The document discusses three key challenges faced by national states in Europe due to globalization and European integration:
1. National states have lost some control over their economies as major corporations have moved operations to other countries and the EU has taken on more governance roles. This diminishes national autonomy.
2. There are pressures for policy and institutional convergence across countries, but the realities are more complex with continued divergence at the micro-level between countries.
3. Both globalization and European integration subject national corporations and policies to greater regulatory controls and competition between countries to attract businesses, creating tensions around balancing economic and regulatory goals.
Law of the Future 2011
23 & 24 June 2011, Peace Palace, The Hague, The Netherlands
Title: Conflict, Fragility and Development in a Globalized World:
Challenges and Implications for the Law of The Future
By: Hassane Cisse
Keynote Presentation
www.lawofthefuture.org
Supranational Integration Versus Intergovernmental Structure: The European U...Abdeslam Badre, PhD
The thesis of this essay provokes a statement holding that the AU, compared the EU, has so far failed in its endeavor to develop an “integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in global arena”. The reason behind this partial failure is accounted for in terms the level of intergovernmental and supranational arrangements characterizing both the EU and AU. To support this claim, the paper suggests a comparative analysis of the functional mechanisms of each of the Unions, by discussing the variables of Intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, as distinguishing features between the two Unions. Three sections constitute the body of the essay: 1) a brief presentation of three key concepts: i) intergovernmentalism, ii) supranationalism, and iii) regional integration; 2) the historical contexts within which each of the Unions was created; and 3) a comparative analysis.
This paper studies determinants of income inequality using a newly assembled panel of 16 countries over the entire twentieth century. We focus on three groups of income earners: the rich (P99-100), the upper middle class (P90-99), and the rest of the population (P0-90). The results show that periods of high economic growth disproportionately increases the top percentile
income share at the expense of the rest of the top decile. Financial development is also pro-rich and the outbreak of banking crises is associated with reduced income shares of the rich. Trade openness has no clear distributional impact (if anything openness reduces top shares). Government spending, however, is negative for the upper middle class and positive for the nine lowest deciles but does not seem to affect the rich. Finally, tax
progressivity reduces top income shares and when accounting for real dynamic effects the impact can be important over time.
Version of March 25, 2009. Please check for updates https://www.elsevier.com/
Read more research publications at: https://www.hhs.se/site
Union Density Dilemmas in France & BritainCharles Audley
A brief look at the reasons behind declining trade union union density in two prominent EU economies; France and Britain. This is a comparison essay, which also looks at potential remedies to weakened union membership.
Law of the Future 2011
23 & 24 June 2011, Peace Palace, The Hague, The Netherlands
Title: Conflict, Fragility and Development in a Globalized World:
Challenges and Implications for the Law of The Future
By: Hassane Cisse
Keynote Presentation
www.lawofthefuture.org
Supranational Integration Versus Intergovernmental Structure: The European U...Abdeslam Badre, PhD
The thesis of this essay provokes a statement holding that the AU, compared the EU, has so far failed in its endeavor to develop an “integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in global arena”. The reason behind this partial failure is accounted for in terms the level of intergovernmental and supranational arrangements characterizing both the EU and AU. To support this claim, the paper suggests a comparative analysis of the functional mechanisms of each of the Unions, by discussing the variables of Intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, as distinguishing features between the two Unions. Three sections constitute the body of the essay: 1) a brief presentation of three key concepts: i) intergovernmentalism, ii) supranationalism, and iii) regional integration; 2) the historical contexts within which each of the Unions was created; and 3) a comparative analysis.
This paper studies determinants of income inequality using a newly assembled panel of 16 countries over the entire twentieth century. We focus on three groups of income earners: the rich (P99-100), the upper middle class (P90-99), and the rest of the population (P0-90). The results show that periods of high economic growth disproportionately increases the top percentile
income share at the expense of the rest of the top decile. Financial development is also pro-rich and the outbreak of banking crises is associated with reduced income shares of the rich. Trade openness has no clear distributional impact (if anything openness reduces top shares). Government spending, however, is negative for the upper middle class and positive for the nine lowest deciles but does not seem to affect the rich. Finally, tax
progressivity reduces top income shares and when accounting for real dynamic effects the impact can be important over time.
Version of March 25, 2009. Please check for updates https://www.elsevier.com/
Read more research publications at: https://www.hhs.se/site
Union Density Dilemmas in France & BritainCharles Audley
A brief look at the reasons behind declining trade union union density in two prominent EU economies; France and Britain. This is a comparison essay, which also looks at potential remedies to weakened union membership.
Recent work on the so-called resource curse has focused on the importance of the interaction between institutional quality and resource abundance. The combination of low quality institutions and easily appropriable resources (such as oil and minerals) tend to be particularly bad for economic development. On the other hand, if institutions are good these same resources contribute more to economic growth than other types of natural wealth. While certainly pointing in the right direction this strand of literature leaves some open questions. First, it is vague on the precise channels through which institutional quality operates. Second, the empirical measures of institutions are often composite measures that arguably include measures of institutional outcomes rather than durable “rules of the game”. Using data for the period 1970-2003, this paper study the extent to which combinations of resource-types and constitutional setup determine the degree of appropriative activity in a country. Our results show that parliamentary regimes and majoritarian electoral systems are associated with less (or no) resource curse-effect than are presidential and proportional electoral systems. These effects are particularly strong in countries having much ores, metals and fuels.
By Jesper Roine (with A. Boschini and J. Pettersson), proceedings from "Meeting Global Challenges in Research Cooperation", Uppsala.
The institution economics became a predominant analytical perspective for developmental national experiences. The economic success or failure has been predominantly explained by the role played by institutions. This approach has particularly been applied to the national experiences where natural resources are abundant and form their main source of exports. Irrespective of this structural dimension, so follows the argument, countries can escape from the “commodity trap” associated to this resource endowment if good institutions can transform this natural asset in an opportunity to foster investment and spread development to other areas and sectors. In these analyses the good economic institutions are normally considered the set of institutions that were supposed to be predominant in developed market economies. This paper considers critically this analysis building its main arguments in two steps. It will be argued that the consolidation of private interests on production of natural resource limit their use for general development economic purpose but it will be argued also that this possibility exists in oil and gas and other strategic mineral raw material when by geopolitical reasons a national vested interest is formed as predominant economic power. Nevertheless this requires an encompassing industrial policy. These arguments will be illuminated by comparisons between Russia, and Venezuela.
This paper takes a systematic look at the economic impact of the crisis that started in earnest in the fall of 2008 across countries and regions. Despite warnings of growing domestic and external imbalances in many countries years ahead of the crisis, the massive impact of the crisis came as a surprise to most. By correlating economic performance in the crisis with an extensive set of early warning, country insurance, and policy indicators, this paper provides some lessons on crisis prevention and management for the future. Although significant efforts have been made to develop robust early warnings systems, the paper shows the mixed success of some commonly analyzed indicators in predicting economic outcomes in this crisis. The only robust early warning indicator was increases in real estate prices while international reserves seem to have insured against the worst crisis outcomes on average. However, much work on building a robust early warning system remains and the analytical and empirical challenges in this area are substantial. The issues confronting early warning systems are also relevant to the more recent field of macro prudential supervision and regulation. Nevertheless, the cost of crises is massive and preventing future ones with better regulation, policies and supervision based on solid research must be a top priority among policy makers and academics alike.
The European debt crisis triggered a debate on the lacking components of the EU and EMU integration architecture. Many believe that a common currency requires closer fiscal and political integration as a condition for its survival. This opinion is not necessarily supported by the experience of other monetary unions, especially those created by sovereign states. On the other hand, the current EU integration architecture already contains several elements of fiscal union. Furthermore, in several important policy areas such as financial supervision, defense, security, border protection, foreign policy, environmental protection, and climate change, the centralization of tasks and resources at the Union level could offer increasing returns to scale and a better chance to address pan-European externalities. This applies to the entire EU, not only to the Eurozone.
Each variant of fiscal integration must be based on sound foundations of fiscal discipline. Market discipline, i.e., the danger of sovereign default, supplemented by clear and consistently enforced fiscal rules is the best solution to this problem. Unfortunately, since 2010, the ‘no bail out’ principle has been replaced by a policy of conditional bailout of governments in fiscal trouble. Some proposals, such as Eurobonds or the lender of last resort to governments, go even further in this direction, and threaten to build a dysfunctional fiscal union.
Authored by: Marek Dąbrowski
Published in 2013
We argue that the tilt towards donor interests over recipient needs in aid allocation and practices may be particularly strong in new partnerships. Using the natural experiment of Eastern transition we find that commercial and strategic concerns influenced both aid flows and entry in the first half of the 1990s, but much less so later on. We also find that fractionalization increased and that early aid to the region was particularly volatile, unpredictable and tied. Our results may explain why aid to Iraq and Afghanistan has had little development impact and serve as warning for Burma and Arab Spring regimes.
Globalization and the future of the laws of Sovreign States.docxHussain Shah
This study contributes to the jurisprudential discussion by arguing that globalization is far from a simple rejection of sovereignty and state law. It does so by combining the techniques of international political economics and sociolegal theory. Global processes have had a significant impact on state law. When analyzing the relationship between globalization and law, we must necessarily move the concept of sovereignty to the foreground when reformulating the entrenched disciplinary assumptions underlying these conceptual definitions of the national and international. At the same time, state law is highly adaptive and plays a significant role in recasting transnational developments. More importantly, in practice, the current divide between international and domestic law is becoming increasingly muddled. The result of these interactions necessitates a reassessment of what constitutes "law."
Arrangements by which politically connected firms receive economic favors are a common feature around the world, but little is known of the form or effects of influence in business-
government relationships. We present a simple model in which influence requires firms to provide goods of political value in exchange for economic privileges. We argue that political influence improves the business environment for selected firms, but restricts their ability to fire workers. Under these conditions, if political influence primarily lowers fixed costs over variable costs, then favored firms will be less likely to invest and their productivity will suffer, even if they earn higher profits than non-influential firms. We rely on the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys of approximately 8,000 firms in 40 developing countries, and control for a number of biases present in the data. We find that influential firms benefit from lower administrative and regulatory barriers (including bribe taxes), greater pricing power, and easier access to credit. But these firms also provide politically valuable benefits to incumbents through bloated payrolls and greater tax payments. Finally, these firms are worse-performing than their non-influential counterparts. Our results highlight a potential channel by which cronyism leads to persistent underdevelopment.
Poverty is associated with political conflict in developing countries, but evidence of individual grievances translating into dissent among the poor is mixed. We analyze survey data from 40 developing nations to understand the determinants radicalism, support for violence, and participation in legal anti-regime actions as petitions, demonstrations, and strikes. In particular, we examine the role of perceived political and economic inequities. Our findings suggest that individuals who feel marginalized tend to harbor extremist resentments against the government, but they are generally less likely to join collective political movements that aim to instigate regime changes. This potentially explains the commonly-observed pattern in low- and middle-income countries whereby marginalized groups, despite their political attitudes and high-levels of community engagement, are more difficult to mobilize in nation-wide movements. We also find that arenas for active political participation (beyond voting) are more likely to be dominated by upper-middle income groups who are committed, ultimately, to preserving the status quo. Suppressing these forms of political action may thus be counterproductive, if it pushes these groups towards more radical preferences. Finally, our findings suggest that the poor, in developing nations, may be caught in a vicious circle of self-exclusion and greater marginalization.
Anders Olofsgård (with R. Desai and T. Yousef).
Dictatorships do not survive by repression alone. Rather, dictatorial rule is often explained as an ― authoritarian bargain by which citizens relinquish political rights for economic security. The applicability of the authoritarian bargain to decision-making in non-democratic states, however, has not been thoroughly examined. We conceptualize this bargain as a simple game between a representative citizen and an autocrat who faces the threat of insurrection, and where economic transfers and political influence are simultaneously determined. Our model yields precise implications for the empirical patterns that are expected to exist. Tests of a system of equations with panel data comprising 80 non-democratic states between 1975 and 1999 confirm the predictions of the authoritarian-bargain thesis, with some variation across different categories of dictatorship.
Although there exists a vast literature on aid efficiency (the effect of aid on GDP), and that aid allocation determinants have been estimated, little is known about the minute details of aid allocation. This article investigates empirically a claim repeatedly made in the past that aid donors herd. Building upon a methodology applied to financial markets, this article finds that aid donors herd similarly to portfolio funds on financial markets. It also estimates the causes of herding and finds that political transitions towards more autocratic regimes repel donors, but that transitions towards democracy have no effect. Finally, identified causes of herding explain little of its overall level, suggesting strategic motives play an important role.
Response 1 The European Union seems to be one of the few mode.docxwilfredoa1
Response 1:
The European Union seems to be one of the few modern arguments that can be made in favor of liberal IR theory. Following WWII realist principles would have dictated that states compete to fill the power vacuum left by the fall of Germany with each state pursuing the sole goal of European hegemony. Amazingly, this is the opposite of what happened. Perhaps it was the need to band together against the powerful Russian threat during the Cold War, which would conform to realist theory, but for whatever reason the European states chose to cooperate and form international institutions instead. According to our lesson this week the EU began as an economic IO to regulate trade in certain materials, and later customs. This should not be surprising, given what we learned two weeks about the link between economic prosperity and the expansion of democracy, but it is still a unique phenomenon in global politics. Between NATO and the EU, Europe probably hosts more successful supranational organizations than any other region in the world. There are other successful supranational organizations, such as ASEAN and the African Union, but they have had significant troubles and do not enjoy the same level of support from their member nations that the EU does. Some of the common difficulties we have seen facing supranational political organizations are accountability and enforcement. Tallberg described the two solutions to this as enforcement and management. “Enforcement theorists characteristically stress a coercive strategy of monitoring and sanctions, management theorists embrace a problem-solving approach based on capacity building, rule interpretation, and transparency.” (2002, 1) The EU has figured out how to combine these two competing approaches into a political strategy that keeps states in line while not subjugating them or overly imposing on their sovereignty. This is why I find this enforcement and management theory most persuasive in analyzing EU policymaking. The EU’s multi-level governance would not work without the accountability that they obtain through balancing enforcement and management. As I said at the beginning of this post, realism is the theoretical approach least persuasive when explaining EU development and effectiveness. As someone who usually ascribes to the bleak, realist outlook, I find the example set by the EU to be refreshing and hopeful. If ASEAN and the African Union could replicate their success, it would greatly increase stability and peace in their respective regions. The recent secession of Great Britain from the EU (dubbed “Brexit”) may indicate a trending decrease in support for the EU from member nations. Going forward the EU will have to carefully balance their enforcement and management mechanisms as states now see leaving the organization as a viable option if they are not happy with the EU’s policies. Great Britain’s decision to leave the EU comes down to unwillingness to c.
Recent work on the so-called resource curse has focused on the importance of the interaction between institutional quality and resource abundance. The combination of low quality institutions and easily appropriable resources (such as oil and minerals) tend to be particularly bad for economic development. On the other hand, if institutions are good these same resources contribute more to economic growth than other types of natural wealth. While certainly pointing in the right direction this strand of literature leaves some open questions. First, it is vague on the precise channels through which institutional quality operates. Second, the empirical measures of institutions are often composite measures that arguably include measures of institutional outcomes rather than durable “rules of the game”. Using data for the period 1970-2003, this paper study the extent to which combinations of resource-types and constitutional setup determine the degree of appropriative activity in a country. Our results show that parliamentary regimes and majoritarian electoral systems are associated with less (or no) resource curse-effect than are presidential and proportional electoral systems. These effects are particularly strong in countries having much ores, metals and fuels.
By Jesper Roine (with A. Boschini and J. Pettersson), proceedings from "Meeting Global Challenges in Research Cooperation", Uppsala.
The institution economics became a predominant analytical perspective for developmental national experiences. The economic success or failure has been predominantly explained by the role played by institutions. This approach has particularly been applied to the national experiences where natural resources are abundant and form their main source of exports. Irrespective of this structural dimension, so follows the argument, countries can escape from the “commodity trap” associated to this resource endowment if good institutions can transform this natural asset in an opportunity to foster investment and spread development to other areas and sectors. In these analyses the good economic institutions are normally considered the set of institutions that were supposed to be predominant in developed market economies. This paper considers critically this analysis building its main arguments in two steps. It will be argued that the consolidation of private interests on production of natural resource limit their use for general development economic purpose but it will be argued also that this possibility exists in oil and gas and other strategic mineral raw material when by geopolitical reasons a national vested interest is formed as predominant economic power. Nevertheless this requires an encompassing industrial policy. These arguments will be illuminated by comparisons between Russia, and Venezuela.
This paper takes a systematic look at the economic impact of the crisis that started in earnest in the fall of 2008 across countries and regions. Despite warnings of growing domestic and external imbalances in many countries years ahead of the crisis, the massive impact of the crisis came as a surprise to most. By correlating economic performance in the crisis with an extensive set of early warning, country insurance, and policy indicators, this paper provides some lessons on crisis prevention and management for the future. Although significant efforts have been made to develop robust early warnings systems, the paper shows the mixed success of some commonly analyzed indicators in predicting economic outcomes in this crisis. The only robust early warning indicator was increases in real estate prices while international reserves seem to have insured against the worst crisis outcomes on average. However, much work on building a robust early warning system remains and the analytical and empirical challenges in this area are substantial. The issues confronting early warning systems are also relevant to the more recent field of macro prudential supervision and regulation. Nevertheless, the cost of crises is massive and preventing future ones with better regulation, policies and supervision based on solid research must be a top priority among policy makers and academics alike.
The European debt crisis triggered a debate on the lacking components of the EU and EMU integration architecture. Many believe that a common currency requires closer fiscal and political integration as a condition for its survival. This opinion is not necessarily supported by the experience of other monetary unions, especially those created by sovereign states. On the other hand, the current EU integration architecture already contains several elements of fiscal union. Furthermore, in several important policy areas such as financial supervision, defense, security, border protection, foreign policy, environmental protection, and climate change, the centralization of tasks and resources at the Union level could offer increasing returns to scale and a better chance to address pan-European externalities. This applies to the entire EU, not only to the Eurozone.
Each variant of fiscal integration must be based on sound foundations of fiscal discipline. Market discipline, i.e., the danger of sovereign default, supplemented by clear and consistently enforced fiscal rules is the best solution to this problem. Unfortunately, since 2010, the ‘no bail out’ principle has been replaced by a policy of conditional bailout of governments in fiscal trouble. Some proposals, such as Eurobonds or the lender of last resort to governments, go even further in this direction, and threaten to build a dysfunctional fiscal union.
Authored by: Marek Dąbrowski
Published in 2013
We argue that the tilt towards donor interests over recipient needs in aid allocation and practices may be particularly strong in new partnerships. Using the natural experiment of Eastern transition we find that commercial and strategic concerns influenced both aid flows and entry in the first half of the 1990s, but much less so later on. We also find that fractionalization increased and that early aid to the region was particularly volatile, unpredictable and tied. Our results may explain why aid to Iraq and Afghanistan has had little development impact and serve as warning for Burma and Arab Spring regimes.
Globalization and the future of the laws of Sovreign States.docxHussain Shah
This study contributes to the jurisprudential discussion by arguing that globalization is far from a simple rejection of sovereignty and state law. It does so by combining the techniques of international political economics and sociolegal theory. Global processes have had a significant impact on state law. When analyzing the relationship between globalization and law, we must necessarily move the concept of sovereignty to the foreground when reformulating the entrenched disciplinary assumptions underlying these conceptual definitions of the national and international. At the same time, state law is highly adaptive and plays a significant role in recasting transnational developments. More importantly, in practice, the current divide between international and domestic law is becoming increasingly muddled. The result of these interactions necessitates a reassessment of what constitutes "law."
Arrangements by which politically connected firms receive economic favors are a common feature around the world, but little is known of the form or effects of influence in business-
government relationships. We present a simple model in which influence requires firms to provide goods of political value in exchange for economic privileges. We argue that political influence improves the business environment for selected firms, but restricts their ability to fire workers. Under these conditions, if political influence primarily lowers fixed costs over variable costs, then favored firms will be less likely to invest and their productivity will suffer, even if they earn higher profits than non-influential firms. We rely on the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys of approximately 8,000 firms in 40 developing countries, and control for a number of biases present in the data. We find that influential firms benefit from lower administrative and regulatory barriers (including bribe taxes), greater pricing power, and easier access to credit. But these firms also provide politically valuable benefits to incumbents through bloated payrolls and greater tax payments. Finally, these firms are worse-performing than their non-influential counterparts. Our results highlight a potential channel by which cronyism leads to persistent underdevelopment.
Poverty is associated with political conflict in developing countries, but evidence of individual grievances translating into dissent among the poor is mixed. We analyze survey data from 40 developing nations to understand the determinants radicalism, support for violence, and participation in legal anti-regime actions as petitions, demonstrations, and strikes. In particular, we examine the role of perceived political and economic inequities. Our findings suggest that individuals who feel marginalized tend to harbor extremist resentments against the government, but they are generally less likely to join collective political movements that aim to instigate regime changes. This potentially explains the commonly-observed pattern in low- and middle-income countries whereby marginalized groups, despite their political attitudes and high-levels of community engagement, are more difficult to mobilize in nation-wide movements. We also find that arenas for active political participation (beyond voting) are more likely to be dominated by upper-middle income groups who are committed, ultimately, to preserving the status quo. Suppressing these forms of political action may thus be counterproductive, if it pushes these groups towards more radical preferences. Finally, our findings suggest that the poor, in developing nations, may be caught in a vicious circle of self-exclusion and greater marginalization.
Anders Olofsgård (with R. Desai and T. Yousef).
Dictatorships do not survive by repression alone. Rather, dictatorial rule is often explained as an ― authoritarian bargain by which citizens relinquish political rights for economic security. The applicability of the authoritarian bargain to decision-making in non-democratic states, however, has not been thoroughly examined. We conceptualize this bargain as a simple game between a representative citizen and an autocrat who faces the threat of insurrection, and where economic transfers and political influence are simultaneously determined. Our model yields precise implications for the empirical patterns that are expected to exist. Tests of a system of equations with panel data comprising 80 non-democratic states between 1975 and 1999 confirm the predictions of the authoritarian-bargain thesis, with some variation across different categories of dictatorship.
Although there exists a vast literature on aid efficiency (the effect of aid on GDP), and that aid allocation determinants have been estimated, little is known about the minute details of aid allocation. This article investigates empirically a claim repeatedly made in the past that aid donors herd. Building upon a methodology applied to financial markets, this article finds that aid donors herd similarly to portfolio funds on financial markets. It also estimates the causes of herding and finds that political transitions towards more autocratic regimes repel donors, but that transitions towards democracy have no effect. Finally, identified causes of herding explain little of its overall level, suggesting strategic motives play an important role.
Response 1 The European Union seems to be one of the few mode.docxwilfredoa1
Response 1:
The European Union seems to be one of the few modern arguments that can be made in favor of liberal IR theory. Following WWII realist principles would have dictated that states compete to fill the power vacuum left by the fall of Germany with each state pursuing the sole goal of European hegemony. Amazingly, this is the opposite of what happened. Perhaps it was the need to band together against the powerful Russian threat during the Cold War, which would conform to realist theory, but for whatever reason the European states chose to cooperate and form international institutions instead. According to our lesson this week the EU began as an economic IO to regulate trade in certain materials, and later customs. This should not be surprising, given what we learned two weeks about the link between economic prosperity and the expansion of democracy, but it is still a unique phenomenon in global politics. Between NATO and the EU, Europe probably hosts more successful supranational organizations than any other region in the world. There are other successful supranational organizations, such as ASEAN and the African Union, but they have had significant troubles and do not enjoy the same level of support from their member nations that the EU does. Some of the common difficulties we have seen facing supranational political organizations are accountability and enforcement. Tallberg described the two solutions to this as enforcement and management. “Enforcement theorists characteristically stress a coercive strategy of monitoring and sanctions, management theorists embrace a problem-solving approach based on capacity building, rule interpretation, and transparency.” (2002, 1) The EU has figured out how to combine these two competing approaches into a political strategy that keeps states in line while not subjugating them or overly imposing on their sovereignty. This is why I find this enforcement and management theory most persuasive in analyzing EU policymaking. The EU’s multi-level governance would not work without the accountability that they obtain through balancing enforcement and management. As I said at the beginning of this post, realism is the theoretical approach least persuasive when explaining EU development and effectiveness. As someone who usually ascribes to the bleak, realist outlook, I find the example set by the EU to be refreshing and hopeful. If ASEAN and the African Union could replicate their success, it would greatly increase stability and peace in their respective regions. The recent secession of Great Britain from the EU (dubbed “Brexit”) may indicate a trending decrease in support for the EU from member nations. Going forward the EU will have to carefully balance their enforcement and management mechanisms as states now see leaving the organization as a viable option if they are not happy with the EU’s policies. Great Britain’s decision to leave the EU comes down to unwillingness to c.
Rodrik_Feasible_Globalizations
FEASIBLE GLOBALIZATIONS
Dani Rodrik1
Harvard University
July 2002
Introduction
We want economic integration to help boost living standards. We want democratic
politics so that public policy decisions are made by those that are directly affected by them (or
their representatives). And we want self-determination, which comes with the nation-state. This
paper argues that we cannot have all three things simultaneously. The political trilemma of the
global economy is that the nation-state system, democratic politics, and full economic
integration are mutually incompatible. We can have at most two out of the three. It follows that
the direction in which we seem to be headed—global markets without global governance—is
unsustainable.
The alternative is a renewed “Bretton-Woods compromise:” preserving some limits on
integration, as built into the original Bretton Woods arrangements, along with some more global
rules to handle the integration that can be achieved. Those who would make a different choice—
toward tighter economic integration—must face up to the corollary: either tighter world
government or less democracy.
During the first four decades following the close of the Second World War, international
policy makers had kept their ambitions in check. They pursued a limited form of
internationalization of their economies, leaving lots of room for national economic management.
Successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations made great strides, but focused only on the
most egregious of the barriers at the border and excluded large chunks of the economy
1 I am grateful to Michael Weinstein for very helpful suggestions.
2
(agriculture, services, “sensitive” manufactures such as garments). In capital markets,
restrictions on currency transactions and financial flows remained the norm rather than the
exception. This Bretton Woods/GATT regime was successful because its architects subjugated
international economic integration to the needs and demands of national economic management
and of democratic politics.
This strategy changed drastically during the last two decades. Global policy is now
driven by an aggressive agenda of “deep” integration—elimination of all barriers to trade and
capital flows wherever those barriers may be found. The results have been problematic--in terms
of both economic performance (relative to the earlier post-war decades) and political legitimacy.
The simple reason is that “deep” economic integration is unattainable in a context where nation
states and democratic politics still exert considerable force.
The title of this essay conveys therefore two ideas. First, there are inherent limitations to
how far we can push global economic integration. It is neither feasible nor desirable to
maximize what Keynes called “economic entanglements betw ...
Konzervatívny inštitút M. R. Štefánika s podporou Nadácie Tatra banky v spolupráci s ďalšími partnermi organizoval dňa 11. júna 2012 v Bratislave ďalšiu z cyklu prednášok CEQLS. Tentoraz bol našim hosťom Roland Vaubel, profesor ekonómie na Universität Mannheim (Nemecko). Viac informácií nájdete na www.konzervativizmus.sk.
The public debt crisis is not limited to Greece or to the Euro area. In fact, several developed economies face rapidly growing debt-to-GDP ratios, which raise doubts about their long-term solvency. Thus, suggesting that the Eurozone is undergoing a currency crisis or is in danger of disintegration is not the right diagnosis (or at least premature). However, if prudent fiscal policies, fiscal discipline and far-reaching structural reforms are not undertaken soon, both the EU and EMU may face serious internal tensions and obstacles to future economic growth.
Authored by: Marek Dąbrowski
Published in 2010
How will the Autonomous Communities be Affected by the New Fiscal IntegrationMiqui Mel
According to the arguments exposed in this report, although the independence of Catalonia is a strictly political project which
depends on will of the citizens, it seems difficult to pronounce
against it with arguments only based on its infeasibility
from the economic point of view.
Source: Fundació CatDem.
Date: November 2012.
Cross border cooperation and the european administrative space – prospects fr...
EUpaper1
1. Do the national states of Europe share fundamentally similar or
fundamentally different challenges when it comes to whether globalization or
integration are the way to go in their countries? These two words that have been at
the center of arguments in recent European history. The issue is no longer whether
Europe matters but how it matters, to what degree, in what direction, at what pace,
and at what point of time (Paragraph 2, page 60, Borzell). Although I concedethat
there are some fundamentally different obstacles, Globalization and European
integration posefundamentally similar challenges to the national states in Europe.
The globalizing of Europe, which can also be referred as Europeanization, is
seen similarly to integration. For the countries that formed the European
Community, regional integration was not seen just as a way to ensure peace, but it
also appeared the only reasonable answer to the problems to international and
inter-European competition. Globalization since then has increased in magnitude,
speed, and volatility while at the same time decreased national governments ability
to control their effects. “In globalization, governments have given up significant
control of the national autonomy, in other words, the ability to make decisions
independently without regard to external forces…” Some of the effects from this
allow for national governments to alter their own country’s monetary policy. By
doing this the governments focus on tight budgets, low inflation, and caps on
public debt, and other major changes. While radicals insist that governments have
2. lost both their uniqueness and the control necessary to maintain postworld war II
commitments of the welfare state in the face of global forces that have taken away
gradually welfare entitlements and workers’ rights while promoting inequality and
unemployment, skeptics respond by saying that globalizing has done little to help
the problems of the welfare state. This can be explained however by changing
demographics, new developing technologies, and forms of work organizations
have all done every little to change the welfare state (Paragraph 2, page 1, The
Challenges of Globalization and Europeanization)
Another challenge facing the national states in Europe is having all your
major corporations in another country to be able to compete on a global level. The
major hub of European globalization is England, specifically London. The city has
been “the centre of a system of global payments,” since as far back as the 1800’s.
When World War I came around, Londonremained a stable financial center with a
high presence of foreign banks. The city has acted as a central pillar of the global
economy. The globalization launched London onto a new status and has helped its
connection with lower level cities, but also with global cities such as Tokyo and
New York City. Another European city, Brussels, is more concerned with shaping
European integration. European Integration is mirrored in the development of the
city of Brussels, which in turn was heavily influenced by the arrival of the
European institutions such as the European Commission and their international
3. employees. The integration of Europe in two other ways, social structure and its
influence on the urban economy (http://eurozone.over-
blog.org/pages/Europeanization_and_Globalization_in_perspective-828371.html
July 4, 2014).
Another similarity is the national states have to not only worry about
globalizing and integration on a national level, but on a continental level too.
European governance now takes precedenceover national ones now. Member
states of the European Union now are not only emerged a European economic
system that includes tying national currency to the euro, encouraging firms to
become European firms, but also in a European multi-level government (Paragaph
1, page 21, The Challenges of Globalization and Europeanizaton)
European integration has created a whole new dynamic of collective law
which has served to diminish EU member’s control over European only issues.
That amount of networks has ensured that the European level is more privileged in
most business sectors except in financial markets or long-internationalized
industries such as chemicals. (Paragraph 2, page 22, The Challenges of
Globalization and Europeanization).
In both globalization and European integration, member state’s corporations
cannot escape regulatory control. What may be ok in the other countries, like a
merger in the US such as Honeywell and General Electric (GE), may not be alright
4. in Europe. The reason why this merger was not allowed in Europe was it was
thought to have created a monopoly. In the areas of technical standard-setting,
environmental protection, and the health and safety policies, the European
Commission has becomeever-increasingly more of a global force.
Europeanization has been an even greater force for change in the European Union
member states than globalization, greatly diminishing national autonomy and
control in exchange for much greater shared EU supranational authority and
control (Paragraph 3, page 22, The Challenges of Globalization and
Europeanization). With multiple national regulators governing international
markets, the regulators themselves are thrust into competition. On one hand, the
work on comparative economic systems implies that differences in regulatory
regimes can lead to an increasingly better chance of determining winners and
losers in the global market. As governments reduce the forms of industrial
protection and promotion, domestic regulatory systems become more important to
the competitive advantage of national firms. Skeptics of this believe that the very
competition between regulators erodes differences between national regulatory
regimes, rendering them out-of-date as a sourceof comparative advantage
(Paragrpaph 2, page 170, Vogel). Authors McKenzie and Lee (1991) and Wriston
(1992) stress that in a world of international markets governed by national
regulations, corporations can engage in regulatory arbitrage. Regulatory arbitrage
5. is the corporations shifting their capital or their business activities to other
countries with lighter less harsh regulatory burdens. As a result of this action by
corporations, countries or national authorities compete to design regulations to
attract capital and business activities. To do this, the national authorities reduce
regulatory burdens (Paragraph 3, Page 170, Vogel,). As stated by David M.
Konisky, this is called the race to the bottomtheory. The theory states that
confronted with economic competition, states have incentives to adoptan
excessively lax in his case environmental standards, but I feel this could be applied
to regulatory standards in an effort to attract capital and corporations. “Therace to
bottom argument is an example of the “Prisoner’s Dilemma”; the equilibrium
outcome is suboptimal, since states would be better off collectively maintaining
their own standards rather than relaxing them. (Paragraph 3, page 854)”
When it comes to Europeanization, adaptational pressures are generated by
the fact that the emerging European policy encompasses structures of authoritative
decision making with might clash with national structure of policy making, and
that given that the EU member states have no exit option given that EU law
constitutes the law of the land. This conceptis very different from other
international institutions which are simply based on voluntary intergovernmental
arrangements (Paragraph 3, page 61, Borzell).
6. Firstly, the European policies might lead to a policy misfit between European
rules and regulations, on one hand, and on the other, domestic policies. “European
policies can challenge national policy goals, regulatory standards like stated
previously, the instruments or technologies used to achieve policy goals, and/or the
underlying problem-solving approach(Heritier et al 1996).” As policy misfits
produceadaptational costs at the domestic level, member states try to achieve
greater policies at a European level in order to reduce their compliance problems
(Paragraph 4, page 61, Borzell).
Europeanization can also cause institutionalmisfit challenging domestic
rules and procedures and the collective understandings attached to them. European
rules and procedures which give governments decision power challenges “the
territorial institutions of highly decentralized member states which grant their
regions autonomous decision powers (Paragraph 3, page 62, Borzell).” The
accessibility of the European Commission for societal interests “challenges the
statist business-government relations in France and the corporatist systems of
interest mediation in Germany (Conant 2001).” Europeanziation might even
threaten deeply collective understandings of national identity as it touches upon
constitutive norms such as sovereignty (Checkel 2001). Institutional misfit is less
direct than policy misfit. “Although it can result in substantial adaptational
7. pressure, its effect is more likely to be long term and incremental (Paragraph 3,
pages 62-63, Borzell).”
Another fundamentally similar challenge is measuring convergence and
divergence in Europe. What looks like convergence at the macro level may still
show a significant degree of divergence at the micro-level. The Economic and
Monetary Union gave rise to policy convergence among the existing twelve
member states with regard to inflation and budgetary constraints, as well as to
institutional convergence concerning the independence of national bank. This did
not lead to similar institutional arrangements in the economic and fiscal policy
area. And the means by which the member states reduced their budget deficits
varied drastically- from austerity programs to new “euro” taxes in Italy (Sbragia,
2001). “While all member states responded to the liberalization of
telecommunication by creating independent regulatory agencies, they adopted
different institutional setups, reflecting variation in organizational structures
(Bolhoff 2002).” Policy convergence seems to be more likely to work than
institutional convergence as policy changes are more easily achieved. EU rules
and regulations require convergence in policy outcomes (such as low inflation or
budgetary restraint in the case of EMU), while they leave substantial extra power
to the member states with regard to the means of ensure compliance. Thus,
Europeans need to specify what they mean by “policy convergence”; convergence
8. in outcome or convergence in policy processes and instruments (Paragraph 3,
pages 71-72, Borzell). There is no convergence however when it comes to welfare.
Rather than all the countries following the Anglo-Saxon way, most non Anglo-
Saxon countries retain the basic feature of their traditional models even as they
introduce liberalizing measures. The Scandinavian countries have remained true to
eh social-democratic model by respecting values of equality and universality of
provision while maintaining a high level of benefits and services despite cuts in
benefits and the introduction of user fees (Paragrapht 2, page 7,The Challenges of
Globalization and Europeanization).
There can be little doubtthat multinational businesses have become
increasingly “stateless (Holstein 1990)” both “becausethey are much harder for a
country of origin to control as they have grown in size and scope(Ohmae 1990)
and becausethey are much more difficult to categorize by national origin in terms
of either ownership or products (Reich 1991).” While home and hostcountries
have been giving up their traditional controls over business in a wide range of
areas in responseto international and regional trade agreements as well as internal
reform initiatives, big business has grown even larger and more global than ever.
In 1970’s UN Center on Transnationals found that more than half of the seven
thousand multinationals were American or British. Fast forward twenty years,
fewer than half of the now thirty five thousand multinationals were Americans,
9. Japanese, German, or Swiss (Barnet and Cavanagh 1994). Globalization
encompasses not just the biggest corporations but also countless small and medium
size firms (SME’s) which have been integrated into production and distribution
networks globally (Castells 1996) (Paragrpah 2, page 7, Challenges of
Globalization and Europeanization).
In conclusion, the three terms of globalization, Europeanization, and
European integration are intertwined in meaning and common obstacles. These
issues will never go away and will be controversial in the future for the European
Union member states.
10. Borzell, Tanja A., and Thomas Risse. "Conceptalizing the Domestic Impact of Europe." The
Politics of Europeanization (2003): 57-80. Print.
"The Challenges of Globalization and Europeanization." (2002): n. pag. Print.
"Europeanization and Globalization in Perspective." N.p., n.d. Web. 4 July 2014.
"Globalization and European Integration in Perspective." Andre's Travel Blog. N.p., n.d. Web. 4
July 2014.
Konisky, David M. "Regulatory Competition and Environmental Enforcement: Is There a Race
to the Bottom." American Journal of Political Science 51.4 (2007): 853-70. Print.