This webinar will provide a short introduction to the State Aid regulation, as well as to the current progress in auction implementation in Member States, past policy discussions on harmonization and support scheme opening. Two main open auction types will be analysed: reciprocally opened auctions versus commonly held auctions. Aspects as the degree of coordination and negotiation, burden sharing, scalability, complexity for investors and policy risks will be assessed. A hypothetic case study of common auction between Portugal and Belgium will be presented. Finally, recommendations will be formulated for consideration in the context of the Renewable Energy Directive.

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S i m o n e S t e i n h i l b e r , F r a u n h o f e r I S I
L e o n a r d o E N E R G Y W e b i n a r
O c t o b e r 4 , 2 0 1 6
EU REGIONAL COOPERATION AND
INTERNATIONAL AUCTIONS FOR
RENEWABLES

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 Background
 Designing International Auctions
 Case Study Portugal – Belgium
 Policy Implications and Recommendations
Content

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 Background
 Designing International Auctions
 Case Study Portugal – Belgium
 Policy Implications and Recommendations
Content

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State Aid regulation:
 General Block Exemption Regulation GBER - Commission Regulation (EU) No. 651/2014:
 Encourages implementation of competitive mechanisms in RES support by 2017
 Commission explicitly encourages Member States to open support schemes
Regulatory Background

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Past and current auction schemes
 Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, UK, Spain
 Brazil, California, China, South Africa
Auction schemes under preparation:
 Croatia, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary
For more info, see www.auresproject.eu
Auction Implementations - Examples

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Levels of design elements. Source: del Río, P., Haufe, M.C.,
Wigand, F., and Steinhilber, S., 2015. Overview of Design
Elements for RES-E Auctions. Available at http://auresproject.eu,
p.9
Auction Design Elements
Instruments
price-based quantity-based
FIT FIP Investment
grant
Quota
Duration of support
Technology-specific vs.
neutral
Etc……
Price level setting
mechanism
auction-based
administrative
Price only/multi-criteria
Sealed bid/descending clock/hybrid
designelements
Level2
Pay-as-bid/uniform price
Price setting mechanism: Auction
Pre-qualification requirements
Penalties
Regularity of auctions
Site selection
Price ceilings

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Investment Grant
 Direct exposure to market signals during
operation
 Non-variable RES: strike price may be necessary
to require operator to start production
 Variable RES: possible incentive for undesired
plant designs
Support Payment Types
FIT
 No exposure to market signals
 Not encouraged under State Aid Regulation
FIP
 Varying degrees of market signal exposure
-> varying division of risk between producers and
regulator
Sliding FIP Fixed FIP
Support level
Cap-and-Floor
FIP
Market price
Total revenue (hourly)
Total revenue (monthly average)
FIP as
percentage

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Why international auctions?
 Same arguments as previously in favour of support scheme harmonisation:
 Use of best sites -> higher static efficiency in the sense of reduced generation costs
 Compatibility with EU internal market
 Based on international agreement, may be less prone to retroactive changes
Benefits of International Auctions

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 Hot spot creation requires grid expansion and reinforcements; lowers electricity market
prices of other producers in the same market zone
 Public acceptability
 Co-existence with national auctions
 Permitting procedures not aligned
 Access to finance: Cost of capital and typical debt-equity-ratios of projects differ – relevant
for smaller actors
 Electricity market prices differ as markets not yet fully coupled
Challenges of International Auctions

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 Background
 Designing International Auctions
 Case Study Portugal – Belgium
 Policy Implications and Recommendations
Content

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Two basic options for international auctions:
 Reciprocally opened auctions:
 Member State A holds its own, nationally organised auctions
 Auction is opened for installations from Member State B
 Most likely reciprocal opening
 Common auctions
 Member States A and B hold an auction together
 All auction design elements commonly determined
 may be held in addition to national auctions or replace them
Types of International Auctions

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 Setting the target volume
 Support expenditures, support type, and reference electricity price
 Effort sharing and payment mechanism
 Necessity of physical import of non-domestic RES-E
 Pre-qualification requirements
 Comparability of licenses and permits
 Site eligibility
 Steering geographical distribution
 Coordination of grid plans with RES deployment
Designing Opened Auctions

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 Setting the target volume
 Support expenditures, support type, and reference electricity price
 Effort sharing and payment mechanism
 Necessity of physical import of non-domestic RES-E
 Pre-qualification requirements
 Comparability of licenses and permits
 Site eligibility
 Steering geographical distribution
 Coordination of grid plans with RES deployment
Designing Opened Auctions

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 Setting the target volume
 Support expenditures, support type, and reference electricity price
 Sliding FIP, domestic ref price:
 Alternatives:
 different reference price
 fixed FIP
Designing Opened Auctions
Assumptions:
• 2 Member States
• Total volume of auction: 100 MW, corresponds to 100 GWh/a (at 1000 FLH)
•Country A: LCOE 100 €/MWh
• Country B: LCOE 80 €/MWh
•Reference electricity price: Country in which installation is located
LCOE (€/MWh)
Market value (€/MWh)
Support payment (€/MWh)
Case 1:
60
40
100
80 50
30
Country A Country B
Volume incountry A: 0 MW supportexpenditures0€
Volume incountry B: 100 MW  supportexpenditures3.0mn€
Case 2:
60
40
100
80 30
50
Country A Country B
Volume incountry A: 0 MW supportexpenditures0€
Volume incountry B: 100 MW  supportexpenditures 5.0mn€

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 Setting the target volume
 Support expenditures, support type, and reference electricity price
 Effort sharing and payment mechanism
 Necessity of physical import of non-domestic RES-E
 Pre-qualification requirements
 Comparability of licenses and permits
 Site eligibility
 Steering geographical distribution
 Coordination of grid plans with RES deployment
Designing Opened Auctions

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 Setting the target volume
 Support expenditures, support type, and reference electricity price
 Effort sharing and payment mechanism
 Necessity of physical import of non-domestic RES-E
 Pre-qualification requirements
 Comparability of licenses and permits
 Site eligibility
 Steering geographical distribution
 Coordination of grid plans with RES deployment
Designing Opened Auctions

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 Setting the target volume
 Support expenditures, support type, and reference electricity price
 Effort sharing and payment mechanism
 Necessity of physical import of non-domestic RES-E
 Pre-qualification requirements
 Comparability of licenses and permits
 Site eligibility
 Steering geographical distribution
 Coordination of grid plans with RES deployment
Designing Opened Auctions

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 Setting the target volume
 Support expenditures, support type, and reference electricity price
 Effort sharing and payment mechanism
 Necessity of physical import of non-domestic RES-E
 Pre-qualification requirements
 Comparability of licenses and permits
 Site eligibility
 Steering geographical distribution
 Coordination of grid plans with RES deployment
Designing Opened Auctions

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 Setting the target volume
 Support expenditures, support type, and reference electricity price
 Effort sharing and payment mechanism
 Necessity of physical import of non-domestic RES-E
 Pre-qualification requirements
 Comparability of licenses and permits
 Site eligibility
 Steering geographical distribution
 Coordination of grid plans with RES deployment
Designing Opened Auctions

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 Setting the target volume
 Support expenditures, support type, and reference electricity price
 Effort sharing and payment mechanism
 Necessity of physical import of non-domestic RES-E
 Pre-qualification requirements
 Comparability of licenses and permits
 Site eligibility
 Steering geographical distribution
 Coordination of grid plans with RES deployment
Designing Opened Auctions

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Reciprocally Opened Auctions

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 Setting the target volume
 Support expenditures, support types, and the reference electricity price
 Effort sharing and payment mechanism
Reciprocally Opened Auctions

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 Setting the target volume
 Support expenditures, support types, and the reference electricity price
 Effort sharing and payment mechanism
Reciprocally Opened Auctions

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 Setting the target volume
 Support expenditures, support types, and the reference electricity price
Reciprocally Opened Auctions
Assumptions:
• 2 Member States, country A opens auction to installations from country B
• Total volume of auction: 100 MW, corresponds to 100 GWh/a (at 1000 FLH)
•Country A: LCOE 100 €/MWh
• Country B: LCOE 80 €/MWh
•Reference electricity price: Country in which installation is located
LCOE (€/MWh)
Market value (€/MWh)
Support payment (€/MWh)
Case 1:
60
40
100
80 50
30
Country A Country B
National auction:
Volume incountry A: 100 MW  supportexpenditures4.0mn€
International auction:
Volume incountry A: 0 MW  supportexpenditures0€
Volume incountry B: 100 MW  supportexpenditures3.0mn€
Burdensharing:
decreasedsupportexpendituresforcountryA
increaseddeploymentandlocal benefitsforcountry B
Case 2:
60
40
100
80 30
50
Country A Country B
National auction:
Volume incountry A: 100 MW  supportexpenditures 4.0mn€
International auction:
Volume incountry A: 0 MW  supportexpenditures 0€
Volume incountry B: 100 MW  supportexpenditures 5.0mn€
Burdensharing:
no local benefits,increase insupportexpendituresforcountry A
increaseddeploymentandlocal benefitsforcountry B
Alternatives for reference price:
Electricity price in country A
 Risk for regulator
 Risk for plant operator, leading to
winner‘s curse
 -> not recommended
Average price of A and B
 More balanced risk
 Main unproductive risk: lack of
interconnectors
Fixed FIP

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 Setting the target volume
 Support expenditures, support types, and the reference electricity price
 Effort sharing and payment mechanism
Reciprocally Opened Auctions

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Commonly Held Auctions

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 Setting the target volume
 Support expenditures, support types, and the reference electricity price
 Effort sharing and payment mechanism
Commonly Held Auctions

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 Setting the target volume
 Support expenditures, support types, and the reference electricity price
 Effort sharing and payment mechanism
Commonly Held Auctions

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 Setting the target volume
 Support expenditures, support types, and the reference electricity price
Commonly Held Auctions
Alternatives for reference price:
Electricity price in country A or B
Average price of A and B
 More balanced risk
 Main unproductive risk: lack of
interconnectors
Fixed FIP
Assumptions:
• 2 Member States holding a common auction
• Total volume of auction: 100 MW, corresponds to 100 GWh/a (at 1000 FLH)
• Auction share country A: 80%
• Auction share country B: 20%
• Country A: LCOE 100 €/MWh
• Country B: LCOE 80 €/MWh
•Reference electricity price: Country in which installation is located
LCOE (€/MWh)
Market value (€/MWh)
Support payment (€/MWh)
Case 1:
60
40
100
80 50
30
Country A Country B
National auction:
Volume incountry A: 80 MW  supportexpenditures3.2mn€
Volume incountry B: 20 MW supportexpenditures0.6mn€
Internationalauction:
Volume incountry A: 0 MW  supportexpenditures0€
Volume incountry B: 100 MW  supportexpenditures3.0mn€
Burdensharing:
SupportexpenditurescountryA:2.4mn € (80% * 3.0 mn €)
SupportexpenditurescountryB:0.6mn € (20% * 3.0 mn €)
decreasedsupportexpendituresforcountry A
increaseddeploymentandlocal benefitsforcountry B
Case 2:
60
40
100
80 30
50
Country A Country B
National auction:
Volume incountry A: 80 MW  supportexpenditures 3.2mn€
Volume incountry B: 20 MW supportexpenditures 1.0mn€
International auction:
Volume incountry A: 0 MW  supportexpenditures 0€
Volume incountry B: 100 MW  supportexpenditures 5.0mn€
Burdensharing:
Supportexpenditures country A:4.0mn € (80% * 5.0 mn €)
Supportexpenditures country B:1.0mn € (20% * 5.0 mn €)
no local benefitsfromdeployment,increasedsupportexpenditures
increaseddeploymentandlocal benefitsforcountry B

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 Setting the target volume
 Support expenditures, support types, and the reference electricity price
 Effort sharing and payment mechanism
Commonly Held Auctions

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Assessment Summary
Reciprocally opened auctions Commonly held auctions
Required degree of
coordination/negotiation
High. Participating Member States need to agree to open auctions
reciprocally. Design elements which affect the other party, such as
target volumes, must be agreed upon.
Very High. Participating Member States need to agree on all design
elements of the support mechanism and the auction mechanism
itself.
Effort sharing Clear. Each Member State pays the support allocated in its national
auctions. Produced RES electricity counts towards the auctioneering
Member States’ RES share. Additionally, potential sharing of indirect
costs and benefits may be agreed upon.
To be negotiated. Participating Member States can agree on a
distribution of target volume, and expenditures will be shared
accordingly.
In case of sliding premiums, possibly additional complications due to
differing electricity market prices.
Scalability Potentially complex. Mutual agreement necessary between each
pair of Member States.
Good. Common auctions can be held by clusters of Member States
wishing to cooperate.
Complexity for
internationalinvestors
High, especially as more Member States open their auctions.
Investors need to familiarise themselves with auction designs in
each market in which they participate
Moderate. Less complex the more Member States participate in the
same common auction, as investors only have to familiarise
themselves with one auction procedure.
Policy risks, likelihood of
retroactivechanges
Slightly reduced as compared to national auction schemes due to
international agreement, differs with the policy risks of individual
countries
Reduced due to international agreement. Especially in cluster
constellations combining low-risk and high-risk countries the
financing risk will be averaged and therefore countries with good
potentialsand higher risks will profit.

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 Background
 Designing International Auctions
 Case Study Portugal – Belgium
 Policy Implications and Recommendations
Content

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Hypothetical case: Common auction
scheme for large-scale PV
PT:
 low-cost PV potentials
 Has expressed interest in cooperation
 Currently no financial support for
large PV
BE:
 High-cost PV potential
 Build PV in Portugal rather than
domestic offshore wind?
 Large PV supported under regional
quota schemes
Major Barrier: Lack of interconnectors ES-
FR
Case Study Portugal - Belgium
LCOE estimate for large-scale PV installations in Belgium and the Iberian
Peninsula in 2020, based on 7% interest rate. Source: Own calculations.

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Objectives of scheme Efficient support allocation; geographical steering using contingents
Auction volumes 100 MW in first year, to be scaled up to 300-400 MW/year
Project sizes 100 kW – 10 MW
Ceiling price 10% above LCOE -> 60.5 €/MWh, with 99 €/MWh for Belgian contingent
Effort sharing Assumption: 70:30 allocation of electricity. Effort sharing to be negotiated
Periodicity long-term and predictable; 2-3 auction rounds/year
Type of support sliding FIP, reference price is 3-month weighted average of PT and BE prices
Auction format multiple-item auctions
Auction type static, sealed bid
Pricing rule start with pay-as-bid, later alternate with uniform pricing
Pre-qualifications, penalties two-stepped bid bonds, grid access and construction permits
Potential Common Auction Portugal - Belgium

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 We assume a 30:70 allocation of electricity between Portugal and Belgium
 Indirect costs and benefits mainly in Portugal
 Additional system costs
 Benefits: labour market, local investment, less local pollution
 Depending on valuation, compensation may be requested by either Portugal or Belgium
 Willingness to pay
 Belgium: Equal to support level that would need to be paid for domestic low-cost
installations (onshore wind)
 Portugal: Equal to support level that would result from purely domestic PV auction
Effort Sharing

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Objectives of scheme Efficient support allocation; geographical steering using contingents
Auction volumes 100 MW in first year, to be scaled up to 300-400 MW/year
Project sizes 100 kW – 10 MW
Ceiling price 10% above LCOE -> 60.5 €/MWh, with 99 €/MWh for Belgian contingent
Effort sharing Assumption: 70:30 allocation of electricity. Effort sharing to be negotiated
Periodicity long-term and predictable; 2-3 auction rounds/year
Type of support sliding FIP, reference price is 3-month weighted average of PT and BE prices
Auction format multiple-item auctions
Auction type static, sealed bid
Pricing rule start with pay-as-bid, later alternate with uniform pricing
Pre-qualifications, penalties two-stepped bid bonds, grid access and construction permits
Potential Common Auction Portugal - Belgium

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 Background
 Designing International Auctions
 Case Study Portugal – Belgium
 Policy Implications and Recommendations
Content

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 RED II may recommend sliding FIPs, but let Member States decide on support type.
Support should discourage production as soon as market prices become lower than the
negative value of support.
Policy Implications and Recommendations I

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 RED II may recommend sliding FIPs, but let Member States decide on support type.
Support should discourage production as soon as market prices become lower than the
negative value of support.
 Member States should be free to implement technology-neutral, technology-clustered, or
technology-specific auctions.
Policy Implications and Recommendations I

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 RED II may recommend sliding FIPs, but let Member States decide on support type.
Support should discourage production as soon as market prices become lower than the
negative value of support.
 Member States should be free to implement technology-neutral, technology-clustered, or
technology-specific auctions.
 Member States should be free to give favourable treatment to actor groups or to
immature technologies; alternative support measures if auction results will be poor in this
specific market for a specific technology
.
Policy Implications and Recommendations I

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 Member States should be allowed to apply secondary objectives in their auction schemes,
if well-justified and if cost efficiency remains the main objective.
Policy Implications and Recommendations

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 Member States should be allowed to apply secondary objectives in their auction schemes,
if well-justified and if cost efficiency remains the main objective.
 Auction rules should be flexibly adaptable by Member States. RED II should give guidance
on certain design elements such as ceiling prices and auction periodicity. It should require
Member States to include penalties and pre-qualifications.
Policy Implications and Recommendations

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 RED II should not prescribe the time and degree of opening of auctions. Instead, provide a
description of options.
Policy Implications and Recommendations I

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 RED II should not prescribe the time and degree of opening of auctions. Instead, provide a
description of options.
 RED II should require Member States to take measures that enable stakeholders to
participate in the design of auctions and have easy access to auctions.
Policy Implications and Recommendations I

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 RED II should not prescribe the time and degree of opening of auctions. Instead, provide a
description of options.
 RED II should require Member States to take measures that enable stakeholders to
participate in the design of auctions and have easy access to auctions.
 RED II should include a clause forbidding Member States to implement retroactive
changes.
Policy Implications and Recommendations I

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Thank you for your attention!
For further information, please contact:
Dr. Simone Steinhilber
Competence Centre for Energy Policy and Energy Markets
Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research ISI
Breslauer Straße 48 | 76139 Karlsruhe
+49 721 6809-281
simone.steinhilber@isi.fraunhofer.de
http://www.isi.fraunhofer.de
For more information on RES auctions: www.auresproject.eu

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Backup

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Type of Support – Numerical Example
LCOE (€c/kWh) = bid price of wind power plant X
3-month average market value for PV plants (€c/kWh)
Average market value achieved by PV plant X (€c/kWh)
Support payment (€c/kWh)
Period a:
4.0
3.5
5.52.0
1.5
Belgium Portugal
Total remuneration of PV plant X
under…
Reference price Belgium: 3.7 €c/kWh (1.5+2.2)
Reference price Portugal: 5.7 €c/kWh (3.5+2.2)
Reference price average: 4.4 €c/kWh (2.2+2.2)
3.3
Weighted
average
2.2
2.2
3.0
2.0
5.53.5
2.5
Belgium Portugal
3.2
Weighted
average
2.3
3.4
Period b:
Total remuneration of PV plant X
under…
eference price Belgium: 5.9 €c/kWh (2.5+3.4)
Reference price Portugal: 5.4 €c/kWh (2.5+3.4)
Reference price average: 5.7 €c/kWh (2.3+3.4)