the translations in this essay are those of Jo Anne Engelbert.
- 131. Jo McIntire Vol. 3,2013/2014 124 McCallister, this subtle quality differentiates Sosa from his literary contemporaries (2010). For Sosa, capitalism is the source of corruption and injustice. In "La casa de la justicia," Sosa refers to Honduras’ House of Justice as "a temple of snake charmers" where "it all happens / with the tender feeling / money can arouse" (Sosa 2002, 75). The last poem in Los Pobres, "Los índios," glorifies the indigenous past where the people were "lords of all," cities were colorful theatres, and the sky was but a small flower – and then contrasts those images with the wretched conditions of so many souls in our modern age "perched on the brink of oblivion" (Sosa 2002, 89). While the view of the past is aggrandized, the imagery is masterful. In Un Mundo Para Todos Dividido (1971), Sosa describes wretchedness not only in terms of poverty, but adds the components of political and military violence. It is decisively more accusatory about the political/economic system than is Los Pobres. This collection won Sosa one of Latin America's most prestigious international literary competitions: the Cuban Casa de las Américas Prize for Literature (IFACCA 2004). In their affirmation, the jury referred to their delight in "discovering the almost imperceptible mechanisms" that hold together Sosa's "minimalist use of words" (Fernández 1971). Sosa brooded over every word he wrote. The collection opens with "Proximidad" in which Sosa reflects on his personal limitations: his personal anguish, his inability to affect
- 132. Roberto Sosa Vol. 3,2013/2014 125 change - "no puedo multiplicar los panes" (I can't work miracles,2 my translation), he laments. In "Límite," Sosa reflects on the filth of hate and cruelty that permeates the city in which he lives. Not even children are spared from the violence. In "Los elegidos de la violencia,"3 Sosa depicts how for "the chosen ones . . . horror played the role of father" (Sosa 2002, 123). "La yerba cortada por los campesinos,"4 sums up his core belief: Virtue does not derive from protest but "In reality / only what man does to honor man / transcends" (Sosa 2002, 135).5 The poet's role is to reveal the truth. Secreto Militar (Military Secret) (1985) is Sosa's most caustic collection of poetry. It sums up his absolute indignation - but also illustrates his firm commitment "to be a bridge for the dispossessed" (Engelbert 2013). Secreto Militar challenges what Nicaraguan poet Alvaro Urtecho refers to as "the enthroned terrorist oligarchs" (1994, my translation). Despite the obvious danger, Sosa daringly denounces those responsible for injustices across Latin America: General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez, an early Salvadoran dictator who ordered the 1932 massacre of 30,000 campesinos (Sosa 2002, 176); Stroessner of Paraguay and his "private galaxy" (Sosa 2002, 163); François Duvalier of "Haiti / a prison state" (Sosa 2002, 165); Honduras' own General Gustavo Alvarez Martínez for his "ética de buitre" (ethics 2 Literally, I cannot multiply the loaves of bread 3 Those chosen by violence 4 The grass cut by the agricultural workers. 5 "En realida / solo / lo que hace el hombre / por enaltercer al hombre es trascendente" (Sosa 2002, 134, my emphasis).
- 133. Jo McIntire Vol. 3,2013/2014 126 of a vulture) (Sosa 2002, 170-1); the "barbed wire" Pinochet of Chile (Sosa 2002, 173); the "cerdísimo" (His Most Swinish Excellency) Rafael Leonidas Trujillo of the Dominican Republic - "hated by the living, hated by the dead" (Sosa 2002, 174-5); and Efrain Rios Montt the "Boa Anaconda" of Guatemala (Sosa 2002, 178). These men were, after all, not abstractions but real human beings. Sosa unabashedly declares war against them all. He does not hesitate to draw the ties between the dictatorships of Latin America and the United States' political/economic interests. In "Fué en el año 32. Y no hay olvido6 ," Sosa takes aim at Franklin D. Roosevelt whose "bleary eyes . . . shone with maximum splendor" at the news of campesino deaths (Sosa 2002, 177). In "La casa de la piedras puntiagudas" (the house of pointy stones), Sosa focuses on the tragedy of Honduras. "The History of Honduras," he writes, "can be written on a gun / on a bullet wound, or rather, inside a drop of blood" (Sosa 2002, 159). Indeed, dictatorships shredded Latin American society for several decades. In November 2009, Sosa wrote a cover story for The Progressive, one of the leading voices for peace and social justice in the United States, denouncing the middle-of-the-night abduction of President Manuel Zelaya and the successive coup. Zelaya was a popular president. In the article, Sosa refers to Roberto Micheletti and General Romeo Vásquez, who together seized power, as "the two-headed monster" (2009)., "They [the military] are thrilled to be smelling blood again," he wrote (Sosa 2009). The coup was a "coronation of death" 6 It was in the year 32. And there is no forgetting.
- 134. Roberto Sosa Vol. 3,2013/2014 127 (Sosa 2009). For Sosa, the coup and the accompanying repression were all very reminiscent of the brutal "lost decade" of twenty years before. There is little doubt that Sosa was one of the most daring and accomplished poets of contemporary Latin America (Genoways 2002, 50). Sosa'a poetry reflects the author's personal integrity. His courage to divulge his political/social analysis has helped raise national awareness in Honduras and empower the Honduran resistance (Engelbert 2013). He died on May 23, 2011, of cardiac arrest at 82. His wake took place at the UNAH ((Engelbert 2013), where he was deeply loved and admired both as a person and as a poet. Homage was paid to Sosa on the first anniversary of his death by the most important cultural institutions of Honduras: the Alcaldía Municipal del Distrito Central (AMDC), the Fundación para el Museo del Hombre Hondureño (FMHH), and La Biblioteca Nacional Juan Ramón Molina (City Hall of Tegucigalpa, the National Cultural Center, and the National Library) - sponsored in part by the Spanish government (El Heraldo 2012). The AMDC dedicated its 2012 annual book fair to him (AMDC 2012) and distributed to attendees a free anthology of twenty- six poems titled “Esta Luz Que Suscribo,” “The Light of My Inspiration.” The National Library organized its first poetry festival and featured “Un encuentro con Sosa” (a meeting with Sosa) that consisted of videos, a literary forum, and, of course, a poetry reading. Sosa's poetry "was his way of giving justice to the destitute and disillusioned of the earth" (Engelbert 2013). The event took place in a convention room that was renamed "The Roberto Sosa Hall."
- 135. Jo McIntire Vol. 3,2013/2014 128 Sosa's life was enveloped in the contradictions of social violence, but he never wavered in his dedication to its "universal victims" (Morris n.d., 13). Like Giovanni Papini, Sosa had little hope. "he descubierto…Que mi poder no tiene / Ni validez ni fuerza… Dejo mi sangre / Escrita en un oscuro ramo" (I discovered...that my power has neither strength nor relevance… I leave my blood written on dark flowers) (Sosa 2002, 88-9). Honduras was a society in a process of collapse. It was doomed. The only equality Hondurans could hope for was "la perfecta igualidad de los muertos" (the perfect equality of the dead) (Sosa 2002, 82-3). Honduras, Sosa said, keeps slipping to lower and lower levels of misery and social degradation – what he refers to as "sub-misery" (Bonta 2009). His commitment was guided by his obsessive disdain for the military and his profound solidarity with the humiliated and the marginalized. His astute observations capture the political reality of the last four decades in Honduras. His heroes were the charismatic bearded revolutionaries - los que nunca mueren- those that never die. Roberto Sosa joins Pablo Neruda, Victor Jara, Mercedes Sosa, and others, whose empathy and love of humanity governed their lives. He joins them through his poetry that, with theirs, will be appreciated by future generations because it captures so well, from deep within Honduras, humanity's universal search for peace, justice, and human dignity.
- 136. Roberto Sosa Vol. 3,2013/2014 129 BIBLIOGRAPHY Alcaldía Municipal del Distrito Central (AMDC). 2012. "Alcaldía capitalina realiza Feria del Libro en honor a Roberto Sosa." http://lacapitaldehonduras.com/sala-de-prensa/alcalda- capitalia-realiza-feria-del-libro-en-honor-a-roberto-sosa/ (retrieved January 27, 2013). Benjamin, Medea. 1987. Don't be Afraid Gringo: A Honduran Woman Speaks from the Heart: The Story of Elvia Alvarado. Harper Press, New York. Bonta, Dave, 2009. "Roberto Sosa: 'Poetry is pain'." Via Negativa, July 3. http://www.vianegativa.us/tag/roberto-sosa/ (retrieved January 28, 2013). Cantarero, Romero R. 2012. Speech made on September 13 at UNAH at the unveiling of Raíces griegas, latinas, mayas y náhuatl. Qtd. by Departamento 19. http://alturl.com/uiggb (retrieved January 28, 2013). Caratula. 2011. "Selección poética: Roberto Sosa. Tegucigalpa." N. 42, Jun/July. http://www.caratula.net/ediciones/42/poesia- rsosa.php (retrieved January 28, 2013). Curbstone. 1994. The Common Grief. Press release from Sosa. Trans. Jo Anne Engelbert. News from: Curbstone Press. El Heraldo. 2012. "La capital de Honduras recordó al poeta Roberto Sosa." ElHeraldo.hn, April 29. http://www.elheraldo.hn/Secciones-Principales/Vida/La-capital-
- 137. Jo McIntire Vol. 3,2013/2014 130 de-Honduras-recordo-al-poeta-Roberto-Sosa (retrieved January 27, 2013). Engelbert, Jo Ann. 2013. Interview with author, February 20, 2013. Fernández, Roberto R. 1971. "Premio Literario Casa de las Américas." Casa de las Américas. http://www.casa.cult.cu/premios/literario/liminar.php?pagina=l iminar (retrieved January 27, 2013). Genoways, Ted. 2002. Review of "A World for All, Divided." Ruminator Review, Fall. Hamill, Sam. 1994. Qtd. by Sosa in Press Release from Sosa. Trans. Jo Anne Engelbert. News from: Curbstone Press. International Federation of Art Councils and Culture Agencies (IFACCA). 2004. "Casa de las Américas literary awards contest." http://www.ifacca.org/events/2004/01/19/casa-de-las- americas-literary-awards/ (retrieved February 18, 2013). King, John. 2004. The Cambridge companion to modern Latin American culture (Cambridge Companions to Culture). Cambridge University Press. McCallister, Rick. 2010. "Una geografía del deseo en Los pobres de Roberto Sosa." Ístmica, N.13, Revista de la Universidad de Costa Rica (UNA). http://www.revistas.una.ac.cr/index.php/istmica/article/view/2 324 (retrieved January 29, 2013). Morris, Andrés. N.d. Prologue to Un mundo para todos dividido, by Roberto Sosa. Honduras: Editorial Guaymuras.
- 138. Roberto Sosa Vol. 3,2013/2014 131 Premio Adonáis. 2013. El Poder de la Palabra. http://www.epdlp.com/premios.php?premio=Adonais (retrieved January 27, 2013). Sosa, Roberto. 2002. The Return of the River: Selected poems of Roberto Sosa. Transl. by Jo Anne Engelbert. CT: Curbstone Press. Sosa, Roberto. 2009. "Roberto Sosa, Presente! In Honduras, the Walls Are Talking." Transl. by Jo Ann Engelbert. The Progressive, November. http://alturl.com/m8s2j(retrieved January 29, 2013). Torres, Samaí. 2012. "Un año sin Roberto Sosa, el autor de los versos sencillos." El Heraldo, May 22. http://www.elheraldo.hn/content/view/full/52287 (retrieved January 27, 2013). Urtecho, Alvaro. 1994. "La poesía de Roberto Sosa: Rebelión e imperative política." Photocopy of manuscript provided by Jo Ann Engelbert. Volpendesta, David. 1984. "A Lucid Poet in Honduras." Review, July 8. San Francisco Chronicle. Wang, Juping. 2003. Roberto Sosa. Southern Arkansas University. Fax of October 6 from Wang to Jo Anne Engelbert.
- 139. Vol. 3, 2013/2014132 China’s Commitment to Foreign Aid: Truth or Fiction James D. Kates Introduction id, also identified as developmental assistance, is a tool utilized by governments in achieving their foreign policy goals. Aid, itself, can be provided in many forms—most notably, it is the transfer of funds and supplies between nations for political, economic, and social development. Military alliances and food assistance were among the earliest forms of foreign aid. As a result of the devastation wreaked upon Europe at the end of World War II, foreign aid entered into a new, more powerful role in the diplomatic world of statecraft. The Marshall Plan not only succeeded in rebuilding Western Europe, it ushered in an era of United States global influence. Economic advances in nations across the globe, coupled with economic stagnation in the West, have led to an emergence of new foreign aid donors. Most notable among these new donors are Brazil, Russia, India, and China-commonly referred to as the BRIC nations. These new nations entering into the international aid arena are doing so with the ability to set their own terms, as they are not members of the United States-influenced Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), or the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). The most noteworthy of these emerging aid-focused nations, and the A
- 140. China’s Commitment toForeign Aid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 133 one that has garnered a majority of the concern from the West, is the People’s Republic of China (PRC). After emerging from decades of sleep, China has begun to reassert itself into the international community. In March of 1992, the National People’s Congress (NPC) announced China’s intention of committing itself to economic reform in pursuit of achieving a socialist market economy. On December 11, 2001, China became the 143rd member of the World Trade Organization.1 This membership marked a significant transformation from China’s traditionally politically planned economy to its commitment to enter into the integrated world economy.2 China is powered by a juggernaut economy, one that has experienced an unprecedented GDP growth rate, averaging 9.25 percent since 1989.3 In addition, China possesses an enormous workforce, comprising a population of over 1.3 billion.4 As a result of a GDP per capita rate of an estimated $9,300, ranking it 124th out of 229 1 Jonathan Weston, et al., “China’s Foreign Assistance in Review: Implications For The United States,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2011, accessed December 7, 2012, http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2011/9_1_%202011_ChinasForeignAssis tanceinReview.pdf. 2 China’s domestic economy has not been as successful as its international economy. This has led the Chinese government to place a greater emphasis on strengthening its domestic economy over the past several years and pledge to do more domestically in its new 12 Year Plan. 3 “China GDP Annual Growth Rate,” Trading Economics, accessed November 14, 2012, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp-growth-annual. 4 “The World Factbook: China,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed November 14, 2012, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/geos/ch.html.
- 141. James D. Kates Vol.3, 2013/2014 134 nations, China continues to define itself as a developing nation.5 As a developing nation, China has surpassed Germany as the lead exporting nation in the world, Japan as the second largest economy in the world, and the United States as the world’s number one energy-consuming nation. China’s primary political focus is to ensure that it maintains the freedom and ability to pursue its number one foreign policy goal: economic growth. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, in 2011 China produced 4.3 million barrels of oil per day, but consumed 8.9 million barrels a day.6 This negative production ratio causes China to rely on its oil imports to fuel its economic growth and production. China has adopted a foreign aid policy that emphasizes the use of foreign aid as a tool to achieve strategic objectives, production goals, and economic needs. China’s assistance is directed toward achieving three primary goals. First and foremost, it wields its aid as a means to secure future energy resources, and other commodities required to maintain its economic development. This drive to maintain economic growth also means that China uses its aid as a means to expand its exports and create new markets for its domestic production. The second purpose of China’s assistance is to advance its 5 Ibid. 6 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “China Energy Overview,” accessed November 23, 2012, http://www.eia.gov/countries/country- data.cfm?fips=CH&trk=m.
- 142. China’s Commitment toForeign Aid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 135 regional and international political agenda.7 China has long supported the One-China policy, contending that Taiwan and the Republic of China (ROC) is an illegitimate government, and that the island nation is part of the PRC. Lengauer points out, “China has long provided aid to developing countries as part of its struggle with Taiwan, with the goal of implementing the One-China policy. China aims at pushing Taiwan out of all formal Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs).”8 As a result of development assistance to Africa, many African nations diverted their support from the ROC, or Taiwan, to the PRC, enabling China to assume the United Nations chair and sole representation of the nation. China’s final foreign assistance goal is to expand its international cultural ideology and increase its international influence.9 There is a growing concern within the United States and the traditional bilateral and multilateral aid and development agencies, that as China continues to increase allocation of funds in their developmental assistance programs, more lesser-developed countries (LDCs) will divert their requests from traditional donors to enter into agreements in China’s alternative programs. This increase in demand of Chinese aid programs will create a shift from Western political influence toward a garnering of Beijing soft 7 Thomas Lum, et al., “China’s Foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia,” Congressional Research Service, last modified February 25, 2009, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40361.pdf. 8 Sara Lengauer, “China’s Foreign Policy: Motive and Method,” Culture Mandala: Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural & Economic Studies 9, iss. 2 (September-December 2011): 45, http://www.international- relations.com/CM2011/PRC-Foreign-Aid-2011.pdf. 9 Lum, et al.
- 143. James D. Kates Vol.3, 2013/2014 136 power.10 The bulk of China’s foreign assistance and foreign direct investments (FDI) are directed into three regions: Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The West has maintained a wary eye on China’s foreign economic development aid progress and the effects that it could have on the norms and standards of traditional aid practices. Analyses of China’s foreign economic development policies, and the intentions behind them, have only recently begun to be conducted and examined. The purpose of this research is to examine China’s foreign aid program and determine the implications related to China’s use of developmental assistance in its foreign policy goals. In order to adequately dissect China’s foreign aid policies, we will review a historical perspective of their economy and aid program, examine the organizations associated with China’s aid policies, and identify Chinese aid practices and the concern of Western donors. The research will be conducted under this hypothesis: China’s assertion that its foreign aid is basically one developing nation mutually assisting another as an alternative to donor nations that impose political demands upon their support is deceptive. The research will be approached using a pragmatic world view to demonstrate that China has both strategic and economic purposes behind its use of foreign aid. In order to demonstrate China’s intentions, 10 Soft power is a term created by Joseph Nye in his 1990 book, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, to describe political persuasive power that attracts and co-opts rather than coerces or economically entices. Nye later expanded on the soft power concept in his 2004 book, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. The term has been accepted as a common term in international politics.
- 144. China’s Commitment toForeign Aid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 137 this research will utilize informational releases, statistical information, the 2011 White Paper, and policy details from various ministries of the PRC. In addition, because material released by the Chinese government on its foreign aid policies is limited, scholarly writings, news releases, and Western governmental resources will also be consulted. Historical Perspective of Chinese Aid Just as the United States’ official developmental aid (ODA) policies have evolved from the Marshall Plan, so have the Chinese foreign economic development policies evolved from the Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries. The principles, released in 1964 by then PRC Premier Zhou Enlai, have become the foundation of China’s present-day foreign economic development practices. In brief they include equality and mutual benefit, non-interference in internal affairs, fostering of self-reliance, quick result projects, and the use of Chinese equipment. The principles have endured and maintained pace with both domestic and international affairs. China’s foreign assistance policies have developed over time through four distinct phases. The first phase took place after the Communist Party defeated the nationalist Kuomintang at the end of 1949 and ended in 1977 with the introduction of economic reforms. During this first phase, China operated under a strict communist political economy. The economy faced many shortfalls as a result of international isolation. China’s foreign aid was primarily in the form of military, technical, and material assistance, and limited to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
- 145. James D. Kates Vol.3, 2013/2014 138 (DPRK), Vietnam, and a handful of African nations that shared political ideologies with the PRC.11 The second phase of China’s foreign assistance started after the PRC adopted economic reforms in 1978 that liberalized its economy and ushered in a transition from a strictly planned economy to a mixed economy. During this phase, the PRC was acknowledged as a legitimate government by the United States and China entered into the international community. China, using lessons it had developed from aid it had received from donor nations, modified its foreign assistance programs. It expanded and strengthened its commitments to LDCs, focusing on creating joint ventures and diversifying its aid techniques. The third phase of China’s shift occurred in 1992, when the NPC announced that it intended to fully transform its economy into a socialist market-based economy and abandon its planned economy completely. The PRC dedicated itself to join the nations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the predecessor of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In 2001, China was granted membership in the WTO, becoming its 143rd member. China immediately adopted a diversified model of foreign assistance funding. An example of this diversification was the establishment of the Foreign Aid Fund for Joint 11 State Council Information Office of the PRC, “White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid,” accessed November 28, 2012, http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2011- 04/21/content_22410897.htm.
- 146. China’s Commitment toForeign Aid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 139 Ventures and Cooperative Projects, and the expanded role of low- interests loans financed through the Export-Import Bank of China.12 China’s final phase of foreign assistance transition began at the turn of the century. The State Council Information Office of the PRC, in China’s first public release of its foreign aid policy, cited, “On the basis of sustained and rapid economic growth and enhanced overall national strength, China’s financial resources for foreign aid have increased rapidly, averaging 29.4 percent [of its annual budget] from 2004 to 2009.”13 This increase was coupled with an annual growth rate that averaged 10 percent during the same time period. China’s foreign assistance has expanded to include aid projects arranged, not only bilaterally, but through multinational and regional associations. Ministries, Organizations, and Elements of China’s Aid The majority of developed donor nations have established independent agencies whose focus is dedicated solely to bilateral foreign aid programs; an example is the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). China’s bilateral foreign aid program is directed by the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries, a department within its Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). This marriage of foreign aid and commerce was not an accident. During the infancy of the PRC, aid was primarily in the form of material goods and was controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. In March of 1982, the NPC restructured and merged the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Ministry of 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid.
- 147. James D. Kates Vol.3, 2013/2014 140 Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, the State Import and Export Administration Commission, and the State Foreign Investment Administration Commission into the Ministry of Foreign Economic Trade.14 Among numerous other functions that relate to trade and economics, the new ministry had a function to “continue to provide economic and technological assistance to third world countries.”15 On March 16, 1993, China changed the moniker of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Trade to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, and its involvement in foreign aid was enormously increased. In 2003, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation was joined with the State Economic and Trade Commission and the State Development Planning Commission and reorganized into the present day MOFCOM.16 The MOFCOM plays an enormous role in China’s foreign aid policies. It is the ministry authorized by the State Council to supervise China’s foreign aid. The MOFCOM, according to the 2011 White Paper, “is responsible for the formulation of foreign aid policies, regulations, overall and annual plans, examination and approval of foreign aid projects, and management of project execution.”17 In addition, the MOFCOM works in conjunction with several various technical and academic agencies in managing implementation and technical support 14 Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, “The History,” last modified December 7, 2010, accessed November 28, 2012, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/history.shtml. 15 Ibid. 16 State Council Information Office of the PRC. 17 Ibid.
- 148. China’s Commitment toForeign Aid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 141 of completed foreign assistance projects, and all the material aid and training programs connected to aid. The Ministry of Finance, another of the many MOFCOM organizations, has two primary functions in China’s aid policy: (1) The ministry provides aid funds to multilateral organizations like the United Nations; and (2) it supervises China’s debt forgiveness program. Finally, the MOFCOM staffs economic counseling offices around the world and serves as China’s bilateral aid consultant to its recipient nations. By staffing these offices within recipient nations, China has been able to extend its influence and garner political support for aid projects it believes are beneficial to future needs. In 1994, the Export-Import Bank of China was formed. According to the bank, its mission is “to facilitate the export and import of Chinese mechanical and electronic products … assist Chinese companies with comparative advantages in their offshore contract projects and outbound investments, and promote Sino-foreign relationship and international economic trade cooperation.”18 In terms of the Export-Import Bank’s function within China’s foreign aid policy, the Bank is tasked with funding foreign aid projects with concessional loans and allocation of recovery loans. The Bank also provides advice on various funding plans to the MOFCOM. China’s state-sponsored banks work with recipient nations on developmental strategies; these strategies are surveyed and assessed to determine if they are in best interests of both China and the recipient nation. If found to be viable 18 Export-Import Bank of China, “Mission Statement,” accessed December 1, 2012, http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/profile/intro.shtml.
- 149. James D. Kates Vol.3, 2013/2014 142 projects, the bank financially supports them by approving concessional loans. Although not officially involved in China’s foreign aid process, the state-owned enterprises SOEs are unquestionably deeply involved in China’s foreign economic development process and a large focus of contention with traditional aid groups. SOEs are involved at three major junctions in China’s aid programs: They assist requesting nations by formulating and completing appropriate paperwork, perform initial aid assessments, and begin required work as directed by the Chinese government and approved by the proper ministry or financial institution. The government-owned businesses use their international influence- influence established via their involvement in China’s bilateral aid programs-to secure commodities, both energy and resource, to fuel domestic economic development. In fact, Beijing has been prompting SOEs to seek out exploration and supply agreements with resource-rich nations. Dambisa Moyo, in her new book, Winner Take All, addresses this commodity campaign. She indicates, China’s Chinalco spent nearly U.S.$13 billion in 2008 for a stake in Australia’s aluminum sector. In June 2009 Sinopec – a leading Chinese petrochemical company– purchased Addax Petroleum, which has sizable assets in Iraq and Nigeria, for U.S.$7 billion … also 40 percent stake in the Brazilian arm of Repsol, a Spanish energy company, for U.S.$7 billion … and partnership in a joint- venture oil company with Russia’s Rosneft for U.S.$3.5 billion.19 19 Dambisa Moyo, Winner Take All (New York: Baic Books, 2012), 1.
- 150. China’s Commitment toForeign Aid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 143 In addition, she points out the purchase of a mountain in Peru by Chinalco for its mineral rights, specifically its estimated two billion-ton copper deposit, for U.S. $3 billion. China’s SOEs, upon acquisition of these energy and commodity assets, are then in position to develop and process aid requests directed at the development of infrastructure necessary to obtain and transport purchased material. As a means to support this buying spree, China provides its SOEs with grants or low-interest loans provided by its Developmental Bank. These financial grants and loans give the SOEs huge advantages over their foreign counterparts that must secure financing through traditional financial markets. These contracts are generally related to infrastructure development aid that is associated with creating accessibility to resources. Examples of infrastructure development aid include the construction of railways, highways, harbors, and airports. The SOEs work with the MOFCOM in developing new plans and conducting assessments for aid projects. In return, the ministry provides the SOEs tax breaks, allocations of contracts, and creation of special regulations on exportation of goods and services.20 Chinese Aid Practices: Truth or Fiction? As a result of economic reforms, China has transformed itself into an international economic and political powerhouse, a powerhouse that has become one of a handful of nations that have expanded their national interest around the world and possess the power to exert 20 State Council Information Office of the PRC.
- 151. James D. Kates Vol.3, 2013/2014 144 influence in every multinational organization.21 As a result of its economic growth, China directs its developmental assistance toward achieving its own strategic and economic interests. These interests include the development of infrastructure in recipient nations, need to facilitate the transportation and security of purchased commodities, and increasing its export markets in order to promote its domestic production. The White Paper contends, “China is the world’s largest developing country, with a large population, a poor foundation and uneven economic development.”22 The foundation of China’s aid policies are founded in the Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries. China claims its aid is aimed at assisting in the creation of recipient nations capable of self- development without imposing political conditions placed on recipient nations by Western donors. It also follows a philosophy of equality, mutual benefit, and a common development focus. It tailors assistance to recipient nation’s needs, while continuously reforming and innovating assistance. China’s foreign aid assumes eight different forms: completed projects, goods and materials, technical cooperation, human resource development cooperation, medical support, humanitarian assistance, volunteer programs, and debt relief. 23 21 Weston, et al. 22 State Council Information Office of the PRC. 23 Ibid.
- 152. China’s Commitment toForeign Aid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 145 Completed projects account for roughly 40 percent of China’s foreign aid, making it a large part of its aid expenditure. China’s completed projects are civil or production constructions financially enabled by low-interest loans and grants. In a completed project, China is responsible for all aspects of construction: study, survey, design, and construction. China also supplies the material, equipment, engineering, technical assistance, construction personnel, installation, and production. Once the project is completed, the recipient nation takes ownership. In 2009, China completed an estimated 2,000 projects in developing nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The projects were in a variety of fields, including industry, agriculture, education, health care, power supply, energy, and transportation.24 China started its aid program by providing material and supplies to developing nations in Africa and Asia. Today, China has expanded it recipient nations to include most of the developing world. Material and supplies include aircraft, locomotives, vehicles, office equipment, medical equipment, machinery, food, medicine, and other items necessary for life improvement and production. The aim of providing these supplies is to improve the recipient nation’s production capacity and development of its industrial sectors.25 China defines technical cooperation as the lending of experts to advise and provide guidance on production or maintenance on completed projects; train personnel in management and technical 24 State Council Information Office of the PRC. 25 Ibid.
- 153. James D. Kates Vol.3, 2013/2014 146 areas; assist recipient nations with agricultural needs, production demands, and traditional Chinese handicraft skills; and provide basic inspection, survey, planning, research, and consultation in various industrial and production fields.26 Technical cooperation covers a vast field of skill sets, from agricultural fields, medical and health fields, and energy development to economic planning. Human resource development cooperation is conducted through bilateral and multilateral channels. It is an exchange program between China and recipient nations that emphasizes research and training programs, educational programs, technical support, and governmental offices. The White Paper of 2011 outlines China’s human resource development cooperation, stating, “By the end of 2009, China had run over 4,000 training sessions of different types for developing countries, attended by some 120,000 people, including interns, managerial and technical personnel and officials.”27 Training sessions were conducted in more than 20 various programs that range from political focuses and healthcare to issues related to farming. Chinese medical teams provide free medical services, medical equipment, and medicines to developing nations. In 2009, China sent teams to 57 deferent nations and provided services to an estimated 260 million people. The China teams treat patients with traditional techniques, such as acupuncture and massage, and modern Western techniques. In total, China reports that it utilized 21,000 medical 26 Ibid. 27 State Council Information Office of the PRC.
- 154. China’s Commitment toForeign Aid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 147 workers divided into 1,324 teams, and visited an estimated 130 different medical facilities across the developing world. This sharing of medical services by China is used to promote its image in the area of humanitarian assistance, create markets for its pharmaceutical and medical equipment sectors, and build deeper bonds in regions it targets as important to its strategic goals.28 However, this sharing of medical assistance has created tension domestically, as many Chinese in rural areas struggle with their health care needs. The newest international aid arena for China to enter is that of emergency humanitarian aid. China’s efforts in humanitarian assistance include the provision of materials, financial assistance, and the deployment of relief workers. In 2004, China emplaced the framework to assist the international community in response to humanitarian relief. Its first test was the December 2004 tsunami that struck the Indian Ocean. Since that time, China has responded to humanitarian relief efforts in Iran, Pakistan, Haiti, and Chile in response to earthquakes; Mexico to combat the H1N1 virus; Burma and Cuba following tropical storms; Southeast Asia to fight the spread of bird flu; Guinea-Bissau devastation by locust and cholera; and food relief in North Korea, Nepal, Afghanistan, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and many other developing nations.29 28 Lucy Chen, “Why China is getting Involved in Africa’s Health Issues,” CNN, last modified May 9, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/09/opinion/china-africa- health/. 29 State Council Information Office of the PRC.
- 155. James D. Kates Vol.3, 2013/2014 148 In efforts to expand Chinese culture, China has adopted a volunteer program that sends educators, medical providers, and managers to developing nations. These volunteers introduce and promote Chinese culture and language to essential figures throughout the developing world. In 2009, China is estimated to have sent more than 7,500 volunteers to more than 70 various nations. 30 This move to provide language instruction can be seen as a means of increasing the efficiency of the PRC’s push in political and economic ventures. By promoting Chinese culture in developing nations with the sharing of expertise, China is attempting to overcome language and cultural barriers that interfere with expanding its non-traditional aid efforts and forging deeper economic and political relations. The final form of aid that China provides to the developing nations of Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Oceania is debt relief, or debt forgiveness. The PRC has forgiven the debt of the most indebted LDCs that maintain political relations with it. China claims, “When recipient countries encounter difficulties in repaying due interest-free loans, the Chinese government usually adopts flexible ways and extends the periods of repayment through bilateral discussion.”31 China does not define what “flexible ways” implies. As of 2009, the PRC has extended debt relief to more than 50 different 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid.
- 156. China’s Commitment toForeign Aid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 149 governments on approximately 380 loans; these loans total more than 25 billion Yuan.32 The question becomes: Is China’s interest in foreign development and assistance as simplistic and transparent as it claims? According to an NYU Wagner School Study on China’s foreign aid program conducted in 2008, China’s foreign aid is driven primarily by the need for natural resources and secondarily by diplomatic objectives, such as the objectives of isolating Taiwan and garnering support in international organizations such as the United Nations. Beijing also aims to open up foreign markets for Chinese goods and help PRC companies invest, set up manufacturing plants, and develop markets overseas.33 China’s foreign aid is subjective to China’s needs and not afforded to all LDCs equally, nor is it free of concessions. According to the Wagner study, “During 2002-2007, 44.5% of aid and investment was directed at natural resources and agricultural sectors while 43% supported infrastructure development.”34 Most of China’s aid and investment was directly used toward facilitating mining and transportation of natural resources secured through concessional agreements. These natural resources were identified as essential to maintaining China’s own development. In addition, China’s SOE’s are generally tied into most aid construction projects, demanding at least a 50% participation requirement. This can reduce the impact of development in a recipient 32 Ibid. 33 Lum, et al. 34 Ibid., 5.
- 157. James D. Kates Vol.3, 2013/2014 150 nation by minimizing employment, education, and skill development that could be garnered through any particular project. It also has generated concern from the United States and the bilateral and multilateral organizations traditionally associated with aid and development. Western Donor Concerns: Truth or Fiction? China’s foreign aid policies have been criticized and questioned by many in the West, such as the United States, The World Bank, and other bilateral and multilateral organizations that work with providing developmental assistance. Concerns over China’s lack of transparency within its aid policy, failure to promote democracy and good governance, and lack of programs aimed at achieving sustainable economic development have caused Western donors and Western multilateral donor organizations to question China’s true intent behind its aid policies. The United States, in particular, has become frustrated as China’s developmental assistance has begun to impact traditional aid organizations’ ability to influence recipient developing nations’ behavior in regard to human rights, and more importantly, economic reforms.35 A portion of the problem lies with China not being a member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Members of the OECD abide by guidelines established on aid by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). DAC defines aid, or official development assistance (ODA), as “Financial flows, technical assistance, and commodities that are (1) designed to promote economic 35 Lum, et al.
- 158. China’s Commitment toForeign Aid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 151 development and welfare as their main objective (thus excluding aid for military or other non-development purposes); and (2) provided as either grants or subsidized loans.”36 In addition, concessional loans must also meet the requirement of containing 25% of a “grant element.”37 China, a non-OECD member that often attends various OECD committees and work groups as an observer, is not held accountable to the OECD definition of aid, nor does it abide by said definition. Lengauer states, “In some aspects Chinese foreign assistance resembles ODA, but in others it shares characteristics of foreign investment.”38 China’s aid, in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI), is seen as beneficial to the recipient nation, but equally beneficial to China’s interests as well. China’s aid is masked in secrecy for a magnitude of reasons. First, Chinese officials contend that the lack of transparency in their aid policies is aimed at avoiding the unwelcome pressure they would receive from recipient nations requesting additional aid-based loan sizes made to neighboring nations.39 Many experts stress that this excuse does not make much sense because China is not committed, economically or politically, to provide assistance of any form to any independent nation. Instead, they counter that the lack of China’s aid 36 Steven Radelet, “A Primer on Foreign Aid,” Center for Global Development, July 2006), 4, http://www.cgdev.org/files/8846_file_WP92. 37 OECD, “Official Development Assistance – Definition and Coverage,” accessed December 10, 2012, http://www.oecd.org/dac/aidstatistics/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinition andcoverage.htm. 38 Lengauer. 39 Ibid., 2.
- 159. James D. Kates Vol.3, 2013/2014 152 transparency has roots in administrative, social, and economical context. Carol Lancaster contends that one reason behind the lack of transparency is that China’s aid programs are difficult to economically track because they cross multiple ministries and state-controlled agencies. Basically, she claims Chinese officials “do not know how large it is.”40 Lancaster cites multiple reasons to assume this. First, they do not keep traditional records as they attempt to avoid comparison with other donor states. Second, Chinese aid is often part of other economic packages that include investments and trade agreements. Third, the MOFCOM is undecided on how to price labor, which is part of the cost of aid. Finally, unlike traditional Western donors, the PRC lacks a single aid-focused ministry that directs its aid programs. Instead, multiple ministries, organizations, and SOEs are involved in the aid process and no one inter-agency has been formed to compile aid data. Another reason for the lack of transparency could be the avoidance of governmental criticism from the Chinese people. The PRC has, only recently, begun to focus on domestic development and was concerned that if the Chinese people became aware of the amount of aid being sent to foreign governments it could cause great unrest and political turmoil. Yet another cause of China’s secrecy behind its aid program is the fact that China itself receives aid based on the economic status of the majority of its population. Thomas Lum, et al, identified this notion 40 Carol Lancaster, “The Chinese Aid System,” Center for Global Development, June 2007, http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/13953_file_Chinese_aid.pdf.
- 160. China’s Commitment toForeign Aid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 153 in a 2009 CRS report to Congress as they write, “Some analysts surmise that the Chinese leadership is reluctant to be perceived as a major aid donor, since the PRC itself continues to be a recipient of foreign assistance.”41 In recent years, with the release of the “White Paper” in 2011, China has slowly given the world a closer look at its foreign aid policies, but continues to shroud in secrecy the specific details of how its aid flows. China promotes its developmental assistance as “no-strings attached.”42 This means that assistance from China does not carry the conditions from the West. It lacks the commitment of the recipient to adhere to economic guidance that promotes fiscal responsibility, liberal trade, privatization, and a reduced role in state. China’s aid is also void of restrictions that relate to good governance requirements, which both bilateral and multilateral ODA demand of recipient nations.43 Thus, Western donors worry that China’s quick-return aid projects, given to nations that include ones they normally refuse to extend credit to, tend to support the promotion of human rights violations and the instability of economic development in the developing world.44 Traditional aid organizations, such as USAID and the World Bank, are concerned that 41 Lum, et al. 42 Chinese President Xi Jinping is quoted as using the term in a speech given in Tanzania shortly after assuming office in March 2013. Quotes can be referenced in the CNBC article prepared by Priyanka Boghani and Erin Conway- Smith, “China’s New President Offers Africa ‘No Strings’ Aid,” CNBC, last modified March 26, 2013, http://www.cnbc.com/id/100593398. 43 Lum, et al. 44 Ibid., 1.
- 161. James D. Kates Vol.3, 2013/2014 154 China’s aid projects often tend to over-extend the credit levels of its recipient nations, causing them to enter into unrepayable obligations. This over-extension of debt is passed onto the recipient nation’s population, which in turn, increases poverty-related concerns.45 Many of China’s aid projects are aimed at developing infrastructure associated with its own needs; the example of railways, roads, and ports was mentioned earlier. Also, as a form of aid-tying, China demands that recipient nations complete projects using at least 50% of Chinese- provided equipment, material, labor, technicians, and training, countering its no-strings attached claims.46 China enters into aid projects with nations that can provide them with resources, strategic and political advantages, and international recognition. This means that Chinese aid projects are not aimed at recipient nation poverty reduction and economic development; they are used as foreign policy tools by the Chinese government to gain access to material and influence that it needs to reduce its own poverty, promote its own economic development, and foster political influence that will enable it to mold international affairs. Many of its projects are funded through resource, or commodity, exchanges. Those projects completed on concessional loans are generally secured using resources or commodities as collateral, a practice used throughout history. In fact, Brautigam contends, “Most ideas and practices applied by the Chinese are based on their own experience with Japan’s engagement in China after the 45 Moyo, 1. 46 Lum, et al.
- 162. China’s Commitment toForeign Aid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 155 Mao era.”47 During the early 1970s, Japan and China entered into numerous resource-back concessional loan agreements, seventy-four by 1978, in which Japan financed turnkey projects for China, and in return China paid Japan in oil.48 This learned experience combined with China’s history, philosophy and ideology, permeate its foreign aid policies. Conclusion In its 2011 “White Paper” on its foreign aid policy, China outlines five basic features of its foreign aid policy: “unremittingly helping recipient countries build self-development capabilities; imposing no political conditions; adhering to equality, mutual benefit and common development; remain realistic while striving for the best; and, keeping pace with the times and paying attention to reform and innovation.”49 These five features are designed to guide China’s developmental aid and ensure that it adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries. However, Chinese assistance lacks transparency, and coupled with its rapid international rise in power, has led many to question the true intent behind its growing aid programs. It can be argued that the number one goal of China’s foreign assistance is its desire to improve its economic position. China’s need to obtain resources, especially energy resources, and commodities used in 47 Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift:The Real Story of China in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 13. 48 Ibid., 13. 49 State Council Information Office of the PRC.
- 163. James D. Kates Vol.3, 2013/2014 156 its production industries is its primary concern. As China continues to march toward becoming the number one economic power in the world, it is using its aid policies in Africa and Latin America to obtain the means of providing its population the material it demands to sustain and improve its standards of living. China’s secondary objective in granting aid is the expansion of its trade markets. In addition to the growing markets developing throughout Africa and Latin America, China courts many nations in Europe, the East, and the West. This surge in Chinese power has been carefully planned by the PRC and utilizes its foreign aid program as a tool to expand its ability to develop its “soft power,” obtain essential energy and commodity resources needed to sustain and advance its own development, and continue its climb toward a possible hegemonic power. Its foreign aid program is far from a simple developing nation mutually assisting other developing nations with no- strings-attached assistance. China’s assistance is also focused toward achieving outlined political doctrine. The primary political focus is pursuing its One-China policy, and alienating the ROC from the international community. In addition, China uses it aid programs to obtain strategic diplomatic support throughout Asia and other parts of the world. This support ensures that China enjoys regional and domestic security, free from territorial and conventional threat. It supports aid projects, to include food assistance and technological assistance, in North Korea as a means to keep the government of Kim Jong-un stable and avoid further Western involvement in the region.
- 164. China’s Commitment toForeign Aid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 157 The final goal of China’s foreign assistance is the expansion of its cultural ideology and fostering of diplomatic influences that enable it to expand its soft power in the international community. China’s support in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia has an underlying agenda of extending and strengthening its “soft-power,” garnering support within various multinational organizations to support Chinese- favored policies and practices. As China continues to ascend the economic and political ladder to the upper levels of international influence, it is using the support it receives from LDCs to extend its arms out to help. China’s unconventional approaches to aid challenge traditional Western donors and the multilateral organizations that represent them. Some contend that the bilateral and multilateral aid organizations of the West may be forced to re-address their aid practices in attempts to stem the spread of China’s growing self-interest-driven policies. China, on the other hand, contends that its quick-return projects are aimed at the reduction of human suffering caused by poverty and increase economic development in developing nations by providing infrastructure needed for growth.
- 165. James D. Kates Vol.3, 2013/2014 158 BIBLIOGRAPHY Boghani, Priyanka and Erin Conway-Smith. "China's New President Offers Africa 'No Strings' Aid." CNBC. Last modified March 26, 2013. Accessed January 5, 2013. http://www.cnbc.com/id/100593398. Brautigam, Deborah. The Dragon's Gift: The True Story of China in Africa. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. “China GDP Annual Growth Rate.” Trading Economics. Accessed November 14, 2012, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp-growth-annual. Export-Import Bank of China. “Mission Statement.” Accessed December 1, 2012. http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/profile/intro.shtml. Lancaster, Carol. "The Chinese Aid System." Center for Global Development. June 2007. Accessed December 10, 2012. http://www.cgdev.org/files/13953_file_Chinese_aid.pdf. Lengauer, Sara. "China's Foreign Aid Policy: Motives and Methods." Culture Mandala: Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural & Economic Studies, Vol. 9, Issue 2, September-December 2011: 35-81. Lum, Thomas, Hannah Fischer, Julissa Gomez-Granger, and Anne Leland. "China's Foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia." Congessional Research Center. February 25, 2009. Accessed December 10, 2012. http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40361_20090225.pdf.
- 166. China’s Commitment toForeign Aid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 159 Ministry of Commerce of the PRC. “The History.” Last modified December 7, 2010. Accessed November 28, 2012. http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/history.shtml. Moyo, Dambisa. Winner Take All: China's Race For Resources And What It Means For The World. New York: Basic Books, 2012. Radelet, Steven. "A Primer on Foreign Aid." The Center for Global Development. July 2006. Accessed December 10, 2012. http://www.cgdev.org/files/8846_file_WP92.pdf. State Council Information Office of the PRC. “White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid.” Accessed November 28, 2012. http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2011- 04/21/content_22410897.htm. U.S. Energy Information Administration. “China Energy Overview.” Accessed November 23, 2012. http://www.eia.gov/countries/country- data.cfm?fips=CH&trk=m. Weston, Jonathan, Caitlin Campbell, and Katherine Koleski. “China’s Foreign Assistance in Review: Implications For The United States.” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 2011. Accessed December 7, 2012. http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2011/9_1_%202011_Chin asForeignAssistanceinReview.pdf. “The World Factbook: China.” Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed November 14, 2012.
- 167. James D. Kates Vol.3, 2013/2014 160 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/geos/ch.html.
- 168. Vol. 3, 2013/2014161 U.S. Influence in Syria: A New Approach Kristina J. Colburn and Abdul Abid ABSTRACT In March 2011, protesters gathered in the city of Deraa, Syria to protest the government’s treatment of a group of young boys who had written negative words about the government in their school. The protest was the beginning of what has become a long, drawn-out civil war approaching its third anniversary. The United States has tried to exert influence through the use of diplomacy as well as threats, but has thus far failed to achieve any substantial accomplishments. This lack of impact stems from several key factors including the history of the U.S. in the region, Syrian perceptions of U.S. intentions and the opposing interests of Russia and China. Now into 2014, the U.S. can help put an end to the conflict by pushing for peace talks between the Syrian government and the opposition. This paper starts with a brief history of Syria and the U.S. role in that history. It also discusses how the civil war came into being. Finally, the paper proposes a plan for the U.S. to exert indirect influence by allowing a longtime ally to play a more direct leadership role in the conflict. Syrian Flag Free Syrian Army Flag
- 169. Kristina J. Colburnand Abdul Abid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 162 Introduction n March 2011, following the arrest and torture of several young boys in the city of Deraa, small groups of young protesters gathered in Damascus and a few other cities in Syria. Little did the protesters know that the protests would soon catapult the nation into extremely dangerous proxy and civil wars. As part of the Arab Spring movement, the protestors had gathered to demand the removal of President Bashar al-Assad from office and push for democratic reform. By the following month, thousands of Syrians began regular protests in the country. Syrians had become tired of al-Assad’s long reign and his Ba’ath party rule. Seeing what had happened in Egypt and Tunisia, al-Assad would not be intimidated. By July 2011, al-Assad’s military stormed into Syrian cities, crushing the protests and killing many civilians in the process. Horrified by this action, many from Syria’s military defected and joined the protesters, forming the opposition group known as the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The opposition would later be joined by foreign fighters, religious extremists, and al-Qaeda affiliated rebels. What had started as protests and a clash between the Syrian military and the FSA has now turned into a major debacle that includes a domestic revolution, a proxy war, and a full-blown civil war. As of mid- 2014, the tragic crisis in Syria was still ongoing. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), over 150,000 Syrians have been killed. More than 16,000 are either detained or missing. Thousands more will die from violence or starvation. Nearly three million have fled I
- 170. U.S. Influence inSyria Vol. 3, 2013/2014 163 the country and become refugees in the neighboring countries of Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. At least nine million have been driven from their homes and become displaced (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights). There seems to be no end in sight to the violence. An end could be achieved if the U.S., Turkey, and Saudi Arabia strongly push for peace talks between the Syrian government and opposition. Syria’s History: A Tragic Tale In order to understand the potential influence, or lack thereof, that the U.S. can expect to have in the region, one must have a solid understanding of the history of Syria. A deep distrust of the western nations has existed for nearly a century, which will limit the U.S. ability to visibly lead the conflict to a desirable conclusion. This distrust was founded in the actions of the West in the early twentieth century and then exploited as a means to unite the people under the Assad regimes up to the present day. From the standpoint of the age of the current borders, Syria is a relatively new and artificially fabricated country formed when the British abandoned their foreign occupation strategy in the mid- twentieth century. However, the people and culture date back to the beginning of human civilization. Syria is rich in history and tradition. Damascus had been an inhabited city before 300 BC and is one of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) World Heritage Sites (UNESCO Convention). The landmass that makes up Syria today has a long history of occupation by external
- 171. Kristina J. Colburnand Abdul Abid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 164 empires including the Persians, Romans, and Ottomans. The land in today’s Syria also suffered the Crusades. It was not until World War I that the idea of an independent nation arose. The people in the region were not thinking of a Syrian nation, but of an Arab nation that spanned a major portion of the Middle East. At the outbreak of World War I, the British recognized that they could leverage this pan-Arab nationalism to help them dismantle the Ottoman Empire, which had allied itself with Germany and Austria at the start of World War I. British Army officer T. E. Lawrence, known as Lawrence of Arabia, was sent to Damascus as an emissary by the British government to secure the support of the Arabs to fight the Germans and Ottomans in the region. In return for Arab help in the war “Great Britain had promised to support an independent Arab state or a confederation of Arab states before the war as a way of getting the Arabs to join the Allies in subduing the Germans and Turks” (Morrison 2009, 182). The Arabs did join in the fight to rid the region of the Germans with the understanding that they would be granted independence (Morrison 2009). The promise was short-lived. The Sykes-Post Agreement of 1916 essentially promised France the rights to the region as part of its spoils of war. At the end of the war, with no consideration for religious, ethnic, tribal, linguistic, cultural, or other major factors, the Allies carved up the Middle East (less Israel) into the nation states that exist today. The Arabs, as well as T.E. Lawrence, felt that the British (and hence the West) had betrayed their trust (Morrison 2009). This would be further
- 172. U.S. Influence inSyria Vol. 3, 2013/2014 165 aggravated by the harsh French occupation, which lasted through World War II. A prime example of this lack of consideration was the fate of the Kurds who found themselves dispersed into three different countries. Today, the Kurds possess an autonomous region in Iraq; they’re fighting a separatist rebellion in Turkey and they constitute a significant minority population in Syria. The future of the Kurds will be just one of many such issues that will require attention following the ongoing conflicts in the area. Ninety percent of the Syrian population is Arab, with Kurds, Armenians and others making up the remaining ten percent. Sunni Muslims make up 74 percent of the population with other Islamic sects comprising 16 percent of the population. Small Jewish and Christian minorities make up the remainder (Central Intelligence Agency 2013). At the end of World War II, most of the European nations realized that it was not in their best interest to maintain occupations abroad. Thus, many of the nations granted former colonies their sovereignty, allowing these countries to transition to independent nations. Unfortunately, with the departure of their occupiers, these countries were not necessarily left with the skills or institutions to allow for stability. In Syria, because of a U.N. resolution in 1946, all foreign troops departed by April of that year. Shukri Kuwatly became the first president of Syria. He was the first of twenty-two presidents or prime ministers to lead Syria over the next twenty-three years (Morrison 2009). There were three common themes among the Syrian leadership. First, there was a desire for one pan-Arab state. Second, the governing members thought the West could not be trusted at all. Third, the Syrian
- 173. Kristina J. Colburnand Abdul Abid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 166 leadership saw the nation at the geographic center of the Arab world and thought that they should be the “go-to” leadership for any Arab global representation (Morrison 2009). Over the next sixty years, Syria’s desire to be the representative of the Arab people not only created great tensions with the West (especially after the establishment of Israel), but also with its Arab neighbors. The creation of Israel and the subsequent regional instability inflamed anti-Western emotions. The Syrian military and political leadership was united in believing that the creation of Israel was another betrayal by the West, and Israel had to be removed. However, continuous failure to do so and the additional embarrassment of losing the Golan Heights in the Six Day War only fed the engine driving one coup after another in the country. It was not until Hafez al-Assad took over the country in November 1970 that Syria enjoyed stable leadership. This is not to say that Syria ever felt secure in practice, however. Syria was in a perpetual state of emergency. Therefore, Hafez al-Assad built a strong internal security structure, known as the mukhabarat, which would promptly and efficiently crush any sign of internal resistance to his Ba’ath Party or regime in particular. It would be said of Hafez al-Assad that he was “… a man whose major accomplishment in three decades had been staying in power” (Morrison 2009, 38). When his son Bashar al-Assad took over following his father’s death in July 2000, he found himself in charge of a nation with a floundering economy and in great need of modern infrastructure. The
- 174. U.S. Influence inSyria Vol. 3, 2013/2014 167 younger Al-Assad had been educated in the West as an ophthalmologist and was thought to be someone who would be more modern in thinking and change Syria for the better. However, he had to contend with the existing Ba’ath party leadership, which expected its lifestyle, power, and dominance to continue. Al-Assad would frequently promise reforms only to be forced to back off because of a bureaucracy that was highly resistant to change. In his 2012 book, Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad, David Lesch describes a comment by a diplomat who had served in Syria: “‘probably some of the tough guys in the regime came to Bashar and essentially said, ‘Hey kid, this is not how we do things here’” (9). In addition, al-Assad continued the practice of elevating the Alawite people in government, thus cementing their singular hold on power much like the Sunnis in the Ba’ath party in Iraq. Alawite is a subsect of Shia Islam. Although al-Assad’s regime is Alawite, it makes up only twelve percent of the total Syrian population (Central Intelligence Agency 2013). The state had also developed a “‘military-mercantile complex’, which developed strong ties between the government and the large Sunni business class” (Lesch 2012, 7). This has resulted in a large income gap in the economy where a few people have gained incredible wealth at the expense of the rest of the population. In addition, the youth unemployment rate is 19.2 percent (Central Intelligence Agency); high unemployment of young people is often a precursor to unrest in nations with high income gaps.
- 175. Kristina J. Colburnand Abdul Abid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 168 Arab Spring Comes to Syria While Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Bahrain and Libya experienced the Arab Spring, Syria remained very quiet. Bashar al-Assad felt secure and thought he had the people’s full support. There were a number of attempts to generate resistance during the Arab Spring but most just fizzled out (Lesch 2012, 54) — at least that’s the way it appeared. Over forty years, the security services of the state had successfully suppressed every sign of insurrection so that people were unlikely to be inclined to publicly denounce the regime. This was until the mukhabarat made a crucial mistake. In March 2011, at least ten school boys between the ages of nine and fifteen from the city of Deraa, inspired by reports from Egypt, wrote “Down with the Regime” on a wall in their school. The mukhabarat quickly rounded up the children and subsequently tortured them in response to the display of insubordination to the regime. There is no evidence to support that al- Assad directly ordered the retaliation (Lesch 2012). The security services always had a long leash to deal with such issues as they saw fit. “When a domestic threat appears, there is a push-button response of quick and ruthless oppression” (Lesch 2012, 105). The result was that the act of juvenile mischief became the spark that lit a firebomb of resistance, with people of all ages coming out in protest of the regime for allowing the torture of children. Much like the Tunisian street vendor who set himself on fire, the torture of the children was the catalyst for the current rebellion in Syria.
- 176. U.S. Influence inSyria Vol. 3, 2013/2014 169 In the weeks that followed, there were a series of escalations. The security forces responded to the initial protests with force, which resulted in more people coming out, followed by more violence and larger protests. When al-Assad finally spoke publicly a month after the protests began, he blamed external forces for inciting terrorism instead of addressing the issues and complaints by the protestors (Lesch 2012, 77). This would just add fuel to the flames of resistance. What made the resistance movement unique is that it occurred organically without any real organized group spearheading the protests or the movements. Small groups of tech savvy youths made use of social media to advertise where to protest and to report the locations of security forces. They did this without a central organization directing their actions (Lesch 2012, 69). This was both a blessing and a curse for the resistance. It was a blessing in that it did not give the government a clear target to focus on to crush the resistance. On the other hand, it did not give traditionally pro-government individuals or groups a real alternative if they preferred to walk away from the cover that al-Assad’s regime afforded them (Lesch 2012, 96). The cycle of violence and protests eventually devolved into civil war over the course of the last two years. The government has shown no credible evidence of moving on any of the occasionally promised reforms and has continued to escalate violence against its citizens (Lesch 2012). Chemical weapons have also been used on many Syrians, as will be further discussed later. Meanwhile, the opposition has ended up forming a number of organizations vying to be the voice of the
- 177. Kristina J. Colburnand Abdul Abid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 170 resistance. Internally in Syria, the FSA is acting as the military arm of the resistance. Local coordination committees (LCC) have sprouted all over Syria and act as the local boots-on-the-ground political voice and the opposition’s organization committees for urban areas. Resistance leaders who have been in exile have also been trying to act as the go-to group for those outside of Syria in helping the citizens fight the revolution. By the end of 2011, a number of them had combined to form the Syrian National Council (SNC). The SNC includes groups such as the FSA, LCCs, Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, Syrian National Current, and Assyrian Democratic Organization. Infighting and power plays among the SNC members have made the organization appear weak and ineffective. However, the SNC is still the only real option for coordination and communication although there is no assurance that it could unify the country should the opposition win; this risks Syria into becoming a failed or failing state, much like Somalia or Iraq. Another key group in the region is the Kurdish Future Movement (KFM), which has been attempting to stay out of the fight. The KFM is worried that other resistance groups might reach out for help from Turkey, which has been in an ongoing civil conflict with its own Kurdish minority. Additionally, some militant groups have also joined the fight through the porous border with Iraq (Lesch 2012). The Proxy War and Sectarian Conflict The Syrian military and the nation’s civilians are not alone in their conflict. Syria’s neighbors, a few countries in the West, and foreign fighters from at least 25 countries have also been
- 178. U.S. Influence inSyria Vol. 3, 2013/2014 171 involved in the conflict and chosen sides, leading to a full-scale proxy war—a conflict instigated or fought on behalf of uninvolved parties (Convoy of Martyrs in Levant 2013). One side of the conflict is supporting al-Assad’s troops, while the other side is supporting the FSA. Unfortunately, the support given to both sides may have only prolonged the war. Furthermore, the al- Qaeda-affiliated rebels have also attacked the Kurds in Syria (Kelley 2013). Supporting al-Assad’s troops directly or indirectly are Iran, Iraq, Russia, and the Lebanon-based Shia militant group Hezbollah. Supporting the FSA are the U.S., United Kingdom, France, Jordan, and Turkey. Foreign fighters and various groups are also on the side of the opposition. A group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is affiliated with al-Qaeda and runs operations in both Syria and Iraq. In addition to battles with al-Assad’s forces, ISIS often fights the Kurds in northeast Syria as well. Other groups on the side of the opposition include Jabhat al-Nusra/al-Nusra Front (also affiliated with al-Qaeda), Ahrar al-Sham, Suqor al-Sham, Syrian Islamic Liberation Front, Farouq Brigades, Army of Islam, Liwa al-Ummah, Liwa al-Islam, and Sunni Lions Brigade. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait have given support to the Army of Islam group (Kelley 2013). Fights between the groups have been increasing. There are reportedly as
- 179. Kristina J. Colburnand Abdul Abid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 172 many as a thousand armed groups representing approximately 100,000 fighters in the opposition (Lister 2013). Russia continues to support al-Assad’s regime for three primary reasons. The port of Tartus in Syria is Russia’s last and only foreign military installation. Syria also purchases a great deal of weapons from Russia, which needs the money. The first Soviet military aircraft was ordered by the Syrians in the mid-1950s (Gordon and Komissarov 2013, 227). Today, Syria continues to be one of Russia’s top customers for military weapons. Furthermore, Russia is against the idea of external powers overthrowing the Syrian government because of the perception that it would not bring a better result, and cites Iraq, Egypt, and Libya as examples. Iran is another important ally for the Syrian government. Iran uses Syria to send arms to Hezbollah and the Gaza-based militant group Hamas. There are reports that Iranian military commanders have sent their soldiers and increasingly given orders in the fight (Kelley 2013). The U.S. has sent non-lethal aid to the FSA, but there have been concerns about arms potentially reaching ISIS rebels and other jihadists. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have been supporting Islamic factions in the opposition through training and donations. Foreign fighters have come from Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, and several other countries.
- 180. U.S. Influence inSyria Vol. 3, 2013/2014 173 Hezbollah fighters and Libyans have had the highest number of casualties among foreign fighters (Convoy of Martyrs in Levant 2013). The stream of foreign fighters pouring in has only added more extremists and jihadists to the opposition. Sectarian violence has been on the rise in Syria and has also been a factor in the casualties. According to Fareed Zakaria, Syria is going through the re-balancing of power along ethnic and religious lines (Fisher 2013). The majority in Syria is Arab Sunni, and as mentioned, the Arab Alawites who run the country are in the minority with only twelve percent of the population. There are also other ethnic groups in the country such as Kurds, Druze, and Armenians, as well as Christians. Because the Alawites are in the minority, they fear for their fate if al-Assad’s regime is out of power and thus will fight to the end. The Shias and Christians have usually supported the Alawites (Zakaria 2013). Various foreign policy experts believe that al-Assad allowed extremism and jihadism to brew in order to create chaos and have the rebel groups turn on each other. According to Zakaria, a bloody civil war will continue in Syria for some time, and U.S. military intervention will not help the crisis. The Chemical Weapons Attack On August 21, 2013, the Syrian government was accused of using chemical weapons on its people in the suburbs of
- 181. Kristina J. Colburnand Abdul Abid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 174 Damascus. The U.N. described the attack as the most significant confirmed use of chemical weapons against civilians since Saddam Hussein’s use in Iraq in 1988 (BBC News 2013). The nerve agent sarin reportedly killed over 1,400 people. Graphic videos and images showed many victims suffering from symptoms. Despite the Syrian government’s strong denial of using chemical weapons, the U.S. government assessed with high confidence that the regime was behind the attack (White House 2013). U.S. President Barack Obama had declared that the use of chemical weapons would cross a red line that would trigger unspecified retaliation. Following the August 21 attack, tensions rose as the world waited to see if Syria would be attacked by the U.S. Iran warned against any strikes on Syria (BBC News 2013). Al- Assad’s regime also warned of retaliatory strikes while repeatedly denying their use of the weapons and blaming the rebels instead. Russia alleged that the attack could have been staged by the rebels to provoke military intervention. Others argued that al- Assad resorted to chemical weapons after exhausting all conventional military weapons on rebel strongholds (BBC News 2013). Americans at home were not interested in any military intervention or involvement in yet another war. Polls showed that a Syrian intervention would potentially be the most unpopular
- 182. U.S. Influence inSyria Vol. 3, 2013/2014 175 conflict of the past twenty years. More than fifty-one percent of Americans were opposed to the attack (Logiurato 2013). Furthermore, there were debates within the U.S. government on whether the strikes would accomplish much. By mid-September, due to a Russian initiative, the U.S., Russia, and Syria reached a deal in which the Syrian government agreed to hand over its chemical weapons arsenal for destruction or face sanctions or military action. The final U.N. report released on chemical weapons used in Syria documented chemical weapons being used in at least four other instances in Syria in 2013 (United Nations). Although the August 21 attack was the major one, it was not the only time chemical weapons had been used. The Future of Syria and U.S. Involvement One of the biggest challenges the U.S. faced in both Iraq and Afghanistan was in stabilizing the countries after the problematic regimes had been toppled. Similar issues are playing out in Egypt and Libya today as well. Nation-building is a complicated endeavor in the best of circumstances. Add in the cultural fears and mistrust often seen in the Middle East and it is very difficult for the Syrian population to feel a sense of security and hope for the future. There is a concept of the “Golden Hour” (Clad 2013) where, in the immediate aftermath of removing an oppressive
- 183. Kristina J. Colburnand Abdul Abid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 176 regime, there is an opportunity to bridge the division between various groups of people and provide a path to stability. In his article in “The National Interest,” James Clad described how the U.S. missed the opportunity to allow former Iraqi military and security forces to remain in their jobs and provide security for the new Iraqi state, thus giving them the sense of ownership for their security and future. A dialog could also have been started toward healing the cross-cultural rifts created by Saddam’s oppression of the Shiite and Kurdish people in his own country. However, by avoiding the mistakes of Iraq and Afghanistan and by using proper foresight and planning with a realistic view of the history, perceptions, and fears of the Syrian people, the U.S. might be able to contribute to a stable transition of power in Syria. The future of Syria is still uncertain and it’s an open question what the U.S. and the West could do to help put an immediate end to the crisis. According to Shadi Hamid of the Brookings Institution, U.S. policy in Syria has been unraveling. By undermining the SNC and being overly concerned about arms reaching al-Qaeda-affiliated fighters, U.S. policy may have led several groups to believe they could not rely on the SNC. Instead of being pushed away from al-Qaeda extremists, rebel groups were being forced to join them. Several groups have rejected the SNC and now support the Army of Islam (Kelley 2013). According
- 184. U.S. Influence inSyria Vol. 3, 2013/2014 177 to Michael Young, the U.S. could have armed the opposition early on when it was making substantial gains rather than allow a vacuum to form, which would later be filled by jihadists (Young 2013). Thus, the opposition is now mixed with extremists, foreign fighters, Syrian military defectors, al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorists, protesters, and other rebels. These parties often turn on each other, creating further chaos and violence in the country. Vali Nasr argues that the U.S. could employ powerful sanctions that could cripple al-Assad’s regime, as well as organize the opposition into a credible political force. Nasr also believes that the wave of refugees in neighboring countries could form an unstable population, which could become a breeding ground for extremism (Nasr 2013). The countries hosting the refugees could become destabilized. The U.S. cannot afford to be the primary influence in the conflict for several reasons. First, there is a cultural distrust of the West in general and the U.S. specifically among Syrians. Second, the U.S. has not established an adequate commitment to any rebel organization sufficient to gain the ability to steer the conflict in the direction that would give maximum benefit. That direction includes helping to bring peace while eliminating al-Qaeda elements in the country. Third, the U.S. lacks the domestic support for direct intervention in Syria and the subsequent
- 185. Kristina J. Colburnand Abdul Abid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 178 nation-building that would be required to avoid repeating mishaps in Iraq and Libya. Finally, since the red line on chemical weapons use has been crossed with impunity, U.S. credibility may have been compromised in a way that al-Assad would not see any reason to step down. Additionally, al-Assad continues to be emboldened by its alliances with and support from Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah. However, in spite of the aforementioned impediments, the U.S. could nonetheless exert some influence. The key is to gather nations and groups the Syrians feel that they can trust, who have a vested security interest in a stable Syria, and who are friendly to the U.S. Working with those nations and groups to push for continued peace talks between the Syrian government and opposition will be critical. The requirements would yield two candidate nations: Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Turkey is a member of NATO, a Muslim democracy, and has a history of providing economic and humanitarian assistance to the Syrians. For those reasons, Turkey may be in the best position to take on a leadership role. Tensions between al-Assad’s government and Saudi Arabia have increased during the conflict; however, the two governments may still have the potential to work together in bringing peace to Syria. For example, one option could be that
- 186. U.S. Influence inSyria Vol. 3, 2013/2014 179 Saudi Arabia halt its donations and training to its preferred rebel organizations, while al-Assad agrees to a cease-fire and peace. Unrest on two borders (both Iraq and Syria) creates security issues for Turkey. First, there is the threat of violence spilling over into Turkey, especially in the disputed Kurdish regions. Second, the security, social, and economic issues in dealing with the huge influx of Syrian refugees into the country. As of June 2014, nearly 800,000 refugees had entered Turkey seeking assistance (United Nations 2014). It is in Turkey’s best interest to encourage a solution to the Syrian crisis as soon as possible to relieve itself of this burden. The Achilles heel for Turkey, however, is the Kurdish population within Turkey and its own internal revolution. Turkey needs the Syrian Kurds to buy into any agreement it could broker. In order for the Kurdish population in Syria to trust any Turkish- brokered deal, it would require Turkey to make significant efforts in its relations with the Kurdish population within Turkey itself. This would likely involve extending equal rights at a minimum or even creating an autonomous area much like that in Iraq for its own Kurdish population. The action could be seen as giving in to Kurdish demands, but the cost of not doing so could be much higher if the war in Syria continues at the current pace.
- 187. Kristina J. Colburnand Abdul Abid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 180 Conclusion By early 2014, al-Assad’s forces were gaining momentum; however, groups such as ISIS were also gaining a stronger presence. A peace conference known as Geneva II was held in early 2014. The U.S. and other countries were hoping that a peace deal could be struck between al-Assad’s regime and the opposition in order to end the bloody war at last. However, many in the opposition have stated that they would not recognize any peace deal if al-Assad remains in power (Kelley 2013). Little progress was made after the peace conference was held. In June 2014, al-Assad was re-elected as president of Syria in an election that was reported as being a farce (Al-Jazeera 2014). Over the past three years, several important questions have been raised and debated. Many have asked if the Syrian rebels should have received arms, if the U.S. and the West should have intervened to topple al-Assad’s regime, or if they should have intervened only to protect civilians. Others debate whether the U.S. should have struck al-Assad’s military and chemical weapons arsenal sites when chemical weapons were used, or if no-fly zones or buffer zones should have been established. There are also questions on how al-Qaeda-affiliated radical fighters could be separated from the more moderate rebels in the opposition, and on how the sectarian violence could be reduced.
- 188. U.S. Influence inSyria Vol. 3, 2013/2014 181 Meanwhile, Syrian civilians also have questions. Many ask why the European Union, the Arab League, and the U.S. have not done more to stop the mass casualties in Syria. They ask why there is a discussion of intervening only when chemical weapons kill a thousand people while over 150,000 have been killed by other means. Many of these questions have led to endless debates. At this point, there may be two remaining options that could work. One option is that there could be a peace deal between the two sides and a hope that things would gradually return to normal. The other option, as retired U.S. General Michael Hayden has stated, is that al-Assad wins (Daily Star 2013). Because the opposition has too many radical extremists, life under their rule may not be the best option for the Syrian people. As stated previously, the U.S. cannot afford to have primary influence in the country, but could still play a role by working with Turkey and Saudi Arabia to help put an end to the crisis and promote peace. Attempts at peace can be made by aggressively pushing for peace talks between the two sides. It remains to be seen what the fate of Syria will be.
- 189. Kristina J. Colburnand Abdul Abid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 182 BIBLIOGRAPHY “Assad Re-elected in Wartime Election.” Al-Jazeera. Last modified June 5, 2014. Accessed June 15, 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/bashar- al-assad-re-elected-syrian-president-20146419457810751.html. “Assad Win May be Syria’s Best Option: Ex-CIA Chief.” Daily Star. Last modified December 13, 2014. Accessed December 18, 2013. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Dec- 13/240934-assad-win-may-be-syrias-best-option-ex-cia- chief.ashx#axzz2nv7SkPmX. Clad, James C. “Wasting the Golden Hour in America's Iraq Meltdown.” The National Interest 126 (July/August 2013): 10-21. Fisher, Max. “Fareed Zakaria’s Case Against U.S. Involvement in Syria.” The Washington Post. Last modified June 17, 2013. Accessed December 16, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/0 6/17/fareed-zakarias-case-against-u-s-involvement-in-syria/. “Flag of Syria.” Wikimedia Commons. Last modified July 1, 2013. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Syria.svg. “Flag of Syria (1932-1957; 1961-1963).” Wikimedia Commons. Last modified March 6, 2013. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Syria_%281932- 1958;_1961-1963%29.svg.
- 190. U.S. Influence inSyria Vol. 3, 2013/2014 183 Gordon, Yefim, and Dmitriy Komissarov. Soviet and Russian Military Aircraft in the Middle East. Manchester, UK: Hikoki Publications, 2013. Kelley, Michael B. “The Madness of the Syria Proxy War in One Chart.” Business Insider. Last modified October 16, 2013. Accessed December 16, 2013. http://www.businessinsider.com/who-is- involved-in-the-war-in-syria-2013-10. Kelley, Michael B. “Middle East Expert Explains Exactly Where the U.S. Went Wrong in Syria.” Business Insider. Last modified October 1, 2013. Accessed December 16, 2013. http://www.businessinsider.com/how-the-us-failed-in-syria- 2013-10. Kelley, Michael B. “The Three Reasons Russia Backs Assad So Staunchly.” Business Insider. Last modified August 28, 2013. Accessed December 16, 2013. http://www.businessinsider.com/why- russia-backs-assad-2013-8. Lesch, David W. “Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad.” New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012. Lister, Charles. “Syria’s Insurgency beyond Good Guys and Bad Guys.” Foreign Policy. Last modified September 9, 2013. Accessed December 17, 2013. http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/09/syria s_insurgency_beyond_good_guys_and_bad_guys. Logiurato, Brett. “Attacking Syria Would Be the Most Unpopular Intervention in the Last 20 Years.” Business Insider. Last
- 191. Kristina J. Colburnand Abdul Abid Vol. 3, 2013/2014 184 modified September 7, 2013. Accessed December 17, 2013. http://www.businessinsider.com/poll-syria-military- intervention-civil-war-chemical-weapons-2013-9. Morrison, Jack. “Creation of the Modern Middle East: Syria.” Edited by Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr. New York, NY: Chelsea House, 2009. Nasr, Vali. “The Dangerous Price of Ignoring Syria.” The New York Times. Last modified April 15, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/opinion/global/the- dangerous-price-of-ignoring-syria.html. Riedel, Bruce. “Lessons from America's First War with Iran.” The Fletcher Forum on World Affairs 37, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 101-106. Sengupta, Somini, and Rick Gladstone. “Chemical Arms Used Repeatedly in Syria, U.N. Says.” The New York Times. Last modified December 12, 2013. Accessed December 17, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/13/world/middleeast/un- confirms-repeated-chemical-arms-use-in-syria.html. “Syria Chemical Attach: What We Know.” BBC News. Last modified September 24, 2013. Accessed December 17, 2013. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23927399. “Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.” Accessed December 15, 2013. http://syriahr.com/en/. “Syria’s Islamist Fighters: Competition Among Islamists.” The Economist (July 20, 2013):45. UNESCO World Heritage Convention. “Ancient City of Damascus.” Accessed August 21, 2013. http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/20.
- 192. U.S. Influence inSyria Vol. 3, 2013/2014 185 UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency. “Syria Regional Refugee Response.” Accessed June 15, 2014. http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php. United Nations. “UN Mission to Investigate Allegations of Use of Chemical Weapons in Syrian Arab Republic.” December 2013. The White House Office of the Press Secretary. “Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013.” Last modified August 30, 2013. Accessed December 17, 2013. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the- press-office/2013/08/30/government-assessment-syrian- government-s-use-chemical-weapons-august-21. “The World Factbook: Syria.” Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed August 21, 2013. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the- world-factbook/geos/sy.html. Zakaria, Fareed. “With Or Without Us: Why Syria’s Future Is In Its Own Hands.” Time. May 13, 2013. Zelin, Aaron Y., Evan F. Kohlmann, and Laith al-Khouri. “Convoy of Martyrs in the Levant: A Joint Study Charting the Evolving Role of Sunni Foreign Fighters in the Armed Uprising against the Assad Regime in Syria.” Flashpoint Global Partners. 2013. Last accessed December 16, 2013. http://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/convoy-of-martyrs- in-the-levant-a-joint-study-charting-the-evolving-role-of-sunni- foreign-fighters-in-the-armed-uprising-against-the-assad- regime-in-syria2.pdf.
- 193. Vol. 3, 2013/2014186 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank the following people who helped make the third edition of the Global Review a success. A special thanks to the Faculty Director of APUS’ School of Security and Global Studies, Professor Michelle Watts, for her continuous work on not just the Global Review, but other chapter projects as well, since the chapter was founded in 2009. I would like to commend our program manager, Kristina Colburn, as well as the faculty members for their support of this edition: Kate Brannum, Ginny Haddock, Ryan Harding, Richard Mahoney, Daniel Opstal, Jennifer Osetek, Kimberly Ruff, and Kyle Snyder. I also want to commend our assistant editors and fact-checkers: Leslie Barstow, Michael Breen, Jean Carminati, Jack Sigman, and Danielle Spencer, without whose hard work and attention to detail this journal would not be possible. I want to acknowledge the support by our chapter president, Gina Schell, and the rest of the Executive Committee. Finally, I want to thank our contributors - they worked hard to revise their articles for publication! Congratulations to the contributors for having their work selected to appear in the Global Review. Respectfully, Abdul Abid
- 194. Vol. 3, 2013/2014187 Appendix A: Chapter History Sigma Iota Rho's (SIR) Gamma Omega chapter was founded in 2009, and was the first SIR chapter to conduct a majority of its activities online. In 2008, Dan Thompson was living in Frankfurt, Germany and looking for a way to connect with other international relations students both within American Public University System (APUS) and on traditional campuses. The idea was to offer online students a similar experience in networking, public service, and publishing academic papers as their peers attending brick-and-mortar institutions enjoy. In the fall of 2008, SIR headquarters signaled their willingness to accept the establishment of an online chapter. In early 2009, a notice was posted within APUS’ online student discussion board asking for volunteers to set up a new chapter. Students Lindsay Johnson, Robert Hones, Sergei Oudman and Dan volunteered, and together, formed a provisional governing body. Lindsay would serve as Vice President, Robert as Secretary, Sergei as Webmaster, and Dan as President. Once the student body was established, Professors Michelle Watts and Kimberly Dannels-Ruff selflessly volunteered their time to make formal contacts with the SIR headquarters and usher the students through the accreditation process both with APUS and SIR. Following hundreds of emails and months of conference calls that were attended by students and faculty living around the globe, from Korea to Virginia, the provisional student government drafted and ratified a constitution. The Gamma Omega Constitution was ratified by Dr. Frank Plantan Jr. at the University of Pennsylvania on September 23, 2009. SIR’s Gamma Omega (SIR GO) chapter immediately began recruiting members of high academic standing, attracting more than 30 members during its first membership drive in March 2010. By the following month, in a project directed by Abdul Abid, the chapter
- 195. Vol. 3, 2013/2014188 distributed its first newsletter edition, known as GO (Gamma Omega) Global. SIR GO members from around the country came together on May 20, 2010 for a special APUS honor society reception in Arlington, Virginia, where the chapter president delivered a speech. Earlier in the day, members were invited by South Carolina Republican Senator Lindsey Graham for a tour of the Russell Senate Office Building and a group photo. On the following day, several SIR GO members participated in the school’s annual Commencement ceremony at the Daughters of American Revolution (DAR) Constitution Hall in Washington, D.C. before holding an informal social later that evening in Arlington, where chapter awards were presented. In September 2010, the SIR GO chapter held its first annual election as over fifty members voted to select the second administration. In the following month, the organization held a General Assembly meeting via teleconference for the first time in which newly elected president, Abdul Abid, discussed his plans and goals for the upcoming term. Achievements in 2011 included the publication of the inaugural edition of the Global Review journal, the chapter’s curriculum committee playing a critical role in adding a minor in International Relations to the university’s curriculum, an increase in the chapter’s membership, an expansion of leadership opportunities made available to members who volunteered, and the coordination of seven interesting, live lectures for members. On June 17, 2011, the second administration was able to secure tours exclusively for members at both the U.S. Capitol and the White House in the morning and afternoon. In the late afternoon, the chapter held its second annual meeting in National Harbor, MD. In the evening, members were able to participate in a networking reception held by the university. The following morning on June 18, several members
- 196. Vol. 3, 2013/2014189 participated in the annual Commencement ceremony, and later in the evening, a few members gathered to participate in the chapter’s second annual SIR GO Social. Yearly gatherings have continued in the Washington D.C. area. In the fall of 2011, the organization held its second annual election in which Travis Hackney was elected president. The year 2012 was another successful one for the organization, as the third administration worked hard to bring members together for their third annual meeting in June. Furthermore, the chapter’s speaker series has flourished; the following is a complete list of SIR GO-sponsored events for students and faculty members through conference calls and Adobe Connect by far: • Colonel Daniel Hampton on his experience in political- military affairs in Africa; February 2014 • Dan Thompson on strategic nonviolent struggle and social media in Egypt; March 2013 • Dr. Paul Lenze on the Maghreb in the war on terror: Algeria, Mali and US foreign policy; March 2013 • Dr. Kelly, the Associate Dean at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS); May 2012 • Professor Monique Tuyisenge-Onyegbula on Rwanda, both from a historical and personal standpoint; April 2012 • Brian Coff on international relations and the intelligence community; March 2012 • Connie Uthoff on the shaping of international cyber law and policy; January 2012 • Richard DesLauriers on the globalization of crime; October 2011 • Charlotte Kea on the Peace Corps and careers in international relations; September 2011 • Professor Andrew Bosworth on his travels through Latina America and the political situation; May 2011
- 197. Vol. 3, 2013/2014190 • Laila El Gohary on the Egyptian Revolution; April 2011 • Markus Krausse on the modernization of China; February 2011 • Clint Borgen on the Borgen Project and global poverty; December 2010 • Frances Arias on the terrorist threat in tri-border area in South America; November 2010 • Jacques Roussellier on the role of international organizations; June 2010 • Marleen Julien on the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti; April 2010 • Michelle Watts and Kimberly Dannels-Ruff on the security of the Panama Canal; March 2010 • Siavash Sartipi on his life in Iran; January 2010 The Gamma Omega chapter has entered its fifth year and now has over 230 members. In its first few years, the organization has published three editions of its academic journal, Global Review; distributed several high-quality newsletter editions; donated many hours of volunteer service; sponsored 18 lectures for members and faculty; and mentored international relations students in academic and career planning, with several members continuing or embarking upon international careers in the U.S. Civil Service, academics, non-government organizations, and pursuing degrees from top graduate institutions around the world. Members of the organization continue to support the SIR society’s goals of promoting interest and scholarship in international relations. https://sirgo.org https://sigmaiotarho.org
- 198. Vol. 3, 2013/2014191 Appendix B: Past and Current Chapter Administrations The chapter applauds and is grateful to the following members and administrations for selflessly volunteering their time and efforts: 2009-2010 Administration Chapter President: Dan Thompson Vice President: Lindsay Ryan Chief of Staff: Robert Hones Tech Chief: Sergei Oudman Newsletter Editor in Chief: Abdul Abid Newsletter Graphic Designers: John Casey, Marleen Julien Academic Journal Program Manager: Donna Walker Journal Editor: Franklin Czwazka Faculty Advisors: Michelle Watts, Kimberly Dannels-Ruff _____________________________________________ 2010-2011 (2nd Administration) Chapter President: Abdul Abid Vice President: Jamie Montgomery Chief of Staff: Scott Freitas Chief Financial Officer: Jeff Johnson Board Chairman: Dan Thompson Tech Chiefs: Sergei Oudman, Robert Hones Newsletter Editor in Chief: Connie Uthoff Newsletter Managing Editor: John Casey Academic Journal Program Manager: Donna Walker
- 199. Vol. 3, 2013/2014192 Journal Editor: Franklin Czwazka Special Events and Speaker Series Managers: Kade Kallon, Megan Morse Director of Charity and Service Programs: Deven Dunkle Curriculum Committee: Donna Mastrangelo, Matthew Griffiths, Gina Schell Networking Program Coordinators: Jon Benignus, Ekaterina Irkaeva Faculty Advisors: Michelle Watts, Kimberly Dannels-Ruff, Kate Brannum _____________________________________________ 2011-2012 (3rd Administration) Chapter President: Travis Hackney Chief of Staff: Gina Schell Chief Financial Officer: Jean Carminati Board Chairman: Abdul Abid Tech Chief: Sergei Oudman Newsletter Editor in Chief: Connie Uthoff Newsletter Managing Editor: John Casey Academic Journal Editor: Natalie Eidsness Journal Program Manager: Jamie Montgomery Faculty Advisors: Michelle Watts, Kimberly Dannels-Ruff, Kate Brannum
- 200. Vol. 3, 2013/2014193 2012-2013 (4th Administration) Chapter President: Gina Schell Vice President: Marian Mazhari Chief of Staff: Vanessa Gilyard Chief Financial Officer: Jean Carminati Newsletter Editor in Chief: Abdul Abid Newsletter Managing Editor: John Casey Academic Journal Editor: Natalie Eidsness Journal Program Manager: Kristina Colburn Faculty Advisors: Michelle Watts, Kimberly Dannels-Ruff, Kate Brannum, Ryan Harding _____________________________________________ 2013-2014 (5th Administration) Chapter President: Gina Schell Vice President: Scott Freitas Chief Financial Officer: Joshua Peterson Newsletter Editor in Chief: Flavia Lloyd Academic Journal Editor: Abdul Abid Journal Program Manager: Kristina Colburn Faculty Advisors: Michelle Watts, Kimberly Dannels-Ruff, Kate Brannum, Ryan Harding