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CLINICAL NOTES
Sigmund Freud (1907). ‘Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices,’ The Origins of
Religion, translated by James Strachey, edited by Albert Dickson (London: Penguin
Books, 1990), pp. 27-41.
Sigmund Freud was fond of thinking in analogies.
There is a good reason for this.
Freud was confronting clinical phenomena that had not been adequately subject to
analysis by clinicians before he came along.
Analogies were a way of structuring these phenomena in ways that may not have
otherwise been possible.
Here are a few specific examples:
Freud compared hysteria to a work of art; obsessive actions and behaviour to a
religion; and paranoia to a philosophical system.
Freud was not saying that these things were exactly the same. His point was that an
analogy can be a form of discovery.
So, for instance, Freud describes hysteria to the extent that he can without pre-
conceptions.
When he encounters the limits of his knowledge in the clinic, he invokes an analogy
from elsewhere. In this specific instance, it was art.
If it turns out that there is indeed an analogy between a work of art and hysteria then
the hitherto unused attributes of art will help the analyst to generate further insights
into hysteria and hysterical phenomena.

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If it turns out that there is no analogy at all between art and hysteria, then, Freud
will not be able to further the comparison. It will simply not be worth his while to do
so.
That is how the validity of an analogy is established from a theoretical point of view.
So by using this method of comparing the unknown (hysteria) to the known (art), he
was able to describe the unknown.
In fact, the German term for the unconscious is ‘Unbewusste’ which means the
‘unknown’ or the ‘unknowable.’
The only way then to describe the structure of what is by definition unknowable is to
compare it to something; that is exactly what Freud decided to do for many of his
important concepts.
When Freud realized that it was worth his while to compare hysteria to a work of art
– maybe he should have compared it to a ‘performing art’ since that would have
been a better analogue – he decided to try out the same method for obsessive
behaviour and paranoia as well.
But once hysteria becomes better known as a clinical entity, then, its libidinal
economy will give us a better understanding of the dramatic construction of the
performing arts themselves.
So in the beginning, Freud learns to structure hysterical phenomena without any
pre-conceptions; then, from his pre-existing knowledge of art.
But, once he gets a better understanding of the libidinal economy of hysteria, he is
anxious to apply his clinical insights into the context of art itself.
In other words, Freud first ‘imports’ structures from elsewhere to make sense of
clinical phenomena when his preconceptions turn out to be inadequate; and, then, he
‘exports’ his clinical insights right back to the same sources in the attempt to settle
his intellectual debts.
These clinical notes however are not on hysteria.
They summarize the main points that Freud raised in his paper of 1907 where he
compares ‘obsessive actions’ with ‘religious practices.’
Needless to say, in this analogy or comparison, the ‘known’ is obsessive actions; the
‘unknown’ is the libidinal economy of religious practices.
The known is not obsessive actions in the sense that there is a larger literature on
obsessive actions than religious practices.

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It is only ‘known’ in the sense that Freud had worked out its libidinal economy
given its fondness for the ceremonial (which was his point of entry into religious
practices)
Now Freud is anxious to export his insights right back into a theory of religious practices.
This paper is an embryonic version of a book that Freud wrote later with the title
Totem and Taboo (1912-13).
In that book, he is pushing the analogy as far as it will go.
Here, however, he is merely trying out this analogy and rehearsing his main
arguments to see if it will be acceptable to his readers.
Most of us tend to think of Freud as being mainly preoccupied with hysteria, but
Freud liked to write about obsessive actions and behaviour as well
There is a good reason for that. As Freud stated elsewhere, ‘obsessional neurosis is
unquestionably the most interesting and repaying subject of analytic research. But as
a problem it has not been mastered.’
This paper then is one of the many attempts that Freud made to master the structure
and function of obsessive actions and behaviour.
What will invoking the analogy of religion tell us about obsessive actions and vice
versa?
The most important point of comparison between those who are obsessive and those
who are religious is that they are both preoccupied with the ‘ceremonial.’
It is the libidinal economy of ceremonies that will provide Freud the fundamental clue to
what is at stake in this analogy between ‘obsessive actions’ and ‘religious practices.’
Freud’s wager is that by studying ‘the origin of neurotic ceremonial’ in his patients
he will be able to explain religious practices even though the history of ceremonies is
the province of those in religious studies rather than of clinicians.
That then is a way of applying clinical insights into obsessive actions in order to
make them available for a theory of religious practices.
Likewise, what we already know about religious practices will also help us to make
sense of obsessive actions.
However that is not made explicitly known in this paper since Freud must have first
imported these concepts from religious studies as operative presuppositions for his

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analogy before attempting to export his clinical insights back to a theory of religious
practices.
So, if this paper is read in the context of Totem and Taboo, it would appear that Freud
is trying to implicate this analogy both ways. But if this paper is read in isolation, it
appears that he is trying to apply psychoanalytic insights on obsessional ceremonials
to religious practices.
In either case – in terms of method – it is important to remember that an analogy cuts
both ways. So an analyst may think he is merely applying the theory, but may wind
up implicating it both ways.
Freud doesn’t spend much space thinking about methodology in this paper, but
understanding the differences between ‘applying’ and ‘implicating’ psychoanalysis
(as Shoshana Felman is fond of pointing out) will give us a better understanding of
what is really going on.
In other words, when we don’t close read it appears that what is going on is an
application in terms of the unknown and the known.
But the moment we close read a text, and examine its operative assumptions or pre-
suppositions, we realize that things are much more complicated in the invocation of
an analogy than it appears at first sight.
That is why it is safe to claim that irrespective of whether Freud is explaining
obsessive actions in terms of religious practices or vice versa, what the reader can be
sure about is that both these practices are implicated in a libidinal economy that
constitutes the structure of an obsessional neurosis (Zwangneurose).
That is why doing research on obsessional neurosis is useful for both clinicians and
those who want to explain religious practices.
Freud’s main contention then is that neurotic ceremonials constitute a private
rendition of what is publicly available in the context of religious practices.
These ceremonials are structured as symptoms of an obsessional neurosis.
The main difference is that religious practices find it easier to sublimate obsessional
thoughts, impulses, and practices than the neurotic subject who will be subject to
anxiety if he is unable to perform these ceremonies in the way that they are meant to
be performed.
That is because religious practices have social sanction in a way that neurotic
ceremonies do not.

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There is nothing secretive about religious practices but neurotic ceremonies are
always performed in secret and can lead to dysfunctional behaviour on the part of
the patient.
That is why Freud invokes the legendary figure of Mélusine ‘who led a secret
existence as a water nymph.’ Likewise, the neurotic subject leads a secret life in
which he or she is pre-occupied with their symptoms.
Clinicians are acquainted with a number of bed, dressing, and bathroom ceremonies
of obsessive patients which are not only repetitive in nature but cause enormous
distress in their daily life.
Freud analyses some of these ceremonies with specific clinical examples in this
paper.
Freud also differentiates between ‘obsessive thoughts’ and ‘compulsive actions.’
The former pertains to the ideational realm and is a source of anxiety, whereas the
latter seeks motor discharge in order to alleviate precisely that anxiety.
So if the obsessive is not allowed to perform these private ceremonies on a daily
basis, it can lead to an outbreak of anxiety.
These neurotic subjects also suffer from ‘expectant anxiety,’ i.e. they approach all
events in life thinking about what can go wrong rather than about what can go right.
Expectant anxiety can then become a form of ‘inhibition’ and reduce their ability to
interact freely in a social situation.
Freud analyses these neurotic phenomena in greater detail in his book Inhibitions,
Symptoms, and Anxiety (1926).
And, finally, Freud explains that obsessive actions are a reflection of the conflict
between the forces of repression and the forces of resistance to that repression.
In Freud’s words, ‘they thus always reproduce something of the pleasure which they
are designed to prevent.’
It is also possible, Freud argues, to study the history of phenomena like guilt, sin,
repentance, and redemption in the context of religious observance as variations on
the theme obsessive actions in the context of religious practices.

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To summarize:
Freud’s conclusion is that ‘in view of these similarities and analogies one might
venture to regard obsessional neurosis as a pathological counterpart of the formation
of a religion, and to describe that neurosis as an individual religiosity and religion as
a universal obsessional neurosis.’
SHIVA KUMAR SRINIVASAN