The document summarizes Nietzsche's theory on the origins and evolution of morality as presented in his work "Genealogy of Morals". According to Nietzsche, the concepts of "good", "bad", and "evil" originated as terms used by ruling noble classes to describe social status rather than moral concepts. Over time, the meanings evolved. The arrival of the priestly caste introduced the concept of the soul and changed "bad" to imply maliciousness. The priestly caste also led a "slave revolt" that inverted aristocratic morality by claiming the poor and suffering were good in the eyes of God. This new morality was born from resentment of the noble classes' freedom of expression. N

1. The Good, the Bad, and the Evil
Lucas Paskash

2. “…the judgment ‘good’ did not originate with those to whom ‘goodness’ was shown! Rather it
was the ‘the good’ themselves, that is to say, the noble, powerful, high-stationed and high-minded, who felt
and established themselves and their actions as good, that is, of the first rank, in contradistinction to all the
low, low-minded, common, and plebian.”1
Divided into three essays, Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals first essay, entitled
“Good and Evil”, address his theory of the origin of our moral definitions of good, bad,
and evil. Nietzsche argues that these basic moral concepts have evolved over time,
holding many meanings since antiquity. The origin of these moral concepts is attributed
to the ruling or noble classes of antiquity who were, according to Nietzsche, the founders
of language. This founding gave them the authority to arbitrate the meaning of specific
words. The meanings of specific terms were geared toward the ruling class’s
understanding and perspective of the world around them. Those who thought of
themselves as strong, powerful, and noble so named the qualities, and themselves, as
‘good’.2
The word ‘bad’ is included along with ‘good’ and ‘evil’ for the same reason that
Nietzsche singles out the term from the others in his account. According to this theory,
the ruling class of old did not see the members and qualities of the lower echelons of their
society as explicitly ‘evil’ (i.e. malicious in nature), but instead as those whom they
viewed as “the weak, the incapable and the subservient” as possessing traits that they saw
simply as undesirable; ‘bad’.3
‘Good’ and ‘bad’ then originated as terms that referred to
societal station, rather than moral polarities.
1
Friedrich Nietzsche, Edited and translated by Walter Kaufmann, On The Genealogy of Morals, (Random
House 1967), (Vintage Books Edition, November 1989) 25-6
2
Christopher Janaway Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche’s Genealogy (Oxford Scholarship Online
2007) Ch. 6 P. 9
3
Janaway Ch. 6 P. 9

3. The opening excerpt demonstrates Nietzsche’s theory that words such as good
and bad are based upon ideas that the ruling, and more importantly the literate class, used
to describe their own society.4
While this may seem to espouse an argument in favor of
moral relativism, his commentary on what he refers to as “the priestly caste”, reveals and
supports a different argument. The arrival of the priestly caste in the Genealogy of
Morals adds the third term to our discussion, ‘evil’. However, the moral judgment which
the term evil implies today had to evolve, as well as those of good and bad, and it did so
out of another societal distinction, that of “clean” and “unclean” members of society as
well as the concept of the soul. Originally, “clean” and “unclean” were terms that denoted
a very explicit difference between groups of people who bathed (or in other ways actively
maintained their person health) and those who did not. For Nietzsche’s genealogy, the
soul is conceived of as a neutral subject to which humans add a moral valuation to.5
We
are each born with a soul and we each determine if it is evil or good. Distinctions such as
these, in conjunction with the concept of the soul, provided the priestly caste with the
authority to evaluate others moral standings. However, the evaluation of their own
morality was not of primary concern, witnessed by the fact that the lower classes (outside
the aristocratic) labeled themselves and their qualities as good only after labeling the
aristocratic as evil.6
Where the noble or aristocratic mode of valuation in antiquity
described an abundance or “overflowing” of health through hunting, dancing, adventure
4
GM 28 (See etymology of German word for schlecht, bad)
5
GM I 45
6
Scott Jenkins, Morality, Agency and Freedom in Nietzsche’s “Genealogy of Morals”, (History of
Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Jan., 2003), pp. 61-88), University of Illinois Press, pp. 64

4. and war, the priestly mode utilized a sharper terminology in which “unclean” and “bad”
are equated with a moral maliciousness.7
The priestly caste, due to the nature of their function in society and therefore their
authority, possessed the ability to reevaluate the “enemy’s” morality.8
This is the
beginning of what Nietzsche refers to as “the slave revolt in morality”. The priestly caste
took the original “aristocratic value-equation (good = noble = powerful = beautiful =
happy = beloved of God)” and out of resentment inverted this valuation to one which
states that only “the wretched alone are the good; the poor, impotent, lowly […] the
suffering, deprived, sick, ugly alone are the pious, alone are blessed by God […].”9
This
type of moral evaluation changes the location of responsibility, and therefore blame, from
those who are in a position of weakness (lower classes) to those in a position of strength
(the noble or aristocratic class). Essentially arguing that those who act as sheep act in the
moral way and those who act as a bird of prey, and not a sheep, are immoral, making the
bird of prey accountable for being a bird of prey. Nietzsche responds by arguing that one
cannot hold a bird of prey accountable for acting in its nature.10
This reevaluation of
morality demonstrates the development of a moral code in direct opposition to that of the
aristocratic and noble whose code seems to have encouraged healthy physical activity and
open emotional expression.
This priest led “slave revolt” against the master’s morality was fueled by
“ressentiment”11
, according to Nietzsche. While the aristocratic morality was born out of
7
GM 32-3
8
GM 34
9
GM 34
10
Jenkins 63-4
11
GM 36 (resentment)

5. self-affirmation, slave morality was born out of resentment toward what is perceived as a
hostile and external force. The perception of an external and hostile moral force is
necessary for slave morality to grow because it requires one “[…] to direct one’s view
outward instead of back to oneself […]”. Nietzsche also argues that the root of
resentment can be located in human beings more animalistic instincts. The aristocratic
classes of antiquity, due to their station in society, were able to express and vent their
more animalistic instincts outward, however the lower classes, the plebian, did not
possess this freedom. Nietzsche believes that these animal instincts are both necessary
and intrinsic to humans. The lower classes were then forced to turn these instincts inward
and upon themselves creating internal damage and twisting their emotions towards the
aristocratic to that of resentment for their ability to freely express their instincts. This
resentment is key to the priestly inversion of the aristocratic or noble form of morality.12
Having discussed his theory as to the origin and evolution of morality, Nietzsche
moves on to a discussion of guilt and “bad conscience” in his second essay. He begins
with a discussion of memory and the role it plays in making promises. The ability to
forget is a necessary attribute for humans as it allows us to function both physically and
mentally.13
In order for humans to make a promise, we must actively remember
something, requiring us to think causally. According to Nietzsche, this skill has
developed throughout human history, at the end of which stands a new type of human,
one with the ability to make and to fulfill promises; what Nietzsche refers to as a
12
GM 32
13
GM 58

6. “sovereign individual”.14
Here we begin to see Nietzsche develop a theory on the future
of morality.
In the beginning of his second essay of the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche
expands upon his notion of the “sovereign individual”. The sovereign individual is
envisioned as someone who is completely liberated from the “morality of custom”- the
historical bias of morality.15
This individual would posses a consciousness of their own
control and complete cognizance of their own free will: they would be their own
guarantors. An individual who posses total sovereignty over themselves would also
posses an unbreakable will, and with this would come a great measure of their own value.
An appreciation for this value through “[…] the proud awareness of the extraordinary
privilege of responsibility, the consciousness of this rare freedom […]” will then become
instinct, an instinct that Nietzsche describes as “conscience.”
Having introduced the sovereign individual, Nietzsche moves on to address the
notion of bad conscience, guilt and punishment. In this discussion he attempts to
demonstrate that the purpose of a judicial system is to enforce promises, which is most
often accomplished through the threat of physical pain and injury as the only sure way for
something to remain in the human consciousness is to have it “burned” in; an event so
painful that one’s mind cannot forget it. This seems to be an accurate argument evidenced
by the potency of not just negative memories in individuals verses the strength of positive
ones overtime, but also in the memory of humanity itself; in history, some of the most
studied events, generally speaking, are negative ones in nature (mainly violent).
14
GM 59
15
GM 59

7. Nietzsche argues that punishment for a crime is often carried through the use of
pain because of its potency on the memory. The severity of a society’s penal code is often
times the most significant measure to the degree of effort needed to overcome
forgetfulness within a society. This is where we first see the notion of “bad conscience”
enter his essay. This idea is best described as the attitude that a criminal should be
punished because he could have acted differently. This is different from more ancient
forms of punishment, which were rooted in anger towards another out of harm or injury,
implying that an injury is similar to a debt, in the sense that it can be paid back in some
form. This creates a system whereby one party (the injured) is allowed to exert power and
superiority over another party (perpetrator) in order to restore balance between the two,
usually accomplished through physical means (pound of flesh). Nietzsche asks of the
reader “[…] to what extent can suffering balance debts or guilt?”16
In both his discussion
of justice and of guilt, there is an underlying theme of health; that both of these ideals
have been enforced throughout history through the use of force and pain.
Nietzsche makes the claim that a need for justice to be exemplified through the
exertion of power over another is rooted in the men of resentment and that within the
history of the administration of law, it’s the strong and noble men who have attempted to
remove the punishment of the lawbreaker from the hands of those directly injured and
instead bring it under the purview of the society itself. The purpose of punishment, in the
general sense, is to instill within the guilty a sense of just that, guilt, and yet within the
realm of the guilty we see the least amount of guilt. Perhaps this is due to the fact that as
human civilization began to develop it necessitated cooperation, which entailed turning
16
GM 65

8. our animal instincts inward instead of towards others. Punishment then becomes a way to
keep those instincts contained. However Nietzsche contradicts himself as it seems as
though he does recognize that our animal instincts, including cruelty or pain towards
others, is not only a natural state for humans but is also one that once denied and
contained, is then turned inward upon ourselves. Perhaps this is what led to such strong
feelings of resentment towards those who were more capable of (or who society allowed
to) expressing their animal instincts.
The discussion of the origin of punishment seems to be arranged in order to better
illustrate to the reader the importance of his concept of the sovereign individual in the
beginning of the essay. The corporal nature of punishment throughout the development of
penal codes in history seems to emphasize Nietzsche’s argument for the need to move
beyond conventional ideas such as good and evil in order to avoid the painful, cruel and
ultimately unhealthy nature of not only penal justice, but also the internally unhealthy
nature of guilt. The root of this guilt then lies with the men of resentment and the leaders
of their moral revolt, the priestly caste; priests whose own behavior itself is explicitly
described as “unhealthy” by Nietzsche.17
According to the Genealogy of Morals, resentment is an entirely unhealthy
emotion. An individual internalizes all their anger, fear, aggression, etc. towards an
external force or another individual, without acting upon these emotions. At times it
appears as though Nietzsche is advocating for the healthy (sometimes and for some
individuals) release of these emotions. He seems to argue that to, essentially, bottle up
such strong emotions rather than releasing them unto the external world and therefore
17
GM 32

9. acting upon our feelings, renders us helpless to an internal battle with ourselves that only
serves to agonize us. Nietzsche makes repeated mention of the way in which the
aristocratic and noble of antiquity would ‘release’ their emotions through vigorous
physical expressions, hunting, adventure, dance, fighting, and even war or blood sport.
His discussion of suffering in human history and how, once set to a purpose, it has been
an essential expression of human self-affirmation of life seems to follow this line of
thought closely.18
Contrasted with Nietzsche’s (sometimes vivid) description of the self-
deprecation and ‘soulful’ suffering of the men of resentment, there is a strong indication
that he is arguing for a morality which transcends a modern conception of black and
white terms like good and evil.
With the sovereign individual, Nietzsche appears to advocate for not only a total
abandonment of the historical weight of modern morality, freeing oneself from both the
slave morality and the master morality, but also for an individual who possesses their
own self-regulated moral code, free of others and with utter self-affirmation regardless of
external forces. It seems clear that there is indeed a strong argument in favor of the
Genealogy of Morals advocating a moving beyond good and evil for reasons of health. In
addition to this, it could also be argued that Nietzsche is advocating for something even
bolder, for a new kind of individual and a new conception of morality itself; a “new”
moral agent. In his discussion of the sovereign individual, there are trace elements of a
new concept for what it means to be a moral agent. Perhaps what he is truly arguing for is
a new kind of morality, one that is based not upon the past (or something that goes
beyond it), but instead upon the shoulders of a rational, sovereign, self-affirming and self-
18
GM 33

10. arbitrating individual, someone with the ability to keep promises because he alone is the
sole judge of his own morality. One could make the argument that the idea of an
individual that transcends conventional morality because they arbitrate their own moral
self, is in fact an argument for the relativism of morality. That because this type of
individual is not constrained by society, or any particular penal code, there then exists the
potential for a kind of moral anarchy within a society, or even the breakdown of that
society itself. While Nietzsche does not address the political philosophy of his sovereign
individual specifically, perhaps within an expansion of Nietzsche’s description of the
sovereign individual there is a defense to be made for the concept.
Given Nietzsche’s description of the sovereign individual we can argue that such
an individual would possess a self-affirming value of their self-worth (1), and that
because of this recognized self-worth and value as an individual moral agent, the “new”
moral agent would hold a greater value and respect for their own morality than other
humans do (2). The sovereign individual’s appreciation for their own value would then
create a greater understanding of their role and value in human society (3). Therefore,
Nietzsche’s sovereign individual constitutes a “new” type of moral agent, one that
possesses a self-regulating moral structure without the bonds of historical dogma (4). The
“new” moral agent is self-affirming and self-arbitrating, owing loyalty only to their own
sense of self-worth and therefore to their ability to make and to keep promises.
Essentially, given Nietzsche’s elaboration on the sovereign individual, their appreciation
for their own value and sense of self-worth would lead to the self-arbitration of their
moral code being kept within its own self-regulating sphere.

11. In the case of the Genealogy of Morals there appears to be a strong argument in
favor of the theory that Nietzsche’s true aim within the book is to advocate a going
beyond that of the historical and even contemporary conceptions of good and evil for
reasons of human health. His description of the historical administration of law through a
corporeal punitive system of justice in conjunction with his theory on the evolution of
good, bad, and evil via the moral valuations of the aristocratic verse slave morality revolt,
lead by priestly ascetics, make a clear case in favor of the afore mentioned prevailing
theory. There is also sufficient evidence within to the theory that the Genealogy of
Morals advocates not only moving beyond good and evil but also for a new type of
morality based on individuals with the ability to truly make promises and to keep their
individual morality in check; for a “new” moral agent.