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EXPOSEYOURSELF
WITHOUT INSECURITY
ARTINTOSCIENCE–JAN162020
DO YOU KNOW YOUR
EXPOSURE?
INTRO
QUESTIONHOW DO YOU DETERMINE
WHAT IS EXPOSED TO THE
INTERNET IN YOUR
CLOUD ENVIRONMENT?
4
Focused on Continuous Attack
Surface Testing (CAST)
• Techniques
• Procedures
• Tools
Continuously learning new
techniques for offensive testing
INTRO
WHO ARE WE?
5
ROB RAGAN
OSCAR SALAZAR
Principal Researcher
Principal Researcher
INVENTORY SUCCESS CRITERIA
What do we want from our asset inventory? (i.e. Targets):
ACCURACY
Through curation of
multiple data sources
(external & internal)
UPDATED
ENDPOINTS
Through continuous
and frequent analysis
ACTIONABLE
INTELLIGENCE
Through
maintained visibility
(metadata & screenshots)
OPERATIONALIZE
IMPACT OF EXPOSURES
6
BUILDING A BASELINE
TARGETS METHODOLOGY
8
• Organization Structure
• Business Units
• Products
• Services
• Mergers & Acquisitions
• Primary Domains
associated with BUs
• Subdomains
• IP Address Space
• Active Services
• Continuously updated
dataset of DNS and IP
based Targets
Master records are your advantage as defenders
Emulate real-attackers but where possible, be several steps ahead of them
Our goal is to inventory the entire attack surface, we should utilize all the things:
MORE SUCCESSFUL APPROACH
INVENTORY MAINTENANCE
9
• Domain registrars
• DNS records
• Certificate Authorities
• BGP Prefix
• Internet Scan Archives
• Cloud account metadata
• …and anything and everything
attackers
and your internal IT uses
METHODOLOGY
02
USING DIFFERENT LENSES
INSIDE LOOKING OUT
OUTSIDE LOOKING IN
INSIDE LOOKING OUT (IT/ENG Configurations)
• When and where possible, always leverage the master records
• Go to the source of truth
• Someone at your organization has to setup and maintain a configuration for
each asset and systematically there is evidence of this system in your master
DNS records and router tables (e.g. DHCP)
OUTSIDE LOOKING IN (OSINT)
• Shadow IT will always exist
• Use techniques from outside your environment to see what the rest of the
world can see
• Attackers scan the internet, they monitor for changes to internet
infrastructure, and can mine massive datasets using OSINT to find what
they’re looking for, i.e. a weakness
• Adopt similar approaches. whois data, registrar data, reverse DNS
USING DIFFERENT LENSES
12
1/19/20 14
ATTACK SURFACE MAPPING
HOW DO YOU IDENTIFY CLOUD ACCOUNTS
Follow the money $$$
Partner with finance to monitor corporate credit
card usage
Whose corporate credit card is accruing charges
from AWS, Azure, GCP, etc? this is your best lead
to identify unknown accounts.
Establish review process and track security
team visibility into these accounts
BEWARE of IaaS/PaaS/SaaS that mask popular
providers (e.g. refinery.io) and hide inventory
WHY NOT ADD ONE MORE AWS ACCOUNT?
Security team should have
an account
One account to read them all
from a monitoring perspective
Establish a parent org account
with engineering
Assume role access or Security Auditor
read-only access to all other accounts
identified at the organization
INSIDE LOOKING OUT LENS
Which accounts have publicly facing systems and services?
How are those specific services externally accessible? (DNS/IP/Port)
Access Levels:
• Internal
• AWS Resource Relationships (IAM Access Analyzer helps here)
• Internet
ACCOUNT ACCESS ESTABLISHED*
NEXT STEPS
17
* Assuming you identified all accounts established a program and a policy to detect future accounts and have executed access controls properly.
Publicly available services should have:
• Scheme/Protocol
• Host (DNS or IP)
• Port
• URI (relative path)
• Anonymous internet-facing access
Internet scale scanners will find these services
• May not route correctly for AWS services and error
without DNS/VHOST info
OPERATIONALIZING DATA
IMPACTFUL EXPOSURES
18
STATE OF THE ART
03
AVAILABLE TOOLS & TECHNIQUES
AWS IN 2011
WHAT SERVICES
DO WE NEED
TO CONSIDER?
20
21
AWS IN 2017
WHAT SERVICES
DO WE NEED
TO CONSIDER?
PACE OF INNOVATION
EXPONENTIAL
22
0
50
100
150
200
250
2011 2013 2015 2017 2019
AWS Features & Services
23
TOO MANY TO LIST!
AWS IN 2020
WHAT SERVICES
DO WE NEED
TO CONSIDER?
What was already available when we tried to solve this problem?
• Cloudmapper
• https://summitroute.com/blog/2018/06/13/cloudmapper_public/
• https://github.com/duo-labs/cloudmapper
• AWS Public IPs
• https://github.com/arkadiyt/aws_public_ips
• IAM Access Analyzer (codename Tiros released at Re:Invent 2019)
• July 2019 https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-security-profile-john-backes-senior-software-
development-engineer/
• https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html
• https://d1.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/Security/Reachability_Analysis_for_AWS-based_Networks.pdf
• Cartography
• https://github.com/lyft/cartography
EXPOSED SERVICES: STATE OF THE ART
AVAILABLE TOOLS
24
Cloudmapper
• "public" - Command to identify public hosts and ports
• The metadata format is valuable for our inventory efforts
• LIMITATIONS:
• Not comprehensive - Does not support IPv6
currently, and only looks at TCP and UDP ports. It
ignores ICMP or any other protocols. It does not
consider network ACL rules.
• Small subset of AWS services covered - currently
only supports the services EC2, ELB, ELBv2, and RDS
• Documentation pointed us to another project
aws_public_ips
EXPOSED SERVICES: STATE OF THE ART
@0XDABBAD00
25
AWS Public IPs
• Fetch all public IP addresses tied to your AWS account. Works with
IPv4/IPv6, Classic/VPC networking, and across all AWS services
• LIMITATIONS:
• Only provides IP addresses – not ports or protocols
• Not comprehensive – does not support dynamically generated
infrastructure as publicly accessible
• Subset of AWS services covered - currently only supports
APIGateway, CloudFront, EC2 (and as a result: ECS, EKS,
Beanstalk, Fargate, Batch, & NAT Instances), ElasticSearch, ELB
(Classic ELB), ELBv2 (ALB/NLB), Lightsail, RDS, Redshift
EXPOSED SERVICES: STATE OF THE ART
@ARKADIYT
26
IAM Access Analyzer
• AWS IAM Access Analyzer helps you
identify the resources in your account,
such as Amazon S3 buckets or IAM roles,
that are shared with an external entity.
• LIMITATIONS:
• Resource-policy based – designed to
report when a resource is accessible.
Knows nothing about the state of users,
roles, service control policies (SCP), and
other relevant configurations
• Per region analyzer required - must create
an analyzer to enable Access Analyzer in
each Region
EXPOSED SERVICES: STATE OF THE ART
@AWS
27
Cartography
• Python tool that consolidates
infrastructure assets and the
relationships between them in an
intuitive graph view powered by a
Neo4j database
• LIMITATIONS:
• Larger setup overhead – seems like it
has a lot of use cases above and
beyond what we were focused on
accomplishing. May not be suited to
multiple organizations
• Not comprehensive – only supports
ELBs, EC2, ElasticSearch, S3 for
determining internet exposure
EXPOSED SERVICES: STATE OF THE ART
@ALEXCHANTAVY
28
EXPOSED SERVICES: STATE OF THE ART
LIMITATION OF AVAILABLE TOOLS
29
CLOUDMAPPER AWS PUBLIC IPS
IAM ACCESS
ANALYZER
CARTOGRAPHY
PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE
INFRASTRUCTURE ASSETS
Yes No No Yes
IP ADDRESSES
Yes, but
IPv6 not supported
IPv4 – IPv6
Classic / VPC networking
No No
PORTS TCP, UDP No No Yes
PROTOCOLS No No No Yes
NETWORK ACL RULES No No No Yes
AWS SERVICES COVERED EC2 – ELBs – RDS
EC2 - ELBs - RDS - RDC
APIGateway, CloudFront,
ElasticSearch, Lightsail
Redshift
S3
IAM roles
EC2 - ELBs - S3
ElasticSearch
COMPREHENSIVE No No No No
OUR SOLUTION
04
YET ANOTHER TOOL
APIs-Guru OpenAPI Directory
🌐 Wikipedia for Web APIs. Directory of REST API
definitions in OpenAPI 2.0/3.0 format
Identified patterns in AWS Service
DNS records from documentation
https://github.com/APIs-guru/openapi-
directory/tree/master/APIs/amazonaws.com
Cross referenced with passive DNS
data to understand real-world usage
AWS EXPOSURE ENDPOINTS
ONGOING RESEARCH
31
s3 https://{user_provided}.s3.amazonaws.com
cloudfront https://{random_id}.cloudfront.net
ec2 ec2-{ip-seperated}.compute-1.amazonaws.com
es https://{user_provided}-{random_id}.{region}.es.amazonaws.com
elb
http://{user_provided}-{random_id}.{region}.elb.amazonaws.com:80
https://{user_provided}-{random_id}.{region}.elb.amazonaws.com:443
elbv2 https://{user_provided}-{random_id}.{region}.elb.amazonaws.com
rds
mysql://{user_provided}.{random_id}.{region}.rds.amazonaws.com:3306
postgres://{user_provided}.{random_id}.{region}.rds.amazonaws.com:5432
route53 {user-specified}
AWS EXPOSURE PATTERNS
Beware of misconfigurations that expose your content with these CNAME patterns:
32
execute-api https://{random_id}.execute-api.{region}.amazonaws.com/{user_provided}
cloudsearch https://doc-{user_provided}-{random_id}.{region}.cloudsearch.amazonaws.com
transfer sftp://s-{random_id}.server.transfer.{region}.amazonaws.com
iot
mqtt://{random_id}.iot.{region}.amazonaws.com:8883
https://{random_id}.iot.{region}.amazonaws.com:8443
https://{random_id}.iot.{region}.amazonaws.com:443
mq
https://b-{random_id}-{1,2}.mq.{region}.amazonaws.com:8162
ssl://b-{random_id}-{1,2}.mq.{region}.amazonaws.com:61617
kafka
b-{1,2,3,4}.{user_provided}.{random_id}.c{1,2}.kafka.{region}.amazonaws.com
{user_provided}.{random_id}.c{1,2}.kafka.useast-1.amazonaws.com
cloud9 https://{random_id}.vfs.cloud9.{region}.amazonaws.com
mediastore https://{random_id}.data.mediastore.{region}.amazonaws.com.
kinesisvideo https://{random_id}.kinesisvideo.{region}.amazonaws.com
mediaconvert https://{random_id}.mediaconvert.{region}.amazonaws.com
mediapackage
https://{random_id}.mediapackage.{region}.amazonaws.com/in/v1/{random_id}/channel
AWS EXPOSURE PATTERNS
Beware of misconfigurations that expose your content with these CNAME patterns:
33
34
DOMAINS > IP ADDRESSES
35
Note: This was a sample of us-east-1 and not comprehensive analysis of
exposures across all regions
AWS
ELASTICSEARCH
EXPOSED
INDICES
• Found 59 exposed instances
• Found 1706 multi-MB exposed indices
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
36
Note: This was a sample of us-east-1 and not comprehensive analysis of
exposures across all regions
AWS
ELASTICSEARCH
EXPOSED
INDICES
• Found 59 exposed instances
• Found 1706 multi-MB exposed indices
• IPv4 scanners cannot find this
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
37
Note: Samsung TV Plus is only available on 2016 - 2019 Samsung Smart
TV's in select territories and an internet connection is required.
AWS MEDIASTORE
SAMSUNG
TV PLUS
• Found Samsung TV Plus streams
• Samsung TV Plus delivers free TV.
Get instant access to news, sports,
entertainment, and more. No
download, additional device, or
credit card needed.
38
Note: Samsung TV Plus is only available on 2016 - 2019 Samsung Smart
TV's in select territories and an internet connection is required.
AWS MEDIASTORE
SAMSUNG
TV PLUS
• Found Samsung TV Plus streams
• Samsung TV Plus delivers free TV.
Get instant access to news, sports,
entertainment, and more. No
download, additional device, or
credit card needed.
• IPv4 scanners cannot find this
REDACTED
Introducing Smog
Identifying The Cloud
That No One Wantshttps://github.com/BishopFox/smogcloud
39
RUNNING AWS CLI COMMANDS ACROSS ALL ACCOUNTS IN AN AWS ORGANIZATION
• https://alestic.com/2019/12/aws-cli-across-organization-accounts/
• Collection of bash functions to help run aws-cli commands across roles in multiple accounts with MFA
Ø https://github.com/alestic/aws-cli-multi-account-sessions
ADDITIONAL REFERENCES & TECHNIQUES
RESOURCES
40
THANK
YOU
@bishopfox | contact@bishopfox.com

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Expose Yourself Without Insecurity: Cloud Breach Patterns

  • 2. DO YOU KNOW YOUR EXPOSURE? INTRO
  • 3. QUESTIONHOW DO YOU DETERMINE WHAT IS EXPOSED TO THE INTERNET IN YOUR CLOUD ENVIRONMENT? 4
  • 4. Focused on Continuous Attack Surface Testing (CAST) • Techniques • Procedures • Tools Continuously learning new techniques for offensive testing INTRO WHO ARE WE? 5 ROB RAGAN OSCAR SALAZAR Principal Researcher Principal Researcher
  • 5. INVENTORY SUCCESS CRITERIA What do we want from our asset inventory? (i.e. Targets): ACCURACY Through curation of multiple data sources (external & internal) UPDATED ENDPOINTS Through continuous and frequent analysis ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE Through maintained visibility (metadata & screenshots) OPERATIONALIZE IMPACT OF EXPOSURES 6
  • 6. BUILDING A BASELINE TARGETS METHODOLOGY 8 • Organization Structure • Business Units • Products • Services • Mergers & Acquisitions • Primary Domains associated with BUs • Subdomains • IP Address Space • Active Services • Continuously updated dataset of DNS and IP based Targets
  • 7. Master records are your advantage as defenders Emulate real-attackers but where possible, be several steps ahead of them Our goal is to inventory the entire attack surface, we should utilize all the things: MORE SUCCESSFUL APPROACH INVENTORY MAINTENANCE 9 • Domain registrars • DNS records • Certificate Authorities • BGP Prefix • Internet Scan Archives • Cloud account metadata • …and anything and everything attackers and your internal IT uses
  • 9. USING DIFFERENT LENSES INSIDE LOOKING OUT OUTSIDE LOOKING IN
  • 10. INSIDE LOOKING OUT (IT/ENG Configurations) • When and where possible, always leverage the master records • Go to the source of truth • Someone at your organization has to setup and maintain a configuration for each asset and systematically there is evidence of this system in your master DNS records and router tables (e.g. DHCP) OUTSIDE LOOKING IN (OSINT) • Shadow IT will always exist • Use techniques from outside your environment to see what the rest of the world can see • Attackers scan the internet, they monitor for changes to internet infrastructure, and can mine massive datasets using OSINT to find what they’re looking for, i.e. a weakness • Adopt similar approaches. whois data, registrar data, reverse DNS USING DIFFERENT LENSES 12
  • 12. HOW DO YOU IDENTIFY CLOUD ACCOUNTS Follow the money $$$ Partner with finance to monitor corporate credit card usage Whose corporate credit card is accruing charges from AWS, Azure, GCP, etc? this is your best lead to identify unknown accounts. Establish review process and track security team visibility into these accounts BEWARE of IaaS/PaaS/SaaS that mask popular providers (e.g. refinery.io) and hide inventory
  • 13. WHY NOT ADD ONE MORE AWS ACCOUNT? Security team should have an account One account to read them all from a monitoring perspective Establish a parent org account with engineering Assume role access or Security Auditor read-only access to all other accounts identified at the organization INSIDE LOOKING OUT LENS
  • 14. Which accounts have publicly facing systems and services? How are those specific services externally accessible? (DNS/IP/Port) Access Levels: • Internal • AWS Resource Relationships (IAM Access Analyzer helps here) • Internet ACCOUNT ACCESS ESTABLISHED* NEXT STEPS 17 * Assuming you identified all accounts established a program and a policy to detect future accounts and have executed access controls properly.
  • 15. Publicly available services should have: • Scheme/Protocol • Host (DNS or IP) • Port • URI (relative path) • Anonymous internet-facing access Internet scale scanners will find these services • May not route correctly for AWS services and error without DNS/VHOST info OPERATIONALIZING DATA IMPACTFUL EXPOSURES 18
  • 16. STATE OF THE ART 03 AVAILABLE TOOLS & TECHNIQUES
  • 17. AWS IN 2011 WHAT SERVICES DO WE NEED TO CONSIDER? 20
  • 18. 21 AWS IN 2017 WHAT SERVICES DO WE NEED TO CONSIDER?
  • 19. PACE OF INNOVATION EXPONENTIAL 22 0 50 100 150 200 250 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 AWS Features & Services
  • 20. 23 TOO MANY TO LIST! AWS IN 2020 WHAT SERVICES DO WE NEED TO CONSIDER?
  • 21. What was already available when we tried to solve this problem? • Cloudmapper • https://summitroute.com/blog/2018/06/13/cloudmapper_public/ • https://github.com/duo-labs/cloudmapper • AWS Public IPs • https://github.com/arkadiyt/aws_public_ips • IAM Access Analyzer (codename Tiros released at Re:Invent 2019) • July 2019 https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-security-profile-john-backes-senior-software- development-engineer/ • https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html • https://d1.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/Security/Reachability_Analysis_for_AWS-based_Networks.pdf • Cartography • https://github.com/lyft/cartography EXPOSED SERVICES: STATE OF THE ART AVAILABLE TOOLS 24
  • 22. Cloudmapper • "public" - Command to identify public hosts and ports • The metadata format is valuable for our inventory efforts • LIMITATIONS: • Not comprehensive - Does not support IPv6 currently, and only looks at TCP and UDP ports. It ignores ICMP or any other protocols. It does not consider network ACL rules. • Small subset of AWS services covered - currently only supports the services EC2, ELB, ELBv2, and RDS • Documentation pointed us to another project aws_public_ips EXPOSED SERVICES: STATE OF THE ART @0XDABBAD00 25
  • 23. AWS Public IPs • Fetch all public IP addresses tied to your AWS account. Works with IPv4/IPv6, Classic/VPC networking, and across all AWS services • LIMITATIONS: • Only provides IP addresses – not ports or protocols • Not comprehensive – does not support dynamically generated infrastructure as publicly accessible • Subset of AWS services covered - currently only supports APIGateway, CloudFront, EC2 (and as a result: ECS, EKS, Beanstalk, Fargate, Batch, & NAT Instances), ElasticSearch, ELB (Classic ELB), ELBv2 (ALB/NLB), Lightsail, RDS, Redshift EXPOSED SERVICES: STATE OF THE ART @ARKADIYT 26
  • 24. IAM Access Analyzer • AWS IAM Access Analyzer helps you identify the resources in your account, such as Amazon S3 buckets or IAM roles, that are shared with an external entity. • LIMITATIONS: • Resource-policy based – designed to report when a resource is accessible. Knows nothing about the state of users, roles, service control policies (SCP), and other relevant configurations • Per region analyzer required - must create an analyzer to enable Access Analyzer in each Region EXPOSED SERVICES: STATE OF THE ART @AWS 27
  • 25. Cartography • Python tool that consolidates infrastructure assets and the relationships between them in an intuitive graph view powered by a Neo4j database • LIMITATIONS: • Larger setup overhead – seems like it has a lot of use cases above and beyond what we were focused on accomplishing. May not be suited to multiple organizations • Not comprehensive – only supports ELBs, EC2, ElasticSearch, S3 for determining internet exposure EXPOSED SERVICES: STATE OF THE ART @ALEXCHANTAVY 28
  • 26. EXPOSED SERVICES: STATE OF THE ART LIMITATION OF AVAILABLE TOOLS 29 CLOUDMAPPER AWS PUBLIC IPS IAM ACCESS ANALYZER CARTOGRAPHY PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE INFRASTRUCTURE ASSETS Yes No No Yes IP ADDRESSES Yes, but IPv6 not supported IPv4 – IPv6 Classic / VPC networking No No PORTS TCP, UDP No No Yes PROTOCOLS No No No Yes NETWORK ACL RULES No No No Yes AWS SERVICES COVERED EC2 – ELBs – RDS EC2 - ELBs - RDS - RDC APIGateway, CloudFront, ElasticSearch, Lightsail Redshift S3 IAM roles EC2 - ELBs - S3 ElasticSearch COMPREHENSIVE No No No No
  • 28. APIs-Guru OpenAPI Directory 🌐 Wikipedia for Web APIs. Directory of REST API definitions in OpenAPI 2.0/3.0 format Identified patterns in AWS Service DNS records from documentation https://github.com/APIs-guru/openapi- directory/tree/master/APIs/amazonaws.com Cross referenced with passive DNS data to understand real-world usage AWS EXPOSURE ENDPOINTS ONGOING RESEARCH 31
  • 29. s3 https://{user_provided}.s3.amazonaws.com cloudfront https://{random_id}.cloudfront.net ec2 ec2-{ip-seperated}.compute-1.amazonaws.com es https://{user_provided}-{random_id}.{region}.es.amazonaws.com elb http://{user_provided}-{random_id}.{region}.elb.amazonaws.com:80 https://{user_provided}-{random_id}.{region}.elb.amazonaws.com:443 elbv2 https://{user_provided}-{random_id}.{region}.elb.amazonaws.com rds mysql://{user_provided}.{random_id}.{region}.rds.amazonaws.com:3306 postgres://{user_provided}.{random_id}.{region}.rds.amazonaws.com:5432 route53 {user-specified} AWS EXPOSURE PATTERNS Beware of misconfigurations that expose your content with these CNAME patterns: 32
  • 30. execute-api https://{random_id}.execute-api.{region}.amazonaws.com/{user_provided} cloudsearch https://doc-{user_provided}-{random_id}.{region}.cloudsearch.amazonaws.com transfer sftp://s-{random_id}.server.transfer.{region}.amazonaws.com iot mqtt://{random_id}.iot.{region}.amazonaws.com:8883 https://{random_id}.iot.{region}.amazonaws.com:8443 https://{random_id}.iot.{region}.amazonaws.com:443 mq https://b-{random_id}-{1,2}.mq.{region}.amazonaws.com:8162 ssl://b-{random_id}-{1,2}.mq.{region}.amazonaws.com:61617 kafka b-{1,2,3,4}.{user_provided}.{random_id}.c{1,2}.kafka.{region}.amazonaws.com {user_provided}.{random_id}.c{1,2}.kafka.useast-1.amazonaws.com cloud9 https://{random_id}.vfs.cloud9.{region}.amazonaws.com mediastore https://{random_id}.data.mediastore.{region}.amazonaws.com. kinesisvideo https://{random_id}.kinesisvideo.{region}.amazonaws.com mediaconvert https://{random_id}.mediaconvert.{region}.amazonaws.com mediapackage https://{random_id}.mediapackage.{region}.amazonaws.com/in/v1/{random_id}/channel AWS EXPOSURE PATTERNS Beware of misconfigurations that expose your content with these CNAME patterns: 33
  • 31. 34 DOMAINS > IP ADDRESSES
  • 32. 35 Note: This was a sample of us-east-1 and not comprehensive analysis of exposures across all regions AWS ELASTICSEARCH EXPOSED INDICES • Found 59 exposed instances • Found 1706 multi-MB exposed indices REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED
  • 33. 36 Note: This was a sample of us-east-1 and not comprehensive analysis of exposures across all regions AWS ELASTICSEARCH EXPOSED INDICES • Found 59 exposed instances • Found 1706 multi-MB exposed indices • IPv4 scanners cannot find this REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED
  • 34. 37 Note: Samsung TV Plus is only available on 2016 - 2019 Samsung Smart TV's in select territories and an internet connection is required. AWS MEDIASTORE SAMSUNG TV PLUS • Found Samsung TV Plus streams • Samsung TV Plus delivers free TV. Get instant access to news, sports, entertainment, and more. No download, additional device, or credit card needed.
  • 35. 38 Note: Samsung TV Plus is only available on 2016 - 2019 Samsung Smart TV's in select territories and an internet connection is required. AWS MEDIASTORE SAMSUNG TV PLUS • Found Samsung TV Plus streams • Samsung TV Plus delivers free TV. Get instant access to news, sports, entertainment, and more. No download, additional device, or credit card needed. • IPv4 scanners cannot find this REDACTED
  • 36. Introducing Smog Identifying The Cloud That No One Wantshttps://github.com/BishopFox/smogcloud 39
  • 37. RUNNING AWS CLI COMMANDS ACROSS ALL ACCOUNTS IN AN AWS ORGANIZATION • https://alestic.com/2019/12/aws-cli-across-organization-accounts/ • Collection of bash functions to help run aws-cli commands across roles in multiple accounts with MFA Ø https://github.com/alestic/aws-cli-multi-account-sessions ADDITIONAL REFERENCES & TECHNIQUES RESOURCES 40