1. GLOBAL REVIEW
Volume Three | 2013/2014
A compilation of papers on International Relations by
members of Sigma Iota Rho, Gamma Omega Chapter
SIGMA IOTA RHO
National Honor Society for
International Studies
4. Editorial Staff
Abdul Abid
Editor
Kristina Colburn
Project Manager
Faculty Advisors
Kate Brannum
Ryan Harding
Kimberly Ruff
Michelle Watts
Faculty Reviewers
Kate Brannum
Ginny Haddock
Ryan Harding
Richard Mahoney
Daniel Opstal
Jennifer Osetek
Kimberly Ruff
Kyle Snyder
Michelle Watts
Assistant Editors
Leslie Barstow
Michael Breen
Jean Carminati
Jack Sigman
Danielle Spencer
5. Disclaimer
The analysis and opinions expressed in the Global Review’s papers are
those of the individual authors and do not reflect the official position or
view of American Public University System or its faculty.
The SIR GO chapter welcomes any suggestions, corrections, and
feedback. To contact the editor, you can send a message via e-mail to
journal@sirgo.org.
6. Table of Contents
1 | Letter from the Editor
3 | Note from the President
5 | Contributors
8 | Egypt’s Democratic Inertia
Sergei Oudman
22 | Analysis of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act and the 9/11 Commission
Arthur Ceballos
45 | Fighting Transnational Crime: New Techniques from
Reliable Standards
Samuel J. Caramela
58 | Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention: Should
Sovereignty Be Ignored?
Jack F. Sigman
77 | International Law and Human Trafficking
Ryan J. Burch
89 | Will Israel Launch a Preventive Attack Against Iran’s
Nuclear Facilities?
Orlando Fonseca
120 | Roberto Sosa: Honduran Poet
Jo McIntire
132 | China’s Commitment to Foreign Aid: Truth or Fiction
James D. Kates
7. 161 | U.S. Influence in Syria: A New Approach
Kristina J. Colburn and Abdul Abid
186 | Acknowledgements
187 | Appendix A: Chapter History
191 | Appendix B: Past and Current Chapter Administrations
8. Vol. 3, 2013/2014 1
LETTER FROM THE EDITOR
Dear readers,
Welcome to the third edition of the Global Review, a journal
organized and produced by members of Sigma Iota Rho’s Gamma
Omega (SIR GO) chapter. This year’s edition features nine papers
by ten writers. The edition is unique from our past two editions in
that it features two papers by guest writers, contributors’
biographies, a new appendix section which contains useful
information on the organization, and a collaborative paper on one
of the biggest global stories of the year by members of the
journal’s leadership team.
Jack Sigman, who contributed to the first edition of the Global
Review, returns with a paper on unauthorized humanitarian
intervention. Arthur Ceballos’ paper explains the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act and the 9/11 Commission.
Samuel Caramela describes approaches to fighting transnational
crime. Ryan Burch examines international law and human
trafficking, while Sergei Oudman writes on the political situation
in Egypt. Orlando Fonseca discusses whether Israel would launch
a preventive attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Our first featured
guest writer, Jo McIntire, explores the life of the Honduran poet,
Roberto Sosa. Our second featured guest writer, James Kates,
analyzes China’s commitment to foreign aid. And finally, the
Global Review’s program manager, Kristina Colburn, and I write
about U.S. influence in the Syrian conflict.
Our journal has now published 31 papers in its first three editions.
We hope you enjoy reading the papers and find them to be
9. Vol. 3, 2013/2014 2
informative. We also encourage other SIR GO members to submit
their best papers on current topics of international relations. For
the past four years, I have been pleased to be given the
opportunity to serve as this organization’s past president, our GO
Global newsletter’s editor, and editor of the Global Review
journal. I look forward to future editions of the Global Review.
Respectfully,
Abdul Abid
10. Vol. 3, 2013/2014 3
Note from the President
Dear Gamma Omega members and friends:
As president of Gamma Omega, it is my pleasure to present the
2013/2014 edition of the Global Review. I take great pride in
being a part of an organization that has a goal to encourage honor
and innovation in the practice of international relations. The
papers selected for this edition showcase thought-provoking
topics in world affairs that demand attention, intellect, and voice.
I would like to extend special thanks to Abdul Abid and Kristina
Colburn for leading this project to its successful completion. I
would also like to thank our organization’s faculty advisors,
Michelle Watts, Kate Brannum, Ryan Harding and Kimberly Ruff.
Finally, I want to express my sincere gratitude to the following ten
members for submitting exceptional papers, without them, we
would not have a journal:
1. Sergei Oudman
2. Arthur Ceballos
3. Samuel Caramela
4. Jack Sigman
5. Ryan Burch
6. Orlando Fonseca
7. Jo McIntire
8. James Kates
9. Abdul Abid
10. Kristina Colburn
11. Vol. 3, 2013/2014 4
In closing, I ask all members to consider submitting papers for
publication in the next Global Review. This will ensure another
high-quality edition that reflects Gamma Omega’s wide range of
international relations knowledge and expertise.
Best regards,
Gina L. Schell
President, SIR GO
2012 - 2014
12. Vol. 3, 2013/2014 5
CONTRIBUTORS
Ryan Burch works within the Anti-Money Laundering/Regulatory
Operations division of a large global financial institution. Ryan has a
bachelor’s degree in Criminal Justice and a master’s degree in
International Relations. In addition, Ryan has earned the prestigious
Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) and Certified Anti-Money Laundering
Specialist (CAMS) designations. His academic and professional areas of
interest include human trafficking, terrorist financing, and civil-military
relations. Ryan is a fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed
Forces and Society, and resides in Houston, TX.
Samuel Caramela is a Sergeant at the Green Brook Police Department
and is assigned as the supervisor of the Detective Bureau. He is
currently studying Intelligence Studies at American Military University
(AMU) with a concentration in Law Enforcement Intelligence. Samuel
resides in New Jersey.
Arthur Ceballos joined the SIR GO chapter in winter 2010. He has a
bachelor’s degree in Intelligence Studies from AMU. Arthur resides in
San Diego.
Orlando Fonseca is an Iraq War veteran from the Illinois Army National
Guard. He served in the capacity of combat medic and military police
officer from 1989 through late 2004. Orlando is also an 11-year veteran
of the Chicago Police Dept. He joined the SIR GO chapter in summer
2011. Orlando holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies
from Roosevelt University and a master’s degree in Intelligence Studies
from AMU. He resides in Chicago.
James Kates is a retired U.S. Army NCO with multiple deployments in
support of America’s war on terror. He has a bachelor’s degree in
Criminal Justice from Troy University and a master’s degree in National
Security Studies from AMU. He is a member of the Golden Key
13. Vol. 3, 2013/2014 6
International Honour Society, the Pi Gamma Mu International Honor
Society, and the 2013 International Scholar Laureate Program’s
Delegation on International Relations and Diplomacy conducted in
China. James resides in Ewa Beach, HI.
Jo McIntire was brought up in Italy, studied Mechanical Engineering in
England, and returned to Italy to work in agriculture. In 1980, he
traveled to the U.S. and became involved in Central American social
issues. For 10 years, he and his wife worked in Central America with
several humanitarian organizations. He was also a co-founder of two
non-profit organizations: ProNica (‘84) and The Friendship Association
(‘00). Jo went on to work as a technical editor for a UNDP project based
in Rome and later in the Philippines. In Florida, he worked as a
rehabilitation inspector for a statewide housing project for the poor. He
retired in 2011 to dedicate time to further study. He recently earned a
B.A. in International Relations (concentration in Latin America) from
AMU.
Sergei Oudman is a political consultant and security analyst with more
than 10 years of experience in both private and government sectors. He
has extensive experience in working in different countries and regions
with expertise in international relations and law, EU policy and affairs,
social media, southeast Europe, and the Middle East.
Jack Frank Sigman completed his M.A. in International Relations (with
honors) in November 2013. He completed a 20-year naval career in
1994, specializing in nuclear engineering onboard submarines. During
the last 19 years, he was elected Director of the North Valley County
Water and Sewer District (St. Marie, Montana) 1998-99, was a
professional actor in Florida from 2000-10, and is currently a member of
the engineering department of Algenol, a bio-fuel R & D firm. Jack is a
member of SIR GO, Golden Key, and Mensa. He is married to Janet
14. Vol. 3, 2013/2014 7
Nislow Sigman, a nationally recognized educator and a Ph.D. candidate
at Nova Southeastern University.
Abdul Abid has a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice from AMU and a
master’s degree in information assurance from Norwich University. He
is a member of SIR GO, Alpha Phi Sigma, Pi Gammu Mu, Golden Key,
Student Veterans of America, and Upsilon Pi Epsilon. Abdul has served
as president of the SIR GO chapter, as well as president of the Alpha Phi
Sigma criminal justice chapter at AMU. He grew up and resides in the
New York City metropolitan area.
Kristina Colburn is a research coordinator at the Polar Science Center at
the Applied Physics Laboratory at the University of Washington. She has
a B.S. in Physics from Seattle University and a M.A. in International
Relations with a focus in International and Transnational Security from
AMU. She joined SIR GO in summer 2010 and has been the Global
Review journal’s program manager for the past two years.
15. Vol. 3, 2013/2014 8
Egypt’s Democratic Inertia
Sergei Oudman
hen the Arab Spring began, media outlets were buzzing with
change, a change that would alter the political dimension in
the Middle East. At least, that was the high hope the West
attached to it. Democracy was on the rise, and a critical
feature in the implementation of this democracy was the
toppling of regimes and dictators.1
The enthusiasm in the West was
somewhat naive; it was as if we were expecting the polity in Middle
Eastern countries to change regimes like they would an Internet Service
Provider. An immediate sense of euphoria was present and anything
was possible. Would the Middle East finally make a transition toward
democracy? Clearly, there were high expectations. These were fueled
by perceived successes in Tunisia and Libya. Other nations in the region
followed with demonstrations and promises of reforms by different
administrations. The euphoria was later replaced by fear when, in
Egypt's case, the people voted for the Muslim Brotherhood. Many
feared the Brotherhood would dismantle democracy and turn Egypt into
an Islamic republic. Slowly, expectations were curbed as the civil war
1
Jonathan Adelman, “Why we should be patient with Middle East,” CNN, last
modified August 13, 2013,
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/08/13/why-we-should-be-
patient-with-middle-east/.
W
16. Egypt’s Democratic Inertia
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 9
that has been raging since 2011 in Syria further deteriorated, and the
situation in Egypt became increasingly complicated.
Maintaining a stable administration plays a crucial role in the
development of a nation on social and economic levels.1
Hosni
Mubarak’s regime created a bureaucratic government, having a fully
developed judiciary system and a very involved military with regard to
the country’s economic structure. These two entities play a crucial role
in Egypt today, as its polity was able to topple Hosni Mubarak and,
Mohamed Morsi. Any elected party that wants to reform Egypt should
do this within the boundaries of the existing system without usurping
any power from the military. Egypt’s military is too powerful to be
ignored, and any transition toward more freedom and democracy will
only be accepted by the military when it does not endanger national
security and interests from their point of view. There is also a similarity
between the situation today in the Middle East and that of fifty years
ago, when young officers in Egypt staged a coup.2
In Syria and Iraq there
were revolutions, and these events led to significant changes in
economic policies.3
An economy in decline, social unrest, and a younger
1
Lisa Anderson, “The State in the Middle East and North Africa,” Comparative
Politics
20, no. 1 (October 1987): 1-18.
2
“Egypt armed forces chief Abdul Fattah al-Sisi – a man of destiny,” EuroNews,
last modified August 19, 2013, http://www.euronews.com/2013/08/19/egypt-
armed-forces-chief-abdul-fattah-al-sisi-a-man-of-destiny/.
3
Rodney Wilson, Economic Development in the Middle East, 2nd ed. (New York:
Routledge, 2010), 7.
17. Sergei Oudman
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 10
generation demanding change all contributed to the movement for
change.
Christians guarding Muslims during prayer time and vice versa
were among the images that went all over the world, and there was a
sense of euphoria that everything would be fine.4
Mubarak was
removed from office fairly easily compared to Gadhafi, who plunged a
nation into disarray by ordering his army to open fire on protesters in
Benghazi. However, the revolution that started so smoothly and swiftly
changed into a crisis. At the beginning of the revolution, all parties had
unified goals: more freedom, better economic conditions, and free
elections. Thus, democracy was moving forward and there was a sense
of unity, although it was fragile. But there is a big difference between
the removal of Mubarak and that of Morsi. During the demonstrations
against Mubarak, Muslim and Coptic Christians alike were demanding
his removal and more freedom on Tahrir Square. In the case of Morsi,
the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters blame the Coptic Christian
community for the removal of Morsi.5
It is this detail that demonstrates
an underlying chronic problem.
Missed Chances
Morsi had a unique chance in history after he and his party won
a democratic election. Morsi was given a chance to reform Egypt and to
4
“Images of solidarity as Christians join hands to protect Muslims as they pray
during Cairo protests,” Daily Mail, last modified February 3, 2011,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1353330/Egypt-protests-Christians-
join-hands-protect-Muslims-pray-Cairo-protests.html/.
5
“Egypt authorities delay Morsi protest camps crackdown,” BBC, last modified
August 12, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23662651.
18. Egypt’s Democratic Inertia
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 11
prove to the outside world that there should not be any fear of the
Muslim Brotherhood; a political party with strict Islamic roots had the
chance to show that it can maintain and further sustain a democracy.
But not even a year later, through his tactics of altering the constitution
would Morsi disrupt the already fragile balance of rule-of-law, which
would be subjected to rule-by-law. Instead of fostering the national
identity and democracy, Morsi started to polarize the country further.
This polarization was due to the effects of Morsi’s policies and actions,
which were aimed at expanding the power base of his party at the
expense of democracy. If left unchecked, the country would have
disintegrated into a civil war. The ramifications of Mubarak's downfall
were contained because the military let him fall; however, a civil war
would have more far- reaching consequences. Morsi’s attacks on the
judicial system also motivated Egypt's military to move, due to the fact
that the constitution doesn’t allow a civilian to be responsible for the
military in the government. Morsi’s attempts to change the constitution
were a direct attack on the army’s political power. In both the case of
Mubarak and Morsi, Egypt’s army made the same choice to initially
withdraw its support for the administrations, which would escalate later
on in the case of Morsi due to the perceived threat by Egypt's military.6
A failed state has several characteristics, but the rule-of-law in
its broadest sense is a crucial factor in the stability of a state. Especially
6
Omar Ashour, “Showdown in Egypt,” The Brookings Institution, last modified
July 2, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/07/02-egypt-
tamarod-morsi-ashour.
19. Sergei Oudman
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 12
if the country already has a fully developed judicial system, any
degradation of this system would have far-reaching consequences. The
most visible would be the loss of equality the polity enjoyed during the
Mubarak regime. Morsi's constant strife with the judicial system meant
that his administration fell short of any of the required reforms to give
people more freedom and equality under law.7
The fragile rule-of-law
would be slowly replaced by Islamic Law. Morsi violated or did not
follow up on his election promises. Egypt's troubled economy also
became a stumbling block as tourists stayed away and the new
administration took on additional debts. Funds were supposed to be
used to stimulate the economy. However, Egypt needed heavy reforms
in order to repair the imbalance in its economy. The lack of economic
reforms and absence of other crucial reforms to bring the country back
on track made its debt a stumbling block. Money was poured into a
dysfunctional system with virtually no impact.8
A year after his election,
Morsi's focus was on applying Islamic Laws and his constant battles with
the judicial system took away his attention from required reforms. The
7
Mirette F. Mabrouk, “The View From a Distance: Egypt’s Contentious New
Constitution,” The Brookings Institution, last modified January 31, 2013,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/01/31-egypt-mabrouk.
8
Patrick Werr, “UAE offers Egypt $3 billion support, Saudis $5 billion,” Reuters,
last modified July 9, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/09/us-
egypt-protests-loan-idUSBRE9680H020130.
20. Egypt’s Democratic Inertia
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 13
International Monetary Fund also advised Egypt to reduce the country's
budget deficit.9
Morsi steered the country further toward civil unrest, and the
economic malaise was increasing to such an extent that it appeared to
be reaching a point of no return.10
The polity realized that Morsi was
not upholding his promises of revolution by creating coalitions either it
appeared that they wanted him out with the same determination as
they wanted Mubarak out. Egypt's military acted and removed him from
office. The pivotal reason for the army to act was the potential for Egypt
to become a failed state if the army did not intervene,11
especially after
threats from groups like al-Qaida and others such as Belmokhtar which
would only attribute to a growing conflict.12
On top of that, Egypt's soft
border at the east has become increasingly vulnerable to groups like al-
Qaida.13
9
Borzou Daragahi, “Egypt to put IMF loan talks on back burner,” Financial
Times, last modified July 15, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e8901092-
ed3a-11e2-ad6e-00144feabdc0.html.
10
“Egypt Overview,” The World Bank, accessed August 8, 2013,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/egypt/overview.
11
“Failed States: An Annual Special Report by FP and the Fund for Peace,”
Foreign Policy, 2013, accessed August 8, 2013,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/24/2013_failed_states_intera
ctive_map.
12
“Belmokhtar joins forces with African jihadists and vows attacks in Egypt,”
The Guardian, last modified August 22, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/22/belmokhtar-
mourabitounes-alliance-egypt-attacks.
13
Daniel Byman and Khaled Elgindy, “The Deepening Chaos in Sinai,” The
National Interest 127 (September-October 2013): 43-55,
http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-deepening-chaos-sinai-8957.
21. Sergei Oudman
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 14
Inertia
Removing Morsi, however, is a quick fix to a deeper problem. In
the year that Morsi was in power, the lack of proper reforms resulted in
delays with regard to democratic and economic reforms. These delays
are a luxury Egypt cannot permit itself, as any delay in reform puts the
country under further stress from both outside and inside stressors. In
order to maintain stability, Egypt's military is resorting to excessive
behavior that violates human rights. Dialogue between Morsi’s camp
and the opposition has become all but impossible. Egypt's military sees
the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat and wants to ban them again. This
would push the Muslim Brotherhood into hiding, and excluding an
influential party would not work in favor of building a lasting
democracy.14
It is very unlikely that Egypt's military will change its
approach toward the Muslim Brotherhood; it is very likely that the
Muslim Brotherhood will intensify efforts in order to retain its current
foothold.15
This situation puts both parties on a collision course. The
Egyptian Army's actions have removed Morsi, but this is not a solution
for the problem that Egypt is facing. On top of that, the courts recently
decided that Mubarak can await trial at home, which could be regarded
as a political statement from the military, showing that they are in
14
“Ikhwanweb: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Official English web site,”
Ikhwanweb, accessed August 28, 2013, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/.
15
Maggie Fick and Lin Noueihed, “Egypt's bruised Brotherhood seeks to show
street power,” Reuters, last modified August 23, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/23/us-egypt-protests-
idUSBRE97M0DW20130823.
22. Egypt’s Democratic Inertia
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 15
control.16
Mubarak was put in power by the military and he was
removed; sending him home to await trial signaled the influence the
military had over the judicial system, something Morsi could not usurp.
The Egypt scenario shows several things, but the underlying
problem is perhaps more important than anything else. One of the
biggest factors is that thus far people were allowed only limited political
freedom, and the lack of a democratic system that has periodic
elections created many aspirations, but experienced leaders are lacking.
The Art of Statecraft and the proper application of power is something
that has been underestimated by Morsi and his followers, as it requires
much experience.17
Morsi did not have democracy on his agenda. This
could perhaps be the temptation of power, in which a politically
suppressed party rises to power and subsequently in fear of losing this
power, begins to usurp power. The end result for the polity is the same,
as they exchange administrations without any improvement in the
government. Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood exercised their
leadership the only way they knew, and the only way they have
experienced life thus far. Any experience they did have from the past
was based on opposition status, which cannot be compared to that of
more free democratic states in the West. The illusion of total control is
unrealistic, and the desire and apparent need from Morsi and the
16
Matt Bradley and Tamer El-Ghobashy, “Mubarak To Be Placed Under House
Arrest After Release,” The Wall Street Journal, last modified August 21, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732416520457902657236191
8800.html.
17
Charles W. Freeman Jr., Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997).
23. Sergei Oudman
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 16
Muslim Brotherhood to impose this on others resulted in another
revolt.18
The crackdown in mid-2013 on the Muslim Brotherhood was
excessive. The dualistic approach by Egypt's army and temporary
government does show the intention to hold new elections again.
However, the crackdown has serious potential to fuel the militant side
of the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaida in the region. Egypt’s military
will use its resources internally, enabling organizations like al-Qaida to
fuel the conflict further in their benefit. The polity in the meantime is
confronted with polarization, while they were unified in their protests
to oust Mubarak, and this puts Egypt on a dangerous path. Egypt has
more examples of violence in its past than democracy.
As stated earlier, in order for democracy to develop properly all
parties should be involved. This includes the Muslim Brotherhood,
despite its failure in its responsibility to protect (R2P). The basis of R2P
should be part of any political party’s aspiration in Middle Eastern
states, as it can be applied not only to external foreign relations but also
internal. A nation state must protect its citizens, including minorities
and political parties. The attempts to usurp power at the expense of
18
H.A. Hellyer, “How Morsi let Egyptians down,” Foreign Policy, last modified
August 2, 2013,
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/02/morsis_disappointing_yea
r.
24. Egypt’s Democratic Inertia
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 17
others clearly shows that it failed in its responsibility to prevent and
rebuild in a sense when it discarded the option of forming coalitions.19
The developments in Egypt during the first part of 2013 clearly
show that once a regime is changed the effort of transforming into a
stable democracy is more complex than it may appear at first view. The
Muslim Brotherhood had a golden opportunity to show the Egyptian
polity and the world that it is different by accepting the basic tenets of
democracy. The question that still remains to be answered is who can
lead the country to stability without undermining democracy? If Egypt
manages to organize new elections, with a new democratically elected
administration, there will be a chance that they can escape the current
spiral of violence and destabilization.20
If not, the democratic inertia in
Egypt will only feed further escalation and a potential civil war.
19
Edward C. Luck, “The Responsibility to Protect: Growing Pains or Early
Promise?,” Ethics and International Affairs 24, no. 4 (Winter 2010), accessed
August 15, 2013,
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/journal/24_4/response/001.html
.
20
Shadi Hamid, “Demoting Democracy in Egypt,” The New York Times, last
modified July 4, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/05/opinion/demoting-democracy-in-
egypt.html.
25. Sergei Oudman
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 18
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http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-deepening-chaos-sinai-
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Ikhwanweb. Accessed August 28, 2013.
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/.
“Images of solidarity as Christians join hands to protect Muslims as they
pray during Cairo protests.” Daily Mail. Last modified February
3, 2011. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
1353330/Egypt-protests-Christians-join-hands-protect-Muslims-
pray-Cairo-protests.html/.
Luck, Edward C. “The Responsibility to Protect: Growing Pains or Early
Promise?” Ethics and International Affairs 24, no. 4 (Winter
2010). Accessed August 15, 2013.
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/journal/24_4/res
ponse/001.html.
Mabrouk, Mirette F. “The View From a Distance: Egypt’s Contentious
New Constitution.” The Brookings Institution. Last modified
January 31, 2013.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/01/31-egypt-
mabrouk.
28. Egypt’s Democratic Inertia
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 21
Werr, Patrick. “UAE offers Egypt $3 billion support, Saudis $5 billion.”
Reuters. Last modified July 9, 2013.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/09/us-egypt-protests-
loan-idUSBRE9680H020130.
Wilson, Rodney. Economic Development in the Middle East. 2nd ed.
New York: Routledge, 2010.
29. Vol. 3, 2013/2014 22
Analysis of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act and the 9/11 Commission
Arthur J. Ceballos
ABSTRACT
A strong intelligence infrastructure is key to winning the war on
terror. The attacks on 9/11 dealt a hard blow to the safety and
security of the United States, prompting Congress to ask the
obvious question of why and how this could have happened with
what was believed to be a strong intelligence apparatus. A
commission comprising lawmakers and politicians was asked to
form The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States, commonly referred to as the 9/11 Commission, to
identify weaknesses in the intelligence and law enforcement
entities. The recommendations eventually led to the passing of
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,
marking the beginning of America’s journey to strengthen its
security.
… In response to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission,
Congress passed a new, major intelligence reform law - the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. It
remains to be seen whether the Act represents a sea-change in the way
the United States goes about the intelligence game, or whether it is
simply a recipe for more of the same bureaucratic bottlenecks and
“
30. Analysis of the IRTPA and the 9/11 Commission
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 23
buck-passing that led, in part, to 9/11.”1
These words of former U.S.
Representative Bob Barr rang true when it came to stating the obvious.
In the aftermath of the attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) towers,
the 9/11 Commission assessed the reasons why the Intelligence
Community (IC) had no foreknowledge of the event in an effort at
preventing the attacks. The 9/11 Commission was formed for the sole
purpose of identifying missteps made by various intelligence and
investigative agencies. The Commission set forth recommendations for
overhauling the IC’s ability to deter any future terrorist attacks before
they happen. The recommendations identified mistakes and their
potential remedies ahead of future attacks. It is significant to compare
the implementation of the IRTPA recommendations with those of the
9/11 Commission. The IRTPA implementation provides a measure of
how far the federal government would go to protect America. The
impact of that implementation on the IC would test the government’s
ability to successfully carry out the changes recommended by the
commission. Of the dozens of recommendations made, several from
both the 9/11 Commission and IRTPA are summarized below.
The 9/11 Commission made a total of forty-one
recommendations based on the perception of a seemingly broken
system. The implementation of these recommendations was deemed
necessary in strengthening National Security as well as eradicating
1
Bob Barr, "Is It Time to Reform Intelligence Reform? Why We May Come to
Regret the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,”
FindLaw, last modified January 21, 2005,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20050121_barr.html.
31. Arthur J. Ceballos
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 24
terrorist networks that posed a threat to the United States. The first
recommendation of the IRTPA includes the identification and
prioritization of terrorist sanctuaries. The commission requested that
assistance from other countries be pursued in identifying and rooting
out terrorist sanctuaries. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, along with other
countries in Africa and the Middle East, have gone to great lengths to
identify individuals suspected of conducting terrorist-related activities
within their own borders. Many of the hijackers of the planes that
struck the WTC were Saudi citizens, and the Saudi government publicly
disowned any support to the attackers. U.S. support to Afghanistan,
Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan anti-terrorism efforts was the focus of the
second recommendation. Much of the U.S. effort at supporting anti-
terrorism in these countries includes the use of unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) that use a variety of ordnance. The UAVs would play a
large role in stabilizing Afghanistan.
The stabilization of post-war Afghanistan was the third
recommendation and called for the United States to support and
strengthen the Afghan government as part of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF). Supporting Afghan efforts to strengthen their
security is an important task in rooting out terrorists who wish to use
the country as a platform for staging attacks. The commission
emphasized the importance of efforts aimed at ensuring Afghanistan
does not end up becoming another safe haven for Al Qaeda and its
operatives. The fourth recommendation dealt directly with the Saudi
government, citing that the need to build a strong relationship should
32. Analysis of the IRTPA and the 9/11 Commission
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 25
extend beyond the oil business. The United States should encourage
Saudi Arabia to foster an environment that embraces cultural respect
and rebukes extremists who teach terrorist ideologies. The thirteenth
recommendation involved tracking terrorist funding, a job suitably
handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). When the FBI
began going down the proverbial rabbit hole that is terrorist financing, it
found that much of the money handled by certain Islamic charities was
from front businesses for terrorist groups. The FBI traced these funds to
numerous individuals around the globe and was successful in arresting
and turning them over to their respective governments for
interrogation/prosecution. This assisted in tracking terrorist activities
and movements.
Tracking terrorist travel around the globe is the fifteenth
recommendation and is cited as the inspiration for the No Fly List, which
contains hundreds of thousands of names of suspected terrorists who
are deemed a threat to U.S. national security. The No Fly List came
under scrutiny for adding individuals who had never been involved in
terrorist-related operations.2
The two other recommendations involved
the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the National
Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), and the appointment of a Director
of National Intelligence (DNI) to oversee all intelligence activities. After
the drafting of the recommendations, it was up to Congress to put forth
2
Jonathan J. Cooper, “No-Fly List Lawsuit: Court Rules to Allow Challenge to
Proceed,” The Huffington Post, last modified July 26, 2012, accessed October
01, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/26/no-fly-list-
lawsuit_n_1707504.html.
33. Arthur J. Ceballos
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 26
legislation implementing them, which would later be known as the
IRTPA.
The reason for creating IRTPA was to assist in reforming the IC
and the related activities of the U.S. government.3
Each component
contributes important pieces of information toward identifying and
preventing terrorist activities. Some of the members of the IC include
the FBI, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency
(NSA), and the Department of Defense (DoD). The FBI, the longest-
running agency of all three, was selected as the executive agency to
deal with matters involving domestic terrorism investigations.
The FBI was granted power to collect intelligence on a broad
scale and has yet to harness the full potential of intelligence gathering.
When the FBI was subsequently tasked with an increased role in
intelligence gathering after 9/11, its seamless transition toward its new
focus on terrorism was not well received by Congress. One of President
George W. Bush’s recommendations for strengthening security included
having all intelligence agencies fall under the control of the DNI.
Furthermore, the FBI was tasked to develop an intelligence unit that
dealt specifically with National Security. A memo to President George
W. Bush from the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the
United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction dated March 29,
2005 revealed a key concern involving the decision by the FBI to make
3
Director of National Intelligence, “Report on the Progress of the Director of
National Intelligence in Implementing the ‘Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004,’” Federation of American Scientists, last modified May
2006, https://www.fas.org/irp/dni/implement.html.
34. Analysis of the IRTPA and the 9/11 Commission
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 27
internal changes in how it conducted intelligence activities. The FBI
created the National Security Division (NSD) but ignored a call for the
FBI to “allocate sufficient resources and authority to the new
Intelligence Directorate to perform its assigned mission.”4
The memo
further added that previous efforts by the FBI to create a National
Security workforce prior to the attacks on 9/11 had failed to launch and
that, “The [current] FBI Plan is inconsistent with the core
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission regarding the FBI.”5
The
Commission noted that it was not for lack of trying that the FBI goals
had not been met, but that the director of the FBI lacked the proper
authority to successfully integrate foreign intelligence collection,
analysis, and operations. This evaluation by the Executive Branch was
met by a rebuttal from the FBI, which responded with reciprocal
concerns over the danger of mixing criminal investigative matters with
intelligence gathering. The decision by the FBI to keep management
decisions within the organization has not changed since its
establishment. The Commission expressed the need to bring the FBI
completely into the role of intelligence, and not teeter the line between
criminal investigation and intelligence operation. Changing the
mentality of the FBI would be difficult, considering its success in the
criminal investigation role.
4
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Letter to the President, last modified March 29,
2005, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/about.html.
5
Ibid.
35. Arthur J. Ceballos
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 28
The FBI has a long history of law enforcement accomplishments,
which include the dismantling of organized crime, the capture and
successful prosecution of spies on American soil, and other high-profile
crimes. In the world of intelligence, the normal route of traffic with
collection and dissemination is typically cradle to grave or rather, start
to finish. For example, when intelligence is gathered in the field, it is
sent to analysts who vet it either by returning it to the field or through
massive amounts of research, which helps verify the information
received. Once analyzed, it goes to various management channels,
which are charged with cleaning up the report for the policymakers in
Washington, where it is disseminated accordingly and given to the
President during his morning Presidential Daily Brief. The FBI contends
that it does not possess the manpower to carry out such tasks solely on
intelligence matters. The FBI considers the amending of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) a welcome change in
assisting the investigative efforts of the FBI.
Amending FISA allowed the FBI to obtain wiretaps on suspected
terrorists without having to prove a connection to a foreign power. Prior
to the amendment, the FBI had to establish probable cause that an
individual had a connection to a foreign power and was being directed
to conduct illegal activities on its behalf. The FBI had a difficult time
obtaining wiretaps on suspected terrorists prior to the amendment
mainly due to the inability to uncover a foreign tie, thus impeding
critical stages of investigations.
36. Analysis of the IRTPA and the 9/11 Commission
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 29
With the passing of the amendment, wiretaps were granted
much more easily and led to the gathering of important terrorist threat
information. In one example, the FBI realized that terror suspects used
tradecraft typically associated with narcotics suspects, who would often
use throwaway phones to make it more difficult for law enforcement to
obtain a wiretap. Throwaway phones were used for short durations
before being discarded for a new phone, which made it difficult for the
FBI to maintain continuous coverage. Terror targets were beginning to
use this same methodology to avoid detection, and the FBI scrambled to
try to close this gap. Roving wiretaps authorized continuous collection
on the target rather than just the phone itself; this way, any device the
target used could be targeted.6
The IRTPA mandated that the FBI create
an intelligence-based position that would continue the reforms within
the Bureau long after the current director’s exit. The CIA would not
escape scrutiny, as reforms would be introduced to fix deficiencies in
the agency.
The CIA adopted many important intelligence collection
methods stemming from the IRTPA, which helped streamline the way it
collected intelligence abroad. Satellites serve a multi-functional purpose
with capabilities that far eclipse those put into orbit just 30 years ago.
Signals intelligence (SIGINT) and measurement and signatures
intelligence (MASINT) are used to collect radar, nuclear, and biological
6
Jerome P. Bjelopera, The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism
Investigations, report no. R41780, Congressional Research Service, April 24,
2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41780.pdf.
37. Arthur J. Ceballos
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 30
intelligence. It is rumored that some of these capabilities were used to
capture Osama Bin Laden, and led to his eventual death. According to a
publication from the Bipartisan Policy Center titled Jihadist Terrorism: A
Threat Assessment, it was widely believed that the death of Bin Laden
would lead to a fracturing and potential splintering of Al Qaeda, but
recent terrorist events by groups like Al-Shabaab have revealed
otherwise.7
It may have been wishful thinking on the part of the West:
the true reason militants could have for joining Al Qaeda involve many
factors, some of which include the fallout of two consecutive wars.
Although this topic is of interest to those who study terrorism, the
discussion would be lengthy and fall outside the scope of this
assessment. The important factor when dealing with technological
intelligence gathering is to take into account significant collection gaps,
specifically human intelligence (HUMINT), which is handled overseas
exclusively by the CIA.
When the CIA was first created under the provisions of the
National Security Act of 1947, the position of Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) was created. With the DCI in charge of the CIA as well
as the other intelligence components of the DoD and FBI, a conflict was
created that would stifle how information flowed from one agency to
the next. With no definable way to share intelligence among respective
agencies, information would never reach the analysts whose job it was
7
Peter Bergen, Bruce Hoffman, Michael Hurley, and Erroll Southers, Jihadist
Terrorism: A Threat Assessment, Bipartisan Policy Center, September 2013,
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Jihadist%20Terrorism-
A%20Threat%20Assesment_0.pdf.
38. Analysis of the IRTPA and the 9/11 Commission
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 31
to connect the dots. The 9/11 Commission recommended removal of
this obstacle by establishing one central head for all civilian intelligence
agencies in the form of the DNI. The 9/11 Commission recommended
that information be shared between the CIA and FBI so that information
pointing to a potential attack would never again be missed.
The IRTPA placed the DNI in charge of national and foreign
intelligence, excluding military intelligence, the ultimate responsibility
for which rests with the Secretary of Defense. However, concern over
the protection of civil liberties would prove to be an ongoing issue.
Protections afforded by the Constitution are an important facet of
American life, and preserving them is essential. It is vital to note that
criminal investigations are different than counterintelligence (CI)
investigations in the sense that in criminal cases information can be
kept for an indefinite amount of time. During CI investigations, the
government has ninety days to uncover ties relating to terrorism- or
espionage-related activities before the information must be destroyed.8
These protections were put in place following the abuses by Richard
Nixon’s presidential administration when he tasked the CIA, the FBI, and
the DoD to spy on American citizens for political gain. The controversy
of telecom companies working with the NSA to collect phone data,
some of it American, brought back fear that history was beginning to
repeat itself. Recent decisions by the Obama Administration to continue
8
“Executive Order 12333 – United States Intelligence Activities,” Assistant to
the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight, Department of Defense, last
modified January 30, 2008, http://atsdio.defense.gov/Library/EO12333.aspx.
39. Arthur J. Ceballos
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 32
with telecommunications collections showed that grey areas would
continue to be a concern. Although the FBI was tasked as the executive
agency on terrorism in the United States, the DoD was working on
revamping its capabilities to do its part in securing the homeland.
In October 2002, the Pentagon announced the creation of a
new command known as the Northern Command, or NORTHCOM,
whose mission is to "deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression
aimed at the United States.”9
The information gathered from
NORTHCOM consisted of intelligence threats with some type of DoD
nexus. The FBI is the lead on all matters domestic, but the difference in
the mission of NORTHCOM involves responding to direct attacks on the
homeland in North America. An added measure to the new command
dealt with the collection of intelligence involving potential terrorists
hiding in the United States. The DoD started a new program called the
Threat and Local Observation Notice (TALON), which enlisted the aid of
the community to report suspicious activities. TALON reports were
compiled in a database that could be searched by analysts looking for
indicators of potential terrorist activities. Unfortunately, the program
included collecting intelligence on protestors of the Afghanistan and
Iraq wars, a repeat of the Nixon-era tactics and a violation of
9
Devin Fisher, “USNORTHCOM Vision Focuses on Defending Homeland,” U.S.
Northern Command, August 4, 2005,
http://www.northcom.mil/Newsroom/tabid/3104/Article/2097/usnorthcom-
vision-focuses-on-defending-homeland.aspx
40. Analysis of the IRTPA and the 9/11 Commission
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 33
information operations (IO) rules.10
However, as a proactive approach
to collecting terrorist-related information, it inspired the creation of the
NCTC.
The IRTPA created a national center for the collection of
terrorist-related information and dissemination to federal, state, local,
and tribal entities around the country: “In August 2004, the President
established the NCTC to serve as the primary organization in the United
States Government (USG) for integrating and analyzing all intelligence
pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism (CT) … the NCTC is a multi-
agency organization dedicated to eliminating the terrorist threat to US
interests at home and abroad.”11
The NCTC gathers all pertinent
information and sends it out to local law enforcement agencies around
the country as well as the world. It was created to help lift the
compartmentalization of information that led to the missed intelligence
before the attacks of 9/11. Unfortunately, reporting from an NCTC
insider revealed that the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment
(TIDE) system was on the verge of collapse.12
Assessments found that
changing the whole system would leave the country more vulnerable to
10
“Pentagon to Shut down Controversial Database,” NBC News, last modified
August 21, 2007, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/20375361/ns/us_news-
security/t/pentagon-shut-down-controversial-database/.
11
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), Pub. L. No.
108-458, 108th Cong. (December 17, 2004),
http://www.nctc.gov/docs/pl108_458.pdf.
12
Michael, Krigsman, “Failed Government IT: ‘The Mother of All Databases,’”
ZDNet, last modified August 26, 2008,
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/projectfailures/failed-government-it-the-mother-
of-all-databases/995.
41. Arthur J. Ceballos
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 34
attack since the changeover would take too long to implement. TIDE
contains data such as the No Fly List for the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), as well as a host of other information. The TSA
would have a very difficult time keeping passengers safe if TIDE were
taken offline.
At least half a million people have been added to the NCTC’s
database and security measures have been increased in response to
prevention of a future attack. Prior to the hijacking of planes on 9/11,
security contractors hired to police the system before passengers
boarded planes missed items that should never have passed through
security checkpoints. After the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), TSA was brought under the new department and given
new mandates to step up security procedures. The Social Security
Administration (SSA) was given new IRTPA mandates on how to verify
birth records as well as upgrade the security of their documents to cut
down on fraudulent card counterfeiting. U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) also upgraded the integrity of its systems to better
comply with those of the IRTPA.
ICE would also lead the way in computer investigation of
suspected terrorists, which would yield leads for other IC agencies to
follow up on for possible exploitation. As part of the 2004 IRTPA,
Congress addressed this issue. Section 5501 of the IRTPA amended the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to include participation in torture
or extrajudicial killings as grounds of inadmissibility and deportability.
Further, Congress made this provision of the INA retroactive, so that
42. Analysis of the IRTPA and the 9/11 Commission
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 35
human rights violators who had previously been granted legal status in
the United States could now face having that status revoked in
immigration court. ICE quickly moved to implement this change in law,
using it as the grounds to successfully deport a former Ethiopian army
officer who was directly involved in torturing suspected political
opponents under the repressive Mengistu Regime.13
One negative
impact the IRTPA had on one agency would become national news,
leading to more questions about diminishing civil liberties within
America: the NSA’s wiretapping scandal.
During a forum with President George W. Bush, an audience
member who did not agree with the decision to wiretap
telecommunication lines went so far as to ask the president to
apologize; the president replied that he would not apologize and
defended his decision to protect American lives during a time of war.14
Although later a federal judge would rule the wiretaps were illegal, the
program would spark a debate on whether a distinction of importance
was made with regard to civil liberties and national security.15
The
dissension of average citizens to the wiretapping program brought it to
the forefront of debate as Congress began its probe into whether or not
13
Marcy M. Forman, “Fact Sheets: Human Rights Violators Investigations,”
Sierra Herald, last modified August 15, 2008, http://www.sierraherald.com/ice-
action.htm.
14
Jim Rutenberg, “Facing Tough Questions, Bush Defends War,” The New York
Times, last modified April 7, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/07/us/07prexy.html.
15
“NSA Eavesdropping Was Illegal, Judge Says,” Washington Post, last modified
April 1, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/03/31/AR2010033102442.html.
43. Arthur J. Ceballos
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 36
the legal language supported the President’s decisions. The U.S.
Constitution protects its citizens from unlawful search and seizure by its
government, with the exception of certain circumstances. A serious
debate on the issue of warrantless searches cannot be told without the
introduction of the FISA system. The IRTPA expanded the powers for all
members of the IC in the hopes that none would abuse those powers.
During the 1970s, warrantless searches and wiretaps, as well as
surveillance, had been carried out on citizens who opposed the Vietnam
War; those actions led to the creation of the FISA courts to hear
arguments on surveillance, searches, and seizures of matters dealing
with terrorist- and intelligence-related issues.
FISA reviews all requests for warrants and ensures that specific
rules are followed prior to them being sent to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC) for its approval. The George W. Bush
Administration believed there were too many constraints to issuing
warrants—specifically, the requirement to tie a target to a foreign
power. This was hard to do if targets were tied to Al Qaeda, a group
whose ties were to no one but their own. A sixty-six-page change was
introduced into the FISA, eleven of which were approved. The one
change that would make it easier to approve any warrant was the
change of tying a person to a foreign power. This change introduced
warrantless wiretaps into the spectrum. The NSA was given permission
to begin listening in on millions of calls inside the country in hopes of
finding sleeper cells domestically. The unfortunate circumstance is that
average American citizens were being listened to, a direct violation of
44. Analysis of the IRTPA and the 9/11 Commission
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 37
Federal law regardless of Executive decision to do so. It would appear
that history had indeed come full circle in the form of the war on terror.
The impact this has had on the IC is damaging but not at all considered
grave. More reforms and increased oversight have reigned in
warrantless activities to a knee-jerk reaction by the White House.
The impact the IRTPA has had on the CIA, FBI, and DoD was
described in a progress report in May 2006. With regard to information
sharing, there has been a significant enhancement since the DNI was
emplaced. “The [chief information officer] is streamlining the processes
and organizations by which community elements acquire and manage
information technology and sharing, and is using designated authorities
to ensure that agencies build networks and databases that can support
rapid and efficient information-sharing, and to eliminate those that
cannot.”16
Improvement of analysis has shown progress as well.
Analysis of intelligence is considered the most important part of
the intelligence process. Analysts can de-conflict information coming in
from the field and send additional collection requirements that fill gaps
in the realm of intelligence. For example, current gaps exist in
intelligence coming in from Russia regarding the new Russian
President’s intentions with regard to foreign policy. The invasion of
Georgia was not a direct surprise, but it did catch intelligence officials
off guard with its timing and execution. Had proper intelligence gaps
16
Director of National Intelligence, “Report on the Progress of the Director of
National Intelligence in Implementing the ‘Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004,’” Federation of American Scientists, May 2006,
http://fas.org/irp/dni/implement.html.
45. Arthur J. Ceballos
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 38
been identified by collectors in the field, there could have been a way to
fill those gaps. The Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis
(DDNUA) scrubbed its analytic process by looking at personnel training.
It is extremely important to train analysts how to spot trends in the
massive amount of raw data received, and an overhaul of this area had
been long overdue. Source validation is another important tool often
overlooked by intelligence collectors on the ground.
Sources in the field can either be electronic or human, and each
has their own weaknesses. The HUMINT aspect is trickiest at finding
good solid intelligence that is not driven by greed, revenge, or just plain
attention-seeking. Greed entered intelligence due to the fact that
millions of dollars were given to HUMINT sources and seldom did that
intelligence, or did the sources themselves, get vetted for accuracy. The
DDNUA wanted to make sure that proper vetting was taking place and
instituted training programs for those in the field who wished to vet
their sources. The end result is better and more accurate intelligence
aimed at real threats and real people. Training is also being given in
languages, and the budget for it has more than doubled in size. The
ODNI created a “National Intelligence University (NIU) system to draw
together existing IC schools and training centers, and provide
centralized management and common educational standards. The NIU
enables intelligence officers to take courses across the community, to
better link training and education to professional development, and to
46. Analysis of the IRTPA and the 9/11 Commission
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 39
derive and share lessons learned.”17
This addition is extremely
important to the future of intelligence processing, as well as the
creation of mission centers in the country.
Mission centers deal specifically with one type of threat. For
example, the NCTC deals specifically with domestic counterterrorist
information and its sharing and dissemination to lower levels. The
National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) was created to handle all
intelligence gathering regarding weapons of mass destruction. The two
areas with the most emphasis were North Korea and Iran, two rogue
nations that were not only identified by President George W. Bush as
part of the Axis of Evil, but also states that are constantly trying to
obtain nuclear materials. North Korea has repeatedly stopped and
restarted its nuclear facilities and shows no signs of shutting them off
forever. Iran on the other hand has consistently voiced its intentions to
build and operate nuclear power plants. Through the progress reports,
it is evident that changes are being made and improvements to those
changes are ongoing. But what are the impacts to local law enforcement
agencies?
According to Armed Forces Communications and Electronics
Association (AFCEA), a non-profit membership organization that serves
the military and IC communities, the integration has been difficult. An
example of the difference between law enforcement and intelligence is
that law enforcement gathers information and evidence to support
prosecution, whereas intelligence gathers information that may reach
17
Ibid.
47. Arthur J. Ceballos
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 40
across two or three different spectrums. This provides a unique
challenge to law enforcement individuals who may need a piece of
information for a case but are stripped of it for National Security
concerns. Also, the intelligence gathered does not have to meet the
burden of proof of a criminal trial. This could jeopardize a case that may
have high-interest press coverage, a gamble that law enforcement or
intelligence officials may be reluctant — or not willing — to make. With
information sharing between law enforcement and intelligence officials
still ongoing, it is important not to forget that the final destination of all
intelligence gathered and provided is those who make the decisions to
support and defend this nation: the policymakers.
Policymakers have one role in the intelligence system: to look at
the intelligence provided and make an informed, unbiased opinion on
whether or not to act on it. The situation in Iran has grown increasingly
heated as time passes, further emboldening the Iranian regime into
supporting terrorists flowing into Iraq to harm U.S. personnel and their
allies. Intelligence is being collected constantly that shows where Iran is
the nuclear process as well as the tools they provide to terror, yet there
is no solid intelligence that shows what top-level Iranian officials are
thinking. In one story during the initial Iranian hostage crisis in 1979, the
Iranians opened a back channel with the U.S. Government in order to
resolve the standoff peacefully. The Iranians were shot down and the
situation worsened, leading to the constant deterioration of ties
between the two governments. The IRTPA has strengthened the ability
to peek inside and outside the country’s once declining intelligence
48. Analysis of the IRTPA and the 9/11 Commission
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 41
system. Vice President Dick Cheney was an advocate of restoring
powers to the Executive Branch and accomplished exactly that through
the passing of the U.S. PATRIOT Act and the IRTPA. America’s ability to
detect future attacks has strengthened considerably, and overall the IC
has improved its intelligence-gathering capabilities, but at what cost to
American citizens’ civil liberties?
Shortfalls within the IC were corrected after the passing of the
IRTPA and provided enhanced measures for improvement. Pitfalls in the
law enforcement community and its hesitance to use or provide
information to the IC can either help or hurt a case they may try to
prosecute later. With recommendations from the 9/11 Commission, the
path toward a well-structured intelligence apparatus would soon come
to fruition. Since the inception of IRTPA, it had been met with
accusations of unethical activities involving warrantless wire-tapping.
The recommendations of the 9/11 Commission were outlined in
accordance to its findings on why the IC was caught off guard to
indicators of an impending attack. With the passing of the IRTPA,
America has a more broad-reaching infrastructure. Mistakes of the past
are less likely to be repeated, allowing Americans to feel a great sense
of security.
49. Arthur J. Ceballos
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 42
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barr, Bob. “Is It Time to Reform Intelligence Reform? Why We May
Come to Regret the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004. ” FindLaw. Last modified January 21,
2005.
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20050121_barr.htm
l.
Bergen, Peter, Bruce Hoffman, Michael Hurley, and Erroll Southers.
Jihadist Terrorism: A Threat Assessment. Bipartisan Policy
Center. September 2013.
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Jihadist%20Terror
ism-A%20Threat%20Assesment_0.pdf.
Bjelopera, Jerome P. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism
Investigations. Report no. R41780. Congressional Research
Service. April 24, 2013.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41780.pdf.
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. Letter to the
President. Last modified March 29, 2005.
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/about.html.
Cooper, Jonathan J. “No-Fly List Lawsuit: Court Rules to Allow Challenge
to Proceed.” The Huffington Post. Last modified July 26, 2012.
Accessed October 1, 2013.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/26/no-fly-list-
lawsuit_n_1707504.html.
50. Analysis of the IRTPA and the 9/11 Commission
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Director of National Intelligence. “Report on the Progress of the Director
of National Intelligence in Implementing the ‘Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.’” Federation of
American Scientists. Last modified May 2006.
https://www.fas.org/irp/dni/implement.html.
“Executive Order 12333 – United States Intelligence Activities.”
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight.
Department of Defense. Last modified January 30, 2008.
http://atsdio.defense.gov/Library/EO12333.aspx.
Fisher, Devin. “USNORTHCOM Vision Focuses on Defending Homeland.”
U.S. Northern Command. August 4, 2005.
http://www.northcom.mil/Newsroom/tabid/3104/Article/2097
/usnorthcom-vision-focuses-on-defending-homeland.aspx.
Forman, Marcy M. “Fact Sheets: Human Rights Violators Investigations.”
Sierra Herald. Last modified August 15, 2008.
http://www.sierraherald.com/ice-action.htm.
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). Pub.
L. No. 108-458. 108th Cong. (December 17, 2004).
http://www.nctc.gov/docs/pl108_458.pdf.
Krigsman, Michael. “Failed Government IT: 'The Mother of All
Databases.’” ZDNet. Last modified August 26, 2008.
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it-the-mother-of-all-databases/995.
“NSA Eavesdropping Was Illegal, Judge Says.” Washington Post. Last
modified April 1, 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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dyn/content/article/2010/03/31/AR2010033102442.html.
"Pentagon to Shut down Controversial Database." NBC News. Last
modified August 21, 2007.
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security/t/pentagon-shut-down-controversial-database/.
Rutenberg, Jim. “Facing Tough Questions, Bush Defends War.” The New
York Times. Last modified April 7, 2006.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/07/us/07prexy.html.
52. Vol. 3, 2013/2014 45
Fighting Transnational Crime: New Techniques from
Reliable Standards
Samuel J. Caramela
Introduction
ransnational crime and terrorism is a growing threat to the
civilized world, and a challenge to law enforcement professionals
and policymakers. With the evolution of the Internet and other
communications technologies, new global law enforcement initiatives
must be implemented to cope with the rise of transnational criminal
groups and their use of these technologies. Criminal exploitation of
these technologies allows transnational criminal organizations to
perpetrate new crimes and facilitate commission of their classic criminal
efforts. Further challenging law enforcement is the new “globalized”
economic environment and the “open border” policies of the world’s
democratized nations. The movement of people and product across
borders has never been easier, creating an environment that enables
transnational criminal groups to operate throughout the world from
nations that have little or no effective law enforcement or government
structure. Additional global law enforcement initiatives must address
transnational crime and its proliferation in this new global economy. At
no previous time has it been easier for organized criminal groups to
become transnational in their exploits. Policymakers must provide the
T
53. Samuel J. Caramela
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 46
needed tools for law enforcement to effectively combat this new threat
and coordinate with partner nations to develop initiatives that reduce
its spread throughout the world.
The Growing Threat
With the end of the Cold War and the increasing globalization of
the economy, many people expected an era of peace and
sustained global well-being to be the hallmark of the twenty-
first century. The new century, however, took an unexpected
turn: greater disparity of wealth and opportunity around the
globe, regional instability and conflict, and the threatened
failure of many states all contributed to a surprising number of
transnational threats to the security of many, if not most,
nations.1
This statement by Kimberly Thachuk best describes the environment in
which the world’s law enforcement community must operate.
Organized criminal groups exploit the present conditions to further their
operations and recruit new members, while leaders of these empires
operate in relative anonymity from regions with unstable governments.2
The disparity of wealth throughout the world provides easy recruitment
of members by those looking for a way out of poverty, while regional
instability affords them government structures that are ripe for
influence by corruption and bribery.
Add to this the new global economy with relaxed policies of
travel and trade, and new technologies (the Internet) that allow
1
Kimberly L. Thachuk, ed., Transnational Threats (Westport, CT: Praeger
Security International, 2007), 5.
2
Phil Williams and Dimitri Vlassis, Combating Transnational Crime (New York:
Frank Cass Publishers, 2001).
54. Fighting Transnational Crime
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 47
communications and transactions to occur across borders unabated,
and you have an environment ripe for criminal groups to operate in and
expand. William F. Wechsler, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Counternarcotics and Global Threats, in his remarks to The
Washington Institute stated, “Taking advantage of open borders, rapid
increases in the volume and speed of global trade, and the
dissemination of technology tools, criminal organizations that once
dealt almost exclusively in narcotics began trafficking in small arms and
light weapons, people, counterfeit goods, and money, while continuing
to ship vast quantities of drugs along an expanding set of transportation
routes. Criminal organizations recognized the additional profits and
operational flexibility that a broader range of trafficking activities could
provide.”3
This realization by criminal organizations has led to the
expansion of their criminal enterprise and their influence in the world.
As these conditions facilitate criminal behavior, they also
suppress law enforcement efforts, and the efforts of stable
governments attempting to partner with their neighbors and finding
corruption and mismanagement are hindering their endeavors. Cross-
border crimes, either through open trade or conducted through the
Internet, pose an additional challenge to law enforcement. Previously,
criminal organizations conducted business in a hidden global economy
that has now been replaced by the use of Internet technologies that
3
William F. Wechsler, "Combatting Transnational Organized Crime," The
Washington Institute, April 26, 2012,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/WechslerPrepared20120426.pd
f.
55. Samuel J. Caramela
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 48
accelerate the transfer of money and provide anonymity for their
transactions.4
While transnational criminal organizations operate easily
across borders and anonymously on the Internet, law enforcement
must operate within their jurisdictional limitations, making
collaboration with neighboring countries a requirement for successful
crime interdiction. It is this collaboration that must be addressed by
policymakers throughout the globe in order for law enforcement to
effectively battle this new transnational criminal threat. Though some
states may be hesitant to partner in this endeavor, either due to
complicity or fear of lost revenues, incentives and sanctions should be
used to encourage cooperation from these developing nations.
A New Approach
Traditional crime prevention tactics do not always work when
dealing with organized crime, as with la Cosa Nostra (the Sicilian Mafia)
in the United States, which led to the enactment of the Racketeering (R)
Influenced (I) and Corrupt (C) Organization (O) Act. This act allowed law
enforcement to apprehend the leaders of organizations whose
members commit crimes on their behalf. It is this type of legislative
ingenuity that is needed to combat this new organized criminal
element, which operates in our new borderless world. It is
understandable that transnational crimes require a transnational
response. Although it is difficult to identify what response is best for the
4
Ibid.
56. Fighting Transnational Crime
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 49
present environment, the past will always provide directions to solving
future problems.
Directing energy toward enforcing individual crimes has not
always been the most efficient approach to combating criminal
organizations with large network structures. The same is true for many
transnational criminal organizations that commit numerous crimes all
over the world, while their command structures reap the benefits
without the exposure. In order for law enforcement to be effective
against them, it must focus on the mediums that support their networks
and crimes, rather than the criminal activity itself. Whether a criminal or
organization is trafficking in illegal drugs, people, guns, or any other
type of illicit activity, the same approach can be used to disrupt its
operation.
With that in mind, a three-pronged approach is needed to
attack the structures that support transnational crime. The first
approach must focus on mitigating the criminal exploitation of
technology. In this approach, world governments would implement
global policies governing Internet usage and define what constitutes
illegal practices. The second approach must address the open borders
and free trade that enable transnational criminal organizations to
expand in size and venture. In this approach, governments need to
collaborate to enable law enforcement agencies from all member
nations with the freedom to operate in partner nations and receive the
cooperation of their governing law enforcement agencies, and to codify
international standards on the definition of illegal activities and crimes.
57. Samuel J. Caramela
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 50
The third approach will focus on money and other illegal financial
activities. Law enforcement partners must emphasize on the seizure of
funds from transnational criminal organizations and penalize legitimate
businesses that knowingly facilitate the laundering of those funds.
These three techniques will be effective in combating any transnational
criminal organization, and will reduce the effectiveness of their
networks while limiting their abilities to encourage local government
corruption.
Targeting Technology
In his book Transnational Crime and the Twenty-First Century,
author Jay S. Albanese points out that the invention of the automobile
led to the doubling of criminal laws in most countries and relates it to
the influence the computer will have on our laws in the future.5
Inventions that have affected the world as much as the automobile or
the computer and Internet do not occur that often; but when those
items come into existence and criminals exploit them to facilitate crime,
the time is short to enact legislation that criminalizes that exploitation.
In Albanese’s example, creating criminal statutes covering
automobiles was an easy task. Each country was free to enact any
legislation that it saw fit to regulate the criminal use of the automobile
or its manufacture and sale. In the cases of the computer and the
Internet, any statute that was not implemented globally would be
ineffective in fighting Internet crimes. To facilitate this type of
5
Jay S. Albanese, Transnational Crime and the 21st Century (New York: Oxford
University Press, Inc., 2011), 74.
58. Fighting Transnational Crime
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 51
cooperation, the United States must use its influence on developing
countries to persuade their leaders to adopt similar criminal statutes
and offer assistance in enforcing them. In many cases the larger world
community will be behind these efforts, and institutions like the United
Nations will offer a venue for promotion and funding for nations to
develop law enforcement resources.
In addition to creating statutes, there are technological avenues
that can help both mitigate the commission of Internet crimes and make
it more difficult for organizations from outside the United States to
commit crimes against American citizens. The United States can also use
technology to limit regional access to United States websites to
particular regions generating criminal activity. This would encourage
those governments to police their regions more thoroughly, lest they
lose access to a wide array of American sites. It is imperative that law
enforcement use technology to fight crime that is being perpetuated by
technology.
The same is true for the situation created by free trade and the
open border policies as is true for the Internet. Though clues to
restricting criminal exploitation may lie in past experiences, the nature
of transnational crime adds complication that requires collaboration
between all countries involved. In this instance, policymakers can
collaborate internationally as has been and continues to be done in the
global fight against drug trafficking and terrorism. This is best
accomplished by expanding collaborations already present rather than
reinventing the wheel. Adding additional components to present
59. Samuel J. Caramela
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 52
alliances can facilitate agreement and speed implementation. Partners
with investment in existing treaties are more likely to agree on further
cooperation as these arrangements already contain the needed
networks to implement policies. Wechsler’s earlier quote is in reference
to the same drug trafficking organizations that have expanded their
reach in this new global economy and added to their criminal exploits.6
This example further illustrates why building on existing efforts that
were developed to combat drug trafficking networks is the best way to
implement new policies and law enforcement initiatives.
The same can be done in the information-sharing (intelligence)
arena. Intelligence sharing has expanded exponentially since 9/1l. These
networks are well established and can be used to facilitate information
sharing that focuses on transnational criminal networks. Much of our
intelligence gathering already involves criminal intelligence, but the
primary focus is on drug smuggling activities. Criminal intelligence
gathering must be expanded to where criminal empires and their
operatives are identified, observed, and to where information is shared
regarding their activities, movements, and operations. This will require
law enforcement agencies across borders to collaborate in intelligence
collection and sharing to develop profiles on all aspects of the
organization, its associations, its crimes, its locations, and its assets.
6
Wechsler.
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Vol. 3, 2013/2014 53
Targeting Finance
On September 11, 2001 the attacks on our country prompted
the United States government to enact legislation that would assist in
combatting terrorism. This included targeting a terrorist organization’s
finance. The resulting enactment of the United States PATRIOT Act
included legislation that enabled the government to seize assets of
foreign banks that operated in the United States, but were
uncooperative in assisting the United States in recouping laundered
funds of criminal and terrorist organizations using their banks.7
This
2001 act was the first change in the money laundering statutes since the
1986 Money Laundering Control Act. In addition to the international
component of the PATRIOT Act, it also added provisions that made non-
banking monetary institutions liable for the same laws as banks.8
This was an important step in fighting transnational crime and
terrorism. However, to further shut down criminal networks, additional
laws should be considered that penalize not only banking institutions,
but also businesses that knowingly support criminal enterprise. The
implementation of international laws governing the forfeiture of
property and monies throughout the world should be promoted by the
United States, building upon the efforts that the Financial Action Task
Force implemented in 1989 at the G-7 economic summit.9
This measure,
7
Albanese, 111.
8
Ibid. 110.
9
Office of National Drug Control Policy, "International Money Laundering and
Asset Forfeiture," The White House, n.d,
61. Samuel J. Caramela
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 54
which supports law enforcement efforts to regain funds from criminal
organizations, is the most important of the three strategies. The Council
on Foreign Relations cites that transnational crime makes up 3.6
percent of the global economy, with money laundering accounting for
two percent. Recovering that money and investing it back into funds
slated toward fighting transnational crime will go a long way toward
supporting developing nations in creating new law enforcement
initiatives to further that cause.
Another reason to focus on disrupting financing is the reality
that much of that funding goes to support terrorist and insurgency
operations. Referring to the situation in Afghanistan, Wechsler states
that drug money is used to facilitate insurgencies, corrupt government
officials, and create a situation that allows terrorist or criminal
organizations to replace an ineffective and corrupt government.10
This is
only one example of the way illicit proceeds are used to facilitate
insurgencies, promote terrorism, and destabilize governments.
Hezbollah turned to illicit activities after the United States cut off other
funding sources to the organization.11
This illustrates the need to target
transnational criminal organization financing and to make it the
cornerstone of the three-pronged approach.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/international-money-laundering-and-
asset-forfeiture.
10
Wechsler.
11
Ibid.
62. Fighting Transnational Crime
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 55
Conclusion
With transnational criminal organizations on the rise, law enforcement
agencies must adapt to combat their new strategies and associations.
Criminal networks are spreading and their use of technology is growing.
Through collaboration, technology, and finance, these organizations are
corrupting governments, exploiting people, and trafficking in drugs,
guns, people, and violence—all while supporting terrorists and
insurgencies. It is in this environment that law enforcement must
operate, but they sometimes lack the support tools they need.
Fighting individual crimes is a necessary part of the plan, but a
more comprehensive strategy should be implemented to address the
entire criminal network and the structures that support its operations.
This strategy focuses on disrupting those structures both financially and
operationally, weakening the operation from its source. By attacking
their use of technology and reliance on the protection of borders to
insulate themselves from law enforcement, and by taking away their
most important resource—money, partner nations and their law
enforcement entities can mitigate criminal exploits throughout the
world.
63. Samuel J. Caramela
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 56
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Albanese, Jay S. Transnational Crime and the 21st Century. New York:
Oxford University Press, Inc., 2011.
Council on Foreign Relations. "The Global Regime for Transnational
Crime." Council on Foreign Relations. March 22, 2013.
http://www.cfr.org/global-governance/global-regime-
transnational-crime/p28656 (accessed April 16, 2013).
McCarter, Mickey. Strategy To Combat International Crime Spells Out
New Authorities, Initiatives. July 26, 2011.
http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/industry-news/single-
article/strategy-to-combat-international-crime-spells-out-new-
authorities-
initiatives/a493ce23d9b9423e17f12b307960a66b.html
(accessed April 16, 2013).
National Security Council. "Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized
Crime." The White House. July 25, 2011.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnati
onal-crime (accessed April 16, 2013).
Office of National Drug Control Policy. "International Money Laundering
and Asset Forfeiture." The White House. n.d.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/international-money-
laundering-and-asset-forfeiture (accessed April 16, 2013).
Thachuk, Kimberly L., ed. Transnational Threats. Westport, CT: Praeger
Security International, 2007.
64. Fighting Transnational Crime
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 57
United Nations Information Service. "Impact of Corruption on
Development and how States can Better Tackle Corruption to
be Under the Spotlight at UN Anti-Corruption Conference in
Morocco." United Nations Information Service. October 21,
2011.
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2011/uniscp6
58.html (accessed April 16, 2013).
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. "Organized Crime." United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2013.
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/index.html
(accessed April 16, 2013).
Wechsler, William F. "Combatting Transnational Organized Crime." The
Washington Institute. April 26, 2012.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/WechslerPrepar
ed20120426.pdf (accessed April 16, 2013).
Williams, Phil, and Dimitri Vlassis. Combating Transnational Crime. New
York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001.
65. Vol. 3, 2013/2014 58
Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention: Should
Sovereignty Be Ignored?
Jack Frank Sigman
ABSTRACT
Some state diplomats would argue that given the concept of
inviolate state sovereignty, intervention in the domestic affairs of
another state, particularly their own state, is never justified.
Others, such as Francis Deng and Gareth Evans of the Brookings
Institute, and the former United Nations General Secretary, Kofi
Annan, argue that with sovereignty comes responsibilities, and
when a state grossly and inhumanely violates the rights of its
people, it has abdicated its right to sovereignty. When, if ever, is
humanitarian intervention, without the invitation of that state,
justified? This paper seeks to answer that question with a view
that affirms the doctrine of “Responsibility to Protect.”
umanitarian intervention is one of the most controversial
actions within the realm of international relations. Given the
concept of inviolate sovereignty since the Peace of Westphalia,
it would seem hard to prove that sovereignty can and should be
violated to stop action taken within a state’s borders (Deng,
Kimaro, Lyons, Rothchild, Zartman 1996, 2). However, justification does
exist and there are many reasons for such justification.
The likely father of the concept of humanitarian intervention,
Hugo Grotius, is also the father of the scholars criticizing such. Proposed
in 1625, Grotius espoused that “just war” includes the assistance
H
66. Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 59
rendered to those outside the state who are battling oppression
emanating from their own sovereign (Green 2003, 104). However, in
almost the same breath, he opined that this principle would more than
likely be exploited by those who sought the resources of that state, thus
utilizing the circumstances to justify a war for conquest (Goodman
2006, 107). Since that time, debate has continued. Indeed, in
1999 then United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan stated the
two sides of the debate: Is it legitimate for an organization to intervene
without a UN mandate, or is it legitimate to allow genocide to occur?
(Merriam 2001, 113).
Currently, there are two types of humanitarian intervention:
authorized, or that which is sanctioned by the UN; and unauthorized, or
that which is not sanctioned by the UN. Another name for unauthorized
humanitarian intervention is unilateral humanitarian intervention, or
UHI (Goodman 2006, 107). Intervention sanctioned by the UN is done
under authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Whether or not there
is such authority, humanitarian intervention is intended for “preventing
or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human
rights of individuals other than its own citizens” (Keohane 2003, 1).
Regardless, even with the best intention, there are those with
considerable power who still find this concept anathema. Indeed, Henry
Kissinger, former United States (U.S.) Secretary of State, indicates that
the United States insists that intervention into the affairs of other states
is inadmissible, regardless of the desire to export American-style liberal
democracy (Kissinger 1996, 17). However, since the 1989 U.S.
67. Jack F. Signman
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 60
intervention in Panama, which theoretically brought human rights and
democracy to that state, there has been a change in American and
international opinion (Papp, Johnson and Endicott 2005, 492). It is the
success of the intervention in Panama that changed that opinion.
The major events of the 1990s involving intervention, including
Iraq, East Timor, and the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo)-and the lack of a
response to the Rwandan genocide-reopened examination of
justifications marshaled to support unilateral humanitarian
intervention. This is not the first time such an examination was made. In
1945, France attempted to amend the charter of the UN to allow states
to intervene without UN authorization (Franck 2003, 206). The concept
proved too vague to override the UN charter’s proscription of
nonviolence. As David Mednicoff, Director of Middle Eastern Studies at
the University of Massachusetts, relates, “International law in general
and the post-World War II United Nations-based legal order in particular
were established to deter the resort to war by powerful states”
(Mednicoff 2006, 375).
Today, as recent interventions show, the concept is no longer as
vague. Francis Boyle, a Professor of Law and an international lawyer, in
his examination of the legality of the Israeli raid into Entebbe, Uganda,
for the purpose of rescuing hostages, indicates that in times of crises,
states will redefine international law to take into account national
interest (Boyle 1985, 79). Actually, Boyle is incorrect in this example as
the protection of one’s citizens, regardless of their location, is within
international law. However, in this same episode, Boyle reflects that a
68. Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 61
successful operation while violating international law may lead to a
change in the law (Boyle 1985, 135). In this regard, it seems that the
UN’s shift from inviolate sovereignty to “right to protect” signals such a
change. Indeed, the UN investigation of NATO’s UHI in Kosovo led the
UN to endorse the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) policy (Mingst &
Karns 2007, 112). However, there is still debate over R2P fundamentally
altering the traditional Westphalian conception of sovereignty. To this
end, and despite progress, there exist various justifications for
humanitarian intervention, specifically, justification of UHI, as well as
objections. Each justification and objection will be examined through
the lenses of liberal idealism and conservative realism for the purpose
of determining if UHI can ever be justified.
One of the iconic realist U.S. presidents, Theodore Roosevelt, in
the 1904 State of the Union Address, declared that the United States
must be prepared to militarily intervene in the affairs of sovereign
states in situations wherein it is justified by virtue of halting mass
atrocities, limited only by having the will and the strength of arms to do
so (Walker & Schaffer 2007, 747; Bass 2008, 1). In contrast, Michael
Desch, gives the conservative realist side of the argument regarding the
process of deciding to entertain humanitarian intervention for the
purpose of safeguarding human rights: that war is legitimate only when
it advances or safeguards the national interest; that individual human
rights are superseded by the rights of the community; and that human
interaction will always contain elements of conflict (Desch 2001).
Therefore, it is better to respect international law, expecting other
69. Jack F. Signman
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 62
states to do so in response, which in turn should reduce the need for
“constant vigilance” to safeguard national security.
In this same vein, Oded Löwenheim, Professor of International
Relations at Hebrew University, explores the realist position regarding
an episode of UHI about 190 years earlier: the British intervention in
North Africa to end white slavery (Löwenheim 2003, 24-48). During
various periods of social reform in Great Britain, starting in 1787, British
abolitionists campaigned to end black slavery and the black slave trade.
The movement finally succeeded in 1807 with Parliament outlawing the
slave trade, and by 1833, outlawing slavery throughout the British
Empire. This occurred, despite Britain’s position as the dominant slave
trader between Europe and Africa, because of societal changes which
caused the public to see slavery as abhorrent, and because national
honor required the end of slavery (Quirk and Richardson 2010, 263-4).
However, there were accusations of hypocrisy, that the crusade was
being undertaken without addressing the issue of white slavery.
Narrating one of the oldest such episodes in modern history-the
British intervention that ended the white slavery trade in the Barbary
Pirate regencies of Algeria, Tunis, and Tripoli-Löwenheim puts forward
that the Barbary pirates were not enslaving British nationals and their
ships left British ships untouched (Löwenheim 2003, 24). In addition,
Britain benefited by trade with the Barbary states. So, clearly, there was
no material benefit to be gained by Great Britain by this humanitarian
intervention.
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Löwenheim (2003, 25) gives three reasons for intervention in
the realist viewpoint: (1) intervention as cover for expansion; (2)
intervention as response to a threat to national interest; and (3)
intervention in order to secure favorable world or regional opinion
(Löwenheim 2003, 25). It seems that there was no desire to expand into
the area, although Richard Gott, a British historian, indicates that Great
Britain’s appetite for colonies was close to insatiable, and there was no
great national interest involved wherein Great Britain would extend
considerable military power to end the trade (Gott 2003, 45). However,
Löwenheim’s assertion that British nationals were not enslaved is
disputed by Jay Freemen (Freeman 2005, 1620). That leaves the third
reason: intervention to secure favorable opinion.
While Great Britain was undergoing a campaign to eradicate the
African slave trade, as mentioned above, there were accusations of
hypocrisy, that the crusade was being undertaken without addressing
the issue of white slavery. In order to maintain the moral high ground in
its campaign to end the slavery of black Africans-during which time
Great Britain intervened several times into the affairs of other
states-Great Britain needed to act to resolve the issue of white slavery
in northern Africa (Bass 2007, 17-19). In order to enforce its political
will, Britain acted in a manner that seems to belie its national interests,
a supposedly sure sign of strict humanitarian interest (Bass 2007, 19).
Löwenheim disagrees with Gary Bass’ conclusion, claiming that
such activity is based on realism in that the action taken reflects the
moral values upon which the state builds its identity (Löwenheim 2003,
71. Jack F. Signman
Vol. 3, 2013/2014 64
28). However, national values is more of an internal struggle for the soul
of the state and what it will stand for, rather than just what is in the
national interest of the state, which is normally limited to security and
prosperity. This is the reason why there was overwhelming support
within the British public, as well as Parliament, to end both black and
white slavery. Regardless, Ambassador Chas Freeman considers such
concerns to be based on “tactical interests” as well as “national values,”
those behaviors that reflect the national judgment of right and wrong,
decent and abhorrent (Freeman 1997, 11-12).
A champion of conservative realism, former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of State Colin Powell’s doctrine for
utilizing military force agrees with Löwenheim’s analysis. While much
stricter in finding purpose for usage, Powell does deem “overwhelming
congressional and public support” as a base requirement for UHI (Desch
2001).
On the other hand, liberal theorists espouse that a major
purpose of the state’s existence is to “protect and secure human rights”
(Teson 2003, 93). Desch offers that individual rights trump national
interest; that norms are more important than power; and that “military
force should only be used in our pursuit of altruistic objectives” (Desch
2001). Therefore, it would seem that violating or ignoring the major
purpose of the state should place the state outside the protection of
international law. In addition, Fernando Teson, the Tobias Simon
Eminent Scholar at Florida State University, insists that sovereignty
serves the people of the state, and those that violate that policy cannot
