This study focuses, firstly, on the pricing of electricity in the Finnish retail market. In particular, the impact of the ownership structure on prices is tested empirically. Secondly, the influence of low-cost electricity sources on retail prices is considered. The question about whether the average fuel costs rather than the wholesale price determines the retail prices is thus addressed. The supply side behaviour characterized may explain the passivity of client activity in the seemingly competitive Finnish market.
In Grossman and Helpman’s (1994) canonical "Protection for Sale" (PFS) model political competition between industry lobbies is purely driven by their interests as consumers. This paper introduces demand linkages and oligopolistic competition into PFS framework to address the rivalry among lobbies due to product substitutability. It shows that increased substitutability weakens the interest groups’ incentives to lobby and reduces tariff distortions. This may explain why empirical tests of PFS find surprisingly little impact of lobbies on the government trade policy decision. The paper also analyzes endogenous lobby formation, suggesting that demand linkages may adversely affect industry decision to get organized.
by Elena Paltseva, forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Economics
Many quality dimensions are hard to contract upon and are at risk of degradation when services are procured rather than produced in-house. However, procurement may foster performance-improving innovation. We assemble a large data set on elderly care services in Sweden between 1990 and 2009, including survival rates - our measure of non-contractible quality - and subjectively perceived quality of service. We estimate how procurement from private providers affects these measures using a difference-in-difference approach. The results indicate that procurement significantly increases non-contractible quality as measured by survival rate, reduces the cost per resident but does not affect subjectively perceived quality.
This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment exploring the relationship between reputation and entry in procurement. There is widespread concern among regulators that favoring suppliers with good past performance, a standard practice in private procurement, may hinder entry by new (smaller or foreign) firms in public procurement markets. Our results suggest that while some reputational mechanisms indeed reduce the frequency of entry, so that the concern is warranted, appropriately designed reputation mechanisms actually stimulate entry. Since quality increases but not prices, our data also suggest that the introduction of reputation may generate large welfare gains from the buyer.
Based on my recent work with several co-authors this paper explores the relationship between discretion, reputation, competition and entry in procurement markets. I focus especially on public procurement, which is highly regulated for accountability and trade reasons. In Europe regulation constrains the use of past performance information to select contractors while in the US its use is encouraged. I present some novel evidence on the benefits of allowing buyers to use reputational indicators based on past performance and discuss the complementary roles of discretion and restricted competition in reinforcing relational/reputational forces, both in theory and in a new
empirical study on the effects restricted rather than open auctions. I conclude reporting preliminary results form a laboratory experiment showing that reputational mechanisms can be designed to stimulate rather than hindering new entry.
We investigate the impact of procurement thresholds on strategic behavior of public buyers in Sweden. We document signs of “bunching” at the threshold, which suggests that strategic behavior in procurement is potentially important in Sweden, and should not be overlooked in the on-going public debate on the procurement thresholds. At the same time, data limitations do not allow us to access the impact of this strategic behavior on procurement outcomes and efficiency. This calls for better and more extensive procurement data collection.
This document summarizes a research paper that presents a mathematical model of a decentralized supply chain with two suppliers and two competing retailers. The paper investigates the sourcing and pricing strategies of the two retailers under conditions of uncertain supply and supply disruptions. It reviews related literature on competition within and between supply chains. The paper then introduces a new model where the retailers face stochastic demand that depends on prices and service levels. The model accounts for the probability of supply disruptions at each supplier. Optimal order quantities and equilibrium pricing and service strategies for the retailers are then derived.
In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some others, caps on fines are introduced based on total firm sales rather than on affected commerce. We uncover a number of distortions that these policies generate, propose simple models to characterize their comparative static properties, and quantify them with simulations based on market data. We conclude by discussing the obvious need to depart from these distortive rules-of-thumb that appear to have the potential to substantially reduce social welfare.
This document provides an overview of the political and legal forces in the marketing environment. It discusses how the European Union regulates competition through laws preventing collusion, abuse of market dominance, and restrictions on mergers and acquisitions. It also discusses laws around state aid and how national governments can influence companies. Specific examples are given of industries fined for price fixing cartels. Overall, the political and legal environment in the EU creates regulations that shape competition between companies.
In Grossman and Helpman’s (1994) canonical "Protection for Sale" (PFS) model political competition between industry lobbies is purely driven by their interests as consumers. This paper introduces demand linkages and oligopolistic competition into PFS framework to address the rivalry among lobbies due to product substitutability. It shows that increased substitutability weakens the interest groups’ incentives to lobby and reduces tariff distortions. This may explain why empirical tests of PFS find surprisingly little impact of lobbies on the government trade policy decision. The paper also analyzes endogenous lobby formation, suggesting that demand linkages may adversely affect industry decision to get organized.
by Elena Paltseva, forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Economics
Many quality dimensions are hard to contract upon and are at risk of degradation when services are procured rather than produced in-house. However, procurement may foster performance-improving innovation. We assemble a large data set on elderly care services in Sweden between 1990 and 2009, including survival rates - our measure of non-contractible quality - and subjectively perceived quality of service. We estimate how procurement from private providers affects these measures using a difference-in-difference approach. The results indicate that procurement significantly increases non-contractible quality as measured by survival rate, reduces the cost per resident but does not affect subjectively perceived quality.
This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment exploring the relationship between reputation and entry in procurement. There is widespread concern among regulators that favoring suppliers with good past performance, a standard practice in private procurement, may hinder entry by new (smaller or foreign) firms in public procurement markets. Our results suggest that while some reputational mechanisms indeed reduce the frequency of entry, so that the concern is warranted, appropriately designed reputation mechanisms actually stimulate entry. Since quality increases but not prices, our data also suggest that the introduction of reputation may generate large welfare gains from the buyer.
Based on my recent work with several co-authors this paper explores the relationship between discretion, reputation, competition and entry in procurement markets. I focus especially on public procurement, which is highly regulated for accountability and trade reasons. In Europe regulation constrains the use of past performance information to select contractors while in the US its use is encouraged. I present some novel evidence on the benefits of allowing buyers to use reputational indicators based on past performance and discuss the complementary roles of discretion and restricted competition in reinforcing relational/reputational forces, both in theory and in a new
empirical study on the effects restricted rather than open auctions. I conclude reporting preliminary results form a laboratory experiment showing that reputational mechanisms can be designed to stimulate rather than hindering new entry.
We investigate the impact of procurement thresholds on strategic behavior of public buyers in Sweden. We document signs of “bunching” at the threshold, which suggests that strategic behavior in procurement is potentially important in Sweden, and should not be overlooked in the on-going public debate on the procurement thresholds. At the same time, data limitations do not allow us to access the impact of this strategic behavior on procurement outcomes and efficiency. This calls for better and more extensive procurement data collection.
This document summarizes a research paper that presents a mathematical model of a decentralized supply chain with two suppliers and two competing retailers. The paper investigates the sourcing and pricing strategies of the two retailers under conditions of uncertain supply and supply disruptions. It reviews related literature on competition within and between supply chains. The paper then introduces a new model where the retailers face stochastic demand that depends on prices and service levels. The model accounts for the probability of supply disruptions at each supplier. Optimal order quantities and equilibrium pricing and service strategies for the retailers are then derived.
In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some others, caps on fines are introduced based on total firm sales rather than on affected commerce. We uncover a number of distortions that these policies generate, propose simple models to characterize their comparative static properties, and quantify them with simulations based on market data. We conclude by discussing the obvious need to depart from these distortive rules-of-thumb that appear to have the potential to substantially reduce social welfare.
This document provides an overview of the political and legal forces in the marketing environment. It discusses how the European Union regulates competition through laws preventing collusion, abuse of market dominance, and restrictions on mergers and acquisitions. It also discusses laws around state aid and how national governments can influence companies. Specific examples are given of industries fined for price fixing cartels. Overall, the political and legal environment in the EU creates regulations that shape competition between companies.
This document describes a project to design pack flat furniture for staging homes for sale. It begins by outlining the problem of empty homes being difficult to envision and stage furniture solutions. Research is presented on the target market of engineers in Clear Lake City, Texas between ages 30-49. Market research on competitive cardboard furniture is also summarized. The document then shows sketches of chair, table and couch concepts from each group member before selecting two final concepts for each furniture type to further develop.
The Gini coeffcient is not in general decomposable by population groups in terms of subgroup Ginis. On the other hand, there is a extensively used and wellfounded decomposition of the Gini by income sources. In this paper a decomposition of the Gini by population groups is proposed which is simple and intuitively appealing. Here the decomposition by sources is utilized by defining a set of indicator functions for a partition of the population, and representing income as the sum of synthetic income sources. The approach is extended by treating each income source separately to give a general decomposition table. The table for the Gini is compared with a similar table obtained for the (square of) variation coefficient. The table elements give first order approximations to the change in the value of the inequality measure which is due to a proportional change in the income source affecting all individuals in the relevant group. Empirical applications of the method are illustrated by examples using Finnish household data.
Inequalities in an OLG economy with heterogeneity within cohorts and an oblig...GRAPE
While the inequalities of endowments are widely recognized as areas of policy intervention, the dispersion in preferences may also imply inequalities of outcomes. In this paper, we analyze the inequalities in an OLG model with obligatory pension systems. We model both policy relevant pension systems (a defined benefit system — DB — and a transition from a DB to a defined contribution system, DC).
This document discusses operational imperatives and progress at improving efficiency. It includes:
1) Results from reducing time to market by 25% and costs by $15 million through improved planning, partnering, and manufacturing.
2) Goals to increase gross margin by 300 basis points by 2020 through sourcing improvements, product mix changes, and design optimizations.
3) Target to reduce inventory days by 30% through leveraging common components, improved planning and end of life management.
This curriculum vitae summarizes the educational and professional background of Dr. Hesham M. Hassan. He holds a PhD in Byzantine Philology from the University of Athens and has worked as a researcher, translator, and professor of Arabic. His research focuses on the relations between the Byzantine and Arab worlds in the 7th-10th centuries. He has published several articles and translations, and regularly reviews publications and speaks at international conferences.
This document is Sagar Kango's official academic transcript from Wayne State University. It shows that Sagar is currently pursuing a graduate degree in Industrial Engineering, and has completed 20 credit hours with a cumulative GPA of 3.53. The transcript details the specific courses taken in Fall 2014 and Winter 2015, along with the credits earned and grades received for each course. It provides authentication information and explains the university's grading system and policies on course levels and repeats.
Range Rover Evoque Convertible Press Release (Full)RushLane
Whitley, UK, 9 November 2015 – Land Rover has unveiled the world’s first luxury compact SUV convertible. Range Rover Evoque Convertible combines the bold design and refinement of Evoque with comprehensive specification and a sophisticated folding roof to create a no compromise, all-season convertible.
The document describes the capabilities of Sage X3, a financial management software solution. It includes 14 sections covering various functional areas such as financial management, sales, purchasing, inventory, manufacturing, and more. For financial management, the solution offers multi-company, multi-currency functionality with flexible setup of ledgers, journals, accounts, business partners and dimensions. It allows for automated period and year-end closing along with tax management and financial reporting across multiple languages and locations.
L. Gorroño-Albizu and J. de Godoy, Aalborg University.
Presentation for the 6th International Conference on Smart Energy Systems, 4th Generation District Heating, Electrification, Electrofuels, and Energy Efficiency, Aalborg, October 6-7 2020
This document discusses mobile call termination, which refers to a mobile network completing calls made to its subscribers. It analyzes fixed-to-mobile (FTM) termination and mobile-to-mobile (MTM) termination separately and presents a framework to integrate the two. For FTM, the network faces a monopoly problem as it is the sole provider of terminating access to its subscribers. For MTM, networks can jointly set low termination charges to soften competition for subscribers. However, the document finds that with wholesale arbitrage and a uniform termination charge for both FTM and MTM, networks' incentives lie between monopoly and efficient levels, reducing but not eliminating the need for regulation.
1) The document analyzes competition between an incumbent telecommunications network and a new entrant network.
2) The networks can charge different prices for on-network calls versus off-network calls, creating price-mediated network effects that favor the larger network.
3) The analysis shows that the incumbent can foreclose competition from the entrant and maintain its monopoly by setting access charges above cost, even when charges are reciprocal, if it benefits from customer inertia on its network.
Running head Economic Analysis of Business ProposalEconomic A.docxcharisellington63520
Running head: Economic Analysis of Business Proposal
Economic Analysis of Business Proposal 7
Introduction
The onus of this economic analysis paper centers around both the “Thomas Money Service Inc.” and “Will Bury’s Price Elasticity” scenarios that collectively constitute a monopolist market structure. (Crane, 2014) wrote that the market conditions and information concerning the pricing strategies, quantity to supply to the entire market, product differentiation, as well as patenting of the innovations dominate these scenarios. As a result of this, many dilemmas emerge under monopolistic markets given that the commodities produced are not complete substitutes rather close substitutes to each other. A big number of producers and product differentiation about the pricing strategies and the price elasticity of demand are the material factors that this manuscript is tasked to discuss.
Overview of the two scenarios
For the case of “Thomas Money Service Inc.”, the financing institution started providing credit lending facilities back in the year 1940 as a consumer finance firm.Between 1940 and 1945, the company increased its activities from issuing small loans to households to offering business loans, mortgages, and business acquisition financing.Early in the year 1946, a lucrative opportunity emerged of providing equipment financing supplementing the high market demand for forestry and equipment.The year 1951 was a year of opportunities where the company bought an equipment manufacturing firm. Consequently, the company suspended the funding of other equipment brands due to the increased manufacturing, selling, and financing its brand of forestry and building equipment.
On the other hand, Will Bury started as a mere worker at the High Tech Digital Industries, where he gathered necessary innovations skills to start his music and digital business.In the garage operation, Will increased his knowledge and entrepreneurship culture to prompt the decision of starting the digital book enterprise that he invented. Will Burry was faced with many dilemmas of how to ascertain his technological application, which kind of clientele to serve, the way of distribution of the services to the people, the demand for books, as well as the pricing strategies.
Monopolistic competition markets structure
As per the two scenarios of Will Bury and Thomas Money Services, it is crystal clear that they are examples of monopolistic market structures. This form of a market is a blend of the monopoly and perfect competition and has been called monopolistic competition or competing monopolists as stated by (Hushke, 2010). In the real world, there is neither absolute monopoly that is an absence of competition, nor perfect competition, but monopolistic competition. The products are not complete substitutes for one another, but they are close substitutes.
With respect to monopolistic competition, the number of dealers (buyers and sellers) is not large, at any rate not as lar.
Case study by team 2 and 3 Trinity Western university.pptxMiyuruJayasundara
The document discusses a 1997 case study analyzing a proposed merger between Staples and Office Depot, the two largest office superstore chains in the US at the time. The government was concerned the merger would hurt competition in the office superstore market by reducing the number of competitors from three to two. Staples and Office Depot argued the merger would result in cost efficiencies benefiting consumers, while their divestiture proposal aimed to address antitrust issues by creating a new competitor. Ultimately, the government concluded the merger was likely to increase market concentration and allow the combined entity to raise prices anticompetitively in many cities where competition would be reduced.
Competition in the electricity market promotes customer choice, innovation, savings, and clean energy resources according to Exelon. Customers in competitive markets can choose from dozens of electricity product offerings and suppliers have incentives to create new innovative products and services. Competition also provides long-term savings opportunities for customers as electricity prices have fallen in many competitive states. Additionally, competitive markets drive economic growth and job creation as businesses benefit from lower energy costs.
The document summarizes a paper that revisits the analysis of mobile termination charges to account for substitution between fixed-to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile calls. It finds that when subscribers can substitute cheaper mobile-to-mobile calls, mobile operators will set termination charges below the monopoly level. Equilibrium termination charges are not necessarily too high. The socially optimal charge can be above the equilibrium level set by operators due to additional network effects from increased mobile penetration. A calibrated model of the Australian market shows cost-based regulation lowers welfare compared to the non-regulated equilibrium outcome.
The document criticizes the European Commission's Green Paper on energy policy for being too ideologically driven by assumptions of market liberalization rather than taking a fact-based approach. It argues the paper's stated goals of sustainability, competitiveness, and security of supply are inconsistent and incompatible with each other. Market mechanisms are seen as incompatible with sustainability and security objectives. The document calls for a more realistic assessment of different policy tools and scenarios given uncontrollable external factors like global fuel prices.
The document provides an analysis of competition in the GB electricity retail market. It finds that while price competition is strong, barriers to entry remain, particularly for smaller suppliers, such as dealing with government policy and regulatory intervention, liquidity issues, and network charge instability. However, forcing changes to reduce barriers also carries costs, so policymakers need to ensure benefits of new entry outweigh these costs. The market is evolving rapidly due to decarbonization goals, so its future structure is uncertain. Overall competition compares well internationally, but pressure to innovate should continue.
This document describes a project to design pack flat furniture for staging homes for sale. It begins by outlining the problem of empty homes being difficult to envision and stage furniture solutions. Research is presented on the target market of engineers in Clear Lake City, Texas between ages 30-49. Market research on competitive cardboard furniture is also summarized. The document then shows sketches of chair, table and couch concepts from each group member before selecting two final concepts for each furniture type to further develop.
The Gini coeffcient is not in general decomposable by population groups in terms of subgroup Ginis. On the other hand, there is a extensively used and wellfounded decomposition of the Gini by income sources. In this paper a decomposition of the Gini by population groups is proposed which is simple and intuitively appealing. Here the decomposition by sources is utilized by defining a set of indicator functions for a partition of the population, and representing income as the sum of synthetic income sources. The approach is extended by treating each income source separately to give a general decomposition table. The table for the Gini is compared with a similar table obtained for the (square of) variation coefficient. The table elements give first order approximations to the change in the value of the inequality measure which is due to a proportional change in the income source affecting all individuals in the relevant group. Empirical applications of the method are illustrated by examples using Finnish household data.
Inequalities in an OLG economy with heterogeneity within cohorts and an oblig...GRAPE
While the inequalities of endowments are widely recognized as areas of policy intervention, the dispersion in preferences may also imply inequalities of outcomes. In this paper, we analyze the inequalities in an OLG model with obligatory pension systems. We model both policy relevant pension systems (a defined benefit system — DB — and a transition from a DB to a defined contribution system, DC).
This document discusses operational imperatives and progress at improving efficiency. It includes:
1) Results from reducing time to market by 25% and costs by $15 million through improved planning, partnering, and manufacturing.
2) Goals to increase gross margin by 300 basis points by 2020 through sourcing improvements, product mix changes, and design optimizations.
3) Target to reduce inventory days by 30% through leveraging common components, improved planning and end of life management.
This curriculum vitae summarizes the educational and professional background of Dr. Hesham M. Hassan. He holds a PhD in Byzantine Philology from the University of Athens and has worked as a researcher, translator, and professor of Arabic. His research focuses on the relations between the Byzantine and Arab worlds in the 7th-10th centuries. He has published several articles and translations, and regularly reviews publications and speaks at international conferences.
This document is Sagar Kango's official academic transcript from Wayne State University. It shows that Sagar is currently pursuing a graduate degree in Industrial Engineering, and has completed 20 credit hours with a cumulative GPA of 3.53. The transcript details the specific courses taken in Fall 2014 and Winter 2015, along with the credits earned and grades received for each course. It provides authentication information and explains the university's grading system and policies on course levels and repeats.
Range Rover Evoque Convertible Press Release (Full)RushLane
Whitley, UK, 9 November 2015 – Land Rover has unveiled the world’s first luxury compact SUV convertible. Range Rover Evoque Convertible combines the bold design and refinement of Evoque with comprehensive specification and a sophisticated folding roof to create a no compromise, all-season convertible.
The document describes the capabilities of Sage X3, a financial management software solution. It includes 14 sections covering various functional areas such as financial management, sales, purchasing, inventory, manufacturing, and more. For financial management, the solution offers multi-company, multi-currency functionality with flexible setup of ledgers, journals, accounts, business partners and dimensions. It allows for automated period and year-end closing along with tax management and financial reporting across multiple languages and locations.
L. Gorroño-Albizu and J. de Godoy, Aalborg University.
Presentation for the 6th International Conference on Smart Energy Systems, 4th Generation District Heating, Electrification, Electrofuels, and Energy Efficiency, Aalborg, October 6-7 2020
This document discusses mobile call termination, which refers to a mobile network completing calls made to its subscribers. It analyzes fixed-to-mobile (FTM) termination and mobile-to-mobile (MTM) termination separately and presents a framework to integrate the two. For FTM, the network faces a monopoly problem as it is the sole provider of terminating access to its subscribers. For MTM, networks can jointly set low termination charges to soften competition for subscribers. However, the document finds that with wholesale arbitrage and a uniform termination charge for both FTM and MTM, networks' incentives lie between monopoly and efficient levels, reducing but not eliminating the need for regulation.
1) The document analyzes competition between an incumbent telecommunications network and a new entrant network.
2) The networks can charge different prices for on-network calls versus off-network calls, creating price-mediated network effects that favor the larger network.
3) The analysis shows that the incumbent can foreclose competition from the entrant and maintain its monopoly by setting access charges above cost, even when charges are reciprocal, if it benefits from customer inertia on its network.
Running head Economic Analysis of Business ProposalEconomic A.docxcharisellington63520
Running head: Economic Analysis of Business Proposal
Economic Analysis of Business Proposal 7
Introduction
The onus of this economic analysis paper centers around both the “Thomas Money Service Inc.” and “Will Bury’s Price Elasticity” scenarios that collectively constitute a monopolist market structure. (Crane, 2014) wrote that the market conditions and information concerning the pricing strategies, quantity to supply to the entire market, product differentiation, as well as patenting of the innovations dominate these scenarios. As a result of this, many dilemmas emerge under monopolistic markets given that the commodities produced are not complete substitutes rather close substitutes to each other. A big number of producers and product differentiation about the pricing strategies and the price elasticity of demand are the material factors that this manuscript is tasked to discuss.
Overview of the two scenarios
For the case of “Thomas Money Service Inc.”, the financing institution started providing credit lending facilities back in the year 1940 as a consumer finance firm.Between 1940 and 1945, the company increased its activities from issuing small loans to households to offering business loans, mortgages, and business acquisition financing.Early in the year 1946, a lucrative opportunity emerged of providing equipment financing supplementing the high market demand for forestry and equipment.The year 1951 was a year of opportunities where the company bought an equipment manufacturing firm. Consequently, the company suspended the funding of other equipment brands due to the increased manufacturing, selling, and financing its brand of forestry and building equipment.
On the other hand, Will Bury started as a mere worker at the High Tech Digital Industries, where he gathered necessary innovations skills to start his music and digital business.In the garage operation, Will increased his knowledge and entrepreneurship culture to prompt the decision of starting the digital book enterprise that he invented. Will Burry was faced with many dilemmas of how to ascertain his technological application, which kind of clientele to serve, the way of distribution of the services to the people, the demand for books, as well as the pricing strategies.
Monopolistic competition markets structure
As per the two scenarios of Will Bury and Thomas Money Services, it is crystal clear that they are examples of monopolistic market structures. This form of a market is a blend of the monopoly and perfect competition and has been called monopolistic competition or competing monopolists as stated by (Hushke, 2010). In the real world, there is neither absolute monopoly that is an absence of competition, nor perfect competition, but monopolistic competition. The products are not complete substitutes for one another, but they are close substitutes.
With respect to monopolistic competition, the number of dealers (buyers and sellers) is not large, at any rate not as lar.
Case study by team 2 and 3 Trinity Western university.pptxMiyuruJayasundara
The document discusses a 1997 case study analyzing a proposed merger between Staples and Office Depot, the two largest office superstore chains in the US at the time. The government was concerned the merger would hurt competition in the office superstore market by reducing the number of competitors from three to two. Staples and Office Depot argued the merger would result in cost efficiencies benefiting consumers, while their divestiture proposal aimed to address antitrust issues by creating a new competitor. Ultimately, the government concluded the merger was likely to increase market concentration and allow the combined entity to raise prices anticompetitively in many cities where competition would be reduced.
Competition in the electricity market promotes customer choice, innovation, savings, and clean energy resources according to Exelon. Customers in competitive markets can choose from dozens of electricity product offerings and suppliers have incentives to create new innovative products and services. Competition also provides long-term savings opportunities for customers as electricity prices have fallen in many competitive states. Additionally, competitive markets drive economic growth and job creation as businesses benefit from lower energy costs.
The document summarizes a paper that revisits the analysis of mobile termination charges to account for substitution between fixed-to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile calls. It finds that when subscribers can substitute cheaper mobile-to-mobile calls, mobile operators will set termination charges below the monopoly level. Equilibrium termination charges are not necessarily too high. The socially optimal charge can be above the equilibrium level set by operators due to additional network effects from increased mobile penetration. A calibrated model of the Australian market shows cost-based regulation lowers welfare compared to the non-regulated equilibrium outcome.
The document criticizes the European Commission's Green Paper on energy policy for being too ideologically driven by assumptions of market liberalization rather than taking a fact-based approach. It argues the paper's stated goals of sustainability, competitiveness, and security of supply are inconsistent and incompatible with each other. Market mechanisms are seen as incompatible with sustainability and security objectives. The document calls for a more realistic assessment of different policy tools and scenarios given uncontrollable external factors like global fuel prices.
The document provides an analysis of competition in the GB electricity retail market. It finds that while price competition is strong, barriers to entry remain, particularly for smaller suppliers, such as dealing with government policy and regulatory intervention, liquidity issues, and network charge instability. However, forcing changes to reduce barriers also carries costs, so policymakers need to ensure benefits of new entry outweigh these costs. The market is evolving rapidly due to decarbonization goals, so its future structure is uncertain. Overall competition compares well internationally, but pressure to innovate should continue.
The relationship between customer value and pricing strategiesshampy kamboj
This study empirically analyzes the relationship between customer value and market prices in the washing machines market. The researchers:
1. Used conjoint analysis to assess the customer value of attributes for a sample of 129 washing machine models. This provided a measure of customer value for each model.
2. Compared the customer values from the conjoint analysis to the actual market prices of the 129 models using regression analysis.
3. Found limited alignment between price and customer value, with overpricing and underpricing of products being common. This suggests that value-based pricing is not fully established in practice in this market.
CFA Institute Research Challenge Hosted in Spokane, .docxcravennichole326
CFA Institute Research Challenge
Hosted in
Spokane, Washington
Eastern Washington University
Daniel Goodman, Danielle Good, Leah Robinson, and Sandra Jeffries
1
Eastern Washington University Student Research
This report is published for educational purposes only by
students competing in The CFA Institute Research Challenge
Electric & Gas Utilities, Utilities Industry
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
Avista Corp
Date: 1/9/2014
Ticker: AVA
Current Price: $35.48
Dividend Yield: 3.6%
Recommendation: SELL
Target Price: $25.11
Investment Highlights
We have a sell recommendation of the stock, based on target price of $25.11.
Stock is not attractive with a low historical ROE.
Stock is inflated due to zero-interest rate environment and the temporary increase in demand from
investors seeking higher yielding securities.
Heightened operational risk due to recent acquisition of a company in new geographic area.
The current winter season has had low precipitation (low snowfall), which may impact 2015 hydro-
electricity generation.
Avista Stock Information
Price (1/9/15 Closing Date) $35.48
52-Week Price Range $27.99 - $37.37
Beta (β) 0.83
Dividend 1.27 (3.70%)
Dividend Payout Ratio 40%
Book Value Per Share 23.75
ROE (ttm) 9.08 %
P/E (ttm) 11.29
EPS (ttm) 3.13
Sustainable Growth Rate 3.99%*
Source: Yahoo! Finance, Team Calculation*
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Avista's Monthly Closing Stock Price for the Last 5 Years (2009-2014)
CFA Institute Research Challenge 1/12/2014
2
Business Description
Avista Corp (AVA) is a producer and distributor of electric and natural gas
energy services to residential and commercial customers located in eastern
Washington, northern Idaho, portions of Oregon, and portions of Alaska.
Originally founded as The Washington Water Power Company, Avista established
its roots in the Inland Northwest in 1889. The company’s innovative business
practices led to the development of the first Spokane River hydroelectric
generator and state-of-the-art wind turbines on the Palouse Hills of eastern
Washington. Avista takes pride in its commitment to philanthropic practices that
enrich the communities in which the company conducts business in.
Avista consists of two business segments, Avista Utilities and th ...
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Talous & Yhteiskunta -lehden numero 4/2019 sisältää artikkeleita ja haastattelun, jotka kertovat alueellista keskittymistä käsitelleistä tutkimuksista. Suomen seitsemän suurimman kaupunkiseudun väestö kasvaa nopeimmin, kun taas pienempien kaupunkien ja maaseudun väestöosuus supistuu. Muutos on kuitenkin verrattain hidasta, ja sille on myös vastavoimia.
Talous & Yhteiskunta -lehden numeron 3/2019 teemana on työ ja terveys. Artikkeleissa tarkastellaan Suomen terveydenhuoltojärjestelmän toimivuutta ja pohditaan mitä voitaisiin oppia Ruotsissa jo tehdyistä terveydenhuollon uudistuksista. Muissa artikkeleissa käsitellään terveyskäyttäytymisen ja työmarkkinamenestyksen yhteyttä, työttömien aktivointia, työikäisten eritasoisia terveyspalveluja, työaikajoustojen vaikutusta terveyteen sekä informaatioteknologian ja tekoälyn käyttöä mielenterveyspalvelujen tukena. Haastateltavana on THL:n tutkimusprofessori Unto Häkkinen. Hänen mielestään sote-uudistus on tehtävä, vaikka se vaatiikin vielä monen yksityiskohdan ratkaisemista.
Opiskelijavalinta ylioppilaskirjoitusten nykyarvosanojen perusteella ei ole täysin perusteltua, todetaan Aalto-ylipiston ja Palkansaajien tutkimuslaitoksen uudessa tutkimuksessa. Ylioppilaskirjoitusten arvosanoilla on pitkän ajan vaikutuksia. Hienojakoisempi arvosteluasteikko tekisi opiskelijavalinnasta nykyistä reilumman.
Esimerkkiperhelaskelmissa tarkastellaan seitsemää kotitaloutta. Laskelmat kuvaavat ansiotulojen, tulonsiirtojen sekä verojen ja veronluonteisten maksujen kehityksen vaikutusta perheiden ostovoimaan. Perheille lasketaan Tilastokeskuksen tietoihin perustuvat perhekohtaiset kulutuskorit, jotka mahdollistavat perhekohtaisten inflaatiovauhtien ja reaalitulokehitysten arvioinnin. Ensi vuonna eläkeläispariskunnan ostovoima kasvaa eniten ja työttömien vähiten. Esimerkkiperhelaskelmia on tehty Palkansaajien tutkimuslaitoksella vuodesta 2009 lähtien.
Palkansaajien tutkimuslaitos ennustaa Suomen talouskasvuksi tänä vuonna 1,3 prosenttia ja ensi vuonna 1,1 prosenttia. Kasvua hidastaa eniten yksityisen kulutuksen kasvun hidastuminen. Toisaalta vienti kasvaa tänä vuonna hieman ennakoitua nopeammin, neljä prosenttia, ja ensi vuonnakin vielä kaksi prosenttia. Tuotannollisten investointien kasvu jatkuu maltillisena, mutta rakentamisen vähentyminen kääntää yksityiset investoinnit kokonaisuutena pieneen laskuun ensi vuonna. Hallituksen vuoteen 2023 mennessä tavoittelemien 75 prosentin työllisyysasteen ja julkisen talouden tasapainon toteutumista on vaikea arvioida, koska nämä tavoitteet on määritelty rakenteellisina ja niiden eri arviointimenetelmät saattavat tuottaa hyvin erilaisia tuloksia.
Suomen palkkataso oli 2015 ylempää eurooppalaista keskitasoa. Suomen suhteellinen asema ei ole juurikaan muuttunut 2010-luvun alun tilanteesta. Hintatason huomioiminen kuitenkin heikentää asemaamme palkkavertailussa. Palkkaerot meillä olivat vertailumaiden pienimpiä ja pysyivät melko samalla tasolla koko tarkastelujakson 2007–2015 ajan. EU-maissa havaittiin erisuuntaista kehitystä palkkaeroissa. Suurin osa palkkojen kokonaisvaihteluista selittyi taustaryhmien sisäisillä palkkaeroilla.
Suomessa toteutettiin vuonna 2005 laaja eläkeuudistus, jossa vanhuuseläkkeen alaikärajaa laskettiin. Tutkimuksessa havaitaan, että ikärajan lasku aikaisti eläkkeelle jäämistä. Kun alaraja laskettiin 65:stä 63:een, myös yleinen eläköitymisikä laski. Taloudellisten kannustimien muutosten vaikutukset eläköitymiseen jäivät paljon heikommiksi alaikärajan muuttamiseen verrattuna. Eläköitymisikään voidaan siis vaikuttaa tehokkaasti ja vähäisin kustannuksin lakisääteistä eläkeikää muuttamalla.
Talous & Yhteiskunta -lehden numeron 2/2019 artikkelit ja haastattelu kertovat tutkimuksista, joita on tehty Suomen Akatemian strategisen tutkimuksen neuvoston hankkeessa "Osaavat työntekijät - menestyvät työmarkkinat". Keskeinen kysymys on, miten sopeudutaan teknologisen kehityksen mukanaan tuomaan työn murrokseen.
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The Labour Institute for Economic Research has lowered its forecast of Finland’s economic growth for the current year from last autumn’s 2.4 per cent to 1.4 per cent. Uncertainty in the international economic outlook will slow Finland’s economic growth, particularly this year. If the worst threats do not materialise, growth will pick up slightly next year to 1.5 per cent. Export growth, which came to a halt last year, will recover and growth in private consumption growth will also provide support to economic growth. In general, Finland has adjusted well to occupational restructuring, but it may be difficult to find means to employ older workers who only have basic education.
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Tämä PT Policy Brief tuo esiin havaintoja Suomen tuloerojen kehityksestä 1990-luvun puolivälin jälkeen. Tällä ajanjaksolla tuloerot ovat kasvaneet. Aluksi kasvu oli hyvin nopeaa, kunnes kehitys tasaantui finanssikriisin myötä. Tämä näkyy tarkasteltaessa kehitystä viiden vuoden ajalta lasketuissa keskituloissa. Taloudessa on tuloliikkuvuutta, ts. tulot vaihtelevat vuodesta toiseen. Havaitsemme, että liikkuvuus tuloportaikossa on vähentynyt. Samalla kun tuloerot ovat kääntyneet kasvuun, on tuloverotuksen progressiivisuus alentunut. Valtion tuloveron alennusten ohella tähän on erityisesti tulojakauman huipulla vaikuttanut pääomatulojen voimakas kasvu.
Julkisen budjetin sopeuttamistoimia toteutetaan usein etuuksien indeksileikkauksina tai tuloverojen korotuksina. Näillä toimenpiteillä on tulonjako- ja työllisyysvaikutuksia. Tämä PT Policy Brief esittää SISU-mallilla lasketut vaikutukset käytettävissä oleviin tuloihin tuloluokittain, jos valtion tuloveroasteikkoa korotettaisiin 0,4 prosenttiyksiköllä tai jos kansaneläkeindeksiä leikattaisiin. Molemmissa toimenpiteissä budjetti vahvistuisi 180 miljoonalla eurolla mutta tulonjakovaikutukset ovat huomattavan erilaiset. Oheisen kuvion mukaisesti indeksileikkaukset kohdistuvat voimakkaasti alempiin tulonsaajakymmenyksiin, kun taas tuloveron korotukset kohdistuvat ylempiin kymmenyksiin. Kun huomioidaan muutosten aiheuttamat työllisyysvaikutukset, kokonaiskuva muuttuu vain hieman.
Makeisvero otettiin käyttöön makeisille ja jäätelölle vuoden 2011 alusta. Virallinen perustelu oli kerätä verotuloja, mutta poliittisessa keskustelussa selvä tavoite oli ohjata kulutusta terveellisempään suuntaan. Makeisvero nosti selvästi makeisten kuluttajahintoja, mutta se ei vaikuttanut makeisten kysyntään. Toisaalta vuonna 2014 virvoitusjuomavero nousi sokerillisille juomille, mutta sokerittomat juomat jäivät alemmalle verotasolle. Tämä muutos alensi sokerillisten juomien kulutusta ja ohjasi kulutusta sokerittomiin juomiin. Onnistunut terveellisiin tuotteisiin ohjailu näyttääkin vaativan riittävän läheisen terveellisempien tuotteiden ryhmän olemassaolon.
Talous & Yhteiskunta-lehden "Suuren vaalinumeron" 1/2019 jutut käsittelevät aiheita, jotka voivat nousta esille kevään vaalikeskusteluissa. Pääpaino on ilmastonmuutoksessa: haastateltavana on Maailman ilmatieteen järjestön pääsihteeri Petteri Taalas, ja kahdessa eri artikkelissa pohditaan metsien hiilinielujen ja yhdyskuntarakenteen merkitystä pyrittäessä hillitsemään ilmaston lämpenemistä. Muut artikkelit käsittelevät tuloerojen kasvua, sotea, eläkkeiden riittävyyttä, maahanmuuttajien työllistymistä, EMUn uudistamista, eurooppalaista palkkavertailua ja kestävyysvajeen sopimattomuutta talouspolitiikan suunnitteluun.
Raportissa tehdään laskelmia korkeakouluopiskelijoille suunnatun opintotuen tulorajojen muutosten vaikutuksista. Opintotuen tulorajojen tavoite on, että suurituloisille opiskelijoille ei makseta opintotukea. Samalla nykyiset tulorajat kuitenkin estävät opiskelijoita tienaamasta niin paljon kuin he haluaisivat. Laskelmissa hyödynnetään simulaatiomallia, jonka avulla voidaan arvioida miten opiskelijoiden tulojakauma muuttuisi eri vaihtoehtoisissa opintotuen tulorajojen muutoksissa. Tulosten mukaan nykyisiä tulorajaoja voisi nostaa esimerkiksi 50 prosentilla, jolloin yhdeksän kuukauden ajan opintotukea nostavan opiskelijan vuosituloraja olisi 18 000 euroa nykyisen noin 12 000 euron sijaan. Laskelmien mukaan tällöin päästäisiin opintotuen nykyisten tulorajojen haitallisista tulovaikutuksista laajasti ottaen eroon, koska vain harva opiskelija tienaisi tätä tulorajaa enempää. Ottaen huomioon verotulot ja tulonsiirrot tämä vaihtoehto lisäisi julkisyhteisöjen nettotuloja arviolta 5,9 miljoonaa euroa vuodessa.
Tässä tutkimuksessa tutkitaan diskreettien valintajoukkojen vaikutusta palkansaajien työn tarjonnan reagoimiseen tuloveroihin. Artikkelin empiirisessä osiossa hyödynnetään opintotuen tulorajojen aiheuttamaa tuloveroissa tapahtuvaa äkillistä nousua, ja reformia, jossa tulorajoja nostettiin. Tulosten mukaan vuoden 2008 reformi, jossa tulorajaa nostettiin 9 opintotukikuukautta nostaneille 9000 eurosta 12000 euroon, aiheutti merkittäviä muutoksia opiskelijoiden tulojakaumassa. Tulojakauma siirtyi korkeammalle tasolle lähtien noin 2000 euron tuloista. Koska opiskelijoiden verojärjestelmässä ei tapahtunut muutoksia näin alhaisella tasolla vuoden 2008 reformissa, eivät työn taloustieteen normaalit mallit pysty selittämään tätä siirtymää. Artikkelissa esitetään empiirisiä lisätuloksia, teoreettisia argumentteja ja simulaatiomalli, jotka kaikki viittaavat siihen, että tuloksen pystyy selittämään diskreettien valintajoukkojen mallilla. Lisäksi artikkelissa esitetään, että verotuksen hyvinvointitappiot voivat olla suuremmat kuin empiirisesti estimoidut, jos valintajoukot ovat diskreettejä, mutta niiden ajatellaan olevan jatkuvia.
Talous & Yhteiskunta -lehden uuteen numeroon sisältyy artikkeleita veropohjasta ja -vajeesta, liikenteen veroista, naisista tulojakauman huipulla, työllisyyden kasvusta, mikrosimulaatiomalleista ja digitalisaatiosta. Lehdessä on myös Helsingin yliopiston professori Uskali Mäen haastattelu, jossa käsitellään tieteenfilosofista näkökulmaa taloustieteeseen.
Tutkimuksessa rakennettiin uusia makrotaloudellisia malleja PT:n ennustetyötä varten. Malleilla tehtiin ennusteita vuosille 2017 ja 2018. Mallien BKT-ennuste vuodelle 2017 on 3,1 prosenttia (vrt. toteutunut 2,8 prosenttia) ja vuodelle 2018 1,8 prosenttia (vrt. PT:n 11.9 ennuste 2,7 prosenttia).
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Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
The Antyodaya Saral Haryana Portal is a pioneering initiative by the Government of Haryana aimed at providing citizens with seamless access to a wide range of government services
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Contributi dei parlamentari del PD - Contributi L. 3/2019Partito democratico
DI SEGUITO SONO PUBBLICATI, AI SENSI DELL'ART. 11 DELLA LEGGE N. 3/2019, GLI IMPORTI RICEVUTI DALL'ENTRATA IN VIGORE DELLA SUDDETTA NORMA (31/01/2019) E FINO AL MESE SOLARE ANTECEDENTE QUELLO DELLA PUBBLICAZIONE SUL PRESENTE SITO
Food safety, prepare for the unexpected - So what can be done in order to be ready to address food safety, food Consumers, food producers and manufacturers, food transporters, food businesses, food retailers can ...
Combined Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) Vessel List.Christina Parmionova
The best available, up-to-date information on all fishing and related vessels that appear on the illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing vessel lists published by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) and related organisations. The aim of the site is to improve the effectiveness of the original IUU lists as a tool for a wide variety of stakeholders to better understand and combat illegal fishing and broader fisheries crime.
To date, the following regional organisations maintain or share lists of vessels that have been found to carry out or support IUU fishing within their own or adjacent convention areas and/or species of competence:
Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT)
General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM)
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC)
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT)
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC)
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO)
North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC)
North Pacific Fisheries Commission (NPFC)
South East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (SEAFO)
South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO)
Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA)
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC)
The Combined IUU Fishing Vessel List merges all these sources into one list that provides a single reference point to identify whether a vessel is currently IUU listed. Vessels that have been IUU listed in the past and subsequently delisted (for example because of a change in ownership, or because the vessel is no longer in service) are also retained on the site, so that the site contains a full historic record of IUU listed fishing vessels.
Unlike the IUU lists published on individual RFMO websites, which may update vessel details infrequently or not at all, the Combined IUU Fishing Vessel List is kept up to date with the best available information regarding changes to vessel identity, flag state, ownership, location, and operations.
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
2. PALKANSAAJIEN TUTKIMUSLAITOS •TYÖPAPEREITA
LABOUR INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH • DISCUSSION PAPERS
* Labour Institute for Economic Research, Pitkänsillanranta 3A, FI-00530
Helsinki, Finland. Fax:+358-9-25357332. Tel.: +358-9-25357330. E-mail:
Eero.Lehto@labour.fi
Helsinki 2010
259
Electricity
prices in the
Finnish
retail market
Eero Lehto*
4. 1
TIIVISTELMÄ
Tämä tutkimus tarkastelee hinnoittelua Suomen sähkön vähittäismarkkinoilla. Tutkimuksessa analy-
soidaan sitä, miten omistusmuoto vaikuttaa sähköenergian listahintoihin. Myös sähkön hankintakus-
tannusten vaikutusta näihin hintoihin arvioidaan. Tutkimuksessa perustellaan myös sitä, miksi shako-
yhtiöiden käyttäytyminen voi osaltaan selittää asiakkaiden suhteellisen vähäistä halua vaihtaa sähkön
toimittajaa. Tilastollinen analyysi perustuu sähköyhtiökohtaiseen aineistoon vuosilta 1997 – 2006.
ABSTRACT
This study focuses, firstly, on the pricing of electricity in the Finnish retail market. In particular, the
impact of the ownership structure on prices is tested empirically. Secondly, the influence of low-cost
electricity sources on retail prices is considered. The question about whether the average fuel costs
rather than the wholesale price determines the retail prices is thus addressed. The supply side
behaviour characterized may explain the passivity of client activity in the seemingly competitive
Finnish market.
Keywords: retail electricity prices, ownership structure, average cost pricing
JEL classification: L16, L21, L31
1. INTRODUCTION
Deregulation in the Finnish market started in 1995. In 1998 the electricity market was opened to
competition with regard to consumers and other small customers. The required unbundling of
distribution, generation and electricity sales enabled transparency in pricing and in this way promoted
competition. According to the assessment of the European Commission, Finland belongs to the group
of countries in which the level of competition is complete.1
Compared with other countries with a
liberalised electricity retail market, however, client activity is low in Finland, as has been noticed by
Perrels and Kemppi (2003) and Littlechild (2006). It is possible that the supply side behaviour and,
especially, Finnish retailers’ pricing strategy offer an explanation to the mystery of lame client
activity.
1
See European Commission (2004). The other countries in that group are UK, Sweden, Norway and Denmark.
5. 2
The mixed ownership of Finnish retailing companies – local private, municipal and purely investor-
based – leads to the variety in motives which, for its part, is reflected in prices. On the other hand, the
different types of forms of ownership may lead to other behavioural differences, for example, with
respect to efficiency, which may also influence firms’ ability to compete for customers. Vertical
integration between generation and sales activity is also typical of the Finnish electricity retail market.
This constitutes another factor which may influence pricing behaviour and retailers’ abilities to
compete. In all, there are good reasons for hypothesing that not only the customer characteristics but
also the heterogeneity among retailers explain client behaviour.
Previous research has not explored the supply side behaviour in the electricity retail market in
adequate depth. In the literature, rather few studies have, for example, investigated how ownership
affects prices in the electricity retail markets. In the United States the price regulation of retail electric
providers - which has treated the large investor-owned utilities even differently from smaller electric
co-operatives or municipal utilities - has obscured the comparison of price-performance between
different types of ownership. Furthermore, the fact that in the USA the locally owned utilities tend to
be small and rural compared with large-size urban and investor-owned utilities makes it more difficult
to analyse the impact of the form of ownership on retail prices. Anyway, Petersen (2006) discovered
that the rates charged to residential customers in the Rocky Mountains and the southwestern United
States do not differ by the type of utility. Hollas et al. (1994) focused on the pricing in the Tennessee
Valley of the two not-for-profit forms of utility: the municipal and the co-operative. According to
them the co-operatives tend to set their prices in a more profit-oriented manner than municipalities do.
The other evidence from the United States is more anecdotal. The role of large-scale operation is
recognized and so, for example, the EIA (Energy Information Administration) (2007) believes that the
investor-owned electric utilities set the lowest prices owing to economies of scale.
The electricity retail market in the Nordic countries would be much more suitable for the analysis,
which concerns the role of ownership, than the U.S. market. Firstly, the markets in Denmark,
Finland, Norway and Sweden were opened up to competition in electricity generation and retailing in
the years 1991 – 2000 (see Amundsen and Bergman, 2007) and so those countries have not been
subject to any regulatory controls on prices or other contract terms (see Littlechild, 2006). Despite the
fact that the vertical integration of retailing, generation and distribution is common, accounting and
management are more or less separated in these activities for regulatory needs, and also have the
purpose to enable the required transparency for competition. Apart from that, in addition to the
increased role of investor-owned companies, various types of local ownership still play an important
role in the Nordic electricity retail market. The utilities may also have their own power plants or they
may own shares in hydroelectric or other types of power-production in other firms.
Against this background one would have imagined that the relevance of the ownership structure
would have been investigated in an analysis that considers pricing in the Nordic electricity retail
6. 3
market. But even in these markets the role of ownership is mostly considered as being rather
insignificant. For example, in the Norwegian markets where most retailers operate only in their own
regions there are a number of small companies that are committed to serving their local clients at
reasonable prices. Von der Fehr and Hansen (2008), however, consider the influence of low pricing -
obliged by local government owners - as limited and unimportant for the whole market. So it is rather
commonly believed that most regional retailers charge prices at around a competitive level which is
more or less determined to be the wholesale electricity price. This conclusion, though, remains vague,
insofar as any statistically significant evidence is provided that would indicate the irrelevance of not-
for-profit pricing behaviour. In the Finnish market the relevance of not-for-profit pricing is important,
as will be shown in this study. However, Littlechild (2006) states that in the Finnish market municipal
ownership reduces retailers’ ability and incentive to compete for customers.
It also seems that in the Scandinavian market both vertical integration and local ownership may affect
both pricing and so also customer activity (to switch the operator or to renegotiate the contract) in the
retail market. Defeuilley (2009) has introduced a new and well-founded approach to interpret
customer mobility in the electricity retail market. This analysis could be supplemented by considering
the supply side behaviour too. It is obvious that pricing which relies on low-cost electricity sources or
which is even targeted to benefit the local customers may freeze customer mobility and give a natural
explanation to unexplained differences in customer activity between various countries where
competition in the electricity market is free.
Amundsen and Bergman (2007) have considered the electricity retail markets in Sweden and Norway
and regard vertical integration as a competitive advantage with reference to the situation in Sweden.
According to them, all retailers suffer from volatile demand and wholesale prices. The lack of an
efficient market against the price and quantity risks makes the situation difficult, but integrated
retailers can control these risks by their own electricity generation and, in this way, obtain a
competitive advantage with respect to the other retailers. It is possible that this obvious cost
advantage stems from a lack of hedging against price risks, as Amundsen and Bergman (2007) put it.
But even if a hedging mechanism is available, it is costly. Furthermore, hedging costs seem to
decrease in a firm’s size (see Haushalter, 2000), and for that reason the appearance of a hedging
facility in the electricity retail market would fail to solve the financial problems of smaller and
independent entrants whose activity was supposed to enliven a lame competition situation.
It is also noteworthy that small clients in the electricity retailer market are more risk averse than the
retailers, and so retailers may obtain extra benefits when removing the price risk faced by their
customers at their own expense. This even emphasizes the competitive advantage of those retailers
who are able to bear or eliminate price risks. As a consequence, the competitiveness of such retailers
– which do not have their own generation – is further attenuated.
7. 4
Empirical findings hint that incumbents that have their own production follow average cost pricing
and decide upon a standard variable tariffs contract which flattens the impact of highly volatile
wholesale prices on the client prices. This concerns at least the Nordic market – as noticed by
Littlechild (2006). According to Zarnikau et al. (2007) and Kang and Zarnikau (2009) in Texas the
average cost tend to reflect average fuel costs in the areas where competition was not allowed. In the
areas open to competition the retail prices, contrastingly, started to follow the price of gas which is the
marginal fuel used for generation.
Whereas a decent statistical analysis of the ownership’s impacts on pricing in the retail electricity
market is practically lacking, studies which consider the ownership’s impact on productivity in the
respective market (including distribution) exist. Hjalmarsson and Veiderpass (1992) obtained a result
according to which different types of ownership had no response on efficiency. But later Kumbhakar
and Hjalmarsson (1998) - again using the Swedish data – found that privately owned companies were
relatively more efficient than municipal companies or utilities. Berry (1994) analysed productivity in
the U.S. retail electrical market and obtained a result which suggests that the rural co-operative sector
is less efficient than the investor-owned sector. These results are not surprising and they make one
believe that investor-owned retailers, possibly being more efficient than others, are not vulnerable to
the possible tendency of locally owned retailers to keep prices at a low level.
This study addresses pricing in Finland’s electricity retail market. The impact of the ownership
structure on prices is empirically tested. The influence of the vertical integration of sales activities and
generation (and other low-cost electricity provision) on prices is also explored. This study contributes
to previous research by analysing retail pricing in the firm level data, which makes it possible to
control the firm characteristics. By means of investigation of the impact of ownership changes, the
panel form of the data set also allows us to control for selection bias due to unobservables.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the Finnish retail electricity market theory in
more detail and introduce a central hypothesis to be tested. Section 3 contains a description of our
data. Section 4 reports our results and the last section concludes.
8. 5
2. THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE ELECTRICITY RETAIL MARKET
AND THE HYPOTHESIS TO BE TESTED
2.1. The characteristics of the Finnish retail market
Electricity sales in the Finnish retail market are no longer subject to licensing. The regionally
exclusive right to sell electricity has been removed from electricity retailers. Anyone can become an
electricity retailer. In each area the incumbent distributor (Distribution System Operator, DSO) is,
however, obliged to sell electricity at a reasonable price to customers and to other small clients
(obligation-to-deliver clients, OD-clients). These prices shall be publicly available and shall not
discriminate within each group of clients. The purpose of this institution was to safeguard the interests
of small electricity users. In practice, the Energy Market Authority has not regulated these prices,
called public list prices (or obligation-to-deliver prices).
The Electricity Market Act (EMA) was introduced in Finland in 1995. From the beginning the EMA
presumed that distribution, generation and electricity sales were separated from each other. This
meant that a separate income statement and, in capital-intensive operations, a separate balance sheet,
had to be prepared for each of these operations for each financial period. In the municipally owned
utilities, the electricity business had to be separated from the municipality’s economy. Since 2004 the
EMA has been changed so that only the separation of distribution from the rest of the activities was
required. Later, from the beginning of 2007, the legal separation of distribution was applied to about
the six largest grid operators (see e.g. Littlechild, 2006). Implementing this amendment made the
largest operators restructure their organisation.
For example in the year 2001, the regional distributors and other retailers sold about 53 per cent of all
net consumption in Finland. According to the survey made by the Finnish Electricity Association in
2003, almost 80 per cent of household customers and two thirds of clients of DSOs have remained
totally inactive.2
Only 5 per cent of household clients have gone so far that they had switched the
operator by 2003. The remaining 15 per cent have renegotiated their contract with an incumbent. It
also noteworthy that active clients (including firms) are, on the average, larger than passive clients.
So, in terms of the electricity purchased, the share of active clients is almost 60 per cent. In the retail
market the electricity to OD-clients (the passive clients) is sold in the form of variable price contracts.
In these contracts the supplier may adjust the contract price when he finds that it is appropriate,
following changes in supply costs (see Olsen et al., 2006).
2
See The Finnish Electricity Association and Statistics Finland (2003). Later Lewis et al. (2007) have assessed
that by 2007 about 70 per cent of Finnish households still bought their electricity from obligatory supplier with
standard terms.
9. 6
In the Finnish electricity retail market the incumbents are obliged to sell electricity in their old,
traditional areas but they are also entitled to challenge the incumbent in the other areas. Most of all
the competitors are traditional incumbents. According to the survey of the Energy Market Authority
(2005), around 46 per cent of regional DSOs in 2005 did not, however, supply electricity outside their
own area. Of all the DSOs the market share of the four largest retailers has been 35-40 per cent in the
market for small and medium-sized customers. The role of non-DSO competitors, as well as their
market share, has been rather small.
In recent years the ownership structure has undergone remarkable changes in the Finnish market.
Large investor owned companies3
have acquired locally owned retailers. It is worth noticing that the
biggest acquisitions have, however, concerned large companies in rural rather than urban areas. In the
biggest cities – excluding Espoo – the DSOs are owned by the municipality. In this respect, the
situation is different from that in many other countries in which local ownership and co-operative
activity are alive only on the periphery.
In 2001 the DSOs themselves generated almost one third of all electricity - which they supplied - in
combined heat and power (CHP) plants. DSOs also have their own hydro-power, but not much. (The
exact figure is not available.) Some DSOs have also acquired equity stakes in electricity generating
companies (often hydro-power generators). DSOs are, however, very heterogeneous as regards the
structure of electricity provision, and thus many retailers acquire most of their electricity supplies in
the wholesale market.
2.2. The interaction of supply side and customer behaviour
There are good grounds to assume that in Finland the behaviour of DSOs in the retail market has also
been two-fold. For the investor-owned company which maximizes profits, the opportunity cost to
retail sales is the wholesale price, whereas for local companies - who are committed to serving the
local community - such an opportunity cost does not exist. The latter entity sets prices according to
average costs so that the margin between the retail price and the average costs covers the expenses.
Let j
AC denote the retailer j’s average electricity purchase costs. Then
(1) ∑ =
=
n
i
j
ii
j
XCAC 1
,
3
Particularly the German E.On and the Finnish Fortum and the Swedish Vattenfall have acquired local retailing
companies. Although the state owns majority in Fortum and 100 percent in Vattenfall, these companies follow
the principles of corporate governance and act as profit maximizers in the electricity retail market.
10. 7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1.2.2006 1.8.2006 1.2.2007 1.8.2007 1.2.2008 1.8.2008 1.2.2009 1.8.2009
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
List price, standard variable price contract (cents/kWh
List price, standard variable price contract (cents/kWh)
Competitive price, 2 years fixed-price contract, (cents/kWh
Wholesale price (Nordpool Elspot price for Finland), (EUR/MWh)
where iC (i = 1,…, n) is the cost of an item i (being the same for all operators) in electricity
purchases and j
iX is the respective amount for an operator j. Assume that retailer j sets her price
j
P according to j
AC . Then
(2) jjj
mACP += ,
where j
m is the price margin to cover the costs of operation and a required profit. Let kC denote the
price for purchases from the wholesale market. The profit maximizing retailer sets her retail price
then according to
(3) j
k
j
mCP += .
If the retailer, who tends to set prices according to average costs, has no alternative sources to provide
electricity than the wholesale market, the price will follow the pattern (3). So, abstracting from
differences in j
m , it is evident that pricing according to (2) actually deviates from (3), only if the
retailer has other (low-cost) sources of electricity than purchases from the wholesale market.
Figure 1. Retail prices for households in an apartment and the wholesale price for Finland.
Figure 1 indicates that competitive prices in the variable price contracts tend to closely follow the
respective list prices. But among the competitive contracts the fixed price contacts are often more
popular (see Kinnunen, 2004). The prices in the latter contract follow the wholesale price more
closely than the prices in the variable contracts. They also customarily exceed the price level in the
11. 8
variable price contracts when the wholesale price is high. Spot contracts with even closer connections
to wholesale prices have also become more general.4
The fact that prices in competitive fixed price contracts follow wholesale prices much more closely
than prices in variable price contracts indicates that pricing in the latter contracts corresponds to
average costs pricing. These figures do not yet tell whether the incumbents - who have low-cost
generation sources and other cheap sources - tend to sell the risk-averse customer stable price
contracts (although formally variable price) in a profit-maximizing manner or whether the target is
really to transfer the rents obtained to local clients in the form of low and stable prices. Johnsen and
Olsen’s recent study (2008) shows that retail prices for households develop very smoothly in Finland.
Volatility is much greater in other Nordic countries.5 The low level of list prices compared with spot
prices makes the authors conclude that suppliers have sold electricity with considerable losses.
The wholesale price (in Figure 1) is Finland’s “area price” in the integrated Nordic wholesale
market.6 It is closely related to the so-called “system price”, which is determined for each hour by the
intersection of the aggregate supply and demand curves representing all bids and offers for the entire
Nordic region. In the integrated system, plants with lower costs (to produce electricity) are started up
first so that the last plant to start up with the most expensive variable costs determines the “system
price” 7. From these definitions it follows that typically kC > j
AC . Typically, the marginal costs of
coal condensing fix the system price. Its volatility is, however, largely caused by fluctuations in
demand and variations in water reservoirs in Norway and Sweden.
The sharp variations in the wholesale price also affect competition between non-profit DSOs and their
competitors. When the wholesale price rises, those competitors - who offer fixed-price contracts -
improve their situation with respect to incumbent DSOs, as a rule. This derives from the fact that the
wholesale price often decreases with heavy rains in Sweden and Norway. The average electricity
procurement costs of many urban DSOs – to whom a district heat CHP is an important source of
electricity – do not, however, necessarily decrease. But in dry seasons and during high demand the
situation is reversed: the competition situation of urban DSOs, especially, improves.
4
This indicates that in the Finnish market the space for profitable market entry has remained narrow unlike in
the UK where high incumbent prices have created a lucrative business prospects for new non-incumbent
suppliers (see Giulietti et al., 2010).
5
This also appears in the report of Nordic Energy Regulators (2006).
6
In the Nordic market area prices may, however, differ from each other. So, for example, the price for Finland
can deviate from other prices owing to congestions (see, Nordic Energy Regulators, 2006). The price mechanism
in the Nordic wholesale market is also considered by Perrels and Kemppi (2003).
7
The respective mechanism in England is described, for example, in Green (1994).
12. 9
The price mechanism in the retail market also has its own impact on customer behaviour. Let us
explore customer behaviour more closely. Assume for the sake of simplicity that customers live only
two periods (t and t+1). A utility D
tu is supposed to accrue to the customer of a local DSO which sets
the retail price according to the average costs. Respectively, a utility C
tu is obtained in a customer
relationship with a competitor who sets prices according to the wholesale price. eD
tu ,
1+ and eC
tu ,
1+ are the
respective expected utilities in period t+1, and θ denotes the switching costs. A parameter θ is simply
assumed to be fixed, although it evidently varies a lot from one client to another, and not only on
strict economic grounds as suggested by Defeuilley (2009).8
Let us first consider a situation in which a client is originally attached to a local DSO. The client’s
pay-off is
(4) D
tu + δ eD
tu ,
1+ ,
when she does not switch the operator. In (4) δ is a discount factor. Switching in period t to a
competitor and then back to a local DSO in period t+1 would produce an intertemporal utility
(5) C
tu - θ - δθ + δ eD
tu ,
1+ .
Switching in t to a competitor and staying with it in t+1 yields
(6) C
tu - θ + δ eC
tu ,
1+ .
Finally staying with a local DSO in t and switching to a competitor in t+1 gives a utility
(7) D
tu - δθ + δ eC
tu ,
1+ .
Let us consider more closely the terms under which it pays to switch in period t. Suppose that
(8)
eD
tu ,
1+ >
eC
tu ,
1+ + θ.
Then policy (5) is superior to policy (6) and then policy (4) is also superior to policy (7). It pays to
switch to a competitor, if the utility in (5) is larger than the utility in (4). So, it is required that
(9)
C
tu >
D
tu + θ + δθ.
8
Von der Fehr and Hansen (2008) considered customer behaviour in the Norwegian retail market. The
contradiction between the apparent ease of switching and the actual customer stickiness becomes also evident
from their empirical study.
13. 10
This shows that when a client assesses that a DSO will be superior to a competitor in the future so that
(8) is valid, the terms of switching in the current period become very strict. If, opposed to that, the
competitor and the DSO are assessed as being equally good in the future, the client switches to
competitor in period t, if
(10)
C
tu >
D
tu + θ.
It is rather conventional to assess the terms of switching behaviour in terms of the condition (10)
which, however, suffers from myopia when eD
tu ,
1+ ≠ eC
tu ,
1+ . On the other hand, comparing (10) with (9)
shows how sensitively the current choices depend on future expectations.
In the situation in which a client is originally attached to a competitor but wishes to switch to a DSO
in t+1, because the condition (8) is valid, the client chooses a competitor in the current period, if
(11)
C
tu >
D
tu + (1-δ)θ.
It is self-evident that current choices are contingent on the original position of the client, because
switching is costly. This can be seen if one compares the condition (11) with the condition (9). The
above analysis also shows that it is rather difficult to understand customer behaviour in the
heterogeneous retail market by focusing only on switching costs.
2.3. The focus of this study and the questions to be answered
In this empirical study, price-setting in the retail market will be considered. The purpose is not only to
obtain knowledge of pricing practices but also of its possible implication on client behaviour in the
formally free electricity retail market. The data set available for this study allows one to investigate
only the determination of list prices (or obligation-to-deliver prices). These prices are, however, the
most remarkable prices in the Finnish retail market. They also have an impact on competitive prices.
The two main questions - which are to be answered in this study - are the following:
(i) Does ownership have a systematic effect on the level of electricity retail prices?
(ii) Does the retailers’ (fuel) cost structure influence its prices?
In addition, the question as to whether the retailer’s larger size – owing to the presence of scale
economies – decreases prices is also explored. All in all, this study aims to give simple, clear answers.
14. 11
3. THE DATA DESCRIPTION AND ECONOMETRIC MODELLING
3.1. The Data
This study uses the data on all the DSO retailers in the Finnish market in the years 1997 – 2006. 109
DSO retailers existed in 1997 but, owing to acquisitions and the structural consolidation of sale
activities, only 70 retailers remained in the year 2006. We have, however, constructed a panel data
which describes retailing in the original 106 distribution areas. So even if a retailer has been merged,
it continues its life in the data with the characteristics of the parent company.
The data of the list prices of electrical energy (excluding distribution component) in various customer
groups in each area is provided by the Finnish Energy Market Authority (FEMA). The data for the
years 2007 and 2008 was not available. The data is annual, but, owing to data restrictions, the retail
prices actually describe the situation in August of every year. Also, the data on turnover comes from
FEMA. Information about ownership changes and about the structure retailer’s electricity provision
has been separately gathered for this study. Information about ownership is based partly on data used
in Lehto (1994). The data is then updated, using various information sources like the electricity
companies themselves, FEMA and the Finnish Competition Authority. The data on the electricity
provision is obtained from the old statistics of the Association of Finnish Electric Utilities and by
investigating the firms’ annual and other interim reports and their internet pages.
The electricity retailers are classified as belonging to 5 different groups, which are municipally
owned, private but locally owned, investor-owned, those retailers in which investors have a
remarkable minority stake, and co-operatives. Most urban companies are still municipally owned.
Locally owned private utilities are often rural companies that are owned by local entrepreneurs,
farmers and private persons. Since the beginning of the 1990s the companies owned by outside
investors (Fortum, Vattenfall, Graninge and E.ON) have acquired locally owned companies. In some
cases they acquired only a remarkable minority stake, typically more than 30 per cent. The role of
classical co-operatives in Finland has been minor.
15. 12
Table 1 The ownership structure of DSOs in the year 1997’s distribution areas.
Year Municipal Local private Investor
owned
Investor with
minority stake
Co-operative
1997 68 20 9 3 6
1998 70 17 11 3 6
1999 67 16 14 3 6
2000 63 16 18 3 6
2001 63 15 20 3 5
2002 64 14 21 3 4
2003 60 13 21 10 2
2004 60 13 21 10 2
2005 60 13 21 10 2
2006 60 13 21 10 2
On some occasions a larger municipally owned DSO has acquired another municipally or private and
locally owned DSO. Mostly, however, the investor-owned companies have obtained other companies.
Exact information about electricity purchases and generation is not available. The dummy variables
have, however, been constructed to describe the existence of low-cost generation and low-price
purchases (based on ownership stakes). These variables tell whether a DSO has
– its own CHP (district heat generation)
– its own hydro-power (generation)
– stakes in hydro-power, (of some other hydro-power companies, especially in Northern
Finland)
– stakes in other power, (in particular of a PVO company which also has nuclear power).
Figure 2. The electricity provision, the average participation rate in the years 1997-2006.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Municipal Private local Investor-owned Investors as minority
owners
Cooperatives
Own CHP
Own hydro
Stakes of hydro
Stakes of other low price
16. 13
According to the information given in Figure 2, on the average 50 per cent of all municipal retailers
generated electricity via their own CHP plant during 1997 – 2006. One can consider one’s own CHP
as a more significant source of low-cost energy than other sources. This gives a competitive
advantage to municipally owned companies, which more often than not have their own CHP
generation. Besides municipal companies, only some investor-owned companies have their own CHP
production. One’s own hydro-power generation is more evenly distributed over various ownership
groups than one’s own CHP plant. Most of the hydro-power capacity in Finland is, however, owned
by manufacturing firms and large power companies. Some retailing firms have their own hydro-
power, but it is often small and therefore a rather meaningless source of energy. The stakes in other
hydro-power generators and other power plants entitle a retailer to buy cheap electricity which can be
economically important for the retailers. In all, low-cost electricity provision benefits electricity
retailers in various ownership groups in very different degrees.
The retailer’s size is expressed by the nominal turnover in euros. The dummy variables for three
groups of different sizes have also been constructed. The retailer is classified as being
– large, if its annual turnover exceeds 100 million euros in the year 2002;
– medium size, if its turnover exceeds 10 million euros in the year 2002;
– small, if its turnover is less than 10 million euros in the year 2002.
If the turnover varies around these limits, the criterion is the maximum value and the retailer is,
however, constantly classified as belonging to the same size group. For the utilities which were
acquired before 2002, size criteria are determined on the basis of the deflated values of the turnover
limits from the year 2002.
– Statistical analysis explains the determination of the DSOs’ (Distribution System Operators’)
– list prices (or obligation-to-deliver prices) for the following consumer groups:
– P1, household in an apartment (fuse 1x25 A, consumption 2 000 kWh/year)
– P2, household in single house (fuse 3x25 A, consumption 5 000 kWh/year)
– P3, single house with direct electric heating (fuse 3x25 A, consumption 18 000 kWh/year)
– P4, single house with partly accumulating electric heating (fuse 3x25 A, consumption
20 000 kWh/year)
– P5, Agriculture (fuse 3x35 A, consumption 10 000 kWh/year)
– P6, Agriculture, direct electric heating, fuse 3x35 A, consumption 35 000 kWh/year
– P7, Small-scale industry (consumption 150 000 kWh/year, demand 75 kW)
DSOs set list prices for the larger industry, too. But because in practice this industry buys directly
from the wholesale market, these prices are not relevant.
17. 14
3.2. The models
The determination of list prices iP (i= 1, …, 7) is first analysed by estimating the model
(12) itimiiktiijtiiit YEARSYXcP ε++Ψ+Ω+Α+= ''')log(
for retailer i with pooled regression. Above in (12) ic is constant, ijtX is the vector of j ownership
dummies, ktY is the vector of k electricity provision dummies, imS is the vector of m size indicators.
Alternatively, imS is replaced by the log of nominal turnover. YEAR describes the year dummies.
Above all, these dummies capture the impact of the general wholesale price on list prices.
In another analysis the ownership changes are analysed using the difference-in-differences (DID)
approach, which, since the work of Ashenfelter and Card (1985), has become widespread to analyse
this kind of situations. For example, within this framework, Bertrand and Zitouna (2008) have
explored the ownership changes.
Next, the ownership variables, which are needed in the DID approach, are specified. Let LO = 1, if
ownership is local (either municipal, local private or co-operative). Otherwise LO = 0. In fact, when
LO = 0, the retailing firm is either investor-owned or such a firm in which an outside investor
possesses a large minority of shares. In the data set of this study LO has changed in 19 cases from 1 to
zero. Variable LO has not changed reversely. Using LO, the following variables are then constructed:
Basic = 1, if LO = 1 in all years. Otherwise Basic = 0.
Propens = 1, the value of LO has changed in some year. Otherwise Propens = 0.
Change = 1 during that year and after it when LO changes from 1 to 0. Otherwise (i.e.
before the change and when no change occurs) Change = 0.
The constructed variables allow us to estimate the model
(13) itimiiktiitiiiiiiit YEARSYChangeopensBasiccP εµβα ++Ψ+Ω++++= ''Pr)log( .
In (13) Propens captures the possible difference between ‘the treatment and the control groups’, in
other words, between those that become subject to a change of ownership, and the rest of retailers.
Because some firms are originally (and all the time) owned by outside investors, a variable Basic has
also been added to the model to control the differences between the firms to which Propens = 0 but a
variable Basic may have different values. By controlling Propens and Basic the model identifies those
that are subject to a change of ownership, those that are locally owned all the time and finally those
that are investor-owned all the time. YEAR dummies control the time effects on list prices. After
introducing these variables the coefficient of Change then reveals the real impact of the change of
18. 15
ownership that has been considered. This procedure then eliminates the selection bias related to the
time-invariant individual characteristics of retailers in control and treatment groups.
All the regressions are estimated by OLS
4. THE RESULTS
Figures 3 and 4 describe the yearly averages for household electricity P1 in each ownership group.
These figures already indicate that the price is highest when the company is owned by investors or
when the investors have, at least, a remarkable minority of shares. Deeper econometric analysis is,
however, needed to control the effect of other influential firm-specific variables.
Figure 3. The price of electricity for households (P1) in different ownership groups.
3
3,5
4
4,5
5
5,5
6
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
All firms
Municipal
Local private
Investor owned
19. 16
Figure 4. The price of electricity for households (P1) in different ownership groups.
The annual averages of the electricity price for retailers which are grouped according to their sources
of electricity do not give a clear picture of the impact of “the low-cost” sources. Because almost all
firms have access to some low-cost source, “all firms” in Figure 5 is not necessarily a good reference.
A proper econometric analysis is undoubtedly needed.
Figure 5. The price of electricity for households (P1) for different sources to obtain electricity.
The estimation results obtained from the model (12) are reported in Tables 2 and 3 and in Table A1 in
Appendix A. Because the ownership dummies and size dummies are linearly dependent, one of these
dummies in both groups must be dropped off. The municipal ownership dummy and large size
3
3,5
4
4,5
5
5,5
6
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
All firms
Investors have a minority share
Cooperatives
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
4,5
5
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
All firms
Own CHP generation
Own hydro power
Stakes of hydro power
Stakes of other power
20. 17
dummy are omitted and so the coefficients of other dummies tell what the difference is with respect to
the omitted dummy. In Table 2, for example, the coefficient 0.051 for the ‘local private’ dummy (in
the first column) shows that in the local and privately owned retail companies the electricity for the
households in apartments is, on the average, 5 per cent more expensive than it is in the municipal
companies or utilities.
The estimations results in Tables 2 and 3 show unambiguously that in investor-owned companies and
in companies in which an outside investor has a remarkable minority stake the retail prices for
households (including heating) and for agricultural consumers are substantially higher than in the
municipal companies (which are regarded as a reference). The results are very robust and the price
difference is, at its lowest level, above 5 per cent and in many models above 10 per cent. When only
ownership indicators and year dummies are controlled, the impact of ownership variables is larger
than in those cases in which the model also includes some other regressors. The possession of one’s
own CHP power is characteristic of municipal utilities, and investor-owned companies tend to be of
large size. So it is no wonder that the inclusion of electricity acquiring and size indicator changes the
impact estimated. Despite this, coefficients for the variables “investor owned” and “investors have a
minority share” remain positive and statistically different from zero. The retail price P7 (for small
business users) also tends to be highest when the owner is an outside investor as seen in Table A1.
21. 18
Table 2. Determination of the household electricity prices, OLS.
log(P1), apartment log(P2), single house log(P3), single house, direct electric
heating
local private 0.051***
(0.011)
0.042***
(0.011)
0.041***
(0.012)
0.017*
(0.009)
0.003
(0.010)
0.001
(0.010)
0.019*
(0.010)
0.015
(0.011)
0.014
(0.011)
investor owned 0.156***
(0.010)
0.089***
(0.015)
0.055***
(0.017)
0.121***
(0.009)
0.082***
(0.013)
0.054***
(0.015)
0.141***
(0.010)
0.102***
(0.015)
0.080***
(0.016)
investors have a
minority share
0.104***
(0.016)
0.107***
(0.016)
0.097***
(0.017)
0.046***
(0.014)
0.047***
(0.014)
0.052***
(0.015)
0.076***
(0.016)
0.078***
(0.016)
0.080***
(0.016)
co-operative 0.007
(0.019)
-0.002
(0.019)
0.002
(0.019)
-0.023
(0.017)
-0.036***
(0.017)
-0.022
(0.017)
-0.072***
(0.018)
-0.076***
(0.018)
-0.066***
(0.019)
medium size -0.109***
(0.017)
-0.101***
(0.017)
-0.071***
(0.015)
-0.069***
(0.015)
-0.060***
(0.016)
-0.058***
(0.016)
Small -0.087***
(0.018)
-0.093***
(0.018)
-0.042***
(0.016)
-0.048***
(0.016)
-0.051***
(0.017)
-0.056***
(0.017)
own CHP -0.012
(0.009)
0.001
(0.008)
-0.002
(0.009)
own hydro power 0.034***
(0.008)
0.028***
(0.007)
0.023***
(0.008)
Stakes in hydro-
power
-0.015
(0.010)
-0.040***
(0.009)
-0.029***
(0.010)
stakes of other
power
-0.037***
(0.009)
-0.018**
(0.012)
-0.016*
(0.008)
constant 1.536***
(0.012)
1.630***
(0.020)
1.642***
(0.022)
1.390***
(0.010)
1.445***
(0.017)
1.452***
(0.019)
1.238***
(0.011)
1.299***
(0.019)
1.297***
(0.021)
YEAR dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2
, adjusted 0.609 0.6238 0.6357 0.539 0.552 0.564 0.661 0.664 0.669
The number of
observations
1060 1060 1060 1060 1060 1060 1060 1060 1060
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; * Significant at 10 %, ** Significant at 5 %, *** Significant at 1 %.
The retail prices under private and local ownership tend to be higher than prices in municipal
ownership only for households in an apartment (P1) and for a single electric house with partly
accumulating electric heating (P4). The fact that local retail companies in private ownership are
located in rural areas is seen in the rather low level of prices for the single house (P2) and for
agricultural users (prices P5 and P6). Co-operative ownership lowers the other prices, except P1, with
respect to municipal ownership. In Finland the number of co-operatives has, however, declined so
much that at the end of the estimation period in 2006 only two co-operatives existed.
22. 19
Table 3. Determination of heating and agricultural electricity prices, OLS.
log(P4), single house, partly
accumulating electric heating
log(P5), agriculture fuse log(P6), agriculture direct
electric heating
local private 0.026**
(0.012)
0.024*
(0.013)
0.022*
(0.013)
-0.007
(0.010)
-0.022**
(0.011)
-0.021*
(0.011)
0.011
(0.010)
0.010
(0.011)
0.008
(0.011)
investor owned 0.139***
(0.011)
0.081***
(0.017)
0.051***
(0.019)
0.100***
(0.010)
0.087***
(0.015)
0.060***
(0.016)
0.129***
(0.009)
0.082***
(0.017)
0.057***
(0.016)
investors have a
minority share
0.093***
(0.017)
0.095***
(0.017)
0.094***
(0.018)
0.047***
(0.016)
0.047***
(0.016)
0.060***
(0.017)
0.060***
(0.015)
0.062***
(0.015)
0.077***
(0.016)
co-operative -0.125***
(0.021)
-0.128***
(0.021)
-0.118***
(0.022)
-0.078***
(0.019)
-0.092***
(0.019)
-0.073***
(0.019)
-0.066***
(0.018)
-0.067***
(0.018)
-0.048***
(0.019)
medium size -0.082***
(0.019)
-0.077***
(0.019)
-0.036**
(0.017)
-0.036**
(0.017)
-0.065***
(0.017)
-0.068***
(0.016)
small -0.074***
(0.020)
-0.081***
(0.020)
-0.005
(0.018)
-0.009
(0.018)
-0.062***
(0.018)
-0.072***
(0.017)
own CHP -0.007
(0.010)
0.017*
(0.009)
0.008
(0.009)
own hydro power 0.030***
(0.009)
0.022***
(0.008)
0.013*
(0.008)
stakes of hydro
power
-0.031***
(0.011)
-0.036***
(0.010)
-0.046***
(0.010)
stakes of other
power
-0.024**
(0.010)
-0.027***
(0.008)
0.015*
(0.008)
constant 1.151***
(0.012)
1.226***
(0.021)
1.236***
(0.024)
1.323***
(0.012)
1.345***
(0.019)
1.351***
(0.022)
1.246***
(0.011)
1.306***
(0.019)
1.320***
(0.021)
YEAR dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2
, adjusted 0.744 0.748 0.753 0.582 0.588 0.596 0.679 0.684 0.691
The number of
observations
954 954 954 1060 1060 1060 954 954 954
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; * Significant at 10 %, ** Significant at 5 %, *** Significant at 1 %.
Corresponding to expectations, the low-cost sources of electricity usually have a negative impact on
prices. In many models this impact does not, however, differ from zero, and sometimes this impact is
even positive. The indicators of electricity sources may also clearly describe some other
characteristics of retailers like their preferences and pricing strategies. From this it follows that the
possession of CHP power – which is typical of municipal utilities – seems to decrease P1 mostly and
so the prices of the municipal utilities’ favourite customers. Respectively, the fact that one has one’s
own hydro-power seems to raise the prices considered, which may indicate that one’s own hydro-
power is actually a scarce and meaningless source and that the possessors of it are companies with
few alternative, meaningful sources of low-cost electricity.
The negative coefficient estimates for dummies ‘small’ and ‘medium-size’ in Tables 2, 3 and A1 are,
to some extent, surprising. One could have expected positive estimates as an indicator of the presence
23. 20
of scale economies and of its implications on prices. Negative values evidently show that the larger
retailers have achieved market power, which is also used in pricing.
Estimation results obtained from the difference-in-differences model are reported in Tables 4, 5 and in
Table A2 in the appendix. The results concerning the electricity-acquiring variables and size dummies
are similar to the results obtained in pooled regression.
Table 4. Determination of the household electricity prices, OLS.
log(P1), apartment log(P2), single house log(P3), direct electric heating
Basic -0.161***
(0.012)
-0.114***
(0,014)
-0.082***
(0.016)
-0.118***
(0.010)
-0.076***
(0.013)
-0.055***
(0.014)
-0.149***
(0.011)
-0.110***
(0.014)
-0.089***
(0.015)
Propens -0.135***
(0.018)
-0.086***
(0.019)
-0.069***
(0.020)
-0.138***
(0.015)
-0.097***
(0.017)
-0.073***
(0.017)
-0.186***
(0.017)
-0.151***
(0.018)
-0.133***
(0.019)
Change 0.081***
(0.019)
0.053***
(0.019)
0.053***
(0.019)
0.099***
(0.016)
0.074***
(0.016)
0.065***
(0.017)
0.130***
(0.018)
0.108***
(0.018)
0.104***
(0.018)
medium-size -0.098***
(0.014)
-0.086***
(0.015)
-0.082***
(0.013)
-0.068***
(0.013)
-0.064***
(0.014)
-0.052***
(0.014)
small -0.062***
(0.015)
-0.066***
(0.015)
-0.057***
(0.013)
-0.050***
(0.013)
-0.060***
(0.014)
-0.056***
(0.015)
own CHP -0.018**
(0.009)
0.001
(0.008)
-0.001
(0.009)
own hydro power 0.029***
(0.008)
0.028***
(0.007)
0.023***
(0.008)
stakes of hydro
power
-0.016
(0.010)
-0.039***
(0.009)
-0.027***
(0.010)
stakes of other
power
-0.028***
(0.009)
-0.022***
(0.008)
-0.024***
(0.009)
constant 1.707***
(0.015)
1.714***
(0.016)
1.714***
(0.017)
1.509***
(0.013)
1.534***
(0.014)
1.509***
(0.015)
1.389***
(0.015)
1.410***
(0.015)
1.390***
(0.017)
YEAR dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2
, adjusted 0.603 0.627 0.631 0.531 0.551 0.565 0.656 0.630 0.668
The number of
observations
1060 1060 1060 1060 1060 1060 1060 1060 1060
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; * Significant at 10 %, ** Significant at 5 %, *** Significant at 1 %.
Let us consider more closely, for illustrative purposes, the model in the third column of Table 4. The
value -0.082 for the coefficient of the ‘Basic’ variable tells us that the price level in the originally
locally owned companies (which is not purchased later by an investor owned company) is 8.2 per
cent lower than in the originally investor-owned companies (being the reference group). If the retailer
is originally locally owned but will, however, be later purchased by outside investors, the price level
is at first 6.9 per cent lower than in the originally investor-owned companies as is shown by the value
24. 21
-0.069 for the coefficient of ‘Propens’ variable. The fact that the price level will rise 5.3 per cent
when the ownership changes, is indicated by the value 0.053 for the coefficient of ‘Change’ variable.
The coefficient estimates for ‘Basic’, ‘Propens, and ‘Change’ variables differ from zero at the
statistically significant 1 per cent level in all the models considered.
A change of ownership that has been considered often increases prices by over ten per cent, or at the
lowest, by more than 5 per cent. The results can be considered very robust. The inclusion of various
controllers may change the point estimates, but the estimated values always remain positive and
statistically significant at a level better than one per cent.
Table 5. Determination of the household electricity prices, OLS.
log(P4), single house, partly
accumulating electric heating
log(P5), agriculture fuse log(P6), agriculture direct
electric heating
Basic -0.149***
(0.011)
-0.103***
(0.017)
-0.073***
(0.018)
-0.091***
(0.011)
-0.065***
(0.014)
-0.048***
(0.016)
-0.130***
(0.011)
-0.079***
(0.014)
-0.064***
(0.015)
Propens -0.177***
(0.021)
-0.133***
(0.023)
-0.112***
(0.024)
-0.125***
(0.017)
-0.099***
(0.019)
-0.082***
(0.020)
-0.188***
(0.017)
-0.142***
(0.019)
-0.122***
(0.020)
Change 0.131***
(0.021)
0.107***
(0.022)
0.103***
(0.022)
0.122***
(0.018)
0.106***
(0.019)
0.100***
(0.019)
0.149***
(0.018)
0.123***
(0.018)
0.114***
(0.018)
medium-size -0.068***
(0.016)
-0.052***
(0.016)
-0.051***
(0.014)
-0.034**
(0.014)
-0.070***
(0.014)
-0.055***
(0.014)
small -0.065***
(0.016)
-0.064***
(0.017)
-0.036**
(0.015)
-0.020
(0.015)
-0.073***
(0.014)
-0.067***
(0.014)
own CHP -0.009
(0.010)
0.020**
(0.009)
0.005
(0.008)
own hydro power 0.028***
(0.009)
0.025***
(0.008)
0.013*
(0.008)
stakes of hydro
power
-0.031***
(0.011)
-0.036***
(0.010)
-0.038***
(0.009)
stakes of other
power
-0.029***
(0.010)
-0.036***
(0.009)
-0.023***
(0.008)
constant 1.301***
(0.016)
1.319***
(0.017)
1.296***
(0.019)
1.410***
(0.015)
1.426***
(0.016)
1.400***
(0.017)
1.375***
(0.014)
1.394***
(0.014)
1.383***
(0.016)
YEAR dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2
, adjusted 0.733 0.738 0.743 0.574 0.579 0.592 0.676 0.685 0.692
The number of
observations
954 954 954 1060 1060 1060 954 954 954
25. 22
5. CONCLUSIONS
This study has shown that ownership has a strong impact on retail prices in the legally free Finnish
market. Local ownership which evidently makes a retailer deviate from pro-profit orientation leads to
lower prices. This also proves that the efficiency of municipal and other non-for-profit firms cannot
be very low compared with investor-owned companies. Otherwise, the heavy cost-structure would
force the prices to be set at a relatively high level. The results also show that local firms have
evidently obtained their ability to keep prices at low levels by investing in their own generation and
other low-cost sources of electricity.
To some extent the results obtained oppose the conventional thinking, according to which,
competition is the main mechanism for restricting price rises. The finding that local ownership lowers
the price level in Finland shows that self-regulation retailers can correct the defects in the competition
mechanism. This may even partly explain the passivity of clients. At least this phenomenon relieves
the adverse effects of weak competition accrued from customers’ reluctance to switch from one
retailer to another.
In popular discussion in Finland at least it is, on the other hand, argued that the observed average cost
pricing in Finland - which does not solely rely on the wholesale prices - creates welfare losses.
According to the critics, investments are not properly allocated, owing to distorting pricing. This is
also regarded as a handicap to achieve an energy-saving goal and the targets to move people to use
clean energy. To answer these questions is outside the scope of this study. But this would be an
interesting starting point for future research. As concerns the impacts of pricing strategies and
ownership structures on the incentives to invest in power plants and to react to the signals of
environmental taxes it is difficult to say anything without a proper empirical study. In this context the
behaviour of retailers could also deviate from that rationality which standard profit maximization
would suggest.
26. 23
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28. 25
APPENDIX A.
The auxiliary results
Table A1. Determination of electricity prices for small-scale
industry, log (P7), OLS.
local private -0.012
(0.013)
0.011
(0.014)
0.034**
(0.014)
investor owned 0.102***
(0.012)
0.047**
(0.018)
0.035*
(0.020)
investors have a minority
share
-0.015
(0.020)
-0.011
(0.019)
0.035*
(0.020)
co-operative -0.074**
(0.023)
-0.053**
(0.023)
-0.015
(0.022)
medium size -0.056***
(0.020)
-0.061***
(0.020)
small -0.100***
(0.021)
-0.080***
(0.021)
own CHP 0.094***
(0.011)
own hydro power 0.041***
(0.009)
stakes of hydro power -0.023*
(0.012)
stakes of other power -0.041***
(0.010)
constant 1.298***
(0.014)
1.368***
(0.024)
1.317***
(0.026)
YEAR dummies Yes Yes Yes
R2
, adjusted 0.567 0.578 0.608
The number of
observations
1058 1058 1058
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; * Significant at 10 %,
** Significant at 5 %, *** Significant at 1 %.
29. 26
Table A2. Determination of electricity prices for small-scale
industry, log (P7), OLS.
Basic -0.086***
(0.014)
-0.012
(0.017)
-0.021
(0.018)
Propens -0.149***
(0.021)
-0.093***
(0.023)
-0.102***
(0.023)
Change 0.126***
(0.022)
0.090***
(0.022)
0.093***
(0.022)
medium-size -0.083***
(0.017)
-0.062***
(0.017)
small -0.134***
(0.018)
-0.084***
(0.018)
own CHP 0.086***
(0.011)
own hydro power 0.040***
(0.009)
stakes of hydro power -0.014
(0.012)
stakes of other power -0.054***
(0.010)
constant 1.379***
(0.018)
1.411***
(0.019)
1.359***
(0.020)
YEAR dummies Yes Yes Yes
R2
, adjusted 0.556 0.582 0.614
The number of observations 1058 1058 1058
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; * Significant at 10 %,
** Significant at 5 %, *** Significant at 1 %.