US Satisfaction with Escobar's Death

“The drug dealer, popularly known as
Pablo Escobar, died in December 1993.
To what extent was the United States’
State Department satisfied by the
event?”
Edward Higgins
June 2011

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Contents
1.0 Introduction..............................................................................................................3
2.0 America’s War on Drugs .........................................................................................4
2.1 General Overview................................................................................................4
2.2 Domestic Policy...................................................................................................4
2.3 Foreign Policy......................................................................................................5
2.4 The Bush Connection...........................................................................................6
2.5 Efficacy................................................................................................................7
3.0 Pablo Escobar, Drug Kingpin ..................................................................................8
3.1 Cartel Leader........................................................................................................8
3.2 Influence ..............................................................................................................8
3.3 Crossing the Lines................................................................................................8
3.4 La Catedral...........................................................................................................9
4.0 The Forces of the Hunt ..........................................................................................10
4.1 Search Bloc........................................................................................................10
4.2 Los Pepes ...........................................................................................................10
4.3 American Involvement.......................................................................................11
4.4 Death Squads .....................................................................................................12
5.0 Death and Aftermath..............................................................................................14
5.1 Escobar’s Death .................................................................................................14
5.2 Cali Cartel..........................................................................................................14
5.3 Effect on Drug Trafficking ................................................................................15
5.4 Plan Colombia....................................................................................................16
5.5 Embarrassing Disclosures..................................................................................17
6.0 Conclusions............................................................................................................21
7.0 Summary................................................................................................................22
Bibliography / Sources.................................................................................................23
Books ...................................................................................................................23
Articles.................................................................................................................23
Documents ...........................................................................................................23
Websites...............................................................................................................26

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1.0 Introduction
Pablo Escobar became a central figure in international drug-trafficking, a larger than
life criminal who achieved a global notoriety before his career came to an end. This
document aims to look into those events and to consider what levels of satisfaction
they provided to the U.S. State Department.
Whilst the initial deed might have provided a certain level of closure, the long term
fallout from the events need to be considered, and in what way they have affected
U.S. interests. In recent years, more declassified documents has been released
concerning both the hunt for Escobar and the repercussions within Colombia,
revealing the extent of American involvement and further altering the perceptions of
his death.
In many ways, what once could have been considered a satisfactory conclusion and a
closed book, might not be seen as such nearly twenty years on.
The body of this document has been divided into four main parts:
 America’s “War on Drugs” – how it developed, where it became involved in
Escobar’s manhunt, and where it went in the ensuring years.
 Pablo Escobar – Who he was, the levels of influence his Cartel had, and how
he crossed the lines from one drug-leader to one of the most wanted men in
the world.
 The Forces of the Hunt – Considering Search Bloc, Los Pepes, and the
American involvement at ground level.
 Death and Aftermath – What happened with Escobar’s death, and just what
effects it had on both Colombia and the drug trade.

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2.0 America’s War on Drugs
2.1 General Overview
The “War on Drugs” is a general term used to refer to the U.S. federal government’s
attempt to end the import, manufacture, sale and use of illegal drugs. It is a colloquial
term that does not refer in any meaningful way to a specific policy or objective, but
rather to a series of initiatives that are vaguely directed towards the overall goal of
ending drug abuse and the criminal activities involved.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower began what The New York Times referred to as “a
new war on narcotic addiction at the local, national, and international level” with his
move to establish an Interdepartmental Committee on Narcotics in November 1954.
This group was responsible for coordinating executive branch antidrug efforts. The
phrase “War on Drugs” first came into common use some years later when President
Richard Nixon used it during a press conference on June 17, 1971, where he described
illegal drugs as “public enemy number one in the United States.”
President Reagan’s 1986 directive that drug trafficking be considered a threat to
national security opened up the way for the use of the military (beyond airborne and
satellite surveillance) in the counternarcotics fight. The federal government’s
authority to prosecute drug-related offenses in theory stems from Article I’s
Commerce Clause, which grants Congress the authority to “regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes” but federal
law enforcement targets drug offenders even when the narcotics are manufactured and
distributed only within state lines.
2.2 Domestic Policy
The creation of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and it’s addition to the
federal law enforcement structure in 1973 was a significant step in the approach to
drug enforcement. With the federal reforms of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, which can be seen as a declaration of war against
the drug trade, the DEA swiftly became the soldiers on the ground in that battle.
Almost two decades later, The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) was
established in 1988 as part of the National Narcotics Leadership Act and implemented
under President George H.W. Bush. The ONDCP was raised to cabinet-level status in
1993 by President Bill Clinton.
In 1994 with the Omnibus Crime Bill by Senator Joe Biden, the provision allowing
for the federal execution of drug kingpins indicated that the War on Drugs had
reached a new level. It showed that the federal government deemed drug-related
offences to be as serious, or worse than, murder and treason.

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2.3 Foreign Policy
When the Nixon administration looked for ways to stop the import of marijuana from
Mexico, they took radical steps and attempted to close the border. In 1969 Operation
Intercept imposed strict, punitive searches of traffic all along the U.S.-Mexican border
all aimed at pushing the Mexican government to crack down on the narcotic on their
side. The civil liberties implications and the furore this caused in the border-states
ensured that it was abandoned after 20 days. It was an unmitigated foreign policy
failure, but it demonstrated just how far the Nixon administration was prepared to go
in the War on Drugs.
In December of 1989 Bush sent troops into Panama to depose General Manuel
Noriega under Operation Just Cause. At that time Noriega was heavily involved in
drug trafficking and after the short fourteen day invasion resulted in a decisive
victory, Noriega was captured and removed from power. American forces brought
him to the U.S. where he was sent to prison for drug and racketeering violations.
Operations were stepped up in 1989 outside of Panama as well, funds for interdiction
were increased. The Andean Strategy targeted coca fields in Bolivia and Peru for
destruction, although new fields planted in Colombia filled the coca demand. Similar
situations arose throughout the 1990’s such as when the U.S. targeted Southeast Asian
suppliers, cartel’s in Colombia swiftly moved to fill the void, ramping up domestic
production of opium poppies.
During the same period in the 1990’s, the U.S. dramatically increased funding to
Colombia’s government security forces, most notably in the form of military
assistance to the Colombian National Police (CNP). Annual U.S. foreign aid to
Colombia went from $18 million in 1989 to more than $200 million in 1999.
The CNP often clashed with Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a
leftist guerrilla group opposing the Colombian government. The FARC levied
protection fees against coca growers as a way to finance their organization. Other
paramilitary forces included the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) and
the National Liberation Army (ELN). Unlike the FARC or ELN, AUC leaders were
directly tied to drug shipping operations. All three were officially labelled terrorist
organizations by the U.S.
The adoption of a shoot-down policy by Peru and Colombia sparked an intense debate
within the Clinton administration in 1994, prompting the Department of Defence
(DOD) to suspend real-time intelligence sharing due to concerns that the use of force
against civil aircraft might subject DOD personnel to legal liability. State Department
policymakers complained that the suspension would set back progress in counterdrug
cooperation, while critics of the policy from the State Department’s legal office
maintained that the shoot-down policy violated domestic and international law,
emphasizing that “mistakes are likely to occur under any policy that contemplates the
use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight, even as a last resort.”
A Colombian army document obtained by Human Rights Watch indicates that a 1991
reorganization of the Colombian military intelligence system—drawn up with
assistance from CIA and DOD officials—made no mention of drugs and instead
focused on “the armed subversion.”

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This has led to many people questioning whether the U.S. interest in Colombia is
about the War on Drugs, or providing aid against those insurgent groups.
As Stan Goff, a retired U.S. Army SF officer and former military advisor to Colombia
claims: “The "war on drugs" is simply a propaganda ploy, a legitimizing story for the
American public. We were briefed by the Public Affairs Officers that counter-
narcotics was a cover story for curious journalists, friends, and family that our
mission, in fact, was to further develop Colombians' capacity for counterinsurgency
operations.”
The 1998 election of President Andres Pastrana was seen by U.S. leaders as a large
step forward for Colombia in limiting internal corruption and human rights abuses,
thus bringing forth increased aid from the U.S. From 2000 to 2003 the U.S. provided
about $2.5 billion in military assistance, hardware, and training under a multi-year
revitalization effort called "Plan Colombia."
In 2004, the United States appropriated approximately $727 million for the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative, $463 million of which was targeted at Colombia. The
compromise version of two U.S. House-Senate bills was approved, increasing the
number of U.S. military advisors that operate in the country as part of Plan Colombia
to 800 (from 400) and that of private contractors to 600 (from 400).
Often the counterdrug strategy relies on source-country security forces to act on
intelligence gathered by U.S. systems. This arrangement limits the extent to which the
U.S. can control the way the data is used. Sovereignty issues also complicate efforts
to enforce end-use restrictions, allowing host governments in ways that violate U.S.
and international law, implicating the U.S. as accessory to potentially criminal acts.
2.4 The Bush Connection
As early as 1982, Vice President George H.W. Bush and his aides began pushing for
the involvement of both the CIA and U.S. Military involvement in drug interdiction.
When President Reagan had signed a classified National Security Decision Directive
in 1986 that declared the flow of drugs across U.S. borders to be a “national security
threat”, Vice President George H.W. Bush had headed a cabinet level task force
against drugs. As President, he declared war on drugs. He made money laundering a
critical target, allocating $15 million to launch a counteroffensive. The Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) was designed to zero in on money
launderers using the latest computer programs to spot suspicious movement.
When the Escobar orchestrated murder of Colombian presidential candidate Galan
occurred in 1989, the Bush administration enhanced intelligence sharing as part of a
broader militarization of U.S. counterdrug programs with the issuance of National
Security Directive 18. NSD 18 and subsequent policy papers called for “real time
intelligence techniques that use leading edge radar,” establishing a constellation of
coordinated intelligence systems throughout the U.S. and Latin America. A small
number of U.S. Special Forces troops were sent to Colombia to train its police and
military in rapid-strike tactics.

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In April 2001, President George W. Bush announced a new ‘Andean Counterdrug
Initiative,’ including $731 million funded through the State Department’s
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) account and an estimated $107
million more through the Defence Department. While the majority (57%) of the aid
went to Colombia, the Bush package includes an enormous increase for security
assistance to other countries in the region, ranging from a 345% increase for Brazil to
a 20% increase for Bolivia. It also included an increase in alternative development
assistance.
2.5 Efficacy
A two-year study by the RAND Corporation in 1986 found that the use of the armed
forces to interdict drugs coming into the U.S. would have little or no effect on cocaine
traffic and might, in fact, raise the profits of cocaine cartels and manufacturers. The
study also noted that in the previous 9 years seven prior studies had developed similar
conclusions.
According to an October 2008 Zogby poll of likely voters, 76% described the War on
Drugs as a failure. In 2009, the Obama administration announced that it would no
longer use the phrase "War on Drugs" to refer to federal antidrug efforts, the first
administration in 40 years not to do so. Obama's drug policy coordinator has called
for an end to the War on Drugs terminology, and an attempt to rebrand federal
antidrug efforts as simple harm-reduction strategies. One of the alternatives
showcased by the administration is Sweden's Drug Control Policies that combine
balanced public health approach and opposition to drug legalization.
In June 2011, a report by The Global Commission on Drug Policy, claims that the
global war on drugs has failed. Although both the U.S. and Mexico reject those
findings as misguided.

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3.0 Pablo Escobar, Drug Kingpin
3.1 Cartel Leader
Escobar was born in 1949 during a particularly troubled episode in Colombia’s
history. In young adulthood he became a small-time drug dealer but quickly murdered
his way to the top, where he became the head of the Medellin drug cartel. In 1989 he
was listed by Forbes magazine as one of the world’s richest men, ranked number 7th
with a personal wealth estimated at $9 billion, but also controlling a $30 billion a year
drug empire.
3.2 Influence
The Medellin cartel was one of the principle forces behind the terror campaign that
led to a new Colombian constitution amendment which banned extradition. Besides
the money they spread around in bribes, the threat of targeted assassinations kept
many officials in the government, the police, and the military in line. In many ways
the Medellin cartel under Escobar came to personify the Colombian saying “plata o
plomo” – silver or lead – meaning “take the bribe or take a bullet.” With the
understanding that the bullet might just be aimed at a family member it comes as no
surprise that many would be willing to accept the money.
While challenging the Colombian government’s authority in such a brazen manner,
the cartel managed to inspire much support from the lower classes by funding
numerous public works projects, such as building a housing project for 200 poor
families in Medellin.
3.3 Crossing the Lines
Many people consider Escobar to have held no respect for human life, he ordered the
assassinations of government officials including members of the Supreme Court, as
well as setting a “bounty” on the lives of police officers. During the height of his
reign of terror, which to many outsiders looked close to being a civil war, under his
orders a mass of terrorist bombings killed thousands of innocent civilians.
But in the end, it was ordering two separate deaths that caused the kingpin to cross the
lines from being considered a simple criminal drug-lord, to become one of the most
notorious criminals on the planet.
The first death was presidential candidate Luis Gaitan, a charismatic reformer who
was the rising hope for Colombia who had a firm stance against the levels of
corruption within the government. His pro-American stance, and repeated desire to
extradite as many cartel members as possible earned him the fear and hatred of the
Cartels while raising his status near to that of national hero for the honest population.
Following Escobar’s orders, Gaitan was shot dead on August 18th during a campaign
speech. This death raised Escobar from just being a powerful criminal within

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Colombia, to one who was vilified by large portions of the population and gave the
current government a greater reason to place him as public enemy number one.
The second death ordered, was that of Gaitan’s successor three months later. Escobar
ordered one of his lieutenants to carry a device onboard an Avianca flight that the
politician was supposed to take. The cartel lieutenant didn’t know it was an explosive
device, and the subsequent explosion during flight killed all 110 passengers on board.
However, the politician remained in good health as he had changed his travel plans.
But by killing two Americans who had been travelling on commercial aviation,
Escobar managed to change the rules of the game.
Since the 1988 bombing by Libyan terrorists of Pan Am Flight 103, airline safety had
become a global concern and by stepping into that arena with the destruction of the
Avianca flight Escobar had become more then just a criminal. The deaths of
American citizens allowed then-President George Bush to send the U.S. military on a
path to Colombia. “The rules have changed,” said President Bush to journalists
whilst setting American participation in the manhunt into action.
3.4 La Catedral
Over a year after the Avianca flights destruction and the resulting manhunt which had
resulted in many deaths from both the searching Police forces and Escobar’s followers
the Colombian public were growing tired of the violence. After declaring an end to a
series of violent acts, including kidnappings, assassinations and bombings, meant to
pressure authorities and public opinion, Escobar turned himself in. Before he arranged
his surrender, the extradition of Colombian citizens had been prohibited in a
controversial decision past into the new Colombian Constitution in 1991.
He was confined in what became a luxury personal prison, La Catedral, but as
accounts of his continued criminal activities surfaced in the media the position he was
in shifted once more. Under pressure from both the U.S. administration and the
media, the Colombian government attempted to transfer Escobar to another jail in
July of 1992. His widely cast net of influence enabled him to discover the plan and
make a well-timed escape.
The manhunt had to begin once more. Only this time it seemed that the Colombians
were ready to welcome any and all help the Americans could give.
“This is critical, please,” President Gaviria told the ambassador. “Help us get this
guy as soon as possible.”
Until this point, even with the previous aid of Centra Spike, the U.S. Military had
been kept at arms length and low-key due to the potential for political consequences,
but now the door was open.

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4.0 The Forces of the Hunt
4.1 Search Bloc
Search Bloc was created in 1989 by then-President Barco. The officers were
assembled with the sole objective of the apprehension of Pablo Escobar and his
associates. It was commanded by Colonel Hugo Martinez.
The members of Search Bloc received training from the U.S. Army’s Special Forces
and were specially selected for being impervious to police corruption from the drug
cartels. Also no member of the unit was a native Antioquian, for fear they would be
on Escobar’s payroll. Since it was largely believed that the majority of Medellin’s
police force was corrupt, Search Bloc could not seek assistance from local police.
However, the lack of anyone who spoke the local dialect and could blend in proved a
decisive problem. Over the course of the first manhunt, many of the men assigned to
the unit were killed by forces under Escobar’s command, a quarter of the initial
personnel were buried within the first few months. It swiftly became in many ways,
less of a police action and more of an outright war between Escobar’s gangsters and
the Search Bloc, with very few live prisoners taken.
During Escobar’s surrender and imprisonment in La Catedral, Colonel Martinez was
rewarded for his work with a post to Madrid as a military liaison with Spain. With
Escobar’s escape, the Colonel was summoned back to Colombia to lead the Search
Bloc once more.
4.2 Los Pepes
Around October 1992, rival drug smugglers and paramilitary fighters calling
themselves People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar, or PEPES (Spanish acronym), began
harassing and killing relatives and associates of drug lord Pablo Escobar to help
Colombian and U.S. authorities track him down.
When Los Pepes surfaced there was no shortage of suspects. There were the many
rival cocaine interests, including the more recent members of his own organisation
that he’d come to distrust such as members of the Moncada and Galeano families.
There were other families of those Escobar had murdered, wealthy Colombians who
believed that they, and the nation were threatened by him. Various allegations have
been made that it was funded by the rival Cali Cartel, the Castano Brothers as well as
various other members of paramilitary organisations.
Los Pepes were prolific bombers, arsonists and killers, targeting the homes and other
property of Escobar and his associates, killing members of his extended family, his
bankers and his lawyers. The first recognised incident by Los Pepes happened in
January 1993, when two car bombs exploded in front of apartment buildings where
several members of Escobar’s extended family lived. A third bomb injured his mother
and his aunt. All of these acts were against the law and aimed at individuals who were
not themselves criminals. DEA agent Javier Pena explained:

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“The CNP believe these bombings were committed by a new group of individuals
known as “Los Pepes”. This group….vowed to retaliate against Escobar, his family,
and his associates, each and every time Escobar commits a terrorist act which injures
innocent people…. Obviously the CNP and the Government of Colombia cannot
condone the actions of “Los Pepes,” even though they may secretly applaud these
retaliatory acts.”
In February, the killings by Los Pepes began in earnest as a controlled bloodbath of
Escobar’s associates occurred throughout Medellin. As these murders continued day
after day, Los Pepes also publicly offered money for information on Escobar and his
key associates.
The DEA had reported since the first appearance of Los Pepes that “[evidence]
suggested that the police were cooperating with the group at some level, including
sharing information,” according to a memo written by one agent. It became obvious
to Centra Spike that the pattern of Los Pepes attacks were in killing off the white-
collar infrastructure of Escobar’s organisation. All the extended structure that had
been identified by Centra Spike and the CIA, almost as if using the very charts that
had been assembled over the months they had been operating in Colombia. It often
seemed as if fresh data that was being passed from Centra Spike to the CIA chief and
onto the Search Bloc was being used by Los Pepes. Whilst the people that were
monitored constantly and provided the most information to the forces on the manhunt
never seemed to be attacked or intimidated.
According to documents released to the public by the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) in 2008, "Colombian National Police director General Miguel Antonio
Gomez Padilla said 'that he had directed a senior CNP intelligence officer to
maintain contact with Fidel Castano, paramilitary leader of Los Pepes, for the
purposes of intelligence collection.'"
The Pepes disbanded shortly after Escobar’s death, but many of its members went on
to form the core of the right-wing paramilitary groups such as the AUC. Under those
organisations they committed countless human-rights violations in Colombia's civil
war against leftist guerrillas.
4.3 American Involvement
While the hunt was conducted primarily by the Colombian police contingent called
Search Bloc, it was assisted by intelligence gathered by U.S. assets. At one point
during the second manhunt it including so many planes that an AWACS aircraft was
sent aloft to direct U.S. air traffic over the city. But from the beginning of American
involvement, on the ground there was a U.S. Army unit, then called Centra Spike, that
specializing in technological spy-craft, signals intelligence and analysis, and in
finding individuals. Dispatch of this unit was approved by the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell and the Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney.
At the time they were on the ground, very few people were aware about Centra Spike.
Only a handful at the U.S. Embassy such as the Ambassador, the CIA station chief,
and certain trusted aides knew they were there. The unit had been sent in shortly after

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the assassination of Luis Gaitan, so they were already on the ground when the
bombing of the Avianca flight took the hunt for Escobar to a whole new level.
While the CIA had been embedded in the Embassy for years, they were focused on
the Marxist insurgents in the hills. With the counternarcotics side only recently
opened up as part of the CIA’s agenda, they couldn’t refocus their assets who were
otherwise fully engaged. The DEA were already working with the Colombian Police,
and considered quite expert at manipulating the rivalries between the various Cartel’s
on the ground and the various divisions between the Colombian forces hunting them.
The FBI providing aid in the form of informants captured in the U.S., traffickers who
would double-cross the cartel’s in order to avoid long-time prison sentences.
After Escobar’s escape from La Catedral a team of Delta Force operators led by a
Colonel arrived in Bogota. Requested by Ambassador Busby, the State Department
had approved it and passed it up through the channels to the President who then
instructed the Secretary of Defence to give Busby anything he needed.
Officially they were not to take part in any raids directly, they were there to help train
and guide the Colombian forces who would be conducting such operations.
The U.S. also put up a $2 million reward for information leading the authorities to
Escobar. Over the six months after Escobar’s flight, the number of American’s
involved in operations would swell to nearly one hundred, making the Bogota
Embassy the largest CIA station in the world.
4.4 Death Squads
The first target that Centra Spike located was Jose Rodriguez Gacha, who according
to various U.S. briefings was in fact the real power player in the Medellin Cartel and
most likely to have ordered the hit on Galan. The information was passed to the CIA
station chief, who in turn sent in on to then-President Barco. Colombian fighter-
bombers took off on a mission to destroy the location and everyone located there.
Only the lead pilot’s decision to abort the bombing run rather then risk striking a
nearby village prevented the success of the attack. However the orders given
certainly highlighted the Colombian’s intentions in this war against Escobar and his
associates.
While Gacha was able to flee from that location, he was later located with the aid of a
drug-smuggler who worked for the Cali Cartel. Once he pointed out the location of
Gacha a precise assault was planned by Colombian forces. According to official
reports, Gacha and his men fired on the government helicopters and were cut down by
fire from the helicopters’ miniguns.
There were many rumours of human rights abuses by the men under Colonel
Martinez, but they were always carried out out-of-sight of the American forces
working with them. The phrase “killed in a shootout with the police” by members of
the Search Bloc swiftly came to be a regarded as a euphemism for summary
execution. As time on the hunt passed, more of Escobar’s men would find death rather
then prison sentences. After the flight from La Catedral, everyone involved knew that
the hunt was not about arresting Escobar again. The Colombians had lost patience

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with the effort of trying to lock him up, and his own terror campaign against
extradition meant that they couldn’t ship him to the U.S. to let them deal with him.
This left the only solution, his death.

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5.0 Death and Aftermath
5.1 Escobar’s Death
Killing Escobar had been the goal of the mission from his escape from La Catedral.
No one wanted to see him taken prisoner again and return to the same influence he
once had. Colonel Oscar Naranjo made mention of this some years after the event.
“Escobar was like a trophy at the end of a long hunt. For him to have been taken
alive… no one wanted to attend that disaster.” To this day, the question of whether he
was shot while attempting to escape, attempting to fight the police, or killed with a
coup de grace while merely wounded is still unanswered. There are some theories that
he was killed by Delta Force snipers as he tried to evade the Search Bloc.
The public perception from the death of Escobar inspired many people to consider it a
fatal blow on the drug trade and the corruption it inspired. The day after Escobar’s
death, the stock markets of Bogota and Medellin spiked up 3% and by Christmas of
that year were at all-time highs. Analysts considered it to be due to foreign capital
pouring in due to the belief in the end of Colombian lawlessness.
In 1996 the Colombian congress passed a sweeping asset-forfeiture bill. This is
known as ‘Escobar’s Law’: his fortune was untouchable for years, because Colombian
law only allowed officials to seize assets as part of criminal proceedings, which are
not permitted against the dead. Now under that law, all such ill-gotten wealth can be
seized. While some view this as a means of channelling the billions made in the
cocaine trade into legitimate government, the mobsters were fighting for their money
as well as for their freedom.
5.2 Cali Cartel
The Cali cartel had already snatched most of Colombia’s cocaine market from
Escobar’s weakened organization during the massive manhunt. With his death, the
Cali leaders at the time mouthed platitudes suggesting they would be willing to serve
limited jail sentences and stop trafficking. However, many DEA agents of the time
understood it was much more likely that the Cartels would mend fences and form a
much larger organization to control the cocaine trade within Colombia. “We believe
that it's going to be one big happy family down there,” one senior DEA official was
reported as saying, “the most powerful criminal organization in the world.” By the
end of the year, the Cali cartel reportedly accounted for 80% of the cocaine entering
the U.S.
The Cali leaders were able to augment their enterprises during this period by
integrating itself into Colombian politics, economics and society. In many ways, the
very connections that had been formed by members of the Cali cartel involved in
Search Bloc and Pepes working with the government officials hunting Escobar
formed the basis for this later corruption and influence. The Cali drug lords had
certainly learned a lesson from Escobar’s fate; they avoided violent confrontations
with government officials if possible and relied on high-priced lawyers, and

15
corrupting local and national security forces to undermine any potential law
enforcement interference. Many of the current crop of drug cartels today have
modelled behaviour on this counter law enforcement philosophy.
The Cali cartel reigned supreme in the early parts of the decade past Escobar’s death,
but by 1995 most of its leaders were in jail after they found themselves under siege by
the Colombian police backed by the U.S. Whilst the Cali were suffering from those
attentions, they also found that the Mexicans, such as the Amado-Carrillo Fuentes and
Arellano-Felix cartels, were pressuring the lucrative trafficking networks and making
the transition from valuable transporters of Colombian cocaine into ‘legitimate’
wholesale distributors.
5.3 Effect on Drug Trafficking
“While the police hunted him down,” said one DEA official, “other criminal groups
had a heyday. The bottom line is that the cocaine business is bigger than ever.”
Even with the breakup of the cartels, it did little to stem the drug trade. Former cartel
agents simply began working for themselves. The production and distribution of drugs
became more spread out rather then concentrated within a few organisations. While
Colombia remained the stronghold for cocaine production, multinational and non-Cali
based groups began to emerge as the players involved over time. These smaller
groups tended to have much more flexible operations to smuggle the cocaine out of
the country and into the U.S.
For example, a DEA intelligence report noted that because of accurate communication
between Colombian and Haitian groups, "when US interdiction forces targeted boats
used by the Coneo Rios trafficking family from the North Coast of Colombia to Haiti
and the Dominican Republic, the Colombians quickly increased their use of air routes
to Hispanola." (U.S. Department of Justice, 1994).
Former DEA director Thomas A. Constantine remarked:
"The methods [smuggling groups use] are as varied as one can imagine and
traffickers frequently vary their routes and modus operandi to thwart interdiction
efforts. Colombian transportation groups have honed their skills to the point that law
enforcement has little chance of interdicting shipments of cocaine, unless intelligence
is developed pin-pointing specific shipments or methods." (DEA Congressional
Testimony, 1998).
The narcotics problem down in Colombia has also been taken over by the leftist
groups, the FARC and the ELN, and various paramilitary groups (primarily the AUC)
who were increasingly financing their activities through profits from illicit narcotics.
These groups were assuming increasing control of the coca trade with the slow
collapse of the criminal organizations. Colombia suffered a severe economic
downturn during this time and the illicit drug trafficking spiralled upward. According
to the US State department, in the 7 years prior to Plan Colombia, coca cultivation
had increased by over 300% and opium poppy cultivation had increased by 75%.
Another U.S. State Department estimate is that such paramilitary forces are
responsible for more then 70% of Colombia’s human rights abuses.

16
Colombian smuggling organizations are still in position to direct the world's illegal
drug market for at least two major reasons. First and foremost, their prime geographic
location enables them to firmly control the source of the world's cocaine supply.
Second, Colombian traffickers possess the experience and overseas transportation
networks to effectively conduct business on an international level. However, the
declines of the old-line Colombian cartels and the expansion in international drug
markets had weakened the region's rigid monopoly.
Since the early 1990’s, Mexican traffickers have been receiving up to 50 percent of
cocaine shipments as payment for their services, enabling them to secure a substantial
portion of the wholesale market in the U.S. Current estimates find that Mexican-based
groups control up to a third of the U.S. cocaine market. Dual ownership of the U.S.
distribution market has lead to a relatively low number of violent confrontations
between the two groups, while armed melees between the cartels and border patrol
agents have continued.
Mexican smuggling groups now command a greater sphere of influence in the drug
trade than did their predecessors. There is recent evidence that Mexican syndicates are
currently buying cocaine directly from groups in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia.
According to U.S. Customs Intelligence, one of the most significant trends involves
the proliferation of "smaller, more tightly knit organizations which move 100-150
kilos at a time in rapid fashion." These transportation groups operate under the
umbrella of larger, more established drug cartels operating in Mexico.
As Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo recently acknowledged, "Drug related
corruption is probably the single greatest obstacle the law enforcement faces in its
global battle against international drug trafficking." (DEA Congressional Testimony,
1998).
International organized crime syndicates have also recently entered the South
American-based cocaine trade, hoping to exploit the power vacuum left by the
decentralization of the major cartels. Because these groups traditionally maintain
secret networks that rely on corrupt officials, and possess the networks to facilitate
trade, their transition to the cocaine industry has been relatively seamless. Over the
last few years, drug syndicates from Italy, Nigeria, Russia, the Caribbean, Asia, and
the Ukraine have developed dynamic partnerships with source organizations.
Expanded global markets for Latin American cocaine and decentralization make the
industry less susceptible to disruption. The range of transportation groups also gives
Latin American traffickers more options when confronted with law enforcement
obstacles.
5.4 Plan Colombia
Plan Colombia was conceived between 1998 and 1999 by the Colombians as an aid
initiative aimed to combat the Colombian armed conflict and create a wider anti-
cocaine strategy with the help of the U.S. military.
The President candidate Pastrana argued that:

17
"[Drug crops are] a social problem whose solution must pass through the solution to
the armed conflict...Developed countries should help us to implement some sort of
'Marshall Plan' for Colombia, which will allow us to develop great investments in the
social field, in order to offer our peasants different alternatives to the illicit crops."
According to Pastrana, Under Secretary of State Thomas R. Pickering eventually
suggested that, initially, the U.S. could be able to commit to providing aid over a three
year period, as opposed to continuing with separate yearly packages. As initially
designed, it was to counter the Colombia’s drug and security crisis through a
comprehensive 6-year, $7.5 billion plan linked to three objects: to reduce the flow of
illicit narcotics and improve security, to promote social and economic justice, and to
promote the rule of law.
In 2000 and 2001 , the Clinton Administration committed to the initiative with a $1.3
billion foreign aid package and up to five hundred military personnel to train local
forces. The stated objective of this aid was the eradication of coca plantations and
what the U.S. called left wing “narco-guerrillas” who were explicitly said to be
involved in the trade. President Clinton argued that this would "increase incentives for
the peaceful resolution of the civil war, while helping the government staunch the flow
of drugs to our shores".
Although Plan Colombia includes components which address social aid and
institutional reform, the initiative has come to be regarded by its critics as
fundamentally a program of counternarcotics and military aid for the Colombian
government.
Amnesty International released a press release in June 2000 criticising the Plan
Colombia initiative:
“Plan Colombia is based on a drug-focused analysis of the roots of the conflict and
the human rights crisis which completely ignores the Colombian state's own historical
and current responsibility. It also ignores deep-rooted causes of the conflict and the
human rights crisis. The Plan proposes a principally military strategy (in the US
component of Plan Colombia) to tackle illicit drug cultivation and trafficking through
substantial military assistance to the Colombian armed forces and police. Social
development and humanitarian assistance programs included in the Plan cannot
disguise its essentially military character. Furthermore, it is apparent that Plan
Colombia is not the result of a genuine process of consultation either with the
national and international non-governmental organizations which are expected to
implement the projects nor with the beneficiaries of the humanitarian, human rights
or social development projects. As a consequence, the human rights component of
Plan Colombia is seriously flawed”
5.5 Embarrassing Disclosures
The relationships between U.S. forces, Search Bloc and Los Pepes were murky and
many of the U.S.-trained Colombian officers have been accused of being directly or
indirectly involved in many atrocities during the 1990’s.

18
Colombia was the leading recipient of U.S. military aid during the late 1990’s, and
due to the continuing internal conflict between outright criminal cartels and left-wing
guerrilla groups, has the worst human rights record, with the majority of atrocities
attributed to paramilitary forces, insurgent guerrilla groups and elements within the
police and armed forces.
In 1997 the U.S. Congress approved an amendment to the Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act which banned the U.S. from giving anti-narcotics aid to any
foreign military unit whose members have violated human rights. In 2000, Human
Rights Watch, together with several Colombian human rights investigators, published
a study in which it concluded that half of Colombia's eighteen brigade-level army
units had extensive links to paramilitaries at the time, citing numerous cases which
directly or indirectly implicated army personnel
In Washington there had been worries that the U.S. Special Forces in Colombia
included "forward leaners"--warriors who push against the codified parameters of
their mission. Clearly U.S. forces were helping Search Bloc, which was collaborating
with Los Pepes as it administered what Bowden calls "a controlled bloodbath.” Over
the years since Escobar’s death, the release of once classified documents keeps
stirring up concerns on the ethics and morality of what occurred during the manhunt
Since 1994, human-rights groups like Amnesty International and information
advocacy groups like the National Security Archives have sought to obtain
information regarding the U.S. government's connections to the Los Pepes.
Another matter was brought up in 2000 with the first newspaper articles of “Killing
Pablo” came out. Twenty-four members of Congress asked President Clinton to
launch a formal investigation into alleged complicity of the U.S. government with the
terrorist group Los Pepes in Colombia. In the In letter to Clinton, which originated
with Rep. Janice D. Schakowsky, D-Ill., the representatives urged Clinton to convene
the administration's Intelligence Oversight Board to review "the role of U.S. agencies
and the relationship of U.S. agencies, both direct and indirect, with the Colombian
group Los Pepes."
"I've been interested in the whole issue of our aid to Colombia," Schakowsky said
Monday. "This series is more evidence that we may not in fact be problem-solvers
there, but problem-causers. These are issues that should not be swept under the rug."
Schakowsky said the articles by Mark Bowden demonstrated "the incredibly unholy
alliances we get into in fighting drug wars. We may have been making the drug
trafficking worse. It's an example of how our efforts are not only not succeeding, but
may be backfiring."
Documents obtained during the investigation show that officials from the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency had frequent contact with Fidel Castano and other paramilitary
leaders during the hunt for Escobar. Fidel Castano was one of the alleged principals
behind Los Pepes, and his brother Carlos Castano, the leader of the AUC.

19
Over a decade later and people still question what went on during the manhunt for
Escobar and exactly what deals were cut to find him. A Washington-based think tank
filed a lawsuit in 2006 to force the Central Intelligence Agency to search its archives
for documents that may help reveal the CIA's links to Los Pepes. IPS, one of
Washington's oldest think tanks, had been requesting documents on the case via the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) since 2004. The new lawsuit sought a court order
to force the CIA to search its records again so it could determine any U.S. government
connections to the vigilante group.
Los Pepes maintained regular relations with the Colombian police and even U.S. drug
agents, U.S. documents already made public have revealed. "The issue is of
accountability," said lead researcher Paul Paz y Mino. "This is a very pivotal issue
with respect to everything that has come out in the past decade."
Many former members of Los Pepes are now under U.S. indictments on drug-
trafficking charges, what Paz y Mino calls a blowback from bad U.S. policy decisions
in the hunt for Escobar.
"The kind of monster the U.S. helped create was, in many ways, worse than what they
wanted to destroy," he said about the Los Pepes morphing into the AUC.
Paz y Mino has also mentioned that the most startling documents made public to date
reveal that even after U.S. agencies knew that the Los Pepes were torturing and killing
people, they continued to have contacts with the vigilantes.
In 2008, further documents were released that provided key evidence linking the U.S.-
Colombia task force to the notorious paramilitary group. Several of these documents
were released as a result of the earlier lawsuit brought by the IPS under the Freedom
of Information Act. The documents revealed that the Search Bloc was sharing
intelligence with Fidel Castano, the leader of Los Pepes, and that the U.S. Embassy
had suspected at the level of cooperation between the Task Force as early as February
1993. In a document titled, "Colombia: Extralegal Steps Against Escobar Possible,"
CIA analysts predicted that President Gaviria's "demand for an intensified effort to
capture Escobar may lead some subordinates to rely more heavily on Los Pepes and
on extralegal means."
By far the most detailed declassified record on the Pepes affair, the August 1993
Embassy cable, "Unravelling the Pepes Tangled Web," reveals that the Colombian
government was both the recipient of U.S. intelligence information and the target of
U.S. intelligence operations. Just as technical and investigative intelligence techniques
tracked Escobar's movements and communications, other agents eavesdropped on the
Colombian president's inner circle.
By May 1994, only five months after the Task Force was dissolved, the State
Department's intelligence branch was calling Fidel Castano a "super drug-thug" and
"one of Colombia's most ruthless criminals" who "could become a new Escobar."
Castano, the report read, "is more ferocious than Escobar, has more military
capability, and can count on fellow anti-guerrillas in the Colombian Army and the
Colombian National Police." It was, State reported, "unlikely that police or military
officials would be willing to vigorously search for him if he did, in fact, act as an
intermediary to deliver Cali bribes to senior police and military officers."

20
It seems that in many cases the U.S. supplied counterdrug intelligence provided is
then used by host governments in ways that violate U.S. and international law,
implicating the U.S. as accessory to potentially criminal acts. All of which provide
potential public relations issues for the U.S. State department, especially as old
documents are declassified and further details emerge.

21
6.0 Conclusions
Looking at the anti-narcotics aspect, in the year following Escobar’s death there was
more cocaine available in the U.S. and at cheaper prices then ever before. This
highlights that the whole process had no real effect on hindering the drug traffic out of
Colombia. In the aftermath, the rival Cartels had consolidated their operations,
cementing their relationship with the Colombian government, in many cases due to
the close alliances forged during the hunt for Escobar. The flow of drugs continued,
and the State Department continued to send money and aid in various anti-narcotic /
anti-insurgent methods in increasing breadth and depth under the aegis of the “War on
Drugs.”
The death of Escobar was one very specific goal, and by the time of his flight from La
Catedral that goal was only indirectly related to the cocaine traffic. His violence and
his ambition had been the key elements behind his death sentence. He was “too big
for his britches” in the words of one of those involved. He had to be stopped as much
to make a statement, as for the effect it had on the narcotics traffic. With the
successful conclusion of the manhunt and Escobar’s death, that goal was achieved and
for weeks after the event there were many congratulations going around the various
organisations involved.
However, the alliances forged between Colombian intelligence agencies, rival drug
traffickers, and disaffected former Escobar associates set the groundwork for the next
generation of narcotics-fuelled paramilitary forces that continue to plague Colombia
decades after Escobar’s death.
"The collaboration between paramilitaries and government security forces evident in
the Pepes episode is a direct precursor of today's 'para-political' scandal," said
Michael Evans, director of the National Security Archive's Colombia Documentation
Project. "The Pepes affair is the archetype for the pattern of collaboration between
drug cartels, paramilitary warlords and Colombian security forces that developed
over the next decade into one of the most dangerous threats to Colombian security
and U.S. anti-narcotics programs. Evidence still concealed within secret U.S.
intelligence files forms a critical part of that hidden history."
The vast majority of U.S. diplomatic and intelligence reporting on the hunt for
Escobar and the involvement of Los Pepes remains classified – in many ways a
looming source of further potential embarrassment to the State Department. When
combined with the fact that as time progresses, more individuals that the various U.S.
agencies developed close ties with during the hunt for Escobar, are now facing a
variety of corruption and human rights charges. All of which increases potential
public backlash to the efforts of the U.S. State Department and influencing ongoing
peace and reconciliation efforts in Colombia.

22
7.0 Summary
While the initial views about the whole event of Escobar’s death produced what were
considered satisfactory results, the ripple effects over the years since have proved
much less satisfactory.
By the time he was found and neutralised, the goal was more about the statement of
dealing with him then the actual effects it would have. The idea of halting or
decreasing the flow of drugs from Colombia were quite secondary to that key issue.
Beyond that, it is the fallout in the past 18 years as further details about the events
have continued to stain the U.S. State Department, and which could be considered to
showcase how compromises to reach a goal can have very long lasting effects.

23
Bibliography / Sources
Books
Mark Bowden, “Killing Pablo”, Atlantic Books, 2001
– Pretty much the comprehensive source for the rise and fall of Pablo Escobar.
John Pearson, “Colombia & the Drug Trade”, Great Neck Publishing,
Articles
Kevin Fedarko, “Police killed Colombia’s Most Notorious Drug Baron, but the
Cocaine Trade Lives”, Time Inc. 1993
Joseph Contreras, Newsweek (Pacific Edition),
George F. Will, “The Last Word”, Newsweek, 2001
“The Americas”, The Economist, 1997
Steven Dudley, The Miami Herald, May 23, 2006,
The U.S. News & World Report, 1993
“Report on Wealth”, NACLA Report on the Americas
John Moody, “A Day with the Chess Player”, Time, July 1, 1991,
Michael McGuire, “Escobar’s Demise Gives Boost to Law Enforcement”, Chicago
Tribune, December 03, 1993
“US weighs costs of Plan Colombia”, BBC, November 7, 2008,
Documents
National Archives and Records Service, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States, George Bush, 1989, pp.1168-1167
National Archives and Records Service, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States, William J. Clinton, 1993. p.2092
Doug Stokes, “They Say the End of the Cold War Doesn’t Matter: the US War of
Terror in Colombia”, Bristol University Politics Department. October, 2005
“Colombia Human Rights Developments”, Human Rights Watch. 2000.
Winifred Tate, “Colombia’s Role in International Drug Industry”, Institute for Policy
Studies, November 1999.
“Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has
Improved; US Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance”, US
Government Accountability Office, October 2008.

24
“Measuring the Deterrent Effect of Enforcement Operations on Drug Smuggling,
1991-1999”, Abt Associates, Inc, August 2001.
ARA Guidances, Wednesday, July 29, 1992 [Colombia: Chasing Escobar]
Department of State cable, Unclassified, 4 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
1992 August 10
GoC to Begin Hitting Narcs on All Fronts
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 17 pp.
1993 March 29
Beyond Support Justice IV (SJIV)
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Secret, 12 pp.
1993 February 01
Escobar Family Target of Medellin Bombings
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Secret, 3 pp.
1993 March
"Alliances of Military Convenience," from Latin American Military Issues, Number 3
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Secret, extract, 2pp.
Source: CIA declassification release under FOIA
1993 April 06
Monthly Status Report – March 1993
1993 April 15
GoC Foreign Policy Advisor on Latest Development in the Search for Escobar
1993 April 26
Los Pepes Declare Victory and Call it Quits
Undated, Ca. April 1993
Colombia: Extralegal Steps Against Escobar Possible
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Classification unknown, extract, 3pp.
Undated, Ca. April 1993
Information Paper on "Los Pepes"

25
U.S. Defence Intelligence Agency, Secret, 4 pp.
Source: DIA declassification decision under FOIA
1993 August 06
Unravelling the Pepes Tangled Web
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Secret/NODIS, 10 pp.
Source: State Department Appeals Review Panel declassification release under FOIA
1993 October 26
The Hunt for Escobar: Next Steps
U.S. State Department cable, Secret/NODIS, 2 pp.
1993 November
The Illicit Drug Situation in Colombia
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Drug Intelligence Report, Classification
unknown, 67 pp.
Source: DEA declassification release under FOIA
1993 December 06
Briefing of NSC and SSCI on "Los Pepes" Affair
Central Intelligence Agency memorandum for the record, Secret, 3 pp.
1993 December 20
New National Police Chief Appointed
1994 February 11
Presidential Contender Samper and Ambassador Discuss Narcotics, Political, and
Economic Issues
1994 May 26
Profile of Fidel Castano, Super Drug-Thug
Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Assessment,
Secret, 3 pp.
1994 June 30
Delivery of Demarche to President Gaviria
U.S. Department of State cable, Secret, 5 pp.
1994 September 07
GoC Overhauls Police Leadership

26
2003 October 03
Medellin Snapshot
Michael Evans, Colombian Paramilitaries and the United States: “Unravelling the
Pepes Tangled Web”, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.243,
February 17, 2008.
Websites
Office of National Drug Control Policy, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
The National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org
- (hey, it’s a rough source to start looking from….)

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