The document “Ethics Lecture 8-2” is a structured academic presentation that explores major philosophical approaches to ethics, focusing particularly on the tensions between absolutism, relativism, Aristotelian justice, and pragmatic ethics. It begins by introducing the concepts of absolutism—the view that truth about right and wrong is clear, fixed, and universally applicable—and relativism, which argues that moral judgments are culturally bound, making cross-judgment illegitimate. The lecture warns that while both positions offer seductive simplicity for decision-makers, they undermine meaningful ethical deliberation. Absolutism risks intolerance in pluralistic societies, whereas relativism discourages the development of new norms in response to global and technological change. Through references to Simon Blackburn’s Being Good (2001), the lecture critiques cultural relativism, emphasizing that tolerance has limits when faced with harmful practices such as slavery or female genital mutilation. From there, the presentation transitions to Aristotle’s theory of justice, stressing its teleological (purpose-driven) and honorific nature, meaning justice involves both identifying the purpose of social practices and recognizing the virtues that deserve reward. Aristotle’s reflections on politics follow, where politics is portrayed not as a necessary evil but as the highest human association, designed to cultivate civic virtue, moral judgment, and deliberation about the common good. Politics, in this view, is the arena in which humans fulfill their distinct capacity for language and ethical reasoning, moving beyond private life into shared responsibility for community welfare. The document then highlights Aristotle’s “learning by doing” principle, where moral virtue is cultivated through practice and habit. Laws play a formative role by instilling good habits in citizens, while civic life develops their capacity for deliberation. Ethical character is not innate but constructed through consistent practice, demonstrating Aristotle’s belief that habituation precedes genuine virtue. The final part of the lecture turns toward pragmatic ethics, drawing on thinkers like John Dewey, Richard Rorty, Amartya Sen, Simon Blackburn, and historically David Hume. Pragmatism challenges purely rationalist ethics by grounding moral evaluation in practice, habit, and lived experience. Charles Peirce’s distinction between theory and practice is introduced, portraying deliberation as imaginative preparation for action. Morality here is understood as habitual but guided by ideals, social influence, and reflective self-assessment. LaFollette’s insights on habits as “two-edged swords” illustrate how dispositions shape not only actions but also future character. Pragmatic ethics emphasizes that moral agency entails responsibility: individuals and societies can reshape habits to align with ethical ideals, and genuine goodness requires consistent, embodied action rather than ab

1. Learning by Doing
Lecture 8

2. • Absolutism: The ‘truth’ about right and wrong is given,
and is clear, and therefore we know what to do.
• Relativism: Cannot judge other people, neither can you
be judged by others, therefore no need to engage in
ethical
• Both can provide easy answers, and therefore are
seductive to managers making decisions.
The Seductiveness of both
Relativism & Absolutism

3. Relativism
• ‘everything is relative’ is a logical fallacy
because it is an absolute claim..
• Respectful and tolerant of other people’s views.
• True that there is plurality in the world – people
with different viewpoints, but is it right to be
totally tolerant? (see next slide)

4. Most people would not
approve of:
‘slave-owning societies and caste
societies, societies that tolerate
widow-burning, or enforce female
genital mutilation, or [that]
systematically deny education and
other rights to women’ (2001: 23)
‘… there is the strong feeling most of us have
that these things just should not happen, and we
should not stand idly by while they do’ (2001: 24)
(Simon Blackburn (2001) Being Good)
Cultural Relativism
Blackburn (2001) also published in this form:

5. Both Relativism and Absolutism are challenges
to ethical deliberation – each suggests that it is
unnecessary.
Absolutism can appear intolerant and unhelpful to a
manager operating in a pluralist society.
Relativism prevents us from evolving new norms
that help us to cope with the new situations we
face with changing technology and globalisation.
Relativism & Absolutism

6. Can Justice Be Detached from Merit?
• Central to Aristotle’s ideas
of justice are two concepts:
1. Justice is teleological.
Defining rights requires us to
figure out the telos (the
purpose, the end, or essential
nature) of the social practice.
2. Justice is honorific (to
reason about the telos of the
practice is to reason about
what virtues it should honor
and reward)
This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-SA

7. Can
Justice Be
Detached
from
Merit?
‘Birth and beauty may be greater goods
than ability to play the flute, and those
who possess them may, upon balance,
surpass the flute-player more in these
qualities than he surpasses them in his
flute-playing; but the fact remains that he
is the man who ought to get better supply
of the flute’

8. What is
the
purpose
of
politics?
• When we discuss distributive justice,
we are concerned mainly with the
distribution of income, wealth and
opportunities.
• For Aristotle, distributive justice was
not mainly about money, but more
about offices and honors. Who should
have the right to rule? How should
political authority be distributed?

9. What is the
purpose of
politics?
• Any polis which is truly so
called, and is not merely
one in name, must devote
itself to the end of
encouraging goodness.
Otherwise, a political
association sinks into a
mere alliance…

10. What is the purpose of politics?
• Politics is for cultivating the virtue of citizens.
• It is about learning how to live a good life.
• The purpose of politics is to enable people to develop their
distinctive human capacities and virtues – to deliberate about
the common good, to acquire moral and practical judgment, to
be capable of self-government, to care for the fate of the
community.

11. What is the purpose of politics?
‘Those who contribute most to an association of this (virtuous)
character’ are those who excel in civic virtue, those who are best
at deliberating about the common good. Those who are the
greatest in civic excellence – not the wealthiest, or the most
numerous, or the most handsome – are the ones who merit the
greatest share of political recognition.’

12. Is politics for the sake of the good life or Is
it a necessary evil?
• Only by living in a polis and participating in politics do we fully realize
our nature as human beings.
• Aristotle sees us as being meant for political association, in a higher
degree than bees and other animals.
• Nature gives nothing in vain, and human beings, unlike other animals,
are furnished with the faculty of language. Language is for declaring
what is just and what is unjust, and distinguishing right from wrong.
• Only in political association, can we exercise our distinctly human
capacity for language, for only in polis do we deliberate with others
about justice and injustice and the nature of the good life.

13. This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-SA

14. Learning by Doing
• Moral virtue is something we learn by doing; we have
somehow to develop the rights habits.
• For Aristotle, the primary purpose of law is to cultivate the
habits that lead to good character. ‘Legislators make the
citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is the wish of
every legislator’
• The habit is the first step in moral education. Aristotle assumes
that practicing proper behavior eventually encourages virtuous
feeling. For example, if you write enough ‘thank you’ letters,
you may actually feel a flicker of gratitude.

15. Learning by Doing
• First, the laws of the polis inculcate good habits form good
character and set us on the way to civic virtue.
• Second, the life of the citizen enables us to exercise capacities
for deliberation and practical wisdom that would otherwise lie
dormant.
• Deliberation is not something we can do at home, alone as this
is not the same as sharing in significant action and bearing
responsibility for the fate of the community as a whole. We
become good at deliberating only by entering the arena,
weighing the alternatives, arguing our case, ruling and being
ruled - in short by being citizens.

16. Pragmatic Ethics
• Rejection of rationality
to solely define moral
criteria
• Practice is primary in
philosophy
Some proponents: John Dewey, Richard Rorty, Amartya
Sen, Simon Blackburn (from the past David Hume 1711-
1776)
See LaFollette (2000)
Not a rudderless ship
on a moral sea.

17. Theory and Practice Divide
• Peirce insists on the separation of theory and practice.
The practical man doesn't need to put his assertions to
the test, nor does he test his beliefs.
• This separation of theory and practice runs parallel to
another split, namely, that of ethics and morals or, better
put, of ethical theory and moral practice. Peirce denies
that morality is subject to rationality and thinks that
ethics is valuable as a science in a broad sense. Ethics
would be a normative knowledge only in so far as it
analyzes the adjustment of actions to ends and in so far as
it studies the general way in which a good life can be
lived.

18. Morals/Ethics
• In morals Peirce appeals to instinct and sentiment,
and in ethics he recommends the use of logical
thinking
• Peirce describes human reason in terms of a
deliberative rationality. Deliberation for Peirce is a
process of preparation for future action which has
to do with the checking of previous acts, the
rehearsal in imagination of different roads to be
followed by possible conduct and the nurturing of
ideals

19. Morals/Ethics
• In the case of ethics, if you want to obtain goodness in
action then you should restrain your acts in certain ways.
For Peirce, this means that you should adjust your life to
an ideal.
• Ethics, then, would be merely the theory of the
conformity of an action to that ideal. The ideal doesn't
cause any action but prompts the revision of past actions
and the judgment of future actions. The judgment that
compares the action with the ideal gives rise to an
influence on habits that, together with the consequences
of past actions, modifies the future action.

20. Morality is a habit
Society plays a large part in creating, transmitting, shaping
& reshaping our habits, by praising and blaming.
Nonetheless, even though our habits may be shaped by society, it is a tenet of
philosophy that individuals do have moral agency.
A moral agent is a being that is “capable of acting with reference to right
and wrong”. A moral agent can be held responsible for their behaviour.
We can deliberate on which are good habits and which we should change.
Ethical thought may guide us, by helping us to identify morally relevant features
of our action.
Pragmatic Ethics

21. Pragmatic Ethics (H.LaFollette)
• Habits are two-edged swords: the very features
that give us power to act and to think also
circumscribe us.
• We confuse daydreams with intentions and desires,
then prone to comfort ourselves by saying that we
are really kind, hardworking honest and self-
directed – no matter how we act. We only have
intentions if we make specific plans (take specific
steps) toward that end. We can legitimately claim
to be kind if we are regularly kind.

22. Pragmatic Ethics (H.LaFollette)
• If I lie to you now, I am not just saying something
(a) my action springs from my habits (my motives);
(b) I am shaping the character of our relationship;
and (c) I am strengthening my dispositions to lie in
the future (i.e. missing deadlines)
• Moral theories can isolate and habitually focus on
morally relevant features of actions.

23. Simon Blackburn, ‘Being Good’
Simon Blackburn argues for
1. Consensually agreed ethical standards
2. Based on emotions as much as reason.
“In all this we seem to have the operation of the passions rather than
the operation of Reasons. In this sense, the foundations of moral
motivation are not the procedural rules on a kind of discourse,
but the feelings to which we can rise. Benevolence or concern for
humanity is the indispensable root of it all”
(2001: 132-133)